The "machine guns" of Mons ?

[phil andrade]

There are also serious question marks over the German Army's (changing) methods of collecting and recording casualty data in the first place between 1914-1818, which has not been given the attention it is due by those asking us to base sweeping reassessments of accounts in the British historiography, from those of James Edmonds to Richard Holmes', upon German accounts which later interpreted them. Regards,

George

George,

The case against Edmonds seems pretty damning. I, for one, would welcome your contribution in defence of the BOH. Did you manage to prepare your post on this?

Phil.

[Robert Dunlop]

It seems to me that a German cavalry screen offered very little in terms of security

saliesie, not if you consider what the BEF did after the action at Nèry. As you know, there were other competent rear guard actions against the German cavalry, Moy being another example. But none of these events, Nèry included, stopped the inexorable advance of the Germans. The BEF protected themselves well but did not threaten the 'gap'. The German cavalry screen more than did its job.

I still say it was the initial loss of synchronisation of movement that was the German Army's primary error; if von Kluck hadn't become "separated" from von Bulow in the first place then he wouldn't have needed to turn the way he did.

It was not the primary error. I will draft a map that illustrates the width of the various German armies, which emphasizes the gap that existed beyond von Kluck's western flank.

Robert

[salesie]

saliesie, not if you consider what the BEF did after the action at Nèry. As you know, there were other competent rear guard actions against the German cavalry, Moy being another example. But none of these events, Nèry included, stopped the inexorable advance of the Germans. The BEF protected themselves well but did not threaten the 'gap'. The German cavalry screen more than did its job.

It was not the primary error. I will draft a map that illustrates the width of the various German armies, which emphasizes the gap that existed beyond von Kluck's western flank.

Robert

The BEF did not threaten the gap, Robert? A few days later, after Joffre had completed his plans, the BEF, with french assistance, drove right into that gap and turned the inexorable German advance into a wholesale withdrawal back the way they came! It seems you are not only losing sight of the causal linkages but also the end-result?

Cheers-salesie.

[Robert Dunlop]

The German 4th Cavalry Division's attack on the 1st Cavalry Brigade at Nèry was beaten off by determined defensive work by the Brigade, and by the prompt counter-attacks from the brigade, other cavalry and the infantry that responded quickly. A local success on the battlefield. But the German attack had a more profound general effect that is often overlooked. This is evident from the War Diary of the British 1st Cavalry Division.

On the 1st September:

"The enemy was not met with again although persistent rumours were heard of the Cavalry Division of the Guard in the direction of BARON and VERSIGNY. At 6 pm news was received that an ammunition column belonging to the 4th Division had been cut up near ERMENONVILLE, by German Guard Cavalry, which confirmed the persistent rumour during the afternoon that some German cavalry, probably a raiding party, had penetrated south."

The following day:

"VILLENEUVE sous DAMMARTIN Sept 2nd – During the day the 1st Brigade forming the rear guard came across traces of German Cavalry as shown in message No PA55 attached. Many alarmist messages came in during the afternoon as shown in G.71 attached. This last message necessitated a contradictory message being sent to all HQs of Corps. See G(a)111 attached."

The German attack spread a degree of uncertainty amongst the BEF. Far from being an inadequate security screen, the German cavalry maintained pressure on the retreating BEF. No gap existed at this time, although the First and Second Armies were separated.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Here is the map showing the actual movements of the 1st through 5th German Armies. These are overlaid on a well-known map showing the movements envisaged in the 'Schlieffen Plan':

Robert

[salesie]

Sorry, Robert, but that latest map of yours is as clear as mud. It seems to me you're saying that the First and Second armies "separated" around the 27th August (the day after Le Cateau), and this gap widened to some thirty miles by the 31st protected by a cavalry screen. But from the 31st von Kluck turned south-east to close with von Bulow again, thus exposing his right flank to de Maunoury's 6th army, who attacked several days later, and this attacked forced von Kluck to turn to meet it thus opening up the gap once more to thirty miles which the BEF drove into. But, because of the cavalry screen, there was in effect no gap between the two German armies from the 27th up until de Maunoury's assault - that the German cavalry prevented any drive into the initial gap.

