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Remembered Today:

BEF 1914. Marksmanship, Musketry and the Mad Minute


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Martin,

That's interesting, I thought the "mistaking of rifle fire for machine guns" was first attributed to Bloem at Mons

This earlier thread has some other German references to the relative efficacity of the BEF: http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=218176&hl=bloem#entry2159090

Indeed. To be honest I had always thought of the rifle fire and machine-gun conflation was deeply anchored on Mons. I have yet to read Gwynne's translation/interpretation, but if it indeed does confirm the German account of Ypres 1914 as the source it will be interesting for a number of reasons. The British OH 1914 Part 1 (page 94) gives a precis of the German account of Mons - "Die Sclacht bei Mons" published by the German General Staff at the end of 1919. The quote at the bottom of the page has been repeated in other histories. It acknowledges a 'murderous fire' among other things.

Edit. It may be that Jones's reference alludes to the British OH Part II rather than Gwynne's translation of Ypres 1914 (both are cited at the end of the same paragraph). the British OH 1914 Vol II, page 462 is the relevant part; Here Edmonds claims

"The musketry of the Expeditionary Force was such that its bursts of rapid fire were repeatedly mistaken for machine-gun or automatic rifle-fire. In the German account already quoted [Ypres 1914], the British are credited with 'quantities of machine-guns' so that 'over every bush, hedge and fragment of wall floated a thin film of smoke betraying a machine gun rattling out bullets' and 'the roads were swept by machine-gun fire' Yet in 1914....."

This is interesting as Edmonds appears to be the source with an interpretation of what the German account meant rather than what it actually stated. Any modern researcher reading the English translation of the German account quoted by Edmonds would readily understand the flamboyant language; viz "every bush" etc as more than a slight exaggeration. Edmonds goes on to discuss the low numbers of British MGs and states that many were damaged and only gradually replaced. A footnote on p. 463 claims that the decision to increase the rate of fire of each rife by Hythe was introduced as a substitute for additional machine-guns. Jones tackles this head on and claims this is simply incorrect. So, the conflation may be Edmond's; cleverly re-interpreting a rather flowery German account. Whether it is Edmonds' version or Gwynnes, both refer to Ypres 1914 not Mons.

Reading back through some similar threads I see that Jack Sheldon had not traced any attributable German source. Given his extensive research on the German Army, I assume Jack is very familiar with the German official account of Ypres, which makes me naturally want to have a close look at Gwynne's translation. Hopefully the book will arrive soon. I have PM'd Jack to see if he would share his thoughts.

There seems little doubt that many German accounts acknowledged the British Army's abilities in a number of areas, but one might expect that of anyone meeting a professional Army. I am still not sure how the many authors who make the various claims can actually quantify their claims; as one example how does Stewart in 1904 know that the BEF was better at shooting than any Continental Army? It might just be an opinion delivered as 'fact'.

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Amazon Deutschland have a number of used copies available from €7.00 plus postage upward, but my German isn't good enough to make much sense of the original

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MG - I would guess that "Figure of Merit" is the highest score achieved by one individual. When your "Superiority of Fire" book arrives, see pages 56 and 57 for description of targets and maximum number of rounds per minute achieved.

Pridham's book just arrived. Interesting reading. Some snippets:

  • 15 rounds a minute was allegedly double the rate of fire of any other Army
  • Snapshooting as part of training was introduced in 1909
  • Page 58 quotes the OH France and Belgium 1914 giving the reason for needing to improve the rate of fire as a substitute for additional MGs - the argument that Spencer Jones regards as 'erroneous'. Large parts of Pridham's books quotes the same passages as the OH and has a few rather romantic comparisons with the archers at Crecy.

One of the architects of the British Army's revolution in musketry was Lt Col N R McMahon DSO (Chief Instructor at Hythe 1905-1909) who incidentally commanded the 4th Bn Royal Fusiliers in 1914 - one of the battalions to hold the line at Mons. McMahon was killed at Ypres on 11th Nov 1914. Pridham (an instructor at Hythe) believed there should be a statue of McMahon in Trafalgar Square. The chapters on the post Boer War reforms and the Great War lean dangerously close towards becoming a eulogy of Hythe and its chief Instructors.

