BEF 1914. Marksmanship, Musketry and the Mad Minute

[Steven Broomfield]

15 hours ago, QGE said:

 Unsurprisingly it was the Connaughts that had to merge its regular battalions -  a unique event in the annals of the Great War history of the regular army. Herein lies the rub: It was a physical impossibility for the Connaughts to compete with the Northumberland Fusiliers in sustained skill at arms simply because they didn't have the men and didn't have the reservists.

 

Until such time as new enlistments arrived at the front (and I don't know when that was), surely the quality of the Connaught Rangers would be unaffected: it would be the quantity which suffered. Just because there were fewer of them doesn't impact, surely, on the skill of the survivors?

[Guest]

2 hours ago, Steven Broomfield said:

Until such time as new enlistments arrived at the front (and I don't know when that was), surely the quality of the Connaught Rangers would be unaffected: it would be the quantity which suffered. Just because there were fewer of them doesn't impact, surely, on the skill of the survivors?

 

The Connaught Rangers started from the lowest base in that it had the lowest number of Army Reservists in the line infantry in July 1914. This was a function of poor historical recruiting and high attrition of Reserves during peace time.  By contrast the Northumberland Fusiliers had the highest: more than double nearly three times the number of Reservists available to the Connaught Rangers, meaning that their Battalions could draw on double three times the number of 7&5 men. This was simply a function of the fact that the Northumberland Fusiliers had been reduced from 4 regular battalions to 2 in 1907-08. In fact it would be more than double three times "7 & 5" men as those going to the Reserve earlier as part of the reduction in the Fusiliers would largely have been "7 & 5" men. A trawl of the 1914 Star data would give exact numbers and proportions.

 

The Northumberland Fusiliers could replace a significantly higher proportion of their casualties with 7 & 5 men due to the large pool of available men. By contrast the Connaught Rangers would be drawing down "3 & 9" much earlier and the proportion of older Reservists serving in the battalion in 1914 would be much higher. The Connaught Rangers also ran out of Reservists earlier than the Northumberland Fusiliers. In addition recruiting Kitchener men was worse in Connaught than in any other part of the country, so the Regiment couldn't do a 'Black Watch' and accelerate enough Kitchener men through training to fill the gaps. 

 

Data for July 1914

 

Edited 27 October , 2016 by Guest

[Guest]

Here is the breakdown of the numbers entering the Army Reserve each year. It provides some idea of the skew towards certain years and the legacy of the post Boer War reductions. All these men would in theory be liable for service in 1914. Not shown is the net declines (death, discharged, Transfers to the Colours, Struck Off, Other causes) which slightly reduces each cohort. Note that this is for the whole Regular Army, not just the Infantry. It does not include the Special Reserve.  Some relevant facts:

 

More than half of Reservist had entered the Reserve before 1909

More than two thirds of Reservists had entered the Reserve before 1911

 

MG

 

 

Edited 27 October , 2016 by Guest

[Guest]

The composition of the 2nd Bn Suffolk Regt when it left Ireland for France on the 13th Aug 1914 was: - 

Officers.........................................................................27
Regular Soldiers.........................................................563
Reservists, 9 years Colour and 3 years Reserve.......145
Reservists, 8 years Colour and 4 years Reserve.........49
Reservists, 7 years Colour and 5 years Reserve.........27
Reservists, 3 years Colour and 9 years Reserve.......178

 

18% of the Battalion that disembarked in Aug 1914 had been away from the Colours for between 7 and 9 years. The Battalion was annihilated at Le Cateau losing 600 men who had to be replaced. The Regiment started mobilization with 975 Army Reservists. the 2nd Bn required 399 for moilization (one of the lowest on record) meaning there were just 576 Army Reservists left in mid Aug 1914. The losses at Le Cateau would require every single Army Reservist and still the battalion would be under War Establishment. 

 

A number of Line Infantry battalions had a similar single-event catastrophe which require a very high proportion of their Reserves to make good. MG

Edited 27 October , 2016 by Guest

[seaforth78]

Martin

 

Would you have a similar breakdown for the Norfolk Regiment in August and for the Northumberland Fusiliers? I noticed that the latter battalion did not suffer as much as let's say the Cheshires, Suffolks or the Royal Irish Rifles or indeed the Norfolks but got their punishment after Aisne. 

