BEF 1914. Marksmanship, Musketry and the Mad Minute

[Guest]

14 minutes ago, Gunner Bailey said:

I asked that because unless you have shot an SMLE you are like a non driver commenting on driving without experience.

John

 

 

John - Is the implication that one needs to have fired the SMLE to be able to debate the BEF's musketry? 

 

Can one be 'informed' about musketry and the debate the efficacy of British Army's infantry tactics without having fired the SMLE? I think so. It has been very interesting to hear from a number of contributors' personal experiences, but it largely remains limited to the mechanism of rapid fire at an individual level. The comments from Salesie were quite pertinent in pointing out the differences between the SMLE and the French and German rifles and how the SMLE was simply a better weapon for the conditions in the trenches.  It has been pointed out on a few occasions that shooting in range conditions might be quite different to shooting during the period of the Mons Star, particularly when being on the receiving end of HE and shrapnel at Ypres in a half-dug waterlogged trench in the freezing cold having not eaten a decent meal in days and hardly slept after a 20 mile march, with one's colleagues being killed left and right and thinking today might be ones's last day on earth. 7th Div history is worth reading to expand on this. 

 

The core of this debate is whether British musketry (of which the mad minute was only a very small part) was superior to German musketry. I am not convinced that one needs to have fired the SMLE to have an informed view. There are a myriad of other factors which would optimise musketry: judging distances, target indication, fire control, use of terrain, discipline, maintenance of the weapon, ammunition type, fatigue, mental alertness, weather conditions, time of day or night, tactical deployment, the enemy's deployment, use of cover or even whether the bayonet was fixed at the time, which changes the balance of the weapon. This doesn't even begin to quantify the hundreds of hours of dry training drills that an infantryman would have done; something that even the most ardent re-enactors or shooting enthusiasts might find difficult to replicate. It is slightly more complex than assessing the ability to fire 15 rpm on a range in peacetime - something that we all agree could be done with ease. 

 

MG 

 

[dansparky]

John

Unfortunately as I said, I have not fired anything, my great grandfather was as I understand though a Marksman of some sort in WW1 (will be researching this further), having been Sussex rifleman champion on a number of occasions.  I think I asked questions more than commented.  I understand you have practical experience that I don't have and that is useful for the debate, I don't think I should be excluded from adding to it.  It becomes quite difficult to debate anything if we stick to practical exerience, for instance only those that have had been exposed to live fire may only comment on any given section.  I wonder how many historians have experience in commanding an Army or firing an Artillery piece, I would like to think their views are valid.  It is part of my research and the informed views from everyone has been most helpful.

[dansparky]

It is very interesting though as you say that you managed to fire so many shots many aimed shots when you attempted it.   It tells us as MG says that a trained infantryman at during peace time training could definitely achieve this.  Training diaries also make of firing practice consisting of : "fifteen rounds firing at four rows of targets exposed for thirty seconds, each row at different ranges from about 1,000 yards up to less", this was while under fire direction.  A pretty stringent test highlighting measures put into place to raise the standard of musketry within the army. 

[David Filsell]

"A general observation: If one wanted to construct an argument that British musketry was 'superior' it would be possible to carefully select the supporting anecdotal evidence and discard the counter-evidence. Similarly if one wanted to construct the opposite argument the same could be done. My sense is that the British OH was doing the former and this confirmation bias has infected most subsequent histories. It is simply a view and one that is difficult to 'prove'."

 

How true, although you use anecdotal evidence in one para and officers accounts in another regarding misbehaviour during the retreat - anecdote/written evidence is a fine differrence

Shooting high - ever a problem. Percentage? Undefinable. Even if  my calculation of round fired is unacceptable Whilst my figure of rounds fired is cod, 

 

There's no dispute that the musketry pudding may have, probably was, over egged and clearly over repeated.

But equally I think we are heading into acceptance of a negative when there is clear doubt about fact and the relative effectiveness of British musketry in 1914 is more than mere anecdote..

