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Remembered Today:

The "machine guns" of Mons ?


i_m_bob

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On the 30th August:

"The situation appeared to [Joffre]... as follows: The Somme had been crossed by the enemy above Amiens; a part of the German First Army was reported near Chaulnes, Lihons and Rozières [south of the Somme, not far from Villers Bretonneux ie continuing in a southwesterly direction]; the French Sixth Army, in the very act of detraining, had been obliged to retire behind the Avre; Lanrezac's army, it was presumed, had received the order to take up a position behind the Serre (on account of the dangerous position created for it by the retreat of the British); and finally, as a result of my interview on the afternoon of the 29th with Sir John French, I no longer nourished any hope of holding our Allies on the anticipated line of battle. They were preparing to retire behind a line running roughly from Compiègne to Soissons, thus creating a more dangerous gap between our Sixth Army, in course of formation, and our Fifth Army. Even if I had preserved the slightest illusions on the subject, Sir John French took pains to destroy them by sending word to me, early in the afternoon of the 30th, that the British Army would not be in a condition to take its place in the line for another ten days.

It was quite evident that the offensive battle I had conceived on the 25th was not out of the question in the form I had planned. Indeed, for the moment, it did not seem possible that we could oppose the German main right wing with a force strong enough to check the enveloping movement which, logically, would lead our enemies to the gates of Paris."

Robert

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It was on the same day, the 30th, that Joffre thought about, and set in train the preliminary planning process for, the possibility of cutting off the German First Army.

"Nevertheless, it did seem possible to make dispositions facing in a general way towards the north-north-west and offering the hope of renewing under more favourable conditions our attempt against the communications of the German right wing. In other words, it was a question of re-editing the manoeuvre which we had essayed originally in a north-easterly direction by debouching from the Meuse. General Berthelot [who had been in favour of attacking von Kluck's inner flank] was a strong partisan of this manoeuvre, and after having discussed it with him for quite a long time, I directed Colonel Pont, chief of Operations Bureau, to make a preliminary study of the orders required for its execution."

On the ground, however, there was no possibility of launching any such attack.

"Thus when, on returning that evening from the headquarters of the Third Army at Varennes, I learned that Sir John French had communicated his desire to bring his troops back behind the Seine in order to re-organise them... I informed him that I accepted his proposal with the sole condition that he make his movement by passing first to the east of Paris... and that he then move to the westward by circling Paris on the south.

Paris was indicated as the general direction of retirement for the Sixth Army, and General d'Amade, who had informed me that his territorial divisions were quite incapable of keeping the field any longer, was assigned Rouen as the line of his retreat.

The Fifth Army received orders to break off its action and to fall back behind the Serre, sending one army corps to Paris."

Robert

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On August 31st, French GQG picked up information that "an intercepted German radio brought us an indication that the enemy forces engaged on the 29th against our Fifth Army had met with a veritable defeat. 'Conceal from our troops our repulse on the left flank', and "by far the most important news" that German forces were being transferred from the Western to the Eastern Fronts. Joffre recommended to the Sixth Army that "no retirement be made unless directly pressed by the enemy and that all retrograde movements be halted as soon as it became certain that our units were not in danger of being caught by superior enemy forces. To Lanrezac [Joffre] made the same recommendation..."

Joffre then "made the most pressing representations to Sir John French. I explained to him that by reason of the information I had just received, I had given orders to the Fifth and Sixth Armies to fall back only when severely pressed by the enemy; they could not fulfill this task if any gap occurred between them and I, therefore, urged him 'not to withdraw the British Army unless we ourselves were obliged to fall back' and I begged that at least he 'handle his rear-guards in such as fashion as to prevent the enemy from getting the impression that a distinct movement in retreat is under way and that a gap exists between our Fifth and Sixth Armies'."

Sir John French later replied that he would attempt to hold a line that was a day's march behind the line of the Fifth and Sixth Armies and he added "if these two French armies fall back, the British Army will follow the movement; it cannot make any advance until it has been reorganised and its ranks filled up".

Joffre noted "this was certainly not the reply I had hoped for, since this systematic retirement of the British line, always one day's march in our rear, would continue to leave the left flank of the Fifth Army uncovered.

Now, that very morning, an intercepted German radio had informed us that a German cavalry corps had succeeded in crossing the Oise by the bridge at Bailly, which had been left intact by a British detachment charged with destroying it. This cavalry force was reported to be marching on Soissons, that is to say, towards the rear of Fifth Army. What I had asked the British to do was intervene against this manoeuvre, which risked transforming the retreat of the Fifth Army into a disaster, for its communications would be cut. I had just related the form which that evening Field Marshal French's refusal to this request had taken. I thus remained much disturbed concerning Lanrezac's fate, until the news came that... the German cavalry corps had been prevented from entering the zone of march of our columns."

The threat to Lanrezac's Fifth Army came from the eastwards movement of von Richthofen's 1st Cavalry Corps, as depicted by the purple dotted line in my previous map.

Spears, in his book 'Liaison', provides more details on this episode but also records that "the German movement on this day culminated in a change of orientation which set the stage for the victory of the Marne. British air reconnaissances established the important fact that von Kluck had attained the furthest limit of his western advance, and was marching south-east while the British fell back south."

