BEF 1914. Marksmanship, Musketry and the Mad Minute

[dansparky]

On 14/03/2016 at 13:56, QGE said:

The latest edition of the Journalof the Society for Army Historical Research has an article on "The Creators of the Mad Minute: The Careers of Brig Gen N R Macmahon and Major J A Wallingford" by Nicholas A Harlow.

An interesting read for anyone interested in the history of the mad minute. MG

 

 

Hi Mg, Any idea how i can access this?

 

Best Dan

[Guest]

The JSAHR is firmly entrenched in the Jurassic. Nothing online. All hard copy only available by subscription, payable by cheque. The main military libraries will have complete runs. The indexing is Annual or quarterly if memory serves. 

 

MG

[dansparky]

That's a shame would have been a good read.   Not the best business model. 

 

Ah well, thanks MG .

[dansparky]

On 28/11/2015 at 13:12, QGE said:

Due to the kindness of Grumpy we are able to compare Table B from the 1905 Musketry Regulations and the 1909 Musketry Regulations. At first glance they look similar, however on closer inspection they differ greatly.

The most striking differences are:

1. Number of rounds: Reduced from 295 to 250

2. Distances shot tend to be much shorter in the 1909 Regulations. Multiplying the number of rounds by distance for each exercise, the total 'rounds x distance' more than halves between 1905 and 1909.

3. The Classification Practices and Marksmen's Practices of 1905 effectively become split into Instructional Practices and Classification Practices in 1909

4. Fire Direction is a new category in 1909.

Below is a rough attempt at making a comparison. Any mistakes are mine. MG

Edit: It clearly raises the obvious questions as to how one can compare musketry results from 1905-1908 to 1909-1914 given the big differences in the test. The Marksmen in 1905 were shooting out to 1,000 yards whereas the Classification shoot was limited to 600 yards.

 

 

I have taken another look at this, thanks again to MG and Grumpy.  To try to ascertain why the Rifle Brigade may have had a noticeable drop  in performance for 1910.

 

1. Fewer rounds may leave less room for error for the final score. MG did yu mean 295 in 1905 and 175 in 1909? 

2. No Mad Minute in 1905 as MG pointed out, nor was there a rapid round 0f 10 (unloaded rifle), for one min.

3. shorter distances to fire in 1909 -  but seems to be far more, slow timed exercises in 1905 (five shots at 20s each = 1min 40 s), in comparison more focus on rapidity, appears in 1909.  Would firing of rapid aimed targets be much harder than targets further away (with admittedly a bit more time)? This does seem to show concerted shift- accuracy required but at a faster rate.

4. introduction of the crossing shot ( the target that moves across firer's front).  This does not appear to be in 1905 but does 1909. There is disappearing and appearing targets within 1905 but not cross firing targets.  Whilst this is not explicit 1909  other pages within musketry regs do mention these sort of targets, for example within snap shooting. 

 

 

further questions:

1. did the targets themselves dramatically change? for any or all types?  there is far more 1st class and second class targets mentioned in 1909, in comparison 1905 depicts far more 2nd class and 3rd class targets.  As I first read this my hypothesis was that first class would probably mean harder, smaller targets.  However, looking at plate 36 (1910 musketry regs) the second class target is smaller than the first.  The first class target is bigger, presumably because it is for longer distance practice, as indicated in the 1909 table. I have no idea if targets differed in 1905 (cannot get a copy anywhere) and to my knowledge is not within this thread, only targets for 1898.  Does anyone have this to share or know of any way to find 1905 in pdf format or to buy?

2. I have Musketry Regs part 2 1910, is 1909 greatly different? I also have Musketry Regs 1909 amended 1914, is this greatly different to original 1909?  Particularly with respect to the above?

Edited 7 November , 2016 by dansparky

[Guest]

8 hours ago, dansparky said:

further questions:

1. did the targets themselves dramatically change? for any or all types?  there is far more 1st class and second class targets mentioned in 1909, in comparison 1905 depicts far more 2nd class and 3rd class targets.  As I first read this my hypothesis was that first class would probably mean harder, smaller targets.  However, looking at plate 36 (1910 musketry regs) the second class target is smaller than the first.  The first class target is bigger, presumably because it is for longer distance practice, as indicated in the 1909 table. I have no idea if targets differed in 1905 (cannot get a copy anywhere) and to my knowledge is not within this thread, only targets for 1898.  Does anyone have this to share or know of any way to find 1905 in pdf format or to buy?

