The "machine guns" of Mons ?

[George Armstrong Custer]

It was certainly not my intention to use the suggestion of disingenuousness in a harsh way Jack, and I rather think it was certainly less harsh than your own earlier dismissal of the introduction of the subject of the significance of the date of publication of the Sanitaetsbericht. As far as your suggestion that tracking down any involvement of Department VIII with the publication and content of the Sanitaetsbericht "would be no harder than your implicit demand that I prove a negative, i.e. that the figures were not tampered with," I fear you really are being disingenuous. Are you really saying that official works produced under the Nazi regime ought not to be automatically viewed with suspicion by historians? I know of no reputable historian who does not apply that rule to such sources, and as I include you in that category I am surprised at what you seem to be implying here. Therefore my suggestion that anything published in 1934 ought properly to be regarded as tainted until proven otherwise is an entirely proper one. I've yet to read an historian arguing the opposite - that Nazi era sources ought to be taken at face value unless proved tainted. Since you have dismissed the official British Historian as a 'fantasist' , but argue the case for the integrity of German sources produced after 1933, this is an important point to clarify. Your Appendix III rightly contains caveats regarding German histories from the Weimar era, yet makes no caution regarding those produced after 1933. It's my view that the latter deserve a far stronger caveat. You ask me why the Nazis would want to change casualty statistics at that date. You might as well ask why they did any number of what to a normal person would be entirely irrational and unspeakable things. Why did they burn AQOTWF? Here's a suggestion for you, though. As early as March 1925, the British Official Historian had already noted in print that the German Official History was evading the subject of German blunders and losses at La Cateau, and that in fact no German losses were mentioned in contrast to the heavy losses reported as being inflicted upon them by British sources. If the German accounts of 1924 were evading the issue of their vaunted field army's stumble before Mons and La Cateau in the opening days of the war they thought would be a walkover, it's not stretching credibility too much to suggest that the Nazi apparatus would take steps to ensure that nothing came out to support the British version. You may, of course, dismiss Edmonds, the British Official Historian, as a 'fantasist'. However, it is clear from the foregoing that he was keeping himself up to speed on what German histories were saying during the 1920's and comparing and contrasting them with the British version of events. His familiarity with what German histories - Regimental as well as Official - were saying is confimed by corrrespondence which I have between Edmonds and General Dill. Dated 1927, Edmonds is responding to a question from Dill on the time it took for German units to transport from the Western to the Eastern front during the war. Edmonds responds: "I have looked up some of the German Regimental histories. they agree with what I said: 3 days railhead to railhead." He then goes on to quote specific examples of dates and times for the 3 Guard Grenadier Regiment.

Leading on from this I certainly didn't suggest that overall figures for the entire war were being reduced, and I would merely suggest here the possibility that established elements (ie silences) of the German Official History on Mons was not something the Nazi's would allow to be upset by the release of inconvenient statistics.

You say you stand by what you say in your Appendix III. However I still find your conclusion to that Appendix irreconcileable with the caveats which it contains regarding the purpose of and circumstances under which the German histories you refer to were produced. And any reference , let alone caveats, to German sources produced after January 1933 are conspicuous by their absence.

The quotes you provide regarding IR 84 at Mons are of interest. However, whilst you state in support of their veracity that "I do not believe, personally, that this material was intended for wide circulation and it had nothing to do with anyone's world view outside the regiment," it should also be pointed out that a Regiment which had formed part of a defeated army is hardly going to pay to circulate accounts of their deeds in that war which castigate themselves rather that 'talk up' and enhance their role in particular and the German military in general - you concede as much yourself in your Appendix III.

