The "machine guns" of Mons ?

[Tom A McCluskey]

Robert

I agree with Salesie, I don't think it matters, in this circumstance, that the observer is British and the area he is commenting on is German. I don't, however, agree with Salesie's reason behind the flanking manoeuvre by the Germans.

The piece I was on about, that gives too much credit to the German is the one below. Plus it contains no tangible evidence that the German infantry training programme contained much in the way of quality training:

"As noted before, the German infantry training programme included markmenship as a core skill. Training was also given in the variety of types of attack. There was a strong emphasis on fire and manoeuvre, right down to the equivalent of squad level. Jack's recent posts provide ample evidence of how this played out on the Le Cateau battlefield. We need to be very cautious about Maurice's remarks, and not assume that the observations from earlier Kaisermanöver can be generalized to the German First Army in August 1914." - Robert Dunlop

The piece referring to German musketry is also 1st Bn The Queen's Own Royal West Kent Regiment "Invicta" page 16, 23rd August 1914.

Aye

Tom McC

[Robert Dunlop]

I don't think it matters, in this circumstance, that the observer is British and the area he is commenting on is German.

Thanks, Tom. I appreciate the way you have worded this, and understand the point you are making.

Thanks also for the clarification about the quote, which is mine. You are quite right that my comments did not include any references. I will now correct that.

Also for the clarification about the Invicta quote, which relates to the attack by Bloem's men.

Robert

[Tom A McCluskey]

Robert,

Map of A Company. 1st Bn QORWKR - sorry it is a bit blurred.

A = No 1 Platoon: 'a fair field of fire, about 250 yards'

B = No 2 Platoon: 'about 450 yards'

C = No 4 Platoon: 'about 450 yards'

3 Platoon in reserve, behind No 2 Platoon

Aye

Tom McC

[Robert Dunlop]

Brilliant. Much appreciated, Tom. I will try and overlay this on the other map that I added earlier in this thread.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

What does the 'D' refer to in the map, Tom?

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Here is the map with the A Company platoons indicated.

Robert

[Tom A McCluskey]

Robert,

It is where a German Battery of guns came into action, Captain Lister's narrative, page 9:

"Within five minutes I saw the enemy's infantry debouching from Tetre in large numbers. I counted on the east side of the road some 400-500 men.

"Fire was at once opened up on them and it could be seen that the enemy was suffering considerable loss. After a short time he returned the fire heavily.

"I sent a report of this to Headquarters at the canal bridge, at the same time asking if any news had been heard from the Divisional Cavalry. This was answered in the negative.

"Shortly after this I received by cyclist a memo. from Major Parsons (Officer Commanding Divisional Mounted Troops) asking me to cover his retirement. There was no indication from whence his message had been written, and so I considered that the only way in which I could do this would be to hold on to my position as long as possible. This I decided to do.

"By this time a battery of the enemy's artillery had come into action at D (on sketch), and another body of enemy troops, which proved to be a machine gun company, came into action straight to our front.

"All this time numbers of the enemy had been deploying east and west of the Tetre-Hornu Road. Hence I decided to send half a platoon (No. 3) under 2/Lieut. Chitty to reinforce No. 1 Platoon, which appeared to be somewhat exposed at A.

Aye

Tom McC

PS - Good Map, by the way.

[andy66]

Robert

Good map, the following two may be of use for more added detail if you wish.

1. Positions occupied by 2Bn Duke of Wellington's West Riding Regt on 23.08.1914.

2. Position Machine Gun Sect Duke of Wellington's West Riding Regt on 23.08.1914.

Both taken from; History of The Duke of Wellington's Regiment (1st & 2nd Battalions) 1881-1923, by Brigadier-General C.D. BRUCE, C.B.E.

Regards

Andy

[Ralph J. Whitehead]

I had a chance to go over some additional Verlustlisten in an attempt to locate the losses reported for the regiments that fought at Mons and Le Cateau in August 1914.

A question was raised from outside the forum on just how accurate these numbers might be for the purpose of determining if losses were as high as some sources have suggested, or lower as some now feel. In large actions (Verdun, Somme, Ypres battles) the lines between the time when first casualties appeared on the lists through the point where the reporting on these actions ended is difficult to pin down.

Simply stated the figures at the start of these actions and at the end will always be blurred with losses that occurred prior and subsequent to the fighting unless the regiments had been in isolation prior to the fighting and suddenly experienced losses, something I have not seen often.

