The "machine guns" of Mons ?

[salesie]

I am somewhat at a loss regarding these comments. I have never challenged the work of others. I am not saying the information cannot be challenged. I am trying to determine what losses were reported in these actions by the units involved. Until recently I have not even looked at this part of the war and as such do not have the information on hand.

All I have asked for is patience and once the numbers are in then people can draw whatever conclusions they care to. If you wish to challenge the information I have supplied please address it directly to the postings and be as specific as possible, thank you.

The current information is preliminary in regard to what I have been searching for among the casualty lists. I am not sure there is enough here to challenge but then you might disagree so please let me know, thank you.

In my opinion, however, to challenge the numbers or draw conclusions at this stage of the work would be along the lines of a news crew asking the first 5 voters how they voted in the presidential election and then declairing one man a winner over the other. Why not simply wait patiently for the information or if you would rather challenge them as I said above, please address the issue you would like to discuss as clearly and succinctly as possible so I can respond in kind.

I am disappointed in the tenor of this thread at times as I am not here to argue or take sides. I am here to look at all of the information and then see what reasonable people would conclude from it. It would seem that you wish to challenge anything and everything that comes up in discussion without any real depth of research that I am aware of. If I am incorrect then I apologize. Having been involved with this forum for many years I am not sure why you are taking this position. This is a forum for the free range of ideas, to exchange thoughts and to discuss events, even disagree at times etc. on a time that we did not experience and as such we rely solely on the written word and in some cases recorded interviews from the men who fought in the war. A such I believe the more primary sources that can be utilized the better the discussion.

Please feel free to address a challenge if you so desire. I will respond in the best of my ability in the spirit of the forum as it was intended when I joined in October 2002.

Ralph

I'm struggling to find the words to answer this, Ralph, on the grounds that if I'm not careful, I may break forum rules - but here goes.

Ralph, you are not the centre of attention in all of this, my words are not specifically aimed at you. This debate has been going on for some time now, and it is certainly not going to be put on hold just because you've become involved of late, and request our patience so you can complete your research. You recently became involved with your fine words about impartiality, and not drawing conclusions from one-sided and/or incomplete work etc. but then you go on to introduce incomplete research yourself. Perhaps you should take your own advice and exercise some patience yourself, complete your work, then present us with it along with your own conclusions? Or not, the choice is yours, but please don't imagine that I wait, with bated breath, to challenge your every word - as far as I can see, your postings so far are not that significant in the overall context of this debate.

Cheers-salesie.

[Jack Sheldon]

Salesie

I can only draw the conclusion from the generalised waffle and bluster of your last response that you have nothing helpful to contribute to the discussion. We are lacking detailed accounts from the British perspective. I posted a long selection of quotations from the histories several days ago and Stephen has come in with several very useful additions, which clarify the position in certain places, but we still do not have anything to explain why the British estimate of German casualties was wrongly pitched so high and believed for so many years. You clearly implied yesterday that you had access to, or knowledge of, evidence that might persuade, but so far you have been unable, or unwilling, to share that with us.

I have produced the figures taken from the regimental histories for one simple reason. Ralph, one of the very few people in the world capable of the work, is now going to immense trouble to sift through the original casualty reports, which will enable us to form a judgment if the casualties published in regimental histories - at least for this battle - are of the correct magnitude. For all the reasons Ralph explained I do not expect to see perfect matches but, equally, I should be quite surprised if they turn out to be wildly different. I have no idea what he will find, or even if he will be able to locate all the relevant lists, but the figures I have derived are all on the table now, so nobody will be able to claim that there is any ex post facto fudging going on between me and anyone else. I, for one, will be very interested in his ultimate conclusions.

Leaving actual casualty figures aside for a moment, I would remind you that I have now summarised the events of the day for the majority of the German infantry regiments involved and there is certainly consistency there. I still have to do the same thing for IR 153 and Fusilier R 36, but I can already tell you that their version of events dovetails with the rest. In each case they closed on the British lines and were checked. They pressed forward and, in most cases, were pinned down in open positions. They then engaged in lengthy firefights. IV Corps built up pressure through the use of their own small arms and from deploying well placed machine gun detachments and gun batteries. The British position became untenable rapidly; the break clean on both flanks being particularly difficult, but made possible by good work from the Royal Artillery. The German infantry then advanced to occupy the battlefield, which throughout history has generally been taken as an indicator of who had the best of the day.

Despite mopping up operations caused by the heroic last stands of certain British regiments, which never received the orders to withdraw and the casualties inflicted on them earlier on 26 August, in every case the German regiments resumed the advance the following day and were committed to battle once again, unreinforced, a little later. If the German infantry had been hit to the extent of taking casualties, 'far greater than ours' then, given the overall numbers of German troops directly involved at Le Cateau, that would have been impossible. The IV Corps would have had to be withdrawn from the line of battle until it had recuperated and been reinforced.

You are clearly enjoying playing the role of self-appointed Devil's Advocate, but that role places a responsibility on the person carrying it out; there is a requirement to make the case against. If you are not willing to do that or, if you are not able to do, that then the only possible explanation is that, stripped of all your humbug, you do not actually have any detailed knowledge about the Battle of Le Cateau.

Jack

[George Armstrong Custer]

We are lacking detailed accounts from the British perspective.

