BEF 1914. Marksmanship, Musketry and the Mad Minute

[phil andrade]

A blindingly obvious observation - but nonetheless worthy of emphasis : this attrition that bore so heavily on the original contingents of the BEF must have impinged on the enemy, too. Indeed, if there had been a falling off in the quality of the drafts that were deployed to bolster up the BEF in the autumn of 1914, then how much more noticeable was this deterioration in the training and performance of the German troops who were expected to storm the Allied lines ? I allude not to the Prussian Guards of Nonne Boschen, of course, but to the notorious fate of their less experienced counterparts at Langemarck etc.

We ought, perhaps, to view the losses suffered by the BEF in 1914 in the context of the experience of other armies if we are to asses the qualitative as well as the quantitative implications.

Phil (PJA)

[Muerrisch]

now subsumed in #146

[Guest]

The data below shows how the mix of men changed in 1914 in a typical battalion.

2nd Bn Royal Sussex Regt; proportion of Special Reservists and Regulars (serving and on the Reserve) with more than 12 years service* in drafts in 1914:

Cohort........................SR........Regular:12 Yrs Svc...........Date

Main Body....................0%...............4%.................12th Aug 1914

1st Reinforcement........0%................4%................21st Aug 1914

2nd Reinforcement.......0%...............3%.................27th Aug 1914

3rd Reinforcement.......0%................7%.................31st Aug 1914

4th Reinforcement........0%..............81%................12th Sep 1914

5th Reinforcement.......33%.............53%................20th Sep 1914

6th Reinforcement.......40%.............16%................10th Nov 1914

7th Reinforcement.......81%...............7%.................23rd Nov 1914 - Note 22% of this draft were SR men who had enlisted for the duration of the War i.e after 7th Aug 1914.Less than 4 months' training.

8th Reinforcement.......58% .............21%...............29th Nov 1914 - note this draft had a higher proportion of young soldiers. I believe this is when the under 19 year-old rule was relaxed.

* men with Army Numbers issued 12 years (or more) before the outbreak of the war will be a good proxy for Section D men. It seems fairly clear that the serving men in this category would have deployed with the main body and 1st, 2nd, Reinforcements. The Section D men clearly start dominating the data by the 12th Sep 1914 (exactly one month after the main body deployed). When this pool of men starts to run dry the SR men begin to dominate the drafts and when these start to run down, the young soldiers previously barred from active service suddently start to appear in numbers.

It is a distinct possibility that the fieldcraft and musketry skills of the the Regulars, Army Reservists, Section D men, Special reservists and young soldiers straight out of training differed. MG

Edit: The OH on Reservists:

"It is significant of the heavy and unexpected wastage that within a month of firing the first shot, the supply of Regular reservists for many regiments had been exhausted, and that men of the Special Reserve - the Militia of old days - were beginning to take their place"

[Steven Broomfield]

The extra weight was found by putting small slabs of iron into the pouches. They were known, I believe, as Kitchener's chocolate, and were quietly discarded on the March. Apparently they still turn up on Salisbury Plain.

Ron

Surprised Sainsbury's aren't selling some

Thanks, BTW, to grumpy for the info on Kitchener Tests: I have read about these but was uncertain what they involved. The TF Battalions in India were doing them in 1916.

[Muerrisch]

Steven: remind me of your email and I will scan the passage from OSS and send to you.

I have found ZERO collateral for FR's tale so am delighted that you have even heard of the Kitchener Tests. Can you add even a smidgen, please?

[Steven Broomfield]

PM sent.

It's somewhere in the Hampshire TF Great War book (with the massively long title). I'll look it out for you.

[David Filsell]

I haven't seen the suggestion that Wynne's translation of the German 1914 monograph might have been mistranslated by accident or intent. As has been suggested a retranslation of the sections discussed here would be of great interest. I seem to recall that he had a falling out with Edmonds over one particular volume of the history on a matter of principle.