Apart from the fact that if von Kluck and von Bulow had not separated on the 27th then von Kluck would not have needed to turn south-east on the 31st, thus exposing his right flank, which gives us a clear causal link to the initial separation, but, also, these actions bring up an obvious observation i.e. there was no attempt to drive into the initial gap. Joffre wasn't ready to pounce, so what you're actually saying is that the security system (German cavalry) kept the burglars (the allies) at bay whilst making no attempt to break-in. However, we all know that the burglars did in fact successfully break-in several days later, so what happened to the security system when it was actually needed?

Cheers-salesie.

[Tom A McCluskey]

Robert,

I think the map tends to show that the Schlieffen Plan is not working and that 'sending the police to arrest the English [sic] army' is not an option any more. Von Kluck's 1st Army is supposed to arc around Paris, and attack the French (now the Allies) in the rear. I also think you are crediting the German cavalry with too much talent as well.

Aye

Tom McC

[Ralph J. Whitehead]

I have been able to locate the casualty lists for three additional regiments from the period covering Mons and Le Cateau.

The first is the 12th Grenadier Regiment, the one mentioned in the book 'The Advance from Mons' by Hauptmann Bloem. This book or at least several sections have long been used to describe the devastating events to the attacking German infantry at Mons and is one of the few first hand German accounts I have seen of this action.

The regimental account states that the losses amongst the NCOs and men cannot be determined exactly because some of the 137 missing turned up later and others were not reported dead until later. The regimental Verlustliste states: 11 officers, 62 men killed, 16 officers, 401 OR wounded, 137 OR missing.

The regiment continued to advance with the army and played a role in the storming of hills south of Hornu. After that their next engagement was not until 1 September near Villers Cotterets and then 4 September at Bellot. Unfortunately there was no list of losses presented for this period. However, the biggest impact to the regiment was probably Mons as outlined in Bloem's book.

The lists for this regiment did not appear until the 3rd, 16th and 20th of October, not unusual considering the losses that were reported. There were a few lists published previously to these dates that contained names of men who were casualties in the fighting in early September.

First list.

I Bn: VL 41, 3 October 1914. The list covered the period from 23 August through 15 September 1914.

4 officers, 47 OR killed; 9 officers, 268 OR wounded; 23 OR missing.

(Bloem's Company losses as reported: 2nd Coy, 16 OR killed; 1 officer, 3 OR severely wounded; 1 officer, 9 OR slightly wounded; 2 officers, 34 OR wounded and 6 OR missing)

2nd list.

I Bn and Fusilier Bn from 23 August to 24 September 1914 and 26 and 27 September 1914.

28 OR killed; 3 officers, 125 OR wounded; 23 OR missing.

3rd list.

II Bn from 23 August and 4, 5 and 14 September 1914.

3 officers, 42 OR killed; 5 officers, 235 OR wounded; 145 OR missing.

The total from the casualty lists from October 1914 were:

7 officers, 117 OR killed; 17 officers, 628 OR wounded, 191 OR missing. The total is 24 officers, 936 OR as casualties.

The regimental account gives the losses for part of this period as:

11 officers, 62 OR killed; 16 officers, 401 OR wounded; 137 OR missing. The total is 27 officers, 600 OR as casualties.

I will look at the subsequent casualty lists to see what corrections were made to the status of the missing men as the original casualty lists show 191 OR missing while the regimental account lists 137 OR as missing. I will also try to locate any reference to the losses suffered in the September fighting to see how it impacts the overall numbers by eliminating the losses from the September period.

Regardless of the possible corrections made as missing men were found or determined to be dead it was odd to see the names of the men mentioned by Bloem in his book also listed on the regimental casualty returns. I will have to look through the book once again as I do not recall Hauptmann Bloem being wounded at Mons but at a later date. His name is listed under the 2nd Company losses but considering the dates the list covers it is quite probable this entry does reflect a

casualty from the later period covered in list No. 1 as described above.

