The "machine guns" of Mons ?

[Ralph J. Whitehead]

I did find several entries for the regiments mentioned in this thread and for the period between 21 and 30 August 1914. Some were reported by battalion, some by company at times. The losses mentioned here will need to be coordinated with the regimental accounts, some of which I have, some not. I will rely on the members like jack who have already done work on these units.

The biggest drawback of the findings was the date issue. Some show losses for only two days, others for a week or more and there is no method to determine what date the loss actually occurred. If there is an Ehrentafel in the regimental at least we can trace the dates of the men listed as killed or died of wounds. The wounded and missing are another thing.

Here is what I have found so far:

I.R. 26 I Battalion for the period of 21 August through 28 August:

1st Coy

1 officer, 13 enlisted men killed. 2 officers, 9 enlisted men seriously wounded. 1 officer, 17 enlisted men slightly wounded. 12 enlisted men missing.

2nd Coy

6 enlisted men killed. 2 officers, 49 enlisted men seriously wounded. 8 enlisted men slightly wounded. 4 enlisted men wounded. 36 enlisted men missing.

3rd Coy

6 enlisted men killed. 3 officers, 30 enlisted men seriously wounded. 2 officers, 30 enlisted men slightly wounded. 13 enlisted men missing.

4th Coy

2 officers, 1 enlisted man killed. 10 enlisted men seriously wounded. 2 officers, 16 enlisted men slightly wounded. 56 enlisted men missing.

I.R. 26 II Battalion for the period 23rd and 26th August

5th Coy

1 enlisted man killed. 5 enlisted men seriously wounded. 7 enlisted men slightly wounded.

6th Coy

7 enlisted men killed. 4 enlisted men seriously wounded. 13 enlisted men slightly wounded. 17 enlisted men wounded.

7th Coy

6 enlisted men killed. 12 enlisted men seriously wounded. 11 enlisted men slightly wounded. 3 enlisted men wounded. 2 enlisted men missing.

8th Coy

11 enlisted men killed. 5 enlisted men seriously wounded. 6 enlisted men slightly wounded. 67 enlisted men wounded. 5 enlisted men missing.

I have not found the III Battalion yet. I have more on I.R. 27 and I.R. 93 to post as soon as I can tabulate the losses. I need to go back to look further for the rest of the units and the full regiments.

These numbers were the ones sent in on the 10 day returns after the actions. it normally took 4 or more weeks to have them posted in the papers.

Ralph

[salesie]

There is a bit too much emphasis on trying to twist words, find absolutes where they cannot be made and trying to trip people up without much factual information being provided in support of any one point of view in some entries. Semantics is a wonderful thing but the essence of the thread appears to be the issue over casualties as reported, as estimated and as accepted in many post-war writings. Just where does the truth lie? Is any one source accurate?

This is a look at all of the details, not supporting one side or the other. While it can be said not every German regimental account is accurate but the same can be said for any account from any of the different countries involved. These were written by the men who witnessed the events in many cases. They were drawing from memory, written accounts, diaries, etc. and what a person saw and how it was perceived at the time will influence their impression of the events.

It would be nice to see some supporting information such as the last few posts where details were provided, statistics on losses, etc. were given and not one-upmanship as I have seen too often. I have located some casualty returns from the German side and I am in the process of determining how many men were originally reported as Killed, Severely wounded, etc. and while not the answer to every question it will provide some factual details as it pertains to the numbers of men reported as casualties at the time of the fighting. I will be posting some numbers as quickly as possible.

I would also tend to rely less upon post war memoirs of leaders from either side or from many books written since then unless the reader has a good idea of the use of original accounts, primary sources etc. After all, who wants to make their position look bad or their judgment look poor. All of the major players tend to over emphasize the positive and to under emphasize the negative.

More to follow shortly.

Ralph

Well, Ralph - I've no idea who's been playing semantics, unless you mean Jack in an earlier post when he gave dictionary definitions, but I was talking about misleading images, logical progression and continuity of plot. In other words, pointing out how writers "paint" images with words, and how those images can be made just as misleading as air-brushed photographs - more akin to semiotics than semantics.

Of course, this makes you right about memoirs etc. but, as I pointed out in an earlier post in answer to the same point, the extracts from the memoirs of Smith-Dorrien that I've been using are backed-up by a mountain of evidence from British eye-witness accounts, plus a few German ones thrown in for good luck, and they're all remarkably consistent in what they're saying with no fundamental contradictions, which I'm sure you'll agree is remarkable in itself. So, if you'd care to browse previous posts you'll see plenty of posts with "some supporting information such as the last few posts", but, fortunately or unfortunately depending on your point of view, they tend to be posts where logic is at odds with the bare statistics.

As for your soon to be posted figures, I'm glad you've added a caveat. After all, we all know about "lies, damn lies and statistics" as well as the old computer maxim "sh*t in then sh*t out", and we wouldn't want to give the impression that statistics are the be-all and end-all of any subject.

Cheers-salesie.

[shawnt63]

I have to echo what Ralph has said.

Eye witness accounts can often be very misleading as they come from a source not privy to the whole picture as Salesie pointed out regarding Jacks IR 72 CO. And a mountain of sources which echo the same picture is all well and good if they all cooperate on building the same story. But I think a sober re-look is necessary if there is evidence which points in another direction. For example if the casualties were so high, then why don't the cemeteries reflect this? not like the Germans didn't have time after the retreats to bury the dead? Also what would be the point of lying or trying to fabricate the truth in the Regimental histories?

To me there is always going to be three sides to a story (minimum), in this case, the British side, the German side and the truth somewhere in the middle. The German side has been almost unheard for a very long time - with the exception of a few "Eyewitness accounts", the British side has been told many times over and hence our present understanding of the battles in question. Now that new evidence is being brought forward from German war records, which have been attested and perhaps not 100 percent accurate, there is still good cause to have a sober look at what actually happened.

We know from reading in other areas of history that some of the old tales die hard (the Alamo, Custers Last stand, the fighting ability of the Canadians and British soldiers in 21st army group) but the story needs to be told in clear terms. Just as Zuber paints the picture of a near perfect German soldier on the Ardennes front, so too did the old writings build a super soldier of the BEF in 1914 - and probably for all the right reasons. But lets keep it real in terms of putting all the cards on the table and dissecting this as closely as possible to the truth. I think that all the questioning of Jacks German numbers needs to be redone for the British accounts, and I for one am always leary of the truth of eyewittnesses! Anyone out there an investigator or police officer? I used to carry that mantle in my old job and we were constantly warned of eye witnesses due to their limited vision/view.

Just some thoughts - please keep up the great flow of information

Shawn

[Ralph J. Whitehead]

Here are some further figures. In regard to the idea of figures lie and liars use figures I would say these are the best initial view of the actual losses suffered by the German army in the fighting near Mons, etc. These are simply the required returns after roll call, investigation, etc. into the losses suffered by the different regiments and as such were not subject to censorship, etc. These were simply the findings of the regiments that were sent in to the war office and then on to the publisher. If the losses were to be concealed or altered they would never have published the millions of names that appeared from Monday to Saturday, week after week with the exception of holiday periods.