MG

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You raise some interesting points, particularly with regards to the limit factor of the Mauser compared to the SMLE. According to Spencer Jones in his From Boer War to the Great War the mad minute involved two changes of magazine rather than one. I.

I suspect there might be a misunderstanding here somewhere. Enfield "magazines" were not changed (in fact in early versions they were linked to the rifle by a chain link). The magazine may have been "CHARGED" (using chargers, aka "clips" of 5 rounds) but it would not, I think, have been changed as additional magazines were not issued (This is more modern practice with automatic and semi automatic weapons)

So do the musketry regs (I can't find my copy) you quote actually say Changed or Charged?

Chris

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I suspect there might be a misunderstanding here somewhere. Enfield "magazines" were not changed (in fact in early versions they were linked to the rifle by a chain link). The magazine may have been "CHARGED" (using chargers, aka "clips" of 5 rounds) but it would not, I think, have been changed as additional magazines were not issued (This is more modern practice with automatic and semi automatic weapons)

So do the musketry regs (I can't find my copy) you quote actually say Changed or Charged?

Chris

I was paraphrasing Spencer Jones (page 94) who gives the Regs as the reference.

"...although the Lee-Enfield rifle possessed a ten-round magazine capacity, reloading was permitted only in five-round increments during this exercise".

My interpretation is it required three magazines, each with 5 rounds. The first round of the first magazine being in the breech and the Test requiring two changes (sic) of magazines. Given his precise description I have not double-checked this against the Musketry Regs Part 1. It is a small point, as 20 rpm seems to have been achieved by many and some could achieve double the rate. I simply raised the point as the extra limitation (albeit an unrealistic one) eliminates the advantage of the 10 round magazine over the Mauser's in the Test. MG

Edit. The Regs state loading from the pouch or bandolier by 5 rounds afterwards. I assume this means a 5 round charger, not a magazine with 5 rounds, thereby making it more difficult as the magazine had to be charged then loaded in increments of 5 rounds. The key being increments of 5 rather than reloading the magazine with 10 rounds.

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I was paraphrasing Spencer Jones (page 94) who gives the Regs as the reference.

"...although the Lee-Enfield rifle possessed a ten-round magazine capacity, reloading was permitted only in five-round increments during this exercise".

My interpretation is it required three magazines, each with 5 rounds. The first round of the first magazine being in the breach and the Test requiring two changes (sic) of magazines. Given his precise description I have not double-checked this against the Musketry Regs Part 1. It is a small point, as 20 rpm seems to have been achieved by many and some could achieve double the rate. I simply raised the point as the extra limitation (albeit an unrealistic one) eliminates the advantage of the 10 round magazine over the Mauser's in the Test. MG

I am not entirely certain I understand what you are saying here. It may be a terminology confusion.

Magazine = sheet metal box containing a spring and a follower to push the rounds upwards so the rifle bolt can push them into the chamber for firing

(on the Enfield this magazine is external - on the Mauser it is is internal - and is of 5 rnd capacity but also loaded by clip/charger)

Charger = spring steel clip that holds 5 rounds of ammunition which can be slotted into the charger bridge and "stripped" down with the thumb to reload the magazine (the charger then being removed).

My understanding is: There was only one magazine involved and it remained attached to the rifle at all times. It would initially contain 10 rounds. It would be reloaded with five round chargers.

So once the rifleman had fired five rounds he could leave the bolt open and strip an additional 5 into the magazine from a charger, fire five more, etc. Then as the end of the minute approached he could expend all the rounds in the magazine. Alternatively all 10 original rounds could be expended and then 2 5-round chargers stripped in - but this would not seem to be wise practice because it would leave the man with an empty weapon and a longer pause whilst reloading.

Firing twenty rounds would require two chargers of 5 rounds in addition to the 10 in the rifle initially (SMLE) and three clips of 5 rounds plus the five in the rifle initially in the Mauser (requiring one extra reload).

