BEF 1914. Marksmanship, Musketry and the Mad Minute

[Muerrisch]

Field Service Pocket Book 1914 (an official WO Publication) gives the following WE:

Brit Inf Bn - 30 Offrs & 977 ORs

Brit Inf Bn in India - 28 Offrs & 810 ORs

The other issue that can cause a bit of numerical confusion in 1914 is the change in battalion organisation from 8 small coys to 4 large ones and various dates the change was made.

Nigel, a few points of difference. The preface to the FSB 1914 states that it is not to be quoted as an authority, and that is for good reason.

Your figures are only for fighting strength put in the field on Day One. That is not the full War Establishment. You omit "Details left at the base" which are "not included in the above totals" but are in the War Establishment Table.

The "Details" were indeed part of WE, and a battalion was not "complete" until the "First reinforcement", "Storemen etc" comprising the "Details" had been gathered in.

In the above, "Base" was not the Depot in the UK, but the forward base at a continental port such as Rouen. At the Base, the Orderly Room Sergeant, the Band Sergt., the Sergeant-Tailor and 4 storemen were stationed. One assumes they were brought together under their Brigade rear part, itself administered by the Base Commandant.

The First reinforcement comprised the remaining 93 other ranks and was called forward very soon after the main body deployed. Most 1st reinforcements were with their parent units by 10 September 1914, and just as well.

Thus to your 977 you need to add 93, giving 1070, plus the Base wallahs.

All of these values exclude officers.

Separately, I know of no regular line infantry who mobilised on other than the 4 company organisation. This is in contrast to the units in India, and the TF.

[Guest]

Perusing the Musketry Regs, it is interesting to note that when "Range-finding by observation of fire.......when trying for observation, 3rd Class shots should not be permitted to fire."

If these small but important instructions were indeed carried out in the field, (circumstances permitting) it might emphasise the importance of fire control aspect of of musketry training and its practical benefit on the battlefield.

There were also quarterly tests for Judging distances with awards and badges.

[Terry_Reeves]

Terry. The mad minute first appears MR 1909.

It started as target appeared. Man allowed one up spout four in mag. Thereafter reloads from pouch or bandolier so two reloads necessary. Time allowed one minute.

David

Thank you. There is a demonstration of the mad minute here, although rounds are laid out.

TR

[Muerrisch]

Terry, thank you, a good source. It corrects my guessed scoring tariff, to become 4 points to hit figure, 3 for inner, 2 for outer, 1 to hit square only.

Regarding the figures of merit for a company such as "102.5", I have trailed my coat on the subject on the VMS site. The reference is:

http://www.victorianwars.com/viewtopic.php?f=21&t=9954&p=49344#p49344

Whereas I have had helpful input, I still have not the faintest idea how a number like 102.5 was arrived at in 1913 because the calculation of F o M changes with every reference I look at.

[Old Tom]

The video of the 'mad minute' is interesting. The grouping obtained was not very good. Possibly because the shooter did not grasp the small of the butt when firing. i.e he retained his grip on the knob of the bolt. It is many years since I used a No 4 on the range but I am sure any army instructor would frown on that style of shooting. I also clearly recall a SASC NCO get off about 20 rounds in a minute and achieving a good group at 200 yds. I guess that was in about 1952.

Old Tom

[Guest]

This guy shows how fast it could be done. No clue to accuracy, but if you were firing into a mass of infantry, could inflict some damage?

Mike

[Guest]

David

Thank you. There is a demonstration of the mad minute here, although rounds are laid out.

TR

Terry

Thanks for posting. Probably closer to combat than the test. He starts with ten rounds in the mag and reloads once which is different from the test

24 secs for the first 10 rounds

11 seconds to reload with 10 rounds and reset.

22 secs to fire the second 10 rounds.

20 aimed shots in 57 seconds. The Mad Minute Test was I believe over 300 yards, and I note he adjusts his 100 metre grouping to 100 yards. If he had scaled the scoring upwards rather than downwards, I wonder what the score would be. One would theoretically see a much wider spread of shots and some would not have hit the target: tripling the distance would give a nine-fold increase in area (9=3x3). Interesting nonetheless and illustrates beautifully Stoppage drill's point about the aiming window being broken by the recoil.

The other point is that the second clip is much harder to get into the magazine as the resistance is that much greater. A point made on some other video clips I have seen. It would be interesting to see a marksman-standard shoot on the Mad minute. My impression from the few video clips I have seen is a lot of movement around the weapon. Given the record was a staggering 38 rounds in a minute -nearly double what we have just seen and all on target at three times the distance - one begins to appreciate the achievement.

