The "machine guns" of Mons ?

[Paul Hederer]

Steven

That is a good point. I shall try and find a couple of examples. I suspect, however, that any formation or unit taking 10% or more casualties in a day would think them 'heavy'. Remember, too, that some of the men who fell in the early battles had been together for years before the war. They would probably feel the loss of long term friends more keenly than some who came later and were not so well known. I have certainly noticed this in my examination of Cambrai. Some of the men killed with three years war service under their belts, were the subject of quite lengthy eulogies in the histories.

Jack

Somthing to keep in mind also is concentration of casualties. Looking back 90 odd years we read, so-and-so battalion lost 15 dead, 35 wounded on so-and-so date. Without further information we have no idea of how those losses were distributed. If all were taken in one company they would be perceived as very heavy indeed by the men of that organization.

Looking at casulaties in detail, at the battlion and company level, it's easy to see that when things went bad, they often went terribly bad. Even in the heavy fighting of Verdun there are wide variations in losses. I've noted companies that lost only 2-3 men in the first week's fighting, while other companies in the same battalion were decimated. One sad incident sticks in my mind of a company that, having returned from the front lines for rest, had one direct hit by artillery on the assembled men outside their billets that resulted in almost 80 dead and wounded. Ernst Juenger relates a similiar tale in his book, "Storm of Steel."

Paul

[phil andrade]

Paul, That is a very important point.

There is also the disparity in the breakdown of the losses - one regiment might suffer a very high overall total of casualties, but on investigation it becomes apparent that relativley few of them are fatal. For example, in the figures that Jack cites, IR 66 suffered more casualties than IR 93, but IR 93 suffered a loss in killed that was 40% heavier than the fatalities in IR 66. There is also the problem of the missing - one of the regiments at Le Cateau lost nearly 350 missing, and while many turned up later, we might assume that many were killed.

Phil.

[phil andrade]

I have been away for the past three days so have not been able to respond to this, although thank you to all who chipped in in mea absentia.

These are not vae victis posts. They are intended to show that, through no fault of the recording authorities/officials, contemporary casualty records can be incorrect/incomplete - largely due to the chaotic situation prevalent at the time. If contemporary figures are incorrect, then it is not a case of deliberate massaging or falsification. I have found no evidence to suggest that casualty figures in the Wehrmacht were deliberately falsified... although the publically-announced figures may well be - and invariably were 'scaled down'.

My "shock" is at size of the figures; these are casualty rates which take the breath away - the only comparison I can really think of is the Red Army in the summer and early autumn of 1941. That said, I take absolutely no pleasure in seeing so many Germans die, however odious their regime (the casualty rate for German civilians in the winter of 1945 is equally terrible). We could all learn a lot from the humility of Ulysses S Grant, whose words have the power to move more than 120 years after he wrote them:

I felt like anything rather than rejoicing at the downfall of a foe who had fought so long and valiantly, and had suffered so much for a cause, though that cause was, I believe, one of the worst for which a people ever fought, and one for which there was the least excuse.

You make the point well.

There is an aspect to this that I think merits reflection - and I'm very aware that we must not let this stray far into the realms of the Second World War.

For us in Britain, a quick glance at a war memorial, whether it be in a city or a village green, tends to reveal that two, three or even four times as many of this nation's manhood perished in 1914-1918 than in 1939-1945. We consider the Somme, Passchendale and Arras as bloodbaths that transcend anything in modern memory.

To read that 450,000 German military personel died in one month in 1945 is a very stark reminder of how far the horrific casualties of the Great War were to be exceeded in the Nazi Soviet conflict a generation later.

I would still have to question the authenticity of that figure. It was a kind of extrapolation, wasn't it, based on some samples?

We find it hard to envisage how 300,000 French soldiers were killed in 1914 alone - 27,000 on a single day on August 22nd. The loss of 21,000 British lives on the opening day of the Somme Offensive in 1916 is mind boggling. Now we are confronted with a figure of fifteen thousand Germans being killed every day for an entire month, and nearly ten thousand a day for the ensuing three months....not to mention the huge losses in wounded and prisoners. The implications are staggering. No wonder I was shocked.

Phil.