The next day, 1st September, Joffre discerned that "although the enemy's intention, as revealed by this concordance of information, appeared to menace Lanrezac's army, it indicated, on the other hand, and quite clearly, that von Kluck was now no longer marching against Paris. Nothing could be more advantageous to us. For if this movement continued, its effect would be to place our Sixth Army in an analogous position to that which on August 25th I had contemplated for it... It can be imagined with what intense interest we now bent ourselves to following von Kluck's movements."

Following growing concern back in London about Sir John French's handling of the retreat, General Kitchener was on his way to meet with Sir John, having left on the 31st August.

Robert

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The quotes from Joffre are taken from "The Memoirs of General Joffre", translated by Colonel Mott and published by Bles, London, 1932.

Robert

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Robert,

I have seen some things taken out of context in my time, but that takes the biscuit! A lengthy quote from Joffre that makes out the British are in no condition to fight (II Corps are tired and disorganised after Le Cateau) and are retreating faster than the French. Which is basically what you are trying to say (couched in a lot of dialogue), as it suits the needs of your standpoint. You then place a snippet from Liaison at the end - a book which probably contains the majority of the pertinent facts.

Yes, there is a disconnect between the British and the French, but you have to read back further than that in Liaison to find it. The bad feeling is caused by some antipathy that Lanrezac harbours for the British and a lack of mutual support, or any support for that matter, by Lanrezac on the 23rd of August. On this day, Lanrezac has an army of comparable size to the German one opposite: the British do not. He then makes a run for it, without even the courtesy of a message to the British. I will leave that to your own imagination what his regard for the BEF is, and what he would like to happen to it. The antipathy is recognised by Joffre and is reported by Spears in Liaison. Concerning this, remember, ultimately, Lanrezac gets sacked! Also, French is under guidance of HM Government not to destroy the British Army as this will be the main cadre for training the enlarged British Army and the Territorial Force.

Aye

Tom McC

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Tom, Joffre's comments were not widely appreciated by the British then. General Huguet was even more scathing. His book 'Britain and the War' was subtitled 'A French Indictment'. It was these types of accounts that prompted Spears, and others such as General Maurice, to publish the likes of 'Liaison'.

I make no apology, however, for publishing Joffre's analyses. His thoughts are crucial in understanding how and why he reacted to von Kluck's advance in the way that he did. We may not agree with his analyses, but that is our perogative after the fact.

A lengthy quote from Joffre that makes out the British are in no condition to fight
Isn't this what Sir John French was telling Joffre? That's my interpretation about some of Joffre's comments on this point that you raised. I believe that British GHQ was extremely worried about what had happened to II Corps at Le Cateau, so perhaps Colonel Huguet's impression was not without some foundation at the time.

the British... are retreating faster than the French.
Isn't this what happened? I understand your point about the 'why', linking back to Lanrezac and the Battle of Mons.

Robert

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I can only echo Tom's comments - the BEF at Mons prevented envelopment of Lanzerac's left flank, but Lanzerac, with no communication of his movements to GHQ, withdrew under the BEF's cover, thus placing that "contemptibly small army" in its perilous position (if not for Mons, the French Fifth Army may have ceased to exist almost a week prior to Guise). But Smith Dorrien, at Le Cateau, negated much of the danger to the BEF. As for Sir John French's assertions to Joffre about the BEF's lack of capability, French soon changed his mind after Kitchener's intervention, and the BEF did turn to the offensive, quite effectively, not too long afterwards on the Marne.

That said, it seems to me that Joffre's comments, as posted by Robert, are not substantially different to my previous overviews. Much of the "Joffre" posts deal with weighing up options, but Joffre does state that the loss of synchronisation between von Kluck and von Bulow enabled him to change his orders for the way the Fifth Army attacked at Guise, thus, and still, giving a clear causal linkage backwards from the Marne to the initial German loss of synchronisation of movement on the 27/28th August.

Cheers-salesie.

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I

The total from the casualty lists from October 1914 were:

7 officers, 117 OR killed; 17 officers, 628 OR wounded, 191 OR missing. The total is 24 officers, 936 OR as casualties.

Ralph

This labour of yours is much appreciated, Ralph.

Am I right in my conclusion that, of the 960 casualties this Grenadier regiment had suffered, nearly two thirds of them were attributable to the battle of August 23rd? There are lots of figures to deal with here, but I understand that nearly a third of the regiment's strength was killed, wounded or missing in the August and September fighting - the statement "The total from the casualty lists from October 1914" has confused me....is this the aggregate from all actions August- September - October, or does it allude to October alone? Or does it allow for the submission of the list in October, which was retrospective and summarised casualties in the August and September battles ? Forgive me if I'm slow on the uptake.

Phil.

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Hello Phil,

You are correct in that the bulk of the losses mentioned, some 627 for the 12th Grenadier Regiment can be attributable to the battle of Mons and as such was a large percentage of the regiment. The rest of the losses were scattered throughout the other periods covered by the lists and there would be a percentage of the missing that would have been identified as returned, wounded, dead, etc.

I use these lists so often and I am so familiar with the dates, etc. it takes a bit of time to get used to the system. I mentioned the October lists because the lists published for this regiment were posted in October in three lists. This is not unusual as each battalion would send in their losses and it depended upon when these made it to the publisher. The rule of thumb is anywhere from 3 to 6 weeks after a casualty was reported.

