BEF 1914. Marksmanship, Musketry and the Mad Minute

[SteveMarsdin]

I'm pretty sure - and I would ask forumites who have access to his book on the Ardennes to bear me out, or otherwise - that he attributes the monstrous slaugher of the French at the Battle of Rossignol to German rife fire, in the main. As I write this, I am away from home so I cite this from memory. I do possess his book " The Mons Myth" and when I return this evening I'll try and dig up a quote or two in which Zuber does acknowledge that British infantry did exhibit creditable skill with musketry and marksmanship.....but if what he says about Rossignol is true then we must agree that it was German infantry who made the most extreme demonstration of the effectiveness of the fusillade.

Phil (PJA)

Phil, Zuber mainly refers to "beaten zones" etc rather than aimed shots at specific targets*. You are correct though when he puts most of the success at the Battle of the Frontiers down to superior musketry skills rather than artillery or machine guns.

* That said, The Colonial Corps officers were picked off in many cases, given away by the gold braid on their kepis, in the August sun.

[phil andrade]

The Bible - as far as I'm concerned - of the standard of marksmanship et alia in the German Army of 1914 must be THE GREAT WAR DAWNING by Joe and Janet Robinson and Frank Buchholz.

Pages 202 -205 deal specifically with marksmanship.

There is a great deal of information here, so forgive me if I precis and pitch in with one or two quotes:

Marksmanship training took a major role in military training.....Prior to the war, German infantrymen were trained to maximise the impact of massed rifle fire, both at squad and platoon level. Aimed fire was of limited value against individual soldiers at distances beyond 400 meters. Squads and platoons were taught to lay down a beaten zone ( Garbe) upon enemy formations. Using the beaten zone, soldiers shot at an area rather than individual targets.......German infantrymen were trained to adjust the rate of fire according to circumstances, otherwise a prolonged firefight would rapidly consume ammunition. Slow fire ( 1.5 to 3 rounds per minute) was indicated for distant targets in poor light and for targets that were difficult to see. A high rate of fire ( 3-7 rounds per minute) was indicated for engaging enemy march columns. High rate was also used to attain fire superiority and to support friendly troops that were bounding forward. Maximum rates of fire ( 7-12 rounds per minute) were used just before an assault was launched, against an enemy assault and in sudden close range combat.

The maximum rate of fire alluded to above would hardly have been considered sufficient by the standards of the BEF of 1914, if the fifteen rounds per minute was indeed attained as the standard denominator. Were the reservists who comprised such a large part of the BEF up to this task if they had previously served in an era when this fifteen rounds per minute requirement had not been applied ?

Phil (PJA)

[Muerrisch]

I have fired the service rifle and, more recently, a target .22 rifle, and can categorically state that 15 aimed rounds per minute is perfectly attainable by a fit, well-motivated young male. Motivation comes readily when the opposition are trying to kill you.

[4thGordons]

I have no formal training at all but have fired SMLEs a lot. 15 rounds a minute is easy, 15 aimed rounds, hitting a target is harder but quite attainable. Fortunately, I have never had to do this under fire but I suspect Grumpy is correct in that it would provide motivation. What it would do to accuracy may be another matter.

Chris

[phil andrade]

If memory serves me - and this is another thing I'll have to check - Zuber alludes to a German assessment of British training that was compiled just before the war.

The Germans noticed and acknowledged that the British soldiers were exhibiting a high standard of marksmanship but - and this is significant - they also remarked upon " deficiencies" in control of this finely tempered firepower.

This is the sort of thing that Zuber likes to emphasise .....the ability of the Germans to integrate various skills into battlefield doctrine and practice ; an ability which, he insists , was more pronounced in the German army than it was in its Franco British counterparts and resulted in such heavy Entente losses in the Battle of the Frontiers. It is, however, important to note that Zuber is happy to concede that British infantrymen were acknowledged - at the time - as being conspicuously proficient in the handling of their rifles.

Phil (PJA)

[Guest]

In light of the widening debate I have amended the title of the OP to include the term 'Musketry'.