There were corrections at a later date. Some MIA were found to be dead, others returned to the regiment, were treated in hospitals of neighboring units, etc. At least 1 in 6 of the severely wounded probably died as a result of their wounds, others would never serve again while some eventually returned. While corrections were made to everything from spelling of names to the birthplace listed for the most part the casualties reported on these lists proved to be accurate and matched closely the post war returns and investigations into the dead of many regiments. The Germans were quite good at paperwork and record keeping from what I have seen.

Just a few general remarks and I am finished for the night. In researching the records for my upcoming book 'The Other Side of the Wire' (I know, a blatant plug) I found several so-called translations made for the British Official History that I disagreed with as well as finding accounts that supported some popular ideas while others disagreed emphatically. I have also come across accounts that were hand picked for their supporting views and I can only guess at the reasons why contrary remarks, reports and diaries were either omitted or marginalized. Sometimes it is a bad thing only to read what you like to see and not look at all of the facts. Just look at the War in Iraq.

The idea of new German materials appearing more and more each year after almost 90 years of seeing the same old tired accounts and photos has added a new dimension to the study of the war. There are things out there hidden among the documents, letters and diaries that shed new light on the events of 1914-1918. Without looking at both sides in combination we will never get to the truth or the best possible answer for the truth we can find. When completing my research using period publications, regimental histories, feldpost letters, unpublished diaries and published accounts not widely known it was difficult at times to use some information because it was not corroborated in other sources.

There were some obvious areas where the post war writing was simply a reflection of the times (pre-1933) and prejudices while others matched historical records almost exactly.

Back to the units.

IR 27, 25th and 26th August 1914

1st Coy

4 enlisted men killed. 21 enlisted men severely wounded.

2nd Coy

1 enlisted man severely wounded

3rd Coy

1 enlisted man killed. 3 enlisted men severely wounded.

4th Coy

7 enlisted men killed. 12 enlisted men severely wounded. 1 enlisted man slightly wounded. 10 enlisted men missing.

5th Coy

2 enlisted men killed. 1 enlisted man slightly wounded. 1 enlisted man missing.

6th Coy

1 officer, 3 enlisted men killed. 1 enlisted man severely wounded. 1 officer, 7 enlisted men slightly wounded.

7th Coy

4 enlisted men killed. 1 enlisted man severely wounded.

8th Coy

4 enlisted men killed. 1 officer, 3 enlisted men slightly wounded. 1 enlisted man missing.

9th Coy

5 enlisted men killed. 5 enlisted men severely wounded. 1 enlisted man missing

11th Coy

2 enlisted men killed. 5 enlisted men severely wounded. 9 enlisted men missing.

IR 93 from 23 to 27 August 1914 (I Bn only)

Staff

Oberst von Arnim killed. Major von Huth severely wounded.

1st Coy

2 enlisted men killed. 1 enlisted man severely wounded. 23 enlisted men slightly wounded.

2nd Coy

9 enlisted men killed. 7 enlisted men severely wounded. 15 enlisted men slightly wounded. 3 enlisted men wounded.

3rd Coy

6 enlisted men killed. 7 enlisted men severely wounded. 22 enlisted men slightly wounded. 15 enlisted men wounded. 9 enlisted men missing.

4th Coy

43 enlisted men killed. 23 enlisted men missing

IR 26, III Battalion for 23 August 1914

9th Coy

1 enlisted man killed. 1 enlisted man severely wounded.

10th Coy

4 enlisted men killed. 1 enlisted man severely wounded. 5 enlisted men slightly wounded. 1 enlisted man wounded.

11th Coy

3 enlisted men killed. 3 enlisted men slightly wounded.

12th Coy

1 enlisted man killed. 2 enlisted men severely wounded. 2 enlisted men slightly wounded.

IR 93 from 23 to 26 August 1914 (III Battalion)

9th Coy

1 officer, 9 enlisted men killed. 1 officer, 20 enlisted men severely wounded. 1 officer, 37 enlisted men slightly wounded. 16 enlisted men missing.

10th Coy

8 enlisted men killed. 1 officer, 65 enlisted men severely wounded. 11 enlisted men missing.

11th Coy

3 enlisted men killed. 7 enlisted men severely wounded. 2 officers, 19 enlisted men slightlywounded. 13 enlisted men missing.

12th Coy

2 officers, 5 enlisted men killed. 9 enlisted men severely wounded. 1 officer, 50 enlisted men slightly wounded. 1 enlisted man wounded. 6 enlisted men missing.

MG Coy

2 officers killed. 3 enlisted men severely wounded. 1 officer, 9 enlisted men slightly wounded. 1 enlisted man wounded. 1 enlisted man missing.

Now to find the remainder of the units as well as comparing them to the regimental accounts. It looks as if some companies saw little action while others saw a great deal. It is a shame we cannot pin down exact dates for each casualty, only the lists that cover a single day as some do.

I have only added together the figures from the previous list that looks like 15 officers, 505 enlisted men from two of the three battalions of IR 26 were casualties. I have not added the additional list from this post or the others.

By looking at the numbers provided so far in the lists I cannot see where the 10-15,000 casualties or more can be substantiated. I hope to have all of the units in hand before too long and will post as they come up. If anyone would like I have their names, rank, birthplace and type of casualty at hand.

Ralph

P.S. When discussing semantics I was not referencing Jack Sheldon.

[Jack Sheldon]

Ralph

Thank you for putting together those interesting figures from the original returns. I do not have Rolls of Honour to hand for either IR 27 or IR 93, I am afraid, though I suspect, due to the detail within it, that there probably is one for IR 27 at least. The casualties you have identified for IR 27 relate to the night action at Landrecies 25/26 Aug 14. The regimental history declares the following:

Officers: KIA Lt Ewald; Wounded, Hptm Burchard, Lt v Kehler, Lt Reck and Lt Schmidt. Lt Bennecke slightly wounded and remained at duty.

OR: KIA 34; Wounded; 82; Missing 39.

It does not seem to have had any casualties prior to Landrecies and was so late onto the Le Cateau battlefield (after 4.00 pm 26 Aug) that its only contribution was to fire at some retreating British troops along the line Honnechy - Reumont at 900 metres. It certainly had no more casualties that day, continued the advance on 27 Aug and closed in on Peronne on 28 Aug.

I shall have a look at IR 93 next.

Jack

[Jack Sheldon]

This is the battle from the perspective of IR 93. I am working from what was intended to be Part 1 of the history, published in 1929. To the best of my knowledge, there never was a Part 2, so we know nothing about the detail of what happened to it after July 1916 and Part 1 does not have a Roll of Honour. It does, however, have an Annex V which is entitled 'Finalised Casualty Figures.' Those given for the attack on Beaumont/Inchy during the Battle of Le Cateau are given as KIA 118; Wounded 315, which agrees with what is written in the text. Ralph, please note that it also had casualties of KIA 13; Wounded 25 at Harchies on 23 Aug and KIA 14; Wounded 77 at Baisieux on 24 Aug.

In the early hours of 26 Aug, it was still north of Solesmes, eventually bringing up the rear of 8th Inf Div through that town sometime around 8.00 am. Because of the length of the columns, IR 153 and Fusilier Regt 36 were in action before it. As it passed through Viesly, it received shrapnel fire for the first time, but this did nothing. At 10.15 am the regiment was ordered to attack Beaumont, maintining contact with IR 153. At this time the regiment was in dead ground to Beaumont. It shook out in flat arable fields just south of Viesly making use of the dead ground: 1st Bn Right, 3rd Bn left of the Viesly - Beaumont road with 3rd Bn following up in a central position.