What you will find is the lists were published in order of being received. The lists mentioned for this regiment cover very specific dates for each one. There would be other lists, some small, some large depending upon the regimental activities that would be published as losses were reported.

The October losses for this regiment would most likely be found in November lists, the November losses in the December lists, etc. If the regiment lost other men in August I would suspect I would find these printed in early to mid September and so on. There is no way to predict the exact publication dates for the losses, you just need to look through them in sequential order to find them.

The biggest problem I have at times is matching a specific date to a series of lists. Some lists published in the VL cover a single day so it is easy to trace the men lost. Others, such as those posted earlier cover a period of days or weeks. it all depended upon when they were submitted.

In looking at the information provided in previous posts you need to look at the dates and numbers provided by sources such as regimental accounts. Then, look at the published VL for the period of time covered to see if there would be a large overlap such as in the 12th Grenadier Regiment or in the case of some quite close in time frame to the loss period covered by the post war books.

There is no method at present to make a perfect match as Prussian records are gone for the most part and the other states records require a personal visit and checking each name against the official accounts kept on each man. I would be surprised if the two lists matched perfectly considering the status changed on some reported losses, especially the MIA but also the wounded who in some cases died from their wounds days, weeks or months later.

I hope this does not make it worse for you. Please let me know if there is something I can help out with and I will answer to the best of my ability.

Ralph

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That said, it seems to me that Joffre's comments, as posted by Robert, are not substantially different to my previous overviews. Much of the "Joffre" posts deal with weighing up options, but Joffre does state that the loss of synchronisation between von Kluck and von Bulow enabled him to change his orders for the way the Fifth Army attacked at Guise, thus, and still, giving a clear causal linkage backwards from the Marne to the initial German loss of synchronisation of movement on the 27/28th August.
Salesie, the fate of the German army on the Marne pre-dated 27/28th August. Lest others get the wrong idea, it was clear to Joffre on the 25th August that the German right wing did not extend far enough west. This can be seen by reviewing the map here.

The following quotes summarise Joffre's assessment prior to the 27/28th August:

25th August - "My own preference inclined more and more towards a wholly different solution, which consisted in creating on the outer wing of the enemy a mass capable, in its turn, of enveloping his marching flank."

"My conception was a battle stretching from Amiens to Rheims with the new army placed on the extreme left of our line, outside of the British and in a position to outflank the German right."

26th August - "I organized, in the early hours of the night of August 26/27, the Sixth Army and placed it under the command of General Maunoury."

These assessments clearly show the root cause of the German problem - there weren't enough forces to cover the German right wing. The loss of synchronisation was merely a further expression of this problem. Repositioning of HKK 1 (German 1st Cavalry Corps, which had been on the other side of the Meuse in the advance into the Ardennes) was not sufficient as this merely served to fill the gap between the two armies, alongside HKK 2. There was still no significant force capable of plugging the open gap on the western flank.

With regards to Joffre's further instructions to Lanrezac after von Kluck's army separated, it should be noted that the forward movement of von Bülow's Second Army, specifically the X Reserve Corps, had reached the BEF 1st Corps rear guards in strength. This led to the heavy losses sustained by the Royal Munster Fusiliers near Etreux on the 27th. You should be cautious about interpreting Joffre's change in orders to Fifth Army. Lanrezac fought the battle according to the whole problem that he faced. He did launch an attack north-east, which eased the pressure on British 1st Corps, but he also continued to counter-attack to the north as well.

Robert

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I can only echo Tom's comments - the BEF at Mons prevented envelopment of Lanzerac's left flank, but Lanzerac, with no communication of his movements to GHQ, withdrew under the BEF's cover, thus placing that "contemptibly small army" in its perilous position (if not for Mons, the French Fifth Army may have ceased to exist almost a week prior to Guise).
With respect, you cannot visit all of the problems faced by GHQ around the time of Mons on Lanrezac. Lest there be any doubt, I wholly agree that it was inappropriate not to maintain the closest of communications between Fifth Army and the BEF. But GHQ was still responsible for maintaining an appropriate understanding of its overall position, both with regards to the enemy (not just in front of the BEF) and the neighbouring allied forces.

It should be noted that the BEF was not the extreme left of the Franco-British line. Prior to August 23rd, contact was made with the 34th French Territorial Division, which was to the west of Condé on the BEF's immediate left flank. There were two more territorial divisions further west.

Robert

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Robert, we'll just have to agree to disagree about the causal links stretching backwards from the Marne.

As for blaming Lanzerac for all the BEF's problem? I didn't - if you look earlier in the thread I highlighted a lack of intelligence as to the German position and strength at Mons to be a reason for many problems, then there was my mention of air reports not being believed. My mentioning of Lanzerac's withdrawal was in the context of Joffre's words about the BEF's perilous situation i.e. it was Lanzerac's hasty withdrawal, with his much larger force and without consultation, from the area to the right of the BEF at Mons which created much of the BEF's peril in the first place. And it seemed a bit cheeky of Joffre not to mention this (unless he did mention it but you didn't post it) and that the BEF's fight at Mons probably saved Lanzerac's left flank from being enveloped.

