BEF 1914. Marksmanship, Musketry and the Mad Minute

[dansparky]

if feels like we may be getting closer :-) do any of you guys have information on 'Pole Targets' that were used to simulate bodies of men? Any pictures would be good as well :-)

[Guest]

if feels like we may be getting closer :-) do any of you guys have information on 'Pole Targets' that were used to simulate bodies of men? Any pictures would be good as well :-)

Post #286...see link. Image opposite page 99 (proper). Easier to save as pdf and then open in a pdf viewer. In Acrobat it is on page 86 of the pdf.

[Muerrisch]

Just one nugget for the weekend.

1909 MR . any officer or sergeant failing Distance Judging cannot be assessed as better than 2nd class shot.

No penalty for those junior however.

[dansparky]

in reference to some of these questions haldane points out:

"RESERVISTS 500 YRDS FIRING. Moderate accuracy. Many men do not know present rifle./instructions on mobilisation. the reserves will be rather rusty as regards Training, it is important to work them with men of their comps so whole shake down together and give COHESION and strength to units which enthusiasm alone cannot do". >Haldane's own comments

it is very unlikely that rerservists will be in as good knick as reuglars, having said that there previous experience having already served a term may have given them steady nerves in actual combat.

Any thoughts on this and reservists ability to shot?

any thoughts on this and possible performance of reservists v reglulars? i would have thought any negatives from less frequent training could be offset by the experince of reservists under fire. I can't remember where i read it but some of the proportion of reservists had a weath of experince some serving in the boer war and this installed some confidence in the regulars. This being the case in all probability any rustiness could be offset by this experince when in the thick of it. Whilst regulars may have been sharper due to more recent practice, they may not be as battle hardened. So apart form a likely inferior state in terms of physical condition i think it would be very difficult to establish if regulars or reservists were more effective shots, particularily as establishing the overal effectiveness has been fraught with problems. I think any difference would have been minimal in actual combat, compared to firing on the range. The only worry for me would be familiarity of the weapon for reservists. How effective intense drill and musketry firing (longer period for 4th division) was in developing familiriarity of the weapon before disembarkation is hard to establish. But as Haldane say's the reservists still performed in a satisfactory manner. (actual quote ''moderate accuracy''. rest all my thoughts.

[Guest]

any thoughts on this and possible performance of reservists v reglulars? i would have thought any negatives from less frequent training could be offset by the experince of reservists under fire. I can't remember where i read it but some of the proportion of reservists had a weath of experince some serving in the boer war and this installed some confidence in the regulars. This being the case in all probability any rustiness could be offset by this experince when in the thick of it. Whilst regulars may have been sharper due to more recent practice, they may not be as battle hardened. So apart form a likely inferior state in terms of physical condition i think it would be very difficult to establish if regulars or reservists were more effective shots, particularily as establishing the overal effectiveness has been fraught with problems. I think any difference would have been minimal in actual combat, compared to firing on the range. The only worry for me would be familiarity of the weapon for reservists. How effective intense drill and musketry firing (longer period for 4th division) was in developing familiriarity of the weapon before disembarkation is hard to establish. But as Haldane say's the reservists still performed in a satisfactory manner.

Dan - it is not clear on the original which part quotes Haldane and which parts are yours. Can you put some quotation marks around Haldane's parts please. MG

Ref Reservists v Regulars. I think the opposite would be the case.

1. A large proportion of Reservists were seen as liabilities rather than assets. One battalion went to war with a third of its men that had only seen a few days refresher training in the prior 9 years. Reservists' training was not annual - in most cases it was every two years and in others every third year - and many were unfit and unfamiliar with the SMLE. It follows that young highly trained regulars with hundreds of hours of practice (dry and real) with the SMLE would likely handle their weapons better than an old Reservist. This is not speculation. The facts show that COs deliberately shunned the older Reservists, on occasion sending large drafts back to the depot and asking for men who had gone to the Reserve more recently. Additionally, there is evidence that some Battalions broke the 19 year-olds rule and deployed with 18 year-olds who had completed Table B.

2. A very small proportion of Reservists in 1914 had Boer War service. This is another long standing part of the BEF's mythology. The terms of engagement were 12 years typically split 3 and 9 (1902-1904 enlistment) and later 5 and 7 (post 1904). Either way a Reservist would only be on the hook if he had enlisted after Aug 1902 (Calc: Aug 1914 less 12 years). The Boer War had ended more than 12 years prior to the Great War, so the numbers were small. The exceptions were from two areas:

a. Reservists who had signed for Section D (4 year extension to Reserve liability). These were only 5% of the Reservists and were typically the oldest and the least desirable. Many were diverted to train the New Armies, staff the depots or take on admin roles.

b. Regulars who had extended beyond 12 years were small as a per cent of total.