I would like to add at this point that whilst I certainly question works produced by a defeated nation under such auspices as those of the Reichswehr and the Nazi party, I have not at any point on this thread comprehensively written them off as worthless, nor their compilers as 'fantasists.' I have confined myself to what is a fairly ubiquitous historiographical position of extreme caution on anything produced in Germany between 1933-45 and, to a lesser degree, between 1918 and 1933. Much of what these sources contain is of great value, and much of it has been sifted for use in your own books of course. Where these German sources, and bearing in mind the circumstances of their origins - particularly 'official' ones - conflict markedly with an overwhelming body of British sources, however, my personal instinct is to trust the British sources. Essentially that is what I think this aspect of the thread boils down to: whether or not you are predisposed to accept some German sources - with all the caveats they carry with them - in preference to an overwhelming body of British testimony to the contrary in the case of Mons. My own view is that German losses were neither as high as some of the more hyperbolic British secondary accounts suggest, nor as low as Reichswehr and Nazi era German sources suggest. I doubt if either point of view on these fundamentally different approaches has been altered by these exchanges, but they may well have served a useful purpose in alerting some of those who read them to the caution and judgement which must be applied to sources due to the peculiar circumstances in which they came into being.

ciao,

George

[Jack Sheldon]

Just a couple of quick thoughts George, because I am about to go out. First of all thank you for putting your position so clearly. I think that everyone will find that helpful and I certainly include myself in that. My problem with Edmonds has nothing to do with his overall output, which I use and benefit from like everyone else. I threw out the word 'fantasist', perhaps a little loosely but, at root, because I can see no justification for his use of the word 'stupendous' to describe German casualties at Le Cateau and I have already devoted a lengthy post to why I doubt them.

This applies also to the remarks of General Smith Dorrien. This has got nothing to do with any published figure, rather it was based on the relatively limited number of troops exposed to British fire at Le Cateau for fairly short periods, much of which was spent by certain regiments being pinned down and unable to move. There are no 'wipe outs' at Le Cateau to compare with some of the events at Mons. No units were smashed, despite the fact that Smith Dorrien had 9 brigades and cavalry at his disposal compared with the German figures I provided earlier - effectively six brigade equivalents and some cavalry.

I can see, too, that have I still not made myself clear about 'integrity and respect for the facts'. The phrase refers to the fact that study of the original regimental archives of the formations I listed, produced information entirely compatible, frequently word for word, with what was published in their histories and I invite anybody who doubts it to repeat the exercise. The material is readily available.

I know there are other outstanding points and I have promised some more information, but it will have to wait for the time being.

Jack

[Robert Dunlop]

do you really think that highly experienced British Regulars believed that when they opened fire and their targets dropped from view that they'd killed or wounded them all? Do you believe that such experienced troops didn't know that men take cover when under fire?

salesie, it seems that you are suggesting, by the nature of your questions, that the British Regulars could distinguish between men being killed and men dropping down to take cover. Is that correct?

Methinks thou doth theorise too much! The logical consequence of what you're saying is, despite a mountain of evidence to the contrary, that when in action the much vaunted German infantry could be stopped by inflicting just a few casualties on them - that when it came to the crunch they couldn't really face it.

Because in this instance they took cover? From your practical experience in the military, what did you do when you came under heavy small arms fire?

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

I have been looking back over the accounts written in the various British battalion and other war diaries. The diary of the 1st Battalion East Surrey Regiment appears to be missing from the National Archives. Does anyone have the account please? "From Mons to Messines and Beyond..." mentions a regimental history written by Pearse and Sloman, published in 1923. Does anyone have the account of the East Surreys at Mons and/or Le Cateau from this source, please? Thanks.

Robert

[phil andrade]

Phil, I don't intend to be rude but, honestly, are you clear about anything? You spent several posts bemoaning the fact of your lost innocence, that you'd been misled for years by British accounts of what the BEF achieved at Mons and that it had all turned out to be a "legend". And your basis for this Road to Damascus experience? Jack's citing German casualty reports which didn't confirm British accounts of the damage they inflicted upon the Germans before Mons. And even these have now essentially boiled down to a single source which Jack holds to be unimpeachable - the Sanitaetsbericht of 1934. From apparently having swallowed hook, line and sinker the more hyperbolic British accounts of Mons for years, you have now become a staunch supporter of Jack's German sources which have such an iconoclastic effect on all British accounts. This is despite the deep misgivings which some - including Jack - have voiced over the purpose of and circumstances around the production of these German sources. With the zeal of the newly converted you now dismiss the concerns over the integrity of Sanitaetsbericht due to its having been compiled under the Reichswehr and edited and published under the Nazis by stating that the Nazis would have allowed publication of a book whose statistics could be used to gauge German performance in the Great War without checking it because, in your words, "It's a hell of a dull read." I'm afraid this reveals an astonishing misapprehension on your part on what the Nazi state was all about.