Cheers-salesie.

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Salesie, no problem.

Apologies for misinterpreting the comment on Lanrezac. Joffre did make some comments about the situation. On the 23rd:

"During the whole day no news [about the Fifth Army and BEF] came in, but in the evening I received a telegram from Colonel Huguet giving me the situation of the British Army in the morning. Its heads of column were at Haulchain, Jemmapes and Saint-Ghislain, the cavalry on the left, towards Quivérain. Huguet informed me that General Lanrezac had asked Field Marshal French, in case the British Army itself was not attacked, to direct an attack on the flank of the enemy forces crossing the Sambre. But Sir John had decided to maintain for twenty-four hours the position he held on the morning of the twenty-third; if air reconnaissances showed that the German forces north and north-west of Mons were not too numerous, he would move forward, with his front facing towards the north-east, provided his left flank was not menaced.

Soon after this I received a report from Lanrezac, in response to my request to inform me of his intentions. He said that his army had been attacked at 11 o'clock that morning, that three corps had fallen back to Valcourt, that the enemy was threatening his right on the Meuse and that a German detachment had succeeded in occupying Omhaye. Givet was menaced, Namur had fallen. In the presence of this situation, and upon learning of the repulse of the [French] Fourth Army, Lanrezac had decided to withdraw his army the next day to the front Beaumont-Givet.

What I feared was that this retreat might result in a similar movement on the part of the British Army."

At this point in time, the evening of the Battle of Mons, Joffre was not aware that the BEF's defensive position had been undone by the German attack, and that the BEF was having to fall back on the second line of defenses. Nor was he aware, seemingly, that the BEF's discovery of Lanrezac's intentions meant that a decision had been taken to fall back further until 3.45 am on the morning of August 24th.

"I received two telegrams. The first... from the British Army announced that our Allies were about to fall back on the line Maubeuge-Valenciennes. The second, from the Fifth Army, stating that the fighting had been renewed with violence during the day of the 23rd... 'The English', added General Lanrezac, 'inform me that they are falling back to the line Longueville-Valenciennes, and that if their left flank becomes menaced, they will retire upon Amiens [ie southwest]. Please inform me of the subsequent direction of retreat'."

Other bad news flooded in from across the Battle of the Frontiers. Unlike the situation facing Sir John French, Joffre had a much, much bigger problem to deal with.

He did not neglect the security of the BEF, however:

"It seemed to me necessary above all to place on the left of the British Army French troops to which I had the right to give orders; and as two reserve divisions coming from Paris were to arrive that night at Arras to join General d'Amade's force, I prescribed for them, as a general mission, the covering of the left flank of the British against any attempt at evelopment."

Joffre took additional steps to protect the BEF with an order that significantly helped Smith-Dorrien in his stand at Le Cateau:

"I also took under my personal direction Sordet's Cavarly Corps, which, instead of marching to the outside flank of the Allied armies had posted itself south of Maubeuge. I directed Sordet to pass to the left of the British and to aid in protecting their flank. But I already knew that nothing much could be expected from this corps, by reason of the extreme fatigue of the men and horses."

With respect to Sir John, Joffre:

"...had to content myself with suggesting to Sir John French that it would be most useful if he could delay the march of the enemy forces between Valenciennes and Maubeuge... At the same time I indicated to him that if the presence of superior forces should oblige him to fall back, he might do so in the general direction of Cambrai. In this way he could join up with the barrier constituted by the three territorial divisions commanded by General d'Amade."

Robert

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Smith-Dorrien, in his memoirs had the good grace to mention d'Amade's and Sordet's contributions to Le Cateau:

"I had no reports from General Sordet during the day, but had heard that French infantry was fighting in Cambrai. These turned out to be General d'Amade's Territorial troops, who finally left Cambrai in a west and south-westerly direction about 2 p.m. That their help to us was very material there can be no doubt, for on the 23rd d'Amade's advanced troops under General de Villaret, straight from Paris, reached Tournai and on the 24th held up the German II Corps directed on Cambrai for several hours, drawing them after them as they fell back that afternoon and the 25th. The delay, and the brave front shown by these Territorials were of vital importance to us, as otherwise it is almost certain we should have had another Corps against us on the 26th.

I had a momentary shock about 5 p.m. on getting clear of the village of Maretz, about three miles south of Maurois on the Roman road, for I suddenly heard very heavy artillery fire away to the north-west, which I reckoned was behind the 4th Division outer flank and feared the enemy had got behind Snow; but was much relieved, on galloping to a hill about a mile in that direction, to recognise the short sharp crack of the famous " seventy-fives," and then I knew they were French guns and probably Sordet's, and this they turned out to be. On reaching St. Quentin I took the opportunity of sending a message to General Sordet to thank him, and also of sending a note to the C.-in-C. asking him to express thanks to him through the French C.-in-C."

However it seems that Joffre makes no mention of a telegram that Smith-Dorrien says that Joffre sent to GHQ after the action at Le Cateau, Smith-Dorrien says:

"As a final and overwhelming testimony to the value of the day. General Joffre telegraphed to our C.-in-C. thanking him in the warmest terms for " the powerful effect that battle (Le Cateau) had had on the security of the left flank of the French Army."

