The "machine guns" of Mons ?

[Jack Sheldon]

Phil

The French were pretty meticulous about tracking casualties. Those who specialise in the study of casualties seem to agree that only the French consistently published their figures in an easily readable form. The figures I quoted are in Tome III of Les Armees Francaises dans la Grande Guerre (p 602). I suspect that one of the main reasons for high mortality was that almost every aspect of French casualty handling from evacuation to treatment was below standard and totally overwhelmed by the scale of the problem. It is probably no coincidence that the American volunteer ambulances units worked behind the lines at Verdun.

Jack

[Paul Hederer]

Remarkable difference in the ratio of dead/missing to wounded : Germany, by end of 1915, counted 948,599 dead/missing and 1,595,406 wounded. Why was the French ratio of dead/missing to wounded so much higher? POWs among the missing would account for a lot of the difference, since the French had lost more than a quarter of a million prisoners by the end of 1915, about double the German total. Even allowing for this, the French proportion of fatalities is inordinately high. Perhaps it was the French, not the Germans, who excluded the lightly wounded from their casualty figures.

Phil.

Phil,

Just a slight addition for clarification--the figure 948,599 includes German military dead/missing from all causes--including sickness and accident.

It might be useful to add some detail about the German system for counting wounded as well.

Wounds were grouped together in group XII. This group included categories 35-38. Some of the categories might sound a bit odd, but am guessing there was some type of "line of duty" determination for pensions and so forth that resulted in these injuries being listed under the group wounded. I double checked this by adding the numbers for each category and they are indeed all carried under the total wounded figures.

The categories were:

35 Shot

36 Edged Weapons

37 Broken bones, Sprains, Dislocations

38 Other Wounds and Injuries

For interest, from those wounded the following was noted as cause:

37.5% Bullet

54% Artillery

3.5% Grenade

.5% Edged weapons

4.5% Other

Note that gas casualties (wounding) were carried in category 39 "other illnesses." These are not carried in the wounded group. There are statistics for gas casualties in the Sanitaetsbericht Vol III, but I did not dig them out.

The "War Year" for totalling casualties ran from August until July of the next year. Here are some detailed numbers for the first two years of the war:

War Year 1914/1915

KIA 232,979

DOW 94,144

WIA 1,252,862

MIA/POW 238,752

DOS 25,780

War Year 1915/1916

KIA 172,793

DOW 69,984

WIA 1,146,942

MIA/POW 132,962

DOS 31,575

DOW=Died of Wounds

DOS=Died of Sickness

It would be possible to extrapolate some numbers seperating the MIA/POW group using overall war figures, but I did not do this (nor did the SanB)

Total WIA from August 1914-July 1916:

2,399,804

Of those, the break down for wounding is:

1,722,880 Bullet, Artillery, etc.

20,515 Edged Weapons

272,045 Broken bones, Sprains, Dislocations

376,384 Other Wounds and Injuries

There is an error of 980 in the total, and that is probably due to a transcription error on my part.

Paul

[Pete1052]

Some years ago I attended a lecture on medical care during the American Civil War. The physician giving the lecture said the medical service of the German army was highly impressed by the six-volume Medical and Surgical History of the War of the Rebellion, 1861-65 published by the U.S. Army Surgeon General's Office in the 1870s and 1880s. The set of books is filled with tables of statistics and hundreds of startlingly graphic plates of the wounds of war. Quite possibly the books had an influence on the development of the German army's medical service and its methodical approach to recording its wartime activities.

[phil andrade]

Phil,

Just a slight addition for clarification--the figure 948,599 includes German military dead/missing from all causes--including sickness and accident.

It might be useful to add some detail about the German system for counting wounded as well.

Wounds were grouped together in group XII. This group included categories 35-38. Some of the categories might sound a bit odd, but am guessing there was some type of "line of duty" determination for pensions and so forth that resulted in these injuries being listed under the group wounded. I double checked this by adding the numbers for each category and they are indeed all carried under the total wounded figures.