This thread is fascinating - one that almost every time it has occurred to me to add something I have been trumped by the greater expertise of others. My 'learning curve' has been pretty sharp. I once discussed musketry with John Terraine he spoke of talking to regulars of 1914 in idle movement assiduously working the bolt of their SMLE to improve the smoothness of its action. I have A wondered if they did so do and B if it would have made any difference anyway to the action.

[Muerrisch]

now subsumed in #146

[Guest]

I haven't seen the suggestion that Wynne's translation of the German 1914 monograph might have been mistranslated by accident or intent. As has been suggested a retranslation of the sections discussed here would be of great interest. I seem to recall that he had a falling out with Edmonds over one particular volume of the history on a matter of principle.

This thread is fascinating - one that almost every time it has occurred to me to add something I have been trumped by the greater expertise of others. My 'learning curve' has been pretty sharp. I once discussed musketry with John Terraine he spoke of talking to regulars of 1914 in idle movement assiduously working the bolt of their SMLE to improve the smoothness of its action. I have A wondered if they did so do and B if it would have made any difference anyway to the action.

It is unclear from the reference in Jones's book whether they refer to Wynne's translation or the OH interpretation or both. I assume, possibly incorrectly that Wynne's translation was the one used by Edmonds.The two references are given at the end of a reasonably long paragraph. Wynne's translation of Ypres 1914 references four separate pages and the OH reference is the quote posted earlier. When I get the book I will post Wynne's translation of the relevant paragraphs. Don't hold your breath - I expect it will be exactly the same as those quoted in the British OH. We shall see.

If one reads the OH paragraph carefully, Edmonds rather skilfully inter-twines select snippets with his own interpretation to give the impression the Germans thought rifle-fire was machine-gun fire. They don't appear to have said or implied that at all. It is simply delivered by Edmonds as if they did without providing the direct quote.

Having re-read Jack Sheldon's assessment I think he is way ahead of us on this one (2010). Terence Zuber (2010) makes similar comments too on this aspect (slightly more forcibly) and both to my mind both make compelling arguments. Rather depressingly the more one scratches at the surface of the British OH, the more one begins to have sympathy with Liddell Hart's assessment that it was Official, but not History.

It is possible that other sources appear, but on the current evidence all roads lead to the Historical Section. I expect the book in a few days. MG

[David Filsell]

Mart

I have the Wynne edition but I am somewhat confused by your comment I'm afraid. I was referring to what I though to be the suggestion that his translation was less than accurate and that a re translation from the German might be instructive. Equally I think criticism of Edmonds, not new of course, like almost anything by LH needs treating with great reserve. Cab 42 gives some indication of the problems the editor faced with imany and varying accounts and opinions. Edmond's final editorial judgements may not have been perfect, how could they be, but I would back him and his team, who get little credit, against the theatrical LH,s views almost every time. Selection of snippets as you put it is harsh, there are other contemporary accounts of the rifles mistaken machine guns, whether they were right or wrong, of which Edmonds and team would have been aware.

[Steven Broomfield]

Kitchener Tests: the History of the Hampshire Territorial Force Association and War Records of Units, 1914-1919 (snappy) in its coverage of the 1/5th Hampshires records:

"Training was pushed along from the day of arrival in India, and in February, 1915, the Battalion went to camp at Barkacha, near Mirizpur, to carry out'Kitchener's Test'"

[4thGordons]

.... regulars of 1914 in idle movement assiduously working the bolt of their SMLE to improve the smoothness of its action. I have A wondered if they did so do and B if it would have made any difference anyway to the action.

For B, conceivably it may make a bit of a difference difference in that it is essentially polishing the bolt. On occasion I have acquired SMLEs which have been in storage a long time and the actions are very stiff (usually from built up crud) and on one occasion a No4 Enfield that was "new" (well produced in 1955 opened four decades later) after disassembly and thorough cleaning these operated smoothly enough but were not particularly slick....in the case of the latter (No4) rifle my recollection is that the smoothness of the action did indeed improve with increased use. In the former case, it remained a little sticky so I polished the bolt body and boltway several times using a jewellers cleaning cloth and eventually it was much improved. I suspect repeated working of the bolt may have a similar effect.