It would be interesting to read any such telegram and to see how its tone may differ from that of Joffre's memoirs i.e. Joffre, in his memoirs, makes plenty of comments about protecting the BEF, but seems to completely fail to mention the BEF's role in protecting Lanzerac's left flank. Smith-Dorrien, it seems, had the good grace to publicly thank his allies and recognise their contribution, but Joffre did not?

Cheers-salesie.

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Salesie, interesting question. I don't recall anything about Smith-Dorrien but will have another look. In his memoirs, Joffre deals with higher level commanders, as you might expect from his position as French C-in-C. There is a lot about Sir John French, who did not inspire confidence shall we say.

Robert

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The October losses for this regiment would most likely be found in November lists, the November losses in the December lists, etc..... If the regiment lost other men in August I would suspect I would find these printed in early to mid September and so on. ... Please let me know if there is something I can help out with and I will answer to the best of my ability.

Ralph

Thanks, Ralph. There is a feature of these lists that I think is pertinent to our discussion, and I would welcome your comments.

The lists that were tabulated by the Zentral Naichweiseamt gave a total of 837,810 dead, wounded and missing for all fronts by 31st December 1914. By the end of 1915, the total reached 2,544,005, which, on a superficial basis, suggests that more than 1.7 million casualties occurred in 1915. This is surely not the case. German casualties in 1915 were undoubtedly very heavy, resulting from huge efforts in both West and East, but not more than double the 1914 total. A significant proportion of the 1,706,195 casualties that were registered in 1915 must have actually occurred in 1914 - perhaps between one tenth and one fifth of them. The implication here is that the real total of 1914 casualties was probably well in excess of one million - this is supposition on my part, but I reckon it's feasible to say the least. With this in mind, I tentatively offer the suggestion that the 643,237 casualties tabulated by the SB for the Western Front in 1914 is short of the mark; this will impinge on the figures we have for Mons etc. On no account do I subscribe to Edmonds' arguments.

Phil.

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Thanks, Ralph. There is a feature of these lists that I think is pertinent to our discussion, and I would welcome your comments.

The lists that were tabulated by the Zentral Naichweiseamt gave a total of 837,810 dead, wounded and missing for all fronts by 31st December 1914. By the end of 1915, the total reached 2,544,005, which, on a superficial basis, suggests that more than 1.7 million casualties occurred in 1915. This is surely not the case. German casualties in 1915 were undoubtedly very heavy, resulting from huge efforts in both West and East, but not more than double the 1914 total. A significant proportion of the 1,706,195 casualties that were registered in 1915 must have actually occurred in 1914 - perhaps between one tenth and one fifth of them. The implication here is that the real total of 1914 casualties was probably well in excess of one million - this is supposition on my part, but I reckon it's feasible to say the least. With this in mind, I tentatively offer the suggestion that the 643,237 casualties tabulated by the SB for the Western Front in 1914 is short of the mark; this will impinge on the figures we have for Mons etc. On no account do I subscribe to Edmonds' arguments.

Phil.

Phil,

I'm not following your logic. How were a significant portion of casulaties listed in 1915 suffered in 1914?

One complication you have is you're trying to fit a square peg in a round hole. The losses were tabulated by war year, not calendar year. But, you can do the math yourself without supposition--use table 147--it lists losses per month, per front. See what you get for January-December 1915. There were only 5 war months in 1914, 12 in 1915--I think the numbers make sense. For example. each month for the period May-August 1915 rival September 1914 for numbers dead.

Paul

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Phil,

I'm not following your logic. How were a significant portion of casulaties listed in 1915 suffered in 1914?

One complication you have is you're trying to fit a square peg in a round hole. The losses were tabulated by war year, not calendar year. But, you can do the math yourself without supposition--use table 147--it lists losses per month, per front. See what you get for January-December 1915. There were only 5 war months in 1914, 12 in 1915--I think the numbers make sense. For example. each month for the period May-August 1915 rival September 1914 for numbers dead.

Paul

The ZN figures surely needed time to "catch up" - it might be that a soldier was killed in October 1914, but his fate was not registered in those figures until some months later.

I am just a novice here - and you're the expert, Paul - but doesn't it appear that the figures for 1914 seem too low, bearing in mind the enormity of the fighting in those first months, when Germany was going all out for victory in the West and fighting huge battles against the Russians as well? I would have thought that the rate of loss suffered by Germany in the Battles of the Frontiers, The Marne and the Race to the Sea, along with the fighting raging around Lodz and elswhere in 1914 would have greatly exceeded that of 1915.

I note that the SB figures give 792,655 casualties for the five months of 1914 on both fronts, compared with 1,536,964 for the twelve months of 1915. These totals, combined, do not amount to the 2.5 million plus compiled by the ZN for the war up until December 31st 1915. The RA compilations give about 1.5 million German casualties on the Western Front 1914-15, which is similar to the reckoning of the SB ( 1,516,462) : the crucial difference is that the RA indicate more casualties sustained on that front in the five months of 1914 than in the twelve of 1915 - this is what I would have expected. Of course, Germany made her principal effort in the East in 1915; but even her casualties suffered on the Russian front that year did not equal those sustained on the Western Front.