Ralph

[Ralph J. Whitehead]

The second regiment I reviewed over the last few days was the 36th Fusilier regiment. The reported losses from the regimental accounts indicate that the losses were:

3 officers, 51 OR killed; 14 officers, 341 OR wounded; no officers or men missing.

There were three casualty lists printed for this regiment that cover the period from just before Le Cateau to the fighting on 26 August.

Prussian List 37, printed 27 September and covers the I Bn for the period of 25 and 26 August 1914.

1 officer, 21 OR killed; 2 officers, 94 OR wounded.

Prussian List 39, printed 1 October 1914 covered the II Bn for the period of 26 August 1914.

13 OR killed; 6 officers, 154 OR wounded; 22 OR missing.

Prussian List 33, printed 24 September 1914 covered the IIII Bn and MG Coy for the period of 18-26 August 1914.

1 officer, 18 OR killed; 4 officers, 99 OR wounded.

Total from the casualty lists:

14 officers, 421 OR

Total from the regimental account:

17 officers, 392 OR

The periods covered in both accounts match fairly closely so while there is a small difference in numbers we still have to look at the final disposition of the missing OR to determine if they were actual losses or simply men who became separated from their regiment and returned. this can be determined by checking the correction portion of later lists where items such as spelling, birthplace and nature of casualty were corrected if additional information was obtained.

Ralph

[Robert Dunlop]

I think the map tends to show that the Schlieffen Plan is not working and that 'sending the police to arrest the English [sic] army' is not an option any more.

Tom, I totally agree. The issue is whether the plan was not working because the First and Second Armies became unhinged, somewhat. IMHO, the map clearly illustrates that the German forces in the wheel were simply not strong enough.

It should be noted that the primary mission was to destroy the French army, not circle around Paris. As it happened, the two were related but if the Franco-British left wing had not reached Paris, then it would have been perfectly appropriate to envelop that wing by going inside Paris. Speed was of the essence, but in the case of von Kluck the southeasterly turn was too soon because he was never going to outflank the French.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

...that latest map of yours is as clear as mud.

Salesie, it would become clearer if you let go of Occleshaw's incorrect interpretation of the flight on 31st August.

Apart from the fact that if von Kluck and von Bulow had not separated on the 27th then von Kluck would not have needed to turn south-east on the 31st, thus exposing his right flank, which gives us a clear causal link to the initial separation

With respect, this is an incorrect interpretation of why von Kluck turned south and then southeast. His mission was not to stay close to von Bülow. It was to envelop the Franco-British left wing.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

However, we all know that the burglars did in fact successfully break-in several days later, so what happened to the security system when it was actually needed?

Fear not, salesie. I will provide some analysis on this. It is pertinent to the comparision between the British performance on the withdrawal to the Marne versus the German withdrawal to the Aisne.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

I also think you are crediting the German cavalry with too much talent as well.

Tom, the performance of the German cavalry will come up again during the German retreat to the Aisne and during the Race to the Sea, particularly in the area just north of Lens.

Robert

[Ralph J. Whitehead]

The final regimental review for the present concerns IR 26. There were four lists to review covering different time periods but all appear to be related to the dates involved in this discussion.

The regimental accounts indicate that IR 26 lost the following men between 24 and 26 August 1914:

6 officers, 77 OR killed; 15 officers, 355 OR wounded, 360 OR missing. (According to the regimental account most of the missing men turned up at a later date.

The regimental losses were reported on four lists:

Prussian List 32, 23 September 1914 covering the I Bn. for the period from 21 - 28 August 1914.

3 officers, 36 OR killed; 12 officers, 172 OR wounded; 119 OR missing.

Prussian List 36, 27 September 1914 covering the II Bn for the period of 23 and 26 August 1914.

25 OR killed; 150 OR wounded; 7 OR missing.

Prussian List 35, 26 September 1914 covering the III Bn for the period of 23 August.