Really interesting on a number of levels. My sense is that he has substituted accuracy with speed and it is not working. I thought I was a bad shot. Was that grouping poor for 100 yards? If the score sheet is anything to go by (1:59 into the video) the second ten rounds were all over the place. The horizontal spread was over 15 inches which at 300 yards would be over 41 inches or nearly 3.5 feet. The vertical spread was 14 inches, or over 3 feet re-based to 300 yards. Area of approximately 3.5 ft x 3 ft or 10.5 sq ft. Enough to hit a barn door. Bearing in mind the aim was to hit the target at 300 yards, this looks way off mark.

MG

[Stoppage Drill]

This debate in the House of Lords in 1904 addresses some interesting matters which are relevant to the thrust of this thread.

http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1904/may/13/the-new-service-rifle

[Guest]

In my youth I used to go grouse/pheasant beating, and was occasionally, a loader for game shoots (before I developed a conscience about these things) anyway, being a good loader took skil. I once received a tip of £100, when other loaders got £15-£20. Anyway, my point is, were men not as proficient at shooting, at any time, used as loaders for their more proficient riflemen?

In this clip, from Gallipoli footage, at about 1 min 30 secs in, it looks like men are handing rifles to others on the Firestep (probably because there was not enough room)

https://uk.video.search.yahoo.com/video/play;_ylt=A2KLqIj8Go9UyDUAmXd2BQx.;_ylu=X3oDMTBzM3UzbjRzBHNlYwNzcgRzbGsDdmlkBHZ0aWQDBGdwb3MDMTA-?p=gallipoli+trench+rifle&vid=322d18f85f2b6fa35d7a718693340417&l=1%3A56&turl=http%3A%2F%2Fts1.mm.bing.net%2Fth%3Fid%3DVN.608002614565536304%26pid%3D15.1&rurl=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DkZPiaSYmj_4&tit=World+War+One+troops+and+fighting&c=9&sigr=11btsgn0e&sigt=1119dis2f&age=0&fr2=p%3As%2Cv%3Av%2Cm%3Asa&fr=chr-greentree_ff&tt=b

Mike

[phil andrade]

Mike,

It is a matter of fact that in earlier, muzzle loading wars - when three rounds a minute was as good as it could get - men would load rifles for their comrades manning the firing line.

If this happened in 1864, then it's feasible that it happened in 1914, too....although the fivefold rate of fire that was attainable in the later conflict rendered that kind of support unnecessary.

Phil (PJA)

[4thGordons]

I don't see any men handing rifles Mike,

It looks to me as though the man nearest the camera steps down with his rifle and then take a charger clip from the pouch of his mate third in line (at 1:26) to reload than then returns to shoot.

Something is passed in the background but it looks to me as though it is either an ammunition bandolier of chargers or a bag/box (1:28) of some sort.

I do not see any rifles being passed.

As to your question... I don't know. In earlier days certainly and men certainly loaded chargers and ammunition belts from loose ammunition at various times during the great war but I suspect it would take almost as long to hand over rifles as it would to strip in rounds from a charger.

Chris

[Guest]

The video of the 'mad minute' is interesting. The grouping obtained was not very good. Possibly because the shooter did not grasp the small of the butt when firing. i.e he retained his grip on the knob of the bolt.

Old Tom

By pure chance I have a old DVD titled 'Lee Enfield Rifle' made by Tommy Atkins Media. Really. It does what it says on the tin. I had never watched it until today. Made by some people who clearly have deep knowledge. Much of the DVD is shot (excuse the pun) in the British Army's Infantry Weapons Reference Collection at Warminster and lots of video of them firing every important version of the Lee Enfield on Ranges and firing the contemporary rifles used by other Armies. There are one-on-one comparisons of firing rifles on the range; the SMLE Mk III v the Mauser for example. Demonstrations of 10 rounds rapid fire, but sadly no demonstration of the Mad Minute.