2. I have Musketry Regs part 2 1910, is 1909 greatly different? I also have Musketry Regs 1909 amended 1914, is this greatly different to original 1909?  Particularly with respect to the above?

 

I don't have the answers to these questions. They will of course simply be laid out in the earlier Musketry Regs. 

 

The whole nature of the course changed. It is an interesting exercise to add up the total yards of each test and also look at the average for each. The differences are far greater than the similarities and the 1909 test is the product of McMahon's work.

 

One interesting factor is that a man going to the Reserve before the 1909 Musketry Test might never have fired it, or at best fired it a few times during his Reserve training. These represented close to half of all Reservists in the line Infantry. Given it took professional soldiers time to adjust to the new test, one might consider how the Reservists did it in only a few days. MG

Edited 8 November , 2016 by Guest

[dansparky]

That's a very good point MG, looking back at the tests there were more likely to have taken there would have been less emphasis on rapidity (which is obviously a very important point in relation to this thread), or targets traversing the enemies front.   The time to adjustment, lack of exposure to 1909 test, prolonged absence from service would have made it an even more difficult task to fire with rapidity.  But then again as we have mentioned in this thread, the rapidity we are talking about was used only on occasion. 

 

Hopefully, I will manage to obtain a copy of the 1905 Regs so I can compare.  Thanks to this thread we at least have some useful pages from the 1898 regs.  (only downside is the lack of data from Rifle Battalion before 1905, and as such 1898  holds less relevance).

 

I have found the statistical data you shared extremely interesting. It is far more compelling than just anecdotes or musketry record (such as 38 shots).  Having said that there is an incredible amount of variables when trying to establish proficiency of the B.E.F as a whole.   If data exists for reservists or other elements, it would be interesting.

[dansparky]

Just thought i would share this...  German fire great (not quantified, individual or mass, i suspect the latter), but inaccurate.  It is part of a report received by Montgomery Massingberd 26.09.14, it looks like it may be written by Haldane but I can't make it out?

[dansparky]

On 22/10/2016 at 20:56, David Filsell said:

There was a times report that a German Army observer at Britsh pre war manoeuvres commented on the skill of British infantry in fire and movement.

 

Do you mean Col GADKE?  In this article (October 17th 1910), he does not specifically say that, if this is the right article.  He says that:

1) raw materials i.e. soldiers second to none. moral qualities, coolness, daring evident but more is needed in a continental war.

2)organisation, tactics, training, leadership partly amended since the Boer war, colonial wars.

3) understanding of high commanders distinctly lacking, not familiar with new organisation in manoeuvres passive, leaders lose their heads etc etc

 

He does say, units fail to support each other and fight their own individual battles. So supporting fire and supporting movements not very good.

Edited 15 November , 2016 by dansparky

[David Filsell]

DanS,

Apologies, I have not yet found the piece, I certainly recall the comment about fire and movemen. Away from home ar the moment. Will have another attempt to track it Down on return.

Apologies

David

[dansparky]

Hi David

 

That's ok, I just thought that is the piece you meant.  If your interested I have that article and subsequent British rebuttals.  

 

Best Dan

[Guest]

Continual Training in Rapid Firing. Some examples from the 4th Bn Grenadier Guards* which show the importance of continual training. There are dozens of examples of firing practice in almost every period when out of the line throughout the war. What is interesting is the relative importance of rapid firing. Of the 50 rounds per man allocated to a musketry test in Jun 1917, 30 rounds (60%) was allocated to the mad minute at 200 yards and 300 yards. In October of the same year again 60% of the available rounds were allocated to the mad minute. This is a significant change from the standard Table B test which allocated only 6% of the rounds to the mad minute. 

 

While not conclusive proof, this might suggest that being able to fire 15 rounds in a minute was considered more important as the war progressed. My speculation. As a corollary to rapid firing, the men were also trained in rapid loading. MG

 

22nd Feb 1916.

Intensely cold – snow and hail storms. Battalion had the use of the French range yesterday for two hours and practised rapid fire. Battalion exercised in Bombing attacks today by Companies with live bombs. Lecture by OC Brigade Bombing Company.

 

24th Jul 1916. 

Two Companies in the Chateau, employed in building dug-outs and exercised in bayonet fighting rapid loading etc.

 

23rd Apr 1917. 

First day of Training, The Battalion did arm drill etc under the Battalion Staff for ¾ hour and then Companies were handed over to Company Commanders  for training. The Training consisted of elementary Platoon training and cycle lectures inside each Company of about 20 minutes each on musketry, rapid loading, bayonet fighting, bombing including the use of German bombs, rifle grenade firing and Lewis gun instruction.