The early advance was untroubled, because of the ground but, as soon as the church tower came in view, the leading battalions came under heavy, accurate shrapnel fire. The battalions stopped advancing as they had and went over to advancing by bounds in waves. 2nd Bn was already taking casualties. Major Puttkamer, the CO had ridden ahead with his company commanders. He was seriously wounded and Hptm von Schlieben slightly. As soon as the battalions arrived on the crest of the hill before Beaumont, they came under heavy, accurate shrapnel fire, 'which increased to especially heavy every time a new wave crossed the crest line.' There were significant casualties here.

1st Bn moved through the grounds of Clermont Chateau (1 km east of Bethencourt) to make contact with IR 153, working its way forward in short bounds through rifle and machine gun fire towards the western exit of Beaumont and the adjacent road. The 3rd Bn passed some of its numbers through the park as well, which immediately became the target for more artillery fire. Making their way through thick undergrowth slowly, the companies 'suffered considerable casualties'. Hptm v Scheven, commander 11th Coy was killed here.

Meanwhile the regiment pressed on with its attack, despatching 2nd Bn to the left to fill the gap to Fusilier Regt 36 somewhat. By 11.45, the leading elements were within 400 metres of the British and were supported by overhead fire from two platoons of the Machine Gun Coy on the crest line (four guns). Major Huth, commander 1st Bn was seriously wounded during this advance, but his companies, using the ground, closed up to the road by midday. 1st and 4th Coys, again using covered approaches got forward a further 200 metres to a sunken road where they claim to have brought well aimed fire down on the British to keep their heads down. 2nd and 3rd Bns were moving through Beaumont by this time, but attempts by 9th and 12th Coys to storm the British main position, together with elements of IR 153, failed completely. The commanders of both coys, Hptm Theinert and Oberleutnant v Koenig respectively were both killed at this point. The regimental commander Oberst Louis von Arnim was also killed by a direct hit with a shrapnel ball at this moment too (He is believed to be the senior fatality on either side during the battle).

Really that is as far as they got until the British started to pull out between 5.00 and 6.00 pm, but of course there was much firing on both sides. IR 93 also claims to have done a great deal of damage to the British as they pulled out - particularly due to the fire of Oberleutnant Heinz's MGs, which had been placed in the roofs of houses in the village. This version of events keys in well with the overall account of 1 Lincolns I posted earlier, but the British version says that casualties during the withdrawal were not heavy. The IR 93 casualties broke down a little further into KIA 6 offr, 112 OR; Wounded 9 offr and 306 OR. It appears that most were caused by good work from the Royal Artillery. The following day the regiment set off on the march again at 7.00 am, closing up to the Somme by the evening of 28 Aug 14. So this is the fifth account so far which says that the infantry of IV Corps, though having taken casualties, were all regarded as fully battleworthy. A consistent pattern seems to be emerging.

Jack

[salesie]

Shawn,

The points you raise about cemeteries and the reasons why doubt has been cast on the veracity of German Regimental Histories have been fully covered in earlier posts. Also, as far as I can see, no one has approached this topic in anything other than a sober manner. Shall we not challenge evidence simply because it is new - how can its validity be tested if not looked at with a critical eye? Not to look at it with a critical eye would be to simply assume that it is true because it is new, would it not?

Ralph,

The figure of 10-15000 German casualties at Le Cateau is a figure that Jack estimated when he was playing semantics with the word stupendous, no one else has mentioned a total figure. That said, let's get to the bottom line before we all disappear in the fog of war - in that, we have so many posts with scattered pieces of information about different German Regiments that it has become nigh-on impossible to keep track. So, how many, and which German Regiments were actually at Le Cateau? And don't forget that German infantry regiments were not alone - there were plenty of cavalry units, Jaegers, artillery and support units involved in the action.

Cheers-salesie.

[Robert Dunlop]

British Attack - FSR 1909, Chap VII, The Battle, The Attack Sect 104, page 113:

The general principle is that the enemy must be engaged in sufficient strength to pin him to his ground, and to wear down his power of resistance [1], while the force allotted to the decisive attack must be as strong as possible. [2]

[1] Out of interest, when we read Bloem’s account, it appears that the British are the ones achieving this and not the Germans – who, of course, are the attacking force.

[2] I would say that the second half of this sentence is the one that the Germans put more emphasis on, and you will see why when I refer to AH Atteridge and The War the Infantry Knew.

Tom, thanks again for taking the time to post the details from the Field Service Regulations. Before discussing the points that you have made, it is worth considering how the battle of Mons unfolded. In a previous post here, you noted that the German attack on Mons was a "deliberate attack". It depends on what is meant by "deliberate" but from the accounts that I have read, it was not an attack whereby the German forces took their time to line up across the British front, get everything into order, and then launch a carefully co-ordinated attack across the whole front. In part this related to the direction of the German advance, which was dictated by First Army's position on the outer rim of the German wheel. Von Kluck's forces were travelling in a south-westerly direction, which meant that they struck the BEF outposts sequentially, starting with the Nimy-Obourg salient. As we have seen from the British accounts, the German IX Corps, which made first contact with the Nimy-Obourg salient, quickly deployed its artillery and created a strong covering force that enabled the infantry to then push forward. The infantry, accompanied by 'boldly handled' machine guns, got deeper into the British defensive position, penetrating as far the southern outskirts of Mons and Hyon (which had been the site of a British 8th Brigade Headquarters at the start of the day). This move by the German 18th Infantry Division (more specifically elements of the 84th and 86th Infantry Regiments) posed a really serious threat to the BEF. At 1.40 pm, for example, the British 3rd Division received a message noting "Royal Fusiliers... are now retiring There are no troops in CUESMES Can a reserve be sent there" - Cuesmes being southwest of Mons and the site of 9th Brigade Headquarters. Then a message "from: 3rd Div [timed] 2.35 pm 23 [August, to:] 2nd Corps. All reports go to show that enemys main attack is against the MONS Salient AAA The troops there are suffering casualties and enemy has crossed the canal AAA My 7th Bde is occupying the position I indicated and I have no troops available to further strengthen the BOIS-LA-HAUT locality." And another example: "Message from: Second Corps [timed] 7.22 pm Twenty-third [August, to:] 3rd Division. Report if there is immediate danger of centre of Corps being pierced."

Bloem's account must be seen in the context of the evolving German attack, the first thrust of which had enabled the Germans to cross the canal in the salient. While this was happening, the German IIIrd Army Corps came into action, with the 6th Infantry Division attacking towards Jemappes and the 5th Infantry Division advancing further west towards St Ghislain. The latter was Bloem's parent division. Elements of the 6th Infantry Division managed to cross the canal and, as was observed in an earlier post, quickly exploited this bridgehead by pushing large numbers of infantry over the canal. Some penetrated directly south nearly as far as Frameries, where they were able to take BEF forces in the flank in the vicinity of Paturages. At the same time, German infantry began pushing towards the now vulnerable right flank of the BEF forces holding the line of the canal to the west. It was these BEF forces that Bloem's infantry company attacked.