The categories were:

35 Shot

36 Edged Weapons

37 Broken bones, Sprains, Dislocations

38 Other Wounds and Injuries

For interest, from those wounded the following was noted as cause:

37.5% Bullet

54% Artillery

3.5% Grenade

.5% Edged weapons

4.5% Other

Note that gas casualties (wounding) were carried in category 39 "other illnesses." These are not carried in the wounded group. There are statistics for gas casualties in the Sanitaetsbericht Vol III, but I did not dig them out.

The "War Year" for totalling casualties ran from August until July of the next year. Here are some detailed numbers for the first two years of the war:

War Year 1914/1915

KIA 232,979

DOW 94,144

WIA 1,252,862

MIA/POW 238,752

DOS 25,780

War Year 1915/1916

KIA 172,793

DOW 69,984

WIA 1,146,942

MIA/POW 132,962

DOS 31,575

DOW=Died of Wounds

DOS=Died of Sickness

It would be possible to extrapolate some numbers seperating the MIA/POW group using overall war figures, but I did not do this (nor did the SanB)

Total WIA from August 1914-July 1916:

2,399,804

Of those, the break down for wounding is:

1,722,880 Bullet, Artillery, etc.

20,515 Edged Weapons

272,045 Broken bones, Sprains, Dislocations

376,384 Other Wounds and Injuries

There is an error of 980 in the total, and that is probably due to a transcription error on my part.

Paul

Thank you, Paul.

Surely the French figure for dead also includes non battle causes. The died of wounds percentage in the German case equates to about 6.4% of the number wounded. The British figure was somewhat higher, approaching 8%, while the French mortality among the wounded reached nearly 10%. This indicates either that the Germans enjoyed better medical care, or that the German figure for wounded was inflated by a relatively large number of slight cases. Also, of course, the French suffered catastrophically in the opening weeks, in conditions of defeat and retreat that did not allow for decent evacuation and treatment of wounded. All the same, the statistics do not flatter the French medical record. They imply that a French soldier, if wounded, was nearly fifty per cent more likely to die than his German counterpart. More than this, it apears that a significantly higher proportion of French soldiers who were struck down on the battlefield were killed outright : the German figures indicate that the killed in action equated to about 16% of the wounded, while the French figure was more than double that. Why? This of course must be tempered by the obvious fact that many of the German missing were killed - even so, the disparity is astonishing; after all, the weaponry deployed was not so very different....high explosive, machine guns etc. Tactics would account for some of this, especially the way the French were massing as easy targets for German artillery and machine guns in August 1914. These figures do suggest, perhaps, that the alleged massed infantry formations that the Germans are supposed to have deployed at Mons are not borne out by the killed to wounded ratio - if I remember correctly, the casualties for 1st Army that Jack revealed for late August 1914 indicate a low proportion of killed to wounded - not consistent with the image of infantry mown down in close formation, which tended to produce a high ratio of those killed outright to wounded. The problem of the German missing needs to be addressed: how many were POWs, and how many were killed? Are there indications in the SB about these respective ratios?

Phil.

[Steven Broomfield]

Only two thoughts on the above:

1. As Jack points out, French casualty evacuation procedures were chaotic, which may well account for a hugely higher likelihood of wounded not surviving (incidentally, a similar case existed with their veterinary services, which relied heavily on external assistance)

2. Many of the wounds suffered by Germans at Le Cateau (as mentioned earlier) were at pretty extreme range (1,300 yards, for example), which would not only increase the likelihood of it being a slighter wound, but also increase the possibility of rapid evacuation.

[phil andrade]

Only two thoughts on the above:

1. As Jack points out, French casualty evacuation procedures were chaotic, which may well account for a hugely higher likelihood of wounded not surviving (incidentally, a similar case existed with their veterinary services, which relied heavily on external assistance)

2. Many of the wounds suffered by Germans at Le Cateau (as mentioned earlier) were at pretty extreme range (1,300 yards, for example), which would not only increase the likelihood of it being a slighter wound, but also increase the possibility of rapid evacuation.

Thank you, Steven. That's a good point about casualties being inflcited at extreme range at Le Cateau - it had not occurred to me. I think that one of the German regiments that suffered particularly high losses there did actually lose an inordinatlely high proportion of killed, though.