Guilty as charged in so far as Mons is concerned.

It's not easy to be clear about those battles in 1914 : I readily admit to being mightily confused about the Battles of the Frontiers and the Marne, they were in their nature enormous and bewildering events.

The statistics of the SB have swayed me ; but I do view them with circumspection.

You were right to pull me up about my comment that the Nazis wouldn't have given that work a glance - a thoughtless throw away remark for which I am to be much chastened !

I remain unrepentant about my contention that the SB was not tampered with. It's such an obscure and heavy going piece of material as to deter would be censors. How many people would read it? There is nothing in its conclusions about German casualties which smacks of supression or distortion.

Phil.

[phil andrade]

It must seem as if I'm "running with the hare and the hounds". I defend the integrity of the sanits bericht (SB) and yet view the tables with circumspection.

Look at this comaprison of two sets of German casualty figures for the fighting on the Western Front between August and November 1914.

The SB figures are : Killed in action 76,541; Missing in action 123,128; wounded in action 383,350; Total 583,019.

The Riechsarchiv : Killed in action 116,750; Missing in action 107,640; Wounded in action 453,050; Total 677,470.

In these opening battles of the war, the RA did admit that only general totals were available, and that their returns had to be partly conjectural. They became more precise later, and then petered out in the last phase of the war. All the same, they do attest to a much higher total of killed and wounded than the SB allows for - the difference being in the order of twenty five per cent. Significantly, it has been argued that the RA figures are inflated by excessive numbers of missing, some of whom later turned up. In this case, the SB figure for missing is substantially higher than that of the RA.

The disparity between the two sets of figures becomes much less marked from February 1915 onwards, although the proportion posted as killed is usually significantly lower in the SB. This, I suppose, testifies to the enormity and confusion of the opening months, when fighting was frantic and fluid - rather like my posts!

Phil.

[Jack Sheldon]

I wonder if I might change tack briefly in support of my contention that German casualties were relatively low at Le Cateau and that, generally speaking, there was not much in the way of mass targets for the marksmen of the BEF to engage. I thought that a few snippets from the regimental histories might help, starting on the British right and continuing to the left as far as Ligny and Fontaine au Pire.

5th Div

14 Bde: 1 DCLI. [The orders not to continue the retreat did not reach this battalion. By 6.30 am they were just about to move off, when they clashed with advance elements of IR 72.]

'We sat down in fours on the right of the road where there were but a few houses and had scarcely done this when fire was opened on us from houses at the bottom of the street and at once the battalion took to the open ground on the right of the road, This operation naturally led to companies getting mixed up and as it appeared there was no time to be lost and in the absence of superior orders each officer did immediately what seemed good to himself. In a very short time the battalion had opened up, but the general intention was not clear, though the East Surreys who had not been fired on and at least two companies of the DCLI took the ground on the left of the road and began an advance. Gradually more and more men were transferred across the road and across the railway cutting from the high ground near which little groups of men could be seen advancing towards the more obvious Germans who, however, seemed to be firing at us from several directions.'

The Bn 2ic , Major Cornish-Bowden was with a group which dropped back when the Germans launched their first assault,

'Arrived at what seemed to be the crest of a hill, we were astonished to find ourselves again under fire. Somebody expressed the opinion that the whistle of the bullets denoted that they were British and that therefore we were under the fire of our own side. I replied that my ear for music was not sufficiently well developed to enable me to distinguish between the note of British and German bullets.'