Interestingly they demonstrated a technique developed by soldiers for firing rapidly which involves using the thumb and forefinger to work the bolt and using the middle finger(s) to activate the trigger. It is shown in real time and in slow motion. Quite convincing. This meant that the rifleman did not need to adjust his grip between firing rounds, thereby dramatically increasing the rate of fire. The compromise was that the rifleman had no grip on the small of the butt when firing. The arguments were that the loss of accuracy was compensated for by increased rate of fire, and given ranges in 1914 were short, and sometimes less than a few hundred yards, rapidity was far more important as attacking forces could (potentially) cover the short distances in a short period of time. It was paramount to lay down as many rounds as possible in these mad moments. Allegedly soldiers needed permission from an Officer to release the magazine locking mechanism (something I find difficult to believe); the implication is that the magazine was kept as a reserve and normal firing was done by loading single rounds. Allegedly the magazine was only used when ordered. Not sure of the veracity of this but that is their theory. The comparisons of the SMLE's rate of fire with other contemporary bolt-action rifles was quite compelling. The 10 round magazine was clearly a massive advantage and while most other (longer barreled) rifles were more accurate, the proximity of trench warfare allegedly eliminated this advantage and the SMLE's higher rate of fire became the critical factor during attacks across shorter distances. Their words, not mine. I would be interested in any thoughts on the above as lots makes sense but some parts sound quite unlikely to me.

A bargain at £9.99 see here. Production quality, sound is appalling and the presentations are very very dry, but worth every penny just for the short clips (another pun) of the rapid fire demonstrations, grip technique and comparisons with other rifles. I once went to the Reference Collection in a previous life but sadly had no idea of its importance at the time.

They clearly believe the SMLE Mk III was the finest etc etc etc......(continues on page 94.)

MG

[David Filsell]

By coincidence I was going to mention the thumb action on the bolt and firing with the third finger. I am no expert on SMLE, but John Terraine told me about it some years ago and I assume he got it from an old soldier when working on the famous BBC series. It rather looks as if the guy in post 182 might be using thumb and fore finger and using middle on the trigger, but I cannot be certain. Others may 'read' it better than me. The fastest of the actions shown seems to be that when the head is not jerked back - I guess an almost automatic response - when the bolt is being operated.

[Muerrisch]

Allegedly soldiers needed permission from an Officer to release the magazine locking mechanism (something I find difficult to believe); the implication is that the magazine was kept as a reserve and normal firing was done by loading single rounds. Allegedly the magazine was only used when ordered. Not sure of the veracity of this but that is their theory.

I believe this was the case for the Long Lee, but soldiers armed with the SMLE were trained to be more self-reliant and to respond to the situation in front of them

I can, I believe, unearth proof if the thread calls for it.

[Muerrisch]

This debate in the House of Lords in 1904 addresses some interesting matters which are relevant to the thrust of this thread.

http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1904/may/13/the-new-service-rifle

Thank you. I found this a marvellous read and very illuminating.

[4thGordons]

Infantry Training Guide - (Wyman and Sons for HMSO): War Office 2052 Infantry Training (4 Company Organization)

Contains a model syllabus for a "6 Months' Course of Recruit Training…Special Reserve recruits to perform the first 4 months" it does have the caveat that "it is not intended to be followed rigidly"

However, having a spare moment I totted up the time allotted to "Musketry" vs "everything else".

If I have done my maths correctly it would seem to show it was expected that a recruit would spend 148.5 hours on musketry (or approximately 23% of the scheduled 640 hours)

For the Special Reserve the balance is slightly different, 28% of the 381 hours spent on musketry.

There is also an interesting section [sec 158] p198-199 which compares rifle and machine gun fire.

I should also correct/comment on something I said earlier. I spoke (inaccurately) of the ability to cycle the SMLE action "without breaking the sight picture" - and it was pointed out (correctly) that the recoil does that. What I intended to convey was that you can work the action on the SMLE with the rifle at the shoulder and with the sights held on the target so only minor adjustment to reacquire the proper sight picture is needed, whereas with the other service rifles (esp straight bolt weapons) the rifle has to be largely lowered from the shoulder to work the action, meaning the entire target has to be refound not just a minor adjustment to obtain the correct sight picture.

I think the accuracy of the longer barrels was significantly overblown - and it was raised as an objection to the introduction of the SMLE but as there appears to be no change in the qualification requirements between the MLE and the SMLE I suspect the small arms school did not see any great disadvantage.

I have fired most rifles of this period a fair bit and I do not notice any systematic variation between types. There is as much variation between different examples of the same type (ie I have a couple of favourite SMLEs which shoot better than my others) as between types as far as I can tell. (To be honest all of the rifles probably shoot better than I can!)