In addition it occurred to me that this practice may help generate "Muscle Memory" / "Motor Learning" in the shooter - where repetition of the physical action of working the bolt allows the shooter to accomplish it more easily, which would also create the impression of the action becoming smoother. Any such improvement would I suspect, be very, very small in reality but it might also be of psychological benefit if it increased confidence in the weapon's function/reliability.

Modern bolt action rifles which are made to very high tolerances (that would have been impractical and in fact undesirable in a service weapon cf M1910 Ross) often have highly polished bolts/boltways.

As to A,whether this was a common practice, I have no idea! I do not recall reading of it.

Chris

[Guest]

Mart

I have the Wynne edition but I am somewhat confused by your comment I'm afraid. I was referring to what I though to be the suggestion that his translation was less than accurate and that a re translation from the German might be instructive. Equally I think criticism of Edmonds, not new of course, like almost anything by LH needs treating with great reserve. Cab 42 gives some indication of the problems the editor faced with imany and varying accounts and opinions. Edmond's final editorial judgements may not have been perfect, how could they be, but I would back him and his team, who get little credit, against the theatrical LH,s views almost every time. Selection of snippets as you put it is harsh, there are other contemporary accounts of the rifles mistaken machine guns, whether they were right or wrong, of which Edmonds and team would have been aware.

David - apologies for not being clear. Spencer Jones, Page 100;

"British rifle fire would arguably prove most effective during the battle of Ypres, when it scythed down densely packed German reserve formations with such ferocity that it was attributed to machine gun fire"

The two references for this passage are:

1. CGW [[Graeme Chamlet Wynne] Ypres 1914 pp x-xi, xvi, 17, 74

2. Edmonds, Official History of the Great War, 2 ; 462-63

The relevant part of the OH pages 462-63 quote is:

"The musketry of the Expeditionary Force was such that its bursts of rapid fire were repeatedly mistaken for machine-gun or automatic rifle-fire. In the German account already quoted [Ypres 1914], the British are credited with 'quantities of machine-guns' so that 'over every bush, hedge and fragment of wall floated a thin film of smoke betraying a machine gun rattling out bullets' and 'the roads were swept by machine-gun fire' Yet in 1914....."

You will note that Edmonds refers to Ypres 1914 (the German Official account). He is clearly working from a translation, either his own, or one done by the Historical Section. Given Wynne was in the Historical Section and had translated Ypres 1914, I am assuming the version referred to by Edmonds is Wynne's translation.

Separately, Jack Sheldon sates in his introduction to The German Army at Ypres 1914, when discussing the OH passage that 'even the translation is inaccurate' and 'choosing this one quotation was seriously misleading'.Specifically he refers to the 'over every bush, hedge, etc..." quote. I am trying to establish

1. Was Wynne's translation the one used in the OH? or..

2. Did Edmonds use a different translation?

I assume 1. but I dont know for sure. Given you have Wynne's translation and the page references, you might be able to answer these questions. My copy of Wynne's Ypres 1914 has not yet arrived. It may be a small point, but it is possible that Edmonds was twisting the translation to suit his purposes. One might be forgiven thinking that Edmonds was exaggerating German perceptions of British musketry to reinforce a view that British musketry was superior. Sheldon (2010) and Zuber(2010) both strongly believe that the Germans did not confuse British rifle fire with machine gun fire. Edmonds (1921) says they did; "repeatedly". This single word suggests multiple sources, none of which are provided in the OH. Given this was the British 'Official History', it is understandable why this view has taken such a strong hold. It persists in a number of histories of this period, including Spencer Jones' (2012).

I am interested in tracing the source material of this particular statement in the OH as it might be incorrect. It seems to have had a disproportionately large influence on generations of authors who have written about 1914.

MG

[phil andrade]

Looks like Wynne and Edmonds were telling us what they wanted us to hear - or is it more a case of what we wanted to hear ?