2 Suffolks

'The enemy's infantry did not show up much at first, but it became immediately evident that their artillery was in vastly superior force to that of the British. Some German skirmishers, who had crept up the knoll of the Montay spur, now opened fire on the British gunners, Upon these and also upon a concealed German machine gun on the Cambrai road the left company of the Suffolks opened fire; but there was some doubt as to the situation, for it never occurred to any of the officers that the high ground imediately to the east and west of Le Cateau would be left open for free occupation by the enemy. It was not, however, until about ten o'clock that the German infantry began to offer a target. In spite of the losses they sustained from rapid individual and machine gun fire they continued to advance steadily for some time, but were eventually checked...By this time the hostile artillery had increased to a pitch of tremendous severity... The enemy were already seeking to turn our right flank... Early in the day the enemy had succeeded in getting a number of machine guns into the cutting on the Le Cateau-Cambrai road, immediately in front of 2 Suffolk. By 11.00 am the fire from these guns had increased to such an extent that the position of the battalion became critical.'

19 Bde (description from Die Hards in the great War Vol 1)

'Soon, towards 3.00 pm, the Germans were seen advancing from the east across the spur on the opposite side of the valley. At once the Highlanders [2 A&SH] and the Middlesex engaged them at 1,200 yards, wherupon the enemy hesitated and finally beat a retreat. Half an hour later the Germans again ventured to show themselves, advancing in extended order and although it was not easy for the machine guns to beat them back, the guns of two Horse Artillery batteries compelled them again to seek shelter. Thus the further advance of the Germans was, for the time being,held up and the retirement began.'

13 Bde

2 KOYLI (5th Div History description)

'Surrounded on three sides, swept by concentrated rifle and machine gun fire from front and flanks, battered by shells and with their ammunition exhausted, the battalion stayed to its death, faithful to the order.'

'In the last stage of the fight when a determined advance by the enemy must at any moment have settled the business, some officers told their men they could take their chance of getting back to the column... a few managed to win through, for there were men who later in the week were able to give evidence of what had taken place within the trenches in the last phases of the action. Such evidence was impressionistic, as evidence gathered under the circumstances was bound to be.'

1 RWK

'As the German attack developed, the battalions holding the front line suffered heavily both from shell and rifle fire. By about 3.00 pm the enemy had succeed in working round the right flank to a position from which he could enfilade the forward battalions of 13 Bde. A retirement was then ordered.'

2 DW

'We had a splendid field of fire and could see a low level plateau for about 1,200 yards. At Le Cateau we did not see any infantry advancing at all except at a great distance.'

2 KOSB

'They were joined by Major Haig, who found a fair field of fire and a view to the right as well. But beyond the Cambrai road there were folds by which the enemy could be dribbled up out of sight. It was soon evident that the brunt of the attack was nearer Le Cateau and against the KOYLI and 14 Bde... About 2.30 pm artillery from a new position opened on the KOSB. Some of the trenches were conspicuous on account of newly turned earth and casualties began to occur, so that trenches had to be evacuated and open ground left and right occupied. For the fist time masses of German infantry were observed about two miles off on the other side of the Selle... Meanwhile A [Coy] had occasionally had long range targets and had wonderfully few casualties considering the way that shells fell all around. Soon after 3.00 pm they also retired in a south westerly direction, dictated by the German thrust on the right.'

15 Bde

1 Beds

'This was the best defence position I have ever taken up in my life. It was sited on agentle reverse slope and well down the revers slope, therefore anyone coming over the crest had a long way to come to reach the trenches... A battery,much to our disgust, had unlimbered about 200-300 metres behind the trench where I was and another took up position behind D Coy. The battery behind me fired all the morning and the Germans retaliated. Rifle fire came over, but nothing to worry about. MG fire and gunfire became intense, especially on our right and got even heavier as the day proceeded.. About 4.00 pm order came that we were to retire by bounds... enemy MG fire was very heavy and the grass at the crest of the sunken road was being cut up, just as if by a mowing machine... the Boches began to shell the crossroads heavily with shrapnel and we crouched under the bank as bouquet after bouquet arrived. Finally, about 6.00 pm, we split into artillery formation and moed in a southwesterly direction - other direction we had none as there were no maps.'