On reflection I think that I understated the true proportion of killed to wounded that the French official figures that Jack cited imply. More than half of all their casualties were dead or missing, and I suppose that about half a million were killed outright and about 1.1 million wounded ( before the died of wounds were to be reckoned with) - a staggering rate of the killed equating to nealry 50% of the wounded !

On the other hand, the initial breakdown of French casualties were very different : in September 1914 they counted 210,000 casualties, excluding officers. Of these, only 18,000 were posted as killed, against 110,000 wounded - a rate similar to that of the German SB. There were, however, 82,000 missing : many captured, no doubt, but all too many of them killed. Clearly an enormous subsequent revision had to take place, in which the missing who were dead, and the wounded who died, had to be taken into account. The disparity between the initial posting of killed for September 1914 - only about 9% of the casualties - and the final reckoning of the dead and missing up until the end of 1915 - over half of the total - is astonishing. I wonder how SB tabulations might be adjusted in this regard?

Phil.

[salesie]

Robert, Paul.

The War Office used a method of fixed percentages alongside the paybook figures, whereas GHQ used paybooks alone, Occleshaw tells us that:

"Manpower studies comprised two inter-related sections, one dealing with the strength and losses of the hostile armies in the field, and the other with reserves in the homeland who could serve with the armies in the field. The War Office and GHQ employed different means of assessing these factors. The former allotted a fixed percentage of casualties to every battalion the enemy had engaged in a specific action. To give an example, a paper by Macdonogh on German losses in the Somme offensive up to 30 September 1916 stated that, since 1st July, 380 individual battalions had been engaged by the enemy on the British section of the Somme, of which 35 had been used twice and 25 others had remained in the line for the whole three months. Macdonogh considered it safe to assume that these 25 battalions had received 100 per cent drafts over this period: it was German practice replace losses in active and reserve units without battalion movements. Consequently the number of battalions engaged was 380 + 35 + 25; giving a total of 440. The German official casualty lists (at this stage belated and incomplete) showed an average loss of 43 percent in infantry. Macdonogh considered that 'We shall therefore probably not be taking too high a figure if we assume an average of 50 p.c. casualties in the 440 infantry battalions engaged'...This was only an estimate and Macdonogh admitted 'it is of course not possible to give as yet, any exact estimate of the German losses on the Somme' (paybook evidence relied on comparing future captured paybooks from the same units with those captured on the Somme up to 30th September)...

...Nevertheless, Charteris's figures could give no indication of how many of the 'missing' men had been transferred to other formations or were on leave or absent for any other reason. GHQ were persuaded to think again about total reliance on German paybooks, the shortcomings of which were bluntly underlined in the debates surrounding Haig's proposals for an offensive from Ypres that summer. In August 1917 GHQ adopted a means of estimating enemy casualties which closely resembled the War Office system. After observing that the 1918 Class provided between 17 and 25 percent of prisoners taken (which corresponds to the information in the Bosworth Papers), GHQ proceeded to estimate enemy losses in Flanders and at Lens by classifying divisions as 'exhausted' when withdrawn from the line after losing 3,200 men, all arms. On this basis GHQ estimated the German losses in Flanders up until 21 August as 90,000 men and a further 10,000 at Lens.

Following the change of method at GHQ, in December 1917 both the War Office and GHQ submitted papers on German losses in the course of the year. The War Office estimated the Germans suffered 662,000 battle casualties on the British front and a further 314,000 through wastage, a total of 976, 000 men. GHQ estimated the German loss as 710,500 battle casualties and 285,120 through wastage, a total of 995,620 men...

...That the Germans had suffered heavy losses could not be doubted; during 1917 the BEF alone had captured over 72,900 prisoners and 527 guns on the Western front. Had the British armies suffered such a loss in prisoners alone it would have been regarded in Whitehall as a major defeat. However, the true significance of these losses lay in the implications they had for German reserves and Germany's ability to continue the war."

Hope this helps, Gentlemen. However, it seems to me that this debate is becoming bogged down with the frightful curse of statistics, one will throw one set and the other a different set - when, in reality, neither are exact. Consequently, I will post no more detail about British Military Intelligence, if you want to see how Macdonogh, and others, were ahead of the intelligence game over the Germans then I respectfully suggest you read Dr Michael Occleshaw's book, Armour Against Fate, it is heavily researched and very detailed - the author's main conclusion is that the activities of Macdonogh, and British Military Intelligence, shortened the war by around a year (that should keep a thread going for many years).