There can be no doubt that British infantry fire was hugely effective and there is clear evidence to support it from both side to support it and  my point about German reportage has been made and apparently ignored.

Equally who said what in their works is actually often quite irrelevant in the light of modern research.

There's no way that the weight of 'anecdotal' evidence - and it is weighty - as there is for BEF misbehaviour -  can or should be brushed aside with out firm evidence of them be in inaccurate.  I'm not pushing the "... important thing apart" angle, merely expressing the view that I think the target is moving and, at the moment, shooting a little high, see.

 

[dansparky]

Thanks, David,

 

Did you manage to fish out that information on German observations at manoeuvres?     Any descriptions based on Manoeuvres or from the individual soldier are less likely to have the kind of agenda's we have discussed and would make interesting reading.   I am not sure that all the German accounts should be ignored as Zuber suggests they should be. 

 

Zuber does mention some accounts of shooting too high but there are not many of them.  In my mind, BEF musketry was effective enough and along with sheer determination was a contributing factor to the BEF's survival.  

[David Filsell]

Dan,

 It's on my 'little' list, currently book reviews and real work keep getting in the way. If you can be a little patient I know that I referenced and sourced it in my 7th Inf Divn work. Thing is where?

Regards David

[dansparky]

Sorry David Just mentioned it in reply to illustrate your point on German observations not forgotten, was not rushing you.  

[David Filsell]

On high firing. There seems little doubt that it was a well recognised problem and attempts were made to 'train it out'. Equally as has been noted, firing while under fire is in itself influenced by the fact that 'they're out to get me', it must also concentrate the mind in terms of fight or flight

I recall in accounts of Ypres that mention is made of range markers were placed ahead of positions expected to come under assault. How effective they were I have no idea. But the lack of common reference indicates - only indicates - to me that it may well have been standard operating practice and thus went largely unmentioned.

in my experience as a often the new, the unusual, the unexpected, the - like the clearly observed  effect of rifle fire on the enemy of fire - that is remembered. As a journo I learned only to well, Mr Editor and Mr Reader wasn't Interested in the common place. But, surprisingly perhaps, what goes un recorded because it was everyday may be very important in the long run of history.

[Gunner Bailey]

3 hours ago, dansparky said:

It is very interesting though as you say that you managed to fire so many shots many aimed shots when you attempted it.   It tells us as MG says that a trained infantryman at during peace time training could definitely achieve this.  Training diaries also make of firing practice consisting of : "fifteen rounds firing at four rows of targets exposed for thirty seconds, each row at different ranges from about 1,000 yards up to less", this was while under fire direction.  A pretty stringent test highlighting measures put into place to raise the standard of musketry within the army. 

 

My mad minute had all the shots on a target about a metre square but only about 6 ended up in a decent group. The rifle I used had a very smooth bolt action. That speed would not have been possible with any Mauser action rifle I've ever used. The SMLE was a work of genius. In the right hands it was deadly.

 

It did however show me that even a rusty marksman as I was could put a stream of rounds into an area without a lot of difficulty. If there had been lines of German it would have been almost a hit per shot so I can well understand why the Germans thought we had more machine guns that we did. The BEF of 1914 had spent many hours perfecting their shooting and I for one would have been terrified of facing the BEF at its best.

 

I don't think anyone should try to undermine their reputation and skills.

 

John

[Muerrisch]

except that more than half of them were taken up from the Reserve and thus hardly in current practice?

[dansparky]

I don't think anyone is trying to undermine their reputation, just trying to see where different arguments fit.  Re-exploring these events etc is important in order to gain a better understanding of them I think.  Michael Gove felt that the depiction of the 'out of touch toffs' in command (in Blackadder etc) and other left-wing views was a denigration of the memories for those that served.  I don't know how it could ever be that, as it was not an attack on the individual soldier and whether you agree with it or not it fostered debate.  Thus we ended up with the Gary Sheffield and others re-examing this period, I think now we have a far better understanding of these events.  Not that we will ever find all the answers.