The reality of the BEF performance at First Ypres was sufficient : it needs no embellishment. Perhaps the sternest test ever faced by a British army ?

Incidentally, in one of my posts above I've cited an account from Sheldon's book in which Germans allude to fire from sharpshooters augmented by the interlocking curtain fire of two machine guns : convincing evidence that the Germans could and did differentiate between fire from rifles and that from machine guns.

Phil (PJA)

[RodB]

All the foregoing seems to indicate that all Regulars could indeed fire 15 aimed shots per minute if necessary - is that correct ? I also understand that this was only a small part of the story : equally important was the skill to lay down fire of a particular density, pattern and range as ordered... I get the impression the real idea was to achieve the required outcome by firing the minimum amount of ammo, otherwise you could run out pretty quickly. Would that be a reasonable summary ?

[phil andrade]

Who would argue with that summary, RodB ?

Eminentlly reasonable, in my view.

Plus the fact that the battle, fought in the confines of hedgerows, ditches, woodlots, small holdings and chateau gardens, didn't afford the defenders the luxury of much time to aim and deliver prolonged fire....this sounds like a ghastly affair of sharp encounters at close range ; an affair of reflexive combat skills, surely, but not anything resembling a target range scenario.

Phil (PJA)

[squirrel]

All the foregoing seems to indicate that all Regulars could indeed fire 15 aimed shots per minute if necessary - is that correct ? I also understand that this was only a small part of the story : equally important was the skill to lay down fire of a particular density, pattern and range as ordered... I get the impression the real idea was to achieve the required outcome by firing the minimum amount of ammo, otherwise you could run out pretty quickly. Would that be a reasonable summary ?

Interesting and absorbing thread. One thing that has not been expanded on, unless I have missed it, is fire control - the control of fire by Officers and NCO's giving target, range and number of rounds to be fired etc. Unless fire is controlled and corrected where required, surely it doesn't matter how many rounds are fired per minute or how accurate it is.

[joerookery]

Of course I am biased however here is some different thinking. I would challenge everybody interested to read Chapter 11 of The Great War Dawning. All in all the discussions of musketry while interesting do not seem to me to be that pertinent. Which unit could shoot faster – straighter or better is only a small part of the equation. I know it sounds flip but Zuber really values that small part.

Combat is about morale; the human factor is paramount. It is not simply about the infliction of casualties. Two recent books by Terence Zuber detail the awakening of doctrinal study from the German view in the early period of the war.[1] These books show German training and drills to be more efficient than Allied ones at inflicting casualties. That is only one leg of a three-legged stool. Shock action, mobility, and firepower create the environment. All of those elements need to be combined to have an effect on the enemy. The desired end is that the enemy runs away. It is most important to the reader to understand that the essence of combat is less about killing the enemy than it is about making him run away and then killing him. It is far easier to kill the opponent when his back is turned. The failure of morale in one soldier can easily lead to a failure of morale in the entire unit and is extremely contagious. Therefore, the essence of war revolves around the morale of the opponent. There is a famous tenet by Napoleon—the morale is to the physical as three is to one.[2] One author goes so far as to say that battles are fought with rifles and other materials; however, they are won in the morale dimension when one side or the other breaks and runs away.[3]

[1] (Zuber, The Mons Myth: A Reassessment of the Battle, 2010) and (Zuber, Ardennes 1914: The Battle of the Frontiers, 2007)

[2] (Showalter D. E., The Wars of German Unification, 2004), p. 175.

[3] (Echevarria II, 2000), p. 125.

Zuber says: “This chapter will concentrate on the final German tactical doctrine that was implemented in 1906 and used as a basis for subsequent training.”[1] He also says that this 1906 document is his baseline for studying German tactics and training and shows what tactical doctrine was actually taught in the German army.[2] This doctrine changed dramatically depending upon interpretation by the army corps and the officers in charge. The 1906 document applied only to the infantry, and things changed a great deal in those 43 years of peace, during which there was no firm consensus on the application of the doctrine. Doctrine had not kept pace with technology, as Col. Charles Repington, the military correspondent for the London Times concluded after observing the 1911 maneuvers, "No other modern army displays such a profound contempt for the effect of modern fire."[3]

[1] (Zuber, The Mons Myth: A Reassessment of the Battle, 2010), p. 13.