There is a post on this thread that gives the exact proportion of men who could possibly have served in the Boer War. From memory it is around 12% max. Put another way 88% couldn't have served in the Boer War. Of the 12% one has to make an educated guess as to the proportion who were weeded out and replaced with younger men - something the War Diaries show in rich detail - and the proportion diverted to training roles. My guess, (and it is an informed guess having researched this in detail) would be less than 1 in 20 BEF infantrymen had Boer War experience. Most would be in admin/QM/RQMS/CQMS/Storemen roles so the number in the firing line would be even less in my view. One might also consider what proportion of the British ARmy fought in the Boer War. Britain still had a vast empire to police that absorbed over half the Army. One might reasonably halve or quarter the assumptions above.

That aside, there are lucid arguments that Boer War experience didn't count for much in 1914. It is a subjective view. Interestingly none of the War Diaries mention the Boer War at all, or indeed the experience of the men. What mattered most is the subject of this thread: the revolution in training of the British Army's infantry, the adoption of a new weapon (the SMLE) and rigorous enforcement of a radical new doctrine enshrined in Musketry Regulations. One could build a fairly sound argument that the BEF's resilience in 1914 and early 1915 was underpinned by a revolution in training and doctrine at the most basic level. One might argue that Musketry Regs was the book that had the greatest impact (from a British perspective) during the whole War.

[dansparky]

Post #286...see link. Image opposite page 99 (proper). Easier to save as pdf and then open in a pdf viewer. In Acrobat it is on page 86 of the pdf.

Martin you are a legend!!! i could not find this anywhere. Haldane talks of moving these to simulate a retiring force, it does not look like that would have been an easy task.

[dansparky]

Dan - it is not clear on the original which part quotes Haldane and which parts are yours. Can you put some quotation marks around Haldane's parts please. MG

done apologies. sorry was getting carried away most my own thoughts

[Guest]

The Regimental Annual of the Sherwood Foresters (Notts & Derby Regiment) - 1st Battalion Notes

1911 Musketry

"Field firing was carried out in a very practical way, but no one was shot....

... March produced a good deal of subject matter. Most important perhaps was the commencement of the new musketry course and the expressions of opinion it produced.

Half the battalion had fired parts 1 and 2 before that most gracious message was received that the men could count their preceding year's classification for the purposes of assessing their pay. The day of receipt of that message was an expensive one in the canteen. The loss of "Crossed Rifles" on the arm was a trivial affair when ex-marksmen realised their pay was safe for one more year."

1912 Musketry

"The musketry average has been raised by twenty points since last year, but there is still room for improvement. This sudden rise proves that last year's indifferent results were mainly due to the inevitable fear and distrust of anything new in the musketry line invariably displayed by soldiers.

A very successful Rifle Meeting was held in November. The results were good and interesting, for in all competitions, including the rapid fire and snap-shooting ones the Class B Competitors (2nd and 3rd Class shots) showed themselves to be as good as Class A (marksmen and 1st Class shots) and the winning scores of Class B were sometimes better than Class A. This leads one to suppose that many failures in Part III are due to "Proficiency Pay Fever" and to hope that some remedy for that disease will soon be discovered..."

[squirrel]

Reservists not familiar with the SMLE? Surely anyone who had served from the very late 1900's would be familiar with the Lee Action from the Lee Metford and the Long Lee?

Anyone familiar and competent with the latter would surely have had no problem in handling and firing the SMLE after a short while.

Frank Richards in his book Old Soldiers Never Die, a called up Reservist, mentions being sent on forward outpost duty at night during the retreat from Mons with two other Reservists.

He mentions not having any qualms about this as they all had previous experience in Burma and India and could manage 20 shots per minute.

They were not all old men who could not not physically cope or shoot.

[dansparky]

Reservists not familiar with the SMLE? Surely anyone who had served from the very late 1900's would be familiar with the Lee Action from the Lee Metford and the Long Lee?

Anyone familiar and competent with the latter would surely have had no problem in handling and firing the SMLE after a short while.

Frank Richards in his book Old Soldiers Never Die, a called up Reservist, mentions being sent on forward outpost duty at night during the retreat from Mons with two other Reservists.

He mentions not having any qualms about this as they all had previous experience in Burma and India and could manage 20 shots per minute.

They were not all old men who could not not physically cope or shoot.

