BEF 1914. Marksmanship, Musketry and the Mad Minute

[Guest]

Thanks David. I am not sure I follow this line...

"So it would appear that in using Wynne's copy from an introduction from the introduction Edmonds accepted, if he did not himself write - remember the OH was a team job - Wynne's 'only inference' as a far more positive thing - a fact"

Are you saying Edmonds turned Wynne's speculation into a fact?

For what it is worth, Wynne's analysis appears rather generous. The line suggesting every (sic) bush, hedge, etc is clearly hyperbole. Wynne and Edmonds don't appear to have considered the author may simply be exaggerating for dramatic effect.

I sincerely hope this thread does not descend into speculation on whether an individual can differentiate between rifle-fire or machine-gun fire. There is already a perpetual debate on this in the Gallipoli section. We know that the OH believes Germans couldn't. My interest here is simply to find the source of the OH claim and to carefully separate fact from Wynne's and Edmond's speculation. Everyone can decide on whether they agree with Edmonds' speculation or not.

The key word in the OH claim is 'repeatedly'. Is there any evidence of this in Wynne's translation? Where are these repeated claims? My copy still has not arrived. MG

[phil andrade]

To call this quotation into doubt simply because a majority of British soldiers in the field at that time had probably not served in the Boer War is a bit off-target. The phrase "with colonial experience" is irrelevant within the context and meaning of the statement. How would he know what experience the British soldiers had and where they had gained it?

Why not accept that, in the opinion of the writer, "this accuracy....verged on the miraculous"?

And why does "colonial experience" equate exclusively to the Boer War?

Cheers

Colin

No intention on my part to cast doubt here ; the thing catches the eye because it so neatly exemplifies the caricature that applies to the Old Contemptibles ....and coming from one who was on the receiving end of their fire, it has added weight.

There is actually another allusion to the " colonial" aspect in Jack Sheldon's book, which Jack has deemed worthy of mention in his notes at the end of the chapter. On page 161, Offizierstellvertreter August Haug 2nd Company Bavarian R.I.R. 16 relates :

It appeared that we were up against ' colonial troops' , that is to say British soldiers who had been in service in the colonies.

The notation attached to this comment on page 178 note 51 reads :

There was some justification for this assessment. The British 7th Division comprised mostly veteran troops. Three quarters of the infantry battalion had had recent overseas service and three of the battalions had fought in the South African War.

A little confused as to reference to " the infantry battalion". Do you think that it should read " division" ?

Phil (PJA)

[Guest]

I assume the proportion of career army officers (and perhaps senior NCOs?) who had Boer War experience (being on the whole older than the average O/R?) might have been substantially higher than those serving in the army as a whole, and therefore they would have been sympathetic towards and enthusiastic in enacting, the "lessons" and passing them on to the men under their command.

Chris

The 1914 Army list shows the commissioning dates of every Officer. Take the 2nd Bn Royal Sussex Regt as one example; of the the 57 officers that served in F&F up to the beginning of Nov 1914, 44% were old enough to have had Boer War experience. I think longer experience will be another factor influencing the performance of the BEF, however attrition was exceptionally high and while many Officers were sent out* many were killed or wounded. Continuity would have been an enormous challenge. One of the claims in the British OH was that the experience died in 1914 (or words to that effect).

Personally I am not convinced that Boer War experience or Colonial experience was as important as it is perhaps believed.. The literature and official reports in the aftermath is not complimentary on the performance of the British Army in this period, so the 'lessons' were not really properly absorbed until doctrine and training changed in the inter-war years. Was a Boer War veteran fighting in 1914 a better soldier because of that experience or because he had been better trained in the aftermath? Or both? and if it is both which was more important? The diaries don't generally mention the Boer war as an advantage. My sense is that the improvements in the inter-war period were far more important. My speculation.

Edit. There is strong evidence that during mobilisation, when COs were faced with Section D men with Boer War experience or a man who had recently left the colours (i.e enlisted in 1907) they would take the latter. This suggests that age and fitness were valued more than old experience. The COs attached a much higher value to men who had only recently left the Colours and who clearly had no Boer War experience.

MG

* 75 by the end of 1914, or the equivalent to nearly three Battalion's worth at 1914 War Establishment. 29 of these would have been old enough to have Boer war experience. (39%). If we look at the 1915 cohort (289 officers) 28% would have been old enough to have served in the Boer War.

[4thGordons]

The 1914 Army list shows the commissioning dates of every Officer. Take the 2nd Bn Royal Sussex Regt as one example; of the the 57 officers that served in F&F up to the beginning of Nov 1914, 44% were old enough to have had Boer War experience. I think longer experience will be another factor influencing the performance of the BEF, however attrition was exceptionally high and while many Officers were sent out* many were killed or wounded. Continuity would have been an enormous challenge. One of the claims in the British OH was that the experience died in 1914 (or words to that effect).

