BEF 1914. Marksmanship, Musketry and the Mad Minute

[dansparky]

Earlier data for the Rifle Brigade,  admittedly it's rather patchy.    To possible factors effects and  the aftermath of Boer war and less concentration on musketry for these dates.  High Percentage of Marksmen and subsequent drop may indicate that more difficult tests were beginning to be introduced will have to check musketry regs etc.  Also, it is noticeable that percentage of third and second class falls (generally speaking).  However, the caveat is the inclusion of 1st Class shots and how this affects the classification of the individual soldier. 

[Guest]

14 minutes ago, ss002d6252 said:

 

Is there such a drop off in the other battalions ?

 

Craig

 

Oddly the per cent hits data was collated in a rather random way. The data is so sparse that it would have no statistical integrity other than being a point of interest. I am reluctant to drown the thread in data (didn't I just do that?) as I know there are many who are phobic about presenting a mass of info in hard factual form. I am rebuilding the data and if anyone is remotely interested I can email it, or maybe create an Appendix Thread that simply has the hard data with a link to this thread. 

 

Only 10 data points were recorded out of a potential 36, so any conclusions drawn from them could be rightly challenged. That said the 3rd Bn data has a run for four consecutive years: 30.0%... 28.5%...32.6%....28.3% from 1910-1913. I would stress that each datapoint is an average of hundreds of Riflemens' scores, so the counter-argument is that the data has integrity, albeit in fewer packages. Incidentally 32.6% was the highest on record.Two aimed shots in every three missed their target.

 

For pedants I will have all eight companies' musketry results for all 33 reports plus best shots etc transcribed this weekend. It should be a useful reference. And before you ask Dan, the answer is 'yes'. I will email a copy. It will be several hundred data points. What it should reveal is the very subtle variances between battalions, years and their strengths v establishment. I have a strong feeling that yound soldiers skewed the data and if this correlaton can be shown it will add weight to the arguments that refined musketry skills could not be learned quickly. This in itself would be an interesting thread on its own and would challenge some assumptions. I am pretty sure the authors who regurgitated the OH's broad, sweeping statements on British musketry might have benefitted from scratching the surface a bit. 

 

Back on topic: Who has the KRRC Chronicles? 

 

MG

 

 

Edited 4 November , 2016 by Guest

[dansparky]

23 minutes ago, QGE said:

 

 It almost feels neo-Victorian. Fourth Afghan War appears to have lasted longer than the Great War. I doubt that T Atkins (1914) is that much different to T Atkins (2016) with his hand to eye coordination. 

 

Yes 13.2%. An astonishingly low figure from a battalion with 31% Marksmen and 52% 1st Class shots. I have no idea what the implications are for Marksmanship v Musketry but it is a figure that absolutely demands investigation in my view.  MG

2

They don't make them like they used to lol.  The main question is how different was T Akins from 1900 different from that of 1914.  Increased standards and much better rifle.

 

That does definitely need investigating, there seems to be no correlation. 

[dansparky]

Thanks, Martin, I tried signing up to the Hathi Trust to access the KRRC and Rifle Brigade chronicles.  I also tried to see if I could log on via my institution (no luck :-(  )  Has anyone in the UK managed this?

[Guest]

1 minute ago, dansparky said:

Thanks, Martin, I tried signing up to the Hathi Trust to access the KRRC and Rifle Brigade chronicles.  I also tried to see if I could log on via my institution (no luck :-(  )  Has anyone in the UK managed this?

 We have GWF friends in the US. An appeal might help. I prefer to have direct access to the hard copy. I will have the RB and KRRC in hard copy as soon as they become available via Abe. 

 

MG

[stiletto_33853]

Dan,

 

Not sure where the data you placed on here comes from, i.e. 1904 has 1st, 3rd & 4th RB musketry results. These results go back pre Boer War in the Chronicles.

 

Andy

[dansparky]

5 minutes ago, stiletto_33853 said:

Dan,

 

Not sure where the data you placed on here comes from, i.e. 1904 has 1st, 3rd & 4th RB musketry results. These results go back pre Boer War in the Chronicles.

 

Andy

 

 

 

Hi There Andy,

 

Yes 1904, I made a note of 2nd battalion omitted as it does not appear in 1904.   1904 also holds 1903 results for the 3rd battalion.  My note for only 3rd battalion in 1904 was with regard to the 1903 figures.  I placed it in that column although it may not be clear.  Notes in row apply to that row.