Au contraire Jack, we have the British Official History. You have on this thread, of course, dismissed its compiler as a "laughable" "fantasist" who is less trustworthy than a quote for a dodgy motor from Arthur Dailey - accusations even more colloquially damning of the British OH than those you have committed to print on pp. 313 - 315 of your The German Army At Passchendaele. As I've already stated, I am not willing to move on until I have to my own satisfaction placed a comprehensive alternate view of the credibility of the British OH to your own on this thread. Readers can then make their own informed judgement. As, indeed, they can over the relative merits and overall value of the exchanges of quotes from British and German regimental histories on the thread. My purpose is not to "win" or convert anyone to my point of view, but simply to make quite clear that there are alternative interpretations of the evidence which, in my view, call into serious question the extent of what is being attempted to extrapolate from German published sources from 1918-1945 by those paying lip service only to the clear conditions of bias in which these were produced under firstly the Reichswehr and then the Wehrmacht. There are also serious question marks over the German Army's (changing) methods of collecting and recording casualty data in the first place between 1914-1818, which has not been given the attention it is due by those asking us to base sweeping reassessments of accounts in the British historiography, from those of James Edmonds to Richard Holmes', upon German accounts which later interpreted them. We need to recall, too, and more pressingly than has been on this thread, the very real effect of the destruction of 90% of the records of the German Army in the Prussian archives - in your own words, "the seriousness of the loss of these documents cannot be overstated." It is not a point which I intend to understate.

I'm sorry not to have been able to get back to this sooner, as it is an important subject, but with the best will in the world the demands of real life have a habit of diverting us from these interesting discussions. And I want to take the time to make my case as carefully and comprehensively as possible. I will endeavour to get something posted this evening.

Regards,

George

[Ralph J. Whitehead]

Nothing more or less than I expected as an answer.

Ralph

[salesie]

You are clearly enjoying playing the role of self-appointed Devil's Advocate, but that role places a responsibility on the person carrying it out; there is a requirement to make the case against. If you are not willing to do that or, if you are not able to do, that then the only possible explanation is that, stripped of all your humbug, you do not actually have any detailed knowledge about the Battle of Le Cateau.

Jack

Devil's advocate, Jack? To be that I would have to agree with your position but test it with contrary questions - but I do not agree with your position, based on the decidedly iffy figures you have thus far produced, and of course I'm self-appointed, I'm my own advocate.

As for your point that German regiments continued with their march, thus proving their light casualties - I would remind you that British regiments also continued their line of march e.g. 2 K.O.Y.L.I. reduced to some 300 men after Le Cateau maintained their place in the line until reinforced.

Now, for this notion of yours that because the German Army were in possession of the field at Le Cateau after the action, it proves that the German Army had the best of that day. With this action, as you very well know, Smith-Dorrien never intended Le Cateau to be a battle of possession - circumstances forced it upon him, and it was intended purely as a stopping action, a delaying tactic, and it succeeded admirably. Firstly, it stopped the German Army and delayed it, and, secondly, and much more importantly, after this stopping action the German Army never closely pressed the BEF again all the way to the Marne - in other words, it taught the much vaunted German steamroller, with its high opinion of itself, so much respect for British forces that they kept a healthy distance thereafter (as Spears observed, "their actions verged on timidity"), and, together with Mons, Le Cateau caused a delay to the German timetable that had strategic implications far greater than the size of those actions.

Did the German Army have the best of that day, Jack? They ended up holding a few empty fields, only after II Corps withdrew, they didn't take them by force of arms on the day - it was a British tactical success, with as yet unknown strategic implications, simply because Smith-Dorrien achieved precisely what he intended. This all ties in nicely with the strategic bottom line i.e. the German Army, despite all the hype surrounding its capabilities, never achieved any of its objectives in the West at any time during the war - in the final analysis, the German Army simply wasn't good enough.

Which brings us back to the paradox that your figures throw up, Jack - in a few short days the "Old Comtemptibles" taught the German Army healthy doses of respect, and, with soldiers of the calibre of the German Army, how come it took so few casualties to bring about their timidity of action?

Cheers-salesie.

[George Armstrong Custer]

Nothing more or less than I expected as an answer.

Ralph

Care to clarify who that's aimed at Ralph?

George

[Robert Dunlop]

... I hope this adds something to the background ethos of the army and why not a lot had changed even 2 month later.

Tom, thanks again for posting the pages from Atteridge's book. I need to be sure that I have got this right, so please bear with me for a moment. Atteridge describes the development of mission-based command in the German army pre-1914. As you pointed out, this was in contrast to the style of Frederick the Great. It represented a response to the impact of more modern rifles and other weapons in the Franco-Prussian War. Atteridge also comments on the German tactics of ensuring that as much artillery and machine guns as possible would be brought to bear in support of an infantry attack. Do you agree with this synopsis so far?

During the FPW, the German army began changing from close order formations, ie dense lines of attackers, to more open order tactics. Atteridge points out that this change evoked significant opposition from some quarters. From his observations at the German manoeuvres, Atteridge believed that the German army reverted back to attacking in close order formations. This came about, in part, because of the concerns about the lack of control, manifest as significant loss of attacking infantry strength as men took the opportunity to shirk, lag behind, or lose the plot through lack of officer/NCO oversight. Atteridge saw the same style of attack, ie dense formations of infantry attacking in lines, repeated in the early months of the war, ie before 1915 when the book was published. Have I got this right?

