BEF 1914. Marksmanship, Musketry and the Mad Minute

[dansparky]

I agree, It is a very good analysis (and prediction). He also makes a very valuable point about the continental armies. One of the reasons why the French Army performed much better at the Marne than earlier in August 1914, was that in many cases the reservists who replaced the regular casualties were more experienced.

Steve

That is the interesting question when we are thinking about performance. Lack of training an acquaintance with weaponary and the like, could be negated by experience in terms of performance.

[dansparky]

Martin very interesting post. Where did that quote come from. It shows that in all likelihood conscription would have to come into force at some point, as it was so unlikely they could not sustain their numbers. This was obviously politically sensitive. I suppose there are benefits with introducing a voluntary force first (they want to be there). However, they would have had more time to prepare and train the men had they done so earlier. What's more if you subscribe completely to the Armies distrust of these new forces (in terms of initiative and ability), a higher degree of training could have led to a more successful implementation of these forces.

[Muerrisch]

Dan, best if you PM me.

Martin, my info. re. the continuation training for Section B was solely from my Hansard 1909 quotation. Other than the 3 year men [who were comparatively well provided for in theory], B reservists could opt for a single day at a range, or a week with the SR, just the once in their 5 years commitment.

The logistics and administration, are, as you suggest, formidable. I have never found an AO or a WOI [predates ACI] which says "this year's arrangements are as follows ............

Not only must the man be summoned, provided with documentation and a relevant Warrant and Subsistence, but the receiver unit [was it his own, or the nearest?] would need authority to expend time, effort and ammunition. I have never had a sniff of the nitty gritty and wonder if [like "annual" exercises] the training was more honoured in the breach than the observance.

Frank Richards [Old Soldier Sahib] on Reserve Pay:

......... Every Quarter-Day ,or Pension-Day as it was called, a number of us reservists and service-pension-wallahs would have a day off from work to spend it together in the Castle Hotel [ed: Blaina].

Ed: over 90 days at 6d per day reserve pay translates into a formidable 180 pints of good beer.

I have to assume that the Post Office, using a Postal Order sent to last official address, would be the pay arrangement, there was little else for the majority of reservists.

[Guest]

Martin very interesting post. Where did that quote come from. It shows that in all likelihood conscription would have to come into force at some point, as it was so unlikely they could not sustain their numbers. This was obviously politically sensitive. I suppose there are benefits with introducing a voluntary force first (they want to be there). However, they would have had more time to prepare and train the men had they done so earlier. What's more if you subscribe completely to the Armies distrust of these new forces (in terms of initiative and ability), a higher degree of training could have led to a more successful implementation of these forces.

Hansard; Historical records of the House of Commons debates and House of Lords. They have been transcribed and are online. Just google Hansard.

One might consider that UK policy was quite confused after the Boer War. About two thirds of the Army was overseas and the WO had made a commitment to put 6 Infantry Divisions and one Cavalry Division into an Expeditionary Force. In a scenario of a continental war where the Armies were significantly larger, it was acknowledged that the UK would have to expand. The Haldane reforms restructured the Volunteers into the TF and the Militia into the Special Reserve. If expansion for war was required, Plan A was to expand the Army on the back of the TF, however the flaw in the plan was that the TF had no overseas obligation and were ostensibly for Home Defence...only six units had signed the Imperial Service Obligation of which only four were infantry pre-war. It was all a bit of a shambles. Regardless, Kitchener shelved the idea immediately.

Spencer Jones (From Boer War to World War) and Bowman & Connelly (The Edwardian Army) are probably the best sources for decent published works on the inter-war years and the massive overhaul of doctrine.

As you can see, one didn't need to be a genius to work out that the numbers were not gong to add up. Kitchener and many other understood this and is why the 'all over by Christmas' was not a view held by the WO. We are beginning to drift away from the core thematic of this thread which is to examine Marksmanship, Musketry and the Mad Minute. I think it is important to remember that the UK's Reserves were far from uniform and while there were tens of thousands who were recently trained and adept soldiers with the SMLE, there were simply not enough. at the other end of the scale were men who may have been familiar with the SMLE but simply had only a few days training with it and no tactical training for years.