The points on collective concentrated firepower rather than individual marksmanship skills are interesting. MG

[brummie76]

Thanks Ron. If anyone has Musketry Regs and would be kind enough to post the relevant page, it would be gratefully received. MG

Any good to you? https://www.scribd.com/doc/42693586/Musketry-Regulations-1910

Paul

[Muerrisch]

now subsumed in #146

[phil andrade]

Doesn't the disparity between a standardised requirement of fifteen rounds per minute against a notional maximum of twelve speak volumes about the store the respective armies set by the importance of musketry ?

Phil (PJA)

[Muerrisch]

That opens a new can or two of worms: number of rounds on the soldier, number of rounds held ready by the unit, number of rounds in the field.

My only immediate offering is that when CO 2nd RWF was expecting action in the very early days of the war he added 100 rounds to the 150 rounds on the soldier. That is a lot of firepower for a lot of minutes.

Mind you, I recall a statistic that it took, on average and for all periods of history, a man's weight in bullets to kill an enemy ............. some huge figure, which I cannot find right now. So by that reckoning [and I am being light-hearted about a serious subject] if every 2nd RWF soldier fired all of his ammunition about one advancing enemy would be hit.

Lies, damned lies and statistics.

[phil andrade]

Too much emphasis on the prowess of the rifleman, perhaps ?

It makes a great story ; but maybe it left other branches of the service depleted. I am thinking here of the shortage of high trajectory heavy artillery.

I know that British cavalry was very good, and that its performance was enhanced by musketry skills of a high order....so maybe I'm barking up the wrong tree here.

Phil (PJA)

[ss002d6252]

Too much emphasis on the prowess of the rifleman, perhaps ?

It makes a great story ; but maybe it left other branches of the service depleted. I am thinking here of the shortage of high trajectory heavy artillery.

I know that British cavalry was very good, and that its performance was enhanced by musketry skills of a high order....so maybe I'm barking up the wrong tree here.

Phil (PJA)

That's a good point - did the emphasis on the rifle lead to reductions in ability elsewhere.

I was reading an quick snippet the other day (Hansard, I think) which alluded to T.F. men in the artillery having their musketry training significantly reduced as it was decided that that there wasn't sufficient time to concentrate on both musketry and their normal training.

Craig

[Muerrisch]

The only arms that did the full musketry training were infantry, cavalry and RE.

All others did less but even the RAMC did a notional amount.

[phil andrade]

The German use of Jaeger battalions might be worth mentioning here.

Did this imply that there was an elitist marksman culture of separation in the German army, whereas the British sought to uphold a conspicuously high standard throughout ?

The British army did, of course, cherish traditions of this kind in its history of the " Green Jackets" ....but in 1914, it was the Germans who deployed large contingents of specially designated troops renowned for marksmanship. This is my belief, not my knowledge, so I'd appreciate enlightenment if I'm wrong.

Phil (PJA)

[David Filsell]

A prewar report by the German military attaché of British manoeuvres commented on the efficiency of Britsh fire and movement and was reported in the Times.

[salesie]

Doesn't the disparity between a standardised requirement of fifteen rounds per minute against a notional maximum of twelve speak volumes about the store the respective armies set by the importance of musketry ?

Phil (PJA)

This disparity is to do with the respective rifles of the two armies - to fire fifteen rounds a minute (and usually more) the Lee Enfield required one reload with two five round clips to fill the magazine; whereas the mauser with its five round magazine needed two reloads to get to twelve. Then there's the angle of the bolt handle; the Lee Enfield handle angled downwards and the mauser handle was at a right angle to the bolt. The downward angle of the Lee Enfield made for a much smoother and quicker single round reload action than the mauser. The British infantryman in 1914 had a distinct advantage in musketry than his German counterpart because of the design of his weapon, and the regular Tommies made maximum use of it with good training and discipline.

Cheers-salesie.

[Phil Wood]

Surely the idea that the British marksmanship was superior to the Germans derives from the effectiveness of British rifles in breaking up German attacks in 1914. In general the British were on the defensive and firing at massed German infantry - where 15 aimed rounds per minute (or more) was the key to stopping infantry in their tracks. Of the relatively few occasions when the British attacked German riflemen en masse did they do that much better than the Germans?