However, in regard to a period covering only a few days, combined with the advantage of knowing what units were present as in this case, a limited number of infantry, artillery and support units, as well as lists that fortunately identify the dates covered makes the possibility of finding the losses directly related to the fighting much easier.

The lists published during the war can be cross referenced with the units that published an Ehrentafel at the end of the regimental history if at the very least to provide a date related to the fatal casualties and the men who subsequently died from wounds. Some, such as IR 26, provide details on the losses to active officers down to the nature and cause of their wounds.

The two units I was able to locate include a complete listing for IR 153 and the III Bn of IR 26. I will look over the previous posted lists to see what we have so far and what is still needed.

The losses reported for IR 153 cover the period from 24 August 1914 through 1 September 1914, a period of 9 days. The losses mentioned in the history are presented in the following chart.

Reported losses for IR 153 from 24 -29 August 1914:

2 officers killed, 1 officer died of wounds

6 officers wounded

68 enlisted men killed

317 enlisted men wounded (Severe, slight, WIA)

The losses reported on Prussian Verlustlisten No. 40, 2 October 1914. IR 153 for the fighting near Crespin, Salesmes, Bethencourt, Vauvilliers 24 August – 1 September 1914 (Their spelling, not mine)

1/153

Killed 5 EM, Sev. Wounded 1 EM, Sl. Wounded 4 EM, WIA 9 EM, MIA 1 EM. Total 20 EM

2/153

Killed 1 EM, WIA 9 EM. Total 10 EM

3/153

Killed 1 officer, 5 EM, Sev. Wounded 1 EM, Sl. Wounded 4 EM, WIA 9 EM, MIA 1 EM. Total 1 officer, 20 EM

4/153

Killed 4 EM, WIA 19 EM. Total 23

II Bn Staff 1 officer slightly wounded

5/153

Killed 8 EM, Sl. Wounded 1 EM, WIA 29 EM, MIA 15 EM. Total 53

6/153

Killed 1 officer 7 EM, WIA 26. Total 1 officer, 33 EM

7/153

Killed 1 officer 7 EM, Sev. Wounded 14, Sl. Wounded 1 officer, 18 EM, WIA 2 EM. Total 2 officers, 41 EM

8/153

Killed 8 Em, WIA 1 officer, 26 EM, MIA 1 EM. Total 1 officer, 35 EM

9/153

Killed 1 officer, 5 EM, WIA 30 EM, MIA 6 EM. Total 1 officer, 41 EM

10/153

Killed 10 EM, Sev. Wounded 1 EM, Sl. Wounded 23 EM, MIA 6 EM. Total 40 EM

11/153

Killed 7 EM, Sev. Wounded 27 EM, Sl. Wounded 1 officer, 8 EM, MIA 2 EM. Total 1 officer, 44 EM

12/153

Killed 3 EM, Sev. Wounded 1 officer, 11 EM, Sl. Wounded 1 officer, 19 EM, WIA 2 EM, MIA 4 EM. Total 2 officers, 39 EM

MG Coy

Sl. Wounded 2 EM. Total 2 EM

Regimental losses per the VL:

Killed 4 officers, 70 EM

Sev. Wounded 1 officer, 54 enlisted men

Sl. Wounded 4 officers, 100 EM

WIA 1 officer, 152 Em

MIA 35 EM

Total VL 10 Officers, 411 EM

Total Regt. History 9 officers, 385 EM

The comparison between reported losses from post-war sources as opposed to period casualty lists show a difference in numbers of 1 officer, 26 enlisted men between the two sources.

Several points need to be considered.

1. The regimental history numbers relate to 24-29 August 1914 while the VL refers to losses from 24 August through 1 September 1914, a difference of 6 days vs 9 days.

2. The MIA from the VL would have been accounted for in the post-war years and could include men killed, wounded or simply separated from their companies and returned afterward.

3. In looking at the wounded enlisted men numbers, 306 for the VL and 317 for the regimental account the numbers for this regiment are not far off. It is not possible at present to report on the status of the men listed as MIA but it is possible that some of these made up the difference in the wounded numbers, a total of 11 men. When looking at the fatal casualties the difference is quite small, 74 dead per the VL while the regimental records report 73 dead.

a. It is not improbable that one or men listed as KIA on the VL were in fact incorrectly reported. I have found instances where later lists have corrected these numbers once new details were provided. Again, it will require a review of the next two years of lists to try and view every potential correction to their names, place or birth or type of casualty.

