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Remembered Today:

BEF 1914. Marksmanship, Musketry and the Mad Minute


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Is anyone interested in the least in my supply of facts as opposed to conjecture and speculation on the minutiae of credit sharing and blame attribution.

Please refer to OP.

Well said, Grumpy - once again, the iconoclastic Martin G gets bogged down in minutiae and fails to see the bleedin' obvious. British accounts of superior BEF musketry he dismisses as hyperbole, but then dismisses German accounts also as hyperbole by them to excuse their failures. What is it that he seems hell bent on "proving" in such a cack-handed way?

Now, the bleedin' obvious I mentioned: Why wasn't the contemptible little army quickly pushed into the sea? Why didn't the much vaunted German army achieve any of its objectives in the west at anytime during the war? And that's not hyperbole, just facts - the contemptible little army was not pushed into the sea at any time, and the German army never achieved any of its objectives. And we don't need half baked speculation about authors' intent/interpretations to figure out that something is not quite right with his iconoclastic ramblings.

Cheers-salesie.

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Martin

I definitely need evidence based proof of your 'hard conclusion' of shoddy perceptions of British musketry. Accounts are absolutely legion from both sides of the effectiveness of British fire. You need to provide detailed evidence to support such an assertion not simply a statement of belief. And yes I have read Zuber's and Sheldon ( who has certainly not made such an all embracing assertion like yours). Let me underline I do not believe the British army "a perfect thing apart", but such a rubbishing as yours cannot go unchallenged.

Regards

David

I also think you harsh on Wynne.

David, I think the OH/Edmonds' twisting of quotes and their speculation on what the Germans thought, delivered as fact was shoddy, not the BEF' s performance. Put simply, the Germans did not say what the British OH suggests.

Wynne thought parts of "Ypres 1914" 'ludicrous' (his words) yet the OH still used it to substantiate a claim. I find that interesting. For what it is worth, I think, and have always thought, the BEF did a good job, as one might reasonably expect from a professional Army fighting a conscript Army, despite being outnumbered. I do think their performance (including musketry) needs no exaggeration by the British OH.

The OP is attempting to explore the evidence on British musketry. There are a number of potential strands to this thread; the subjective view of the OH, the subjective views of other participants, the empirical evidence from British training, etc. The only conclusion I have come to so far is that the OH's use of "Ypres 1914" was shoddy, simply because they make false unsubstantiated claims of what the Germans allegedly thought.

When I started this thread I did not know the source of some of the critical comments or quotes. It has been a revelation. Similarly I had not seen any empirical evidence that has kindly been offered by some of our more informed colleagues on the GWF. I had not seen the Musketry Regs (ditto). I had not seen much of the Musketry doctrine or even knew who McMahon was. I would agree with Pridham that there should be a statue of him in Trafalgar Square. I had never read Ypres 1914, or Superiority of Fire by Pridham. I had not considered a number of points raised on this thread, such as fire control, the critical differences between marksmanship and musketry. The OP was a series of questions, which I am still exploring.

MG.

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Well said, Grumpy - once again, the iconoclastic Martin G gets bogged down in minutiae and fails to see the bleedin' obvious. British accounts of superior BEF musketry he dismisses as hyperbole, but then dismisses German accounts also as hyperbole by them to excuse their failures. What is it that he seems hell bent on "proving" in such a cack-handed way?Now, the bleedin' obvious I mentioned: Why wasn't the contemptible little army quickly pushed into the sea? Why didn't the much vaunted German army achieve any of its objectives in the west at anytime during the war? And that's not hyperbole, just facts - the contemptible little army was not pushed into the sea at any time, and the German army never achieved any of its objectives. And we don't need half baked speculation about authors' intent/interpretations to figure out that something is not quite right with his iconoclastic ramblings.Cheers-salesie.

It hurts to read comments like these.

No need for such anatagonistic conduct.

MG : thanks for your help.

Salesie : shame on you.