Tom, you are quite correct to emphasize that in this area of the attack, the BEF infantry held the upper hand to the front of their units. Unlike the situation around Nimy and Obourg, the German 5th Infantry Division's artillery did not gain fire superiority, at least as far as the canal bank was concerned. The BEF musketry supported by well-placed enfilading machine gun fire did not stop the advance of the Germans at distance, but did slow the advance (including the rear guard action around Tertres) and then bring the German infantry attack to a shuddering halt at around 150-200 yds from the canal bank. Excellent work, no doubt. The threat, however, lay not to the front of these units. While the German IV Army Corps was steadily making its way southwest and then south towards the exposed left flank of the BEF, the real problem lay to the immediate right of battalions facing the German 5th Infantry Division. So long as Bloem and his colleagues kept up a degree of pressure, at the very least maintaining the threat of an immediate follow-up if the defenders of the canal chose to retire (which is what happened further east), then the BEF units were pinned to some degree. Not by German rifle and artillery fire per se, but by the mere presence of a very large force. So long as the right flank of the BEF 5th Division held, then the pressure being exerted by Bloem's parent division was not sufficient to force the canal. If the German 6th Infantry Division had been able to roll up from the east... but they didn't, at least not to any significant degree, ie sufficient to destroy significant numbers of British companies or battalions. This was in no small part due to the way in which the BEF units further east were able to disrupt the power of the German advance and to minimise the threat before it got away on them.

Robert

[phil andrade]

Thank you Ralph. Here's a quick summary of your tabulations:

The two battalions of IR 26 suffered 533 casualties, of whom 54 were killed, 355 wounded and 124 missing. The third battalion lost only 9 killed and 15 wounded.

For IR 93 there is what appears a freakish anomaly in 4 Coy, which lists 43 killed (!) no wounded (!) and 23 missing. That, I take it, is an error?

If two battalions suffer 533 casualties, what percentage does that equate to of their strength? Am I right in assuming that 1 battalion= 1,000 men, and , by implication, 1 Company =250 men?

A significant feature of the compilations is that Jack's figure for IR 27 is higher than the one that you cite : your figure states 33 killed, 63 wounded and 22 missing, totalling 118, while Jack's is 35 killed, 86 wounded and 39 missing- for a total of 160, a difference of more than 35%.

Leaving aside 4 Coy of IR 93, which would have been pretty well annihilated if the figure for killed is correct and a notional number of wounded is added, these casualties, although significant, do not bear out the image of the fighting as I had formerly perceived,

Phil.

[Jack Sheldon]

Salesie

I suggested 10,000 during an earlier part of the discussion when we were trying to reach closure on what Edmonds meant by the use of the word 'stupendous' to describe the German casualties in the British Official History and what Smith Dorrien meant by 'casualties far greater than ours.' I also invited other suggestions. Last week, for the first time, I came across published figures from a British source, though I did not say where they were from. For the record, on p 82 of Mons, Osprey Campaign Series No 49 by David Lomas, Oxford 1997, the following appears with regard to Le Cateau: 'II Corps was severely mauled at Le Cateau. The official casualty figures show Smith Dorrien lost 7,812 men and 38 guns. German losses are not known. No figures are available and estimates range from 15,000 to 30,000 dead, wounded and missing. Without doubt the casualties were very severe.' Lomas does not state whose estimates those are and I do not know either, but I presume that they were not picked out of the sky. Somebody else may know the answer.

For ease of reference; in particular, for those joining the discussion, here is a repetition of the list of the German Infantry Regiments committed at Le Cateau (all from IV Corps)

7th Infantry Division: 13 Bde IRs 26 (two battalions only) and 66

8th Infantry Division: 15 Bde Fus R 36 and IR 93; 16 Bde IRs 72 and 153

The regiments of 14 Bde of 7th Infantry Division (IRs 27 and 165) were delayed by the clash the previous night at Landrecies and did not reach the area of the British 5th Div until after the British had withdrawn. Their contribution to the battle was almost nil.

The only other infantry to be involved in the fighting were four Jaeger batalions subordinated to Higher Cavalry Commander 2. They engaged regiments of the British 4th Division.

Total infantry deployed: 12 battalions, all nominally about 1,000 men strong, but probably slightly lower due to previous casualties, illness or injury. Total deployment around 11,000 men.

To this must be added the dismounted element of those cavalry regiments of HKK 2 which were actually engaged against the British 3rd and 4th Divs. Most of the cavalry contributed little and a large percentage spent the day more or less idly in the area of Cambrai.

Jack

[phil andrade]

A twenty five per cent casualty rate amongst those eleven thousand would produce a casualty list in the order of 2,750 for the Germans. Three thousand is the outer limit, it would appear. How strange that SD thought his corps had lost fifteen thousand men ! Perhaps not so strange after all, given the desperate circumstances.... a wing and aprayer, if ever there was one.. Of all battles, this one at Le Cateau has been exceptionally distorted in statistical terms.

Another word about German IR 93 : Ralph's figures exclude Coys 5-8, where were they? Even if we allow for the hapless Coy4, the total in the tabulation - for killed - falls significantly short of the figure of 118 for killed at Le Cateau alone, which Jack cites from the regimental history. I note that Ralph states that about one in six of the severely wounded Germans died; also that there are no missing in the regimental history figure that Jack uses. Might it be that the regimental history, in this case, allowed for died of wounds, and for missing who were subsequently presumed killed, that were not included in the initial ten day reports?

Phil.

[Robert Dunlop]

British Attack - FSR 1909, Chap VII, The Battle, The Attack Sect 105, page 116:

Para 4

[…] When once the firing line comes under effective fire, its further advance will be greatly assisted by covering fire from the rear and by the mutual support which neighbouring units in the firing line afford one another. All leaders, down to those from the smallest units, must endeavour to apply, at all stages of the fight, this principle of mutual support [1]. Aided in this way the infantry will fight its way forward to close range, and, in conjunction with the artillery and machine guns, will endeavour to gain superiority of fire [2]. This will involve the gradual building up of the firing line in good fire positions, usually within close range of the enemy. Here it is to be expected that there will be a prolonged and severe fire fight, during which each side will try to exhaust the enemy’s power of endurance and force him to use up his reserves, while keeping his own intact.

[1] Same for defence. Having mutual support is absolutely essential, which is why the salient of Nimy was so difficult to defend. But holding Nimy is not essential (or practical), hence the fallback positions, with better fields of fire. But, it is better to hold it for a while, than to surrender it wholesale before the battle begins.

[2] Again, when I refer to Atteridge, you will see that the Germans will try to achieve this by having more men per yard (which they will try to maintain), and, at times, by having their machine guns with the attacking troops.

Tom, before tackling your point about defence, it is important to emphasize that the attacks perpetrated by the German 6th and 18th Divisions illustrated this point about mutual support very well. Turning now to your observation about the holding of Nimy. The idea of defending Mons and the canal came to the fore quite early, at least two days before the actual battle took place. In the advance to contact, the BEF's 1st Cavalry Division led the way. It left the Maubeuge area first but even before its advanced recon elements made any contact with von Kluck's forces, the cavalry were ordered to take a defensive position in the area of Mons on the 21st August. This order was based on information received by GHQ's Intelligence Section that '7000' German cavalry were on their way from Nivelles to Mons. Contact was made with the German cavalry patrols on the 22nd August, during which time the BEF 1st and 2nd Army Corps were taking over the defensive positions around Mons, extending these defenses to the west along the canal and strengthening the defensive line to the southeast that had been thinly held by the cavalry around St Symphorien, Harmignies and down towards Givry.