[Guest]

1 hour ago, seaforth78 said:

Martin

 

Would you have a similar breakdown for the Norfolk Regiment in August and for the Northumberland Fusiliers? I noticed that the latter battalion did not suffer as much as let's say the Cheshires, Suffolks or the Royal Irish Rifles or indeed the Norfolks but got their punishment after Aisne. 

 I am afraid not. The Suffolk data was simply how the diarist decided to record it. Most battalions simply recorded the totals without any breakdown. The level of detail in the Suffolk diary is reasonably rare. The Cameronians recorded:

 

"The number of men who enlisted for 3 years with the colours and 9 years Reserve Service and who were mobilised in the month of August 1914 and were posted to the 1st Bn Cameronians is 329"

 

Which implies close to a third of the Battalion came from this category. Tis simply illustrates a wide spread across battalions. Compare to the Suffolks' 18%. There are enough data-points to get a good idea of how dependent on Reservists the BEF was;  Here is a snippet from the East Surrey Regt which provides an idea of prevailing attitudes towards the '3 years' men

 

6th Aug 1914. 2nd Day of Mobilization.  402 Reservists arrived from Depot about 4:00 pm.  Posted to Companies and instructed in fitting equipment and Line Discipline at one began.  About half these men had left the Colours as long as 6 and 8 years, many having only done 3 years with the Colours.  Programme for the day completed.

 

7th Aug 1914. 3rd Day of Mobilization.  242 Reservists arrived from Depot about 6:00 am.  Most of these men having left the Colours more recently were better trained and as far as possible replaced the 3 years men posted to Companies the previous day.  

 

8th Aug 1914.  4th Day of Mobilization. 50 Reservists arrived from Depot about 10:00 am.  These men had only recently left the Colours and with the inclusion of them enabled the Battalion to mobilize with but few 3 years men in the ranks.   

The 1st Reinforcements however which were formed today under Capt J K T WHISH with 99 other ranks were chiefly composed of these men.  

 

Note the reference to the men being 'better trained'. MG

Edited 27 October , 2016 by Guest

[Guest]

Edmonds in the OH 1914 pages 286 and 440:

 

"The number of reservists in the ranks was on average over one half of full strength and  owing to the force of circumstances the units were hurried away to the area of concentration before all ranks could resume acquaintance with their officers and comrades and re-learn their business as soldiers .......

 

 ...... It is significant of the heavy and unexpected wastage that within a month of firing the first shot, the supply of Regular Reservists for many regiments had been exhausted, and that men of the Special Reserve - the Militia of old days - were beginning to take their place"

 

Letter to Edmonds, author of the OH 1914  from an Officer of the Queen's (Royal West Surrey Regiment)

 

"...the first draft after 31st October which joined us on the 9th November was a good one, consisting of reservists almost entirely. After that we fell off sadly in quality as well as quantity. The 2nd Battalion was also short of personnel and was filled up prior to the 1st Battalion owing to the latter being in corps troops.
   It was only in January 1915 that a C Company could be formed from a draft which joined the Battalion at Hinges. D Company was formed about February 1915. The men who joined us in January-February were very untrained and any sprinkiling of trained NCOs and men amongst them were mostly medically unfit.
   I remember one draft in particular which joined us at Chocques in March 1915 and 75 per cent of whom were returned to the Base within a week as medically unfit. I should say that the majority of our drafts after 1st December were only partially trained."

 

Queen's Own Royal West Kent Regt:

 

9th Aug: . 9:00 am to 1:00 pm (Sunday) Coys carried out short route marches of about 6 miles. All the Reservists marched well. The 1908 Pattern Infantry  Web Equipment was issued to the Battalion in October 1909, so that any Reservists who had left the Battalion before that date had never carried this equipment.

 

Edited 27 October , 2016 by Guest

[David Filsell]

I really do not think one quote justifies it for me, any more than I suspect it would you. You presented it as a statement of fact. That said I have made my point, I consider it sweeping and intemperate and will leave the point there.

[trajan]

On a side but possibly related issue re: reservists, I have always had the impression that the German army in WW1 was much more prepared and advanced on this issue of proper training, etc., among the "reserves". And so the several Reserve, Ersatz, and even Landwehr units that were in front-line service in the GW, many of them providing excellent service.

[Gunner Bailey]

Regarding reservists they were all ex regulars (as opposed to Territorials) and quite simply you do not lose basic shooting skills. It's a life skill like riding a bike or driving. If you can shoot you can shoot.

 

The quality of reservist and Territorials varied inevitably but the core of the BEF's skills was still there.