4. This is only one regiment and as such does not mean the other regiments will show the same results. This can only be checked by making a similar comparison for each one.

5. The loss numbers associated by company allow the researcher to see if the reports of which units were in action, met the most resistance, etc. are correct. Some with lower numbers might be expected to have been in reserve, involved in limited fighting, etc.

6. It is my intention to continue to look at the comparison numbers wherever they can be found for each regiment as well as artillery, Jäger and cavalry units.

Ralph

[salesie]

It says that von Kluck ventured west. 'Too far' is a relative term and cannot be deduced from what von Kluck wrote. 'Not far enough' was my description further up, which should be applied to the outer limit of the German right wing, as opposed to the narrower focus of von Kluck's First Army. The reason for adding this point is that the First Army could not extend itself to the coast and remain a threat, IMHO.

The highlighted paragraphs make no mention of the gap between von Kluck and von Buelow. As a result of the Battle of Guise, and the presence of the French Fifth Army, von Buelow's Second Army slowed down. With the slight westward deviation, and the continuing forward drive of von Kluck's First Army, a gap opened up between the main bodies of both armies. First Army became echeloned forward in respect to Second Army, even though First Army was on the outer rim of the wheeling movement (ie had the furthest distance to travel). Von Kluck was not timid.

As I noted above, the area between the main bodies of the armies was not a void space. The 'gap' between 17th ID and the rest of First Army was screened by the German cavalry.

There is no information above with respect to von Buelow's requesting help or not. The Battle of Guise took place on the next day, the 29th. During the 28th, and again on the 29th, von Kluck's right wing came in contact with French forces, which fought delaying actions or fell back. On the 28th, the German High Command sent the following order to von Kluck: "The First Army, with the II Cavalry Corps under its orders, will march west of the Oise towards the lower Seine. It must be prepared to cooperate in the fighting of the Second Army. It will also be responsible for the protection of the right flank of the Armies, and will take steps to prevent any new enemy concentration in its zone of operations."

In response to the Battle of Guise, the 17th Infantry Division was detached from First Army and assigned to Second Army for a temporary period. First Army itself continued west southwest, echeloned forward as described, until it turned south on the 31st August.

Occleshaw appears to have muddled several things together. He was, as you said, making a point about the role that air reconnaissance could play during the war of movement. With the greatest of respect to Dr Occleshaw, you should not, however, take the details of his account too seriously with respect to the actions of von Kluck's First Army. The significant event that was observed, and confirmed by the captured orders, was the southerly then southeasterly change in direction of the First Army. If anything this movement narrowed any gap between First and Second Armies. In any case, this gap (which was at its widest prior to 31st August) was not of great operational significance. The big gap was that which occurred when von Kluck, having headed in a southeasterly direction, was taken in the right flank by Maunoury's Sixth Army. Von Kluck then held his outer right flank in place and pivoted his inner left flank (nearest to von Buelow's Second Army) round to meet Maunoury, creating an enormous gap into which the BEF and supporting French forces penetrated.

Are you wanting to make a more general point about von Kluck's and/or von Buelow's actions during this period of the Franco-British retreat?

Robert

"Too far" was my term, Robert. If von Kluck's venture Westwards, and his continuing forward momentum, created the effect of him being echeloned forward (whatever that may mean) when von Bulow paused (or as I would say, caused him to present a potentially advantageous operational opportunity, in the form of a gap, for the allies to exploit) then in essence it must have been "too far" given the end-result.

That said, it seems to me, Robert, that in reality the only difference between Occleshaw's overview and your admirably translated summary is a matter of dates, which, in essence, are immaterial to the point in question. Whatever the chronology, is it not a fact that the loss of synchronisation of movement between von Kluck and von Bulow's respective armies is the real nub of the matter? Is it not a fact that this loss of synchronisation of movement is precisely what enabled Joffre to spot a German operational mistake and therefore exploit it, and thus recover from a seemingly hopeless situation?

The dates are immaterial; if you read Occleshaw's piece again, and ignore the dates, he actually agrees with you i.e. to paraphrase what he says - though a gap had opened (echeloned forward?) and had been spotted by the allies, they could do nothing at first. De Maunoury could not act until von Kluck turned south-east across the face of Paris thus exposing his right-flank, and the BEF, with French support, could not exploit the said gap until de Maunoury attacked and forced von Kluck to turn and meet this attack or be outflanked, thus opening a gap that could be readily exploited. Is it not a fact that the allies (Joffre in particular) spotted an opportunity and, with skill and excellent timing, acted upon it and thus turned an operational blunder by the Germans into a strategic disaster?