My last words on this topic, Gentlemen, will be that; I hope I have shown in this thread that if we're not careful then the bottom line can be totally lost in the pedantic search for the devil in the detail, when in reality it is the minutiae of that detail which is the true devil of the matter. The bottom line of this thread always was, and still remains despite all the rhetoric, that the much vaunted German steamroller failed to roll-over and flatten the contemptibly small BEF, and, what's more, it failed when manpower and materials were in its favour. Some say the BEF was lucky, I say I don't believe in luck and that the Old Comtemptibles made their own luck by being the finest, man for man, soldiers in the world at that time and, consequently, could punch well-above their weight. Some say, it was purely down to German error that the BEF escaped annihilation, I say that's like explaining the loss of the Titanic without mentioning the iceberg, plus see my previous point about luck.

Cheers-salesie.

[phil andrade]

[

Following the change of method at GHQ, in December 1917 both the War Office and GHQ submitted papers on German losses in the course of the year. The War Office estimated the Germans suffered 662,000 battle casualties on the British front and a further 314,000 through wastage, a total of 976, 000 men. GHQ estimated the German loss as 710,500 battle casualties and 285,120 through wastage, a total of 995,620 men...

Cheers-salesie.

Much more realistic estimates of German losses than I had expected. Thank you.

Phil.

[Robert Dunlop]

... when, in reality, neither are exact.

salesie, it is helpful to get the additional information. I had been under the impression that you thought British Military Intelligence's figures were the correct figures. This impression was mistaken, and it is clear that their figures included assumptions. It should be noted that the potential for error in the BMI figures has no bearing whatsoever on whether the German records were exact or not. So far, I have not seen any conclusive evidence that the German records were not 'exact', though I have noted that several contibutors to this thread believe that Nazi influences led to falsification of the German figures.

Robert

[Paul Hederer]

...it seems to me that this debate is becoming bogged down with the frightful curse of statistics...

Salesie,

I posted the numbers in response your request for specific figures from the SanB.

I agree with Robert that they are valuable to compare and contrast with the British figures. I also agree that they are the most correct and exhaustive figures available.

Paul

[Desdichado]

On July 2nd, 1916, Haig wrote in his diary that the estimated casualties on the first day of the battle numbered about 40,000; some 20,000 shy of actual losses, killed and wounded. Does anyone know when the actual number of casualties on the British side on July 1st became known and also was Haig provided with an ongoing, that is to say a constantly updated estimate of casualties as the battle was joined?

[Halder]

Whilst I can't add to the excellent figures Paul has kindly provided based on a great deal of research in the archives, I can offer some insight into casualty reporting in the Wehrmacht which might shed some light.

In March 1945, the General Staff compiled casualty figures from the first two months of 1945, based on submissions from the various front-line commands. The total arrived at was 660,000. The most recent research shows that 450,000 soldiers were killed in January 1945 alone. February 1945 dead were 280,000 - which means 730,000 dead for the two months' fighting, 70,000 higher than originally estimated. I can easily understand how discrepancies occur given the chaotic nature of fighting in the closing months of the war; I don't believe there was any massaging of figures, simply mistakes in the heat of battle.

Interestingly, of every three German soldiers killed in WW2, one died in 1945 - a truly sobering statistic which makes you realise just how bloody those final months were.

[phil andrade]

Whilst I can't add to the excellent figures Paul has kindly provided based on a great deal of research in the archives, I can offer some insight into casualty reporting in the Wehrmacht which might shed some light.

In March 1945, the General Staff compiled casualty figures from the first two months of 1945, based on submissions from the various front-line commands. The total arrived at was 660,000. The most recent research shows that 450,000 soldiers were killed in January 1945 alone. February 1945 dead were 280,000 - which means 730,000 dead for the two months' fighting, 70,000 higher than originally estimated. I can easily understand how discrepancies occur given the chaotic nature of fighting in the closing months of the war; I don't believe there was any massaging of figures, simply mistakes in the heat of battle.