 

I think most on this thread have argued that reputation may have been over-egged but there was definitely some substance.  I think their skill is evident and their bravery is undoubted.  I think whatever anybody's stance is it is important to explore counter views, even if you disagree.

[Guest]

1 hour ago, Gunner Bailey said:

 

so I can well understand why the Germans thought we had more machine guns that we did.

John

 

John, I think this alleged view is a construct of the British OH based on hyperbole of a single German account. ...which incidentally does not make the claim.

 

Is there any German reference that makes this claim? I cant find one after a year of looking. I am genuinely interested in this as I think it is a myth. MG

[dansparky]

The efficiency and effectiveness of BEF fire  from my limited exposure to material of this period I think was pretty damned good.  But these two videos for me show where things may have bee over-egged.  Given the rate of fire of the Vickers and using 15 rounds as a benchmark we need to times video 1 by 3 to get the same rate for one Vickers gun.  Obviously, this is not sustainable, but the British often waited for maximum effect. so whatever the rate of British fire was and however this differed in the heat of battle I do believe it was effective.  I am not sure that video 1 however features the best marksmen and I am aware that video 2 is not the MK1.

 

 

 

[Guest]

The British OH implies only 40% of the BEF infantry first cohorts were regulars. The remainder were reservists who had less than one day's training per year, if they were lucky. I have severe doubts this was even achieved as some sources seem to imply training was done every second or third year after going to the Reserves.  The average time away from the colours was over three years, meaning the majority of the BEF had barely done one or two day's training in the three years before mobilization. One battalion had 60% of its reservists  men who were "3 & 9" rather than "7 & 5" meaning over a third of the Battalion had not been in uniform for a significantly longer  period. For rather complex reasons the Irish and Scottish and rural English regiments relied on a higher proportion of older reservists. The regiments that has been reduced from 4 to 2 regular battalions a few years prior to the War had a surplus  of Reservists. The point here - and it is critically important - is that the BEF was far from uniform. The Northumberland Fusiliers (recently reduced from 4 to 2 battalions) had more than double the number of regular Reservists available to the Connaught Rangers. Given their BEF battalions were annihilated and reinforced  to WE  and smashed again, it is clear that the Connaughts would be at a disadvantage. Unsurprisingly it was the Connaughts that had to merge its regular battalions -  a unique event in the annals of the Great War history of the regular army. Herein lies the rub: It was a physical impossibility for the Connaughts to compete with the Northumberland Fusiliers in sustained skill at arms simply because they didn't have the men and didn't have the reservists. Add to this the random annihilation of battalions and their need to almost completely reinforce 800 men, some battalions simply could not do this.  The mythology conveniently ignores these truths. 

 

The dregs of the Reserves arrived on the Western Front in mid Oct 1915. This is important too. It is before First Ypres. 

 

Edited 27 October , 2016 by Guest

[Muerrisch]

4 hours ago, dansparky said:

I don't think anyone is trying to undermine their reputation, just trying to see where different arguments fit.  Re-exploring these events etc is important in order to gain a better understanding of them I think.  Michael Gove felt that the depiction of the 'out of touch toffs' in command (in Blackadder etc) and other left-wing views was a denigration of the memories for those that served.  I don't know how it could ever be that, as it was not an attack on the individual soldier and whether you agree with it or not it fostered debate.  Thus we ended up with the Gary Sheffield and others re-examing this period, I think now we have a far better understanding of these events.  Not that we will ever find all the answers.

 

I think most on this thread have argued that reputation may have been over-egged but there was definitely some substance.  I think their skill is evident and their bravery is undoubted.  I think whatever anybody's stance is it is important to explore counter views, even if you disagree.

 

Michael Gove? I think not!

[dansparky]

? http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-25612369

[Muerrisch]

Oh! 

 

I am clearly behind the drag-curve!