Good point, i am not sure. He just states that sooting was moderate and that '' Many of the men do not know the present rifle". Martin G alluded to seeing this read else where as well.

What page in old Soilders Never die Prey tell. That would be really useful :-)

[Muerrisch]

Training of reservists during reserve period was truly derisory ...... usually only one or two days musketry IN TOTAL. Just lip service and useless. This is not just my opinion but established fact.

[Guest]

I am not sure of the level of difference between the Long Lee-Enfield and the SMLE, however it is the nature of the musketry training that changed. Some regimental journals record how they struggled with the introduction of the new musketry regulations training exercises, particularly the overhaul in Table B - some commenting on just how difficult it was. It is interesting to note how the scores required to achieve Marskman or 1st Class shot changed over the period.. A significant proportion of reservists were '3 & 9' men meaning they would have left the Colours in 1905-07. Assuming they were introduced to the SMLE during their time in the Reserves, they would only have had a few days on the weapon in the intervening 9 years. Familiarity in this sense is simply the number of days training a man would have had with the weapons and the way that it was used. Musketry is as much about the collective training and use of the weapons as it is the training of the individual. British Army doctrine was focused on raising levels of musketry across the board. The Figure of Merit in the Musketry returns rose steadily during the inter-war periods as the nature, intensity and standards of musketry training improved. During the inter-war years Musketry Regulations changed twice (1905 and 1909) and were further amended in 1914 (pre-war). Infantry tactics right down to section level changed as well as the training in field-craft for the individual soldier. '3 and 9' men would have been trained under regulations written in 1898. The most recently trained soldiers would have been trained under the 1909/10 musketry regs which were quite different.

The training of Reservists during their Reserve obligation is an area that has not attracted the attention of academics. There is a widespread assumption that their training was regular and to a high standard. By extension it is tacitly assumed that all reservists were equal. Due to complex changes in terms of enlistment post the Boer War, the time spend with the colours varied considerably. Experience , training and time spent on the Reserves was far from even and CO's were faced with hard choices in Aug 1914 during mobilisation. As one might expect, the worst of the Reservists were sent out last. Commanding Officers were noting the decreasing quantities and quality of the troops. The deterioration prompted Sir John French to complain to the War Office on 16^th Dec 1914 that:

“Some of the reinforcements sent over were over 50 years of age, and had not fired a rifle since the South African War; he mentioned two battalions which had been filled up chiefly by men of this class”

Source: OH France and Belgium 1915 Part I page 10 footnote.

Commanding Officers were not keen on taking ‘3 & 9’ men, however the large overall requirements and the limited numbers available often meant that COs had little choice. The war diary of the 1^st Bn East Surrey Regiment provides wonderful insight to attitudes:

6th Aug 1914. 2nd Day of Mobilization. 402 Reservists arrived from Depot about 4:00 pm. Posted to Companies and instructed in fitting equipment and Line Discipline at once began. About half these men had left the Colours as long as 6 and 8 years, many having only done 3 years with the Colours. Programme for the day completed.

7th Aug 1914. 3rd Day of Mobilization. 242 Reservists arrived from Depot about 6:00 am. Most of these men having left the Colours more recently were better trained and as far as possible replaced the 3 years men posted to Coys the previous day.

8th Aug 1914. 4th Day of Mobilization. 50 Reservists arrived from Depot about 10:00 am. These men had only recently left the Colours and with the inclusion of them enabled the Battalion to mobilize with but few 3 years men in the ranks. The 1st Reinforcements however which were formed today under Capt J K T Whish with 99 other ranks were chiefly composed of these men.

Despite reaching War Establishment the COs continued to replace Reservists who had left the colours many years ago with Reservists who had most recently left. The Northumberland Fusiliers:

“But though in numbers the battalion was complete, its quality was not regarded by the Commanding Officer as entirely satisfactory. It had been anticipated that the first men to arrive from the reserve would be highly trained men who had but recently left the Colours. But this was not the case. At the close of the South African War the terms of service for the infantry of the line had been altered to 3 years with the Colours and 9 with the Reserve. This reduced colour service had remained in force for some three years. In 1914 the reserve service of those first enlisted under these terms was approaching its conclusion. The drafts so provided to be composed very largely of these men which had been in civil life for close to on nine years – years moreover that had been marked by the great developments in training which had followed the South African War. An urgent call was dispatched to the greatly harassed Depôt Commander for one hundred picked, fully trained reservists and each commander was instructed to weed out the twenty-five most backward reservists allotted to his company. The hundred men dispatched by the Depot in response to this demand were selected from among those who had received their discharge on the return of the Battalion from India. The arrival of these cheery, confident men to take their place in the ranks they had but recently left, immensely strengthened the Battalion. None the less the Fifth was to go to war with a large proportion of men who for years had had no marching and who were in sad need of military training in general. Never let it be thought that these older men lacked spirit; they were to give ample evidence of that. But had it been possible on mobilisation to arrange for men to rejoin the Colours in the reverse order to that in which they had gone to the Reserve, opportunity would have been secured for giving training and exercise to those most in need of it and the Battalion by the inclusion of men in harder condition and with more recent training would have been better equipped for the first few strenuous weeks of the War.