Please make any corrections or amendments if you believe that I have misrepresented any aspect of Atteridge's review.

Robert

[Jack Sheldon]

George

I look forward to your further comments concerning the BOH. I should perhaps repeat what I have said before. My remarks about the unreliability of Edmonds relate to his manipulation of figures. I use and refer to the histories like anybody else, but I do not trust him on casualty figures. I have also stated before that this is not an original point of view. His most notorious cooking of the books, that concerning Vol II of the Battle of the Somme, was discredited over forty years ago in a damning article which has never been seriously challenged since by any reputable historian I know of.

The article concludes with the observation that, 'General Edmond's methods in using figures here and throughout his Preface to '1916' Volume II have a strong resemblance to Humpty Dumpty's use of words in 'Through the Looking Glass.' The British Official History of the Western Front 1914 - 1918 was in some respects much superior to the French and German Official Histories. Unfortunately its treatment of German losses on the Somme is unscholarly and unreliable. An official history has great authority and most of its readers will accept its statements unquestioningly. It is supremely inmportant, therefore, that it should always maintain scholarly standards of scrupulous exactitude.'

Again to make it clear, I only have one main complaint against Edmonds and one question which concern the 1914 volume. The complaint is that I do not believe he was justifed in describing the German casualties at Le Cateau as 'stupendous' when they were anything but (and a mere fraction of those suffered by II Corps). The question is why the last occasion in the campaign when he summarised British casualties was 5 Sep 14. He had every opportunity to include some remarks in his section 'Retrospect of the Battle of the Aisne.' I think the omission is at least strange.

Jack

[George Armstrong Custer]

Jack,

Thanks for that further clarification. I don't think I was under any misapprehension as to what you were saying at any point earlier in the thread. But just to make sure - am I correct in understanding you to say that Edmonds' is a reliable history except for his references to German casualty figures, specifically those of 1914 and the Somme in 1916? And as you've previously criticised those relating to Passchendaele, I'm supposing you include those too in what you are now defining as a narrowly restricted area of criticism of Edmonds' work?

You refer to a "damning article of over forty years ago" as definitive proof of Edmonds' "notorious cooking of the books" regarding German Somme casualties. I assume you are referring to the work of M. J. Williams? You will no doubt be aware then that he had not one but two goes at Edmonds' conclusions on German casualty figures - first in 1964 and then in 1966 - in articles in the United Services Institution Journal. I have both - along with McRandle and Quirk's The Blood Test Revisited article from 2006 in the Journal of Military History. In fact, your pre-emptive quote from Williams' 1966 article is one that I will be deploying myself, with rather different implications from your own. And I will be examining the validity of your claim that Williams "has never been seriously challenged since by any reputable historian I know of," in light of the fact that current reputable historians have referenced their awareness of Williams' work before going on to conclude that German casualties on the Somme are likely to have been closer to Edmonds' than those of the post-war German sources which, like yourself, Williams was prepared to take at face value. We also need to look at the role of Liddell Hart, who is lauded without question by Williams, in promoting his own agenda by way of discrediting the British OH through the work of other historians. It's a rather large can of worms which has been opened here, which is why I have not felt constrained to rush into it over the past week or so whilst there have been so many constraints on the time I could devote to it. As I say, I hope to have something more comprehensive and detailed to put up later this evening in terms of setting out my stall as to why I am not persuaded as to the academic sustainability of the the far-reaching revisions of the British historiography which you think it is safe to extrapolate from your German sources.

Regards,

George

[Jack Sheldon]

George

Of course one can always quibble with particular points in any set of histories and there is a well publicised critical view of the BOH as it progressed. I would not be truthful, however, if I suggested anything other than I find it to be extremely useful, especially when it is a question of detailed factual content. As for your other points, I think I should prefer to read and digest what you have to say, especially about Liddell Hart. There was a clear drifting apart of Edmonds and L-H as time went by and I would not underestimate the long term influence that the latter may have had on the overall debate. Have you read his 'Basic Truths about Passchendaele' (J RUSI 1959)?

There is absolutely no hidden agenda here. I am interested in your viewpoint and I should not want you to feel that you had to respond to any particular point I might raise whilst presenting your case. I should perhaps add, however, that of the modern historians I was thinking of, those who have problems with Edmonds' figures who spring immediately to mind are Gary Sheffield, David French, Robin Prior, Trevor Wilson and Christopher Duffy. Clearly I can supply references if you would like, but I should like to hear your view on the whole question first.

Jack

[phil andrade]

Regarding the casualty statistics he presents for the battles of 2nd Ypres and Loos, Edmonds ( I speak here from memory- woe betide me if I'm wrong!) presents us with figures which are stark in their depiction of British losses relative to those of the Germans. For Second Ypres, the tabulations show roughly 60,000 British casualties to 35,000 German. For Loos the balance against the British is worse still - 50,000 to 20,000. Edmonds does not challenge the veracity of the German figures in these cases - he might suggest that they are not quite complete; but he does not make a case for revising them upwards by a factor of 50% as he does in his essays on the Somme battle, or by even more in his assesment of Passchendaele. Is this because Edmonds was writing with a specifically "pro Haig" agenda ?

