The "machine guns" of Mons ?

[Steven Broomfield]

My Craftsman was called Craftsman Basey, and he came from Norfolk. Very flat, Norfolk.

[salesie]

My Craftsman was called Craftsman Basey, and he came from Norfolk. Very flat, Norfolk.

Steven, are you sure it wasn't Count Basey, and that you've simply jazzed the whole thing up?

Cheers-salesie.

[salesie]

Whilst we await George's posting, I'd like to go back to earlier in the thread, to Jack's mention of von Kluck's flawed intelligence which, after Le Cateau, led him to believe that the BEF were withdrawing along their lines of communication towards Calais, and thus sent the German First Army on a wild-goose chase.

I've just been browsing Occleshaw's Armour Against Fate again and noticed the following:

...The first big breakthrough for aerial reconnaissance had come in the Marne campaign of 1914, when von Schlieffen's design appeared to be carrying all before it. The German armies had swept through Belgium and it seemed that nothing could stay their advance on Paris. Yet in spite of their apparent success, all was not well within the German camp. The army on the extreme right was the German First Army commanded by the proud and impatient von Kluck. To his eyes the road before him seemed clear. The British had been sent packing and the only French troops which might be met would be the hotch-potch of units drawn from widely different commands now forming as the French Sixth Army under General de Maunoury. Von Kluck felt confident that his army could deal with this mongrel and envelop Paris from the west: the capture of Paris would surely bring victory to German arms and make von Kluck a national hero.

At this point the fledgling Royal Flying Corps (RFC) intervened, an intervention which was the beginning of a sequence of events that were to change the course of the war and the course of history. On the afternoon of 31 August, Captain E. W. Furse was flying on routine patrol. He had no particular expectation of meeting any enemy. Indeed, no one at G H Q actually knew the precise whereabouts of von Kluck's forces. What Furse saw on his reconnaissance must have sent the blood racing through his veins; for below him, trekking towards the west, swarmed von der Marwitz's cavalry corps, the spearhead of von Kluck's masses. Disbelief was the order of the day. A further reconnaissance was sent out by the doubtful British, an aeroplane from No. 4 Squadron manned by Captain D. Le G. Pitcher and Lieutenant (temporary Captain) A. H. L. Soames, and they con-firmed the news brought back by Furse. The report was sped along the telephone wires to GHQ, to General Lanrezac commanding the French Fifth Army and to General de Maunoury with the Sixth, now in some peril.

In moving to the west, von Kluck was drawing away from the German Second Army on his immediate left commanded by General von Bulow. A gap was thus being created between the two German armies on the right of the German line and if the Allies had the ability to penetrate that gap they could fall on the open and undefended flanks of either army. This the Allies were not in a position to do, and it was Lanrezac, facing von Bulow, who inflicted a sharp check on the German Second Army at Guise. Von Moltke, the German Chief of the General Staff ostensibly directing operations in the west, was already concerned about the gap which was unmistakably growing between his first and Second Armies and, faced with von Bulow's call for help, agreed to von Kluck's design to an inward wheel which would bring his legions eastwards across the front of Paris and to von Bulow's aid. Von Kluck had decided to forego the chance of a triumphal entry into Paris less because of any liking for von Bulow, of whom he had no high opinion, but because German Staff doctrine demanded the crushing of the enemy's armies in the field before all else and von Kluck felt he had little left to do, and turned away from Paris.

Such a march could only take von Kluck's footweary soldiers across the Allied front, exposing in the process a weakly guarded right flank to de Maunoury's swelling ranks - but for de Maunoury or anybody else to take advantage of that, they needed to know that von Kluck had made the fatal turn. The crucial discovery was again made by the RFC during a reconnaissance on 3 September. Macdonogh described their work in glowing terms: 'A magnificent air report was received disclosing the movements of all the Corps of the 1st. German Army diagonally South East across the map towards the Marne.' High praise indeed, for the reticent Macdonogh did not use words like magnificent readily. De Maunoury attacked, forcing von Kluck to retrace his steps to parry the French thrust. Once von Kluck's army was embroiled with de Maunoury's, the BEF at last pressed into the gap between the German armies, forcing both into hasty retirement and bringing about the collapse of Germany's attempt to win the war in the west.

Aerial reconnaissance had in fact done precisely what the cavalry of old had been wont to do and after the experience of the 1914 campaign the new air arm underwent considerable expansion..."