 

Best Dan

Edited 4 November , 2016 by dansparky

[dansparky]

Martin,

 

Do you think the pre-1905 data and 1910 in particular correlate with a more demanding musketry tests?

 

In addition, I do not know to what extent the Magazine Lee–Enfield, SMLE MK1 (Intro 1904), SMLE MK2, (Intro 1906) ,SMLE MK3 (Intro 1907) differed.  I am aware of some points of difference, I am just wondering which model may prove the more taxing to get to grips with and how this could have affected the result.  As you say the introduction of the SMLE and the subsequent learning process may have affected musketry results, I am just wondering which change in rifles presented the most difficult challenge and whether or not we can see that in the figures around the year of introduction. 

 

Best Dan

[dansparky]

An amendment forgot to add 1902 only data is for 3rd battalion, for 1901 and 1902 they also add figures for revolver test.   I began to look at the figure of Merit but given gaps in data I think a comparison is meaningless.

[Guest]

12 hours ago, dansparky said:

Martin,

 

Do you think the pre-1905 data and 1910 in particular correlate with a more demanding musketry tests?

 

In addition, I do not know to what extent the Magazine Lee–Enfield, SMLE MK1 (Intro 1904), SMLE MK2, (Intro 1906) ,SMLE MK3 (Intro 1907) differed.  I am aware of some points of difference, I am just wondering which model may prove the more taxing to get to grips with and how this could have affected the result.  As you say the introduction of the SMLE and the subsequent learning process may have affected musketry results, I am just wondering which change in rifles presented the most difficult challenge and whether or not we can see that in the figures around the year of introduction. 

 

Best Dan

 Dan

 

1. I have no idea. 

 

2. I suspect the differences were small and that experienced riflemen adapted quickly. There is no point speculating. The Battalion notes in the Chronicles provide the necessary detail. One correspondent certainly did comment on the introduction of a new mark of rifle with regards to the less favourable Musketry test scores. It had been suggested very early on in the thread that good shots would be good shots with different rifles and that the transition from one rifle to another, particularly the various Marks of the SMLE would be easy. It is a reasonable assumption. Unfortunately the Rifle Brigade Chronicle seems to provide contrary evidence.

 

The interwar regulars only transitioned from various marks of the SMLE which saw gradual incremental change, so I suspect the impact was fairly limited. Looking at the musketry reports it is always useful to focus on the bad scoring years. There is usually some explanation and factors such as weather seem to loom large, particularly for battalions in India.

 

The Field firing is also a very large unknown quantity. There are humorous sketches in the RB Chronicles showing men scrambling over rocks on steep hillsides ding their field firing. How this compares to men doing the same on Salisbury Plain I do not know.  

 

The most interesting part is how low the recruits scored in their Tests (the RB Chronicle has data on this too). There is consistency between regiments: the recruits scores were close to half of the regular battalions. Given the Special Reserve had 30% turnover each year, it seems highly likely that the recruits or young soldiers' musketry scores would be structurally lower and by extension largely explain the differential between serving regulars and the Special Reserve. Where we don't yet have sight is the standard of musketry of the Army Reservists. A "3 & 9" Man eight years in civvy street would have had at best three days training in that period. This equates to 0.1% of the total time. I would argue that skill at arms diminishes over time* and requires constant practice. The Army at least believed so. It therefore seems highly improbably that the Reservists were remotely close to the regulars with their musketry. If the proportion of marksmen in a battalion could drop from 33% to 5% in a single transitionary year, I cant see how rusty reservists could do any better given their almost complete lack of training during their reserve obligation. Anyone who had gone to the Reserve before 1909 would never have fired Table B, unless he attended one of he few days training. 

 

We need to find some Reservists' musketry results and the percent of shots on target.  That would at least enable us to quantify the differentials.  

 

It would be interesting to discover if Table B changed during the War. Did the Army believe it was adequate or did it adjust the nature of the Test and the training behind it? MG

 

 

[Muerrisch]

Away from my sources today, but was there not also a new 0.303" ammunition introduced later than the SMLE, with different characteristics?

 

This might introduce another discontinuity.