However, under the rationale that says every effect must have a cause, I'd like to rewind a little i.e. we know what caused the effect of von Bulow pausing (the battle of Guise) but what caused von Kluck to venture into the (wild) West in the first place, and also his continued forward momentum for at least another forty-eight hours, much to the surprise and delight of the allies?

Cheers-salesie.

P.S. My post about your nationality was simply an attempt to warn you that you were, in effect, shooting yourself in the foot (metaphorically speaking, of course). And, in reality, I was actually defending the validity of your own observations vis-à-vis British and German forces, unlike the silly criteria you were attempting to apply to the British observer of German forces. Perhaps you'd prefer it in future if I simply use your own words to attack you?

[Robert Dunlop]

salesie, I will approach the issue of von Kluck's vs von Buelow's movements in a different way. Here is a map of the movements of the inner flank of von Kluck's First Army and the outer flank of Second Army for the period 23rd to 28th August, 1914. The stars represent the approximate positions of the inner/outermost units at the end of each respective day.

Next map will illustrate the movements from 28th onwards.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

This map illustrates the movements of the flanks of the two armies from 28th August to 1st September. The infantry movements can be discerned for the 31st, the day of the flight. Note that First Army became split at the end of the 31st. I have added some lines to indicate the breadth and approximate lines of the First Army's units.

Robert

[phil andrade]

Thank you for posting those statistics for IR 153, Ralph.

One thing that immediately strikes me is how equally the casualties were spread through the 12 companies: not to read too much into this, but it is so often the case that a preponderance of loss in a regiment, or battalion, is suffered by one or two very unfortunate units within the larger formation. It might imply good tactical practice when the loss is evenly spread, the suggestion being that the troops are deployed to good effect when the burden is shared equitably.

Phil.

[Robert Dunlop]

... the following two may be of use for more added detail if you wish.

Terrific. Thanks, Andy. What was the source? I think they had been reproduced in Horsfall and Cave's book on Mons but I didn't see a reference.

Robert

[Pete1052]

It might imply good tactical practice when the loss is evenly spread, the suggestion being that the troops are deployed to good effect when the burden is shared equitably.

I'm not sure that equalizing the distribution of casualties within a command is a goal that military leaders give any conscious thought to when planning and conducting military operations. Some missions and pieces of ground are inherently more dangerous than others. By definition delaying actions generally avoid becoming decisively engaged with the enemy, as opposed to "forlorn hope" types of offensive operations or die-in-place defensive stands.

[phil andrade]

I'm not sure that equalizing the distribution of casualties within a command is a goal that military leaders give any conscious thought to when planning and conducting military operations. Some missions and pieces of ground are inherently more dangerous than others. By definition delaying actions generally avoid becoming decisively engaged with the enemy, as opposed to "forlorn hope' types of offensive operations or die-in-place defensive stands.

Point taken, Pete. This occurred to me after studying battles in which commanders were criticised for not making effective use of their forces; one criterion of effective command ( I was reading this in a book about Gettysburg) was the ability to fight the entire army to its utmost : the suggestion being that an equitably spread casualty list implied that this had been achieved; whereas an army which had extreme disparity of casualties among its various parts had, perhaps, not been turned to such good acount.

I appreciate that this seems out of context: Le Cateau was certainly not Gettysburg; and IR 153 was not the Army of the Potomac, but I like to try and place an interpretation on the statistics that Ralph has produced : even at the risk of making some silly observations !

Phil.

Incidentally, in this edit I would like to point out that in the tabulation of the casualties suffered by the six German regiments that were engaged at Le Cateau, presented by Jack in post 390 or 391, there is a similar eveness of loss between the six regiments...none suffered extreme loss, but all sustained significant casualties. This, I think, merits some reflection.

[andy66]

Terrific. Thanks, Andy. What was the source? I think they had been reproduced in Horsfall and Cave's book on Mons but I didn't see a reference.

Robert

Apologies Robert ,

I scanned them from; History of The Duke of Wellington's Regiment (1st & 2nd Battalions) 1881-1923, by Brigadier-General C.D. BRUCE, C.B.E. There is also personal by account by Capt W.M. Ozanne the Machine Gun Officer with 2Bn Duke of Wellington's West Riding Regiment (part of which is in Post#66).

Regards

Andy

[Robert Dunlop]

Not a problem, Andy. Thanks for the info. Is there any additional material on the German infantry attacks?