Phil (PJA)

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Martin

I really cannot see that the OH quotes twist, they summarise what had been written by Wynne, and perhaps others. You may consider them Ill chosen, but that is editorial selection. You may consider Ypern poor and Wynne's analysis poor but there is evidence that the Germans considered the British fire efficient and at times seem to have considered they were, rightly or wrongly, under MG fire when they were not and Edmonds, and the team who worked on the volume, accepted that. You may fairly judge their opinion to be wrong, but your suggestion of falsification of facts is unfair

Much valuable information has been thrown up by this thread,but I think it time for you to examine what other participants on both sides actually said, then and later. As I have said there are writings from both sides which support a more positive side than you seem to be prepared to accept.

Go to more original sources, do not trust your opinion on this OH Wynne analysis.

David

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Martin

I really cannot see that the OH quotes twist, they summarise what had been written by Wynne, and perhaps others.

David

I will have to disagree on this. They claim the Germans believed things that the Germans didn't say. That is twisting things in my view. It really is that simple.

Edit : Having read Ypres 1914, it is clear that the German account often exaggerated the number of men opposing them, the amount of artillery, and the number of MGs.etc. The book inflates the size of the opposing forces and its assets simply to explain its failure as Wynnes copious notes point out. To conclude that the Germans thought rifle fire was MG fire (something the German account does not state) is not the clonclusion I would come to. It is a subjective view.

Rather than go around in circles, can we agree to disagree on this.

Separately I have no doubt the Germans had a high regard for the British musketry etc.

MG

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The relevant efficacity of the participants' musketry skills is particularly important in 1914, before rigid trench warfare set in and heavy artillery came into its own but from the evidence provided there is no great disparity between the British and German armies. The greatest difference was in the opening encounters between the French and German armies, where the latter's shills, including fire control,honed on the vast German training areas, were superior to those of the French who often fired too high to inflict damage.

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Martin

We can, but you must realise that I simply feel you have formed a fixed opinion far too early.

That said "They claim the Germans believed things that the Germans didn't say" simply is not true. Wynne's 'inference' is clearly based on copy within the text of Ypern, propagandistic as that publication may be, poor as you consider it. Not least both you and I simply have no idea what other evidence from participants may have been presented to Edmonds and his collaborators. The file has not simply been weeded it has been stripped almost bare of this material.

Sadly, at this time, I simply do not have time to trawl through my German and British accounts of the battle as I would like to do. But as I say there are most definitely other German and British contemporary comments to support the facing MG claim although we know that that the number of British MGs declined hugely during the battle.

That said, the fact is it really doesn't matter if MG and rifle fire were confused, or if defences were strong or weak. There is a huge body of evidence to support the view that the Germans were most definitely concerned about the sheer weight and effect of fire from the British firing from defences they could, frequently, not take.

As a side issue, when the Germans did break the British line, at Zandvoorde for instance on October 30th, after driving through a very thin British crust, they simply failed to use initiative to push on toward Ypres. Not least there is strong evidence of non Zuberistic poor low level command and control by the Germans time and time again at Ypres. Not least on the Menin road the next day.

It would be valuable to know if any forumistas could offer indications of British bn by bn losses of MGs at Ypres. Then perhaps these could be aligned with German unit's accounts. Certainly in 7th Div, losses of guns and specialists were very serious by late October. So just what fire were the Germans facing?

All that said Sheldon does contain many quotes about rate and heaviness of fire, strong defences and of facing British MGs - which may or may not have mistaken for rifle fire in the noise of battle. Were the Germans facing rifle fire or MG fire? How can we know for sure. Without prolonging the MG/rifle fire argument I do consider that they could - could - be mistaken under the circumstances obtaining.

However I believe you have drawn emotional conclusions, some possibly erroneous, because of your stated belief that Edmonds dissembled and Wynne was less than a competent judge. It is quite wrong to use your strongly stated ant Edmonds/Wynne views as a stick to beat the topic. More work is needed if I am to accept this approach.