[T8HANTS]

Just as an aside I remember reading an article concerning civilian shooting, that when the non service shooter could get their hands on the SMLE, scores went down.

This resulted in the NRA increasing the bull size by up to 2" for the longer ranges, and they remained this way until surplus P 14, & No 4 became readily available, which I thing was the late 1940's.

[Guest]

1 hour ago, Muerrisch said:

Away from my sources today, but was there not also a new 0.303" ammunition introduced later than the SMLE, with different characteristics?

 

This might introduce another discontinuity.

 

Yes. A very good point. In the Field there were two types of ammunition which also caused some problems in 1914. (diary evidence). MG

[David Filsell]

Away from refs. I think from memory Mk 7 ammunition - many thousands of rounds of which were ordered to be returned to the UK from Malta with the regular bns which joined 7th Inf. Div. from Malta. I believe that it was the London Scottish who had problems with rifle/ammunition compatibility at Ypres, and were reduced to single round loading. I have read no reports of other regular bns having similar problems, some one may of course "know different".

Edited 6 November , 2016 by David Filsell

[Guest]

35 minutes ago, David Filsell said:

Away from refs. I think from memory Mk 7 ammunition - many thousands of rounds of which were ordered to be returned to the UK from Malta with the regular bans which joined 7th Inf. Div. from Malta. I believe that it was the London Scottish who had problems with rifle/ammunition compatibility at Ypres, and were reduced to single round loading. I have read no reports of other regular bns having similar problems, some one may of course "know different".

 

 

1st Bn Irish Guards had a bad batch of duff ammunition that caused jams in Nov 1914. 

 

[Muerrisch]

Regarding ammunition I was wondering about the different characteristics of Mk VI compared with Mk VII. I have no idea who was issued with which, and when, but the muzzle evlocities, for starters, were very different: VI ' 2060 ft/sec, and VII @ 2440 ft/sec. 

 

Back home now, Musketry Regs Part I 1914 open at the right page. The good book sees fit to print two sets of  range versus height of trajectory above line of sight, one for each of VI and VII.

 

As to when Mk VII superceded Mk VI, we need an ammunition or rifle expert I suspect.

[Guest]

London Scottish. War Diary for 1st Nov 1914:

 

1st Nov 1914.  About 2:00 am the German attack came pass and through our trenches and they were then driven back by our reserve Company in a counter-attack.  This counter-attack was also assisted by a portion of C Coy who had earlier been withdrawn from the trenches.

 

About 3:00 am the Germans again broke through on our left and having now no reserve Company, it became necessary to retire in order to avoid capture.  The Companies in the trenches, however, hung on gallantly until daylight when, finding themselves surrounded, they fought their way out and fell back on WULVERGHEM and KEMMEL.

In front of KEMMEL a defensive position was maintained and at dusk the London Scottish concentrated at LA CLYTTE having been relieved in the firing line.

During the action 31st Oct / 1st Nov, the rifles Mark I * were proved to be very bad and nearly 50% are useless for rapid fire owing to faulty magazines and an enquiry is being made and it is expected that fresh rifles will be obtained if possible.

[Derek Black]

The 5th Black Watch were deficient in weapons after arrival in France.

They were using the MLE (long Lee) in April 1914, so preumably that's what they went to France with, although too few.

 

Thursday 5^th Nov 1914
Today was spent completing details of billets, and in arrangements for completing the Battalion in arms, equipment etc., still deficient.

They had ammunition issues in late 1914 too.

Tuesday 1^st Dec 1914
....O.C.'s reported that the men had had a lot of trouble with rifles jamming and bayonets flying off.

Wednesday 2^nd Dec 1914
A report was rendered on the jamming of rifles, which was largely due to dirt getting into the action of the rifle, and largely to the rifles being unsuited to the MARK VII ammunition.

Friday 4^th Dec, 1914
.... Companies reported some trouble with rifles. One rifle burst, but no one was injured.

Edited 5 November , 2016 by Derek Black

[Guest]

The 1/6th Bn Cheshire Regt rather thoughtfully kept some notes on mobiliation, presumably in the off-chance that the Battalion was ever mobilied again. I have long been curous to know if the WWI battaion read these notes. Anyway here they are in full. The highlighting is mine

 

31st Dec 1914.   Strength, Officers 26, WO 1, Other ranks 638.