[2] (Zuber, The Mons Myth: A Reassessment of the Battle, 2010), p. 11.

[3] (Herwig H. , 2009), p. 47.

Far more pertinent I think then the perception of musketry was the perception of a professional long serving Army that had been together for a while.

The reservists who filled out one-half of each active unit may have had their active duty training in 1907-1911. Compare those years to the timing of doctrine in those branches: infantry doctrine–1906, cavalry doctrine–1909, and artillery doctrine–1907. Many of those soldiers never received any training under the new manuals, and their officers’ training completely predated their teaching. In the reserve units with their Landwehr soldiers, the situation was much worse. The classes represented in reserve units significantly predated the doctrine. There were significant variances in the performance of those units compared with active units based on knowledge of doctrine alone. There was also an issue of retention of knowledge. Generally speaking, it is a far better deal to have soldiers who trained together go into combat together. In the case of the German army, the training of each unit had to be melded with the 46 percent of soldiers that had just joined the unit.

Two other thoughts – comparing the target set of German units and Mons and Ypres is like comparing apples and oranges. Jack has shown how poorly prepared the units were that came from the post August deployments. If we think that the British were shooting at mass targets early on they certainly did at Ypres.

Another thought is that there was a real shortage of ammunition in the training base due to cost. First-year training really only allowed for fifty-eight rounds per soldier. It was mentioned above that the reserves in the British forces had a schedule of eighty rounds.

[squirrel]

The General Staff Report on Foreign Manoeuvres in 1912 - p 53 Germany

"It is difficult to say anything new about the Prussian and Saxon infantry. The spirit, discipline, endurance and marching powers of these men are in every sense admirable. If there is a weakness it is the leading of the company officers. This weakness is most evident in the control of fire which is elementary and inefficient, as has already been reported (see report on Foreign manoeuvres in 1911 p 42)...

Attack - The various deployments for the attack were seldom made under cover, even if available. The change from column to line frequently took place within view and effective rifle range of the defence and there was usually no difficulty in determining, from within the defensive line, the position of the flanks of the attack. Forward movements in the attack were made with but few pauses so that they could seldom be supported by infantry covering fire.

The rigid discipline in companies and sections appeared to leave no latitude for wide extension, even when the ground permitted it. For example, in quite open country, there were frequently large areas of unoccupied ground between battalions and companies.

Defence - When meeting an assault the infantry of the defence invariably left their trenches when the attackers approached to within about 150 yards, and met them with a counter charge just at the moment when rifle fire would have been most effective.

[Guest]

Interesting and absorbing thread. One thing that has not been expanded on, unless I have missed it, is fire control - the control of fire by Officers and NCO's giving target, range and number of rounds to be fired etc. Unless fire is controlled and corrected where required, surely it doesn't matter how many rounds are fired per minute or how accurate it is.

There are dozens of very good examples. One that immediately springs to mind is Maj C A L Yate, 2nd Bn KOYLI at Le Cateau. His B Company's trenches were at right angles to the forward trenches in anticipation of a possible outflanking manoeuvre on the right. The position on the immediate right was Suffolk Hill which was eventually overrun by the Germans who pressed on down the slope of the hill. Here is the action described in the CO's own words:

The ridge held by the SUFFOLK REGT Battalion was taken and again reoccupied by the Battalion in counter-attack. From the time that it was again occupied by the enemy, B Coy and the right Platoon of D Coy (Lt WYNNE), were constantly engaged, their fire was directed to prevent any further advance along the high ground and coming from an unexpected quarter, was apparently very effective.