2nd Corps issued their Operation Order No. 4 on the 22nd August. It noted the close proximity of "two hostile cavalry columns" and ordered that the outposts' objectives were the "line GIVRY (inclusive)-HARMIGNIES-BOIS LA HAUTE-NIMY (inclusive) to be occupied by 12 noon – NIMY (exclusive) and the line of the canal Westward via MARIETTE as far as the BRIDGES S. of OE in POMMEROEUIL (inclusive) to be occupied by 1 pm". This was a slight change from previous OO (which had not given details of the line to be held) with the specific inclusion of Nimy but not rest of the Nimy-Obourg salient as Obourg lay north of the line. Later in the day "about 5 PM" the 8th Brigade received orders from 3rd Division to "throw the line forward and Northwards thus: left at NIMY, holding the canal bridges (i) immediately North of NIMY (ii) at Lock No 5 (iii) near OBOURG STA." In a follow-up "Message from: Second Corps [timed] 2.30 am 23/8/14 [to:] 3rd Division. Should an attack be made during the night or early morning troops will hold their ground. Outpost line will be strengthened as much as possible in the time available. Bridges will be prepared for demolition. Outpost line of 3rd Division may have its right at HARMIGNIES as directed in order if you prefer it if not already there. Acknowledge." The intent here was that the outpost line should be strengthened and held.

The 3rd Division acknowledged with a message "[timed] 9.40 am 23 [August, to:] 2nd Corps. Right of our Outpost line is at the building half mile N of HARMIGNIES St. and ... on to NIMY... AAA This line is occupied by Outposts only but all preparations have been made for occupying it in strength AAA". Tom, you are quite right to mention that fallback positions were essential, and the BEF made preparations for this, as we have seen in previous posts. Smith-Dorrien's order seems clear, however, and placed a strong emphasis on holding the outpost line. This point was made again in a message from 2nd Corps Message at 7 am to 3rd Division on the morning of the battle, when the division was advised to select a "suitable defensive position to South of MONS... but it must be understood that canal line and Outpost line must be strengthened and held as long as possible AAA Acknowledge".

Although 8th Infantry Brigade lost their war diary and associated documents in the retreat, the reconstructed version suggests that 8th Brigade responded to the German 18th Infantry Division's attack by attempting to reinforce the 4/Middlesex position: "About 9 AM [on August 22nd] an attack by infantry and artillery was commenced from the North side of the Canal against the 4/Middx trenches guarding the bridge. G.O.C., who was in the vicinity at the time, answered an appeal for reinforcements by sending up some of 2/R. Irish Regt & a party of R.E. into these trenches. Subsequently he answered a further call for reinforcements by sending up the remainder of 2/R. Irish Regt to reinforce 4/Middx R... about 12 Noon." This version of the events in 8th Brigade's sector accords with the information from the relevant battalion war diaries.

The situation in 9th Brigade's sector, which included Nimy, appears to have been somewhat different. The brigade's war diary has a lot of detail. Pertinent to this issue of mutual support, 9th Brigade issued an order by message just after 1 pm on August 22nd. The message was addressed to the frontline battalions and confirmed that "the line of the canal is to be the line of resistance 4/R FUS will hold all crossings from NIMY inclusive to including letter S of STA ¾ miles W & S of word MONS". In a fascinating supplement, however, 9th Brigade issued highly confidential 'Special Instructions' at 7.15 pm, which stated that "if attacked the outposts are to hold their ground as long as possible but they will not be reinforced from Units in CUESMES". This represented a different approach from 8th Brigade. The rest of the 'Special Instructions' went on to list in detail how all of the elements of 9th Brigade would retire and by what routes, "in case of serious attack...[not otherwise defined]". "Verbal Instructions" were received from "Major Cory, G.S.O. 3, 3rd Division by telephone at 10.45 pm, 22nd Aug.", ie the night before the battle. A detailed record of these instructions was attached to the war diary. The first paragraph of the record reiterates the fact that significant German forces were heading south and 'an attack from the N.E. is possible'. Points 2 and 3 are extremely interesting.

"2. Maj. Gen. intends (if this eventuality should occur) to take up a position facing North East.

3. 9th Brigade must therefore be prepared to collect all troops in the area and move to CIPLY Station as a Reserve to the Division. The Outposts would be relieved by Cavalry and Cyclists."

At 11.55 pm, 9th Brigade's Major sent out the following message:

"1. Reliable reports point to the extreme probability of an attack by the Germans in Force at an early hour tomorrow. In this case the Division will take up a line very much as described for the Brigade in secret instructions issued this evening.

2. The 9th Infy Bde moving into a position in reserve about CIPLY Rly Station.

With a view to the above

a. All units are to be ready to move at 15 minutes notice from 4.15 am tomorrow onwards.

b. The retirement of the Brigade will be carried out in the same as described in the secret instructions referred to except that units will move by the routes ordered to a place of assembly about CIPLY Station instead of the deployd line as given and arrangements will be made by 3 Division for the outposts to be relieved by Cavalry or Cyclists."

FWIIW, I believe that the above quotes cast an interesting backlight on the events of 23rd August in the Nimy-Obourg salient. Whatever we might think about the importance of holding the salient, there was a clear difference in the way that the two British brigades planned to defend it and then executed on those plans. Given that the salient lay across the junction of two brigade commands, then mutual support was vital for the British defence. As we have seen, the repercussions were not just relevant to the unfortunate companies and battalions that bore the brunt of this locally, but they carried significant implications for the whole of 2nd Corps.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

For the record, on p 82 of Mons, Osprey Campaign Series No 49 by David Lomas, Oxford 1997, the following appears with regard to Le Cateau: 'II Corps was severely mauled at Le Cateau. The official casualty figures show Smith Dorrien lost 7,812 men and 38 guns. German losses are not known. No figures are available and estimates range from 15,000 to 30,000 dead, wounded and missing. Without doubt the casualties were very severe.'

Jack, I had forgotten about this source. It is probably one of the most widely read accounts of the Mons and Le Cateau battles, being part of the popular Osprey Campaign Series. This only serves to emphasize Shawn's point about why it is so important to pick up on the German sources. Not that a lot of this material was unavailable at the time when the BOH was published, as we know from the list of references. Edmonds quotes from 'Die Schlacht bei Mons', as you have noted before, but I didn't get anything like the same impression of what happened until I finally took it down off my shelf and began reading it a few days ago.

Robert

[salesie]

Enough is enough - even I can't take anymore of this nonsense.

Whenever such figures are posted we see discrepancies highlighted between stats from different sources, an example of which is Phil's latest post, and this is not an isolated case of, "why is that different to so and so's", "where are the figures for such and such a unit", "if we extrapolate this and guesstimate that and average this and assume that then we can come to an accurate estimate" etc.

What we have in reality are disseminators of German casualty figures, who, throughout this thread, have started off by giving reasons as to why their figures may not be accurate then go on to tell us that they can see no reason why their figures should not be taken as fact - that is an oxymoron, plain and simple, and every disseminator of such figures has the same contradictory foundation to their argument.

