BEF 1914. Marksmanship, Musketry and the Mad Minute

[Guest]

The latest edition of the Journalof the Society for Army Historical Research has an article on "The Creators of the Mad Minute: The Careers of Brig Gen N R Macmahon and Major J A Wallingford" by Nicholas A Harlow.

An interesting read for anyone interested in the history of the mad minute. MG

[JMB1943]

Martin,

An editorial in the journal Arms & Armour, Vol. 12, No. 1, Spring 2015, pp. 1-3 refers to a talk given by Dr. Matthew Ford (University of Sussex) in 2014 on the origins of the 'mad minute.' From his website, Dr. Ford is in the Dept. of Intl. Relations, and publishes frequently in the British Journal for Military History. I do not know if he has published on this topic.

Is he referenced in the article that you cite above ?

Regards,

JMB

[Steven Broomfield]

I've not yet read the article, but a skim through the references in footnotes to the article doesn't show him, so far as I can see.

[Guest]

A snippet from the 7th Div Routine Orders. One of the few pieces of hard evidence i have seen of Germans complimenting the British on their musketry.

[seaforth78]

Martin,

In your research, have you found very little first hand original accounts of this most talked about episode of 1914? Thank you for the gem.

[Guest]

Martin,

In your research, have you found very little first hand original accounts of this most talked about episode of 1914? Thank you for the gem.

Yahya

In short - there is no evidence in my view that Germans mistook British rapid fire for MGs. It is a deliberately misleading interpretation by the OH of one German account.

A few hundred posts back I put forward a view that the origins of this were misquoted snippets of the German "Ypres 1914" by Edmonds in the OH 1914. Shortly afterwards having read a bit more I became aware that a number of authors had made the same observation some time ago - in particular Jack Sheldon (see post #71), Terence Zuber nd others, some rather more forcefully, so it is nothing new.. The ispeculation that some Germans mistook British 'rapid fire' for MGs has been expanded in the propaganda of the OH and many subsequent histories to imply that all Germans mistook this for MG fire. Of greater interest is why so many authors are willing to accept this hyperbole and recycle it.

It should be no great surprise that the OH was, on occasion, rather biased in its reporting of the 1914 campaign. It appears to be heresy in some circles to make objective criticism of the BEF's performance in 1914. viz Smith-Dorrien and Le Cateau. They were of course all 'heroes' etc to the hero-romantic school of British military history. Fortunately there has been plenty of objective analysis in the past few years, however the nonsense that the BEF was the 'best trained,' etc still pervades in most popular histories. As we have seen, the original BEF was annihilated in 1914 and rapidly replaced with less able men - almost all Reservists of various types with poorer fitness and training - who were in turn destroyed. These were in turn replaced with appallingly trained TF and New Army men who were also destroyed - not only in France but in the MEF in Dardanelles as well. It would take three years for the BEF to become a supremely efficient killing machine.

The BEF's infantry in France and Flanders turned over at least three times in 1914-15 by my calculations which might suggest that despite their rapid fire training and the benefits of the SMLE, these were largely offset by shortcomings elsewhere, particularly in artillery, ammunition and leadership. One wonders what might have happened without their 'superior' musketry skills. One might also wonder if musketry skills mattered at all when artillery was by far the prime cause of battle casualties and absolutely headed the list of concerns for the BEF.

I posted the snippet as I thought it was at least tangible evidence that some Germans respected the British ability with the rifle (albeit reported speech) - as we might expect when facing the formation with the highest concentration of regulars in the whole of the BEF in the whole of the War. Note there was no confusion between rifle fire and MG fire in this example. On the flip side the British diaries are replete with complimentary remarks on the Germans abilities, so it was not one-way traffic. MG

[phil andrade]

Those of us who possess that book by Stephen Westman SURGEON WITH THE KAISER'S ARMY, might take a look at pages 61-63, describing an episode early in 1915 when the author participated in an attack against " ...a brickworks...not far from the La Bassee Canal."

This was a fight that involved the British, who repulsed the German attack and "...returned to their brick heaps."

The author emphasises the severity of the British fire, and the terrible casualties sustained by his regiment.

He describes the carnage, and alludes to the "..rifle, machine gun and artillery fire .." cutting down his comrades.

He writes of the German losses "..no fewer than nine hundred and sixty young men had been killed..."

Presumably , if he alludes here to the total casualties suffered by his regiment, those men were killed or wounded, or were posted as missing, rather than killed outright.

I suspect that this is the battle at Givenchy on January 25th 1915, but would welcome correction if appropriate.

Incidentally, on page 62 he writes " On top of the brick heaps, as high as houses, the enemy machine - gunners sat pretty, and wherever there was the slightest movement, they let rip. "

Phil (PJA)

[David Filsell]

7th Division, commanded by Capper, former Inspector of Infantry.

Interesting because by the date of that document, most of the 'old soldiers' the ranks of the division - the regulars and (probablyy) the best quality reservists deployed in October 1914 were gone along with their officers. Its quite a commendation for what were still pretty scratch battalions and the reservists who were held back from original embarkation..