 

Sorry pardon !

[dansparky]

I can understand why he felt that way, but i also think seeing the value of other's take on things is important.  Even if you strongly disagree!  Anyway back to 1914 :-)

[David Filsell]

I greatly dislike the use of the word dregs in your last posting, it is intemperant  to say the least. However Iine with your picture of the composition of the British Army  - which is again presented as being at very low point on the spectrum in terms of musketry and now manpower - and if your judgement of the the incompetence of reservists (and the red herring of shooting high) is balanced against Zuberist view of the highly efficient and competent enemy - British performance Ypres seems strangely, perhaps uniquely competent. Statistical analysis, however careful, often fails to tell the complete story, equally, as I have noted, ssertion and account are not by definition little different. 

In addition your figure, inferred from the OH, is not, I think, accurate in terms of 7th Infantry Division. Although wrongly described in many works on Ypres until the 80s as being entirely comprised of regulars, its reserve complement overall was smaller in most than you indicate overall for the BEF according to my research.

Edited 26 October , 2016 by David Filsell

[Guest]

On 10/26/2016 at 22:32, David Filsell said:

I greatly dislike the use of the word dregs in your last posting, it is intemperant  to say the least. However Iine with your picture of the composition of the British Army  - which is again presented as being at very low point on the spectrum in terms of musketry and now manpower - and if your judgement of the the incompetence of reservists (and the red herring of shooting high) is balanced against Zuberist view of the highly efficient and competent enemy - British performance Ypres seems strangely, perhaps uniquely competent. Statistical analysis, however careful, often fails to tell the complete story, equally, as I have noted, ssertion and account are not by definition little different. 

In addition your figure, inferred from the OH, is not, I think, accurate in terms of 7th Infantry Division. Although wrongly described in many works on Ypres until the 80s as being entirely comprised of regulars, its reserve complement overall was smaller in most than you indicate overall for the BEF according to my research.

 

It is not my view, it is the view of many diarists who recorded the decline in quantity and quality of the Reservists. It was so bad in late 1914 and early 1915 that is some cases Reservists were being sent back, despite the shortfall in fighting strength. Five regiments actually ran out of Reservists - "fully trained and effective" men in early 1915 and most regiments had less than the equivalent of one reinforcement draft in fully trained and effective Reservists. These are simple facts that have bypassed most historians and the OH in particular. 

 

In early November 1914 men were being sent to the front line who only three months earlier had never worn a uniform. These are the earliest Kitchener recruits. This process accelerated through 1914 and 1915. There is only one reason for this: the British Army was running out of trained men. The augmentation of the Army stipulated 6 months of training for Kitchener recruits. In theory the earliest arrivals should have been in February 1915 (assuming they could be clothed and equipped from the start, something that we know was not achieved). That they started to arrive in November is very telling and that thousands were arriving by end December is strong evidence of this manning crisis. The history of the Black Watch tells us that they had to shorten the recruits training to 12 weeks and that every trained man was in France by mid October (before First Ypres), meaning subsequent drafts would largely be composed of half trained recruits. 

 

90% of the original BEF had become casualties according to the OH.  It is possible to deconstruct a Battalion and its reinforcements from the men's Army Numbers and the medal rolls: The split between Regulars, Army Reservists and Special Reservists  Occasionally we can find valuable data on the fate of every man. It is possible to do this with the  2nd Bn Royal Sussex Regiment as the 3rd Reserve Battalion kept a ledger which recorded their fates. When they were killed or wounded or sick and  (importantly) when they were evacuated, where they were evacuated to and who replaced them. Numbers, Army Numbers, Ranks, Names of every man who served in France and Flanders in 1914. The 2nd Bn Royal Sussex Regiment is doubly interesting because the Regiment's 1st Battalion was in India throughout and no TF Battalion of the Regiment was in France for the dates of the Mons Star, so we know that every man on the medal roll was heading to the 2nd Bn. This makes is a fairly unique case-study due to the survival of the ledger. It is more interesting as the 2nd Battalion had the average number of fatalities of BEF battalions in 1914 which makes it a useful benchmark.