Towards 3:00 pm, they witnessed an advance of dense masses of the enemy, of the strength of two Battalions, who swept over the crest and down through turnip fields beneath the ridge. Allowing them to advance about 100 yards down the forward slope, they reserved their fire and then all opened “Rapid”. The losses of the enemy were numerous and the whole mass moved back and disappeared again behind the ridge. Half an hour later, the enemy advanced again more cautiously and it was then seen that he stretched far away to the South West, enveloping our right. This constituted the third attack of the Germans in this quarter, which gained ground slowly, gradually concentrating their fire on B Coy, until they almost enfiladed them from the South West. The attack came from the direction of LE CATEAU. By Lt HIBBERT’s range card, the ridge was distant 600 yards and fire was opened on the massed attack at 500 yards distance.

Lt WYNNE’s Platoon was the connecting link between B and D Coys and was across the corner of the angle where their lines produced would meet and was very much exposed to fire.

The natural advantage of defence, albeit in poorly constructed trenches, the CO's realisation of the potential threat from the right, Yate's judicious use of ground (allowing the Germans to come down the slope), and timing (fire control), range control (accuracy), combined with the men's discipline and nerve maximised their firepower. The compounding effect of optimising each small factor is very strong. It is a small example of probably hundreds of similar experiences.

Lt Wynne was incidentally the same Wynne who later translated Ypres 1914. Wynne, Lt Col Bond and Maj Yate were eventually overwhelmend and made POWs along with over 300 KOYLI ORs. 600 casualties in total despite their local tactical abilities. Yate was to be awarded the VC for his actions that day and was later murdered* whilst trying to escape as a POW. MG

*Some accounts claim he committed suicide.

[phil andrade]

This quote trumps all.

From Jack Sheldon's book, The German Army at Ypres 1914, page 262, the account of Offizierstellvertreter Bottcher I.R. 136, describing the fighting in the first days of November :

This accuracy shown by the long service British soldiers with colonial experience who were deployed opposite the company, verged on the miraculous.

Phil (PJA)

[Guest]

This quote trumps all.

From Jack Sheldon's book, The German Army at Ypres 1914, page 262, the account of Offizierstellvertreter Bottcher I.R. 136, describing the fighting in the first days of November :

This accuracy shown by the long service British soldiers with colonial experience who were deployed opposite the company, verged on the miraculous.

Phil (PJA)

It is an interesting quote.

To be a Boer War veteran a man must have enlisted before the end of Nov 1901 (assuming 6 months' training), and more likely to have enlisted well before this cut-off. Anyone enlisting before this date would, by August 1914 have served out his 12 years service by end Nov 1913. i.e he would have been time expired unless he had signed on for longer with the colours or extended his Reserve Service in Section D. The BEF in early Nov would still be dominated in numbers by Regulars and Section A and B Reservists. Section D men had not arrived in sufficient numbers.

There is an easy way to cross check this with the 1914 Star medal rolls. If the 2nd Bn R Sussex Regt is any indication (it had the average number of casualties among the BEF infantry in 1914), its medal roll shows us that by the end of October less than 12% of its men in France and Flanders could have served in the Boer War. Put another way, 88% of the men facing Bottcher would have had no Boer War experience. Bottcher's statement implies the men opposite him were Boer War veterans, while there is no doubt there were some, they were in reasonably a small minority. If one to take a slightly more stringent start date of early 1901 to qualify as a Boer War veteran, the numbers in F&F drop to less than 9%.

The lessons of the Boer War were enshrined in changes to training that impacted every soldier, not just the Boer War veterans.One could build a fairly solid argument that Musketry Regulations 1909 had a profound impact on the conduct of the BEF in 1914. MG

[4thGordons]

It is an interesting quote.

To be a Boer War veteran a man must have enlisted before the end of Nov 1901 (assuming 6 months' training), and more likely to have enlisted well before this cut-off. Anyone enlisting before this date would, by August 1914 have served out his 12 years service by end Nov 1913. i.e he would have been time expired unless he had signed on for longer with the colours or extended his Reserve Service in Section D. The BEF in early Nov would still be dominated in numbers by Regulars and Section A and B Reservists. Section D men had not arrived in sufficient numbers.