This part of Occleshaw's book is ostensibly dealing with the new Air Arm's usefulness to intelligence, but, given what was discussed earlier in this thread, was von Kluck's wild-goose chase after the BEF the reason he moved so far West in the first place? Did "acting with timidity", and failing to keep close contact with the BEF, and thus learning their actual line of march ultimately bring about the downfall of the von Schlieffen plan?

Cheers-salesie.

[Pete1052]

Click here to read about the facility in Alexandria, Virginia where the U.S. Government stored the captured German archives for about two decades after 1945. Years ago I read that the government copied the documents and returned the originals to Germany in about 1965. The building is now an art center that was constructed in 1918 as a U.S. Navy torpedo factory at the end of the Great War. It's ironic that a place as homely as this with such little architectural merit has been preserved, especially given that it's on prime real estate on the waterfront of the Potomac River. I know this message is a non sequitur but it ties in with both the German archives and the Great War.

[truthergw]

According to Sewell Tyng, The Campaign on the Marne, German High Command were convinced that The BEF had marched from and were were being supplied from Channel Ports. That is why von Kluck kept to the line he did. He was under the impression that the BEF would withdraw west or south west and he was endeavouring to cut their supply lines. They were of course, withdrawing on a line to the south and even east of south. Von Kluck, in his The March on Paris confirms this. He states in the foreword that he gives the situation as it was known to him and his staff at the time, without the benefit of hindsight. Tyng suggests this is one of the reasons Smith-Dorrien was able to slip away to the south after Le Cateau, von Kluck was looking for him to the west of his actual line of withdrawal.

[Robert Dunlop]

On the afternoon of 31 August... trekking towards the west, swarmed von der Marwitz's cavalry corps, the spearhead of von Kluck's masses.

salesie, Occleshaw said that the cavalry were moving 'west' on this date?

...it was Lanrezac, facing von Bulow, who inflicted a sharp check on the German Second Army at Guise.

Is Occleshaw suggesting that the Battle of Guise occurred in response to this move?

Robert

[salesie]

salesie, Occleshaw said that the cavalry were moving 'west' on this date?

Is Occleshaw suggesting that the Battle of Guise occurred in response to this move?

Robert

Robert, the section I posted is word for word what Occleshaw wrote, so you see the same words that I see. But remember, the context of this section is not a definitive evaluation of those actions, but just part of a section in his book devoted to explaining the usefulness of the new air arm to intelligence (intelligence operations being the sole theme of his book). And, to me it seemed to fit in nicely with previous discussions in this thread.

It seems to me that Occleshaw is saying that, according to the reports by two patrols of the RFC (his research gave him access to the original reports) on the afternoon of 31st August 1914, von Kluck's cavalry Corps was indeed moving west on that date, and that this information took everyone by surprise, and had significant consequences for the course of the war.

As for the purpose of the battle of Guise, I don't believe he is saying it was in response to this information but that it coincidentally helped the allies to plan their exploitation of the newly discovered gap between von Kluck and von Bulow - but, who knows, as I said earlier, his purpose in giving this information was not to define the battle of Guise, but to explain the importance of the new air arm to intelligence work.

Here's another section from Occleshaw, when dealing with the importance to intelligence of documents taken in contact with the enemy (some thirty-odd pages later), but it has plenty of relevance to the earlier piece I posted - he cites his source for this as his face-to-face interview with General Marshall-Cornwall:

"The prize catch would be a document which revealed the enemy's plans in their entirety. This happened only once for the Allies and then good luck smiled on the French rather than the British. In the mobile warfare of 1914 a German motor-car was ambushed by a French patrol and in the wreckage they found the body of a German cavalry officer who was acting as a liaison officer with von Kluck's First Army. More important than the dead officer was his bag, which was hurried off to the Intelligence staff of the French Fifth Army. To the amazement and delight of the new owners, it was found to contain documents and a map, albeit gruesomely smeared with the blood of their late bearer. They were von Kluck's orders to his subordinate commanders for the critical turn to the east, and the bloodstained map revealed the precise lines of advance for all the corps of the First Army, together with their destinations for that evening, all pointing to the south-east and the valley of the River Ourcq. These documents, in association with the reports of the airborne observers, gave Marshal Joffre and the demigods of the GQG the vital information which persuaded them to fight on the Marne rather than continue their energy-sapping retreat behind Paris."

Cheers-salesie.