If we take the ZN figure as it stands, and allow for 1.7 million casualties in 1915, then we are accepting that German casualties that year were heavier than for 1916 ( 1.4 million), when Verdun, the Somme and Brusilov combined to make unprecedented demands on Germany. It just doesn't look right. It seems - to me at least - that a significant part of those 1.7 million casualties registered in 1915 had actuallly occurred in 1914, when fighting raged at maximum intensity. It's certainly understandable that those initial months produced chaotic pressure on bureaucrats; the war had not assumed its positional nature and the routines of ciphering were harder to establish. At the risk of seeming slap-dash, I would guess that 1.1 million casualties in 1914, 1.4 to 1.5 million in 1915, and a similar amount in 1916, accords more with the scale and intensity of the fighting than a figure which ascribes such a preponderance to 1915.

That's just my guess, I admit, and I submit it with diffidence.

Phil.

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Phil,

Just from an initial review of your recent post regarding the different numbers, etc. by year and the possibility that some 1914 losses were calculated into the 1915 numbers I believe you are looking at two different systems and trying to match them into one method.

The Verlustlisten were published Monday through Saturday as lists were submitted by units in the field. There was often a 3-6 week delay in having them actually appear in print. This was a matter of time needed to send them in, compile, set the print and then actually print them.

The SB and ZN accounts were calculated from having the overall reports on a full war year and with all of the information supplied on the losses therefore allowing them to calculate with some accuracy the total numbers for 1914, 1915, etc.

I will look at the resources and methods applied by the SB and ZN to give more detail on this but it would be a mistake to apply the time delay from the daily Verlustlisten to the others. The SB numbers do not seem out of sorts based upon the periods involved, the extent of the fighting and the losses suffered both east and west by the Germans.

I will get back to you as quickly as I can.

Ralph

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Phil,

Just from an initial review of your recent post regarding the different numbers, etc. by year and the possibility that some 1914 losses were calculated into the 1915 numbers I believe you are looking at two different systems and trying to match them into one method.

Ralph

Yes, Ralph, that is indeed what I'm trying to do. There is, I trust, some harmony somewhere between these two systems. The impression I get - although fataly flawed by my inability to read or speak German - is that the SB gives an overview of wartime losses and provides a figure of 2,037,000 deaths, which is very much in accord with the compilations of the ZN. My problem arises from the disparities bewtween the number of deaths tabulated by the ZN as of October 31st 1917, and the very much lower figure provided by the SB. The figures from the RA also allow for a much heavier German casualty list for 1914 than does the SB.

I realise that I might be very misled by my view of German casualties in those opening battles on the Western Front - this is, after all, what this thread is about. Paul's charge that I seem to be trying to put square pegs into round holes also has an impact on me.

Bearing in mind the enormous French, Russian and Austo-Hungarian casualties that were suffered in 1914, I do find it hard to accept that German losses that year were fewer than half their casualties for 1915, and that 1915, with its policy of defence in the West and advance against an allegedly clunsy and backward enemy in the East, produced more German casualties than 1916 was to inflict - the strain of the Somme, Verdun and Brusilov, I would have thought, greatly exceeded that of Artois, Chamapagne and Gorlice- Tarnow in 1915. I will be happy to stand corrected - one thing is becoming increasingly apparent...historians and commentators have underrated the performance of the Russian army in the Great War: even when they were winning thier victories on the Eastern Front, the Germans suffered heavy casualties fighting the Russians.

A mistaken image of Mons might have a lot to answer for in my perception of the Great War.

In the meantime, I would like to express my thanks to you, Ralph, and to you Paul, for helping me gain some perspective on the experience of German soldiers 1914-1918.

Phil.

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Until very recently, my awareness of German casualties in the Great War was fashioned by Winston Churchill's history.

In his chapter, The Blood Test, Churchill produced a kind of spread sheet of German casualties on the Western Front 1914-1918, and compared them with Allied losses. In this essay, Churchill relied on two sources, the Reichsarchiv and the Zentral Nachweisamt, and, in a sense, he synthesised them to produce an overall tabulation. This is probably why I've formulated the view I have of German casualties; the SB figures have come as a rather rude awakening, disturbing the hitherto harmonious assessment that I had nurtured about the numbers of casualties suffered by Germany in the war. I am reluctant to cast doubt on the SB: it is extremely meticulous and authoratitive: but I am loathe to dismiss the ZN figures, and am anxious to try and see some way of reconciling them.

Phil.

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Salesie, this is the additional material from Joffre's memoirs that is pertinent to the 26th August.

"August 26th. Early on the morning of the 26th I left for Saint Quentin, accompanied by Berthelot and my A.D.C., Captain Muller. I attached the greatest importance to the interview I was about to have with the commander of the British Army, the first since the day he had come to see me at Vitry, at the moment he assumed command. The object I had in view was to make arrangements with him for the new plan of operations which I had decided upon and which would bring about a battle along the line Verdun-Laon-Amiens. I realized the difficulties that lay ahead of me; indeed, I had reason to fear that the Field Marshal was not entirely free to make a decision, for I knew that Kitchener had frequently tried to interfere in the direction of the British Army's operations. I also knew that there already existed some friction between Sir John French and the general commanding our Fifth Army.