1 Norfolk

'During the early part of the battle even the front line in this part was not attacked and the Norfok battalion, dug in on the sunken road, was not disturbed at all. What a contrast to what was going on only a mile or so away!'

3rd Div

9Bde

1 NF

'On the slightest indication of enemy movement in Inchy, the exits were smothered by artillery and rifle fire and the battalion was undisturbed except for an occasional shell.'

At 3,30 pm came orders to retire.

'The position, strong for defence was most unfavourable for this operation. Retirement from the forward trenches entailed traversing an open slope for some four hundred yards... the Germans did not advance to within 1,000 or 1,200 yards of B Coy, which had taken up aposition in rear to cover the retirement of the remaining companies.'

1 Lincoln

'The German artillery began firing at about 6.30 am, not very heavily at first. Their infantry came over the opposite skyline and down the open slope in extended lines. Our guns opened up on them with some effect. By degrees the Germans got down to the village and into it, where they were out of sight until they reappeared on the outskirts of the vilage nearest to us, when our companies opened a heavy fire on them... More and more lines of Germans came over the skyline and down the slope and established themselves in the village. They got their machine guns to work, as well as sharp shooters, who had apparently spotted our piece of trench, as whenever a head was raised a bullet came past it. The trenches were fairly good, but it was impossible to keep a good lookout on the Germans, which was necessary lest they rushed us from the village, without exposing ourselves.'

8 Bde

1 Gordons

'About 9.00 am the German artillery got to work. Many attempts have been made to describe the situation in a trench when an artillery duel is in progress, but really no words can give any idea of the intensity of the confusion. On both our flanks machine guns maintained a steady staccato. All other sounds were sudden and nerve-straining, especially the sudden rush of the large German shell followed by the roar of its explosion in Audencourt... Gradually the number of our own shells grew less and less as our batteries were silenced or forced, perhaps even ordered, to retire. As this went on it became evident - far more evident than at Mons - that we were up against overwhelming odds... It was not long before we had a chance of getting rid of some ammunition... The command,' Five rounds rapid at the stubble field 900 yards,' produced a cinematographic picture in my field glasses. The Germans hopped into cover like rabbits. Some threw themselves flat behind corn stooks and when the firing ceased, got up and bolted back to the wood. Two or three who had appeared to fling themslves down remained motionless. The enemy, having discovered we could be dangerous at even 900 yards then successfully crossed the stubble field in two short rushes without losing a man... Great numbers of troops now began to appear on the ridge between Bethencourt and the little wood. They advanced in three or four lines of sections of ten or fifteen men extended to two paces.... They were advancing in short rushes across pastureland which provided no cover whatever and they offered a clearly visible target even when lyng down. Although our men were nearly all first class shots, they did not often hit the target...' [to be fair, because of German suppressive shrapnel fire]

7 Bde 9Caudry)

3 Worcesters

'The trenches held by B Coy had been sited... to command the little valley that runs up to Caudry from Beauvois. Consequently the enemy's guns took the company in enfilade. The position was puzzling at first, but when the situation was realised B Coy wheeled back into a new position in the firing line. There again the company was enfiladed, for German machine guns opened from Guizette Farm. To avoid that fire B Company withdrew a few hundred yards and found good cover in a sunken road on the outskirts of the hourses. The spreading daylight revealed German cavalry and guns in the wooded valley north of Beauvais...Small parties of the enemy were seen moving at different points along the line and several German machine guns opened fire. The British platoon answered with short sharp bursts of musketry and presently the enemy's fire died down...'

'B and C Coys were more hotly engaged. From 6.00 am onwards strong forces of the enemy came in view beyond Jeune Bois [disnounted cavalry]. German machine guns were brought into action as the enemy advanced. The shooting of the Worcestershire platoons was fast and accurate and such of the enemy as came south of the road were severely punished... about 9.30 m orders came for them to fall back to a fresh position on high ground west of the town. The reason for the move was pressure on 4th Div on the left and the not inconsiderable gap between the flanks of 11 and 7 Bde.'