A process of ‘upgrading’ the quality of the Reservists was clearly under way. A more extreme case is that of the 1^st Bn Royal Scots Fusiliers stationed in Gosport at the outbreak of the War. On paper the battalion required another 532 Reservists to come up to War Establishment. However the 1^st Battalion diary records that it took in ‘about 750 Reservists’. One possible explanation is that the CO was replacing some less desirable men with better quality Army Reservists. The challenges were universal. Despite the 2^nd Bn Suffolk Regt having a lower than average demand for Reservists, it still took a decent proportion of ‘3 & 9’ men:.

2nd Bn Suffolk Regiment – OR’s Deployed in Aug 1914: Breakdown of Prior Service

Regular Soldiers 563 53%

Reservists, 9 years Colour and 3 years Reserve. 145 14%

Reservists, 8 years Colour and 4 years Reserve 49 5%

Reservists, 7 years Colour and 5 years Reserve. 27 3%

Reservists, 3 years Colour and 9 years Reserve 178 17%

First Reinforcements (service unspecified) 93 9%

Total 1,055 100%

Note: rounding errors mean totals might not exactly match.

It is also of interest that there were no Special Reservists in the group. The 1^st Bn East Surrey Regiment noted that their 1^st Reinforcement “chiefly composed of these [3 year] men.” The 1^st Bn Cameronians (Scottish Rifles) recorded 329 men who had originally enlisted for ‘3 & 9’ joined the Battalion in August 1914, representing nearly a third of the Battalion.

[squirrel]

Dansparky P 313 - "Good point, i am not sure. He just states that shooting was moderate and that '' Many of the men do not know the present rifle". Martin G alluded to seeing this read else where as well."

Didn't get the quote quite right, it was at Fromelles 1st Battle of Ypres - p 28 in OSND edited and annotated by Grumpy 2004 - three men including Richards on a patrol:

"....Pardoe got one side of the ditch and Miles and I on the other and opened up with rapid fire. We had our rifles resting on the bank. The three of us had been marksmen all through our soldiering: each could get off twenty five aimed rounds a minute...."

While I accept that many of the Reservists had not done that much "soldiering" and many that had not done so for many years, many had and that while the overall standard of musketry may not have been what was required, there were many old soldiers who adapted and became proficient very quickly. Richard's references to the "old soldiers" in his battalion seem to confirm this. I should think that most of these were 7 and 3 men.

[Guest]

Didn't get the quote quite right, it was at Fromelles 1st Battle of Ypres - p 28 in OSND edited and annotated by Grumpy 2004 - three men including Richards on a patrol:

"....Pardoe got one side of the ditch and Miles and I on the other and opened up with rapid fire. We had our rifles resting on the bank. The three of us had been marksmen all through our soldiering: each could get off twenty five aimed rounds a minute...."

While I accept that many of the Reservists had not done that much "soldiering" and many that had not done so for many years, many had and that while the overall standard of musketry may not have been what was required, there were many old soldiers who adapted and became proficient very quickly. Richard's references to the "old soldiers" in his battalion seem to confirm this. I should think that most of these were 7 and 3 men.

Squirrel - there is no doubt that a large proportion of the Reservists were brought up to speed fairly rapidly and fought well. There were tens of thousands who had only left the colours in the prior 2 years, however these were offset by men who had left 7,8 and 9 years before.

Edit: According to GARBA 1913 26.8% of the regular line infantry's Army Reservists were Section D men. These would have completed their 12 years and have signed on for another 4, so could have enlisted as early as 1898 or as late as 1902. The former would have joined the reserve in 1905 and the latter (3 and 9 men) would also joined in 1905 i.e. the bulk would have been away from the colours for around 9 years. It would be wrong to assume they were all Boer War veterans.

Edit 2: The GARBA 1913 records:

4.4% of the line Infantry's Army Reserve was old enough to have served in the Boer War.