Weather: Fine but cold.

 

16th Jun 1917. 

Firing range commencing 06:00. The snap-shooting practice at 200 yards and the deliberate practice at 400 yards were finished by 11:00.

 

The Battalion averages in the various practices were as follows:

200 yds application         5 rounds   1st Class Figure Target                             11.91

200 yds rapid                 15 rounds   2nd Class Figure Target    1 min              20.53

300 yds application         5 rounds   1st Class Figure Target                            11.69

300 yds rapid                 15 rounds   1st Class Figure Target     1 min              22.58

200 yds snap-shooting   5 rounds     Head & Shoulders            4 sec exp         5.14

400 yds application        5 rounds    1st Class Figure Target                             10.71

 

25th Oct 1917. 

08:50. The Battalion left billets to join the Brigade column marching to the Review.

11:30. The  Review by the C-in-C commenced. The Review was over by 12:15 and the Battalion marched over to the Range where cookers had already arrived and had dinners prior to shooting during the afternoon.The practices fired were all at 200 yards on account of the very high wind which was blowing. 5 rounds application and 5 rounds in 20 seconds for every man in the Battalion and then 15 rounds rapid in one minute for the 8 best shots in each Platoon. The Battalion left the range at 16:35 and arrived back in billets at 18:00

 

* 4th Bn Grenadier Guards war diary is a very detailed war diary by any standards. 

[Guest]

Continual Training in Rapid Firing II. These examples from the 2nd Bn Grenadier Guards. Incidentally there is a very unusual example of training for night operations during the day with darkened glasses. MG

 

22nd Sep 1915.

In billets at CAMPAGNE-LES-BOULONNAIS.

Battalion fired 10 rounds rapid per man with smoke helmets on.

 

13th Jun 1917.

The Battalion fired on TILQUES RANGE from 06:00 until 16:30. Practices slow and rapid at 200 and 300 yards. A fine day.

 

14th Jun 1917.

The Battalion fired on TILQUES RANGE from 06:00 and on completion of shooting at 17:30 marched back to RENESCURE through the outskirts of ST OMER. The following practices were fired: slow, rapid and snap-shooting at 200 yards with fixed bayonets. Total scores:

 

No. 1 Company      85.2

No. 2 Company      84.8

No. 3 Company      89.9

No. 4 Company      84.0

Battalion average 86.5

 

The Battalion has benefited much by this musketry.

 

7th -10th Jul 1918.

Scouting and patrolling by day, by men wearing darkened glasses which produce a night effect was carried on by Companies under the Battalion Intelligence Officer, 2 Lt S C K GEORGE and competitions were carried out both for shooting and for the best construction of a new shelter. In the first competition one NCO and 6 men from Battalion Headquarters shot against any other section in the Battalion. All Companies entered two sections and three events were shot off -  slow, rapid and an improvised event in which competitors approached the firing point from the rear and under the direction of their Section Commander had to knock out as many particularly concealed objects as possible in two minutes. Result:

 

1st    Headquarters

2nd   No. 4 Company

3rd   No. 2 Company

 

10th – 15th Aug 1918.

In Reserve at RANSART. The weather was very fine throughout and much invaluable training was done which included musketry, dribbling, the Platoon in advance and silent patrolling. A shooting competition also was held, each platoon entering a section to compete in rapid and snap shooting. A prize was offered for Company teams of Sergeants and one for Corporals and a team of Officers was defeated by a very narrow margin by a team of picked Sergeants.

 

 

Edited 27 November , 2016 by Guest

[Guest]

 

 

 

Continual Training in Rapid Firing III. The 3rd Bn Grenadier Guards Training Notes from October 1916

 

Musketry and Bayonet Fighting will be done in gas helmet order by all ranks (especially young Officers and drafts.) Helmets to be worn for at least 20 minutes. In musketry attention is to be paid to the following:-

 

(i)         The Firing Position

(ii)      Aiming (aiming discs)

(iii)   Rapid Loading (dummies)

(iv)      Control by fire Unit Commander

(v)         Descriptive Points (clock method)

(vi)      Special Practice for Snipers and Lewis Gunners.

 

Officers and NCOs will be examined in all the Military Subjects in which they should be proficient. Leave will not be granted to those who are not proficient.