Just to add another snippet not mentioned yet:

Upon completion all SMLEs were tested. They were all fired at 100 feet and about 10% were also tested at 600yards. Any that were seen as "doubtful" in the shorter test were retested at the longer. The rifles were held in a rest and sighted by means of an optical site laid on top of the normal sights. The rest held the rifle as a rifleman would and they could be adjusted with hand wheels to obtain the correct sighting.

One the foresight blade had been "set" with testing shots and its height adjusted 5 rounds were fired at 100 feet. Four of the five rounds had to fall within a rectangular target 1 inch wide and 1.5inches high for the rifle to be accepted. At 600yds 9/10 shots had to hit within a 2ft circle

By "magazine locking mechanism" I suspect you are referring to the cut-off. There are endless debates on this (and there have been threads on it on here)

Working from memory (I cannot find my notes on this currently OR my copy of the musketry regs where this is I believe detailed)

While when initially introduced the cut-off may have served as a fire control device (ie single loading until given the order when the men could "blaze away") it is my recollection that by WWI the use of the cut off for this purpose was specifically prohibited (not to be utilized for single loading) and served as an additional safety mechanism to prevent inadvertent chambering of rounds. Several earlier marks of MLM and MLE did not have safety catches so this was necessary in those models. As has been pointed out above, by WWI ammunition was supplied in chargers, not loose. So I believe that the statement/theory you quote is not accurate for WWI use of the cut-off, it was also omitted on later wartime production rifles.

One additional note : later in the war the Germans introduced a high capacity magazine for their Mauser rifles (although this saw limited use). A 20 round magazine (the Mark I no4 Magazine)was also approved for the SMLE. This resembles a short Bren-gun magazine (with a pronounced curve). It was approved in April 1918 and by August 120,000 had been sent to France. The total orders were for 200,000 which Skennerton (p159) indicates was completed by "early September 1918" Skennerton suggests that the impetus for the development of this magazine was "it had been found that mud was transmitted into magazines via the chargers and it was considered that a larger capacity magazine would not have to be filled so often" (ibid)

Chris

Edit: I would like to thank Stoppage Drill for posting the Hansard link also - excellent - I had lost track of my copy of this and now I have it again.

Edited 15 December , 2014 by 4thGordons

[rd72]

HI all,

I came across this topic via Grumpy's post on the VWF regarding the Figure of Merit question... I have spent the last hour or so reading the excellent posts and making sense of the many tangents that the discussion has taken, all with keen interest. Imagine my surprise when I got to this, the latest page of the conversation and I see a video reference,......... to me, of all people. That is me in the clip.... I have read the comments specifically regarding this clip and I would like to put the experiment, as shown, in the proper context....

The shoot was done as part of a friendly competition between some people on Youtube and this was my first effort... The object was to answer, primarily, a question of rate of fire.... We had to put at least 15 rounds on target. The requirement for "accuracy" was secondary, in that strict scoring was not a criteria while the phrase "on paper" would be a better explanation of the accuracy requirements..... I was and am interested in the technique used to achieve the "record setting" rates of fire as mentioned here and elsewhere and this shoot was an initial experiment at possible techniques....

It was not intended to be a replication of the so called mad minute. i.e. 15 rounds at 300yds at a second class figure target..... (the correct target was used by the way).

Interestingly to some perhaps, I tried a second time and this was the result......

Again it was the technique that was the driving aspect of this experiment.... None of these was trying to dovetail into the Table B shoot at all.....

Anyway, thought that some might like to hear from the guy in the clip and provide context to what you are seeing....

The cut off.... This was kept on the rifle (No 1 Mk III) as a safety feature... It was not a fire control feature as it had been during the era of the MLM and MLE when indeed it was up to the "Fire Controller" to determine when to use the magazine, fire still, at the time, being dominated by the application of section volleys.....

Fantastic thread here gents, many thanks.

Rob

I

[Guest]

Rob, many thanks for your comments. Really fascinating to hear about the learning process. I would be very interested to hear what you think are the small but critical techniques you have used to improve speed; grip on the bolt and trigger, reloading etc. I would also be interested to hear if you have done the experiment at 300 yards and your views on how difficult it is to get 15, 20 or 30 rounds on target within the mad minute at this range.

I saw on another video that there were ways of loading the chargers that reduced the chances of the rims on the rounds catching each other and jamming. Two different techniques were shown which had the rims staggered or stepped to reduce/eliminate risk of this. It seemed sensible and wondered if a number of very small adjustments or changes like this could combine to produce significantly faster rates of fire.