5.5% of the line Infantry serving regulars were old enough to have served in the Boer War

Assuming a Regular/Reservist split of 40/60 for the BEF this means on average 4.84% of the BEF's line infantry could have served in the Boer War; less than one in twenty. This has to be a generous estimate as a proportion would have been weeded out as unfits and given more sedentary roles in training establishments and depots.

One can not escape the fact that a significant proportion were also '3 and 9' men. The arithmetic of resolving different cohorts under different terms of engagements in the inter-war years is complex. This is not well understood. It is a legacy of the Boer War and the need to contract the size of the Regular Army. In 1902 the Line Infantry numbered 217,966 and by 1907 the numbers had declined to 136,632, a contraction of 37% in just five years. By 1913 the Line infantry was still 135,807 meaning that 99% of the Infantry's contraction took place in the earlier years.

The '3 and 9' terms were partly a way of accelerating this contraction; while the Army still needed to recruit young men to maintain rank demographics, larger proportions were becoming Reservists earlier; in 1905, 06 and 07 as the short 3 years with the colours expired the Standing Army declined and the Reserves grew - effectively mirror images. The pool of Reservists in 1914 was skewed towards the cohorts who had transferred in 1905-1907. The table below shows the numbers transferring to the Reserves each year. All would be eligible to be called up in Aug 1914. While this is data for the whole Army the bulk (65%) would be Infantry. The years 1905-1907 generated 44% of all those on the Reserve and these cohorts were heavily skewed towards terms of engagement of 3 and 9. Within the line infantry over 60% of all transfers to the Reserves in 1905-1907 had 3 years colour service.. In 1907 the number of men joining the Reserves was 80% larger than the average number transferring in the subsequent six years.

1905.....26,510 .....men transferring from 3 years with the colours

1906.....24,749 .....men transferring from 3 years with the colours

1907.....30,777 .....men transferring from 3 years with the colours plus early transfer to Reserve from disbanded battalions

1908.....21,374

1909.....17,748

1910.....13,818

1911.....13,527

1912......17,269

1913..... 18,428

Total....184,200 All Arms

Data source: GARBA 1902-1913

Additionally some nine battalions of regular infantry were disbanded in 1907 - the 3rd and 4th Battalions of the Northumberland Fus, Lancashire Fus, Manchester Regt and the Royal Warwickshire Regt (as well as the 3rd Bn Scots Guards) . A significant proportion of these regiments were offered terms that allowed the men to transfer to the Reserve earlier than planned. This further boosted the numbers on the Reserve but with shorter terms with the colours.

The compounding effect of these two dynamics distorted the profile of the Army Reserves. The 1st Bn Cameronians went to war with 30% of their Other Ranks from the '3 and 9'. They simply had no choice.

MG

Edit. For some reason the Highland regiments had very high proportions of Section D men. This might be related to historically below average recruiting and the need to boost numbers of Reservists. The average % of Section D men to all Army Reservists was 29%. In the Highland Regiments it was between 39% and 45%. The implication would be that on average the Highaln regiments went to war with more Boer War veterans.

[Guest]

Due to the kindness of Grumpy we are able to compare Table B from the 1905 Musketry Regulations and the 1909 Musketry Regulations. At first glance they look similar, however on closer inspection they differ greatly.

The most striking differences are:

1. Number of rounds: Reduced from 295 to 250

2. Distances shot tend to be much shorter in the 1909 Regulations. Multiplying the number of rounds by distance for each exercise, the total 'rounds x distance' more than halves between 1905 and 1909.

3. The Classification Practices and Marksmen's Practices of 1905 effectively become split into Instructional Practices and Classification Practices in 1909

4. Fire Direction is a new category in 1909.

Below is a rough attempt at making a comparison. Any mistakes are mine. MG

Edit: It clearly raises the obvious questions as to how one can compare musketry results from 1905-1908 to 1909-1914 given the big differences in the test. The Marksmen in 1905 were shooting out to 1,000 yards whereas the Classification shoot was limited to 600 yards.

[squirrel]

Thanks Martin, excellent research as usual.

Experience from the Boer War may have been the reason for the shorter ranges. The sun in Europe is/was not as strong as that in South Africa (and other countries further East) so our troops had to learn to estimate and fire over longer ranges than trained for in that War. The War in European conditions, not only due to the light but the more closed nature of the countryside, meant that engagements would take place at shorter ranges so perhaps this was but one of the many reasons for practices over shorter ranges.

There were many reasons for the changes in Musketry regulations between these wars and the Army had to adapt accordingly.