Equally, and finally, I support the criticism of intemperance which has crept into a worthwhile debate. Lets play fair guys however wrong we may be.

With regards

David

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Some examples from British sources on the effect of fire discipline and control and a snippet on the use of marksmen.


Lt Col Gibbs, 2nd Bn Duke of Wellington's Regt - Narrative. Mons, 23rd Aug 1914. I sent back to the railway crossing and ordered the two Companies up to ST GHISLAIN MARKET SQUARE, telling JENKINS on arrival there to send two platoons to TULLOCH.It was now about 1:00 pm and oppressively hot. I sent to where B Coy was in fairly good cover behind some banks just beyond the sheds (D) and from which we could get a fairly good view with the glasses. Occasional glimpses of Germans creeping along hedge rows at from 400 to possibly 700 yards, were now to be had but CARTER had warned his men not to fire till a really good target offered itself, so as not to give their position away. When they did begin, I think it fairly staggered the enemy who went to ground at once.




2nd Bn OBLI 23rd Oct 1914. On the HAANIXBECK. A good deal of shelling, and at times some infantry and MG fire from the Germans trenches.


In the afternoon the shelling increased. At 5:30 pm an infantry attack was made on the same part of the trenches as on the previous day by a considerately larger force which came on in thick lines.


The leading Germans again got to within 25 yds of our trenches, but they then turned and ran, retiring behind a hedge about 150 yds off. Here there was much shouting but no further attack was made.

The French who relieved us here during the night reported officially that 740 dead Germans were counted near the trenches the next morning. Deducting the 70 killed the night before, this leaves 670 killed this night.

There is no means of verifying or checking the figures given by the French, but it does not seem possible that this number of the enemy were killed as they came on in very thick lines and the firing on our side was steady.


Casualties - 2 killed.

Wounded - Capt A W N PONSONBY, 2 Lt D H W HUMFREY & 5 men.


At night relieved by the French 125th REGT amidst some interruption from the enemy with shrapnel, MG and rifle fire.



Lt Col H R Davies 2nd Bn OBLI. Personal Diary 23rd Oct 1914. On the HAANIXBECK (near LANGEMARCK)HAZEBROUCK Sheet


A good deal of artillery fire, and sometimes some infantry and machine gun fire from the German trenches. In the afternoon they gave us a good deal of shelling both in the farm and in the trenches. A trench just west of the main road under BAINES was smashed in by high explosive shells which luckily did little damage to the men it. The men here were ordered to retire about 50 yards, till the shelling was over and then re-occupy the trench if an infantry attack came on. At 5:30 pm an attack was again made by the enemy, this time by a larger force than the previous evening. They came on in very thick lines and got close to the trenches in places, but our men were absolutely cool and steady and fired well. The attack seemed more formidable than the night before. I had shoved up every man to reinforce till the firing line was as full as it could be, and also got ammunition up so that after the repulse of the first attack every man was again well supplied.


The result of the attack was the same as on the night before. Some Germans got very close but in the end they turned and ran back behind the next hedge 150 yards off. Here they remained for some time, with a good deal of shouting which appeared to be that of officers trying to get their men on again. However no further assault was made and they evidently retired to their own trenches.


Our men were wonderfully calm and steady. Everybody did their duty splendidly. The French who relieved us afterwards reported that they counted 740 dead Germans the next morning in front of this part of the line. These would include the 70 whom we had killed the evening before.



1st Bn Gloucestershire Regt. 15th Sep 1914. The Germans made an attempt at advancing but were foiled. Four of our men posted at the corner of a wood did good work as marksmen.

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I think these quotes indicate that low level tactics played as much a part as marksmanship in these early encounters. Germans advancing to the attack en masse and presenting a dense target, British waiting until they could hardly miss.

In such circumstances, "mad minute" shooting would be just what was required - every bullet would find a billet, as it were.

