BEF 1914. Marksmanship, Musketry and the Mad Minute

[David Filsell]

Interesting, as a sidelight, that the Japanese had 'indifferent' lenses, at that time British lens manufacture was producing extremely high quality producrts, virtually matching that of the Germans.

[SteveMarsdin]

do you have this transcribed??

Hi Dan,

No, a friend took a copy when he was at the French archives in Vincennes, researching for a book. I do have it in higher resolution though.

Steve

[Muerrisch]

Regarding marksmanship, there is a little-known Appendix II in MR 1909 which allows RA, ASC and AOC the possibility of further qualifying as marksmen if they have qualified as 1st class shots for two years running and there is ammunition available.

Thus there opens a possibility that such men might be glimpsed wearing the coveted crossed rifles.

There is no such dispensation for RAMC or AVC, although both fired a recruits course.

I wonder if any photographs exist of RA, ASC or AOC with the badge being worn?

[SteveMarsdin]

Might this reflect better use of cover by the Germans ?

Phil, I think it is mainly down to them been better trained; yes, they did make good use of available cover and although these were encounter battles with no pre-dug trenches, they did often "dig-in" on contact but the Germans were simply better trained and led. Points covered by J C Delhez and extremely well made by Simon House.

Steve

[SteveMarsdin]

I know it's been touched on before in this thread but Zuber stresses the German doctrine of suppressing fire, beaten zones and advancing in bounds, rather than aimed volley fire. The British musketry doctrine that has been described over the last few pages seems to centre on aimed volley fire: was the concept of "beaten zones" or a similar tactic taught ?

Steve

[Muerrisch]

Volleys? Frowned upon, vide para 283, " ......... every man will in any case press his trigger independently, volleys being less effective than bursts of independent fire".

The exception was using the [very] long-range or "volley" sight, which was in any case withdrawn as the SMLE was successively modified.

[dansparky]

I suspect the answers to the methodology of scoring might lie in one of these publications.... I can locate any via Abe books... this was taken from the front pages of The Machine-Gunner's handbook Eighth Edition WH Smith and Son 1915. MG

i cannot find any of these either. From what i have found they were not bound and contained few pages, these are probably very rare

[dansparky]

from what i have seen in shoncliffe diary adancing by bounds is often highlighted in the British Army.

Grumpy - Interestingly points required for classification are bit lower than required for infantry or cavalry.

95 points 1st class... obtaining 60 pints or less than 95 = 2nd class ... less than 60 = 3rd class. (page 268).

Edited 9 December , 2015 by dansparky

[SteveMarsdin]

Hi Grumpy,

I used "volley" rather carelessly, aimed shots individual or volley was my main target : according to Zuber German doctrine was to bring down company strength fire on a beaten zone, if say ranged at 700m then it would extend from 660-740m and bring down a weight of rifle fire on the target therein. The parabolic nature of the trajectory at that range and beyond would pass over the head of advancing German infantry up to 400m, allowing them to close. The ability of the NCOs to judge range (and for them and their subordinates to adjust it) was of paramount importance. Marksmanship was less important than these musketry skills. Most of the training documentation posted alludes to firing at targets rather than its role in a tactical combat situation.

Steve

[Guest]

Hi Grumpy,

I used "volley" rather carelessly, aimed shots individual or volley was my main target : according to Zuber German doctrine was to bring down company strength fire on a beaten zone, if say ranged at 700m then it would extend from 660-740m and bring down a weight of rifle fire on the target therein. The parabolic nature of the trajectory at that range and beyond would pass over the head of advancing German infantry up to 400m, allowing them to close. The ability of the NCOs to judge range (and for them and their subordinates to adjust it) was of paramount importance. Marksmanship was less important than these musketry skills. Most of the training documentation posted alludes to firing at targets rather than its role in a tactical combat situation.

Steve

Steve

For the British Army the 1909 Musketry Regulations allocated Part VI of Table B to Collective Field Practices and Part V to Fire Direction. My sense is that a large part of Musketry Training was focused on the collective body of men rather than the individual. Naturally the starting point is with the individual and raising his standards, however all the literature and doctrine stressed that musketry was more important than marksmanship and that Fire and Manoeuvre were inseparable. The more I read of British Army musketry doctrine and infantry training the more I am impressed with the level of detail and how it probably translated to field conditions. MG

[SteveMarsdin]

Thanks Martin,

It does seem that when comparing the three countries that the one where training was lagging behind is France. I know that Joffre was desperately trying to improve matters but the advent of war came too soon.

Steve

[dansparky]

I tend to agree, fire and manouvre was of considerable importance, i think it is largely the official history and the individual accounts it uses the over emphasise British marksmanship. The training of the 10th brigade focused on fire and movement, assulting a position much more than marksmanship. I think the British method was not to far from that of the Germans (which ever is the greater), for they placed great empasis on fire and movement to which Zuber alludes. Zuber also indicates that marksmanship was of great importance to the germans and competitions to establish their best were similar to our own.