9 OR killed; 18 OR wounded.

Prussian List 42, 4 October 1914 covering the III Bn for the period of 26 and 28 August 1914.

7 OR killed; 62 OR wounded; 3 OR missing.

The regimental accounts report:

6 officers, 77 OR killed; 15 officers, 355 OR wounded; 360 OR missing for a total of 21 officers, 792 OR.

The Casualty lists report:

3 officers, 77 OR killed; 12 officers, 402 OR wounded; 129 OR missing for a total of 15 officers, 608 OR.

I still need to determine the final outcome of the missing men, possibly they did return to the regiment for the most part and this will be either confirmed by the findings or not. It is also possible that once the missing men were accounted for it did bring the actual loss number closer to the Verlustlisten numbers. This will need to be verified one way or the other.

I hope to have additional units to report shortly. I did take a quick look through the lists on cavalry and artillery units and while there were some listed their losses were quite low. I will not know the reported numbers until I can identify the exact units, find the related casualty returns and post them here.

I understand there is some concern by forum members over the method the German army used to report casualties. Since this is an area that I am interested in I would appreciate it if this could be elaborated on at some point in the future.

Ralph

[Tom A McCluskey]

Robert

Let's not jump the gun here; let's talk about them getting to the Aisne first. But firstly let's qualify and look at the route to beginning of the German failure to achieve the aims of the Schlieffen Plan. From The Mons Star, By David Ascoli, page 43:

The most significant error of all was simply one of German arrogance, shared equally by Schlieffen and Moltke. It was the assumption that the Belgians would stand aside and allow the Germans to walk over them; and that the British would not, at the eleventh hour, honour their pledge to go to war war in defence of Belgium's neutrality. It was one of the greatest errors of judgement in military history; and certainly one of the costliest. Total casualties in the Great War are conservatively put at 8,020,780 killed and 21,228,813 wounded - a bloody price to pay for a scrap of paper.

The German invasion of Belgium can be summarized shortly; and it is proper to record the resistance of the Belgian Army - six infantry divisions and one cavalry division - and the fortitude of the Liege and the Namur garrisons had an incalculable influence on the German offensive plan. It also called down upon the heads of the Belgian people the full savagery of a very savage military machine. The Germans had not expected any resistance. They responded with such brutality that even Moltke was shocked by his armies' excesses*. Let there be no doubt about German atrocities. They were in every sense atrocious.

* Moltke: Erinnerungen, Briefe, Dukumente, 1877-1916.

I will come back to the German Cavalry

Aye

Tom McC

[salesie]

Salesie, it would become clearer if you let go of Occleshaw's incorrect interpretation of the flight on 31st August.

With respect, this is an incorrect interpretation of why von Kluck turned south and then southeast. His mission was not to stay close to von Bülow. It was to envelop the Franco-British left wing.

Robert

Robert, your latest map is a clear as mud because the sudden and massive increase in scale disguises its context with the other maps. That said, I accepted quite a while ago, for the sake of this particular sub-argument, that Occleshaw's "interpretation" is irrelevant, it seems to be you that is obsessively refusing to let it go - I understand what you're saying, Robert, I just don't agree with your conclusions.

With respect, I'm afraid your logic is all over the place. It is clear that von Kluck's mission was not to stay close to von Bulow per se, otherwise he wouldn't have gone west, he would have mirrored von Bulow's movements. Also, and more importantly, on several occasions whilst debating this sub-thread, I've asked what you believe was von Kluck's intentions when carrying out the initial "separation" from von Bulow. Now, after going around the houses about cavalry screens and there being "no gap", you finally give an answer that he was attempting to "envelop the Franco-British left wing", which he actually says himself; his own words being posted twice by me earlier in this thread.

So, surely, the end-result being a German defeat on the Marne gives a clear causal link to the initial separation? It was a deliberate operational act, with a specific intent on von Kluck's part, to move away from von Bulow in the direction he did, but he failed in that intent, and he failed because his movements allowed Joffre to out-general both he and von Bulow.