Although one does wonder . . . . I was recently reading a very short account of 50 men of the Dorsets shooting (Lee Metfords) at a similar number of charging rebels of the fanatical loony variety in Malabar in 1894. The range never exceeded 50 yards. The Dorsets expended 700 rounds, it seems, (supplemented by a hundred Snider rounds from a supporting police detachment) and yet a number of the rebels still reached the bayonet line.

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Sadly, at this time, I simply do not have time to trawl through my German and British accounts of the battle as I would like to do. But as I say there are most definitely other German and British contemporary comments to support the facing MG claim although we know that that the number of British MGs declined hugely during the battle.

That said, the fact is it really doesn't matter if MG and rifle fire were confused, or if defences were strong or weak. There is a huge body of evidence to support the view that the Germans were most definitely concerned about the sheer weight and effect of fire from the British firing from defences they could, frequently, not take.

As a side issue, when the Germans did break the British line, at Zandvoorde for instance on October 30th, after driving through a very thin British crust, they simply failed to use initiative to push on toward Ypres. Not least there is strong evidence of non Zuberistic poor low level command and control by the Germans time and time again at Ypres. Not least on the Menin road the next day.

It would be valuable to know if any forumistas could offer indications of British bn by bn losses of MGs at Ypres. Then perhaps these could be aligned with German unit's accounts. Certainly in 7th Div, losses of guns and specialists were very serious by late October. So just what fire were the Germans facing?

David

David

I am not sure it will be easy to trace the numbers, simply because the diaries did not always record what happened. The 20th Inf Bde being a good example. 50% losses and no mention of these losses until 10th Nov. They were probably too busy trying to survive. The 1st Bn Grenadier Guards:

(20th Oct 1914 - 6th Nov 1914). The period from 20th Oct 1914 to 6th Nov 1914 was occupied in continuous fighting during which the 1st Bn GRENADIER GUARDS was very heavily engaged. It was not possible at that time to keep a diary. After the Battalion was withdrawn to MÉTEREN I believe the diary was made up. The information at present in the diary was entered by the then Commanding Officer, Lt Col M EARLE DSO and myself as Adjutant, some time before the end of Oct 1914. I could complete the diary myself up to 6th Nov or thereabouts had I the correct dates and my rough notes which are now in ENGLAND.

Maj G E G RASCH
3rd Bn GRENADIER GUARDS

Fortunately I have searchable diaries for the BEF in 1914. Searching MG and machine gun - 7th Div and sixteen mentions of their battalion MGs at Ypres. One brigade captured 3 MGs in a single day.

20th Inf Bde: Mentions of MGs between 5th Oct and 17th Dec 1914. One significant diary entry records that there were 2 Sections of MGs cobbled together from the Brigade's remaining MGs under the 2nd Bn Scots Guards. I make that 4 MGs out of 8.

2nd Bn SG 10th Nov, 17th Dec

2nd Bn Border 1st Nov

2nd Bn Gordons 10th Nov, 24th Nov

21st Inf Bde. Seven mentions of battalion MGs from 9th Oct to 23rd Nov. No mention of any losses.

2nd Bn Wilts 20th and 23rd Oct

2nd Bn Yorks 20th Oct

2nd Bn RSF 27th Oct, 21st Nov, 23rd Nov

2nd Bn Beds 29th Oct

22nd Inf Bde. Four mentions of battalion MGs. 2nd Warwicks mention supporting 1st RWF whose MGs were out of action on 21st Oct - an horrendous day for 1st RWF. Significantly the Bde captured 3 MGs on 7th Nov.

2nd Warwicks 21st Oct

2nd S Staffs 21st Oct

2nd Queens 7th Nov

1st RWF 7th Nov

An interesting quote from the 2nd Bn South Staffs diary on 21st Oct 1914 which covers fire control and MGs:

Lt F L HOLMES was killed this day. He was taking observation and instructing the men where and when to aim. He was in command of a half Coy of B Coy and had been doing excellent work the whole day. He had been looking after and superintending a MG which did very good service. LCpl PROTHERICK of the Band was wounded whilst carrying a wounded man out of the trench in the firing line. On the right flank, Capt C G RANSFORD was wounded in the hand. He was taking observation with this glasses and a shot struck them in the middle, and I feel it saved his life. Capt C G RANSFORD remained at duty with his Coy with his arm in a sling, but he was more seriously wounded at a later date. The MGs were on the road between A and B, and one between B and D did great execution. Sgt BYTHEWAY and his men are to be congratulated on this very good work preformed; they gave the GERMANS a thorough good doing this day.