I arrived at Saint Quentin towards 10.30 am. D'Amade was already there. He was describing to the me the difficult situation in which his troops found themselves, when Lanrezac in his turn arrived, he having received the evening before my instructions relative to the battle of Amiens-Rheims-Verdun. He told me that he thoroughly understood my intentions and he raised no objections, except in regard to the elimination of the zones assigned to his army and to the British. He pointed out that nothing had ever prepared our Allies to take part in a combined manoeuvre and that they paid little attention to directions which were intended to coordinate the action of neighbouring armies. When I insisted on the necessity of having his army make frequent counter-attacks, in order to gain the time necessary for constituting a mass of manoeuvre on our extreme left, he assured me that he expected to resume the offensive as soon as his forces had debouched from the close country around Avesnes, were his artillery could accomplish little.

At this moment French came in, accompanied by General Murray, his Chief of Staff. I expected to find the same calm officer whose acquaintance I had made a few days before; but, to my great surprise, the British Commander-in-Chief started out immediately in a rather excited tone to explain that his army had been violently attacked, and that, the evening before, General Haig's corps had been obliged to fall back on Guise and the Cavalry Corps on Bohain (that is to say, into the zone assigned to the French Fifth Army); that his II Corps and General Snow's 4th Division were being pressed by the enemy in the direction of Le Catelet. He explained to me that since hostilities had begun his troops had been submitted to such hardships that he could not for the moment contemplate resuming the offensive. He considered the situation as being very delicate. More than once he made complaints concerning the manner in which the Fifth Army, his neighbour, had acted. He accused this army of having broken off the fight and left him completely isolated.

In reply, I said to the Field Marshal that all the Allied troops without exception had been pushed hard by the enemy and that he must no suppose that the British Army was the only one which had suffered from the severe conditions of the campaign. I also invited his attention to the importance which I attached to his conforming his manoeuvre to the general instructions whcih I had given to our armies, and that, in particular, he make every effort to respect the zones of march reserved for each army, so as to avoid confusion.

I then urged with all my force that, since the first manoeuvre, as conceived, had failed, he do everything that lay in his power to make it possible to fight a new battle which I had in view. I saw by his surprise that he was not acquainted with my intentions, and I asked him if he had received a copy of the Instructions of August 25th which I had sent him. He had not yet seen this paper, as it had never left General Murray's hands. I then explained my conception of the new manoeuvre which I proposed to execute, indicating in detail the role which the British Army would be expected to play.

French immediately raised objections, and in spite of my insistence, I had the impression that he remained unconvinced. His idea was, above all, to fall back on Saint Quentin. I promised him to give orders to Sordet, not only to cover the British left, but to intervene in the approaching battle with all his forces and most energetically. Moreover, at Sir John's request, I immediately gave orders to d'Amade to push his two fresh divisions to Bray, so as to give support to the British Army. I then asked French if he expected to receive reinforcements from England shortly, and whether the 6th Division was coming; for in the situation in which the Allies now found themselves, they had need of every man. French replied that the Secretary of State for War comtemplated sending this division to Belgium, in support of the Belgian Army. I represented to the Field Marshal how dangerous such a situation would be. I told him of my conviction that a decision would be obtained on the French front and nowhere else, and that every man Great Britain could furnish should be sent without delay to the left of our line of battle. I had the impression that on this point Sir John and I were in agreement.

When I left British Headquarters in the early afternoon, I carried with me a serious impression as the fragility of our extreme left, and I anxiously asked myself if it could hold out long enough to enable me to effect the new grouping of our forces. I was impressed, moreover, by the lack of mutual comprehension between Field Marshal French and the commander of our Fifth Army. The temperaments of the two men, their mentalities were so wholly different, that they seemed unable to work together under the hard strain of battle."

I have quoted the subsequent material relating to the Battle of Le Cateau, including Huguet's pessimistic report about the outcome noting that the British Army 'had lost all cohesion'. There is no mention of the telegram to Smith-Dorrien, though this is not too surprising for when Joffre returned to GQG after the meeting with Sir John, he learned of the virtual collapse of his centre, particularly the French Fourth Army.

"From everywhere there arrived news of weaknesses which made me fear that the morale of the troops was broken; discouragement began to make itself felt in every grade of the army, and even at my own headquarters."

Robert

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Hello Phil,

Sorry for the delay in answering. I make the distinction of war year instead of until December 1914 as I don't think it changes the comparison and unfortunately I just don't have the time to break out and add all the figures for each month, each front, to get a Jan-Dec total.

I don't see the numbers for the 1914-1915 as too low. Germany suffered more casualties (dead, wounded and missing--this is important later) in this first war year than either of the other two following war years, and that later timeframe would include Verdun, and the Somme. I'll not include the last war year as the numbers for the last 4 months are incomplete.

As Ralph said the SanB figures were compiled figures for periods of time, and I don't think there would be any delay factor in reporting KIA and WIA and well as missing--died of wounds is another matter.

As to your concerns about the ZN numbers versus the SB for total dead. I guess this is from the "Blood Test," article by McRandle and Quirk, table 11. The difference is explained in the difference of KIA in that the SanB figures show casualties as recorded at the time. The ZN show later updated information on those who died of wounds. On page 26 of the SanB this is explained. You'll see that 1,061,740 men died of wounds, this explains the difference. The SanB carries 289,053 died of wounds--and I think that must reflect men who died a short period after being wounded. If you do all this rather tedious math you see the numbers come out almost exactly between the two sets of figures.