I regard all of these figures as decidedly iffy on the following grounds:

a. An agreement early in the thread that, in the final analysis, casualty figures are irrelevant, in that the most important aspect of these actions lay in their strategic importance. So, if irrelevant, then do they not automatically become "iffy" - simply because if taken at face value they become misleading?

b. The disseminators' own, carefully worded, health warnings about their sources (in this thread and in other works).

c. A mountain of eye-witness, extraordinarily consistent, evidence contradicting these figures (many of which have been detailed in this thread).

d. And for the reasons I've personally detailed in earlier posts i.e. on the basis of cause and effect, these figures throw up a paradox, a paradox which has yet to be adequately explained away by the disseminators of such figures.

Am I the only one who sees all this as "Lies, Damn Lies and Statistics?

Cheers-salesie.

[Halder]

Am I the only one who sees all this as "Lies, Damn Lies and Statistics?

Yes...

There is no conspiracy here. There are no historians who stomp around in their Pickelhaube or Stahlhelm, saluting the Reichskriegsflagge trying to demonstrate that the glorious army of the Kaiser was actually victorious and we Brits got it all wrong.

There are, however, historians who painstakingly go through the records, through German regimental histories written in hideous Fraktur, who spend hours in the archives checking and double checking figures and accounts. They have taken considerable time to translate and post detailed accounts - it took me an hour alone to work through the WW2 figures to demonstrate that official figures can be wrong through no attempt at deliberate massaging rather pressures of time, pressures of battle etc. To have them dismissed out of hand is, at the very least, rather galling.

I wish I could add more to the debate, but I am a Wehrmacht historian principally who dabbles de temps en temps with the Great War. But I share with Jack, Paul and Ralph a deep passion that the accounts of both World Wars have been badly one-sided - at times to the point of being misleading. Jack in particular has done WW1 historiography a great service - and this is widely acknowledged - with his studies of the German Army on the Western Front.

Mons has assumed an almost mythical status in the British image of WW1. Surely a detailed account and study from the German viewpoint would be more than welcome to show the battle from the "other side of the hill". I for one have been taken aback by the detail provided in this thread and rather humbled that so many people have taken so much time to shed light where it is dark for no personal or financial gain, purely to enlighten.

We should encourage these efforts, not call for a guillotine on them...

[Ralph J. Whitehead]

'Another word about German IR 93 : Ralph's figures exclude Coys 5-8, where were they? Even if we allow for the hapless Coy4, the total in the tabulation - for killed - falls significantly short of the figure of 118 for killed at Le Cateau alone, which Jack cites from the regimental history. I note that Ralph states that about one in six of the severely wounded Germans died; also that there are no missing in the regimental history figure that Jack uses. Might it be that the regimental history, in this case, allowed for died of wounds, and for missing who were subsequently presumed killed, that were not included in the initial ten day reports? Phil.'

I would like to state again that the entries I have made so far are only preliminary. As I stated the different regiments reported their losses over a period of time so all might not appear on any one given day. It seems that most were reported by battalions and some will cover different periods of time.

From reading several recent posts it seems some members are jumping the gun and need some patience when it comes to research into a new field. No one as far as I can tell has ever looked at these sources when tabulating the original loss numbers so it is extremely premature to announce errors, conflicting numbers, etc. Just be patient.

Until all of the lists are located and entered there can be no real comparison. The ones listed above are partial returns and I hope to have all of them shortly. My reader is out of service so I am forced to use the local library system to view the lists. The ones found above were taken from about two weeks of Prussian lists and there are obviously more to come.

In regard to missing figures in the lists as opposed to regimental accounts. The regimental author had the full history of the losses after the war was over so the missing in August 1914 would have been categorized into killed, wounded, captured, sick, injured, returned to the regiment, etc. It was a matter of time needed to ensure all of the men were accounted for. If you see missing next to a name by the end of the war there is a good chance he is either buried somewhere on the battlefield or buried in a grave marked 'unknown'.

My estimate of 1 in 6 of the missing being killed was taken from a general average of the casualty returns and corrections made to the lists in the following months from the regiments of the XIV Reserve Corps. The averages were fairly steady in each regiment for a 2 year period. While this is no guarantee that these men suffered a similar percentage of dead it cannot be checked easily until I look through about two years of casualty lists for each regiment. This is something I will get to over time and add my findings as they are found.

These corrections on these lists could take the form of advising the public that a soldier who had been listed as severely wounded or in some cases slightly wounded had in fact subsequently died from his wounds or in some cases were actually sick and were being treated or had in fact returned uninjured to the regiment after being separated.

As to the one company with the high numbers of dead and missing and no other apparent losses it will take further review to see if any corrections were made.

The point is be patient, all of the numbers are needed to look at the losses that were reported. Jack has made good use of post war numbers that were taken from the existing records at the time and these filled entire archives. Every detail possible was recorded on each soldier and the loss of the primary resources from destruction in WWII is unfortunate. However, it does not change the facts that the sources was at hand for the men who wrote the regimental histories and they made good use of it.

As an example of the details found in one regimental record, IR 153, I will provide a capsule of the details in the text for the chapter Mons-Le Cateau, 24 August to 26 August 1914.

On 24 August only two battalions were involved in the events of this day, the II and III. There battle strengths were:

II 25 officers, 965 men.

III 24 officers, 994 men

Later records show the I Bn had 20 officers, 931 men while the MG Coy had 4 officers, 93 men and the regimental staff consisted of 5 officers and 53 men making the regiment 78 officers, 3,036 men,

The losses suffered on this day were the first the regiment suffered in the war. This in itself and the subsequent losses in the following two days were the first the men of the regiment had ever seen personally for the most part. There were probably veterans of previous fighting in Colonial Africa and in some cases the Boxer Uprising at the turn of the century but for the most part none had seen death nor experienced the death or wounding of their friends. They also came across enemy dead and wounded as well and captured a number of prisoners during this time, all new experiences for the men as well.

The II Bn lost 2 dead (Reservist Künzel, 5th Coy, Reservist Hunger, 8th Coy) and 5 wounded.

The III Bn lost 7 dead (Tambour Grabolle, Reservists Patzschke, Schomburg, Rühl and Horbei 10th Coy and Viefeldwebel Döhner, Musketiers Walther I 11th Coy) and 25 wounded.

On 25 August the three battalions were involved as they were on the following day, 26 August

At about 3 p.m. the first officer to be a casualty was the commander of the 8/153, Leutnant von Bentivegni who was wounded.

On 26 August the regiment lost the largest number of men for the 3 day period. The final losses reported after the fighting were:

2 officers killed and 1 officer died of wounds (Leutnant Devos 3rd Coy, Leutnant von Wangelin 6th Coy KIA. Leutnant Messerschmidt 9th Coy received a fatal head shot).

5 officers wounded (Major von Behr, Leutnants Schmidt, Galle, Heht and Stoltzenburg)

I Bn: 9 enlisted men killed, 56 enlisted men wounded.

II Bn: 25 enlisted men killed, 98 enlisted men wounded.

III Bn: 14 enlisted men killed, 79 enlisted men wounded.

MG Coy: 2 enlisted men wounded.

Charts at the end of the book list the dates of the heaviest losses suffered by the regiment during the war. The numbers of wounded and dead and the numbers of officers reported as casualties matches these figures.