 

At present this debate has not revealed any new research that will undermine the reputation of the BEF and their marksmanship, It's all conjecture so far and not enough to re write history.

 

John

[Muerrisch]

Regarding reservists they were all ex regulars (as opposed to Territorials) and quite simply you do not lose basic shooting skills. It's a life skill like riding a bike or driving. If you can shoot you can shoot.

 

The quality of reservist and Territorials varied inevitably but the core of the BEF's skills was still there.

 

At present this debate has not revealed any new research that will undermine the reputation of the BEF and their marksmanship, It's all conjecture so far and not enough to re write history.

 

John

 

Your query about Drill Halls, and your curiosity regarding continuation training at #471, having been answered, have in no way influenced your opinions.

One wonders why you asked, and indeed why you did not thank me. These were clearly aspects regarding which you knew nothing, and took me many hard yards to establish.

 

I disagree with you about the bulk of the research presented above: it is original, it is not conjecture but hard facts, and it shines a light in some dark corners. You do not have a monopoly of admiration for the Old Contemptibles, 

[David Filsell]

Certainly some postings seem out on a limb. Some claims are drawn without sufficient evidence in my book. As I have said I am not part of the "perfect thing apart' persuasion, but some questions have gone unanswered by pre convinced Expeditionary Force nay Sayers. More sure and certain facts, not least about the quality of reservists are essential. There's certainly a book of detailed uncontravertable fact in the subject.

[Guest]

2 hours ago, Gunner Bailey said:

Regarding reservists they were all ex regulars (as opposed to Territorials) and quite simply you do not lose basic shooting skills. It's a life skill like riding a bike or driving. If you can shoot you can shoot.

John

 

Personally I believe musketry skills do diminished over time and do diminish with lack of practice. If they didn't why would the Army bother with continuous training or annual musketry tests for its trained men. Why would it hold pre-war musketry competitions. Why would regimental journals report their delight in improving musketry scores. Why, after four years of continuous warfare would battalions and brigades hold musketry competitions. If your thesis holds true there would be no need for musketry training once a recruit had passed his Table A. He would, in theory, have the skills and never lose them. The Army clearly thought continual training and annual testing was necessary, but even this was not enough. It introduced financial reward as an incentive for improved musketry. A Marksman was not considered a marksman for life. He only held that award (and its financial benefit) for one year. He had to achieve a marksman's score on his annual test to retain this. This alone should indicate that the Army at least did not think achievements in marksmanship or musketry were perpetual. 

 

I simply don't believe that a Reservist who last served with the colours nine years before and perhaps 3 days of training during his Reserve service could come anywhere close to a serving soldier. Musketry is far more than aiming at a static target on a range. 

 

Separately, this is not about trying to 'undermine the reputation of the BEF and their marksmanship'. Their achievements against considerable odds are well documented. If one cares to re-read the OP, this is about exploring the concept promoted by Edmonds and the OH that the BEF had superior musketry skills and as an adjunct of that whether the German army mistook the British Army's rapid fire for machine gun fire. 

 

MG

Edited 27 October , 2016 by Guest

[Muerrisch]

David could I trouble you to give an example or two, naming authors, of " claims drawn without sufficient evidence" ? 

 

I hope that I am not one of them but would happily scratch any itches if needs be.

 

Apart from the number-crunching which is obviously quantitative rather than qualitative, we have a substantial weight of comment from the units receiving reservists. I am currently reading the new history of the Scots Guards and wish that I had noted the adverse comments on their own and other regiments replacements.

[David Filsell]

I think my views have been clearly made. None were directed at individuals.  This is a fascinating debate. Much of value has come out of it so far and some that I feel has draw a long bow without absolute evidence. But it has been thus far, frank, fascinating and without rancour.  Perhaps I should have been clearer and said "which I consider, think, feel, may etc etc" or something of the like. if I have caused you or others offences it was  unintended. 

Edited 27 October , 2016 by David Filsell

[Muerrisch]

Thank you. I am not offended.

[Gunner Bailey]

The way this thread's going people will be saying the Generals were Donkeys and that the Lions were actually Pussycats.

 

Neither of which I agree with. There seems however a direction in the thread to diminish the skills and the memories of a group of men who out numbered vastly by the enemy yet inflicted huge damage on them and not by chance.

 

 

Edited 28 October , 2016 by Gunner Bailey

[Muerrisch]

1 hour ago, Gunner Bailey said:

The way this thread's going people will be saying the Generals were Donkeys and that the Lions were actually Pussycats.