APPENDIX I

Notes on mobilization, organization, education, training, equipment etc.

Mobilization proceeded smoothly according to the programme.  Pay books and identity discs should be kept up to date.  The name of a clerk should be registered for use on mobilization and he should be partially trained in military work.

The transport was a weak point, the civilian transport was generally unsuitable.  No remedy can be suggested for this except the provision of military transport.

Much might have been done in the time available for training had not the Battalion been frequently moved from place to place.  As it was, the training was thrown back several months.

Had the Battalion been encamped instead of being in billets, it would have been much better in the interests of training and discipline and would have eased the men into service conditions.  Much useful elementary knowledge can only be taught in barracks.

The practice of cleaning rifle and equipment has not hitherto been a sufficiently important part of the training.  It should be the duty of every man to keep his own rifle and bayonet clean.

The number of compulsory drills has not been sufficient.  Weekend camps should be more frequent and compulsory.

The equipment was very old.  It was replaced only five days before leaving ENGLAND.  The men did not know the rifle, the pull-off of which was different.  The rifles, being new, required use, practice with dummy cartridges and many minor adjustments before they could be considered thoroughly serviceable.

The first issue of boots was very bad.  It appears essential that boots should be kept as an article of mobilization stores and the turnover arranged for at the annual training.

A far greater percentage of Regular establishment is badly needed to ensure the smooth working of discipline and interior economy.  The fact that all ranks are drawn from the same district militates against perfect discipline.

The men were mainly young and many were of only moderate physique.  A far stricter medical examination would have been advisable.

The methods under which National Reservists were enrolled appear to be in need of revision.

The unequal treatment (financially) of men who rejoined the Colours caused much dissatisfaction.
 

Which perhaps suggest the challenges for the TF were considerable. I am trying to imagine the level of training between elite TF battalions and the Special Reserve.

 

Incidentally it was these chaps who were allegedly playing football with the Germans on Christmas Day 1914. MG

Edited 5 November , 2016 by Guest

[Guest]

9th Bn HLI War Diary reveals that they only became acquainted with the SMLE the day they embarked for total war and were trying to train men on the hoof so to speak. ....

 

3rd Nov 1914.  Battalion arrived at SOUTHAMPTON at 11:00 am.  Scarcely any of the stores etc indented for at DUNFERMLINE have reached us and we have been instructed to furnish fresh indents here.  We are also to draw the short rifle, the long bayonet and Mark VII ammunition by ½ Battalions tomorrow.  

Lt WEIR GRIEVE arrived from DEPTFORD with newly issued horses and vehicles.  No possibility of making men comfortable in the rest camp.

 

4th Nov 1914.  10:00 am.  Orders received that the Battalion will embark on the NOVIA at 2:30 pm today.  New rifles are to be drawn at 12:30 pm and 1:30 pm by ½ Battalions.  The shortness of notice given necessitated the cooking pots being packed on transport at once and men had little to eat.

6:00 pm.  The Battalion has drawn new rifles etc and has embarked.  A very large proportion of the stores etc indented for have again not been received owing to the timing of departure.

 

......

 

9th Nov 1914.  No time is being lost in commencing the training of the 320 men received from the Reserve Battalion last week.  They are big and well made, as well as being of an exceedingly good class but appear to have learned little or nothing of their duty as soldiers.  

They have been exercised today in loading and adjusting the sights of the new rifle and have had an hour's instruction in the attack and an hour in the use of the bayonet by the Adjutant.  They seem anxious to learn and make good progress.  During the afternoon the Battalion was ordered to entrench ground near by under the supervision of a RE Officer, who explained the type of trench now being used

 

....

 

25th Nov 1914.  The Battalion marched at 3:00 pm together with the remainder of the 5th INF BDE to KEMMEL, arriving there at 5:00 pm to relieve troops already occupying the trenches.  The distribution of the Battalion was as follows:  firing line,  A and ½ B Coys, supports ½ B Coy and ½ D Coy and C Coy.  Remainder in reserve.  

 

While marching out, the road was shelled in the vicinity of the Battalion but without effect.  The trenches occupied by A and ½ B Coys in the firing line were most inadequate, being too shallow in places and without any means of communication with the rear.  No effort was made to deepen them as the floor was found to be resting on the bodies of French soldiers covered with a few inches of earth and straw.  The night passed quietly with only desultory rifle fire from enemy's snipers.