Interestingly, of every three German soldiers killed in WW2, one died in 1945 - a truly sobering statistic which makes you realise just how bloody those final months were.

May I please ask for clarification, Halder? Are you talking about deaths here, or is it a question of casualties, which, of course, include not only the killed, but also the wounded and prisoners? Those figures for early 1945 are simply appalling, and my suggestion is that perhaps they allude to total casualties i.e. killed, wounded and missing, rather than just to those killed. The Red Army suffered about a third of a million casualties in the Battle for Berlin, of whom about eighty thousand were killed.

Phil.

As an edit, I would add that, in the Great War, the casualty rate suffered by Germany on the Western Front in the most intense periods of fighting - August -November 1914, and March-June 1918 - was comparable with the rate of loss suffered in the heaviest fighting on the Eastern Front 1941-45; at least, that is what official statistics indicate.

[Halder]

Hi Phil,

These figures are dead (Gefallen/Toten) not Verwundeten/Verlusten/Vermissten. They would have been appalling figures as casualties, but as dead, truly shocking. They come from MGFA/BA-MA (Germany's IWM/PRO):

"Estimates based on sample methods suggest that the number of dead Wehrmacht soldiers in the first month of 1945 reached the record level of 450,000, followed by 280,000 dead monthly in February to April and another 95,000 dead in May 1945" (Andreas Kunz, Wehrmacht und Niederlage, p.155.).

Casualties (dead, missing, wounded) in June and July 1944 (ie Normandy, Rome and especially Bagration) were 740,000. Losses (dead, missing, wounded) in the 12 months to July 1944 were 2.1m.

[phil andrade]

Hi Phil,

These figures are dead (Gefallen/Toten) not Verwundeten/Verlusten/Vermissten. They would have been appalling figures as casualties, but as dead, truly shocking. They come from MGFA/BA-MA (Germany's IWM/PRO):

"Estimates based on sample methods suggest that the number of dead Wehrmacht soldiers in the first month of 1945 reached the record level of 450,000, followed by 280,000 dead monthly in February to April and another 95,000 dead in May 1945" (Andreas Kunz, Wehrmacht und Niederlage, p.155.).

Casualties (dead, missing, wounded) in June and July 1944 (ie Normandy, Rome and especially Bagration) were 740,000. Losses (dead, missing, wounded) in the 12 months to July 1944 were 2.1m.

Thank you Halder. Shocking figures, truly shocking....in fact, were it not for your authentication, I would have refused to believe them.

Besides that, the worst of the Great War begins to pale.

Phil.

[salesie]

I was more disappointed than shocked - when I realised that if we'd killed more of the b*st*rds the first time around then probably there would not have been a re-run. How many Jews were killed in January 1945 or in the four and a bit years up to July 1944, not to mention the non-jewish civilians? I'll save my shock, and my sympathy, for the victims not the criminals!

Cheers-salesie.

[Paul Hederer]

For those interested in having a first hand access to the a lot of the German casualty figures mentioned here, Patrick Schallert will be offering a scanned version of

"Sanitaetsbericht über das deutsche Heer," Vol III, for 5 euros at his website:

Books on CD

The book is in German, and Fraktur, but with a little work it can be used by everyone. The definitive source for German military losses in the Great War.

Salesie, I'm sure your sentiments are appreciated by our German members here. Unfortunately, anyone searching through these posts in future will also see your comments. I hope they don't take them as an example of the attitudes of the membership here at Great War Forum. I would be embarrassed if they did. Shame on you.

Paul

[salesie]

Salesie, I'm sure your sentiments are appreciated by our German members here. Unfortunately, anyone searching through these posts in future will also see your comments. I hope they don't take them as an example of the attitudes of the membership here at Great War Forum. I would be embarrassed if they did. Shame on you.

Paul

Just highlighting the bottom line, Paul - just reminding everyone what those dead Germans were actually fighting for, before someone became too shocked at their deaths.

Cheers-salesie.

[Steven Broomfield]

Salesie - that really is an awful thing to say. Yes, many were Nazis, but many were young men with little or no option but to fight for their country. To make comments like those is unnecessary.