The other issue is that the BEF comprised regulars and ex-regulars - all well trained to use their weapons (even if a bit rusty they would soon get back their skills) - whereas the Germans fielded a large number of their reserve against the BEF, far (IIRC) less well trained than English reserves. On average one would expect a British soldier to be better with a rifle than a German one - though the German's still seemed able to find some pretty effective snipers.

The other other issue could be the German's far heavier use of machine guns and artillery - they were moving on from reliance on the defensive power of the rifle and hence in training might place less emphasis on musketry than other aspects of combat.

[squirrel]

In the book "Old Soldiers Never Die" by Frank Richards he mentions that during the retreat from Mons himself and two other men, all of them Reservists, were tasked with acting as a forward post at night.

He states that they had no qualms about being forward of the rest of their Company as they knew each other well and could each fire twenty shots a minute.

[phil andrade]

This disparity is to do with the respective rifles of the two armies - to fire fifteen rounds a minute (and usually more) the Lee Enfield required one reload with two five round clips to fill the magazine; whereas the mauser with its five round magazine needed two reloads to get to twelve. Then there's the angle of the bolt handle; the Lee Enfield handle angled downwards and the mauser handle was at a right angle to the bolt. The downward angle of the Lee Enfield made for a much smoother and quicker single round reload action than the mauser. The British infantryman in 1914 had a distinct advantage in musketry than his German counterpart because of the design of his weapon, and the regular Tommies made maximum use of it with good training and discipline.Cheers-salesie.

Don't the respective rifles themselves - with their differing capacity to deliver rounds according to clips, bolt angles etc. - indicate some difference in priorities ?

It was only forty odd years since French rifles had cut down several thousand Prussians in a short time at Gravelotte St Privat ; so the Germans were surely conversant with the potential of effective musketry on the battlefield. And then, it appears, they themselves were able to inflict even more catastrophic damage with their Mausers at Rossignol.

If they were content to maximise their rifle fire at twelve rounds a minute, and were willing to retain the Mauser despite the superior rate of fire of the SMLE, then I have to wonder whether the Germans were more " multi dimensional" in their battlefield doctrine, and reposed more confidence in the efficacy of artillery which was, after all, the big killer.

Phil (PJA)

[salesie]

Don't the respective rifles themselves - with their differing capacity to deliver rounds according to clips, bolt angles etc. - indicate some difference in priorities ?

It was only forty odd years since French rifles had cut down several thousand Prussians in a short time at Gravelotte St Privat ; so the Germans were surely conversant with the potential of effective musketry on the battlefield. And then, it appears, they themselves were able to inflict even more catastrophic damage with their Mausers at Rossignol.

If they were content to maximise their rifle fire at twelve rounds a minute, and were willing to retain the Mauser despite the superior rate of fire of the SMLE, then I have to wonder whether the Germans were more " multi dimensional" in their battlefield doctrine, and reposed more confidence in the efficacy of artillery which was, after all, the big killer.

Phil (PJA)

In a thread specifically about musketry (and marksmanship) I was pointing out that a German infantryman in 1914 could not possibly be as proficient/effective in musketry as his British counterpart simply because his rifle prevented it. Whether German battlefield doctrine "allowed" this to happen is another point, a point that I have no answer for, except to say; stalemate ensued on the battlefield, whatever the doctrine or weapons of any of the respective armies , which tells me that they were all, in essence, pretty equal overall.

Cheers-salesie.

[Guest]

This disparity is to do with the respective rifles of the two armies - to fire fifteen rounds a minute (and usually more) the Lee Enfield required one reload with two five round clips to fill the magazine; whereas the mauser with its five round magazine needed two reloads to get to twelve. Then there's the angle of the bolt handle; the Lee Enfield handle angled downwards and the mauser handle was at a right angle to the bolt. The downward angle of the Lee Enfield made for a much smoother and quicker single round reload action than the mauser. The British infantryman in 1914 had a distinct advantage in musketry than his German counterpart because of the design of his weapon, and the regular Tommies made maximum use of it with good training and discipline.

Cheers-salesie.