[Jack Sheldon]

I have thought of a couple more useful checks. One is to analyse from the Rolls of Honour (if available) where the casualties hit the hardest within each regiment, then, because the target is so small (i.e. only six infantry regiments) to track in each case how the battle unfolded and what happened next. Any regiment wiped out would have had to be pulled out of the line of battle and in the short term sub units would have had to be amalgamated. These ideas arise out of a brief examination of the detail of the day for IR 66. In essence, it was the advance guard of 7th Inf Div. Its leading companies came under fire about 9.00 am (GE time), went to ground, had great difficulty in locating enemy fire and spent a long time in a heavy fire fight pinned down. Other companies tried to get forward, were also pinned down and also spent a long time trying to 'win the fire fight', a standard pre-assault tactic. The scales began to tip from about 11.00 am (GE time) when the 36 guns of FAR 40 galloped into position and started to bring down heavy supporting fire - goodness knows where they had been for the past two hours. They were not exactly covering the advance. Then, around 2.00 pm, just about when the British withdrawal began, 2nd Bn FAR 4 turned up with another eighteen guns. The Germans noted a reduction in resistance - no wonder, the pull out had begun, but they did not follow up (lots of hyperbolic description here) until 4.00 pm. Their casualties were sprinkled throughout all the companies, with a few from each killed, although the Machine Gun Coy, which used its heavy armoured shields on its guns that day, had none. During reorganisation a composite battalion was swiftly assembled from 3rd, 9th and the Machine Gun Coy and despatched as rapidly as possible to Bertry. The remainder reorganised and advanced more deliberately to Clary. The folowing day they continued the advance to Le Catelet then became involved in the battle for Peronne on 28 August.

To me this all seems compatible with what they declared about overall casualties. The story will continue.

Jack

[Halder]

I would still have to question the authenticity of that figure. It was a kind of extrapolation, wasn't it, based on some samples?

Phil.

Hi Phil,

Excellent post - I couldn't agree more. I've just been on a battlefield tour to Normandy where "bloody Omaha" came up time and again. Total casualties for D-Day on both sides are "only" c.11,000 which pale by comparison with some of the WW1 and especially some of the WW2 battles.

Sadly Kunz gives no reference or details on the figures he gives, only plenty of references to contemporary documents. As he's working under the auspices of the MGFA, I can only assume that it's some internal research project by the German official military historians, or he's using Rüdiger Overmans' Deutsche militärische Verluste im Zweiten Weltkrieg. I don't own a copy unfortunately, but I know it is contentious (q.v http://web.telia.com/~u18313395/overmans.pdf for example). There's no preview of it on Google Books either, so I cannot tell whether it also covers WW1 casualty reporting as a preamble.

[Desdichado]

Is this the same U.S. Grant that said: "The art of war is simple enough. Find out where your enemy is. Get at him as soon as you can. Strike him as hard as you can, and keep moving on.” I believe he was known to his men as the "Butcher".

[Jack Sheldon]

I am now going to tackle what happened to IR 26, the other regiment, along with IR 66 in 13 Brigade, 7th Division. This history is in several volumes and I do not have the final one to hand, so I do not know if there is a Roll of Honour. This regiment had taken casualties at Elouges on 24 Aug 14 - KIA 2 offr, 20 OR; Wounded 3 offr, 108 OR, but it was still fully in the line on the day of Le Cateau. At 7.50 am it was ordered to an assembly area near to Montay and by 11.00 am it was deployed (right forward 1st Bn, left forward 2nd Bn, reserve 3rd Bn) on open ground to the north east of that place, where it was on the receiving end of a British attempt at shrapnel fire, which did nothing. It then moved fairly rapidly to an advanced area southwest of Montay, where British fire began to become more of a problem and, as it advanced over open ground with no cover along the line of the Montay - Reumont road it took heavy casualties. As German artillery fire gradually got the upper hand it was able to advance further, though continually troubled by by 'heavy artillery and small arms fire from the heights south of Le Cateau.' As it moved to attempt an outflanking movement, it came under fire from its own side. Two batteries of FAR 4 had made a mistake. The fire was stopped and some guns of the German 5th Division began to add their fire as the British pulled back. In the latter stages of the battle, it claimed that some British troops seemed to surrender, while others opened fire once more, causing serious casualties in 8th Coy, including Hauptmann Jakob, its commander. Apparently they then went in hard with the bayonet in a merciless manner. (Sounds more like a battlefield mix up than anything planned, but it is a common accusation in accounts from both sides during the 1914 campaign). The whole of 7th Div moved together into the British positions at 3.30 pm and the 3rd Bn was called forward from reserve near Montay, so it would appear that IR 26 casualties were mainly in the two leading battalions. After the battle the whole regiment moved forward to Clary, which must have been the RV for 13th Bde. The following day IR 26 marched forward as the advance guard of 7th Division and, moving via Beaurevoir, reached Bony by 4.30 pm 27 Aug 14. Of course this was the wrong direction; the BEF was off to the south so, when IR 26 next went into action, it was against French forces near Peronne.