The next step is to locate the lists where the losses were reported and see how it matches the regimental accounts.

All I can say is wait for the complete lists before making comparisons and remember that the fate of the missing as reported after the action was usually determined by the end of the war so this number will probably never match the numbers provided at the time the losses occurred.

Ralph

P.S. In regard to other German units being involved in these actions and accounting for their efforts and losses I will also be checking for them. However, I can say from previous experience in looking through hundreds of lists from different periods the numbers of losses attributed to cavalry and artillery units is generally negligible. However, in the attempt at being as accurate as possible I will include these as well but as said before, the infantry bore the brunt of the fighting and the losses.

[Tom A McCluskey]

Robert,

I will get back to you soon with respect to your 2 earlier points. However, first I just want to clarify some more issues concerning my last post (FSR and the German & British way of doing things). One is the Prussian military's way of doing things. I think A Hilliard Atteridge covers this quite well in his book The German Army in War, (printed 1915). He goes some way to explain some of the legacy ethos of Frederick the Great, and how the German version of Mission Command developed - we see this on Page 36: "...no subordinate could be allowed to plead as a reason for failure that he had followed the strict letter of his orders". The level of mission command that the Germans had may have appeared like quickly-adapted field tactics to the soldiers of 1915 and 1916*, but the truth is the Germans had no option but to try something different as failing to achieve the mission after plan 1 (advancing en masse), was not an option. During the 1st Ypres, we see the same tactics used again, from: The War the Infantry Knew, page 81 (24th October 1914):

Enemy shelling and sniping were much heavier than yesterday, and never ceased all day. In the morning, when we were all digging, the Germans were seen coming over the Fromelles Ridge and down its slope. 'I** counted eleven lines in open order. We lost them when they got to the bottom of the ridge because of the high hedges.' We were digging again when, suddenly, at 1.30, they appeared from behind the hedge lining the Ver Touquet road. They deployed smartly and came across the beet-fields. At once our men began to fire rapid, and our machine guns opened. Failing to advance in line, they tried to come on by short rushes of sections. Our fire stopped them. Where a platoon of A two or three they swung off. Everywhere they fell back and started to dig in, with snipers in all of the houses to cover them. 'This*** was not the real effort, so we got on with our own digging. At 3.30 they shrapnelled our line, my man wounded rather badly. Men tired. It's cold and wet, and my Burberry is bust.' No. 3 Platoon had its first man killed. The sergeant 'had warned them against looking over the top, but there seemed to be no fear in them. This man was looking through a pair of German field-glasses he had picked up in Steenwerck, and inviting the "------- dratsabs**** to come out and fight.'" At 6.30, when it was becoming dark, something like "the real effort" was made, without achieving anything. '8 p.m. attacked, attack beaten off. We send out patrol. 11p.m. Hun again. Seven got through on our immediate left: promptly done in.' The brunt of the day's action was borne by the right of the Battalion, but no details can be given. The casualty return is 2 killed, 1 officer and 14 men wounded.

* By this time, the British are in no longer fielding an Army of experience (unlike the Regular and Reserve soldiers of the 1914 BEF, who, I don't think, would have seen anything too radical in the German attack techniques).

** Stockwell

*** Davies

**** Anagram of: illegitemate children

Anyway, I hope this adds something to the background ethos of the army and why not a lot had changed even 2 month later.

Aye

Tom McC

[Steven Broomfield]

The 1st RB: the battalion was west of Caudry, south west of Beauvois, with Quarry Knoll behind them. They stood to at 0400. Outposts were soon driven in by enemy infantry and cavalry - a battalion of Somerset LI sent 2 companies to Fontaine (to the south of Beauvois and to the right of the RB) to cover the retirement of transport; the other 2 battalions of the bde (Hampshires and E Lancs) were in a defensive line on and behind the Quarry Knoll, with the Hants on the left with their flank across the railway line to the south.

Following instruction the RB retired onto the Knoll; up to that point most of their activity had been in response to German shell fire and mg fire, but once they vacated their positions, German infantry appeared to occupy them. The Bn was put into a reserve position in a sunken road running across the Knoll (from west to east), but the retirement of the SLI companies from Fontaine and the driving-in of the Hampshires outposts soon brought them into action.

Indeed, at one point A, B and C Coys (on the Knoll) fixed swords, ready to meet an attack, but (according to the history), their rifle fire "was too suggestive to the Germans of their own machine guns."

However, the loss (on the left flank) of high ground by 12th Bde, and the fact that 7th bde was being pushed out of Caudry made the position difficult: at one point C Coy had to counter-attack some quarry pits on the Knoll.

At about 1330 there was a lull, and - bu chance - the four battalion commanders met at Bde HQ (the Brigadier, Hunter Weston, being absent), and a counter attack was suggested, but by 1400 the German line had been reinforced and artillery fire broke out with fresh intensity. An attack on the front of the RB by the Germans ("a determined effort to advance in force"), but was a "complete failure" due to the "withering" fire of the three companies in the sunken road, and the battalin's m.g.'s to the south.

Round about 1500, the loss of Caudry made the RB's position untenable, and Hunter-Weston ordered a withdrawal to Ligny. Orders for this were passed easily to the Hampshires; the E Lancs were mostly at Ligny already, and two companies of the SLI were with their CO, as was one company ("I") of the RB. But two companies of the SLI and three of the RB (A, B and C) were still under heavy fire on the Knoll, where orders seem not to have been received.

Therefore, the withdrawal of most units was covered by the RB and SLI, until the office in command on the spot (Maj Salmon of the RB) realised the position was lost and ordered a sauve qui peut retirement on Ligny.

There is an interesting passage:"The enemy, eager to turn the position, yet unprepared to risk a rush on the resolute Riflemen whose deadly fire was steadily maintained, contented himself with creeping in on all sides until he had established himself withoin about one hundred yards of the position."

The final sentence of the chapter reads: "Three Jaeger battalions and a cavalry brigade had been held at bay by three shattered companies of British Riflemen."

Losses in the 1st RB are given as 8 officers and 'some' 350 other ranks. of these, only one officer was killed, but it is noted that "The bulk were too severely wounded to be moved when the time came to fall back on Ligny, and......were left in the care of (The Medical Officer) in the sunken road."

[Tom A McCluskey]

These 2 pages will help to qualify pages 86 and 87. It explains the German desire to go to a dispersed system of attack (formed from ideas gained in the Franco-Prussian war), which was countered by the arguments that there would be shirkers; there would be no order; and cohesiveness would be lost etc. Pages: 86 and 87 go on to explain that: to keep the cohesiveness; to hit hard; and to bring many rifles to the fore, the mass of shoulder-to-shoulder advance should take place. This may also go some way to explaining the 'firing from the hip', whilst advancing - with the German thought being the mass of firepower that it would issue?

Aye

Tom McC

[Tom A McCluskey]

I would also like to return to another issue that has been dismissed. However, Atteridge witnessed German manouevres pre-war. He mentions German machine-guns in the firing line:

Aye

Tom McC

[phil andrade]

From reading several recent posts it seems some members are jumping the gun and need some patience when it comes to research into a new field. No one as far as I can tell has ever looked at these sources when tabulating the original loss numbers so it is extremely premature to announce errors, conflicting numbers, etc. Just be patient.