I repeat; it seems clear that a German operational mistake (starting on the 27/28 August) enabled Joffre, with skill and excellent timing, to turn that mistake into a strategic disaster.

Cheers-salesie.

PS. If you think that I'm going to get involved in a diversionary debate comparing the respective British and German withdrawals then you have another think coming. Stick to the topic in hand or don't stick at all, Robert! If you want to debate that topic then start a new thread.

[salesie]

I still need to determine the final outcome of the missing men, possibly they did return to the regiment for the most part and this will be either confirmed by the findings or not. It is also possible that once the missing men were accounted for it did bring the actual loss number closer to the Verlustlisten numbers. This will need to be verified one way or the other.

Ralph

Ralph, I'd forgotten about you and your lists. What exactly are you trying to say with all this?

Cheers-salesie.

[Robert Dunlop]

Stick to the topic in hand or don't stick at all...

Interesting response, salesie. This portion of the thread started when you posted the information from Occleshaw here. You can't have it both ways I'm afraid.

With respect to von Kluck's reason for continuing west southwest on 27th August, I quoted from von Kluck here. At that time, there were French territorial forces attacking towards Peronne on the Somme. As von Kluck indicated, he wanted to envelop this effort by extending his right flank around the 'Somme salient'.

I have retrieved Joffre's memoirs and will post on his appreciation of what was happening during the period in question.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Let's not jump the gun here; let's talk about them getting to the Aisne first.

Quite right, Tom.

But firstly let's qualify and look at the route to beginning of the German failure to achieve the aims of the Schlieffen Plan.

It is good to see the reference to the resistance put up by the Belgians.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

I will come back to the German Cavalry

Great, Tom. I look forward to your comments and thoughts.

Robert

[salesie]

Interesting response, salesie. This portion of the thread started when you posted the information from Occleshaw here. You can't have it both ways I'm afraid.

With respect to von Kluck's reason for continuing west southwest on 27th August, I quoted from von Kluck here. At that time, there were French territorial forces attacking towards Peronne on the Somme. As von Kluck indicated, he wanted to envelop this effort by extending his right flank around the 'Somme salient'.

I have retrieved Joffre's memoirs and will post on his appreciation of what was happening during the period in question.

Robert

I'm not trying to have it both ways, Robert - if you look at the link to my post you will see that I referred Occleshaw's words, and my subsequent question, to a discussion earlier in thread, between Jack and myself, about von Kluck's "wild-goose chase" in search of the BEF after Le Cateau. Once again there is a causal link that you seem to have missed?

Cheers-salesie.

[Robert Dunlop]

Here is Joffre's appreciation of what happened up to August 25th. On that date, based on the maps that I have posted, von Kluck was moving in the southwesterly direction that pointed directly at Paris. Joffre references this movement, and its intended 'goal' in paragraph 3 below. He then notes the discussion about attacking von Kluck's inner flank. Joffre decides, however, on attempting to outflank von Kluck to the west. This decision was based on the fact that there was room to perform this manoeuvre, given that von Kluck's western flank did not reach to the sea.

"On the morning of August 25th it was manifest that the strategic manoeuvre which had been in preparation since the 18th ended in a complete failure.

The news arriving during the night no longer left any hope. The forward movement of the German armies in Belgium continued. The British Army, attacked during the 24th by large forces, had fallen back to the line Valenciennes-Maubeuge, and there was every reason to fear that the enemy would be successful in the enveloping manoeuvre which would certainly undertake against that army.

...I felt that not an hour must be lost in preparing a manoeuvre which would block the movement now menacing our left, a movement which pointed straight down the Valley of the Oise towards Paris.

In the first place, could I hope that our left would hold fast where it stood, and thus give me time to prepare a new manoeuvre? The answer was, No; the power of resistance of our men and that of the British had been too seriously weakened to permit any illusion on that point; however painful the necessity might be, further ground would have to be ceded in order to give the Allied troops a chance to recuperate.