Does not sound to me as though this regiment suffered insupportable casualties either. The story continues.

Jack

[Andrew Hesketh]

I'm sure that there will be no objections if I elevate this thread to 'classic' status. There is a lot of exceptional information and debate within it.

[shawnt63]

Spectacular thread fellas and very interesting (with a few exceptions). Jack I was wondering if in your research you found any references to the amount of time it took to inflict the casualties on the 6 Regiments? I would think that if a unit (battalion or regiment) suffered 10 percent losses in a matter of 5 to 10 minutes that would be equally or more devastating that suffer 15 to 20 percent losses over the course of a days action. Is it possible that the casualties were exaggerated through non-wounded helping the wounded etc, thus drawing off more strength that was actually hurt, or that with a regiment going to ground may look a lot more damaged than they really are? Just some idle thoughts, I often discuss things like this with my students at the leadership academy here in Victoria (I am the course director for junior leadership training for Canada's west coast). So I was just curious if you had run into anything like this in your reading, was there a significant psychological result from concentrated damage to the German units that either affected their immediate ability to carry on or to the British who saw a lot of troops fall out of the ranks but actually thought they saw more than they really did?

[Jack Sheldon]

Shawn

That is a very interesting view point and one which had not occurred to me. Over the weekend, I shall re-examine the timings and come back to you with some figures. I suspect we are talking hours, rather than minutes however.

Jack

[Steven Broomfield]

or to the British who saw a lot of troops fall out of the ranks but actually thought they saw more than they really did?

Interesting thought, Shawn. Additionally, is it possible that British reporting might also have been affected by the fact that (say) 10 blokes fired and saw 'their' target fall, not realising, obviously, that all ten were shooting the same target? Thus, 10 for the price of 1. (This was, I believe, very common in WW2 aerial fighting, with - for example - USAAF air gunners massively over-claiming).

Of course, firing at 1,300 yards would make it all but impossible properly to see what the results of your shooting were.

(And Andrew - good call).

[Jack Sheldon]

The story of the British right flank from the German perspective concludes with these remarks about IR 72, the regiment which had the lightest casualties. Their history has an extremely detailed Roll of Honour, examination of which has thrown up a small accounting error between the declared figures which were given as: KIA 1 offr (Hauptmann Emil Frucht, who is buried in Grave 662 at Le Cateau German cemetery), 21 OR; Wounded 5 offr, 1 Offizierstellvertreter, 87 OR; Missing 4. I suspect that these are figures from the War Diary, though that cannot be checked. This is the breakdown of fatal casualties from the post war Roll of Honour:

Offr 1 (Frucht)

1st - 2

2nd - 2

3rd - 1

4th - 0

5th - 5

6th - 2

7th - 5 + 1 DOW (Reservist Alwin Schuster. Died Brussels 6 Sep 14)

8th - 0

9th - 6 + 2 DOW Musketier Richard Herrmann. Died Mons 29 Aug 14; Gefreiter Eduard Hubig Died Brussels 4 Sep 14

10th - 0

11th - 0

12th - 5

MG Coy - 0

Total 32

But the history gives 22 + 4 missing = 26. Add on 3 DOW = 29, three fewer than the real figure. I have no idea why there is a discrepancy of 3, but it illustrates the difficulty of obtaining precise figures. Another point to note is that two of the DOW fell outside the reporting period, so they will not show up correctly in the Verlustlisten which cover the day of the battle.

IR 72 spent the longest period under fire of any of the regiments, originally coming into action before 6.00 am German time. It had marched 38 km the previous day in the heat and was extremely tired. The history says that it was difficult to get a spring in the mens' step after all the exhausting days behind them and that numerous men could not march because of foot problems. For them the battle opened when they surprised 1 DCLI at about 6.00 am German time. They then worked their way through the town, which contained only a few British stragglers and, although they carried the full load of the contact battle for a good two hours, a fact in which they subsequently took considerable pride, their casualties were not high as they worked their way round to the east of Le Cateau. Although lacking artillery support and having to rely on fire and manoeuvre between and within the companies to get forward, they did have the regimental machine guns forward; two being allocated to 4th Coy, for example, which, together with 7th Coy, gained the high ground to the west of the town. It is probable that the guns with 4th Coy were the first to be able to bring down fire towards Sussex Hill from the area of the present day water tower by the Le Cateau - Cambrai road. They were joined there later by others. Exploiting the open British flank, 2nd and 3rd Bns spent the morning advancing further and threatening complete envelopment of the British right. They came under fire from time to time, but not particularly seriously. It is interesting to note that the two companies which came closest to the British positions - 7th and 9th took 14 fatal casualties - roughly half of the regimental total, so presumably they also had the largest number wounded as well. At the end of the day after the British 5th Division had withdrawn, the regiment gathered on the southern outskirts of Le Cateau where they were served a meal. They then marched to Reumont and subsequently to Troisvilles, where they found billets. The following morning they marched off once more with the remainder of IV Corps.