They were also seriously considering a smaller calibre rifle immediately before the start of WW1which may have something to do with the change to shorter ranges.

It was already appreciated that engagements would probably take place at shorter distances so the need for a rifle with which you could shoot a fly's eyes out at 1000 yards was becoming less necessary.

[dansparky]

Dansparky P 313 - "Good point, i am not sure. He just states that shooting was moderate and that '' Many of the men do not know the present rifle". Martin G alluded to seeing this read else where as well."

Didn't get the quote quite right, it was at Fromelles 1st Battle of Ypres - p 28 in OSND edited and annotated by Grumpy 2004 - three men including Richards on a patrol:

"....Pardoe got one side of the ditch and Miles and I on the other and opened up with rapid fire. We had our rifles resting on the bank. The three of us had been marksmen all through our soldiering: each could get off twenty five aimed rounds a minute...."

While I accept that many of the Reservists had not done that much "soldiering" and many that had not done so for many years, many had and that while the overall standard of musketry may not have been what was required, there were many old soldiers who adapted and became proficient very quickly. Richard's references to the "old soldiers" in his battalion seem to confirm this. I should think that most of these were 7 and 3 men.

thanks :-)

[dansparky]

Thanks Martin, excellent research as usual.

Experience from the Boer War may have been the reason for the shorter ranges. The sun in Europe is/was not as strong as that in South Africa (and other countries further East) so our troops had to learn to estimate and fire over longer ranges than trained for in that War. The War in European conditions, not only due to the light but the more closed nature of the countryside, meant that engagements would take place at shorter ranges so perhaps this was but one of the many reasons for practices over shorter ranges.

There were many reasons for the changes in Musketry regulations between these wars and the Army had to adapt accordingly.

They were also seriously considering a smaller calibre rifle immediately before the start of WW1which may have something to do with the change to shorter ranges.

It was already appreciated that engagements would probably take place at shorter distances so the need for a rifle with which you could shoot a fly's eyes out at 1000 yards was becoming less necessary.

That is indeed interesting as one may think at first glance if intnesity and standards had improved, one may think that standards reqired for musketry results would be higher. Such as comments on how difficult it had become. But would shorter distances not be somewhat easier even if expectations had increased?

I also wonder why if a smaller calibre was being considered why would they also test a new rifle with a heavier charge (i assume heavier calibre) at a distance of 2000 yrds? The new rifle that was set to be introduced was tested in november 1913. I will dig out reference, i believe was the .276 rifle, although i have no idea what exactly that was.

Edit. Seems to be a more powerful Lee enfield.

[squirrel]

The problem in South Africa was shorter range of the Lee Metford using a round nosed hardened lead bullet compared to the Mauser with the Spitzer pointed round used by the Boers.

This was to some extent improved with the MkVII pointed nosed round which the SMLE was designed to use.

The pattern 13 .276 was based on the German Mauser and using a rimless cartridge while retaining some of the SMLE configuration -similar weight and recoil, full length handguard, charger loading,

10 round magazine. In the event this weapon suffered from problems with extraction of the fired cartridge, excessive muzzle blast, heat and high pressures mostly due to the high velocity cartridge.

The small arms experts I am sure will be able to give you chapter and verse on this.

[Muerrisch]

The Regular Reserve in detail.

Soldiers serving 12 years with the Colours and those granted permission to serve beyond 12 years to pension had no reserve liability. They accounted for about 25% of the infantry each year. The Army Reserve Class I comprised Sections A., B., and D. and the Special Reserve. There had been a C. but it was subsumed into B. On completing colour service a soldier was medically examined, issued with documentation, and entered A. or B.

Section A. was voluntary and limited, each infantry regiment being allowed about 50 men on their books, and the Army total not to exceed 6000. The Section could be called out without Proclamation. These men had to be of “Good” character or better on a scale of: “Exemplary, Very Good, Good, Fair, Indifferent, Bad and Very Bad”. They were selected from those with the best musketry qualifications, were paid full infantry basic pay of 1/- per day, and could remain in the Section for a maximum of two years. There was no provision for continuation training.

Section B. was the normal destination for the balance of the 12 years enlistment, and was on half-pay. Regarding continuation training: Haldane The Regulations for the training of the Army Reserve are issued annually. In the case of Section B. of the infantry, men enlisted for three years are required to train in the fifth, seventh, ninth, and eleventh year of their service, and those enlisted for more than three years in their tenth year of service. The training consists of one day's musketry instruction, or, if the man so prefers, six days' training with a Special Reserve unit. Hansard 24^th August 1909.