I would also stress that it was not simply a case of being able to shoot straight. The Musketry regulations put huge emphasis on the doctrine that musketry and tactics were inseparable. This raises yet more questions as to how a Reservists with his one day training every two years managed to keep abreast of the revolution in infantry tactics.

The BEFs infantry was 60% reservists. 3 and 9 men were roughly a quarter of these meaning one in four Army Reservists had left the colours before many of the radical changes in musketry. One only has to look at the differences between the 1905 and 1909 Musketry Regulations' Table B to get a feel of the magnitude of the change.

90% of the Regulars and Reservists that landed in August were casualties by the end of First Ypres barely four months after landing: casualty rates more than double expectations with no fall-back plan. One might consider who replaced those trained men. The hard facts are that even older men were dragged in (re-enlistments) and young Kitchener recruits with barely 3 months' training were accelerated through training and used to plug the gaps along with the TF (Long Lee Enfields) and the Indian Army and of course the highly trained Cavalry.

MG

[dansparky]

Yes Spencer is my supervisor as it were. The all over by Christmas comment was actually said be very few, very few believed it. I know Wilhelm 2nd said some along the lines that we would be over before the leaves fall.

That is an interesting point, despite experience under fire and any ability too shot. Fire and movement tatics etc had very much evolved, with so little Training it is a wonder a big catastrophe was adverted. However, at the same time elements of there oponents made tactical errors from lack of training.

It still seems to me an acceptance of the situation earlier would definatley have given us valuable time to train these men we would need. I also still very suprised so little German tactical doctorine was discussed during training. I know that a colonial police force could be required anywhere, but at the same time little attention was paid despite the growing posibilty of war. And so many figures suggest that war would come (much of it may be due to being wise after the event).

[Guest]

That is an interesting point, despite experience under fire and any ability too shot. Fire and movement tatics etc had very much evolved, with so little Training it is a wonder a big catastrophe was adverted. However, at the same time elements of there oponents made tactical errors from lack of training.

It still seems to me an acceptance of the situation earlier would definatley have given us valuable time to train these men we would need. I also still very suprised so little German tactical doctorine was discussed during training. I know that a colonial police force could be required anywhere, but at the same time little attention was paid despite the growing posibilty of war. And so many figures suggest that war would come (much of it may be due to being wise after the event).

There was a catastrophe. The original BEF's infantry suffered 90% casualties. 30% of them would eventually die during the War and the majority of these would die within 12 months of landing - arguably the highest casualty ratios of the whole war of any cohort of the British Army. The BEF of Aug 1914 had the lowest survival rates of any British soldiers during the whole war.

The OH had to explain this inconvenient truth. It put a great emphasis on the asymmetry in the size of the opposing forces; points that have been debated ever since. According to the OH the offset for the outnumbered British Army was its superior training. Integral to this claim was its alleged superior musketry. The opening chapter of the OH France and Belgium Vol I claims that the BEF was the best trained Army that ever left the shores of Britain. The 'mad minute' became a central metaphor for the hero-romantic school of military history and the British Army's 'success' in 1914.

My personal belief is that it was a lot more complex. MG

[dansparky]

That is true but in the sense that the BEF still retained a fighting capacity and was not wiped out in those first few weeks. I definitely share your belief that it is very much more complicated matter. There is till much argument as to a great disparity existing between the forces or relative equilibrium at point of contact. Themes such as the Mad minute and best trained Army argument are quite possibly over romanticised. If the forces were equal then there is little positives to take out of the retreat. If these forces were roughly equal then it starts to suggest snow had a point that it was a 'badly bungled affair' as we came close to disaster. My aim is to establish how close his comments were to the truth of the matter.

I think that given the conflict to come, the emphasis on the advance and attacking (simplified)* in training, left the BEF having to deal with unexpected difficulties it was not prepared for. Snow states that Sir Charles Douglas forbade exercises in anything to do with retirement or retreat. He states in his memoirs that he was "determined to practice that particular manoeuvre". However, I have found little evidence of this.

*something common to all combatants.

[Guest]

Thank to the kindness of GWF colleague Bootneck here are the musketry returns fro the 1st Bn East Surrey Regt in 1913 (and 1912 by way of comparison)

Some thoughts.