I think we would all agree that the British had MGs at Ypres. the number can be debated but I suspect we will not get a definitive answer because the records were simply not kept in sufficient detail. I suspect any Brigade commander who had depleted numbers of MGs would retain as many as he could in the front line continuously and simply rotate the remaining MG section men through the remaining guns. Given the largely static nature of this phase of the War, I suspect MGs were not withdrawn when battalions went into reserve. My speculation. MG

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Martin

I think you are correct. At least one 7th Inf Div bn has a re-written diary because the original was lost.As well as losses of guns there mechanical failures, loss of competent MG officers and men. I think you are right it would be hard to calculate losses of guns with any accuracy but my reading of 7th Inf Div material certainly indicated greater losses than those indicated - replacements perhaps?

That said what of my other comments about your views??

David

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The dreaded Zuber's THE MONS MYTH, page 177, provides an interesting and - I think - revealing account. This is about the heavy fighting on 24th August in the Frameries sector.

2/64 was inserted in the middle of the line and the battalion attacked. It was difficult and bloody : ' the old British mercenaries were excellent shots'. But 1/64 was not to be stopped. It received superb support from a machine gun platoon that was set up on a high slag heap. The British withdrew by bounds.........9/ IR 35 was given the mission of burial detail in the 6 ID sector...it buried 169 German and 135 British.

There's quite a lot in this. First, the Germans acknowledge the skill of British riflemen ; secondly, in this instance it was the efficacy of German machine gunners that is emphasised ; and, finally, the candid report of rather higher numbers of German than British dead being counted and buried reflects the prowess of those " excellent shots" who, despite being subjected to machine gun fire from the slag heap, were able to take a significant toll of the attacking Germans.

To my mind, this strikes me as a more plausible account than the one cited in post 137 which alludes to 740 dead Germans being reported ( by the French) in front of British troops who lost 2 killed and 7 wounded.

Phil (PJA)

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Martin

That said what of my other comments about your views??

David

As I said, we should agree to disagree for now. You may well be correct that there is other evidence, which, if it appears I would be happy to change my mind. I have to decide on what is available, rather than what might be available. To 'prove' something it is better to have hard evidence rather than an empty CAB 42 file. The absence of material in CAB 42 does not necessarily mean it was there in the first place. Most of the correspondence would be with British Officers and if they had opinions on what the Germans thought I would be surprised. Most of the correspondence tends to be bogged down unravelling a small point of debate on what the British did or didn't do. I have been through these files and nothing stuck in my mind. Why would this material be weeded and other material not weeded out? I will keep an open mind. I think the 'repeatedy' in the translation refers to Ypres 1914; the German account repeatedly exaggerates the forces opposing it as Wynne repeatedly reminds us in his footnotes. It is only my view and therefore not important. I completely respect the fact that you and others may have different views based on the same evidence. That's what makes a debate. Friendly disagreement : )

For what it is worth I am re-reading Ypres 1914 and cross-referencing them to the British diaries. There are some discrepancies and it perhaps simply illustrates just how difficult it is to resolve accounts by opposing forces. I do have German published unit histories too on this period.

MG

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Martin

I cannot answer your question about weeding. It is impossible to understand why that which remains does so. I have strange things , including a map prepared by an officer in captivity after discussions with others who were captured showing positions of troops at Ypres which are totally at odds with the Oh. From memory on 30th October.

Amongst the mixture of correspondence you will find Gough fighting his corner and then a note from a junior officer.. Important

to recall that.weeders were/are rarely experts. There job was and is just to make piles of papers smaller - and at times remove that which is problematical. A great deal of important material clearly has gone.