 

28th Nov 1914.  A considerable quantity of stores indented for has arrived, including rifle oil, which we badly needed.  The rifles are new ones and jammed badly in the trenches.

 

 

Edited 5 November , 2016 by Guest

[David Filsell]

If I did not make my self clear - I think  nothing was wrong with either the rifles or the ammunition - simply that they were incompatible

[Guest]

32 minutes ago, David Filsell said:

If I did not make my self clear - I think  nothing was wrong with either the rifles or the ammunition - simply that they were incompatible

 

I thought you said the London Scottish was the only example. I must have mis-read it. Apologies.

 

The facts are that there were some problems with rifles, ammunition and (separately) their compatibility.  When we see examples of how the 1/9th Bn Highland Light Infantry went to war with nearly 40% of their number having been incorporated into the battalion only days before; the whole battalion receiving a weapon that they had never fired before on the very day they disembarked, and three weeks later in the line finding they didn't work, it raises questions over the British Army's preparedness for the War. They embarked exactly three months after War was declared. 

 

The 9th HLI's experience might indicate that parts of the BEF were wholly unprepared. The romantic claims in the Official History about the BEF being the best trained and equipped Army that ever left Britain's shores might have drawn a few wry smiles from any surviving 9th Bn HLI man who, facing the German Army, having squeezed the trigger of his new SMLE discovered it did not work. It doesn't matter how good one's musketry is if the weapon does not function. 

 

Incidentally the same problems happened at Gallipoli on quite a large scale. Oddly no-one was claiming the British Army's musketry skills were superior in this theatre of war which destroyed half of the fist Kitchener's Army, the 29th Div the RND, the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade the 42nd Div (TF) and most of three more TF Divisions and a few ANZACs for zero gain. Lessons of November 1914 were still not being applied a year later. The 1/5th HLI, 1/6th HLI and 1/7th HLI served there and I would be fascinated to know if they had read any notes of the 1/9th Battalion from 1914. 

 

MG

Edited 6 November , 2016 by Guest

[Steven Broomfield]

17 hours ago, Derek Black said:

Tuesday 1^st Dec 1914
....O.C.'s reported that the men had had a lot of trouble with rifles jamming and bayonets flying off.
 

Units of the Indian Corps had this issue. It was caused, I believe, by the 'new' rifle being issued on arrival in Marseilles, but not a 'new' bayonet. Although the bayonet they had fitted, it came off if the rifle was fired for any length of time. The War Diaries and unit histories refer to this in late '14 - effectivelt, with the rifles clogged with mud and the bayonet having fallen off, the jawans had no weapon.

[seaforth78]

21 hours ago, David Filsell said:

Away from refs. I think from memory Mk 7 ammunition - many thousands of rounds of which were ordered to be returned to the UK from Malta with the regular bns which joined 7th Inf. Div. from Malta. I believe that it was the London Scottish who had problems with rifle/ammunition compatibility at Ypres, and were reduced to single round loading. I have read no reports of other regular bns having similar problems, some one may of course "know different".

The 2nd Scottish Rifles (Cameronians) were part of the Malta garrison in 1911-1914 and wonder if their diarist mentions this big hiccup? 

[squirrel]

22 hours ago, David Filsell said:

Away from refs. I think from memory Mk 7 ammunition - many thousands of rounds of which were ordered to be returned to the UK from Malta with the regular bns which joined 7th Inf. Div. from Malta. I believe that it was the London Scottish who had problems with rifle/ammunition compatibility at Ypres, and were reduced to single round loading. I have read no reports of other regular bns having similar problems, some one may of course "know different".

Musketry regulations 1909 revised 1914 chapter II p 14/15 & diagram - magazines, p 50/51ammunition.

 

The No.3 magazine for the LLE, CLLE etc. and the Mk VI round had a 3  leaf spring.

The No.4 magazine for the SMLE and Mk VII ammunition had a 4 leaf spring.

The Mk VI round length 1.25 inches weight 630 grains.

The Mk VII round length 1.28 inches weight 556 grains.

 

Small differences but enough to make loading the lighter and slightly longer Mk VII round using the No.3 magazine problematical -

add some dust and/or mud to increase the difficulty with unfamiliar ammunition or rifle.