1. The Bn Scores are simply averages of the Company scores. By extension FoM means 'average score' (I think) although in this instance FoM is not mentioned.The layout is fairly standard.

2. The Company Scores are very highly correlated with weighted average scores of the various classes

3. The 3rd Class seems to be a drag and might indicate that scores are dropped for every 3rd Class shot - compare A Coy and B Coy scores.

4. The Company scores only appear to include those who qualified or passed Part I

Here is a transcription of the original.... MG

Table (see below)

Total numbers classified 710 (including 224 men who fired Tables A & B this year)
Best Shooting Company - E
Best shot of Officers - Lieut. E. G. H. Clarke (Score 157)
Best shot of Sgts & L/Sgts - No. 5845 Sgt M. Hill (Score 163)
Best shot of Corpls & Ptes. No. 5196 L/Cpl C. Free (Score 162)

E Company is much to be congratulated on again being the best Shooting Company, and H Company for being such a close second.

The Commanding Officer is pleased to see that all Companies (with the exception unfortunately of B Company) have practically reached the 110 average which he alluded to in Orders a year ago as the minimum to be aimed at by all ranks of a Company.

No Company with a lower average can be considered to have reached a satisfactory standard in shooting, and he trusts Company and Platoon Commanders will bear this in mind, also that it is during the winter training the seeds are sewn of a good score in the Summer.

[Old Tom]

I have only just come to this thread which well illustrates the acquired knowledge of many members. My thoughts on this complex topic may, I hope, be helpful.

In his first post Martin posed 5 questions;1. Is there any evidence that the British Army were better shots than the French or German armies? 2. Is marksmanship something that needs constant practice,3. Is there any evidence that the Reservists were as good marksmen as the regulars when mobilised?4. Can a marksman with one rifle easily adapt to another rifle? 5. What percentage of the Regular Infantry were marksmen?

The thread has identified and examined two main factors; the effectiveness of infantry in battle and the measurement of achievement in training. I do not want to take issue with either of these, but would suggest that a further factor is the training itself, in other words, how useful was the training in preparing the soldier for battle. I have the impression that up WW2 the emphasis in training was on marksmanship. Training which exercises the soldier in movement together with engaging fleeting targets at unknown ranges is difficult to achieve. In the years from the Boer War to just before 1914 the company organisation of infantry made, I believe, a half company the smallest fire unit and would add meaning to the assessment of unit performance by statistically analysing range scores.

The German Army and General Staff 1807-1945 by Colonel Dupuy, if I recall correctly, argued that in terms of casualties inflicted the German army was superior, but as the majority of casualties were not caused by rifle fire this may not be wholly relevant but does suggest that German training was as good as and probably better than British. Not surprising, as starting with a small army and increasing its size once operations have commenced means there is a lot to catch up.

I was not an infantryman but in the days of the No 4 rifle in the 50’s did a lot of range shooting with a reasonable degree of success. I assume that the range practices prior to 1914 were very much the same. It would aid comparison with German army if we knew something of their shooting in training. I would agree with others that marksmanship requires regular practice.

Old Tom

[Guest]

I suspect the answers to the methodology of scoring might lie in one of these publications.... I can locate any via Abe books... this was taken from the front pages of The Machine-Gunner's handbook Eighth Edition WH Smith and Son 1915. MG

[Muerrisch]

I have the Gale & Polden equivalent for Table B, TF, Irish Horse and OCT.

No methodology, concentrates on individual soldier, indeed one such has used my copy for scores.

[Guest]

While on a completely different quest, I stumbled on this report by a British Officer who was an observer during the Russo-Japanse War written in 1905. It might be relevant to the British Army's inter-war doctrine.

[Guest]

Observations of Russian Infantry tactics and musketry during the Russo-Japanase War as reported in the official British Army observers' report.

[Muerrisch]

Martin, thank you. Seemingly, range determination was very much in the observer's mind.

I am no rifleman but would have thought that at ranges less than 600 yards the flat trajectory of a modern rifle implies accurate ranging not of prime importance?

[Guest]

Martin, thank you. Seemingly, range determination was very much in the observer's mind.

I am no rifleman but would have thought that at ranges less than 600 yards the flat trajectory of a modern rifle implies accurate ranging not of prime importance?