[Robert Dunlop]

... as I said earlier, his purpose in giving this information was not to define the battle of Guise, but to explain the importance of the new air arm to intelligence work.

salesie, thanks for double-checking. I agree that Occleshaw's quote needs to be seen in this light only. There are multiple inaccuracies. First, the example was arguably not 'the first big breakthrough for aerial reconnaissance'. There were numerous RFC flights prior to the Battle of Mons that indicated a significant German force was descending on the BEF. As to the westward movement, Sir John French's Operation Order for 31st August, issued at 8.50 pm, noted that "the enemy appears to have completed his westerly movement and was today pivoting around to the south, large columns having been observed advancing in a southerly or south-easterly direction on the front Noyon-Compiegne from about Roye-Montdidier. This advance is covered by at least two Cavalry Divisions who reached the Oise this afternoon." It was the change in direction to the south that was significant, not the previous westward movement.

A gap had opened up between the German First and Second Armies prior to the 31st, but it was filled by the German Guard and 5th Cavalry Divisions, both in the German H.K.K. 1 (1st Cavalry Corps). General von der Marwitz's 2nd Cavalry Corps were moving almost due south. I believe this was the force referred to in Sir John's OO. On the date in question, the cavalry of H.K.K. 1 were moving almost due east, trying to get in behind the French Fifth Army after the Battle of Guise, which had been launched by Lanrezac on the 29th August (as ordered by Joffre to help protect the BEF).

Robert

[salesie]

salesie, thanks for double-checking. I agree that Occleshaw's quote needs to be seen in this light only. There are multiple inaccuracies. First, the example was arguably not 'the first big breakthrough for aerial reconnaissance'. There were numerous RFC flights prior to the Battle of Mons that indicated a significant German force was descending on the BEF. As to the westward movement, Sir John French's Operation Order for 31st August, issued at 8.50 pm, noted that "the enemy appears to have completed his westerly movement and was today pivoting around to the south, large columns having been observed advancing in a southerly or south-easterly direction on the front Noyon-Compiegne from about Roye-Montdidier. This advance is covered by at least two Cavalry Divisions who reached the Oise this afternoon." It was the change in direction to the south that was significant, not the previous westward movement.

A gap had opened up between the German First and Second Armies prior to the 31st, but it was filled by the German Guard and 5th Cavalry Divisions, both in the German H.K.K. 1 (1st Cavalry Corps). General von der Marwitz's 2nd Cavalry Corps were moving almost due south. I believe this was the force referred to in Sir John's OO. On the date in question, the cavalry of H.K.K. 1 were moving almost due east, trying to get in behind the French Fifth Army after the Battle of Guise, which had been launched by Lanrezac on the 29th August (as ordered by Joffre to help protect the BEF).

Robert

Robert, you're right, there were aerial reports prior to Mons and none were believed - this episode, according to Occleshaw, was the first big breakthrough for the air arm. And, also according to Occleshaw, it was Haig who gave the air arm its next big boost i.e. "When Trenchard tried to give the reports of aerial observation to an artillery general during the battle of Neuve Chapelle in 1915, he was curtly told that the general was busy fighting a war, too busy to 'turn round and deal with your toys of the air'. Trenchard noted in his private papers that, 'After the battle I reported to Sir Douglas Haig and told him of the incident ... He assembled all his Gunner Generals at once and told them he was not going to have any more "early Victorian" methods. He was going to use the air in this war, and they had to use it.'"

Also, you may be right about von Marwitz's 2nd Cavalry Corps moving due south on that date, but the aerial reports sourced by Occleshaw say not, they say von Marwitz's 2nd Cavalry were moving west. And the plans captured by the French gave von Kluck's forces' first destination as the Ourcq not the Oise. Perhaps, these were not the troops that Sir John French referred to in his operational order after all?

However, all this is irrelevant to my main point within the context of this thread. It seems that, whatever the dates, von Kluck moved too far West after Le Cateau. So, given what was discussed earlier in this thread, was von Kluck's "wild-goose chase" in pursuit of the BEF the reason he moved too far West in the first place? Did "acting with timidity", and failing to keep close contact with the BEF, and thus learning their true line of march, ultimately bring about the downfall of the von Schlieffen plan?

Cheers-salesie.

[Robert Dunlop]

Tom, thanks. The first question to raise is what reliance should we place on a non-German observer as to the pre-war tactical and operational methods of the German army? Put another way, if the situation were reversed, would we consider going to German sources as the best way to learn about the British army? I suspect that the answer to this latter question would be a categorical 'no'. Atteridge's comments are of considerable interest (and thank you again for posting them). But they must be reviewed in this light, IMHO.