Assuming the mad minute had a purpose (more than a party trick) I would think it would simulate real conditions and as British soldiers were not issued with extra magazines at any point, the use of additional, pre-loaded magazines would be totally unrealistic. As a matter of practice I think stripping rounds down into the magazine might actually be quicker than changing a magazine - it would certainly be more reliable and less likely to cause damage to the magazine lips (critical to correct feeding) and to transfer dirt into the weapon. Ammunition was issued to soldiers in 5 round chargers and the 08 web (and earlier 03 Bandolier) was designed to hold it in this fashion.

The addition of the charger bridge (or earlier bolt head charger) was one of the innovation of the SMLE over the Boer War period MLE. Many of these MLEs were later converted to CLLE (Charger Loading Lee Enfield) by adding a charger bridge to allow loading from chargers rather than singly.

Sorry if I have misunderstood what you were saying, but I would be most surprised if more than one magazine were involved.

Chris

Edit:

Just a further thought: "...although the Lee-Enfield rifle possessed a ten-round magazine capacity, reloading was permitted only in five-round increments during this exercise".

This is an odd comment to me - "was permitted only"

How else would it be done? The only alternative would be to have single rounds as there were no larger capacity chargers, or to actually change the magazine - which as I have outlined would not have been done and which this phrasing would seem to disallow.

The Mausers too were reloaded using 5 round spring clip/chargers the only difference being that the Mauser could only take one at a time whereas the Enfield - if empty could take 2.

I think the confusion may lie here.

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Salesie

You raise some interesting points, particularly with regards to the limit factor of the Mauser compared to the SMLE. According to Spencer Jones in his From Boer War to the Great War the mad minute involved two changes of magazine rather than one. It is unclear which source he is relying on. Edit1: Musketry Regs Part 1 page 260. It is a small point given that most could achieve a rate of fire far higher than 15 rounds a minutes even with this extra factor. The pre-war record was 38 aimed shots on target in one minute and the examples on the thread suggest 20 was easily achievable.

There was no change of magazine, Martin - the SMLE had a fixed magazine that could hold a maximum of ten rounds, inserted by opening the bolt and pushing in the rounds from the top by way of two five round clips. It is a matter of simple arithmetic that only one recharge of the magazine would be needed to achieve a rate of fire of fifteen rounds per minute (unless, of course, the magazines were empty at the beginning, but I doubt that any soldier would go into action with an empty mag). He may be talking about training - where, I suppose, recruits may have had to achieve "15 in a minute" with an empty mag at the start. If so, this would highlight a difference between training and combat and, thus, an increased rate of fire when in combat.

Cheers-salesie.

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There was no change of magazine, Martin - the SMLE had a fixed magazine that could hold a maximum of ten rounds, inserted by opening the bolt and pushing in the rounds from the top by way of two five round clips. It is a matter of simple arithmetic that only one recharge of the magazine would be needed to achieve a rate of fire of fifteen rounds per minute (unless, of course, the magazines were empty at the beginning, but I doubt that any soldier would go into action with an empty mag). He may be talking about training - where, I suppose, recruits may have had to achieve "15 in a minute" with an empty mag at the start. If so, this would highlight a difference between training and combat and, thus, an increased rate of fire when in combat.

Cheers-salesie.

See my comments above

But the SMLE mag is definitely NOT fixed - it is removable....but it was to be removed only for cleaning -- not for reloading.

The Mauser's internal 5 round magazine cannot be removed

The Berthier M1916 split the difference and had an external, fixed magazine (5 rnd cap)

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See my comments above

But the SMLE mag is definitely NOT fixed - it is removable....but it was to be removed only for cleaning -- not for reloading.

The Mauser's internal 5 round magazine cannot be removed

The Berthier M1916 split the difference and had an external, fixed magazine (5 rnd cap)

I know that, I was making the point in the context of Martin's post. I doubt if anyone would want to remove and clean their mag in the middle of a "mad minute" - in my experience, some of 'em are absolute ******* to remove easily. Fixed, for all practical intent and purpose, during combat.

Cheers-salesie.

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Just a further thought: "...although the Lee-Enfield rifle possessed a ten-round magazine capacity, reloading was permitted only in five-round increments during this exercise".

This is an odd comment to me - "was permitted only"

How else would it be done?