I haven't really done any thoughtful analysis.... One needs to remember that the British had observers on both sides of the War and could (later) compare notes, as well as valuable discussions with other observers from a number of other nations, some of whom (US Army) had been observers with the Boers a few years earlier. Inevitably there will be a degree of subjectivity in the author's observations

I am busily wading through volumes on the Russo-Japanese War and it is truly fascinating reading - and incidentally throwing off examples that might be relevant to this thread. All the British observers were professional Officers with Boer War experience. Their observations and analysis are surprisingly detailed, thoughtful and seemingly without bias. I was very positively surprised to say the least and it seems that the British spent a lot of time on this study. There are small chapters on the ammunition scales, rates of fire, rates of resupply of ammunition etc... and often the authors make reference to the (then) British scales/doctrine etc.

There is a massive amount of material. I am trying to see if British Army doctrine was in any way influenced by the experiences of this war.... the references seem to be quite technical with regards to range, accuracy, fire control, rates of fire, resupply etc. The British observers certainly knew what to look for and reported on these factors in some incredible detail. MG

[Muerrisch]

Thread creep, but one of my areas of interest is military mining, and you will not be surprised to learn that Russo-Jap. mining experience was similarly reported on and noted.

The military observer as an instrument of policy is a neglected subject as far as I am concerned, I have not the slightest idea if the observers were Embassy attachees, or seconded on duty to the warring sides, or private enterprise, or indeed spies in mufti. And who, if anyone, tasked them and collated/ analysed their reports?

I am thinking aloud, not necessarily a good thing.

[reese williams]

Grumpy,

Accurate range estimation is critical. The battle rifles of WWI and WWII operated at velocities in the range of 2200-2600 feet per second. While not an exact duplicate the ballistic information for currently produced .303 ammunition won't be that far off of MkVII ball. Winchester lists their 180 grain (MkVII was 174 grn) ballistics like this: For a rifle zeroed at 100 yards bullet drop at 200 yards is 5.5 inches, at 300 yards 19.3 inches and at 400 yards 44.2 inches. So if you estimated your target at 300 yards and it was actually 400 aiming at a man's chest would result in hitting him in the ankles. The trajectory is really more rainbow like than one would think.

The Lee-Enfield sniper variant of WWII (one of the better sniper rifles of WWII) was only good out to about 600 yards and at its best at around 400 yards.

Hope this is of some value.

[dansparky]

Not as many answers as i hoped in the Musketry reg, some info on third class shots : Those that fail to reach standards in two attemts wil be deemed 3 class shots- therefore will not fire in part lll, can fire in part vl if amy available. those that do not commence table b will be classifeid 3rd class shots.

[Guest]

Grumpy,

Accurate range estimation is critical. The battle rifles of WWI and WWII operated at velocities in the range of 2200-2600 feet per second. While not an exact duplicate the ballistic information for currently produced .303 ammunition won't be that far off of MkVII ball. Winchester lists their 180 grain (MkVII was 174 grn) ballistics like this: For a rifle zeroed at 100 yards bullet drop at 200 yards is 5.5 inches, at 300 yards 19.3 inches and at 400 yards 44.2 inches. So if you estimated your target at 300 yards and it was actually 400 aiming at a man's chest would result in hitting him in the ankles. The trajectory is really more rainbow like than one would think.

The Lee-Enfield sniper variant of WWII (one of the better sniper rifles of WWII) was only good out to about 600 yards and at its best at around 400 yards.

Hope this is of some value.

Judging distances was an important part of Musketry training and was also part of the annual Test. If we look at Table B Parts II and III (the instructional and classification parts that formed the scores) over two-thirds of the rounds were aimed at targets of known ranges of between 100 and 300 yards. This included the 15 aimed rounds within one minute - the Mad Minute - which was fired at 300 yards. The weighted average distance of the targets in Table B was just 327 yards. I assume the SMLEs were zeroed for 300 yards. I am not sure where the bullet would hit a target at 100 or 200 yards if sighted for 300 yards and sights were not adjusted accordingly. I am guessing that at 200 yards the MPI would be about a foot too high....