There is an easy way to cross check this with the 1914 Star medal rolls. If the 2nd Bn R Sussex Regt is any indication (it had the average number of casualties among the BEF infantry in 1914), its medal roll shows us that by the end of October less than 12% of its men in France and Flanders could have served in the Boer War. Put another way, 88% of the men facing Bottcher would have had no Boer War experience. Bottcher's statement implies the men opposite him were Boer War veterans, while there is no doubt there were some, they were in reasonably a small minority. If one to take a slightly more stringent start date of early 1901 to qualify as a Boer War veteran, the numbers in F&F drop to less than 9%.

The lessons of the Boer War were enshrined in changes to training that impacted every soldier, not just the Boer War veterans.One could build a fairly solid argument that Musketry Regulations 1909 had a profound impact on the conduct of the BEF in 1914. MG

This seems entirely reasonable - and I think your last line is right on the money.

I assume the proportion of career army officers (and perhaps senior NCOs?) who had Boer War experience (being on the whole older than the average O/R?) might have been substantially higher than those serving in the army as a whole, and therefore they would have been sympathetic towards and enthusiastic in enacting, the "lessons" and passing them on to the men under their command.

What is interesting about this line of reasoning is that for once "being prepared to fight the previous war" might actually have been advantageous (at least in 1914)

Chris

[David Filsell]

"Looks like Wynne and Edmonds were telling us what they wanted us to hear - or is it more a case of what we wanted to hear ?" I think not.

Martin,PJA

Not at all a question of Wynne at least telling us what we wanted to hear.

Edmonds quotes from the introductory pages to Wynne's translation using words taken, and given in quotes, in the body of the book and appears to turn what Wynne though an inference into a fact.

Wynne writes in the intro:

"As regard rifle and machine-gun fire, we are credited with 'quantities of machine guns,' 'large numbers of machine-guns,' etc with the result that 'the roads were swept with machine guns'; and that over 'every bus, hedge and fragment of wall floated a thin film of smoke betraying a machine gun rattling out bullets' As at that date we had no machine-gun units, and there were only two machine-guns on the establishment of a battalion, and many of these had been damaged and not yet replace: actual machine guns were few and far between (DJF comment perhaps a slight overstatement, but from my own research of 7th Inf Div, numbers were very greatly reduced in number by late October)

Now the crunch

'The only inference to be drawn is that the rapid fire of the British riflemen, where he infantryman, cavalryman, or sapper was mistaken for machine gun fire both as regards volume and effect.'

So it would appear that in using Wynne's copy from an introduction from the introduction Edmonds accepted, if he did not himself write - remember the OH was a team job - Wynne's 'only inference' as a far more positive thing - a fact.

That said I am positive that I have seen rankers accounts claim "they though we all 'ad machine-guns" and the like.We do know that the OH team drew on thousands of accounts to compile the works - it seems highly likely that some officers may have thought and written of the

same misidentification of fire in their accounts to the OH and the that they were accepted them. Drafts were sent out to those who had offered accounts and the comments apparently accepted. This might well have also helped establish the view that German's mistook rapid fire for mgs to be true - and perhaps it was and they really did make that mistake . I find it hard to believe in very busy fire fight mg rounds could distinguished from rifle fire in the noise and fear of the minute.

[Wigwhammer]

This quote trumps all.

From Jack Sheldon's book, The German Army at Ypres 1914, page 262, the account of Offizierstellvertreter Bottcher I.R. 136, describing the fighting in the first days of November :

This accuracy shown by the long service British soldiers with colonial experience who were deployed opposite the company, verged on the miraculous.

Phil (PJA)

To call this quotation into doubt simply because a majority of British soldiers in the field at that time had probably not served in the Boer War is a bit off-target. The phrase "with colonial experience" is irrelevant within the context and meaning of the statement. How would he know what experience the British soldiers had and where they had gained it?

Why not accept that, in the opinion of the writer, "this accuracy....verged on the miraculous"?

And why does "colonial experience" equate exclusively to the Boer War?

Cheers

Colin