Leaving this point aside, however, it is worth considering at least one other contemporary British review of German pre-war infantry tactics. The British General Staff issued the 'Handbook of the German Army (Home and Colonial)' in 1912. The IWM and Battery Press have reprinted the version that was amended to August 1914 (ISBN: 1-901623-47-5). The section entitled 'Infantry' (pp 234-35) provides the following observations:

"Infantry tactics have altered but little in principle in the last 14 or 15 years, although modifications have of late been introduced as regards extension during the opening phases of an attack.

There are three recognised phases in the attack. The forming up or assembly (Aufmarsch); the deployment (Entfaltung) and the extension (Entwickelung).

Forming up consists in changing from march formations to formations with a broader front, but still close, such as battalions in column or lines of companies in column of route.

Extension is the distribution of troops in fighting formations in the form of skirmishing lines.

As a rule, forming up takes place some 2,500 yards from the enemy, but this must necessarily depend on the circumstances of terrain, etc.

Similarly deployment is dependent on hostile fire and varies accordingly, but generally speaking may be said to take place at from 2,000 to 1,500 yards from the enemy's position.

This advance takes the form of successive lines, firing line, supports and reserves, with roughly 300 yards between each, though the usual endeavour is to keep reserves in echelon on one or both flanks.

At manoeuvres the original extension now varies from 4 to 6 paces between men, and is sometimes as much as 10 paces, though the Regulations lay down 2 paces as the normal, and state as a guide that a company at war strength (250) will require 165 yards, and a brigade of six battalions 1,650 yards. But the tendency at present, as shown above, is to increase the original intervals between men.

The firing line is gradually increased in density, and since casualties, at any rate at manoeuvres, are not practised, by the time the final line position, viz 160 yards or so from the enemy is reached, the line is a very thick one.

The various advances consist of movements of some 50 to 100 yards, but as they are not often carried out at the double, they can scarcely be termed rushes.

The Regulations are very precise as to the necessity for the provision of covering fire during these movements.

The tendency is produce somewhat rigid and inelastic lines, although the regulations distinctly contemplate elasticity as shown in the following:-

The infantry combat often presents the most varied situations at different points of the same battlefield.

If an opportunity to advance presents itself to any unit or portion of a unit - whether a group, half-section, section or company - it is the duty of the commander to use it.

Too great regularity in the forward movement of units is to be avoided, though due care must be taken that portions of the line do not, in advancing, interfere with the fire of the men lying down in the rear.

From the foregoing it is evident that the German Regulations and our own are not so different in principle as is sometimes asserted."

In the section on the tactics of machine-gun units (p. 121), the following sentence appears:

"As regards the method of attack against machine-guns, the principle employed is to use wide extensions and short rushes by small groups."

In the section on infantry special badges and marks (p. 111), there is reference to:

"Shooting badges - For individual marksmen: A plaited cord from right shoulder to top button of tunic. For best shooting company or battery of an Army Corps: Laurel wreath with crossed rifles or guns on right arm."

Robert

[salesie]

Tom, thanks. The first question to raise is what reliance should we place on a non-German observer as to the pre-war tactical and operational methods of the German army? Put another way, if the situation were reversed, would we consider going to German sources as the best way to learn about the British army?

Robert

Robert, I hate to say this, I really do - but are you not Belgian by nationality? So, by your own criteria, what reliance should we place on your own, non-German, non-British, observations of the German and British armies in WW1 - should your own observations be restricted to those of the Belgian Army alone? Of course not - so please stop being so silly.

Cheers-salesie.

[Robert Dunlop]

salesie, the British Official History records that on 21st August "the morning... broke thick and misty, rending aerial reconnaissance impossible until the afternoon. In the afternoon the weather cleared and the Flying Corps was able to carry out reconnaissances. It reported a large body of cavalry with some infantry and guns south-east of Nivelles. This intelligence was confirmed, and the formation identified as the German 9th Cavalry Division, by a British intelligence officer who was in Nivelles when the division entered, but escaped by motor." At 11.55 pm on the 21st, GHQ issued Operation Order No. 6, which indicated that "Two hostile Cavalry columns are reported moving S. and S.W. from the neighbourhood of Nivelles..." It was on the basis of this information that 1st Cavalry Division deployed in a defensive posture, and that the two infantry corps then formed up to defend the area around Mons.