Interestingly the most common musketry 'error' recorded in the war diaries was that the men shot too high, suggesting either their sights were ranged too long or they judged the distances to be further than reality. The BEF at Le Cateau and at Ypres were largely in static positions which afforded the opportunity to find ranges based on maps and by using tried and tested methods of Musketry training. It is worth remembering that range-finding was only to be done (in theory) by 1st Class Shots and Marksmen and was observed. If peace-time training was carried out in practice in war-time this might have been a critical factor for the British Army's collective musketry. If range-finding was accurate, it would have a significant impact on the effectiveness of the musketry and the resulting beaten-zones. The advantage being with the defender in static positions firing at targets of known ranges, particularly if fire control was strict.

MG

[SteveMarsdin]

Interestingly the most common musketry 'error' recorded in the war diaries was that the men shot too high,

MG

Martin,

This was a common problem for the French too in 1914; Joffre issued instructions seeking to remedy this (I haven't the reference to hand). I do have to hand a letter from General Roques (not "the" General Roques) highlighting the problem in September, ironically he was killed the next day:

Perhaps more anecdotal but those that cleared the dead and wounded from the battlefield at Bellefontaine commented on the greater number of head wounds on the fewer German casulaties, compared with a greater number of body wounds on the greater French casualties.

Steve

[Guest]

Martin,

This was a common problem for the French too in 1914; Joffre issued instructions seeking to remedy this (I haven't the reference to hand). I do have to hand a letter from General Roques (not "the" General Roques) highlighting the problem in September, ironically he was killed the next day:

Roques (450 x 600).jpg

Perhaps more anecdotal but those that cleared the dead and wounded from the battlefield at Bellefontaine commented on the greater number of head wounds on the fewer German casulaties, compared with a greater number of body wounds on the greater French casualties.

Steve

Thanks Steve. Very interesting.

I seem to recall that the British defenders at Mons felt that the Germans were shooting high as well, so perhaps this is simply a common phenomenon. Not sure if this is anything to do with the types of weapons (Bolt action?) and the nature of the recoil. It seems fairly widespread and it is interesting that the British and French were aware of it at least, suggesting it was something leaders were trained to look out for. I wonder if there is anything in Musketry Regs that alludes to this being a common problem....

MG

[Muerrisch]

Nothing obvious but para 159 notes that a fixed bayonet caused height errors as follows:

Rifle sighted for target at 600 yards ............ 4 feet high

ditto 400 3

ditto 200 1.5 feet

Unfortunately we have not much visibility of doctrine or practice regarding fixing, do we?

With advancing "grey hordes" at 600 yards would it be prudent to fix, given that a late command might be fatal? Or, preliminary to a British charge, fire would be given, very possibly again with bayonets fixed, otherwise fixing might spoil the moment.

"Bugler, sound 'Charge' ........ er ........ er, fix bayonets ........!"

[phil andrade]

Martin,

Perhaps more anecdotal but those that cleared the dead and wounded from the battlefield at Bellefontaine commented on the greater number of head wounds on the fewer German casulaties, compared with a greater number of body wounds on the greater French casualties.

Steve

Steve,

Might this reflect better use of cover by the Germans ?

Maybe at Bellefontaine the Germans were attacking as much as the French ; but I'm wondering whether the greater ratio of body wounds on the French implies that Germans were either lying down, or availing themselves of some form of cover, while Frenchmen were caught out in the open.

Phil (PJA)

[dansparky]

Martin,

This was a common problem for the French too in 1914; Joffre issued instructions seeking to remedy this (I haven't the reference to hand). I do have to hand a letter from General Roques (not "the" General Roques) highlighting the problem in September, ironically he was killed the next day:

Roques (450 x 600).jpg

Perhaps more anecdotal but those that cleared the dead and wounded from the battlefield at Bellefontaine commented on the greater number of head wounds on the fewer German casulaties, compared with a greater number of body wounds on the greater French casualties.

Steve

do you have this transcribed??

[dansparky]

Martin do you know of any source that stated your last point? That the British arcuracy may have been greater due to firing from static positions.. using tried and tested methods in trainig (firing from the map).

In addition Germans firing too high is often quoted... i will have to find my quotes on that. It is often mentioned that the Germans kept up a heavy fire, howver this was often to high to greatly trouble the troops. i have seen this on many occasions, can't recal where