Many men found the 6d per day a valuable supplement in hard times, so that when it stopped, aged 30 or so they volunteered for further reserve liability in Section D, for four years only. Those leaving after 12 years colours service were also eligible. The authorities used D. as a shock absorber, opening it to enrolment subject to medical examination only when reserves were scarce. It was closed for infantry for eight months from 1^st October 1906 and for 18 months from 1^st June 1908. The quarterly payment was substantial, and, if one were so minded, paid for a great deal of beer at 3d per pint. Frank Richards in his Old Soldier Sahib: In 1912 I extended my service for another four years on the Reserve. I little thought when I did so that two years later I should be called back to the Colours to rejoin my old Battalion again. Every quarter-day, or pen­sion-day as it was called, a number of us reservists and service pension wallahs would have a day off from our work to spend it together in the Castle Hotel. There was provision for one day of continuation training.

Section D. was a cause of controversy. It was not supposed to be employed until A. and B. had been used up, and had been until recently part of the Army Reserve Class II. Some men would be as long as 16 years from enlistment. These would be unused to modern tactics and organisation, unaccustomed to marching under loads and unfamiliar with their officers. They had attracted much adverse comment after service in the Boer War. Hansard 4^th May 1911: The Duke of Bedford. The men comprising ... Section D ... were found by Lord Methuen and Sir T. Kelly-Kenny during the South African war to be unfit for active service. ... Why, if these Section D men were found unfit for active service in South Africa, should they now be considered fit for active service at a moment's notice with the Expeditionary Force in Europe and elsewhere? The noble Viscount (Haldane) knows that the reason why the men ... proved unsatisfactory in South Africa was due to the length of their absence from the Colours. I must remind the noble Viscount that whereas the men found ... unfit for immediate active service abroad had been absent from the Colours from five to nine years, the men now relied upon by the noble Viscount to complete his Expeditionary Force will have been absent from the Colours from nine to thirteen years. The noble Viscount must be aware that he is counting upon men who will be the product of the three years with the Colours and nine with the Reserve term of enlistment, and that consequently the unfitness complained of by Lord Methuen and Sir T. Kelly-Kenny will be not only intensified but in some cases more than doubled.

The Duke did not receive an answer to this question.

[Guest]

Thanks Grumpy or that details sypnopsis. Very useful.

Here is what was discussed in 1912 in Parliament. One MP (Amery) seems to believe there was no training. He may have been exaggerating, as it is difficult to see how a man would qualify for his pay without turning up. The questions seems to be whether the system simply went through the motions or indeed did give the Army Reservists real refresher training every two years.The extract was posted a year ago, but is worth recycling in light of the new energy in this thread. Note that his numbers are for the whole Army. Mobilisation absorbed 57,000 of the available 80,000 line infantry Army Reservists. Section D men were in France in September 1914 in considerable numbers. MG

"Obviously from that answer alone the whole of these six divisions cannot be ready to take the field. If they do, how will they be composed? Are they in any sense a homogeneous force as regards men? It is admitted that less than half of them will be men serving with the Colours, and something like 90,000 will be drawn from the Reserve. I readily agree that that is also the case as far as numbers go in the Continental armies, and that they draw upon the reserves to the extent of half or more for mobilisation. But the reserve in their case is of men who were in the ranks last year or the year before that or the year before that. There is no great gap between the reserves and the men with the Colours. They take the men between twenty years and twenty-four and twenty-five from the same villages and the same district, and they are really homogeneous. In our case the men with the Colours are separated from the Reserve by at least five years, and in the great majority of cases by ten and even thirteen years. The men with the Colours are between twenty and twenty-two and twenty-three. Of our Reserves 52,000 are over thirty years of age, and of Section D of the Reserve, which is 30,000 strong, practically the whole of them have been away from the Colours from nine to thirteen years, and have not had a day's training or have not seen a rifle during that time. Can anybody call that a homogeneous force? I know that Lord Haldane declared the other day that it might not be necessary, except in a few units, to draw upon Section D. I should like to see the right hon. Gentleman, show how that is the case. Next year, as far as I can make out, although a great number will have been away from the Colours for more than five years, A and B Reserves will be only 106,000 strong. When you subtract from that 10 per cent. for casualties, 8,000 who are abroad, the 4,000 that will be required to complete the Regular battalion at home, and the 6,000 that will be required in category B which was to have been supplied by the Territorials but which has never materialised, and with the other deductions, you will find that you are left with not more than 75,000 in A and B; so that, in other words, for the shortage of 12,000 or 13,000, you will have to draw upon Section D.