I vividly recall the interview in the BBC series on the Great War in which an RFC pilot was interviewed. He described observing a significant German infantry force south of Brussels. Upon landing he spoke directly to General French, who allegedly pooh-poohed the information. Irrespective of this anecdote, Macdonogh clearly got the information about the German cavalry through and it was published in the OO. Nice work by the Flying Corps, supported by intelligence services on the ground.

Robert

[salesie]

salesie, the British Official History records that on 21st August "the morning... broke thick and misty, rending aerial reconnaissance impossible until the afternoon. In the afternoon the weather cleared and the Flying Corps was able to carry out reconnaissances. It reported a large body of cavalry with some infantry and guns south-east of Nivelles. This intelligence was confirmed, and the formation identified as the German 9th Cavalry Division, by a British intelligence officer who was in Nivelles when the division entered, but escaped by motor." At 11.55 pm on the 21st, GHQ issued Operation Order No. 6, which indicated that "Two hostile Cavalry columns are reported moving S. and S.W. from the neighbourhood of Nivelles..." It was on the basis of this information that 1st Cavalry Division deployed in a defensive posture, and that the two infantry corps then formed up to defend the area around Mons.

I vividly recall the interview in the BBC series on the Great War in which an RFC pilot was interviewed. He described observing a significant German infantry force south of Brussels. Upon landing he spoke directly to General French, who allegedly pooh-poohed the information. Irrespective of this anecdote, Macdonogh clearly got the information about the German cavalry through and it was published in the OO. Nice work by the Flying Corps, supported by intelligence services on the ground.

Robert

Robert, I'm aware of all of this, but the aerial report was not believed until confirmed by conventional means (I saw the very same programme) - what you're arguing about are the words first and big, but it's not me you're arguing with it's Dr Michael Occleshaw, and he probably knows all about it as well, but he's not here - perhaps you could google his name, get an email address, and have a go at him directly?

Now, all of this is completely irrelevant to my point, so is there any chance of getting back on track instead of being waylaid by your pedantic, spurious points?

I'll repeat my question to see if anyone can manage an answer: It seems that, whatever the dates, von Kluck moved too far West after Le Cateau. So, given what was discussed earlier in this thread, was von Kluck's "wild-goose chase" in pursuit of the BEF the reason he moved too far West in the first place? Did "acting with timidity", and failing to keep close contact with the BEF and thus learning their true line of march, ultimately bring about the downfall of the von Schlieffen plan?

Cheers-salesie.

[Robert Dunlop]

Did "acting with timidity", and failing to keep close contact with the BEF, and thus learning their true line of march, ultimately bring about the downfall of the von Schlieffen plan?

No. If anything, it was von Kluck's failure to appreciate the significance of the threat from the west, specifically the growing strength of Maunoury's Sixth Army and Joffre's efforts to outflank the First Army because of its turn south and then southeast. The issue of von Kluck's drawing away to the west is relevant perhaps to the specific point about enveloping the BEF. But the BEF forces that advanced on Mons and then fell back in the retreat never formed the absolute left (western-most) flank of the Franco-British forces. Von Kluck consistently dismissed the various French units that his Army came up against on its right (western) flank, such as at Tournai, Cambrai, Peronne, etc. Ultimately, however, it was this flank that caught him out.

Robert

[salesie]

No. If anything, it was von Kluck's failure to appreciate the significance of the threat from the west, specifically the growing strength of Maunoury's Sixth Army and Joffre's efforts to outflank the First Army because of its turn south and then southeast. The issue of von Kluck's drawing away to the west is relevant perhaps to the specific point about enveloping the BEF. But the BEF forces that advanced on Mons and then fell back in the retreat never formed the absolute left (western-most) flank of the Franco-British forces. Von Kluck consistently dismissed the various French units that his Army came up against on its right (western) flank, such as at Tournai, Cambrai, Peronne, etc. Ultimately, however, it was this flank that caught him out.

Robert

Thankyou - so, after Le Cateau, von Kluck wasn't trying the "cheaper" option of starving the BEF on the vine by cutting its lines of communication with the Channel ports, rather than maintain the "more expensive", but better informed, close-contact option as he had done between Mons and Le Cateau?

If not, why did he go too far West if he believed there was nothing there to trouble him?

Cheers-salesie.