We have to look at the casualty figures as a whole. To extract only one set of numbers will leave us a mistaken picture. If you look only at KIA between the ZN and SanB numbers the ZN are much higher, if you look at the WIA between the SanB and the ZN the SanB numbers are much higher.

It's all a bit complicated. There are various sets of figures available:

1) The wartime loss reports (such as from the units and OHL) which are the least accurate. They tend to overestimate the number of missing and undestimate the number of dead. These figures can be as much as 30% different than the final reconciled numbers from what I've seen.

2) The SanB numbers which reflect a compiled report on the troop and sick reports from the war based on treatment. These numbers are much more accurate and detailed, but they reflect the situation at the time of reporting. They have the advantage of showing us information for a given period of time.

3) The ZN numbers are less detailed, but have the advantage of having been compiled using reconciled figures for those who later died.

Seen as a whole neither the SanB or ZN numbers are incorrect--they are simply different animals.

The SanB numbers must be seen as a whole to reflect the true picture of casualties suffered at the time of battle--dead, wounded and missing/POW.

I see the rational behind using the SanB numbers. I mean where do you draw the line as far as final disposition of the soldiers? If poor soldier Schmidt is wounded at the Aisne in 1914, and dies two years later of his wounds at home, the SanB is going to carry him as WIA for the month he was wounded. In the final count he will be counted amongst the dead.

And in all of this it's important to try and maintain some humanity and remember that these numbers represent actual men and try to retain some of the meaning of the loss and suffering they represent.

Paul

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As to your concerns about the ZN numbers versus the SB for total dead. I guess this is from the "Blood Test," article by McRandle and Quirk, table 11. The difference is explained in the difference of KIA in that the SanB figures show casualties as recorded at the time. The ZN show later updated information on those who died of wounds. On page 26 of the SanB this is explained. You'll see that 1,061,740 men died of wounds, this explains the difference. The SanB carries 289,053 died of wounds--and I think that must reflect men who died a short period after being wounded. If you do all this rather tedious math you see the numbers come out almost exactly between the two sets of figures.

Paul

Thank you, Paul.

Still struggling, I'm afraid. The ZN figures were adjusted upwards to reflect information that later became available. As a result, nearly half a million additional casualties were added to the list in the years after the war. But even at the time of compilation, they acknowledged a far higher number of KIA and DOW than the SB. By 31st May 1919 the ZN tabulation for killed in action and died from wounds had reached a total of 1,531,048 - nealry fifty per cent higher than the SB - and this was without the missing who were to be presumed dead, and when there were still another 200,000 additional casualties yet to be added. Why did the SB fall so far short in its recording of killed/died from wounds? If you've already answered this in your post, Paul, and I've failed to understand you, please forgive me.

Phil.

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Thank you, Paul.

Still struggling, I'm afraid. The ZN figures were adjusted upwards to reflect information that later became available. As a result, nearly half a million additional casualties were added to the list in the years after the war. But even at the time of compilation, they acknowledged a far higher number of KIA and DOW than the SB. By 31st May 1919 the ZN tabulation for killed in action and died from wounds had reached a total of 1,531,048 - nealry fifty per cent higher than the SB - and this was without the missing who were to be presumed dead, and when there were still another 200,000 additional casualties yet to be added. Why did the SB fall so far short in its recording of killed/died from wounds? If you've already answered this in your post, Paul, and I've failed to understand you, please forgive me.

Phil.

Phil,

No, no additional casualties were added in the context were discussing. Some men initially reported as WIA and later died of wounds were recorded in the final count as war dead. It's also imporant to remember that the SanB numbers end in July 1918. The ZN reported all casualties. Look at the "Blood Test," article and they show on the charts the divergence between KIA and WIA in both sets of numbers.

Your numbers will continue to diverge over time. The ZN continued to change as more men died of wounds, and the difference between the two sets of numbers became larger. The SanB numbers became final as of 31 July 1918, or 31 December 1918 (I forget which), the ZN numbers were finalized on 31 December 1933.

The final numbers for the dead come from the ZN in the SanB study--it's important to understand this, the two are not divorced. The WIA numbers are much higher for the SanB numbers, that's where your 772,687 additional died of wounds are coming from. The SanB is not wrong or incomplete, it's recording men who were wounded at that time.

The SanB gives you a detailed and accurate list of casualties in time. The ZN gives you the final count--two different things.

As an example. We go into combat. We have ten men. Two are killed and four are wounded in the month of July. We suffered six of ten as casualties, or 60%. The SanB reports two killed and four wounded for the month of July for our unit. Two of the four wounded die of wounds two months later. The SanB doesn't change--it's locked in time. The ZN reports four men killed towards the total of all war dead.

I've never seen this explained before, but I beleive the men reported as died of wounds in the SanB died before the end of that reporting period--that's why they are carried forward as dead, instead of wounded.

It's all very complicated, but it makes sense. It wasn't explained well at all in "The Blood Test Revisted." I think it's actually possible to come to even more secure conclusions than the authors did in their article.

For the study of what we're looking at here, or any other casualties this all presents no problems--men who were casualties are accurately reflected.

Paul

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