If the record was 38 rounds, this would involve at least two reloads. Given the time taken to reload, this would seem to be a fairly critical part of the process to refine. 20 rounds a minute in battle conditions, assuming 10 already in the mag and one up the spout still would require a reload of 10 rounds. I would be interested to hear what your thoughts are on how the British infantryman refined technique to maximise the rate of fire. I would also be interested to hear any thoughts on the trade-off between rate of fire and accuracy. Some of the other videos simply show people trying to fire as fast as possible without and qualifiers on accuracy.

A very interesting set of videos and one included the Black Bear as background music (my regiment's quick march) so doubly pleased to hear that. MG

[4thGordons]

I saw on another video that there were ways of loading the chargers that reduced the chances of the rims on the rounds catching each other and jamming. Two different techniques were shown which had the rims staggered or stepped to reduce/eliminate risk of this.

Yes this is accurate and it does (in my experience) make a difference. See here for an illustration

[Guest]

More from Hansard on the relative merits of the SMLE v the German Mauser from 1912...

http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1912/mar/04/the-army-rifle

And more on the technical side of trajectory v rapidity

http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1912/mar/12/vote-a-number-of-land-forces#S5CV0035P0_19120312_HOC_248

MG

[4thGordons]

More from Hansard on the relative merits of the SMLE v the German Mauser from 1912...

http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1912/mar/04/the-army-rifle

I believe the "new rifle" being referred to in this Hansard extract is probably what was to become the Pattern 1913 rifle (and later the Pattern 1914 and US M1917).

That Britain was actively developing a replacement for the SMLE at the time that war broke out is perhaps relevant to this discussion. The first extensive discussion happened in 1910 and the Small Arms Committee determined to investigate a rifle that

• had a front locking bolt action (like the Mauser)
• had a one piece stock (like the Mauser)
• used a rimless cartridge (like the Mauser)
• had aperture sights

They also specified that the rifle be similar to the SMLE in dimensions (it was longer) and recoil, have full furniture, be charger loading, have a 10 rnd magazine (as it turned out the production rifles did not they had an internal 5 round magazine) and a heavier barrel.

The Pattern 1913 rifle was the response to this and had a new smaller calibre - higher velocity round (.276") About 1000 of these were produced for trials in 1912/3 (see Hansard extract)

While the rifle was mostly deemed successful (some issues with the safety and the front handguard), the cartridge gave significant trouble with excessive muzzle blast and higher pressures than wanted. It was the cartridge development that delayed the rifle's introduction and this was the situation when war broke out. Had the war come a couple of years later we might have been comparing a quite different rifle.

As it turned out the rifle was of course put into production in the US as the Pattern 1914 rifle (rechambered for the .303" rimmed cartridge) although few saw action in the Great War, but in another guise, rechambered once again for the us .30-06 calibre round saw very extensive use with the AEF with over 2 million Model 1917 rifles being produced in the US in 1917/18 and many suggest it was more numerous in the AEF than the M1903 Springfield.

While the receiver mounted aperture sight on the P14/M1917 is excellent (and very similar to the later sight mounted on the WWII Enfield No4 Rifle) and the action is incredibly robust. I do not find either of the rifles preferable to shoot over the SMLE. I am not large and I prefer the length/weight/balance of the SMLE. The action is certainly not as fast in my experience. They are however very accurate weapons.

Chris

[phil andrade]

Does this wonderful thread testify to a misplaced view by authority that the conflict that loomed was going to be a rifleman's war, rather than a gunner's war ?

Phil (PJA)

[Guest]

It was interesting to see in the second Hansard thread (post 195*) long discussion over the SMLE (Mark III?) and its potential replacement. Some debaters seem to think it was an inferior weapon, which in the light of what happened subsequently and the benefit of hindsight now seems very surprising. Some members of the House were military ("gallant members") and informed, but clearly not experts. One side arguing that the higher trajectory of the SMLE compared to other continental armies' rifles was a disadvantage. Lots of discussion on the relative merits of the German Mauser which indicated that politicians at least thought Germany was a potential rival in 1912. The counter argument consistently returned to the superior rate of fire due to the Lee bolt action and the 10-round magazine, although at one stage it was pointed out that the musketry regulations only allowed one 5-round clip to be loaded at one time, thereby eliminating its advantage. I read somewhere else that this was to preserve the magazine. Presumably this limitation was abandoned at some stage.