This point being settled, the next question was, what manoeuvre should we undertake? During the whole of that long and gloomy August 25th, I studied with my collaborators the various possibilities which offered themselves. Berthelot... anticipated that the British Army, under the enveloping action of the German right, would inevitably fall back in haste, thus accentuating the danger to our Fifth Army of being out-flanked on its left. He believed that it would be opportune to take advantage of this situation and direct an offensive against the inner wing of the German right opposed to the British [ie the inner flank of von Kluck's Army]. In support of this idea, he pointed out that his solution could be rapidly executed and that it might produce very great results through separating the enemy right from the main body of his forces engaged in the battle.

This conception of General Berthelot did not satisfy me. Before considering it, we would first have to be assured that the Fifth Army could hold out long enough to permit me to assemble behind its front the mass charged with piercing the enemy's line; again, if through lack of time, or any other reason, this manoeuvre should fail, we should run the risk of seeing our armies irremediably eneveloped by the enemy and forced to deliver a calamitous battle facing their rear.

My own preference inclined more and more towards a wholly different solution, which consisted in creating on the outer wing of the enemy a mass capable, in its turn, of enveloping his marching flank.

After having conscientiously weighed the advantages and the chances of success of the two conceptions, I decided, on the evening of August 25th, upon the second solution, and I directed Major Gamelin to have the order drawn up which later became General Instructions No. 2."

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Having decided that he would envelop von Kluck's right flank, and rejected an attack on the inner flank, Joffre then considered the factors that would be necessary to achieve this:

"My conception was a battle stretching from Amiens to Rheims with the new army placed on the extreme left of our line, outside of the British and in a position to outflank the German right.

If this manoeuvre was to succeed two essential conditions had to be fulfilled:

In the first place, our Fourth and Fifth Armies, interrupting their retreat with partial offensives and counter-attacks, well supported by artillery (most efficacious against troops on the march), must give me the time required for assembling on our left the mass which I had decided to form.

In the second place, the British would have to resist tenaciously and yield ground only very slowly, so that our left would not be obliged to fall back so fast to facilitate the enemy's attempt at envelopment. To support them, there was the d'Amade group [on the western flank], to which were now being added the 61st and 62nd Reserve Divisions, in course of detraining at Arras."

Joffre then visited General French at GHQ on August 26th, the day on which the Battle of Le Cateau was fought. Afterwards he noted:

"I carried away with me a serious impression as to the fragility of our extreme left, and I anxiously asked myself if it could hold out long enough to enable me to effect the new grouping of our forces. During the day we had intercepted two German radio telegrams which indicated that the right group of the enemy's forces was expected to reach the line Cambrai Le Cateau that day; the leading elements of this group were to have attacked along the whole front at 9.10 am and I was not without anxiety concerning the way our Allies would meet this assault, coming as it did at the moment which was particularly critical. The possibility of realizing our new manoeuvre would depend in large part upon the tenacity of their resistance. Late in the night, a very pessimistic telegram arrived from Colonel Huguet [Chief of the French Military Mission attached to GHQ] dated Noyon, and giving me the worst news as to the day's results. "The British Army," he said, "has met with defeat, and it now seems to have lost all cohesion. It will have to receive serious protection if it is to reorganize. British Headquarters this evening will be at Noyon." In the face of this situation, it was evident that if a grave disaster was to be avoided, our left would have to be organized under a sound commander furnished with all the elements necessary for him to make his action felt. My thoughts turned to Maunoury, who seemed to me more suitable than anyone else to take command under such difficult circumstances. In this way... I organized, in the early hours of the night of August 26/27, the Sixth Army and placed it under the command of General Maunoury."

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Concerning August 27th, Joffre wrote:

"Information which had arrived concerning the British Army showed that, instead of taking the general direction of Cambrai [ie southwest], which on August 24th I had indicated as its line of retreat, it had fallen back into the zone of march reserved for the Fifth Army, thus facilitating the envelopment which the right wing of the German forces was manifestly seeking to effect. The assembling of the Sixth Army had not progressed sufficiently for it to be able to protect the British retreat and give the time required to get these forces in hand. Under the circumstances, the most profitable solution appeared to be a vigorous attack by the Fifth Army on the enemy around Guise and Vervins [von Bülow's Second Army], in a south-north direction, the main force of the attack being directed along the left flank."