 

Neither of which I agree with. There seems however a direction in the thread to diminish the skills and the memories of a group of men who out numbered vastly by the enemy yet inflicted huge damage on them and not by chance.

 

 

 

I prefer facts to mythology and propaganda. Its a personal thing. Each to his/her own.

[Guest]

The Adjutant of the Northumberland Fusiliers on 11th Aug 1914, just a few days before embarking:

 

11th Aug 1914.  100 NCOs and men arrived from the Depot to replace unsuitable reservists.90 NCOs and men who were considered unsuitable left for depot.

 

Despite having the largest number of Reservists in the Line infantry, the regiment would run out of fully trained and effective men on 12th April 1915. For the prior month it had less than the equivalent of one standard reinforcement draft. The Reserve Battalion literally had no more trained men to send to the front. This means in all likelihood that the '90 NCOs and men considered unsuitable' probably made it to the front line during the interveneing period. If the regiment with the single largest pool of Reservists ended up in this sorry state, it is easy to see how this was not an isolated case. The Adjutant of the Royal Irish Fusiliers, barely six weeks after disembarking recorded

 

23rd Sep: Lt M J W O'DONOVAN sent away during the night for horses; bivouac of B and D Coys shelled from 1:30 pm to 2:30 pm.  About 11:30 pm Lt A M SAMUELS SR, A Coy and Lt C R CRYMBLE SR, B Coy, arrived with a reinforcement of 145 other ranks, chiefly Section D men.

 

Which raises some interesting questions: Why did the diarist feel it necessary to record the fact that these were Section D men? These men would have been away from the colours for at least 5-7 years. Note how early this was in the campaign. Scores of diarists were noting the arrival of Special Reservists. If they were all equally trained this would seem to be an unnecessary identifier. Elsewhere, the Royal Irish Regt recorded their views on reinforcements in the middle of the battle of First Ypres:

 

3rd Nov: The large majority of NCOs arriving with reinforcements entirely ignorant of their duties in peace and war.

 

There are dozens of similar comments scattered across the BEF's diaries. Rather than speculate on the ebb and flow of the Reservists and the numbers available, we can look at the hard facts. The British Army thankfully kept meticulous records. Here is the relentless erosion of available 'fully trained and effective men' of the Northumberland Fusiliers:

 

 

And here is the same data for the Royal Irish Fusiliers' whose Adjutant had such a low opinion of the NCOs in the drafts on 7th Novemeber 1914. It is worth noting where this was in the timeline in the chart below. 

 

 

 

We can do this for every Regiment in the British Army. The charts all tell the same story; one of relentless decline in the number of available trained men. The diarists were quite clear in the order that the various classes of Reservists were drawn down: recently departed Army Reservists, other Army Reservists, Special Reservists. This is further corroborated by the hard data in the 1914 Star and 1914-15 Star medal rolls which show this 'pecking order' in the disembarkation dates of each cohort in sharp relief. 

 

When criticism of the Special Reserve starts we can be fairly confident these are not isolated cases as the accounts are so widespread across the BEF. That does not mean it was all bad, simply that the quantity and quality of the available Reserves was often commented on by the receiving battalions. Almost every diarist felt it necessary to distinguish between regular serving men, Reservists and Special reservists. Most did the same for Officers annotating the returns with 'SR' after their names. If is abundantly clear that the BEF had qualitative views on the different types of Reservists. This naturally raises the question: Why? 

 

If standards of training were homgeneous across the Reserves, there would be no need to make these observations. The quantitative aspects of this are simple facts: the Army was losing men faster than they could replace them or train them. This imacted every infantry regiment and battalion in the BEF. Most were severely under War Establishment for prolonged periods and more than a few were annihilated and rebuilt, putting further pressure on the reinforcement chain. The qualitative aspects are open to interpretation but they seem to be in sufficient number and detail to raise some important questions over common perceptions of the BEF. 

 

If a soldier is inadequately trained, it is not his fault. It is the responsibility of the War Office. The BEF was being asked to do things beyond its capacity which led to its near destruction in 1914 and early 1915. If the BEF succeeded in 1914 it came at a huge cost. 