Drawing together a few threads it is clear that significant fighting, some at long range, took place on this flank and that the German army entered the battle in dribs and drabs and lacking vital artillery support in the early stages. It was not until this was corrected that they began to bring superior firepower to bear. A total of 8 battalions (something like 7,500 - maybe up to 8,000 - infantrymen) was committed here and, although they suffered casualties, which all except IR 72 felt were heavy, nothing stopped them surging forward onto the old British positions when the 5th Division withdrew, marching to other nearby locations that day, continuing the march the following day and going into battle again for the Somme crossings very soon afterwards: all without any additional reinforcements.

Jack

[Tom A McCluskey]

"As noted before, the German infantry training programme included markmenship as a core skill. Training was also given in the variety of types of attack. There was a strong emphasis on fire and manoeuvre, right down to the equivalent of squad level. Jack's recent posts provide ample evidence of how this played out on the Le Cateau battlefield. We need to be very cautious about Maurice's remarks, and not assume that the observations from earlier Kaisermanöver can be generalized to the German First Army in August 1914." - Robert Dunlop

Robert,

I disagree with the above, and you also allude to the fact that the British & German methods of attack were similar, but I will come onto that on a later post. I would just like to go back to an earlier point made by Robert, suggesting, in its simplest form - and using Bird as the supporting evidence – that the British and German methods of attack were the same. The principles of attack may appear to be similar, in general, but in detail are quite different, and I feel that this needs to be recognised. The Germans would, no doubt, have access to [british] Field Service Regulations (FSR). So if the Germans tried to apply the guiding principles contained within the FSR, without the prior learning-experience that the British had been through, I am sure would not bring about the British Army’s way of doing business, and would more than likely be flavoured with a bit of German ‘kultur’. More of which I will come onto later.

Anyway, concerning the attack, here are a couple of extracts from FSR 1909, they can be referred to as a comparison baseline for the German method of attack ( I appreciate that the British are defending on the first stage of a Delaying Action a Mons):

British Attack - FSR 1909, Chap VII, The Battle, The Attack Sect 104, page 113:

The general principle is that the enemy must be engaged in sufficient strength to pin him to his ground, and to wear down his power of resistance [1], while the force allotted to the decisive attack must be as strong as possible. [2]

[1] Out of interest, when we read Bloem’s account, it appears that the British are the ones achieving this and not the Germans – who, of course, are the attacking force.

[2] I would say that the second half of this sentence is the one that the Germans put more emphasis on, and you will see why when I refer to AH Atteridge and The War the Infantry Knew.

British Attack - FSR 1909, Chap VII, The Battle, The Attack Sect 105, page 116:

Para 4

[…] When once the firing line comes under effective fire, its further advance will be greatly assisted by covering fire from the rear and by the mutual support which neighbouring units in the firing line afford one another. All leaders, down to those from the smallest units, must endeavour to apply, at all stages of the fight, this principle of mutual support [1]. Aided in this way the infantry will fight its way forward to close range, and, in conjunction with the artillery and machine guns, will endeavour to gain superiority of fire [2]. This will involve the gradual building up of the firing line in good fire positions, usually within close range of the enemy. Here it is to be expected that there will be a prolonged and severe fire fight, during which each side will try to exhaust the enemy’s power of endurance and force him to use up his reserves, while keeping his own intact.

[1] Same for defence. Having mutual support is absolutely essential, which is why the salient of Nimy was so difficult to defend. But holding Nimy is not essential (or practical), hence the fallback positions, with better fields of fire. But, it is better to hold it for a while, than to surrender it wholesale before the battle begins.

[2] Again, when I refer to Atteridge, you will see that the Germans will try to achieve this by having more men per yard (which they will try to maintain), and, at times, by having their machine guns with the attacking troops.