[SteveMarsdin]

Good morning,

A major difference between the French and German training pre-war was the lack of access to large training areas to the French. Although it had been decided to increase the number on several occasions, there wasn't the political will in the "belle époque" to carry it through. As a result in 1911 the French only had 2 large (corps size), 2 small (division size) and 3 very small (brigade size) training areas. Even then the large areas were only 2-3,000 hectares in size. By contrast, at the same time Germany had 28 large training areas in excess of 5,000 acres each.

Joffre sought to increase the number and at least ensure that each French Corps spent some time each year at one of the large areas. That said, in 1913 the sheer lack of areas meant that not all corps could be fitted in the schedule; Simon House found that there was some correlation between those Corps that missed out and those that performed the worst in August 1914.

Steve

[phil andrade]

Steve,

The question of the preponderance of head wounds on the Germans at Bellefontaine, as opposed to body wounds on their French counterparts, fixates me.

Zuber emphasises that, at Rossignol, most of the damage inflicted by the superbly trained Germans was caused by rifle fire.

Presumably, the same might well apply to Bellefontaine.

The French - here I assume - achieved their greatest effect with their soixante quinze guns. I would imagine that many of the Germans were hit in the head by shrapnel from air bursts.

Could this account for the disparity in the location of wounds in that engagement ?

I note that, in the cemetery at Bellefontaine, the numbers of German and French dead are very nearly equal - just over 500 Germans and about 525 French ( nearly all from 22nd August ) - implying very equal casualties.

Phil (PJA)

[SteveMarsdin]

Hi Phil,

I don't want to divert Martin's thread away from its main thrust, although I do think it's important to compare the training experience of the BEF with that of the two main adversaries on the Western Front

That said, to quickly answer your points:

• Present day cemetery numbers also reflect post-war consolidations but the numbers are roughly equal at Bellefontaine, with the French having slightly more dead and the Germans having the highest overall casualties
• The French, unusually for 22 August, did made effective use of their 75s but the main reason for the parity/French advantage in the casualty figures is that for a large part of the day the 120e RIF adopted a largely defensive stance (and the Germans were slow to bring up their machine guns)
• It could hardly be termed a French victory as they failed to reach the bridge at Tintigny and protect the flank of the 3e Colonial Division, their objective.

Steve

[Guest]

From the Sherwood Foresters' Regimental Annual 1913 (2nd Bn Notes)

The new rifle sighted for high-velocity ammunition was issued to the battalion in January and although some difficulty was experienced in the rapid practices owing to the bolt working rather stiffly causing a number of jams, its superiority over the older pattern is responsible to a certain extent for the sill further improvement in the shooting of the battalion which has gone up nearly 12 points, the battalion average being 113.2 and the numbers exercised 17 Officers and 567 other ranks.

It is followed by a mass of detail on best shots and a detailed description of the way the shoot was conducted. Notably there was a competition for Judging Distances (with prizes), which was won by the same company that were on average the best shots. No surprise really.

It looks as if there were separate shooting competitions on the same day;

Prizes were 5s, 3s, 2s, 1s in the individual matches and 10s,7s 6d, s and 3s for the best aggregate scores in matches 1,2 and 3, and £1 and 12s in the Tile competitions

Match 1 - Snap shooting Figure 2 target, silhouette, 200 yards exposed 3 seconds each shot. rounds.

Match 2. - 2nd class figure target ARA 300 yards 7 rounds with one sighting shot

Match 3. - Rapid firing 1st class figure target ARA 500 yards 5 rounds; time 20 seconds

Match 4. - Figure 6 silhouette 10 yards run, pace quick time 5 rounds 1 round each run.

Match 5 - Tile competition

In the same year the battalion competed in the Western Rifle Meting (open to the Navy and Army)

Lastly, the battalion won the Evelyn Wood Cup (nine miles march and shoot) which appears to have been the most prestigious prize of all in musketry competition.

the Depot recorded:

In October we received the re-sighted rifles and pointed ammunition. Mark III Rifles have been issued to the Regular Establishment, Mark I* to Special reservists and Mark IV to Advanced Recruits

[seaforth78]

Martin,

Would you think that with the reservists issued with the Mark 1 'hand me downs' that this would have affected their musketry standard in August 1914? I always thought that both regulars and reservists would have had the same rifle. What a revelation!

[rd72]

Hello all,

I have revisited the thread after some time and have enjoyed the developments of late, greatly. Especially the in depth analysis of the Musketry manuals. Thank you for all your input. I hope that I would not be seen to be intruding on the conversation if I were to add some observations.

In regards to the last post from seaforth78, I took the opportunity to view what I think are the relevant LoC entries re the Mk I* and the Mk IV and it would seem that generally they are the same as the Mk III... The Mk IV more so... The Mk I* I suspect (and I haven't uncovered anything to state otherwise, as of yet) would have still had the receiver mounted charger guide... Whereas the Mk III (of course) and the Mk IV had the bridge charger. They are all Short MLEs though and received the new sights beginning in 1911. Would this have affected scores? And would the Special reservists have been issued these same rifles the next year when mobilized?