 

When we go through the data it is clear that the first cohort is almost entirely destroyed: killed, wounded or sick and evacuated back to England. We should not be surprised by this as the OH has already pointed this out for the whole of the BEF's regular infantry.  The same fate is met by the first reinforcements, the second reinforcements and the third and fourth and so on. It is possible to deconstruct each reinforcement draft by the number of Regulars, Army Reservist and Special Reservists and eventually Kitchener men. We also know from the weekly returns exactly how many Reservists there were in the Reserve Battalion, how many recovering wounded and sick and how many were returned as invalids. We can effectively rebuild the profile of available Reserves for every regular infantry regiment. I have done this. On 1st March 1915 the Royal Sussex Regiment's 3rd Reserve Battalion had no fully trained and effective men left. 

 

It is quite clear that the BEF's infantry  was destroyed and replaced; destroyed and replaced again. Each cohort was replaced with men who had been out of uniform for longer, and had trained for fewer hours Regulars were replaced with Army Reservist, then Special reservists and when they had run out of Reservists, then Kitchener men. In my view I think it would be impossible to sustain the level of training and expertise of the pre-war regulars in this context. For the 2nd Bn:

 

First cohort: Battalion disembarking:.......58% Army Reservists

1st Reinforcements (21st Aug)................95% Army Reservists

2nd Reinforcements (27th Aug)...............81% Army Reservists

3rd Reinforcements (31st Aug)...............78% Army Reservists

4th Reinforcements (12 Sep)..................95% Army Reservists

5th Reinforcements (20th Sep)...............68% Army Reservists, 32% Special Reservists

6th Reinforcements (10th Nov)................53% Army Reservists, 45% Special Reservists, 2% Kitchener Men

7th Reinforcements (23rd Nov)................12% Army Reservists, 86% Special reservists, 2% Kitchener Men

8th Reinforcements (29th Nov)................1% Army Reservists, 98% Special Reservists, 1% Kitchener Men

9th Reinforcements (4th Jan 1915)......... 1% Army Reservists, 99% Special Reservists of which a third were post Aug 1914 recruits

From January 1915 onward, post declaration recruits dominate the data.

 

The key point is that this regiment had started to run out of Army Reservists by 20th Sep. By mid November 1914 Special Reservist made the majority of reinforcements and by late November they were dominant in the data. The trickle of Kitchener men starting in early November 1914 turns into a steady flow by the new year. The speed at which this happened is not properly understood by historians of the period. This is understandable because it would take a considerable time to rebuild the data.

 

The chart below shows the fate of the original battalion and how their numbers declined over the war. Half of the battalion had become casualties by the end of October 1914. The data on this chart partially overstates the numbers available as there was a lag between becoming a non-fatal casualty and being evacuated (the data includes men returned to the UK).

 

 

Edited 2 November , 2016 by Guest

[Gunner Bailey]

12 hours ago, QGE said:

The British OH implies only 40% of the BEF infantry first cohorts were regulars. The remainder were reservists who had less than one day's training per year, if they were lucky. I have severe doubts this was even achieved as some sources seem to imply training was done every second or third year after going to the Reserves.  The average time away from the colours was over three years, meaning the majority of the BEF had barely done one or two day's training in the three years before mobilization. One battalion had 60% of its reservists  men who were "3 & 9" rather than "7 & 5" meaning over a third of the Battalion had not been in uniform for a significantly longer  period. For rather complex reasons the Irish and Scottish and rural English regiments relied on a higher proportion of ldler reservists. The regiments that has been reduced from 4 to 2 regular battalions a few years prior to the War had a surplus  of Reservists. The point here - and it is critically important - is that the BEF was far from uniform. The Northumberland Fusiliers (recently reduced from 4 to 2 battalions) had more than double the number of regular Reservists available to the Connaught Rangers. Given their BEF battalions were annihilated and reinforced  to WE  and smashed again, it is clear that the Connaughts would be at a disadvantage. Unsurprisingly it was the Connaughts that had to merge its regular battalions -  a unique event in the annals of the Great War history of the regular army. Herein lies the rub: It was a physical impossibility for the Connaughts to compete with the Northumberland Fusiliers in sustained skill at arms simply because they didn't have the men and didn't have the reservists. Add to this the random annihilation of battalions and their need to almost completely reinforce 800 men, some battalions simply could not do this.  The mythology conveniently ignores these truths. 