This, I reiterate, is from memory, so I state the case with trepidation...it does seem inconsistent. Any one got the BOH for the 1915 battles to hand?

Phil.

[shawnt63]

Shawn,

The points you raise about cemeteries and the reasons why doubt has been cast on the veracity of German Regimental Histories have been fully covered in earlier posts. Also, as far as I can see, no one has approached this topic in anything other than a sober manner. Shall we not challenge evidence simply because it is new - how can its validity be tested if not looked at with a critical eye? Not to look at it with a critical eye would be to simply assume that it is true because it is new, would it not?

Well, I find your belief that no one has taken anything but a sober look rather shocking have reread the entire thread three times now. Also I couldn't find any definitive answer on the cemetery question.

I agree whole heartedly that we must question and that includes the German views, but it seems to me that you, in particular, tend to defer any argument against British numbers as being utter nonsense as you have a mountain of quotes and information as well as eye witness accounts stating otherwise and at the same time will not accept even with reservation, German sources or eye witness accounts of German origin especially commander of IR 72 (if I recall correctly) as being too close to the action - this to me looks like blind acceptance of one story and not a sober view - but that is simply my opinion and certainly appreciate that you have you own. A sober view to me would be taking both accounts having a good look at them and try and find the linkage between the two and then build the conclusion from there.

One thing I will add, I put it to you who has the better vision on the field of battle, the commander of the regiment or the private on the firing line. I believe you have some experience in the military? If so the answer is obvious but I leave it to you to put your touch on it. As I have already said I am skeptical of eye witness accounts but prefer a more general view as they tend to be less focused on a single point.

Regardless of all the argument that has been raised, both statistically and through anecdotal memoires etc there are a some truths that emerge for me.

1 - the BEF made an effect which slowed German progress - be it luck, tactics, firepower or good generalship the outcome was definitely favourable to the French/British cause

2 - the casualties inflicted by the British likely were not the total that we have lead to believe from previous histories - which to me does not reflect poorly on the British fighting ability just reflects more information now available

3 - the volume of fire that the BEF could bring to bear with small arms was significant - I believe the statements of every British solider having a machine gun is meant as wry humour/honouring of the ability of the British soldier, similar to how the Germans asked 21 Army group soldiers in WWII if they had belt fed artillery.

4 - there is no slights being made of the fighting value of the BEF soldier - he was definitely the equal to his opponent

5 - digging people out of an entrenched position is no easier when it comes to historical belief than it is on a battlefield

Cheers,

Shawn

[salesie]

Well, I find your belief that no one has taken anything but a sober look rather shocking have reread the entire thread three times now.

Cheers,

Shawn

Shawn, I've chopped your post to save space.

There is no definitive answer in this thread to the cemetery question because the question itself was non definitive - nor did I suggest that there was such a definitive answer. I actually said it had been covered i.e. the original point raised was that there seemed to be a lack of German graves in the Mons area to justify anything other than light German casualties, then it was pointed out that at least one large German cemetery had been moved some years ago, and that there was some anecdotal evidence that the Germans operated mobile crematoria, at which point the cemetery question was never raised again (until you mentioned it, of course).

Your point about the C.O. of IR72 is a fallacious one, no eye-witness account from this source has ever been posted in this thread - the only reference to IR72's C.O.'s point of view was when I challenged Jack's assertion that this regiment had carried the full load of the battle for two hours, and in response to my challenge Jack asked me to imagine how I would feel in his place. No eye-witness account, no anecdotal evidence how the C.O. felt, just Jack's creative use of imagery and me being asked by him to put myself in the C.O.'s place - in other words, no one has any idea whether this commander believed his regiment was carrying the full load or not.

Indeed, one of my earlier points vis-à-vis eye-witness accounts is that the only German ones posted in the thread have consistently agreed with the British ones, which in themselves show a remarkable consistency in what they say, (though from diverse units spread around the battlefields). And I find that significant i.e. no fundamental contradictions between eye-witness accounts from both sides, as an ex-policeman you must have heard the phrase "weight of evidence"? And I find it telling that no German eye-witness account has been found to back-up the German casualty figures produced in this thread, just the opposite in fact.

You also say that, "A sober view to me would be taking both accounts having a good look at them and try and find the linkage between the two and then build the conclusion from there." How do you know that I haven't done this? If my conclusions don't agree with your own, it doesn't mean that I don't understand, it means that I don't agree!

Cheers-salesie.

[Tom A McCluskey]

Robert,

Pretty much, that is how I see it. However, I do think that Frederick the Great, at a fundamental level, did imbue the military with with a lasting 'Prussian Military' ethos, and I think that this would have a great impact on some of the decision making, as I said, not achieving the mission was not an option, so something different had to be done. I may be wrong, but that is how I see it.

Reference the Mission Command and achieving the mission, I think that this would be coming to the fore after the 'intimidating' mass approach proved either ineffective or useless. The Germans would know how to fire and manoeuvre, however, due to the amount of men in the firing line, the moving portion would still be quite dense (shoulder-to-shoulder), thus would still make them easy picking for rifles, machine-guns, and artillery.

Dare I say it, the only army that I see making the soonest, most-radical, military-change to platoon and individual tactics is the British, who in tandem with this are constantly reviewing their offensive procedures and updating their personal equipment and weapons.