Para 5

The attack on each tactical point will constitute a distinct engagement in itself, and may require a large number of men and guns. Thus the attack, more often than not, will resolve itself into a series of distinct engagements, each ranging round a series of a different locality, and each possibly protracted over many hours. All important tactical points, such as suitable buildings, small woods, &c [sic], should, when gained, at once be put in a state of defence, so that attempts on the part of the enemy to recapture them may be defeated, and they may be made to serve as supporting points to the attack. […]

I put these extracts here to show the amount of freedom of action that has developed within the British method of attack, which I feel has come about due to the bitter experiences learned in the Boer War.

The procedure goes on to Part 106, The Decisive Attack, which I will not type out, but will place the salient point here:

British Attack - FSR 1909, Chap VII, The Battle, The Decisive Attack. Sect 106, page 119:

The climax of the infantry attack is the assault, which is made possible by superiority of fire. The fact that superiority of fire has been obtained will usually be observed from the firing line; it will be known by the weakening of the enemy’s fire, and perhaps by the movement of individuals or groups of men from the enemy’s position towards the rear. The impulse for the assault must therefore come from the firing line, and it is the duty of any commander in the firing line, who sees that the moment for assault has arrived, to carry it out, and for all other commanders to cooperate as soon as possible. […]

Shortly, after this point, the attacking force fixes bayonets and runs the defenders out, or destroys them. When we go back to Bloem’s account, this is where the main similarity begins. When you read his account, he is waiting for the British – the defending force – to counterattack them: an aggressive defence (page 44).

Anyway, Atteridge, who witnessed the German tactics prior to the war writes about the rationale behind the German mass of men advancing (se excerpt below). This method of massed advance (walking or at the trot) does not change a great deal by the time of First Ypres.

I think we are in danger of over-estimating the Germans power to adapt to new tactics, especially at the individual level.

Aye

Tom McC

[salesie]

Drawing together a few threads it is clear that significant fighting, some at long range, took place on this flank and that the German army entered the battle in dribs and drabs and lacking vital artillery support in the early stages. It was not until this was corrected that they began to bring superior firepower to bear. A total of 8 battalions (something like 7,500 - maybe up to 8,000 - infantrymen) was committed here and, although they suffered casualties, which all except IR 72 felt were heavy, nothing stopped them surging forward onto the old British positions when the 5th Division withdrew, marching to other nearby locations that day, continuing the march the following day and going into battle again for the Somme crossings very soon afterwards: all without any additional reinforcements.

Jack

A stirring tale, Jack, part of which Smith-Dorrien confirms i.e. "...The battle commenced in the streets of Le Cateau itself, the Germans having got into the houses and opened fire on the Cornwalls and two companies East Surrey, which troops were in the act of vacating the town, causing them to move out to the east and to fight their way back by a circuitous route taking them right to the rear of their Brigade ..."

But come on, IR72 can hardly be described, as you say, as "carrying the full load of the contact battle for two-hours", the Cornwalls were already vacating the town and when coming into contact with IR72 they simply changed the route of their withdrawal - this particular action was light-contact only, how could it be anything else? And as you mention, the German companies that got too close suffered the most.

As for "nothing stopped them surging forward onto the old British positions when the 5th Division withdrew" - is this not an oxymoron? Sounds highly thrilling, "surging forward" as you put it - but why wouldn't they "surge forward", there was literally nothing there to stop them once the 5th Division had withdrawn? I don't see any evidence of them "surging forward" over the British positions when the 5th Division was there to stop them (or, indeed, until those units who never received the order to withdraw had been overcome by superior firepower).

This smacks of the Titanic analogy again, Jack - it would have surged forward, and continued on its course, if the iceberg had moved.

Cheers-salesie.

[Jack Sheldon]

Salesie

Thanks for the reminder that I need to tighten up my language. 'Carrying the full load of the contact battle' is how IR 72 saw it - on the grounds that no other German infantry was on hand to assist them and it left them feeling rather exposed, should the British have attempted aggressive counter action. Fortunately for them that the British had left a gap in which they could operate. IR 66 was next on the scene, but its timings are: 5.30 am (all GE time) Head via Croix for Forest. Continue to advance. Orders to shake out on approach to the British 'between 8.00 am and 9.00 am.' I am quite happy to amend my words to the more neutral, 'For the first two hours of operations on the British right flank, the only regiment in contact was IR 72.'

'Surging forward' could just as easily be 'advancing'. I just thought 'surging' conveyed the impression that there were lots of them left to move forward, which indeed there were; as demonstrated by what happened next to the formations of IV Corps. I am trying to show, this time from the language of the histories and the way events are described, that German losses at Le Cateau were a fraction of those suffered by II Corps.

More on Fus R 36, and IRs 93 and 153 to follow and I promise that nobody else will surge.