[Guest]

The German Officers' comments do not necessarily only relate to the musketry in the date of their capture. They could be comments relating to an undefined period running up to that date. The comments could be read as complimentary of British musketry in general.

As discussed on this thread, fire control and other factors were just as important as musketry skills of the men pulling the triggers. MG

[Muerrisch]

for pulling read squeezing?

[Guest]

for pulling read squeezing?

Depends on how well trained they are.

[David Filsell]

Martin,

Fair comment, thanks.

David

[Muerrisch]

I expect the Engineers pulled .....................

[Guest]

I expect the Engineers pulled .....................

Given the frequency that 'shooting high' was mentioned in the contemporary accounts, I imagine more than the RE were pulling triggers. The Germans too. MG

[dansparky]

I think popular history takes the quote best trained and runs with it, conjuring a picture that the BEF was tactically far superior to everyone else.  Ultimately it was only German Artillery superiority (numbers and counter battery prowess), and German superiority in terms of 'Boots on the Ground'.      The actual quote though in the official history is about it being the best British army sent forth to war.  From this, my question is how prepared was the British Army for the first world war.  Whilst there were many failings particularly at the operational level, at the Brigade or Battalion level it had learnt an awful lot from the Boer War.  Some of these lessons were diluted by observations from the Russo-Japanese war, but ultimately many lessons from the Boer war were woven into the fabric of training prior to ww1.  The BEF moved away from Volley Fire, became more adept to crossing the fire-swept zone (although this was still a tricky problem), encompassing use of cover, advancing in stages via the rush, greater extension, using a thin firing line to pin enemy and then flanking it, greater emphasis of MG, Art fire in final firefight., improved artillery, Marksmanship skills improved and there was a move towards fostering initiative in the individual soldier etc.

 

 

[David Filsell]

Size did matter - and the army was small in numbers by any standard in 1914. As it grew in 1915 it remained small in trained staff officers, small in live experienced officers and other ranks, and in infantry training, particularly musketry, when the the  K Divisions began to arrive.

[dansparky]

Agree, Zuber argues that where it mattered forces were of equal size and that the British were pushed back because of German superiority in tactics.  From the archives, i have explored (if  you take Zuber's evaluation of German fire and movement tactics) I find that British fire and movement tactics are on a par with the German Army.   However, it can be argued that in the initial engagements the German's to their cost advanced en masse.   I would also expect British Marksmanship to be better due to more exposure to live fire, although this is not easy to calculate.  It's hard enough as we have seen to work out how proficient the British were during training.  

 

Had the BEF had been on the size it was to become I think at a tactical level it would have been pretty formidable.  Inevitably as numbers increased in 1915, there would have been a decline in the level of training and expertise in the individual soldier. Hence the lack of confidence in the new recruits of 1916, prior to the Somme in some circles.  Although I would also say at an operational level the BEF had a better understanding of how to fight a modern war and the problems it posed.  

[David Filsell]

There was a times report that a German Army observer at Britsh pre war manoeuvres commented on the skill of British infantry in fire and movement.

[dansparky]

ah that's a point i think i have heard that somewhere, anywhere i can nab a free glance from?

[Guest]

Personally I think the concepts of British musketry prowess are completely misguided. The bulls will select the few positive reports and ignore the disparaging (German) reports (and vice versa). In warfare and its reporting it is difficult and arguably impossible to differentiate between a genuine complement from a POW from a sycophantic platitude by the same scared subject. There is no ''control' to the study. It is plainly clear that the BOH 1914 references to the Germans' alleged respect for British musketry are a deliberate mis-quote taken out of context. This is a crumbling foundation stone on which a number of misguided authors have regurgitated BOH myth as 'fact'. 

 

We need large data (lots of accounts) to reassure ourselves that the British Army not falling into the trap of self-aggrandisement. This is a common trap in Great War history: one report is used as 'evidence' for a general argument. The British OH did a superb job of massaging the prowess of the BEF in 1914. The simple fact was that the BEF was not fit for purpose (to use a modern expression), nor indeed was the opposition. How could they be? The ridiculous concept that the British Army's soldiers were such supreme musketeers (rather than marksmen) rather conveniently ignores any quantitative measures. It is a claim that can  not be proved (or disproved for that matter). The fact that it cannot be disproved is of course the convenience: The OH says it was so, so it must be true. This is what is called 'first mover advantage': The initiator of a theory is assumed to be correct despite the lack of evidence and the doubters are forced to 'disprove' something that is not yet proven. This is common in politics.

 

Hardly any British diaries in late 1914 and 1915 refer to musketry. It is a rarity. Mass musketry 'accuracy' after first Ypres had become irrelevant. There are over 200 diaries covering Loos in Sep 1915. Not one makes any reference to musketry or marksmanship in a general context. It was irrelevant as other weapon systems dominated the battlefield. The OH 1915, 16,17, 18 and other Theatres do not mention British musketry or the mad minute. It is only mentioned as an offset for Mons, Le Cateau and the retreat, which were unmitigated embarrassments for the BEF as they were simply vastly outnumbered and went to war with 60% of the infantry rank and file from the stale Reserves. The hero-romantic school would have us believe that the BEF were first among equals. I think this is a fallacy. 