 

The dregs of the Reserves arrived on the Western Front in mid Oct 1915. This is important too. It is before First Ypres. 

 

If the reservists only had one day a year of training why was the country covered by drill halls?

 

Please detail 'one day a year'. 

 

Also reservists mainly were ex regulars so had been fully trained.

 

 

[Muerrisch]

Easy. The Drill Halls in the main were for the TF.

 

As for continuation training of Army Reserves [ex-Regulars], MG actually overstates it.

 

I quote from my article in Stand To!, written jointly as a series of three with MG.

 

The Army Reserve Class I comprised Sections A., B., and D. There had been a C. but it was subsumed into B. On completing colour service a soldier was medically examined, issued with documentation, and entered A. or B.

Section A. was voluntary and limited by statute, each infantry regiment being allowed about 50 men on their books, and the Army total not to exceed 6000. The Section could be called out without Proclamation. These men had to be of “Good” character or better on a scale of: Exemplary, Very Good, Good, Fair, Indifferent, Bad and Very Bad. They were selected from those with the best musketry qualifications, were paid full infantry basic pay of 1/- per day, and could remain in the Section for a maximum of two years. There was no provision for continuation training.

“The Regulations for the training of the Army Reserve are issued annually. In the case of Section B. of the infantry, men enlisted for three years are required to train in the fifth, seventh, ninth, and eleventh year of their service, and those enlisted for more than three years in their tenth year of service. The training consists of one day's musketry instruction, or, if the man so prefers, six days' training with a Special Reserve unit”.  August 1909: ^thHansard. Section B. was the normal destination for the balance of the 12 years enlistment, and was on half-pay. 

Many men found the 6d per day a valuable supplement in hard times, so when it dried up, aged 30 or so, free of commitment to the Army, they volunteered for further reserve liability in Section D, four years at a time. The authorities used D. as a shock absorber, opening it to enrolment subject to medical examination when reserves were scarce. It was closed for infantry for eight months from 1^st October 1906 and for 18 months from 1^st June 1908. The quarterly payment was substantial, and, if one were so minded, paid for a great deal of beer at 3d per pint. Frank Richards in his Old Soldier Sahib: “In 1912 I extended my service for another four years on the Reserve. I little thought when I did so that two years later I should be called back to the Colours to rejoin my old Battalion again. Every quarter-day, or pen­sion-day as it was called, a number of us reservists and service pension wallahs would have a day off from our work to spend it together in the Castle Hotel”. There was provision for one day of continuation training.

Section D. was the cause of anxiety and controversy. It was not supposed to be used until A. and B. had been used up, and had been until recently part of the Army Reserve Class II. Some men would be as long as 16 years from enlistment. These would be unused to modern tactics and organisation, unaccustomed  to marching under loads, and unfamiliar with their officers. They had attracted much adverse comment after service in the Boer War.

 

In fact this inadequate Army Reserve was committed to the fray, and consumed by it, before Christmas 1914, together with the Special Reserve and even some of the early Kitchener men. In addition to the army of 1915 having few trained riflemen, the losses of junior leaders were disproportionate, so that the vital aspects of fire control and manoeuvre discipline were badly affected. Battalions were recording as early as November 1914 that they were bereft of trained NCOs, and we have already seen the truly shocking losses of junior officers. The wonder of it is that the tiny nuclei of regulars of all ranks held the army together through the harsh winter of 1914-15 so that the army lived to fight, and win, another day.