Very happy with the open mind, I too am prepared to change my views in the light of evidence. I am open minded, but feel your judgement of Edmonds and Wynne too emotional. The cross referencing could be valuable. I predict one thing though - discrepancies!

Regards

David

I will try to find some time to see what I have in personal accounts - German and British to move things forward, but be patient.

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I think that there is an element missing from this most interesting debate - the quality of the opposition. By all accounts the majority of the German forces arrayed against the British infantry around Ypres were Reserve Korps, not "regular" Reserve Korps but the newly formed "kriegsfreiwillige" units. Jack Sheldon ( in the prologue of "The German Army at Ypres") gives a short account of their formation which indicates that they were both ill equipped and, most importantly, very poorly trained. Regimental officers were "dug out" from any available source and consisted of some who were physically incapable and others that had been out of the service for so long that they had no idea how to train the volunteers, let alone fight them. It is true that these Korps were fully stocked with manpower and that probably around a quarter of them were reservists of one sort or another but I can't see how they could have been very proficient, especially in the opening rounds of the battle. The image of German infantry being cut down by rifle fire (or machine-guns for that matter) as they advance might apply more to Ypres than any other (British) battle in 1914.

Just my two cents worth,
Dave

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I have searched the BEF Infantry and Brigade HQ diaries for key-words such as shooting, accurate, gun-fire, rifle fire, musketry, machine, machine-gun, MG. It seems quite clear from these searches that German artillery fire was the British Army's biggest concern by a very big margin. There are hardly any comments on the accuracy of German rifle-fire. The dominant feature, particularly after the crossing of the Aisne was the increasing volume, frequency and accuracy of the opposing artillery. The number of references increases very sharply after the move to Belgium.

Included in these searches are over 20 personal diaries which typically carry far more detail; usually written by officers who luckily saw the whole period through - some were the only Officers left in their battalions. Some of these personal diaries were used as substitutes for lost unit war diaries. Again the (small) body of evidence pays little attention to musketry skills - British or German - and is generally focused on describing in some frank detail the ghastliness and intensity of the conflict. The body of material (unit diaries and personal diaries) is over 150 diaries and a million words, so a reasonable starting point. I will do some more refined searches and flag anything of interest. MG

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Looking back at the thread my injections of fact have been sporadic and scattered. I have therefore now brought them together as a source for posterity, and they appear below.

Provided this meets with approval I will go back through the thread later and weed out the duplications.

BRITISH MUSKETRY 1905-1914: THE FACTS.

The official doctrine is enshrined in Musketery Regs Part I 1909 amended to 1914. [MR1909]

Great emphasis is placed on collective action, rather than marksmanship.

This from the intro: “Musketry training ........... should assist commanders, when they have considered the conditions under which fire is delivered in war, in making the most effective use of their commands in the presence of the enemy.

Musketry must not be regarded as a skill-at-arms which can be separated from tactical study and manoeuvre training. It is to be assocated in theory and practice with manoeuvre.

................... high scores in range practices bear no relation whatever to the results to be expected when firing under service conditions, even in peace-time.”

Continuation training of reservists:

Regarding continuation training, Haldane:

“... The Regulations for the training of the Army Reserve are issued annually. In the case of Section B. of the infantry, men enlisted for three years are required to train in the fifth, seventh, ninth, and eleventh year of their service, and those enlisted for more than three years in their tenth year of service. The training consists of one day's musketry instruction, or, if the man so prefers, six days' training with a Special Reserve unit. (Hansard 24th August 1909). “

In this context "enlisted" must mean 3 and 9 men, who actually got more refreshers than the others. Section A men, at most 2 years away from the colours, got none, and Section D got one per four-year period in the Section [two such periods were allowed subject to age].

A few other matters to ponder:

The Classification section of Table B for regular infantry and cavalry, on which a soldier's Proficiency Pay of an extra 25% depended [1st class shot and marksman] was of 50 rounds of which 30 were timed and of these 30, 15 were fired in one minute at 300 yards ... the "mad minute". There were other preconditions including a third class education certificate.