[Robert Dunlop]

To understand von Kluck's move to the "west" after Le Cateau, it is important to go back before the 31st August. Occleshaw has got the direction muddled on that date. First Army had been travelling almost due southwest after leaving Brussels. It was almost a straight line until the 28th, when it took a slightly more westerly direction. Von Kluck recorded that:

"On the 27th August, after the day's fighting (including Le Cateau) the Army stood in two groups ready to attack the Somme positions. [Von Kluck gives a detailed description of his forces' locations and then notes that] The Second Army was to advance, its right wing moving by Catillon, south-east of Le Cateau, through Bohain towards St. Quentin [ie in a southwesterly direction, so at the very least he had to move to the southwest as well]. The [First Army's] corps were to keep close on the heels of the retreating enemy with their cavalry and field batteries, so as to increase his general disorder and be able to attack him at the Somme crossings. By these orders the Army Commander hoped to be able to outflank the Somme salient from north and east by pushing forward his right wing and thus force the crossings, with the II Corps at Bray and Corbie, the IV. Reserve Corps and the Cavalry Corps above Bray and downstream from Peronne, the IV. Corps at Peronne, the III. Corps above the bend of the Somme at Brie and St. Christ, and the IX. Corps, coming up on the following day, at Falvy and Bethancourt."

Then:

"During the afternoon of the 28th a wireless message was received at Army Headquarters in Villers Faucon [with a message of congratulations from the Kaiser]. At this period the Headquarters of the First Army summed up the situation as follows: 'The left wing of the main French forces is retreating in a southerly and south-westerly direction in front of the victorious Second and Third Armies. It appears to be of decisive importance to find the flank of this force, whether retreating or in position force it away from Paris, and outflank it. Compared with this objective, the attempt to force the British Army away from the coast is of minor importance."

This led up to the subsequent turn south on the 31st August.

Robert

[Paul Hederer]

...loss of the German archives in WWII presents a problem....

I would add lack of use of what did survive as an additional factor. Has anyone looked in the German military archives for the time period being dicussed? Who knows what "secrets" sit undiscovered in Freiburg. There is an entire file for losses at Verdun--down to the regimental level. Before we discount the surviving archives it would be good if someone actually engaged in some research and went trhough the material there on this phase of the war

Paul

[salesie]

To understand von Kluck's move to the "west" after Le Cateau, it is important to go back before the 31st August. Occleshaw has got the direction muddled on that date. First Army had been travelling almost due southwest after leaving Brussels. It was almost a straight line until the 28th, when it took a slightly more westerly direction. Von Kluck recorded that:

"On the 27th August, after the day's fighting (including Le Cateau) the Army stood in two groups ready to attack the Somme positions. [Von Kluck gives a detailed description of his forces' locations and then notes that] The Second Army was to advance, its right wing moving by Catillon, south-east of Le Cateau, through Bohain towards St. Quentin [ie in a southwesterly direction, so at the very least he had to move to the southwest as well]. The [First Army's] corps were to keep close on the heels of the retreating enemy with their cavalry and field batteries, so as to increase his general disorder and be able to attack him at the Somme crossings. By these orders the Army Commander hoped to be able to outflank the Somme salient from north and east by pushing forward his right wing and thus force the crossings, with the II Corps at Bray and Corbie, the IV. Reserve Corps and the Cavalry Corps above Bray and downstream from Peronne, the IV. Corps at Peronne, the III. Corps above the bend of the Somme at Brie and St. Christ, and the IX. Corps, coming up on the following day, at Falvy and Bethancourt."

Then:

"During the afternoon of the 28th a wireless message was received at Army Headquarters in Villers Faucon [with a message of congratulations from the Kaiser]. At this period the Headquarters of the First Army summed up the situation as follows: 'The left wing of the main French forces is retreating in a southerly and south-westerly direction in front of the victorious Second and Third Armies. It appears to be of decisive importance to find the flank of this force, whether retreating or in position force it away from Paris, and outflank it. Compared with this objective, the attempt to force the British Army away from the coast is of minor importance."

This led up to the subsequent turn south on the 31st August.

Robert

This seems to be saying (I think) that von Kluck didn't venture too far west, that no gap opened between von Kluck and von Bulow (I think), that von Bulow didn't request help because of Guise (I think), that it was all part of the plan (I think)? Any chance of a translation, Robert?

Cheers-salesie.

[Robert Dunlop]

It says that von Kluck ventured west. 'Too far' is a relative term and cannot be deduced from what von Kluck wrote. 'Not far enough' was my description further up, which should be applied to the outer limit of the German right wing, as opposed to the narrower focus of von Kluck's First Army. The reason for adding this point is that the First Army could not extend itself to the coast and remain a threat, IMHO.