I think the confusion may lie here.

Indeed. My understanding is that the test only allowed 5-rounds to be loaded with one up the spout. These were fired and another 5 rounds loaded/charged, fired off and then another 5 rounds loaded/charged and fired. I have no idea why this would be the case but if my understanding is correct, it simply eliminates the SMLE's advantage of a 10-round magazine for the purposes of the Test. I think we would all agree that it would be more likely to re-load a magazine with 10 rounds.

My misunderstanding that the SMLE magazine could be reloaded/recharged without taking it off. MG

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One additional point that may or may not be relevant.

One thing it is relatively easy to do with the Enfield action is to work the bolt without breaking the sight picture (IE you can keep your hold on the target), I find this very difficult to do with the Mauser action (and more so with the Nagant, Berthier etc) where I have to virtually lower the rifle from my shoulder to work the action/reload and then reacquire the target. There may be a way of doing this but I find it hard.

Whilst this may not have a massive impact on speed of fire I think it might have an impact on speed/accuracy of fire.

Chris

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To what might we attribute this British speciality ?

South Africa ?

Or is it a function of a small army - of professionals - as opposed to conscripted continental hosts ?

If the Boer War had taught British soldiers to appreciate the value of small arms fire, then surely the Germans had not forgotten Gravelotte etc.

Then there was the Russo Japanese War, too.

People like to think that their soldiers are the best shots.

American commanders were insistent that their marines at Belleau Wood exhibited unique prowess with the rifle ; this reminds me of the claims made for the Old Contemptibles.

The historiographical themes of patriotism and propaganda loom large.

I am persauded, though, that British soldiers in 1914 were the " real business" when it came to musketry.

And so were the Turks at Gallipoli.

Phil (PJA)

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One additional point that may or may not be relevant.

One thing it is relatively easy to do with the Enfield action is to work the bolt without breaking the sight picture .

Chris

I think it's very relevant but only when talking about aimed rounds. I remember the comparison being demonstrated at a GWF Conference (either by Taff Gillingham or Andy Robertshaw)

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Recoil breaks the sight picture regardless of bolt handle design, or even if there is no bolt handle - you have to re-establish after each round even if you are using a semi-auto rifle (with the exception, perhaps of .22 rimfire) unless you are just blazing away in the general direction of the target.

However, the straight handle of the G98 makes it necessary to lift the head away when cycling the bolt, whereas the turned down bolt of the SMLE allows the firer to keep his cheek on the comb of the butt. This permits more rapid re-establishment of the sight picture.

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The extra weight was found by putting small slabs of iron into the pouches. They were known, I believe, as Kitchener's chocolate, and were quietly discarded on the March. Apparently they still turn up on Salisbury Plain.

Ron

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Much of this debate has so far focused on the ability of the BEF to sustain a high rate of fire, enshrined in the Mad Minute, and this has become associated as the key differentail between the BEF and other Armies. The Musketry Regs show (unsurprisingly) that only 15 rounds were allocated to this part of the Test. There were another 235 rounds allocated to other parts of the Musketry test. To save anyone the maths, only 6% of all rounds allocated for the Test were for the Mad Minute. I wonder if this part of the test, and the association of this to F&F 1914 has had a disproportionately large influence on perceptions of British musketry skills.

The implied logic of some authors appears to be

1. The British Army put a great deal of focus on Musketry post the Boer War and raised standards

2. Part of the overhaul was a Musketry test which involved the Mad Minute of 15 aimed rounds per minute - something not replicated in Continental Armies. The Mad minute was only 6% of the British Army's test.

3. The BEF's success in 1914 was largely attributed to superior musketry skills

4. Conclusion: The BEF's success was largely attributed to the mad minute.

While the Mad Minute might well be a factor, it would seem to be fairly obvious that the musketry skills were much broader-based. Added to this is the British Army's pre-war doctrine that 'musketry and tactics are synonymous and cannot be separated'. To my mind the arguments over superior rates of fire seems to have taken on mythological and disproportionate importance at the expense of other factors.