Personally I am not convinced that Boer War experience or Colonial experience was as important as it is perhaps believed.. The literature and official reports in the aftermath is not complimentary on the performance of the British Army in this period, so the 'lessons' were not really properly absorbed until doctrine and training changed in the inter-war years. Was a Boer War veteran fighting in 1914 a better soldier because of that experience or because he had been better trained in the aftermath? Or both? and if it is both which was more important? The diaries don't generally mention the Boer war as an advantage. My sense is that the improvements in the inter-war period were far more important. My speculation.

Edit. There is strong evidence that during mobilisation, when COs were faced with Section D men with Boer War experience or a man who had recently left the colours (i.e enlisted in 1907) they would take the latter. This suggests that age and fitness were valued more than old experience. The COs attached a much higher value to men who had only recently left the Colours and who clearly had no Boer War experience.

MG

* 75 by the end of 1914, or the equivalent to nearly three Battalion's worth at 1914 War Establishment. 29 of these would have been old enough to have Boer war experience. (39%). If we look at the 1915 cohort (289 officers) 28% would have been old enough to have served in the Boer War.

Thanks for this...makes sense

Perhaps it is important to specify the level of analysis here. When we are talking about "experience" as we (and perhaps the previous accounts being quoted) seem to be conflating the value of individual experience of the Boer/Colonial Warfare (Soldiers who had "been there") and the value of an ARMY (as an institution) that had experienced and reflected upon that conflict, and subsequently, learned from it and enshrined that learning in their doctrine and training.

I think this is implicit in what you are saying above - but it is perhaps as well to make it explicit here.

Chris

[Guest]

Thanks for this...makes sense

Perhaps it is important to specify the level of analysis here. When we are talking about "experience" as we (and perhaps the previous accounts being quoted) seem to be conflating the value of individual experience of the Boer/Colonial Warfare (Soldiers who had "been there") and the value of an ARMY (as an institution) that had experienced and reflected upon that conflict, and subsequently, learned from it and enshrined that learning in their doctrine and training.

I think this is implicit in what you are saying above - but it is perhaps as well to make it explicit here.

Chris

I would agree. For the British Army the Great War dates could be 1907-1919. Radical changes made in 1907 and afterwards were instrumental in the BEF's performance. It is very difficult to fully understand 1914 without the inter-war period context. I mentioned Jones' book a number of times, but Peter Hart also devotes a more condensed chapter to this period in his appropriately titled book 'Fire and Movement'. MG

[David Filsell]

Mart,

A poor sentence. Apologies.

The quotes are from an introduction and drawn from the German official account which Wynne translated which follows his intro. From the sections he chooses to quote he simply draws an inference. Now, Edmonds, whilst quoting some of Wynne's points, says that there are repeated references to the Germans mistaking rifle fire for MGs. Where does he get this repeated from? Possibly,just possibly, officers with whom he was corresponding? Either way Wynne did not suggest the mistaken identification as fact however good or bad his translation.

Apologies for mentioning the MG rifle fire debate. But we had few machine guns at Ypres. The Germans claimed there were many shooting at them - see Wynnes quotes and his translated German text when your copy arrive? There were however rather a lot of 20 round a minute infantrymen, cavalrymen and sappers trying to kill them, and doing so. Is it not possible in the heat of battle that they too drew an inference similar to Wynne's. After all I once mistook a Ferrari exhaust note for that of a tweaky Mini Cooper. ( That's a joke!)

It should not of course be forgotten that the original German account which Wynne translated was written, it is believed, in a large part to justify failure.

Hope this makes things clearer.

David

[David Filsell]

As an addition your comment about German hyperbole. It may be, I believe is, so . But the Wynne's book is a straight translation - good or poor I am not qualified to judge - of the German original rather than a clinical analysis. I have another book on Wynne's military writing. I will see if there is more in there.

[Guest]

Edmonds, whilst quoting some of Wynne's points, says that there are repeated references to the Germans mistaking rifle fire for MGs. Where does he get this repeated from? Possibly,just possibly, officers with whom he was corresponding? Either way Wynne did not suggest the mistaken identification as fact however good or bad his translation.

David

Thank you for expanding on this David.

With regards to the OH correspondence, much of it is included in the war diaries files. Having done a small amount of work on transcribing these diaries there does not appear to be any discussion on this. It is possible that there are some in the CAB files at TNA, but I have waded through these some time ago (albeit on a different mission) but nothing sticks in my mind on this particular aspect. It is probably a few days worth of work and currently beyond my limited time. From my perspective it does need to be kept open as a possible explanation. I suspect we have now exhausted this line of enquiry.