The highlighted paragraphs make no mention of the gap between von Kluck and von Buelow. As a result of the Battle of Guise, and the presence of the French Fifth Army, von Buelow's Second Army slowed down. With the slight westward deviation, and the continuing forward drive of von Kluck's First Army, a gap opened up between the main bodies of both armies. First Army became echeloned forward in respect to Second Army, even though First Army was on the outer rim of the wheeling movement (ie had the furthest distance to travel). Von Kluck was not timid.

As I noted above, the area between the main bodies of the armies was not a void space. The 'gap' between 17th ID and the rest of First Army was screened by the German cavalry.

There is no information above with respect to von Buelow's requesting help or not. The Battle of Guise took place on the next day, the 29th. During the 28th, and again on the 29th, von Kluck's right wing came in contact with French forces, which fought delaying actions or fell back. On the 28th, the German High Command sent the following order to von Kluck: "The First Army, with the II Cavalry Corps under its orders, will march west of the Oise towards the lower Seine. It must be prepared to cooperate in the fighting of the Second Army. It will also be responsible for the protection of the right flank of the Armies, and will take steps to prevent any new enemy concentration in its zone of operations."

In response to the Battle of Guise, the 17th Infantry Division was detached from First Army and assigned to Second Army for a temporary period. First Army itself continued west southwest, echeloned forward as described, until it turned south on the 31st August.

Occleshaw appears to have muddled several things together. He was, as you said, making a point about the role that air reconnaissance could play during the war of movement. With the greatest of respect to Dr Occleshaw, you should not, however, take the details of his account too seriously with respect to the actions of von Kluck's First Army. The significant event that was observed, and confirmed by the captured orders, was the southerly then southeasterly change in direction of the First Army. If anything this movement narrowed any gap between First and Second Armies. In any case, this gap (which was at its widest prior to 31st August) was not of great operational significance. The big gap was that which occurred when von Kluck, having headed in a southeasterly direction, was taken in the right flank by Maunoury's Sixth Army. Von Kluck then held his outer right flank in place and pivoted his inner left flank (nearest to von Buelow's Second Army) round to meet Maunoury, creating an enormous gap into which the BEF and supporting French forces penetrated.

Are you wanting to make a more general point about von Kluck's and/or von Buelow's actions during this period of the Franco-British retreat?

Robert

[Halder]

...loss of the German archives in WWII presents a problem....

I would add lack of use of what did survive as an additional factor. Has anyone looked in the German military archives for the time period being dicussed? Who knows what "secrets" sit undiscovered in Freiburg. There is an entire file for losses at Verdun--down to the regimental level. Before we discount the surviving archives it would be good if someone actually engaged in some research and went trhough the material there on this phase of the war

Paul

I'm guessing Paul that rather more survives than has often been assumed - particularly with the merger of material once held by the DDR. From what I've read in Annika Mombauer and Robert Foley's excellent works there's considerable material out there - especially that gathered for the official histories. I'm ashamed to say that on my visits to Freiburg I've never even looked through the Reichsheer Findbuecher, let alone ordered any Great War material, so fixated have I been on the copious WW2 documents. One day, perhaps...

I would also not be too surprised if the various Nachlassen/Msg series don't hold some real hidden gems that historians are only just beginning to tap. From what WW2 Nachlassen I've had a flick through, there's quite a lot of official and semi-official material within the personal papers.

[Paul Hederer]

I'm guessing Paul that rather more survives than has often been assumed - particularly with the merger of material once held by the DDR. From what I've read in Annika Mombauer and Robert Foley's excellent works there's considerable material out there - especially that gathered for the official histories. I'm ashamed to say that on my visits to Freiburg I've never even looked through the Reichsheer Findbuecher, let alone ordered any Great War material, so fixated have I been on the copious WW2 documents. One day, perhaps...

I would also not be too surprised if the various Nachlassen/Msg series don't hold some real hidden gems that historians are only just beginning to tap. From what WW2 Nachlassen I've had a flick through, there's quite a lot of official and semi-official material within the personal papers.

Richard,

Judging from the material that survives for Verdun I think the same. It's also catalogued poorly. The researchers extracted what they needed for the section they were writing and often these materials are not reflected at all the the catalogue. Whole sections of war diaries, booklets of facts and figures, and other materials long thought destroyed were copied and placed in these working folders.