Jack

[salesie]

Salesie

Thanks for the reminder that I need to tighten up my language. 'Carrying the full load of the contact battle' is how IR 72 saw it - on the grounds that no other German infantry was on hand to assist them and it left them feeling rather exposed, should the British have attempted aggressive counter action. Fortunately for them that the British had left a gap in which they could operate. IR 66 was next on the scene, but its timings are: 5.30 am (all GE time) Head via Croix for Forest. Continue to advance. Orders to shake out on approach to the British 'between 8.00 am and 9.00 am.' I am quite happy to amend my words to the more neutral, 'For the first two hours of operations on the British right flank, the only regiment in contact was IR 72.'

'Surging forward' could just as easily be 'advancing'. I just thought 'surging' conveyed the impression that there were lots of them left to move forward, which indeed there were; as demonstrated by what happened next to the formations of IV Corps. I am trying to show, this time from the language of the histories and the way events are described, that German losses at Le Cateau were a fraction of those suffered by II Corps.

More on Fus R 36, and IRs 93 and 153 to follow and I promise that nobody else will surge.

Jack

It's interesting, Jack, that you see it as a language problem - whereas I see it as being one of misleading images, of logical progression and, of course, of continuity of plot. For example, changing the wording about IR72's early contact does conjure up a far more realistic image of the actual events i.e. light contact would almost certainly show why IR72 suffered light casualties, whereas carrying the "full-load" for two hours but with light casualties would perhaps endow IR72 with a false image of that Regiment's skill-at-arms? But, conversely, substituting "surging forward" for "advancing" would not alter the image presented i.e. it does not alter the fact that, in the context of your previous post, they were unable to do either until 5 Div withdrew.

I don't think it's a language problem per se, Jack.

Also, in your latest posts, I can see no mention of your own health warnings vis-à-vis German Regimental Histories. Are we to take it that your reservations about their veracity, as stated by you in your earlier posts and in the appendix to your book, have completely evaporated and that you now regard them as being "the one true word"?

Cheers-salesie.

[Jack Sheldon]

Salesie

Put yourself in the shoes of the commander and men of IR 72. You are an advance guard, not expecting to contact the enemy when suddenly you butt up against a strong enemy position which locally turns out to be at least three times your strength and with its artillery support in place. You, on the other hand know that your guns are still closing up from the rear and that no other infantry is nearby to assist. I suspect that you would indeed feel that you wre bearing the whole weight of the battle. It also seems to me creditable in the circumstances that while one part of IR 72 kept the British lines under fire as best they could with the numbers they had, the remainder began and maintained the outflanking movement, which, in association with the pressure exerted by the arrival later in the morning of substantially more guns and two more infantry regiments, caused the 5th Division position to be untenable fairly rapidly.

It is a pity that George has not yet completed his review of the British histories because it would be good to see more detailed accounts appearing together, so we can judge where they are in accord and where there might be discrepancies though, as you have mentioned, the IR 72 account at least seems to chime with Smith Dorrien's account.

The bit that those who object to the German figures have still to demonstrate is what and where were the sources of the alleged 'stupendous' losses, 'far greater than ours.' Clearly not around Le Cateau itself. You will recall that I suggested that 'far greater than ours' could be taken as 10,000 and nobody objected. In fact I may have been overgenerous. As I pointed out in Post 390, one British published source states that they were reckoned to be between 15,000 and 30,000.

Just to make my position clear, I take 10,000 to be an exaggeration of more than 3:1; 15,000 5:1 and so on. Somebody has got to come up with accounts of mass German targets presenting themselves repeatedly at Le Cateau and being shot so severely to a standstill that not a man survived unscathed to continue this battle or any other. I maintain it cannot be done, but equally I am ready to be persuaded.

Jack

[salesie]

IR72's C.O. may well have thought that his Regiment was bearing the whole weight of the battle alone, but that is not the point I was making, Jack. The fact is they were not, they were experiencing light contact only (the Cornwalls were in the process of vacating the town), and the use of phrases such as "carrying the full load of the contact battle for two-hours" are misleading in the extreme, especially after stating this Regiment only suffered light casualties, thus creating a false context; it is false imagery, pure and simple.

That said, if the C.O. of IR72 thought his Regiment was in the thick of it then he was undoubtedly mistaken. After all, von Kluck, as late as 1920, thought his forces had met the whole BEF at Le Cateau instead of just a lightly reinforced II Corps, and the only conclusion I can take from this is that II Corps punched so much above its weight that the Germans believed them to be greater in number than they actually were, hence the Germans belief they were in the thick of it even when in light contact only, resulting in their extreme caution (verging on timidity according to Spears) when coming into contact with British forces. The paradox, unanswered from earlier posts, is still evident, Jack.