More than that, according to the mobilisation tables, the very day you send your Expeditionary Force you are to send abroad 10 per cent. of drafts for the field units, that is some 15,000 men. How are you going to do so when you have only some 14,000 or so of Section D left behind, of whom 10,000 have been earmarked for the stiffening of the Special Reserve? You have 8,000 Reserves, who I trust and who undoubtedly will in large numbers, come back from abroad. But taking these and the young men in the line you have only got about 20,000. That means from the very start you will have to come down on the Special Reserve for something like 40,000. The Special Reserve is not 60,000 strong, and from that you have got to send 15,000 of the extra Special Reserve to which my right hon. Friend has referred. So wonderful are they that after three months they can do what any other troops are only expected to do after several years. There are something like 15,000 to be sent to the Mediterranean and other lines of communication. You are left with 45,000 Special Reservists of whom 20,000 are under nineteen, or only just recruited to meet drafting requirements. In other words, you cannot even with the Special Reserve keep the Expeditionary Force going for six months. Even if you could, it means that, so far from having a homogeneous force, you will have a force consisting partly of young soldiers and partly of men who have left the Army eight or ten years before, and partly of boys of eighteen or nineteen who have had six months' training. Surely that is not a sufficient kind of force with which to face an enemy" .

This debate happened in 1912. In light of what happened two years later it was very far-sighted and very accurate in terms of the consequences for sustaining an Army in the Field for more than six months. MG

[SteveMarsdin]

I readily agree that that is also the case as far as numbers go in the Continental armies, and that they draw upon the reserves to the extent of half or more for mobilisation. But the reserve in their case is of men who were in the ranks last year or the year before that or the year before that. There is no great gap between the reserves and the men with the Colours. They take the men between twenty years and twenty-four and twenty-five from the same villages and the same district, and they are really homogeneous.

This debate happened in 1912. In light of what happened two years later it was very far-sighted and very accurate in terms of the consequences for sustaining an Army in the Field for more than six months. MG

I agree, It is a very good analysis (and prediction). He also makes a very valuable point about the continental armies. One of the reasons why the French Army performed much better at the Marne than earlier in August 1914, was that in many cases the reservists who replaced the regular casualties were more experienced.

Steve

[Muerrisch]

regarding the issue of Reserve pay quarterly:

The Officer in Charge of Records and the Paymaster of the Regimental District required reservists to submit a “Life Certificate”, Army Form D 462, quarterly, as proof that they were indeed alive. Poor people moved rented house very often, so the certificate gave an up-to-date address to which to send correspondence. Each soldier held a rail warrant to ensure that he had the means to report on mobilisation or as required. If he were to be recalled, he would retain any substantive rank and good conduct badges.

Clearly the soldier would be in serious trouble if he failed to report for his brief refresher if summoned. Never in my fairly extensive reading have I found record of any such summoning. Has anyone else, please?

[dansparky]

Thanks Grumpy. So only the Army would in the first instance select the creme of the crop from the reserves. This may indicate that they could perform reasonably well, particularily as Musketry was a consideration.

Those i section D remained were deemed unfit so it is indeed bafaling why the were retained at all. It must be lack of numbers (for dire need).

As well as Old soldiers never die, what were the other sources you used in that comment?

[Guest]

regarding the issue of Reserve pay quarterly:

The Officer in Charge of Records and the Paymaster of the Regimental District required reservists to submit a “Life Certificate”, Army Form D 462, quarterly, as proof that they were indeed alive. Poor people moved rented house very often, so the certificate gave an up-to-date address to which to send correspondence. Each soldier held a rail warrant to ensure that he had the means to report on mobilisation or as required. If he were to be recalled, he would retain any substantive rank and good conduct badges.

Clearly the soldier would be in serious trouble if he failed to report for his brief refresher if summoned. Never in my fairly extensive reading have I found record of any such summoning. Has anyone else, please?

So the refresher training for Section B men was on demand rather than statutory?

Given most line regiments recruited men from across the country, the logistic challenge of moving 100,000 Reservists to their depots every 2 years might have been a cost that the WO was not that willing to pay. I never quite understood this. I assume the 'quarter day' was simply when they were paid (via the Post Office?) rather than having to travel somewhere (extra cost) and those receiving their quarterly payments managed to mark the day in the pub.

It would be interesting to see the annual publication regarding Reservists that Haldane referred to. I have a few Returns for the Reserves from the interwar years but these are simply the return numbers and make no mention of training at all in the way that the TF returns do. MG