100 posts later, my initial thoughts are that the inter-war reforms have not been fully appreciated by some authors on 1914 and it is an area that would benefit from a lot more research. Officer training at subaltern level for example is something I have not seen in many books and it would seem to be rather important, given they were at the very sharp end and would be executing the fire control. One other sub-group is the Company commanders, particularly the few Majors. All I have read on this small group suggests extra-ordinary (two words) performance during this period, and in the context of this thread their impact on how the BEF's infantry conducted the campaign is probably worth a small book.

I read recently that every Officer had to complete the Musketry course, which suggests that they would have been indoctrinated with the new doctrine. McMahon - the 'Musketry Maniac' and Chief Instructor at Hythe 1905-1909 - lectured every intake. I wonder aloud just how important this individual was to the performance of the BEF in 1914.

MG

[David Filsell]

Cab42 is the key file but as interesting for what it does not contain as that which it does. Clearly the correspondence on the OH series was copious and only a fraction remains. On Wynne - he was captured in 1914, a proficient German speaker, fell out with Edmonds on the Paschaendale volume of the OH because of his heavy criticism of Gough. Bough appealed to Edmonds, Wynne was sacked. Wynne also translated Viormarsch and wrote an analysis of the German development of defensive tactics. He also wrote in Army Review in other words he was no duck egg.

[SteveMarsdin]

It should also be remembered that at First Ypres the Germans were attacking. At the beginning of the war German infantry doctrine was that the machine dun was a defensive weapon and rather than been spread across their units they were concentrated together. This may contribute as to why in some cases they considered that when met with British defensive rapid-fire it was machine guns.

As David has also hinted at, "machine guns" are often found in accounts to mask the failings of the attacking force to which the author belongs or identifies with, such as with the French in August 1914 and British/ANZACs at Gallipoli a year later.

[phil andrade]

Yes, that last point of yours rings true, Steve....well, it does to me, anyway.

An excuse for failure.

Zuber's account of Le Cateau offers and illuminating perspective here : in his summary, he cites how the Germans went on record as expressing great satisfaction with the outcome, more especally because they rated British training and equipment highly. It's almost as if they were surprised at how well they had done against a first class foe. It would be interesting to see how far Germans alluded to British MG fire in that battle.

Phil (PJA)

[Guest]

Wynne's translation just arrived. Only a few lines after lots of German hyperbole he writes:

"..the lavish praise, might be deemed exaggerated. Part of it undoubtedly is. It is fair however to deduce that the German nation had to be given some explanation why the 'contemptible little Army had not been pushed straightaway into the sea."

One can only assume Edmonds didn't read that far. MG

Edit. At one stage Wynne comments that one statement "is almost ludicrous in its travesty of the facts".

Edit 2: Wynnes' footnote to the comment on Colonial Wars "It was not in 'long colonial wars' but in careful training on the ranges that the majority of the defenders of Ypres had learnt that mastery of the rifle was the mainstay of the success of the defence. Betweeen the close of the South African War (1902) an the outbreak of war in 1914, scarecly any British troops had been on active service. "

[Muerrisch]

now subsumed in #146

[Steven Broomfield]

As a thought, presumably the German perception of the British was that they chased round the world taking pot shots at fuzzy wuzzies, hence the comment about colonial wars. The fact that the BEF was made up of youngsters and reservists (I exaggerate to make a point) wouldn't occur to the average German soldier, would it?

I seldom cease to be surprised at exactly how few medal ribbons one sees on 1914-pattern BEF soldiers, not how many.

[phil andrade]

Not just the German perception, dare I suggest ?

A homegrown caricature, exemplified by Kipling's Barrack-Room Ballads, gave credence to the Old Sweat syndrome of Tommy Atkins as a seasoned veteran of imperial service.

Phil (PJA)

[squirrel]

As a thought, presumably the German perception of the British was that they chased round the world taking pot shots at fuzzy wuzzies, hence the comment about colonial wars. The fact that the BEF was made up of youngsters and reservists (I exaggerate to make a point) wouldn't occur to the average German soldier, would it?

I seldom cease to be surprised at exactly how few medal ribbons one sees on 1914-pattern BEF soldiers, not how many.

Perception, probably, as you say - however, there were more than a few Senior NCO's and Officers who had fought in South Africa and doubtless passed on their experience.

[David Filsell]

The British troops - regulars and reservists alike - sent out in 14 were undoubtedly sound, well trained and, taking into account the views expressed on this thread, enjoyed extremely good musketry skills. They were no push over, despite the size of the force. It seems to me the Germans - hyperbole or not in the Ypern account - fully recognised their competence. After that it is largely a question of detail and debate.