And no, I wasn't there, but my father spent 6 years of his youth in places like France (1939-40) and Egypt/Libya; his opinion is one I would value and he never had anything but admiration for the German soldier, and certainly bore no grudges post-war.

Referring back to the Great War, I always think of Sassoon's lines about remembering German soldiers who were loyal and brave - that applies to both wars, IMHO.

[truthergw]

I worked beside a Ukrainian who had served in the SS during the war. At 17 he was given the choice, join the SS or go to the camps. What would you have done, Salesie? In the same factory was a Ukrainian who had escaped from the camps and who assured me that, given the choice, he would have joined up as well.

[Desdichado]

My godfather was a Warrant Officer on board a 49 Squadron Lancaster that was shot down over Kassel. All seven members of the crew baled out but the pilot and wounded rear gunner, the last to leave the aircraft, fell into the hands of the SS, who, before a mob of angry civilians, shot them in cold blood. One of the SS men was a Latvian. I cannot have any sympathy at all for the Nazis and, yes, many did not have a choice but to serve. On the other hand, many did and many of those chose to commit atrocities.

[David Filsell]

"In the war it was not the fighting men who were distinguished for abuse; as has been said "Hell hath no fury like a non-combatant'. Never ascribe to an opponent motives meaner than your own."

J.M. Barrie, Rectoral Address at St Andrew's University, May 3rd, 1923 in the presence of Earl Haig.

[Desdichado]

"In the war it was not the fighting men who were distinguished for abuse; as has been said "Hell hath no fury like a non-combatant'. Never ascribe to an opponent motives meaner than your own."

J.M. Barrie, Rectoral Address at St Andrew's University, May 3rd, 1923 in the presence of Earl Haig.

It's actually "War hath no fury like a non-combatant" and is attributed to Charles Edward Montague. And, with respect, J.M. Barrie knew a thing or two about fantasy didn't he?

[salesie]

As intended, feathers have been ruffled. I was using absurdity to spotlight the gross absurdity of post no's 362, 363, 364 & 365 - in which not a thought was given to what those German casualty figures, that so shocked Phil, represented - not a mention of the great evil that those German soldiers were defending - the innocent casualties created by that infamous army, which far outnumbered the casualties that Hitler's criminally inclined forces suffered themselves, were not even an afterthought to any of those posts.

If the shame is on me then I'm more than happy to carry that shame to the grave.

Now, for those of you who attempt to use single examples to excuse the actions of the many, I'll say this. The pathetic excuses of just obeying orders, I had no choice, is no defence at all. When I was a young soldier (British that is) in the 1960's, I had to attend lessons in British Military Law and I was informed, in no uncertain terms, that a British soldier is only obliged to obey lawful orders - which means that if a British soldier committed crimes such as those committed by German forces and if brought before a court, either civil or military, and pleading that he was only obeying orders would be no defence at all. That said, it is not easy for the lowest of the low (in rank terms) to challenge his superiors alone, but when there are massed ranks, who live together and discuss all kinds of things behind their superiors backs, it is clear historically that if the majority thought what they were doing was wrong then they would act. In other words; in a fighting force, morale is as vital as training, manpower and ammunition, so would any army, German or otherwise, fight as long and as hard as the Wermracht did if the vast majority didn't have "faith" in the righteousness of what they were doing? They were full of themselves when they were winning, as all bullies are, but when they lost it was: "I had no choice", "Nothing to do with me", "I was only obeying orders."

Phil used the words of AJP Taylor to make a point in an earlier post, perhaps he'd like to hear that Taylor, in his Origins of the Second World War, apart from saying that Hitler was a "normal" German leader and was no worse than any of the Western leaders of the time, claimed that the German people, as a whole, were just as anti-Semitic as Hitler was, and thus, because he was only speaking on their behalf, there was no reason to single him out from the millions of Germans and Austrians who were ferociously anti-Semitic.

This is a Great War forum, Gentlemen, so this theme as it stands can't run, but bear in mind that the roots of Nazism can be clearly traced back to pre-WW1 Germany - so please stop making excuses for the army that became the scum of the earth and deserved everything that it bloody well got; think of its innocent victims just for once.

Cheers-salesie.

[truthergw]

Time for your tablets , old chap.