Phil highlighted Jack Sheldon's view in his intro to his German Army at Ypres 1914 that the BEF and its allies may well have been focused on conserving ammunition. Is it possible that the BEF's fieldcraft (my words), and tactics optimised a number of key factors (of which musketry was one)?

MG

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Martin, your 6% is only part of the truth. Try adding up the rounds fired in Table B at different targets from different postures at different ranges, with and without bayonet, UNDER TIME PRESSURE.

The mad minute so called was only a culmination of the musketry course.

Also, COs had an allowance of extra ammunition primarily to bring the less able shots up to standard.

We are now well into page three of this thread. Fortunately the discussion has been weaned from target shooting.

I think the EF infantry demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that its fieldcraft and firepower at unit level was adequate in a defensive battle, by day or night, so long as its generals deployed it properly, its artillery protected it with counter battery fire and its flanks were secured. The 1914 problem was that, too often, the generals and the artillery were not up to it.

PBI indeed.

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In his "The German Army at Ypres 1914" Jack Sheldon addresses the British OH claim that British rifle fire was confused with machine gun fire. The British OH quote is posted below:

"The musketry of the Expeditionary Force was such that its bursts of rapid fire were repeatedly mistaken for machine-gun or automatic rifle-fire. In the German account already quoted [Ypres 1914], the British are credited with 'quantities of machine-guns' so that 'over every bush, hedge and fragment of wall floated a thin film of smoke betraying a machine gun rattling out bullets' and 'the roads were swept by machine-gun fire' Yet in 1914....."

Jack's view is that is was 'a completely false notion, which has been repeated ever since by British authors'. He argues that the translation itself was inaccurate (he provides an alternative translation). Like may selective quotes, the parts left out by the British OH were more telling. In short he argues the quote was 'misleading'.

Unsurprisingly the British OH (first published in 1921) seems to be the common source of this idea when mentioned in subsequent histories. To date I haven't found any other quote that makes quite the same claim. It seems to have become the primary 'evidence' of alleged superior British musketry. Taken at face value, the British OH 'quoting' a German OH would clearly carry significant weight and understandably have a strong influence on most subsequent accounts.

MG

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Martin, your 6% is only part of the truth. Try adding up the rounds fired in Table B at different targets from different postures at different ranges, with and without bayonet, UNDER TIME PRESSURE.

The mad minute so called was only a culmination of the musketry course.

Also, COs had an allowance of extra ammunition primarily to bring the less able shots up to standard.

We are now well into page three of this thread. Fortunately the discussion has been weaned from target shooting.

I think the EF infantry demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that its fieldcraft and firepower at unit level was adequate in a defensive battle, by day or night, so long as its generals deployed it properly, its artillery protected it with counter battery fire and its flanks were secured. The 1914 problem was that, too often, the generals and the artillery were not up to it.

PBI indeed.

Grumpy

Thank you for this. So the Mad Minute would be significantly less than 6% of musketry training. .

I know we have discussed this before, and forgive me if we are going over old ground, but what level of annual musketry training would the British Army Regular Reservists have? My understanding is that a Reservist would do some form of annual training, but it has never been clear to me whether this always happened. Given Reservists were dispersed across the country and often far from their Regimental Depots, how did this training happen and did it include muskery refresher training?

There might be some value in the musketry stats. From mobilisation to the initial deployment of the first Divisions of the EF would be approximately one week. The diaries seem to indicate the Reservists were on the ranges almost every day during this period. If we had battalion musketry scores for this period (including the 60% Reservists) and were able to compare them with battalion scores from say 1913, 1912, 1911....1909 (serving regulars only) , it might show us how the aggregate score changed due to the absorption of the Reservists for mobilisation. We might even see an improvement. I note from the stats posted for 1913 that the recruits were three times more likely to fail. If, as some suggest a Reservist did not lose his ability to shoot well, or could regain former levels with a small amount of training, it is possible that the average score might actually improve as recruits and under 19 year-olds drop out of the equation, being replaced with older experienced better shots in the shape of Reservists. It would at least provide some evidence whether Reservists retained musketry skills during their sometimes long absence from the Colours.