Aye

Tom McC

[Halder]

Given certain reservations - with good reason - about official accounts, I wondered whether Feldpostbriefe might shed some light on Mons. They are, of course, a flawed source, but written in or just after the heat of battle, they can be useful. I have several hundred letters from the German campaigns of 1914-15 but can only find one which mentions Mons (by an Unteroffizier in IR 26 published in the excellent anthology Wir Kämpfer im Weltkrieg). It talks aplenty of German machine-guns around Pommeroeul, to the west of Mons, but alas little of British or German casualties (a couple of wounded, one dead in 8 Kompanie/II Btl/IR 26) on August 23. It does, however, mention that 28 British prisoners and a water cart were seized the following day.

I cannot help thinking that there's a strong similarity between the British fixation on Mons in 1914 and the Germans' fixation on Langemarck a couple of months later - both have sparked strong bodies of work and have been clouded by myth, legend and propaganda for generations.

[George Armstrong Custer]

Jack,

Putting my research together for posting this evening I have come up with one potentially key element in one strand of my argument which I would like to check with a London archive tomorrow. If I am right, then it makes a connection which I have not seen referenced in any previous work. Whatever the outcome of that check I will indicate what it referenced in my post tomorrow. I trust that you will understand my desire to check my facts as thoroughly as possible before presenting the conclusions which I draw from them.

Regards,

George

[Ralph J. Whitehead]

Care to clarify who that's aimed at Ralph?

George

As to your question, it was not you, it was Salesie

George,

You made mention of the question of how the German Army collected their casualty data and recorded it. Could you be a little more specific and mention what these issues were as well as when these changes were made during the war, thanks.

Also, the destruction of the Prussian Archives in WWII is devastating to historians who would like to have access to them. Despite the destruction I have found that many of the post-war regimental histories mirror the events and reports found in the archives with some obvious editing otherwise the books would be several thousand pages long. The materials I have checked so far concern the Bavarian and Württemberg units and some Prussian units. The similarity between the books and archives is amazing at times and in some cases the author clearly used information directly from the original regimental records, something they all had access to after the war.

I mention Prussian units because I have researched units and events that should have been destroyed on WWII bombings but for the foresight of the U.S. Army Historical Section. During the inter-war years members of the the U.S. Army went to Germany and copied the sections of possibly every unit in the German Army that fought against U.S. troops in 1917 and 1918. These are a unique and historic record of the documents thought to be entirely lost. They also copied materials from earlier fighting so while not a complete copy of the archives it is a valuable source of information.

The destruction of the records in WWII does not affect the Verlustlisten as these were compiled, printed and corrected over the course of the entire war and through 1919 when the final numbers appeared. These are, in fact, primary records taken from the casualty returns submitted by the different German States.

There are four main lists: Prussian, Bavarian, Saxon and Württemberg. There were smaller, less frequent lists that included Marine losses, Colonial losses, returned prisoners of war as well as periodic attempts to identify casualties from the jewelry found on them, photographs from their possessions as well as tattoos. In a few cases photographs of the wounded and dead were provided in the hopes that someone could identify them. In fact every possible attempt was made to identify all of the casualties the army suffered in the war. Some entries referred to men being found and identified by British and French soldiers. Their identities forwarded through the Red Cross.

Early lists could contain important details such as the time period they covered, the full rank of every man listed as well as the nature of the wound or cause of death. Later, when the lists continued to grow they also evolved. The dates covered by each list were no longer provided as well as the rank of the losses below non-commissioned officers were omitted. Given the numbers of men lost late in 1916 and early 1917 the lists that had been formatted by the simple sequential numbering of the different units in each list now only listed men alphabetically from each of the major German states. You could no longer follow a particular regiment or support unit list by list and unless you knew the name of the man you were looking for as there was no way to determine his unit.

What I have found after many years of searching through these lists and comparing them to post-war regimental accounts and the numerous casualty books printed between the wars is that the reporting of the men killed or died of wounds, accident, etc. matched perfectly. A further confirmation can be found within the VDK on-line records of burial locations. While not a complete verification due to the large numbers of German soldiers without a known burial location it does help. The post-war lists had the benefit of knowing which men had died from wounds, died from an accident, heart attack, suicide, etc. so while an earlier list from the war might have a man listed as severely or slightly wounded there were a number of these men who died as a result of their wounds.

The odd part I found was the inclusion of every type of injury or cause of death from combat action to suicide. There was no attempt to alter the nature of the death or injury, just a simple method of reporting each one as it occurred. This has been a consistent theme in the sources I have reviewed, whether published during the war or in any of the decades following the war. So when I was searching for the names of the men from RIR 119 that were killed or injured when a transport vehicle was struck by a train just behind the lines I was able to find their particulars quite easily as they were reported to have been killed or injured in the time period being searched and as a result of an accident.

The book covering the Jewish war dead of the German army also provides a reference to the Verlustlisten where the casualty details appeared as do several others as part of the information, making it a great way to cross reference each soldier and see how he fits in to the overall picture. As in any source the information needs to be looked at in the context of which it was prepared. I have not seen any attempt to minimize loss details, hide numbers, etc.