Cheers,

Rob

[dansparky]

This is indeed interesting, complicates matters further if different rifles were issued. Would they on mobilisation all have the same rifle? What is the basic difference between all these models? I believe the Mark III over the Mark I was that it could fire higher velocity ammunition, magazine improvement and rear sight.

[Guest]

On Mobilization the 'Fully Trained and Effective' men of the Special Reserve effectively integrated with surplus Army Reservists and formed a body of Reserves, which in turn provided reinforcement drafts for the front. I think it inconceivable that the reinforcement drafts went out with different Marks of weapon.

Given the similarity in Marks, I suspect changing from one to another would take little time.

Where there might have been differences is in the standard of training. Sadly, few regiments recorded much detail during mobilization, especially the Special Reserve battalions. It is a bit of a black hole in our knowledge. Where there are accounts they simply don't go into enough detail to answer the questions. MG

Edited for typos.

[rd72]

What is the basic difference between all these models? I believe the Mark III over the Mark I was that it could fire higher velocity ammunition, magazine improvement and rear sight.

Just to confirm, all patterns of "Lee" could fire all varieties of 303 ammo... by this I mean "safely".... The Mk I SMLE could fire MK VII ammo, without safety issues (i.e. it wouldn't blow up)... as could a Mk I LM from 1889. All the changes were to, as you mentioned, the sights (for the different trajectory of the faster, flatter ammo) and the magazine (to remedy feeding issues of the shorter, pointy cartridge)

Generally, they are very similar. (this picture is a little big, sorry)

The MK I... Newly built... Note the lack of charger bridge and the inclusion of the first pattern "bolt head" charger guide. Half of the guide is on the bolt head and the other half is on the receiver. It was upgraded to the Mk I* by the addition of a gunmetal butt plate some minor stock work to allow for slightly different furniture such as swivels, a modified magazine case, a minor mod to the bolt (the keeper screw for the striker), and lots of sharp corners milled off to prevent "injury to equipment and clothing". From Jul 1911 (LoC 15638), there were numerous mods made to accommodate Mk VII ammo such as mag platforms and springs, sights, and minor changes to the receiver for better feeding.

The Mk IV was a conversion from the MK I and I* MLE, or the MK II and II* MLM. This involved a weighty amount of changes to bring the converted rifles to Mk III standards...

The Mk III was originally manufactured for the eariler, MK VI (and earlier) ammo and went through the same conversion process as all other rifles starting from 1911.

Cheers,

Rob

[Old Tom]

Some fine pictures which have caused a thought to come to mind. A number of posts have commented on the skill of reservists and whether they would have retained the standards they had achieved when recalled. My thought is concerned with the process of zeroing, in other words adjusting the foresight of the rifle to suit the individual user. I am asuming that the practice was used in 1914 and that a recalled reservist was issued with a rifle from store and that the mobilisation time scales would not allow time for a zeroing shoot. It may be that the inaccuracies in shooting without zeroing would have been small and deemed to be acceptable. Is this consideration relevant.

Old Tom

[Guest]

Some fine pictures which have caused a thought to come to mind. A number of posts have commented on the skill of reservists and whether they would have retained the standards they had achieved when recalled. My thought is concerned with the process of zeroing, in other words adjusting the foresight of the rifle to suit the individual user. I am asuming that the practice was used in 1914 and that a recalled reservist was issued with a rifle from store and that the mobilisation time scales would not allow time for a zeroing shoot. It may be that the inaccuracies in shooting without zeroing would have been small and deemed to be acceptable. Is this consideration relevant.

Old Tom

From day one until disembaration Reservists were either marching or on the ranges. It was very intense.

Given each regular battalion could choose from many hundreds of reservists, the ones that disembarked in mid Aug 1914 would have been the best Reservists available. The ones left behind would have a few weeks to come up to scratch. None of the dairies mention poor marksmanship or musketry skills by the Reservists but all mention their relatively poorer fitness compared to the serving men. Almost every battalion diary records the number of men who dropped out of each route march, which makes me believe that the numbers falling out (or not falling out) was a point of Battalion pride and something brought to the notice of Brigadiers etc. The diaries are always quick to point out when no-one fell out of a route march... by extension if their musketry skills were poor I would imagine this would have been noted and recorded. I can't think of a single example among nearly 200 BEF 1914 diaries that mentions poor shooting by Reservists.

Timescale: Mobilization started on 5th Aug. Most battalions were complete by 7th-8th Aug. First battalions disembarked 12th-13th Aug meaning they had a week to get the men into shape and zero weapons etc. All men had to have shot Table B before departing, and it would be difficult to pass this without a zeroed weapon I imagine. ranges up to 500 yards.

MG

[Old Tom]

Many thanks.

Old Tom

[seaforth78]

Thanks Martin. It didn't seem logical to arm different Marks to different men in a given battalion. Doesn't make sense.