 

Company Commanders will render to the Orderly Room by 18:00 daily the programme of work for the next day. The return will be made out as follows:-

 

Hour         No. Company Training     Place

 

08:30        Musketry                 In field 200

 to          descriptive points       yards NE of

09:30        & rapid loading.         Company HQ

 

Edited 27 November , 2016 by Guest

[stiletto_33853]

Something that had been causing me a few niggles regarding a certain aspect of this thread, having dug out the reservists in my own sphere of interest who had been taken POW in 1914.

 

This is not in anyway an attempt to put down reservists  which the BEF could not have done without, but something rather that stuck in my mind. Just had to remember where I had seen this so had to dig through a lot of papers on my cloud to locate this reference.

 

I draw your attention to the Statement Smith-Dorrien released in a small book form in response to Lord Roberts book 1914 (First Edition).

 

Andy

Edited 3 December , 2016 by stiletto_33853

[stiletto_33853]

Source

[Guest]

1 hour ago, stiletto_33853 said:

Something that had been causing me a few niggles regarding a certain aspect of this thread, having dug out the reservists in my own sphere of interest who had been taken POW in 1914.

 

This is not in anyway an attempt to put down reservists  which the BEF could not have done without, but something rather that stuck in my mind. Just had to remember where I had seen this so had to dig through a lot of papers on my cloud to locate this reference.

 

I draw your attention to the Statement Smith-Dorrien released in a small book form in response to Lord Roberts book 1914 (First Edition).

 

Andy

 

 

Andy

 

A very interesting discovery. It is the only time I have seen any Officer criticise the Reservists in a publication. It is also interesting that he specifically cites Reservists breaking rather than regular serving men. I cant see how one could easily differentiate. Presumably he is basing this in information from anonymous 'Regimental Officers' and their alleged statements rather than his own observations. 

 

5th Division of course was the formation commanded by Fergusson who had exhorted his men to fight to the last, promising that he would be in the last ditch with them. He wasn't of course. It is interesting that they didn't and in SD's view 'first broke'. We need to remember that the per centage of Reservists in the 5th Div was around 60% and hundreds of them didn't 'break' and ended up as POWs, a large proportion wounded. 

 

More interestingly I have never seen this quoted in any published history. Thanks for posting. MG

Edited 3 December , 2016 by Guest

[Muerrisch]

A dispassionate view might be that OF COURSE the reservists would be less reliable.

 

Not because of inherent lack of personal qualities, but because the system [the politicians, themselves mandated by the electorate] relied on reservists and then failed to prepare them adequately.

 

My case in point is the contrasting fortunes of the two regular battalions of RWF. It is heresy in the hushed precincts of the RWF but I do wonder if 2nd RWF [with not a large proportion of reservists, and the ones taken were hand- picked because the battalion had first choice] might have fared better than 1st RWF at First Ypres. Alternatively, they might have been wiped out, as opposed to very many being taken as PoW. This is not to impugn the valour of 1st RWF [or any unit], but they had to put up with the reservists rejected by their sister battalion.

 

[Guest]

4 hours ago, Muerrisch said:

A dispassionate view might be that OF COURSE the reservists would be less reliable.

 

Not because of inherent lack of personal qualities, but because the system [the politicians, themselves mandated by the electorate] relied on reservists and then failed to prepare them adequately.

 

My case in point is the contrasting fortunes of the two regular battalions of RWF. It is heresy in the hushed precincts of the RWF but I do wonder if 2nd RWF [with not a large proportion of reservists, and the ones taken were hand- picked because the battalion had first choice] might have fared better than 1st RWF at First Ypres. Alternatively, they might have been wiped out, as opposed to very many being taken as PoW. This is not to impugn the valour of 1st RWF [or any unit], but they had to put up with the reservists rejected by their sister battalion.

 

 

 

I know you know this Grumpy, but for the benefit of others following this thread,  the RWF as one of the best recruited regiments in the Army is not the best of benchmarks. It's home based 2nd Bn required the smallest number of Reservists of all the Home based battalions on mobilitzation. When we look across the whole infantry the asymmetry between Home based and Overseas based battalions was even greater,

 

On the demand side of the equation: The Home based Battalions required (on average) 591 Reservists compared to 232 per Overseas battalion (on average); equivalent to two-and-a-half times more; the implications being that not only did the Home based battalions get the pick of the bunch, they also took (on average) a significant majority. I have only seen one example where Reservists were prioritised for the Overseas battalion. While the overseas battalions were nominally at full establishment, there was still a reasonable amount of swapping out men who were medically unfit for the rigours of active service.  Added to this the Peace Establishment of Battalions based on the various outposts of the Empire varied, meaning their theoretical requirements to come from Peace Establishment to War Establishment (including First Reinforcements) depended largely on where they were initially based; If we focus on the Rank and File alone:

 

Peace Establishments:

India.........................940 .... typically at full establishment

Other Colonies.........840.....typically at full establishment

UK............................720.....typically well below establishment

UK ( Foot Guards)....650.....often below establishment 

 

On the supply side of the equation: the number of available Army Reservists per paired battalion varied; The average per paired battalion was 1,026 Army Reservists, however this masks wide differences: The Northumberland Fusiliers (reduced to two regular battalions from 4 in 1907) had 1,763 Army Reservists. At the other end of the scale the Connaught Rangers had only 674.  At risk of stating the obvious, the moblisation of the 2nd Bn Connaught Rangers would have nearly utilised all their available Army Reservists. By time the Overseas based battalions of 7th Div, 8th Div British battalions of the Indian Divisions of IEFA  and  were beginning to replenish their depleted ranks post the devastation of First Ypres, the quantity and quality (read: training, years away from the colours) of Reservists would have been significantly lower. Of this there should be no doubt given the diary evidence. The 1st Bn Connaught Rangers would have been in a much worse position than most battalions. When Irish recruiting difficulties are thrown into the mix, It is no coincidence that Connaught Rangers' regular battalions were amalgamated in Dec 1914 only four months into the War. 

 

The other major swing factor was the occasional annihilation of Battalions and their subsequent rebuilding draining large proportions of residual reservists. 

 

In theory the Reservists at Le Cateau in the 5th Div that Smith-Dorrien criticised would have been the pick of the bunch. The known dynamics (above) and scores of diarists' comments make French's comments that "the condition of the Reservists was excellent and constantly improving" seem quite unlikely and SD's counter-claims more likely.  MG

 

 

Edited 4 December , 2016 by Guest

[David Filsell]

DanS

Been through all my written stuff - I know I've used the German comments somewhere though. Now moving on to boxes of notes - not a happy task

Apologies

David

Later

Boxes now checked - nothing

It would be helpful to have a copy of the piece have quoted.

Sorry to have been so long in replying and in finding nothing to support my comments about field craft - most annoying.

My apologies.

 

Edited 5 December , 2016 by David Filsell

[stiletto_33853]

Just for your reference Martin, here is a piece written by Major Walker of the 59th Field coy. R.E. on their mobilisation and 1914 in France.

[Guest]

7 minutes ago, stiletto_33853 said:

Just for your reference Martin, here is a piece written by Major Walker of the 59th Field coy. R.E. on their mobilisation and 1914 in France.

 

Very nice. Thank you. It is interesting to note the period that had lapsed since holding a rifle. I assume he was referring to his own RE Field Compnay, who in theory had the same Musketry training and tests as the Infantry and cavalry. MG

[Muerrisch]

Of significance is that the RE reservists were treated as per the infantry and cavalry, so the "eight years" [regarding which I have blathered on about herein] easily applied to the latter two arms.

 

Continuation training? None worth a farthing. This can not be levelled at the army, it was a matter for Parliament and the Treasury.

[Guest]

The 59th Field Coy war dairy recorded the same...more fragments that might suggest the musketry skills were far from uniform.  Interesting that they 'show very poor form' .... MG

 

Edited 14 December , 2016 by Guest

[dansparky]

On 05/12/2016 at 14:46, David Filsell said:

DanS

Been through all my written stuff - I know I've used the German comments somewhere though. Now moving on to boxes of notes - not a happy task

Apologies

David

Later

Boxes now checked - nothing

It would be helpful to have a copy of the piece have quoted.

Sorry to have been so long in replying and in finding nothing to support my comments about field craft - most annoying.

My apologies.

 

 

Thanks for looking for me David. 

[dansparky]

It appears that targets in 1905 were slightly bigger than they were by 1910.  eg 1905: first-class targets 6x8 feet, diameter of bull 3 feet, inner 5. 1910: 6x 6 feet, diameter of bull 2 feet, inner 4 feet.  Again this demonstrates that measures were taken to increase proficiency further.  Musketry returns standards increased as tests became more demanding and targets became smaller.  So at least amongst the regulars, musketry standards increased significantly under peacetime conditions.  

 

Thanks Muerrisch for the information.

One further point to add differences in target size are only targets used for classification ranges and the elementary figure target (for 30 yards ranges) appears to be smaller.  The long-range sighting target (30 yards ranges), targets for field practices and the spacing of the crossing targets remained the same.  This to me indicates that targets were only made smaller for examination purposes. 

 

Edited 15 December , 2016 by dansparky