Robert

[salesie]

Nice, maps, Robert, very nice indeed. But why post them? I made it clear a good few posts ago that, for the sake of this particular line of argument, I accept your dates as valid, and that this acceptance made any further argument/proof about the chronology irrelevant.

Now, did a loss of synchronisation of movement (a gap) occur between von Kluck and von Bulow's respective armies? Was this loss of synchronisation of movement spotted early by the allies and seen as a potential opportunity for exploitation? Were the allies watching out for further movement from von Kluck that would mean the time for exploitation was ripe? Was the timing of de Maunoury's attack to von Kluck's right flank, after he'd turned south-east and across the face of Paris, planned by the allies? Did the BEF, with French support, as planned by Joffre, push into the new gap created by de Maunoury's attack and von Kluck's counter movement, and thus threaten both inner flanks of the German first and second armies? Did these flank attacks, from the French 6th Army on von Kluck's right, the French 5th Army on von Bulow's left, and the BEF on both inner flanks, force a general German retreat back North? Did Joffre skilfully manoeuvre the allied forces to exploit the potential presented by the initial gap, and thus, by skilful handling of the situation, turn a German operational mistake into a strategic disaster?

Now there seems to be a clear sequence of events here, Robert - whatever the dates, there is a clear pathway of cause and effect (unless, of course, you say that these events didn't happen) - so, to complete the chain, what caused von Kluck to "echelon forward" in the first place?

Cheers-salesie.

[Robert Dunlop]

Salesie, one last map. This is the same map for the period 28th August to 1st September but with the movements of the two German cavalry divisions overlaid. As you can see, they were not moving in the directions described in Occleshaw's account.

Furthermore, they were screening the forward movement of von Kluck's First Army on its inner flank, as well as the gap between the two major infantry formations.

The relative loss of synchronisation between First and Second Armies was mostly caused by the resistance put up by Lanrezac's Fifth Army, ie it was the Second Army that fell behind the pace of von Kluck's forces.

Around the time of Battles of Mons and Le Cateau, in which the BEF slowed von Kluck's First Army, von Buelow was fighting the Battle of Charleroi and then having the brief altercation with Haig's 1st Corps around Landrecies as well as the ongoing contact with Fifth Army. The two German armies maintained their synchronisation up till the 27th. After that point, the BEF did not contribute any significant delaying effect, this fell almost entirely to Fifth Army. Hence the more rapid movement of von Kluck's First Army which became echeloned forward.

The relative loss of synchronisation was not the decisive problem exploited by the Entente.

Joffre exploited the fact that the German right flank did not extend far enough to the west.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

The details of the movements come from von Kluck's book "The March on Paris and the Battle of the Marne 1914", von Buelow's book "Mein Bericht zur Marneschlacht", and from the fabulous map in von Poseck's book "Die deutsche Kavallerie 1914 in Belgien und Frankreich".

Robert

[salesie]

The relative loss of synchronisation was not the decisive problem exploited by the Entente.

Joffre exploited the fact that the German right flank did not extend far enough to the west.

Robert

Robert, there was clearly a loss of synchronisation from the 27th onwards, compared to the inner flanks of First and Second armies being in relatively close contact before that. The gap's distance, some twenty to thirty miles (according to your maps), was maintained until the 31st at least, but if the gap had continued to widen, or been maintained at twenty to thirty miles, then any allied drive into that gap would have threatened both armies' inner flanks. So if von Kluck had moved further west and von Bulow had not followed then surely Joffre could have exploited any westward extension as well, by driving into an even bigger gap? But, if von Kluck turned south-east to close with von Bulow again (as he did) then he would expose his right flank (as he did).

It seems to me that once the initial loss of synchronisation occurred then Joffre had opportunities for a decisive strike whatever von Kluck or von Bulow did, whichever way they turned. It was the initial opening of the gap that was the primary German mistake, and Joffre spotted its potential and skilfully exploited it (though assisted by captured German plans, but he still had to pull it off, which he admirably did).

Cheers-salesie.

[Jack Sheldon]

Our attention has been drawn under 'Units and Formations' to a downloadable version of Brg Gen Gleichen's diary. He commanded 15 Bde during this campaign and what he has to say is well worth a read.