Salesie

You raise some interesting points, particularly with regards to the limit factor of the Mauser compared to the SMLE. According to Spencer Jones in his From Boer War to the Great War the mad minute involved two changes of magazine rather than one. It is unclear which source he is relying on. Edit1: Musketry Regs Part 1 page 260. It is a small point given that most could achieve a rate of fire far higher than 15 rounds a minutes even with this extra factor. The pre-war record was 38 aimed shots on target in one minute and the examples on the thread suggest 20 was easily achievable.

Spencer Jones has 5 detailed pages on the infantry's tactical evolution between the Boer War and the Great War which is very relevant to this thread.As alluded to earlier in the thread, the School of Musketry at Hythe conducted experiments that 'proved' massed concentrated fire by average shots was more effective that fire from fewer marksmen for example. I think this means that the British Army was more focused on raising the average standard rather than trying to increase the number of marksmen. Clearly doing the former will likely increase the latter but the focus was on the broader body of men. My only concern with Jones' view are that the examples of German praise for British musketry are very few in number, and are the same one sees in books on this period time and time again*.

Separate to all the above (and as a general point of discussion), rifle fire does not have to be hitting the target to be effective. The simple fact that a man knows he is under fire or knows he is in a beaten zone will likely impact what he does. I find the arguments on musketry and the collective and efficient use of firepower rather compelling.

My other thoughts are that the phase of war might be a significant factor. The advantage to the defender in prepared positions (Mons and Ypres) in static defence should give the defending rifleman a local advantage over the attacker. Most of the anecdotes I have read regarding the British superiority relate to these phases and Mons in particular, rather than the crossing of the Aisne for example, where the British were attacking rather than defending. The exception appears to be Le Cateau which for complex reasons had the British in hastily prepared and poorly sited defence works, which is perhaps not representative of the general experience. The concentration of fighting in 1914 focused on Mons, Le Cateau, the Aisne and outweighing all these put together - Ypres. The latter was a rather static affair; the advantage was with the defender which was largely to remain the case until 1918. I wonder if the predominantly defensive nature of the British experience in 1914 partly explains the perceptions of superior marksmanship/musketry.

Added to this, the British Cavalry's impact with the SMLE, particularly with regards to rearguard actions and delaying actions during the retreat may well have reinforced perceptions. MG

*In particular Walter Bloem - OC 2nd Coy, Grenadier Regiment 12 which saw exceptionally high casualties. Jack Shedlon argues that the experience of Gren 12 was not typical. One might argue that Bloem's account has been ascribed a disproportionate amount of weight. It would be akin to describing the experienece of the KOYLI as typical of Le Cateau.

[phil andrade]

Earlier in this thread I advocated a re visit to Jack Sheldon's superb book on the German experience of First Ypres.

This gives the best possible source in regard to what it was like being on the receiving end of the British musketry.

I know that there are allusions to the skill of the British riflemen in the text, and I intend to cite them.

The salient thing ( forgive the pun!) about the way the fighting is described is the claustrophobic nature of much of the battlefield : not wide open expanses giving clear fields of fire ; but little woodlots and small fields, intersected by ditches and dotted with hamlets. This meant that infantry combat was intense, close quarters stuff and entailed sudden encounters with short, sharp bursts of fire. As to how far the SMLE and the man behind it impinged on the outcome......well, that's something we might kick around.

Phil (PJA)

[Guest]

The often paraphrased (and it seems sometimes mis-quoted) line that British rifle fire was allegedly attributed to machine-gun fire comes from an Official German account of the Battle of Ypres. The translation was done by 'GCW' in 1919. GCW was Graeme Chamley Wynne, a KOYLI Lieutenant captured at Le Cateau. He was a linguist, fluent in German (of course) and was later a member of the Historical Section and one of the authors of the British OH. It is paraphrased (not quoted) in Spencer Jones's book. I don't recall exactly what the OH 1914 said about the relative merits, but it may well reflect the views expressed in Ypres 1914. Incidentally I have a copy of Wynn'e 1914 diary.