Paul

[Tom A McCluskey]

Tom, thanks. The first question to raise is what reliance should we place on a non-German observer as to the pre-war tactical and operational methods of the German army? Put another way, if the situation were reversed, would we consider going to German sources as the best way to learn about the British army? I suspect that the answer to this latter question would be a categorical 'no'. Atteridge's comments are of considerable interest (and thank you again for posting them). But they must be reviewed in this light, IMHO.

I don't really need to answer this as Salsie has suitably answered this for me

However, I will add that If you read Bloem's 1916 version of events, it differs from his original. In "Invicta" With the 1st Battalion The Queen's Own Royal West Kent Regiment by Major C V Molony, you will see that it is only A Coy with no machine-guns that are up against Bloem's battalion:

"we were exposed to machine guns, but there were many, which shot excellently and were absolutely invisible [from Bloem]." Though this may have been may have been written in good faith, Capt Bloem is almost ccertainly mistaking rapid rifle fire for that of machine guns. At that time the British Army, compared with the Germans, had very few of the latter weapons. .

Neither of the two machine guns belonging to the Battalion was with "A" Company. The truth is that very few German Officers then had any conception of the capabilities of the rifle in British hands. Since the South African War an immense advance in musketry training had been made, and the quick and neat manipulation of the bolt of the rifle had received as much attention as accurate shooting. This had entailed much hard work, and the British Infantry in general, and the Queen's Own Regiment in particular, should be very grateful to Capt. Bloem for his testimony to the result of their labours.

Do I think the Germans carried out a Deliberate Attack? Yes I do. Albeit you may see it as an Advance to Contact. As soon as Corporal Drummer Thomas fired his rifle at the Germans on the 22nd of August, the Germans knew that the British would not be too far away, by virtue of coming into contact with their cavalry screen. Also, when the German's guns opened up on the morning of the 23rd of August, they had a rough idea that the British were in the area.

Reference your paragraph on the German's tactics: I think you are crediting the German infantry with too much tactical competence, and ability to adapt. When you see them even at section level, they are shoulder to shoulder and layers deep. An example of this can be seen in episode 4 of The Great War on the 1st DVD at 28:39. In all honesty, because of their formation, on level ground, they may as well be in a line.

Again, reference their musketry (again from "Invicta"), also bearing in mind that regardless of the amount of time speant on training, it has to be valid and quality training:

What seemed to impress the rank and file, almost more than the unpleasantness of the German shell fire, was the very low standard, compared with their own, of the German rifle fire. "The Germans couldn't hit a haystack," said one private. A lance corporal remarked, "The Germans came across the valley in front of us in thousands, but their rifle fire as they were advancing was absolutely rotten, while the only damage inflicted was wrought by the big guns which covered their advance."

I think I have covered musketry and tactics enough now.

Aye

Tom McC

[Robert Dunlop]

Tom, I am uncertain about your first response. The wink suggests you may not agree with what salesie said/the way he said it. Have I misunderstood this? It is so hard to tell with electronic messages.

Later in your post, you noted:

Reference your paragraph on the German's tactics: I think you are crediting the German infantry with too much tactical competence, and ability to adapt.

Are you referring to what I posted here? If so, then I am sorry that I wasn't clear. None of what was posted about German tactics was written by me, only transcribed. It was all material quoted from the British General Staff publication from 1914.

This being the case, it seems that there are some differences between what Atteridge noted pre-war versus what his General Staff colleagues noted, and the interpretations placed thereon.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

In "Invicta" With the 1st Battalion The Queen's Own Royal West Kent Regiment by Major C V Molony, you will see that it is only A Coy with no machine-guns that are up against Bloem's battalion:

"we were exposed to machine guns, but there were many, which shot excellently and were absolutely invisible [from Bloem]." Though this may have been may have been written in good faith, Capt Bloem is almost certainly mistaking rapid rifle fire for that of machine guns. "

Thanks, Tom. It is good to have more details from the British perspective. I am not sure that A Company was the only unit that brought fire to bear on Bloem's men. Captain Wynne, who translated and annotated the English version of Bloem's account 'Vormarsch', noted that the enfilading machine gun fire referred to by Bloem (and some of the rifle fire) was coming from "the machine-gun section of the East Surrey Regiment and part of C Company that were in position in this part of the wood [on the north side of the canal and on the right flank of Bloem's company]". I have not been able to find any details about the East Surrey's, other than what was published in the British Official History.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

What seemed to impress the rank and file, almost more than the unpleasantness of the German shell fire, was the very low standard, compared with their own, of the German rifle fire.

Tom, what time period/battle was this quote referring to? Thanks.

Robert