From all of the years spent researching German losses during the war and utilizing the Verlustlisten in conjunction with the primary sources still available for the Baden, Bavarian, Saxon and Württemberg losses it is a valuable reference source in studying the war even with the destruction of some archives in WWII.

An example of the information provided on soldiers in the war. These are not meant to represent all of the records, just simple examples.

Landwehrmann Karl Zick, 7th Coy, RIR 119 from Stuttgart. On or about 29 September 1914 he was listed as being slightly wounded in the Ovillers-La Boisselle area. His details were printed on 27 November 1914 on Verlustlisten No. 66.

On 26 May 1915, Verlustlisten No. 187, his status was corrected to Wounded and Missing. This was corrected once more on Verlustlisten No. 311, 1 December 1915 where his status was given as a PoW.

The list for this and other regiments I have compiled have similar entries. As new details were discovered the lists were corrected until hopefully the final status was reached. In the case of Zwick he was a prisoner, not the best outcome and not the worst. It would also appear he survived the war and most likely was sent home.

Unteroffizier Johannes Oefinger, 8th Coy, RIR 119 from Trossingen, Tuttlingen was also listed as being severely wounded approximately the same date as Zwick. He also appeared on List No. 66. The next entry, List No. 220, 17 July 1915 corrected his name from the original listing of Ofinger and his status was changed to having died from his wounds.

The details on the lists can also be checked against local memorials, village records, etc. throughout Germany. All of these help to provide additional details, verification of the Verlustlisten, etc.

One valuable piece of information that can be ascertained from these entries is their approximate age. The terms Landwehrmann and Reserve indicate an approximate age spread based on the traditional ages of men that served in these categories.

Please let me know about the changes in collecting and recording German losses you mentioned in your message, thanks.

Ralph

[Tom A McCluskey]

"I cannot help thinking that there's a strong similarity between the British fixation on Mons in 1914 and the Germans' fixation on Langemarck a couple of months later - both have sparked strong bodies of work and have been clouded by myth, legend and propaganda for generations."

Halder,

This is fine as a personal opinion, but does not go anyway to explain the proportionality of the, positive and negative, feeling about the fighting experiences concerning the BEF, which is reflected in: personal accounts, Regimental histories, and the Official History. That is to say, when doing well, it is generally recorded so; when not doing well, that is recorded also and as such it often goes to the British extent of being overly-critical of itself. The British Army knew when it was up, as is recorded in the writings of the time, and afterwards. It also knew when it was down, and the same witnesses/commentators write about this with the same amount of objective reflection - which can be seen by reading accounts about the Somme, IIIrd Ypres (especially Passchendaele), parts of the March 1918 Offensive. All of which, as far as I am concerned, is not formed with a 'mythical' backdrop. Just look at witnesses such as James Jack, who is honest enough to tell us about the tremendous strain that the war put him under and how it nearly broke him. His writings reflect a trend of feeling (that he had at the time) which was commensurate with the situation covered by other authors experiencing the war at the same given period, and in tune with the Army's record in general. If you read his book, I would say, as opposed to projecting propaganda it states simple truths.

Jack,

Having read your views on Smith-Dorrien, I can't help but think that this needs some readjustment or calibration. I would put in the machiavellian or craven camp: Lanrezac, Huguet*, and French. I can't see how Smith-Dorrien fits into this camp, a man who is fired into the breech and does more good than harm. We know he is one of the few survivors of a major defeat in 1879 and knows the grave consequences of encirclement and defeat (and he could have hung onto this crutch as his excuse for not fighting Le Cateau), but, for all of the practical and morally-right reasons chooses to delay at Le Cateau. I seem to remember the mud-slinger in all of this - who to me has more of a credibility issue - as none other than the 'Little General' himself: French (whose retrospectives, conveniently omit many issues).

Aye

Tom McC

* EDITORIAL PS - Maybe should have put this one down as an alarmist/melodramatist.

[George Armstrong Custer]

George,

You made mention of the question of how the German Army collected their casualty data and recorded it. Could you be a little more specific and mention what these issues were as well as when these changes were made during the war, thanks.

Please let me know about the changes in collecting and recording German losses you mentioned in your message, thanks.

Ralph

Since you've asked twice in the same post Ralph, this is obviously something you think you've "got" me on. However, I have already stated that this is one of the subjects I will address, and I will do so. And as I've already pointed out, I don't see the purpose of this discussion as winning or losing, but simply the presentation of alternate bodies of evidence and interpretations. It is up to those reading these to come to their own conclusions as to which interpretations are the most persuasive. I have to confess my surprise, though, that you are implying that any of this is news to you - your own posts on this thread give plenty of mention of what German data did or did not record at various periods of the war.

I have to say, too, that your long defence of the integrity of German sources without caveat in this latest post doesn't strike me as particularly consistent with your declaration of having "no real interest in taking sides" which you made in post #400. I have no problem with anyone taking a partisan stance based upon their understanding of the facts, but they should not pretend otherwise. I have already made my own preference for the integrity of the British state-sponsored historiography over that of the German clear.