Incidentally, the weekly returns were inflated and very misleading. Regiments were taking very different approaches in the way they categorised their available reserves. The 'trained men' included thousands of recovering wounded, invalids,  medically unfit and permanently unfit, under aged, over aged, unfit for overseas service etc. The data had also been swollen by an influx of re-enlisted men, some of whom would never make it to the front. In January 1915 and again in February 1915 the Reserves were recategorised to reflect the reality. At the stroke of a pen (two pens in fact) the number of fully trained and effective men halved. This is worth considering at a strategic level. Imagine you were running the BEF and were suddenly presented with this fact in early 1915. It would still be  a few months before Kitchener's Army deployed.  It is difficult to train an Army without sufficient number of weapons and equipment. 

 

When we see the collapse in the number of trained men and look at the numbers in the Field, it is no wonder that some diarists made critical comments. How the mismanagement of the War Office ultimately impacted the BEF's basic skills and musketry in particular is worth exploring. It has nothing to do with undermining their considerable achievements. The first cohorts of the BEF were the unluckiest men to ever wear a British uniform their casualty rates are the highest of the whole war. MG

 

Edited 28 October , 2016 by Guest

[squirrel]

Educational and thought provoking thread - well done to all the contributors - some excellent research there.

[seaforth78]

12 minutes ago, squirrel said:

Educational and thought provoking thread - well done to all the contributors - some excellent research there.

 

Second that. Well done. 

[Guest]

Thanks to the kindness of a GWF member, I have the 1914 Star medal roll for the 1st Bn East Surrey Regiment transcribed. It enables us to quickly reconstruct the disembarkation patterns and the split between Regulars, Army Reservists and Special reservists. On the chart below the dates run left to right. The vertical axis is Army Number. Note the SR (in black) ran a parallel numbering system which overlaps the Regular numbering system. Thanks to the SR prefix we can differentiate the two. For the serving  Regulars (red) and Army Reservists (green) the most recent enlistments (highest Army Number) are at the top of the chart and the old and bold with 'early' low Army Numbers are at the bottom of the page. 

 

Each vertical set of data represents the Main Body (extreme left) and as we shift to the right we see the various Reinforcement drafts (8 in total) and their composition. Note the diminishing number of regulars. By October they remaining regulars were usually young recently trained men, typically in the 19 year old bracket who were initially barred from active service until the manpower crisis hit. The rules were relaxed and we see a small number with high Army Numbers (recent enlistments) come through. 

 

The split  between the regulars and the Army Reservists is not a neat cut-off. Many regulars extended their service and were still serving when others in their cohort had gone to the Reserve, so there is a penumbra where there is some overlap.  I have eliminated about 10 out-liers in the data where numbers might have been recorded incorrectly (they seem to be extraordinarily low, pre Boer War). It does not diminish the integrity of the data, it simply concentrates the image.

 

It takes a bit of tuning into, but it is the only way of explaining in one image the breakdown of 1,700 men by their categories and how they were sent to France in 1914. At risk of stating the obvious, the diarists seem to believe the fitness and skills of each group were rather different. 

 

Any mistakes are mine. MG

 

Edited 28 October , 2016 by Guest
Lots of typos

[Muerrisch]

 

Epitaph on an Army of Mercenaries

 

These, in the day when heaven was falling,

The hour when earth's foundations fled,

Followed their mercenary calling,

And took their wages, and are dead.

 

Their shoulders held the sky suspended;

They stood, and earth's foundations stay;

What God abandoned, these defended,

And saved the sum of things for pay.

 

A.E. Housman

 

 

 

[Gunner Bailey]

6 hours ago, Muerrisch said:

 

I prefer facts to mythology and propaganda. Its a personal thing. Each to his/her own.

 

So 100 years of written and oral history history (see IWM interviews from the Great War) is now mythology and propaganda?

 

Oh dear what a SAD place to be.

 

I'll leave the new wave of 'historians', 'revisionists' 'Time Team dreamers' to it. Oh What a Lovely War!

 

 

[Muerrisch]

 

Hansard 25^th February 1907. Viscount Haldane.  ... “The Government should have ready this force [the BEF] of six divisions and four cavalry brigades and keep it alive through regular machinery for six months, and after that the nation should be prepared to do its part. That aid should come, through channels which should be provided for it beforehand, to the support and the expansion of the professional Army of the country. ...  I should define the obligation of the War Office to be to keep this force of six divisions and four cavalry brigades with their military administrative services in an efficient condition for mobilisation, and to maintain them for a period of at least six months. After six months, drafts are found by the ordinary machinery of war. It does not follow that we shall use the whole of that force at once, and therefore we hope to spread out its use for a larger period of time. But with the wastage of war one feels that at the end of six months the resources of the War Office may be at an end with that amount of men, and then an appeal must be made to the nation itself”.