The book's full title was "Ypres 1914. An Official account published by the order of the German General Staff". I have an original copy of the translation winging its way to me (this is becoming an expensive thread). The detail will be interesting given it is an official view by those on the receiving end. If anyone has the original German version it would be interesting to see exactly what was written in German rather than an English translation.

Separately, the view that British musketry was better than that of any Continental Army has its roots in 1904, the year after the introduction of the SMLE in a Cassel Magazine article by Leslie Stewart titled 'Hythe and Its School of Musketry' pages 479-84. MG

[SteveMarsdin]

Martin,

That's interesting, I thought the "mistaking of rifle fire for machine guns" was first attributed to Bloem at Mons

This earlier thread has some other German references to the relative efficacity of the BEF: http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=218176&hl=bloem#entry2159090

[phil andrade]

The thread, I hope, will not be diverted by my reference to Jack Sheldon's book on the German Army at Ypres 1914, because it is replete with first hand accounts of how the British fusillade hit the Germans and staggered them.

In his introduction, page xii, Jack cites the contentious German official monograph which we suspect has been " hyped up" by the wishful thinking of British historians:

A much more typical quotation, one faithful to almost all German descriptions of the British defensive tactics during the battle, could have been taken from p 21 of the monograph, " The British, most of whom had experience gained through long years of campaigning against cunning opponents in close country, let the attackers get to close range then, from hedges, houses and trees, opened up withering rifle and machine gun fire from point blank range."

Then he ( Jack) goes on to write a passage that has made a profound impact on my perception of the battle :

One of the hardest things for the modern visitor to visualise is how changes in agricultural practice have altered the landscape in Flanders. Hundreds of kilometres of hedges, which once surrounded small fields, have been grubbed up and trees are no longer coppiced for firewood. In 1914 the defenders - French and Belgian, as well as British, exploited these hedges and scrubby wooded areas for the concealement and the canalisation of offensive movement they offered. In addition, for the Allies in general there were shortages of small arms ammunition and difficulties of resupply, especially at the front line, so there was little scope for blasting off in ' mad minute' fashion at long range. Such tactics would have achieved very little and led to individual riflemen firing off all their ammunition in short order, with very limited scope for replenishment.

No, in contrast to the myth, the watchwords for the defending infantry were fire discipline and conservation of ammunition ; both of which were best served by allowing attackers to get close to defended localities and then pouring lacerting fire into them at short range for as brief a time as possible.

Skipping from the beginning to the end of the book - and avoiding many excellent examples in the middle - I cite further passages that impinge on this :

p 327 It was claimed that the French reservists , who had attempted to surrender earlier, did not put up much of a fight and were captured by follow up waves, but the British who were encountered fought with desperate courage, firing their rifles from the standing position at very close range and inflicting numerous casualties on the attackers.

Here I must point out that through much of the book Jack is at pains to emphasise the tremendous role played by Franco-Belgian troops who did much more to hold the line in this fighting than most British accounts acknowledge. I underlined the reference to fire from the standing position at point blank range, because it seems more redolent of battles fifty years before in the Wilderness of Virginia than it does of twentieth century combat.

p 330, Reserve Leutnant Hagedorn 9th Company Infantry Regiment 143 relates

Then, far too early...the entire assault line joined in, even though they were still eighty to one hundred meters short of the enemy trenches. The assault was then met by a storm of British fire from sharp shooters and in the interlocking curtains of fire of two machine guns, which did enormous damage.

Note the mention of " sharp shooters".

p 349-50, Unteroffizier Quest 2nd Company Footguard Gegiment 1 tells us

We had to strain every sinew to obtain cover from view because the enemy was manning a hedge only about thirty metres away. All we could do was to press ourselves flat on the ground and attempt to scabble away with fingers and toes as best we could.....Any movement from us was enough to unleash a hail of fire from the British.

p 351-52, another officer in the 3rd Company Footguard Regiment 3, writes

As we continued to storm forward, we caught fleeeting glimpses of the small gardens, noting that they had all been turned into miniature fortresses by the digging of trenches and small fire positions.

Judicious use of cover and skillful exploitation of terrain clearly counted as much as - and contributed to - the prowess of the rifleman.

Phil (PJA)