MG

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Just a thought - for instance, a soldier has served his seven years, been passed as "efficient" for 6 of those years and has qualified as a first class shot. He does his annual course as a Reserve. He is called to the colours in 1914 after 4 years out of the Army.

With that experience, would it not be feasible that he is up to speed again with his musketry skills in a fairly short time frame?

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The thing about this thread - and so many others like it - is that we are made aware of our own susceptibilities when it comes to Great War myths, folklore, legend : call it what you will. Martin G's analyses have made us so much more discerning ....remember the way he demolished the Ferguson claims about Scottish mortality ?

The more hyperbolic stories have been exposed. On the other hand, Martin has also endorsed or even enhanced the startling stories about the death of the Regular Army that disembarked in August 1914. I, for one, would not have believed that virtually one third of them died before war's end - roughly half of them in 1914 - and that hardly any came through unscathed.

In regard to musketry, fieldcraft and battlefield resolve there can be no doubt that the men in khaki made an excellent account of themselves in 1914. As to how far we have over rated their superiority in those regards, let's hope that Martin's efforts bear fruit in publication. To my mind, the achievement of the 1914 BEF is even more inspiring when we are encouraged to countenance the flaws that it demonstrated.

Phil (PJA)

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Just a thought - for instance, a soldier has served his seven years, been passed as "efficient" for 6 of those years and has qualified as a first class shot. He does his annual course as a Reserve. He is called to the colours in 1914 after 4 years out of the Army.

With that experience, would it not be feasible that he is up to speed again with his musketry skills ina fairly short time frame?

Quite possibly. I am trying to find out if there is any evidence. The challenge with this approach is that not all were first class shots and not all had been out for 4 years.

The diaries are quite clear that CO's mobilising their battalions did not want '3 & 9' men and the inference is that they were either less fit or were less familiar with the equipment or both. For obvious reasons COs wanted the men who had most recently left the Army. Given the SMLE was introduced in 1907, one might reasonably assume almost every Reservist was familiar with it, however there is evidence that some were not (presumably Section D men). One of the challenges for the line infantry is that mobilisation absorbed nearly all the Section A & B Reservist, and the Section D men and Special Reservists made up very large proportions of the reinforcement drafts from the 4th draft onward (roughly speaking from mid Sep 1914).

One of the other challenges is that the profile of the BEF changed continuously. The original battalions deployed with (on average) 40% serving regulars and 60% Army Reservists. Casualty rates far exceeded expectations and BEF battalions that deployed in Aug 1914 saw around 80-90% casualty rates. Each reinforcement draft consisted of higher proportions of Section D and Special Reservists and some time-served men who had re-enlisted. By Ypres, most battalions would consist predominantly of Special Reservists whose training and experience were quite different from the regulars they replaced. *

The BEF battalions were not homogeneous. They had tranches of men with vastly differing levels of training and experience and the proportions of these tranches changed continuously. The BEF infantry facing the German Army at the end of Ypres was rather different from the one that faced the German Army at Mons only three months earlier. Using the 1914 Star and 1914-15 Star medal rolls as proxies, and focusing on regiments that had only one regular battalion in theatre in 1914 we can see the numbers sent out. The Royal Sussex Regiment had sent out the equivalent of two battalions worth of men by end Dec 1914 suggesting very high casualty rates which is corroborated by other data. It is possible to relate the Army Numbers of each draft to original recruitment dates and closely approximate the service history of the men - essentially rebuild the battalion profile and how this changed. This is something I am working on at present. The Black Watch claimed it had every trained man in France by mid October. One wonders about the training levels of the men who came after that who faced the German Army at Ypres.

While some (most?) Reservists likely got back to previous levels of proficiency with their SMLE's the diary evidence suggests they didn't do this quite as quickly on the fitness front. The diaries again allude to some poorly trained drafts (in 1914) and Reservists who lacked basic skills. One wonders how the men in these examples managed to attain high levels of proficiency with their SMLEs yet fail on other basic areas. There is correspondence between surviving officers and the Historical Section that clearly shows the rapid deterioration in the quality and quantity of drafts. It is unclear how widespread these challenges were. While none refer directly to the quality of marksmanship or musketry, the context raises some obvious questions.

MG

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