Joffre's main concern remained the potential for the Franco-British left flank to be enveloped. He personally intervened with Lanrezac to ensure that Fifth Army went onto the offensive, hence the Battle of Guise, which played a major role is protecting the BEF. The precise details of Lanrezac's attack were influenced by intelligence reports from radio intercepts.

"Thus, at the very moment when, in my conceptions, I was placing the British near Ham, they already had their eyes turning in the direction of Compiègne. The situation had become agonizing. It seemed to me to be impossible to count upon their help for gaining the time required for forming the Sixth Army.

About this time a German wireless message which we had intercepted gave us the information that the German First Army was expected to act independently during the time that the Second Army was investing Maubeuge. This [the investment of of Maubeuge, not the movement of von Kluck's Army] made it probable that along the front of the French Fifth Army the enemy's pursuit would be considerably slackened. In such a case it seemed useless to undertake an action by Lanrezac's troops towards the north, which an offensive pushed in the direction of the north-west would have the advantage of retarding the march of the enemy units [outer flank of von Bülow's Second Army] which had been launched in pursuit of the British.

Therefore, towards 7 pm I decided to modify the orders previously given to Lanrezac, and I telegraphed him that, by reason of information indicating that a part of the forces opposed to him had halted in front of Maubeuge, he should move his left between the Oise and Saint Quentin the next morning and attack all enemy forces in the act of marching against the British Army; it was essential to disengage this army at any cost."

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Joffre was aware on the 27th that von Kluck's Army was going to keep up its momentum towards Paris, whereas von Bülow's Army was going to slow down, ie that there would a loss of cohesion. After the Battle of Le Cateau, Joffre's primary concern was to take pressure off the BEF. Lanrezac's attack was to be directed against the outer western flank of von Bülow's forces, in an effort to stop them pursuing the BEF.

Maunoury had been placed in charge of the newly formed Sixth Army, whose role was to envelop von Kluck's First Army when it was formed. Meanwhile, the 61st and 62nd Reserve [not Territorial as I indicated above] Divisions, along with General Sordet's Cavalry Corps, were attempting to oppose von Kluck around Peronne. As we know, this caused von Kluck to deviate in a more westerly direction to get round the left flank of this force. The French force was trying to buy time for the Sixth Army to form up.

Joffre again:

"Shortly [after 8pm on the 28th August] a telephone message from the Sixth Army, confirmed a moment later by Major Maurin, liaison officer between Maunoury and GQG, informed me that nobody knew what had become of the 61st and 62nd Reserve Divisions, and that General Ebener, appointed to take command of them, had vainly sought them during the day. Towards midnight we learned that the 61st Reserve Division had been driven back upon Amiens, but no news came in regarding the 62nd.

Thus, the line of the Somme was no longer held, and, what was more, the detraining area of the Sixth Army would before long be seriously menaced by the enemy's advance. Under these circumstances, the only hope I could see of bringing about a change in the situation was through the success of the Fifth Army's attack. I, therefore felt the need of again pressing General Lanrezac to make the action of his army as vigorous as possible.

The last hours of the night 28th/29th brought in still more bad news. It appeared that the German First Army had penetrated between Péronne and Saint-Quentin."

Note that von Kluck's advance was not seen as advantageous, but as 'more bad news'. Why?

"At Péronne the French forces had been obliged to retreat and the detraining area of the Sixth Army had become more and more endangered. It began to look as though nothing could prevent the victorious march of the German right wing in the direction of Paris, which place, in all likelihood, was its objective. If, as every indication led me to suppose, the Sixth Army was caught in the act of detraining [north of Paris], it would not be able to undertake the offensive I had assigned to it, and our whole front of battle must be drawn back to a new line, possibly to a wide obstacle offered by the Seine."

Robert