Now back to my earlier question: What's happened to your own health warnings vis-à-vis the veracity of German Regimental Histories?

Cheers-salesie.

[Steven Broomfield]

Apologies if I have this wrong, but pending George's more detailed examination I've been looking through a few books I have.

I'm assuming that IR72 were up against the 2nd Suffolks, who seem to have been the extreme right of the British line (as I say, apologies if I have this wrong). The Suffolk's history comments that their positions were, at best, scrapes and at worst nothing at all. Firing commenced at 0600 (British time, presumably) when a patrol of Uhlans was fired upon (all german cavalry being Uhlans, of course). Although shelling started soon after, and a few German infantry presented a target, it was ot until 1000 that "German infantry began to offer a target".

"In spite of the losses they sustained from rapid individual and machine gun fire, they continued to advance steadily for some time, but were eventually checked. The machine guns under Lieutenant Bittleston, did very good work, and Sergeant Spriggs (machine gun sergeant) was subsequently awarded the DCM for his behaviour on this occasion."

By 1100, German m-g's, which had got into the cutting on the Le Cateau/Cambrai raod immediately in front of the Suffolks, made the position critical. At this point the 2nd Manchesters and 2nd Argylls attempted to reinforce the Suffolks, but only a few managed. The Suffolk's CO (Lt Col C A H Brett, DSO), was killed at this stage.

Around noon the last gun of the supporting battery (11th Battery) was silenced, and shortly after that two platoons of the Suffolks had to turn about and fire to their rear. The end came at about 1445. The history comments that the turning movement did not bring an immediate end, the men of the Suffolks and Argylls "opened fire to their fron with terrific effect, two officers of the Highlanders in particular bringing down man after man and counting their scores aloud as if at a competition."

The Suffolks lost about 720 all ranks, including the CO, a Captain and two subalterns killed. At roll call on the following day, strength was 111.

The interesting point here is that the germans appear to have infiltrated very well. There are several mentions of the sunken road (the Le cateau/Cambrai one) being used, and, indeed, it seems the final turning movement was created by use of that road. German artillery on the heights of the Montay spur obviously proved crucial (the Suffolk's history comments that it was of "tremendous severity", "deafening" and "rendered communication between units well-nigh impossible".

Again, sorry if this is not relevant, but it seems to me that the Suffolks were subject to some enemy tactics which used ground well and developed an attack on the basis of finding 'our' weakness and exploiting it.

[Steven Broomfield]

The history of the 2nd Duke of Wellington's is very different. An officer of the Battalion is quoted as saying: "We had a splendid field of fire and could see a low-level plateau for about 1,200 yards. At Le Cateau we did not see infantry advancing at all except at great distance......Personally I had made quite a good trench for myself." Most of their day seemed to be as spectators to an artillery duel.

[Steven Broomfield]

The 3rd Worcesters (at Caudry) were roused at 0230, and between 0400 and 0500 received orders that they were to stand at Caudry. They had trenches, but these were shallow and ill-defined and the troops worked with their entrenching tools to improve them, but were tired and were asleep over their rifles.

B Coy were on the left flank, in a position facing south west; coming under enfilade fire from their right they changed position, eventually falling back to a sunken road on the outskirts of the village.

Dawn revealed massed German cavalry and guns in a wooded valley to the north of Beauvois - these were engaged by British artillery. Small groups of enemy were seen alla long the battalion front and engaged by rifle and mg fire, and German fire died down.

There was then a lull and breakfast was served, after which heavy artillery fire started falling on the battalion's positions. Gradually the Bn pulled back to the village, A Coy being detached to protect the British artillery. A Coy subsequently spen the morning watching events.

B and C Coys came into action at about 0600, when "strong forces of the enemy came in view beyond Jeune Bois" (a hamlet slightly to the N W of Caudry).

"The shooting of the Worcestershire platoons was rapid and accurate, and such of the enemy as came south of the main road were severely punished. Most of the German bullets went high, and the enemy made no great attempts to come to close quarters."

At 0930 "the two companies had not suffered heavy losses when...orders came for them to fall back to a fresh position." (The reason for this is given as the 4th Division, to the left, being under heavy enemy pressure).

The next move was a retirement from Caudry, followed by a counter-attack by B, C and part of A Coys. This was apparently successful in driving "such few of the enemy's troops as had followed up the retirement" out at the point of the bayonet. The southern half of the village was occupied and posts pushed forward, but shell fire made them untenable.