Finally, I find your statement that "the destruction of the Prussian Archives in WWII is devastating to historians who would like to have access to them," to be somewhat puzzling as it seems to imply that the loss of the records of 90% of the German army in the Great War is not a problem for historians who aren't bothered about not being able to access them. Which historians of the German army in the Great War would they be? I shouldn't need to tell you, of course, that the material you refer to as being copied by the US Army in the interwar years from the Prussian archives hardly scratches the surface of what was there, and in any case bears no relation to this thread in so far as the US Army was not interested in copying any material from actions between 1914 to 1918 in which they played no part. It also, of course, only reflects what the US historians were allowed to see - and that surely wasn't going to be anything which conflicted materially with the German OH's line.

As I've already said, I'll get back on the issues I've already alluded to when I'm happy with the preparation of my material - including on the question you repeatedly press for an answer to.

Regards,

George

[Jack Sheldon]

Tom

I did make my position vis a vis Smith Dorrien clear a long way back in the thread. These are probably not my exact words but in essence, my view is that his decision to stand at Le Cateau required great moral courage, that I was personally glad that history had vindicated him and that in his statements about German casualties he was mistaken. I think I have also said that I could see why he felt the need to publish a robust defence of his actions after the shabby way he was treated later. I suppose it is possible that he was tempted into his assertion of German casualties because it lent justifying weight to his actions. I do not think he needed to do that. The facts of the matter as they actually were reflect credit on both him and the men of the BEF who carried out his orders. Kluck, I suspect, in his book, made the claims about facing the entire BEF in an attempt to explain why he blew a great chance to encircle and destroy at least II Corps during this early phase of the war. The BOH and other writers use the Kluck material a great deal but, as I have also pointed out, it cut no ice at all with the German Official History which stated the British strength at Le Cateau correctly and criticised both Kluck and his chief of staff and the cavalry for failing to bring about a decisive victory.

Your point in another recent post about the influence of the old Prussian linear tactics is a shrewd one. I think that it lasted on as an influence in the minds of senior commanders, long after the harsh facts of the front line had led to radical alterations in low level tactics. Juenger was extremely critical of this mindset. Writing about the middle stages of the Battle of the Somme, he said 'The terrible losses, out of all proprotion to the breadth of front attacked, were principally due to the old Prussian obstinacy, with which the tactics of the line were pursued to their logical conclusion...' It took the arrival of Hindenburg and Ludendorff in the West in early September 1916 to bring about the ditching of this approach and it is probably no coincidence that, freed from its mental constraints, it was not long, for example, before flexible defence was proposed, tested and used and increasing numbers of storm battalions and divisional assault groups began to appear on the battlefield.

Jack

[Ralph J. Whitehead]

Since you've asked twice in the same post Ralph, this is obviously something you think you've "got" me on. However, I have already stated that this is one of the subjects I will address, and I will do so. And as I've already pointed out, I don't see the purpose of this discussion as wnning or losing, but simply the presentation of alternate bodies of evidence and interpretations. It is up to those reading these to come to their own conclusions as to which interpretations are the most persuasive. I have to confess my surprise, though, that you are implying that any of this is news to you - your own posts on this thread give plenty of mention of what German data did or did not record at various periods of the war.

??? I just want to know what you are referring to, nothing more, nothing less. I can't tell what you are referring to as you did not elaborate on your statement. You just alluded to a vague statement regarding casualties. I was unaware I was laying an ambush.

I have to say, too, that your long defence of the integrity of German sources without caveat in this latest post doesn't strike me as particularly consistent with your declaration of having "no real interest in taking sides" which you made in post #400. I have no problem with anyone taking a partisan stance based upon their understanding of the facts, but they should not pretend otherwise. I have already made my own preference for the integrity of the British state-sponsored historiography over that of the German clear.

Finally, I find your statement that "the destruction of the Prussian Archives in WWII is devastating to historians who would like to have access to them," to be somewhat puzzling as it seems to imply that the loss of the records of 90% of the German army in the Great War is not a problem for historians who aren't bothered about not being able to access them. Which historians of the German army in the Great War would they be? I shouldn't need to tell you, of course, that the material you refer to as being copied by the US Army in the interwar years from the Prussian archives hardly scratches the surface of what was there, and in any case bears no relation to this thread in so far as the US Army was not interested in copying any material from actions between 1914 to 1918 in which they played no part. It also, of course, only reflects what the US historians were allowed to see - and that surely wasn't going to be anything which conflicted materially with the German OH's line.

??? Don't read implications into what I said. It was a simple statement, the destruction of the archives was a loss of material that any historian or researcher I know would like to have access to. No more, no less. The mention of the U.S. Army copying was simply a reference to that not all of the materials from this period were lost and they did copy items from 1914 and other years the U.S. was not involved.

As I've already said, I'll get back on the issues I've already alluded to when I'm happy with the preparation of my material - including on the question you repeatedly press for an answer to.

Regards,

George

My responses are underlined above to differentiate them from the posting and for no other reason so please do not read anything into it. I thought I was asking a simple question but it seems not.

Ralph

[Steven Broomfield]

but we still do not have anything to explain why the British estimate of German casualties was wrongly pitched so high and believed for so many years.

I wonder if we haven't touched on this before: I would suggest the following as possibly being at least part of the reason:

1. Certainly at the beginning of the day, the Germans advanced en masse; they were fired upon and figures dropped. At least one British Battalion (2nd Essex) we know were firing at extreme range (1,300 yards): I would suggest it is impossible to assess the effectiveness of your shooting - some targets will be hits (of more or less severity), while many others will be going to ground. As Jack has suggested and the British confirm, the Germans then 'went to ground' and a fire fight/artillery duel ensued. It wasn't until that duel was won and lost, and the Germans had infiltrated where possible (again, the Suffolks give evidence of this) that the assault was repopened. For a lot of the day, British infantry appear to have had relatively few targets at which to shoot.