Jack

[Robert Dunlop]

salesie, had von Kluck continued in a westerly direction after the 28th, or even in a southwesterly direction after the 30th, then the gap between two armies would have widened further, as you rightly point out. Von Bülow's Second Army had to stay engaged with the French Fifth Army, which was withdrawing in a southerly direction. Joffre would have been faced with a different dilemma, supposing that the gap had widened. Attacking into the gap would not have been adequate. It would have exposed the attacking force to an envelopment by von Kluck's First Army. To prevent this happening, Joffre would have needed a substantial force to pin von Kluck's front and, ideally, another large force to threaten the outer westerly flank of von Kluck's army. All of this in addition to a force large enough to penetrate into the gap and then attack laterally on both flanks. This would have required at least double the size of force that actually executed the successful counter-offensive based on von Kluck's southerly and then southeasterly change in direction.

The cavalry movements show that there was no overall loss of synchronisation. There wasn't a void between the First and Second Armies. Quite the opposite in fact. As the action at Nèry demonstrated on the 1st September, the aggressive forward movement of the German cavalry created a significant sense of concern in the BEF as they were falling back. Leading up until that time, ie covering the time period under discussion during which the 'gap' had opened up, BEF rear guards were consistently in action against pursuing German forces, often cavalry. Nèry heightened the British anxiety because although the German 4th Cavalry Division did not overwhelm 1st Brigade and was forced to break off with the loss of the majority of its artillery, the 4th Cavalry Division's attack was still a very significant incursion into the BEF lines.

Robert

[salesie]

salesie, had von Kluck continued in a westerly direction after the 28th, or even in a southwesterly direction after the 30th, then the gap between two armies would have widened further, as you rightly point out. Von Bülow's Second Army had to stay engaged with the French Fifth Army, which was withdrawing in a southerly direction. Joffre would have been faced with a different dilemma, supposing that the gap had widened. Attacking into the gap would not have been adequate. It would have exposed the attacking force to an envelopment by von Kluck's First Army. To prevent this happening, Joffre would have needed a substantial force to pin von Kluck's front and, ideally, another large force to threaten the outer westerly flank of von Kluck's army. All of this in addition to a force large enough to penetrate into the gap and then attack laterally on both flanks. This would have required at least double the size of force that actually executed the successful counter-offensive based on von Kluck's southerly and then southeasterly change in direction.

The cavalry movements show that there was no overall loss of synchronisation. There wasn't a void between the First and Second Armies. Quite the opposite in fact. As the action at Nèry demonstrated on the 1st September, the aggressive forward movement of the German cavalry created a significant sense of concern in the BEF as they were falling back. Leading up until that time, ie covering the time period under discussion during which the 'gap' had opened up, BEF rear guards were consistently in action against pursuing German forces, often cavalry. Nèry heightened the British anxiety because although the German 4th Cavalry Division did not overwhelm 1st Brigade and was forced to break off with the loss of the majority of its artillery, the 4th Cavalry Division's attack was still a very significant incursion into the BEF lines.

Robert

The affair at Nery was mentioned earlier in the thread with a fairly neat summary from per ardua, i.e. "A British cavalry brigade literally caught with its pants down by a German cavalry division. Outnumbered in artillery, machine guns and rifles fought said division to a standstill and when British reinforcements arrived it was the British that had control of the battlefield and the Germans who abandoned their guns and ran away."

It seems to me, Robert, that a German cavalry screen offered very little in terms of security - and this action would seem to confirm that, after Le Cateau, if the Germans got too close to the BEF then they got a bloody nose.

Also, I didn't mean driving into the gap in isolation - if von Kluck had ventured further to the west, France's 6th Army would still have been growing in strength, and your maps clearly illustrate that further westward movement by von Kluck would have made the German position just as hazardous, maybe more so by thinning out even further a not so secure German cavalry screen. I still say it was the initial loss of synchronisation of movement that was the German Army's primary error; if von Kluck hadn't become "separated" from von Bulow in the first place then he wouldn't have needed to turn the way he did.

Anyhow, we're venturing into the wild west ourselves, by debating hypothetical scenarios - the facts are; the two armies did "separate", von Kluck did turn south-east, and the Allies did drive the German Army back north. So, back to your maps, and another question: your maps show that von Bulow slowed on the 27th then turned south on the 28th, a full forty-eight and twenty-four hours respectively before the battle of Guise started, but von Kluck continued on his south-westerly line of march. It seems that von Bulow's turn south is what opened the gap to some twenty to thirty miles - so, was von Bulow's dramatic turn south, and von Kluck's continued south-westerly advance, part of overall German planning all along?

Cheers-salesie.