However, the position at Caudry could not be held because of the situation on the 4th Div front, so between 1500 and 1600, troops began to withdraw from Caudry, and the retirement was continued.

However, the history comments that the German round Caudry had been paralysed by the counter attack, and little follow-up was carried out. certainly German cavalry did not cross the railway line to the south, and musketry held off any German attacks.

Finally, the history records losses in the 3rd Worcesters as being about 100, many of which had been caused by a single shell hit on Bn HQ, which seriously wounded the 2 i/c and the Adjutant (both of whom were subsequently captured in hospital).

Unfortunately, I suspect that completes my easy access to British regimental records.

[Robert Dunlop]

I disagree with the above

Thanks for picking up on these points, Tom. I am not quite sure - do you disagree with all of the paragraph quoted, or just the piece about the Kaisermanöver?

you also allude to the fact that the British & German methods of attack were similar, but I will come onto that on a later post. I would just like to go back to an earlier point made by Robert, suggesting, in its simplest form - and using Bird as the supporting evidence – that the British and German methods of attack were the same.

Sorry that I wasn't clear. I was not alluding to or suggesting that the British and German methods of attack were the same. It was interesting, however, to note that at least one British officer thought so, which is why I quoted his observation (not mine). I will respond to the additional points that you have raised, and look forward to your follow-up on the similarities or otherwise between the British and German methods of attack in 1914.

Robert

[Ralph J. Whitehead]

There is a bit too much emphasis on trying to twist words, find absolutes where they cannot be made and trying to trip people up without much factual information being provided in support of any one point of view in some entries. Semantics is a wonderful thing but the essence of the thread appears to be the issue over casualties as reported, as estimated and as accepted in many post-war writings. Just where does the truth lie? Is any one source accurate?

This is a look at all of the details, not supporting one side or the other. While it can be said not every German regimental account is accurate but the same can be said for any account from any of the different countries involved. These were written by the men who witnessed the events in many cases. They were drawing from memory, written accounts, diaries, etc. and what a person saw and how it was perceived at the time will influence their impression of the events.

It would be nice to see some supporting information such as the last few posts where details were provided, statistics on losses, etc. were given and not one-upmanship as I have seen too often. I have located some casualty returns from the German side and I am in the process of determining how many men were originally reported as Killed, Severely wounded, etc. and while not the answer to every question it will provide some factual details as it pertains to the numbers of men reported as casualties at the time of the fighting. I will be posting some numbers as quickly as possible.

I would also tend to rely less upon post war memoirs of leaders from either side or from many books written since then unless the reader has a good idea of the use of original accounts, primary sources etc. After all, who wants to make their position look bad or their judgment look poor. All of the major players tend to over emphasize the positive and to under emphasize the negative.

More to follow shortly.

Ralph

[Steven Broomfield]

Funnily enough, I have realised I have the history of the Rifle Brigade, whose 1st Battalion was in the 11th Bde to the west of Caudry. I'll post the details tomorrow, but taking Ralph's point about 'not every...account is accurate', they differ from the Worcester's history I have already quoted. The Worcesters ascribe the loss of Caudry to the retirement of the 4th Division troops on their left. The RBs say the opposite - their retirement was caused by the loss of Caudry!

You pays your money......

Incidentally, I agree with Ralph's comments about the semantics of this. I find it interesting that German casualty figures are so doubted. I assume that a German regimental history was written for the same general audience as a British one - the survivors, the families of the dead, and the people who served in the regiment subsequently.

I therefore cannot see why the casualty figures printed should be anything but as true as possible: mistakes would be made (we've all seen them in British histories, after all), but generally is Musketier Schmidt's family didnt see his name, they'd want to know why. There seems to be suggestion that the figures were falsified by the Nazis, but looking, purely at random, at the bibliography of jack's book on the Germans on the Somme I see that the regimental histories he consults were published in a range of dates from the early 20's to just prior to WW2. It must have been a job of huge proportions had the Nazis meddled with Rolls of Honour published in these books - a veritable MiniTrue, full of Wilhelm Schmidts, all beavering away on rewriting history! I wonder what their room Ein Hunderd Einz was......

[phil andrade]

This is, I suppose, the nub of it. Is there anybody involved in this thread who now seriously believes that the Germans suffered six thousand casualties at Mons, or ten thousand at Le Cateau?

I must admit that before I encountered the Sheldonian analysis, I thought that they did.

Now things seem different. Six thousand down to three thousand - a bit like the FTSE.

Phil.