 

I have the greatest admiration for the Old Contemptibles but it does not blind me to the shortcomings, which were not of the soldiers' making.

Edited 27 October , 2016 by Muerrisch
addendum and corrigendum

[Guest]

2 hours ago, Gunner Bailey said:

If the reservists only had one day a year of training why was the country covered by drill halls?

 

Please detail 'one day a year'. 

 

Also reservists mainly were ex regulars so had been fully trained.

 

 

 

The terms of engagement for the infantry changed in the inter-war years. In the post Boer war years terms of engagement were "3 & 9" meaning 3 years with the Colours and 9 with the Reserve. This changed to "7 and 5". In addition there were Section D men who, having completed their Reserve obligations could extend for another 2 years on the reserve.

 

When the British Army mobilized 99% of Reservists reported for duty. Regiments' home-based battalions typically required many hundreds of Reservists to make up their numbers to War Establishment. We have exact data on each battalion's strength on the eve of war and can make an accurate estimate of minimum numbers required. In addition, around 70% of the BEF's battalions recorded the exact numbers taken in to replace unfit men and those undder the age of 19. I have the data if you need it. Many battalions also provided a breakdown of the Reservists' service and, importantly the number of years that had passed since they were last with the Colours. COs naturally wanted men who had left the Colours most recently, so as a rough guideline "7 &5" men were more desirable than "3 & 9" and Army Reservists were more desirable than Special Reservists. Again this process is recorded in many of the war diaries. There were simply not enough "7 & 5" men and every battalion had to mobilize with a proportion of "3 & 9" men.

 

Due to rather complex reasons anchored in recruiting patterns from 1902, the quantity and quality of Reservists varied considerably across regiments. At one extreme a reservist could have only left the Colours in July 1914. At the other extreme the oldest reservists would be a "3 & 9" man who left the colours in 1905, nearly nine years previously. If any of this cohort had gone on to Section D, it is quite possible that some had left the colours more than 10 years before and may have even fought in the Boer War. We know that just about every available fit Army Reservist eventually went out and as the Black Watch tells us, they were more or less all out in France by October 1914. Therefate the Special Resevists dominated the drafts (see Royal Sussex Regiment example above)

 

It follows that the training and skill at arms varied considerably across the Reserves - both Army Reserve and Special Reserve. This was observed by a number of diarists in unit war diaries during 1914. It was far from uniform. Some diarists commented on the poor skills of the reinforcements. . Very little of this filtered through into Regimental histories or the OH simply because preserving regimental reputations was far more important. One of the consequences of this sanitised history is the belief that the BEF was a thing of perfection. 

 

MG

 

 

 

Edited 27 October , 2016 by Guest
typos

[David Filsell]

No argument about decline - its was inevitable.

However the damning term "dregs" remains distasteful, and almost certainly not deserved of those sent out during Ypres. By the end of the battle  when rebuilding of battalions started - under less strenuous conditions - I am sure there was a considerable loss competence when rebuilding officer and others ranks numbers.

Certainly drafts contained very high levels of reservists, as did the original Expeditionary Force. That is a given in that it was a very small army inevitable equally levels of losses were far higher than anticipated . However the rebuilt force certainly remained adequate at least for the trench holding that continued in appalling conditions for some months.

Equally - and  while your reading may well be more extensive than mine, and your research most comprehensive - although t I have seem some accounts of relative and  inevitable post Ypres drafts' quality I have never seen the word dregs used of men sent who served the colours in late 14 and 15. I believe your comment about those who served the colours deserves modification or retraction.

[Guest]

18 minutes ago, David Filsell said:

No argument about decline - its was inevitable.

However the damning term "dregs" remains distasteful, and almost certainly not deserved of those sent out during Ypres.

 

It is a quote. I will dig up the source.