2. It is possible that 'hits' were multiple claims. The two Highland officers with the Suffolks were counting their targets, but who's to say the men they were counting were not also being shot by other riflemen? My very limited military experience reminds me of a falling plate competition where I was doing rather well, until I discovered an REME Craftsman next to me had been shooting at my plates - and also doing rather well! That's in a peacetime range environment - how much more difficult must it be in the real thing?

3. We know what we lost, and it is always assumed the attackers lose more. QED.

4. The British were not in possession of the field at the end of the day; the Germans were. Therefore the British side had no empirical evidence on what happened - merely assumption. The comment in the Essex history about seeing dead germans behind corn stooks is interesting - one must assume that only British prisoners could have seen this.

5. In strict terms of land ownership at the end of the battle, we lost. Therefore a train of thought might be that we have to prove we 'won', and the only measure we could provide figures for is enemy losses. I know it might sound strange, but the desire to paint enemy losses as higher than ours might be a perfectly reasonable way to suggest we 'won' the battle. 'Spin' wasn't a Blairite invention.

6. There is no doubt that S-D did the right thing at le Cateau, and the bloody nose his men inflicted had longer-term effects, I would suspect, but he was faced with oprobrium from his boss, so, again, German losses have to be a factor in justification, given the conditions S-D was acting under. How was he to know, until much later, what longer-term effect his decisions had?

Finally, the reason these have been the accepted truth all these years is - very possibly - that no-one has ever questioned them, or properly examined any evidence which might come to light.

Just my thoughts.

[George Armstrong Custer]

I thought I was asking a simple question but it seems not.

Right, Ralph.

George

[shawnt63]

I wonder if we haven't touched on this before: I would suggest the following as possibly being at least part of the reason:

1. Certainly at the beginning of the day, the Germans advanced en masse; they were fired upon and figures dropped. At least one British Battalion (2nd Essex) we know were firing at extreme range (1,300 yards): I would suggest it is impossible to assess the effectiveness of your shooting - some targets will be hits (of more or less severity), while many others will be going to ground. As Jack has suggested and the British confirm, the Germans then 'went to ground' and a fire fight/artillery duel ensued. It wasn't until that duel was won and lost, and the Germans had infiltrated where possible (again, the Suffolks give evidence of this) that the assault was repopened. For a lot of the day, British infantry appear to have had relatively few targets at which to shoot.

2. It is possible that 'hits' were multiple claims. The two Highland officers with the Suffolks were counting their targets, but who's to say the men they were counting were not also being shot by other riflemen? My very limited military experience reminds me of a falling plate competition where I was doing rather well, until I discovered an REME Craftsman next to me had been shooting at my plates - and also doing rather well! That's in a peacetime range environment - how much more difficult must it be in the real thing?

3. We know what we lost, and it is always assumed the attackers lose more. QED.

4. The British were not in possession of the field at the end of the day; the Germans were. Therefore the British side had no empirical evidence on what happened - merely assumption. The comment in the Essex history about seeing dead germans behind corn stooks is interesting - one must assume that only British prisoners could have seen this.

5. In strict terms of land ownership at the end of the battle, we lost. Therefore a train of thought might be that we have to prove we 'won', and the only measure we could provide figures for is enemy losses. I know it might sound strange, but the desire to paint enemy losses as higher than ours might be a perfectly reasonable way to suggest we 'won' the battle. 'Spin' wasn't a Blairite invention.

6. There is no doubt that S-D did the right thing at le Cateau, and the bloody nose his men inflicted had longer-term effects, I would suspect, but he was faced with oprobrium from his boss, so, again, German losses have to be a factor in justification, given the conditions S-D was acting under. How was he to know, until much later, what longer-term effect his decisions had?

Finally, the reason these have been the accepted truth all these years is - very possibly - that no-one has ever questioned them, or properly examined any evidence which might come to light.

Just my thoughts.

Steven, I think you summed up things quite nicely actually, and this is very nearly an exact interpretation that i take from this whole thread.

Makes a huge amount of sense, thanks for posting up such an eloquent synopsis.

Shawn

[salesie]

My very limited military experience reminds me of a falling plate competition where I was doing rather well, until I discovered an REME Craftsman next to me had been shooting at my plates - and also doing rather well! That's in a peacetime range environment - how much more difficult must it be in the real thing?

Falling Plate! Now there's a blast from the past, Steven. I was part of the team (using No 4 SMLEs) that won the West Riding ACF Falling Plate competition in 1966 at Strensall, which was Yorkshire Brigade Depot & HQ in those days. I was wearing a Young & Lovelies cap badge back then, but within a year, after joining the colours, I was badged REME. Perhaps the REME guy in your case was carrying out his support role to the letter? We're like that, us REME guys you know - always thinking about the feelings of others, kind, gracious and well-mannered, helping others wherever and whenever we can, just getting on with the job, getting them back into action, and avoiding controversy if at all possible...

Cheers-salesie.