Continues!

[Jack Sheldon]

4th Division

11 Bde

1 RB [on the main Quarry Position, which found itself in the front line as 1 SLI and 1 Hants on its left and right were pushed in by the Jaegers]

'By now the enemy was seen massing as if for an attack. The artillery, machine gun and rifle fire increased. The companies fixed swords [bayonets] and prepared to meet the attack halfway; but no attack developed.'

1 SLI

'At 5.30 am heavy hostile enemy artillery fire was opened on the Quarries position which was very exposed and entirely unentrenched. Here C and D Coys had taken whatever cover was possibile, the surrounding country being very open. A glacis-like slope, which provided the only fair field of fire led up to where the companies were extended, but the enemy was too cautious to advance in that direction, his attention being turned to the flanks of the position... At 6.30 am masses of Germans were advancing from the main Cambrai - Le Cateau road, west of Beauvois. They were supported by the artillery in action rnear the road. Their machine gun detachments, which had worked their way around Fontaine and through the village, now opened very heavy flanking fire on the right of 11 Bde and casualties among 1 SLI became severe... Shortly after 8.00 am the Quarries became untenable. Both flanks of the position were now exposed. 7 Bde on the right and 12 Bde on the left having been forced back by heavy pressure and intense machine gun fire.'

1 Hants

'The country... was open and gave a fair field of fire, particularly to D coy, north of the railway, as the Germans found when they tried to advance, British rifle fire soon discouraging them and checking efforts to work round to our left. Accordingly against 11 Bde they relied mainly on shell fire and machine guns... B Coy had been quite sharply engaged and had several casualties... Captain Connellan brought two platoons of C up to reinforce and he and Captain Palk set a splendid example of leadership and coolness encouraging the men to endure the ordeal and to take advantage of any targets which presented themselves... About 9.00 am D had the satisfaction of seeing Germans coming forward in large masses. Reserving the fire of his left half company till the enemy were quite close, Lt Halls then opened rapid fire with great effect, the surviving Germans falling back to a ridge nearly 300 yards away; but after that very few such targets were given again and the Germans, apparently dismounted cavalry, merely maintained a desultory fire at a very respectful range.'

[During the withdrawal]

'The best marksmen of D coy were able to pick off some of the machine gun crews and occasional officers who marked themselves out by carrying drawn swords.'

1 ELanR

'Eventually, about 10.00 am, C Coy less one platoon, in a most exposed position on the left was forced to retire... More casualties were inflicted during the retreat and one of them was Major Collins, severrely wounded... During the withdrawal there were many casualties and, on continuing the retirement over the wide open slope to Ligny, the Bde came under a hail of shrapnel and small arms fire. There were more casualties, the most serious of which were from small arms fire, for the German shrapnel burst very high and though nearly every man was bruised by shrapnel bullets, very few casualties were caused by them...'

12 Bde

2LF

'The enemy, having a greater number of machine guns had begun to work around the battalion's left and enfilade it. Captain Ward had therefore withdrawn his company a short distance...It was now about 8.00 am and Ward's company and Cross's platoon were being seriously harrassed by machine gun fire from behind...Casualties were mounting...The Germans were creeping around the flank and a retirement became necessary.'

2Essex

'Shortly afterwards the Germans reappeared. C and D Coys opened fire at extreme range and checked their advance which died away by 11.00 am... About 1.00 pm an advance was made to Logsart Farm, the enemy having apparently evacuated the hill. Many killed and wounded were found there, but as the Germans reopened a heavy fire, the troops were ordered to retire again to the Haucourt-Esnes road... '

2 Inniskilling

'The enemy was about 1,000 yards off and was progressing. Nothing was audible above the crack of rifle and Maxim fire and the whistlnig of bullets as they tore through the beet and shrubs. How any of us escaped to continue the fight I cannot imagine! We took what cover was available and then returned their fire, first at 1,000 metres then at 600. At the latter range we could see them in big thick lines and seemingly bent on overwhelmng us by sheer weight of numbers.'