Haldane was clearly very on top of this subject (as one might expect). Lots of detail over the efficiency of the charge in the propellant, the type of cordite and muzzle velocity impacting range and trajectory and the weight of impact of the bullet at various ranges. It was quite educational for ballistic novices such as myself.

The potential of rapid fire was well understood and the trade-off between various factors ultimately affecting trajectory were equally understood. I suspect a debate of this quality would be impossible in today's House.

MG

*it is worth persevering and getting to the end of the section.

[Guest]

I thought this part of the second Hansard discussion quite relevant - pointing out the relative strengths and weaknesses of the proposed structure of the Expeditionary Force and its unsustainable reliance on Reservists. Note his comments (highlighted) on the relative training of Reservists. The speaker was Amery talking in March 1912. His comments were quite far sighted. It is interesting that he claimed the Army Reserves Section D had hardly any training. It illustrates a point made in the opening paragraph of the OP that the British Army was far from homogeneous. MG

"Obviously from that answer alone the whole of these six divisions cannot be ready to take the field. If they do, how will they be composed? Are they in any sense a homogeneous force as regards men? It is admitted that less than half of them will be men serving with the Colours, and something like 90,000 will be drawn from the Reserve. I readily agree that that is also the case as far as numbers go in the Continental armies, and that they draw upon the reserves to the extent of half or more for mobilisation. But the reserve in their case is of men who were in the ranks last year or the year before that or the year before that. There is no great gap between the reserves and the men with the Colours. They take the men between twenty years and twenty-four and twenty-five from the same villages and the same district, and they are really homogeneous. In our case the men with the Colours are separated from the Reserve by at least five years, and in the great majority of cases by ten and even thirteen years. The men with the Colours are between twenty and twenty-two and twenty-three. Of our Reserves 52,000 are over thirty years of age, and of Section D of the Reserve, which is 30,000 strong, practically the whole of them have been away from the Colours from nine to thirteen years, and have not had a day's training or have not seen a rifle during that time. Can anybody call that a homogeneous force? I know that Lord Haldane declared the other day that it might not be necessary, except in a few units, to draw upon Section D. I should like to see the right hon. Gentleman, show how that is the case. Next year, as far as I can make out, although a great number will have been away from the Colours for more than five years, A and B Reserves will be only 106,000 strong. When you subtract from that 10 per cent. for casualties, 8,000 who are abroad, the 4,000 that will be required to complete the Regular battalion at home, and the 6,000 that will be required in category B which was to have been supplied by the Territorials but which has never materialised, and with the other deductions, you will find that you are left with not more than 75,000 in A and B; so that, in other words, for the shortage of 12,000 or 13,000, you will have to draw upon Section D.

More than that, according to the mobilisation tables, the very day you send your Expeditionary Force you are to send abroad 10 per cent. of drafts for the field units, that is some 15,000 men. How are you going to do so when you have only some 14,000 or so of Section D left behind, of whom 10,000 have been earmarked for the stiffening of the Special Reserve? You have 8,000 Reserves, who I trust and who undoubtedly will in large numbers, come back from abroad. But taking these and the young men in the line you have only got about 20,000. That means from the very start you will have to come down on the Special Reserve for something like 40,000. The Special Reserve is not 60,000 strong, and from that you have got to send 15,000 of the extra Special Reserve to which my right hon. Friend has referred. So wonderful are they that after three months they can do what any other troops are only expected to do after several years. There are something like 15,000 to be sent to the Mediterranean and other lines of communication. You are left with 45,000 Special Reservists of whom 20,000 are under nineteen, or only just recruited to meet drafting requirements. In other words, you cannot even with the Special Reserve keep the Expeditionary Force going for six months. Even if you could, it means that, so far from having a homogeneous force, you will have a force consisting partly of young soldiers and partly of men who have left the Army eight or ten years before, and partly of boys of eighteen or nineteen who have had six months' training. Surely that is not a sufficient kind of force with which to face an enemy" .

[roger cleverly]

I suspect that the famous maximum 38 aimed shots a minute can only have been accomplished by lining up pre-loaded spare magazines (not, of course, a normal issue)- not by loading with chargers through the action. On the 'machine-gun under every hedge' quote at Mons, I thought the original German comment was 'too many 'automatische gewehre' rather than 'maschinen-gewehre'. Perhaps the ten-round staggered row box magazine and turned down bolt handle of the Sht. L.E. looked like a (semi) automatic to a soldat used to the integral magazine and right-angled bolt handle of the Gew.98. RC