Personally, as an excuse or as a fact, it seems reasonable to believe that it became accepted on both sides that rifle fire may well have been mistakenly identified as MG fire. That said it is actually unimportant, whether rifle or MG. The fact is that the rate and volume of British rifle fire in 1914 had a damaging and disconcerting effect on Germany infantry which is reported time after time in German accounts of their assaults on British positions.

[Guest]

I have just finished Ypres 1914. Possibly the second worst book on Great War period I have ever read. It is too complex to summarise in a few lines, but I am simply astounded that the Historical Section gave it any credence. Parts of it read like fiction. I think the poor author ( a lowly Captain) was told to simply write an excuse for German failure. It is pure propaganda. Wynne's comments and counter-arguments are copious but begin to grate after some time. His counter-arguments are nearly as dismal as the original text he is challenging. An extremely poor book with some extremely poor analysis. A definite buy (£20 for an original copy) simply to see how bad things were. I understand it was not an 'Official' History and there is a larger, pukka German OH on this period. If anyone can confirm this it would be useful.

My only hard conclusion so far is that the British OH claims regarding German perceptions of British musketry were built on extremely shoddy foundations. Sheldon and Zuber knew this 4 years ago, so this is nothing new.

MG

Edit: \i believe the Colonial/Boer War angle is a red herring. The stats simply don't stack up. As an aside, one of the diaries records a CO complaining that a re-enlisted man was so old he had served at El-Teb in 1882. Technically possible but does rather stretch the imagination. Cameron Highlanders or Cameronians if memory serves. MG

[Terry_Reeves]

I am of the opinion that it was the "mad minute" that caused the German comments about "machine gun fire". The mad minute was fired against german troops advancing en-masse so there was no real marksmanship involved. The oft quoted 15 rounds a minute as propounded by the likes of JM Craster equates to one round every 4 seconds, although that is a cyclic rate of fire. There was a magazine reload that had to taken into account of course.

Grumpy in post No 25 is quite right to point out that there was a very real difference between the comparative serenity of the rifle range and the reality of the battlefield.

TR

[David Filsell]

Martin

I definitely need evidence based proof of your 'hard conclusion' of shoddy perceptions of British musketry. Accounts are absolutely legion from both sides of the effectiveness of British fire. You need to provide detailed evidence to support such an assertion not simply a statement of belief. And yes I have read Zuber's and Sheldon ( who has certainly not made such an all embracing assertion like yours). Let me underline I do not believe the British army "a perfect thing apart", but such a rubbishing as yours cannot go unchallenged.

Regards

David

I also think you harsh on Wynne.

[squirrel]

MG - Extracts from the German OH - translations from the German Official History of the Great War - Mark Osborne Humphries & John Maker editors based on translations by Wilhelm J. Kiesselbach. Wlfred Laurier University Press Ontario Canada. Not a light read and not that much on the battle of Mons.

23rd August 1914 -

"At 18.30, 10th Brigade's attempt to gain ground towards St. Ghislain failed in the face of enemy machine gun fire, which had already deployed north of the canal."

"8th Brigade...Further attacks against the southern canal crossing, however, stuck fast in the face of heavy enemy machine gun fire from the far bank".

[Muerrisch]

Is anyone interested in the least in my supply of facts as opposed to conjecture and speculation on the minutiae of credit sharing and blame attribution.

Please refer to OP.

[squirrel]

Well said David -p121.

Point taken Grumpy p123.

I am reminded of Richard Holmes's comment from his book Tommy about the BEF, "They were paid to shoot and frankly, they loved it".

[phil andrade]

Let's hope that this passes muster as a discerning comment, not least because it was written literally within two years of the deployment of the BEF in France, by Arthur Conan Doyle :

That instrument was an army which was remarkably well prepared for its work. It cannot be said that the Boer War had increased the prestige of the British forces ; though only those who have studied the subject can realise how difficult was the task with which they were then faced, or how considerable an achievement it was to bring it to a success. But the campaign had left behind it a valuable legacy, all the richer because so great a proportion of the land forces had been drawn into the struggle. In 1914 a large proportion of senior officers and a considerable number of non-commissoned officers and reservists had passed through that ordeal, and learned by experience what can be done, and, even more important, what cannot be done, in face of modern rifles in skilful hands.

The lesson had been well pressed home after the war, and every general, from Lord Roberts downward, had laid emphasis upon the importance of cover and of accuracy of fire.

THE BRITISH CAMPAIGN IN FRANCE AND FLANDERS 1914 ( published October 1916)

Phil (PJA)

[David Filsell]

Grumpy,

Excuse my ignorance. What is OP?

David