Infantry Special Reservists received the benefit of an annual course of a total of 80 rounds only, of which 50 were for classification and included the "mad minute"

The minute was rapid fire at 300 yards at the second class target, lying, “rifle to be loaded [this means one up the spout] and four rounds in the magazine before the target appears. Loading from the pouch or bandolier afterwards. One minute allowed”.

[so two chargers of five rounds to be loaded at some stage, either at intervals or as soon as the magazine is empty. ].

In his first year the recruit shot at least 200 rounds of ball, in addition to hours on wet days spent on rapidly loading drill ammunition, and hours using the aim corrector with his NCO doing the correcting. This NCO had a stake in the matter: his prize badge for being a section leader of best shooting company. In subsequent years the trained soldier fired 250 rounds.

The assessment of target range was also practised quarterly under field conditions, with a distinctive badge for the best performers.

Fire control by junior leaders was frequently practised under field conditions.

The Kitchener Tests in India were, according to Old Soldier Sahib by Frank Richards, three days simulated war: iron rations, 15 miles march to contact, one mile skirmishing and engaging snap targets under fire control of NCOs and officers, a fixed-bayonets assault, a one mile withdrawal, an hour to brew up, and 15 miles to start line. And only then to barracks. This whilst carrying extra weight to simulate 150 rounds on the soldier.

KITCHENER TESTS. Another version.

Introduced in India for British and native Infantry 1905

To be undertaken annually each December. Competition initially by Districts, then by Commands, with further grading by extra competition or tests, with final decision by a Board of Officers nominated by CinC.

Cup to winners, and another cup to Sgts Mess*** of Winners. See http://www.queensroyalsurreys.org.uk/sport/sport001.html for illustration of cups.

Comprising.

1. Battalion march 15 miles with 100 rounds ammunition* followed by attack on a position. 200 marks.

2. Scouting and outpost duty day and night. 300 marks.

3. attack and defence of position. 800 marks.

4. Duties of bivouac. 150 marks.

5. Night operations. 150 marks.

6. Rearguard, 10 miles. 150 marks.

7. Transport duties. 120 marks.

8. Physical condition. 100 marks.

9. Miscellaneous duties. 80 marks.

TOTAL POSSIBLE 2000 marks.

Marks to be deducted for:

1. every man falling out during 1. and 6. above. Minus 1 mark.

2. If Third Class Shots exceed 12%, minus 10 marks for each % age increase.

3. If men continuously hospitalized for alcoholism or “general disease”** exceeds 10 in 1000, then 5 points deducted for each 1 per 1000 excess.

* Evidence of lead squares or iron squares to make up full weight.

**Probably venereal disease.

***for Native champions, special badges to be issued to the NCOs.

Source Montreal Gazette Jan 1905.

Figure of Merit. See #10 for example.

This is dealt with in MR1909 para.120 et seq. "Testing of Arms"

Surprisingly, it is a calculation of the RIFLE'S performance, rather than the rifleman. .......... "when .... reason to believe rifle is inaccurate .......a skilled shot will be selected ......."

The calculation when performed [after 3 sessions of 7 shots under very controlled conditions at 500 yards] provides the mean of the deviations from the mean point of impact in feet. I therefore fail to see what is the implication of proving a "Figure of Merit" for the musketry returns grading Marksmen, 1st class, 2nd class and 3rd class shots. They did not all use the same rifle! MR 1909 does not require such a Figure to be submitted in the Annual Returns. A minor mystery.

Annual Classification:

130 points and up: Marksman, and the crossed rifles badge +

105 to 129: 1st class shot

70 to 104: 2nd class

less than 70: 3rd class if they had qualified for the classification part of the course [in other words, done the easy bits].

MR Part II has sketches of the relevant targets.