 

I suspect, but cannot prove that the alleged 'success' of the Mad Minute was a British propaganda construct. The BEF infantry in 1914 saw close to 90% casualties. Something had to 'explain' this away by suggesting they killed more of the enemy than they killed T Atkins. The British Army in 1914 and early 1915 was utterly destroyed. This part is not a debate.. The data is undisptuable. If they were so good relative to the Germans, how could this happen? Just a thought. MG

 

 

Edited 22 October , 2016 by Guest

[dansparky]

Oh I definitely agree  that the bef marksmanship skill is over inflated.  But I think it was competent enough and accounts for the fact that we managed to break free along of course with and German mistakes.  According to Spencer Jones, the British had five times as much ammo for training, so I would expect this to deliver some sort of advantage.  However, I think this was at best negligible especially in the face of many numbers.  The firepower of the day favoured the defence and the difficulty of crossing a fire-swept zone, I think this counts for a lot.  If we reverse it, at the Marne we see that a German rearguard holds off the BEF (we find pursuit as hard as they did) , this shows it is more the difficulty of the Manoeuvre more than one side being far superior to another.?   I don't think there was much in it, the Germans were a very competent military machines, there was more about them than just mere numbers.

[dansparky]

Yes and can never be proved, even if we manage to establish how proficient the BEF were, this will never translate to explaining how they performed during  war.   I do think generally there is a grain of truth in some of what Zuber says. In that, some evidence was Cherry Picked to fit the OH narrative.  Shame that so much of the German files went up in smoke.

[Guest]

19 minutes ago, dansparky said:

Oh I definitely agree  that the bef marksmanship skill is over inflated.  But I think it was competent enough and accounts for the fact that we managed to break free along of course with and German mistakes. I strongly disagree. German mistakes post Le Cateau are a far greater factor for example.  According to Spencer Jones, the British had five times as much ammo for training This is slightly misguided in my view. The SMLE was a greater factor. The weapon not the man behind it. It was superior in every way. Ammunition expenditure on 15 rounds rapid was a tiny part of musketry. In a war where Artillery and machine guns dominated, musketry counted for less. The British Army diaries are dominated by accounts of German artillery. so I would expect this to deliver some sort of advantage.  It didn't. Mons: defeat: Le Ctaeu: Defeat: The Retreat and the ultimate Stalemate essentially proves this. However, I think this was at best negligible especially in the face of many numbers.  The firepower of the day favoured the defence and the difficulty of crossing a fire-swept zone, I think this counts for a lot.  If we reverse it, at the Marne we see that a German rearguard holds off the BEF (we find pursuit as hard as they did) , this shows it is more the difficulty of the Manoeuvre more than one side being far superior to another.?  I don't think there was much in it, the Germans were a very competent military machines, there was more about them than just mere numbers.

 

Comments in blue above.

 

The casualty exchange rate at Le Cateau where the British were in defence and in theory at a musketry advantage does not bear this out. Artillery mattered  most. The KOYLI lost 600 men, half of whom were unscathed. and became POW. Why were their superior musketry skills so ineffectual?. It is a myth. If musketry was such a dominant factor why did the British spend no time at all trying to enhance it and a lot of time trying to develop other weapons or increasing the number of weapons (proportionally) that mattered such as machine guns, grenades (bombs) and trench mortars for the infanty, and more importantly a massive proportional increase in artillery and artillery ammunition.  The rife and bayonet were significantly less relevant than then British doctrine would believe ....the doctrine changed to fit the circumstances and musketry had very little to do with the changes, suggesting it was not a factor that would win the war. 

Edited 22 October , 2016 by Guest

[dansparky]

I think the unmitigated embarrassment is largely due to the numbers.  I think on an individual level the BEF were competent.

 

I think you can dispute the Mad Minute.  There is evidence that musketry practice to attain this level of shooting and there are accounts to demonstrate it was achieved.  But again, trying this while under fire would have been difficult and it was only sustainable for 1-4 mins  before tiredness to hold and as Max Hastings points out, ammo is exhausted.  I think this level was obtainable but if it had any effect in 1914, it was probably minuscule.   It probably would only have effected the first couple of lines of (reported) mass German infantry at mons and le cateau.

Edited 22 October , 2016 by dansparky
spelling mistake

[dansparky]

undoubtedly Artillery mattered most, they had more of it, more spotter planes and good counter-batt fire (the BEF'S was non-existent).   I don't think musketry was such a dominant factor- but I think British musketry was effective enough to prevent whole scale destruction.  Had it not been for German mistakes . i.e. the change of direction of Kluck we would have been more or less destroyed.  It seems we had enough about us in, as well as the difficulty of pursuit to hold off until we got lucky. I think musketry was amongst our best assets as the BEF were pretty deficient in most of them. I think whatever value the BEF musketry had it died with the old contemptible and with the transition from mobile to trench warfare. 

 

unfortunately, we then reverted back to the primacy of the offensive to break vast defensive lines whilst facing withering fire. 

 

Can I also ask as I think all these things are relevant in understanding the effectiveness of the BEF.  How much of a role do you think Sordet played at Le Cateau?