Apologies, Ralph. My intention is to honour your contribution, not criticise it.

Phil.

[salesie]

There is no conspiracy here. There are no historians who stomp around in their Pickelhaube or Stahlhelm, saluting the Reichskriegsflagge trying to demonstrate that the glorious army of the Kaiser was actually victorious and we Brits got it all wrong.

There are, however, historians who painstakingly go through the records, through German regimental histories written in hideous Fraktur, who spend hours in the archives checking and double checking figures and accounts. They have taken considerable time to translate and post detailed accounts - it took me an hour alone to work through the WW2 figures to demonstrate that official figures can be wrong through no attempt at deliberate massaging rather pressures of time, pressures of battle etc. To have them dismissed out of hand is, at the very least, rather galling.

I wish I could add more to the debate, but I am a Wehrmacht historian principally who dabbles de temps en temps with the Great War. But I share with Jack, Paul and Ralph a deep passion that the accounts of both World Wars have been badly one-sided - at times to the point of being misleading. Jack in particular has done WW1 historiography a great service - and this is widely acknowledged - with his studies of the German Army on the Western Front.

Mons has assumed an almost mythical status in the British image of WW1. Surely a detailed account and study from the German viewpoint would be more than welcome to show the battle from the "other side of the hill". I for one have been taken aback by the detail provided in this thread and rather humbled that so many people have taken so much time to shed light where it is dark for no personal or financial gain, purely to enlighten.

We should encourage these efforts, not call for a guillotine on them...

Yet again, I am urged not to challenge these "findings", principally on the grounds that members spend time compiling them, and/or that they are new and enlightening. I will ask the same questions as earlier, when faced with similar points. Because someone spends time rooting out these details shall we set up an un-challengable, read only section in this forum? How can their validity be verified if not challenged - surely it is answers to the challenges that test the depth and strength of their veracity? Shall we automatically assume that they're valid simply because they are new? Why is it fine, and welcoming, for the disseminators of this "new and enlightening information" to challenge the work of others, but wrong, and unwelcoming, for this "new research" to be challenged in turn?

What you are asking for, Halder, is censorship of thought, through the suppression of any reflection of those thoughts in this forum - and that, my friend, is simply not on.

Also, I have never called for the guillotining of this "new" information; that is definitely not my style - I would much rather have it out in the open, and open to challenges, rather than left festering in some dark and dusty recess. I would, therefore, strongly point out that all I have ever asked is for direct answers to pertinent questions that challenge the depth and strength of these new implications for the history of these actions, direct answers which seem to be continually avoided by those who, armed with their new research, should be able to answer.

Cheers-salesie.

[Jack Sheldon]

Salesie

I am pleased to see that you are back in the discussion. I rather feared from, 'I can't take any more' in Post 439 that we might have lost you, just when it is apparent from your remarks that we could call on you to throw some light on our darkness. I was certainly aware that we had the British regimental histories to call on but, until you mentioned it, I had not realised that there was also, 'A mountain of eye-witness, extraordinarily consistent, evidence,' in support of the contention that the German casualties at Le Cateau were, 'far greater than ours.' I assume that you have ready access to this, or clearly you would not have drawn our attention to it. It would obviously be unfair to expect you to share the entire mountain with us, but I wonder if you would mind producing, perhaps, a foothill - say ten good quotes - to demonstrate that the German losses at Le Cateau were, 'far greater than ours.' If you do not wish to use my 10,000 suggestion and the 15,000 - 30,000 supplied by David Lomas does not suit you either, feel free to base your answer on a number of your own choice. I am sure that you would not wish your evidence to be, 'left festering in some dark and dusty recess.'

Jack

[Ralph J. Whitehead]

Yet again, I am urged not to challenge these "findings", principally on the grounds that members spend time compiling them, and/or that they are new and enlightening. I will ask the same questions as earlier, when faced with similar points. Because someone spends time rooting out these details shall we set up an un-challengable, read only section in this forum? How can their validity be verified if not challenged - surely it is answers to the challenges that test the depth and strength of their veracity? Shall we automatically assume that they're valid simply because they are new? Why is it fine, and welcoming, for the disseminators of this "new and enlightening information" to challenge the work of others, but wrong, and unwelcoming, for this "new research" to be challenged in turn?

I am somewhat at a loss regarding these comments. I have never challenged the work of others. I am not saying the information cannot be challenged. I am trying to determine what losses were reported in these actions by the units involved. Until recently I have not even looked at this part of the war and as such do not have the information on hand.

All I have asked for is patience and once the numbers are in then people can draw whatever conclusions they care to. If you wish to challenge the information I have supplied please address it directly to the postings and be as specific as possible, thank you.

The current information is preliminary in regard to what I have been searching for among the casualty lists. I am not sure there is enough here to challenge but then you might disagree so please let me know, thank you.

In my opinion, however, to challenge the numbers or draw conclusions at this stage of the work would be along the lines of a news crew asking the first 5 voters how they voted in the presidential election and then declairing one man a winner over the other. Why not simply wait patiently for the information or if you would rather challenge them as I said above, please address the issue you would like to discuss as clearly and succinctly as possible so I can respond in kind.

I am disappointed in the tenor of this thread at times as I am not here to argue or take sides. I am here to look at all of the information and then see what reasonable people would conclude from it. It would seem that you wish to challenge anything and everything that comes up in discussion without any real depth of research that I am aware of. If I am incorrect then I apologize. Having been involved with this forum for many years I am not sure why you are taking this position. This is a forum for the free range of ideas, to exchange thoughts and to discuss events, even disagree at times etc. on a time that we did not experience and as such we rely solely on the written word and in some cases recorded interviews from the men who fought in the war. A such I believe the more primary sources that can be utilized the better the discussion.

Please feel free to address a challenge if you so desire. I will respond in the best of my ability in the spirit of the forum as it was intended when I joined in October 2002.

Ralph

[salesie]

Salesie

I was certainly aware that we had the British regimental histories to call on but, until you mentioned it, I had not realised that there was also, 'A mountain of eye-witness, extraordinarily consistent, evidence,' in support of the contention that the German casualties at Le Cateau were, 'far greater than ours.' I assume that you have ready access to this, or clearly you would not have drawn our attention to it.

Jack

The actual point I made - "c. A mountain of eye-witness, extraordinarily consistent, evidence contradicting these figures (many of which have been detailed in this thread)." Please note the qualifier in brackets, it is in posts in this very thread - your attention has already been drawn to it, are you saying that you've missed it and just carried on in ignorance?

I also raised other points i.e.

I regard all of these figures as decidedly iffy on the following grounds:

a. An agreement early in the thread that, in the final analysis, casualty figures are irrelevant, in that the most important aspect of these actions lay in their strategic importance. So, if irrelevant, then do they not automatically become "iffy" - simply because if taken at face value they become misleading?

b. The disseminators' own, carefully worded, health warnings about their sources (in this thread and in other works).

c. A mountain of eye-witness, extraordinarily consistent, evidence contradicting these figures (many of which have been detailed in this thread).

d. And for the reasons I've personally detailed in earlier posts i.e. on the basis of cause and effect, these figures throw up a paradox, a paradox which has yet to be adequately explained away by the disseminators of such figures.

Perhaps you'd like to answer these points, Jack?

Cheers-salesie.