Most but not all have three zones: an inner which is a partial "enemy" silhouette, an intermediate, circular, and an outer, concentric. These I suggest could be scored 3, 2, or 1. These targets accounts for 40 rounds, max score 120. The remaining 10 shots were at targets whose scoring is a mystery at the moment, but I infer that a Marksman had to more-or-less consistently hit the middle of his target zone under time pressures out to 500 yards.

+ there were additional badges for :

best shot of company

best shot of corporals and below in the battalion

best shot of sergeants and above in the battalion

SNCOs of best shooting company.

See also #150 and #155 below

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Yes Martin, yes indeed.

You wrote: . It seems quite clear from these searches that German artillery fire was the British Army's biggest concern by a very big margin. There are hardly any comments on the accuracy of German rifle-fire.

nothing more satisfying to the soul than quoting Grumpy, very early on in the thread:

Many engagements were settled by overwhelming artillery, and a fair few by manoeuvre .. outflanking, envelopment etc. Some significant ones in late Octoer and November were in darkness ......... what price marksmanship under those conditions!?

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Grumpy

Many thanks for taking the time and effort to consolidate this info. I have a few questions:

1. When did the Table A and table B Tests start? 1909?

2. Can we assume the Reservists also shot Table B when the opportunity for refresher training arose?

3. Do we know what the ammunition allocation was for SR? And did they also shoot Table B annually?

4. I assume Kitchener Tests were not applied to Home based battalions?

5. .....

MG

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Its useful to remember that the 7th Div was not part of the original BEF, this means it was not one of the planned expeditionary divisions and was not representative of them, eg it would have had a higher percentage of reservists because the 'peace' establishments of its units were lower than the 90% or thereabouts of the designated expeditionary units. I suspect the serving Boer War veterans were field officers and higher, and SNCOs. Presumably a few battalions had NW Frontier experience in the preceding decade, while there was no formal 'campaign', there were always a few live rounds flying around to keep units on their toes. Once reservists appeared there would have been more Boer veterans.

It's interesting that one of the most innovative artillery officers of the war (Franks) was a veteran of Omdurman. However, in summer 1914 indirect artillery fire tended to be more theory than practice, but it changed rapidly, communications were the problem, being limited to lights and, flags. The truth is the British Army's capability to mass artillery fire against opportunity targets was next to non-existent until 1942.

IIRC the first British shot of the war was by a cavalry JNCO at 400 yards range.

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Martin,

The report of the OBLI that you cite in post 137 has inspired me to try and cross check the narrative with German accounts from the same day . I am flicking through pages of Jack Sheldon's book, and have indeed encountered some startling accounts from the fighting of 22-24 October. I can't identify location, though ; so am doubtful about compatibility of the accounts.

If a lot of the fighting was so stupendously one sided as the OBLI accounts suggest, we might wonder why the Allies weren't in Berlin by Christmas.

Phil (PJA)

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1. When did the Table A and table B Tests start? 1909?


MR 1905, much slimmer than MR 1909, has Table A and B much as MR 1909 BUT there is no mad minute. I will scan and send. Meantime, there is acknowledgement therein that range shooting at known ranges did not produce military shots. Edit. Also Table A and B in 1898.


2. Can we assume the Reservists also shot Table B when the opportunity for refresher training arose?


No. Given that doctrine was that it was undesirable to fire more than 15 rounds per day, most early deployments to F&F would not have had time to complete Table B.


3. Do we know what the ammunition allocation was for SR? And did they also shoot Table B annually?


Answer is in #146 above.


4. I assume Kitchener Tests were not applied to Home based battalions?


I don't know. NB however Ron Clifton's reference to Kitchener's Chocolate on Salisbury Plain. Certainly Home units did Musketry camps, and indeed war interrupted some units during theirs. Of course Home units always were low strength and always had recruits and drafts round their necks. Perhaps regimental histories or year books might reveal the facts. Here, our regimental experts might be prevailed upon, most of us have pre-1914 information ............. for us, the world did not begin in 1914!


5. ..... Yes and No and Maybe.


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