[There was then a short withdrawal]

'We took up position here with the Essex and, seeing our danger and our thinned ranks, a captain of that regiment told us to get inside the trench. We had not been there long before a hail of bullets fell on us... We held on like grim death, but soon recognised that the trench being easily enfiladed, fresh cover would have to be found...'

10 Bde was in reserve on the left and did not clash with the German army.

I was encouraged to go down this route when Salesie reminded us in Post 202 that there was 'a mountain of eye witness evidence from those who fought the action' and, indeed, by George's remark in Post 226, '...my personal instinct is to trust the British sources.' So I checked; Salesie was correct and these extracts emerged from that work. Would either of you like to comment and perhaps talk us through where on the Le Cateau battlefield the Germans suffered 'stupendous' casualties and 'losses far heavier than ours' and who caused them? Feel free to adduce any more evidence from the British regimental histories which you may come across and which may help you construct your case.

Jack

[George Armstrong Custer]

This applies also to the remarks of General Smith Dorrien. This has got nothing to do with any published figure, rather it was based on the relatively limited number of troops exposed to British fire at Le Cateau for fairly short periods, much of which was spent by certain regiments being pinned down and unable to move. There are no 'wipe outs' at Le Cateau to compare with some of the events at Mons. No units were smashed, despite the fact that Smith Dorrien had 9 brigades and cavalry at his disposal compared with the German figures I provided earlier - effectively six brigade equivalents and some cavalry.

Thanks for that, Jack. As to Smith-Dorrien's remarks on Le Cateau - the corollary to what you say is that he was either a black liar or badly mistaken. I'd suggest he was neither, and that Mons and Le Cateau is not a comparsion of like with like. As to the forces involved at Le Cateau, Sir Edward Spears notes that "He [smith-Dorrien] stood with 55,000 men against von Kluck who could bring against him 150,000, and who had a gun superiority of at least three to one. Three British infantry divisions and one cavalry division were attacked in front and on both flanks by six German infantry divisions and three cavalry divisions, whilst the German II Corps was descending on their left."* Yet even after the war, when he had read Sir John French's despatches from 1914, von Kluck thought he had been up against the whole BEF and asserted that: "six divisions, a cavalry division and several French Territorial divisions opposed the First Army."** Post-war German writers claimed that von Kluck's report to the Supreme Command that he had won a victory over not three divisions but nine helped to mislead von Moltke as to the true situation. Major-General Sir F. Maurice observes of von Kluck's forces that "it was out of the question that the British could oppose any but very inferior numbers to the four corps and three cavalry divisions which he had within reach of the battlefield. Even assuming, as is possible, that the whole of the Fourth Reserve Corps did not reach the battlefield on the 26th, he cannot have had less than 130,000 men to oppose to Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien's 55,000 and to some 4,000 French in Cambrai, while his superiority in guns was not less than three and a half to one." *** Yet, as we have seen, the performance of Smith-Dorrien's force was such that even after the war, von Kluck asserted that he had been faced by the entire BEF. No wonder John Terraine concluded of Le Cateau that "it was, in truth, not only the most brilliant exploit of the BEF during the Retreat, but one of the most splendid feats of the British Army during the whole of the War." **** Edmonds, the British Official Historian, devotes a section of volume one of the British history to German accounts of Le Cateau (pp. 182-185), in which he concludes that "Very little has been published in Germany about Le Cateau, and there is no official account of the battle, as there is of Mons and Ypres. The fighting on the 26th August was at first almost concealed by being included in the so-called "battle of St Quentin." There is no doubt that the enemy suffered very heavy losses, and for that reason has said little about it." And "As there is no coherent account of the battle from the German side, the information available with regard to each of the German corps is given for reference in a note at the end of the chapter." ***** Edmonds notes that in the official German list of battles (Schlachten des Weltkrieges, published between 1919 - 1945), Le Cateau is called "the battle of Solesemes-Le Cateau (25-27 August 1914)", and the troops present are given as III Corps (5th & 6th Divisions), IV Corps (7th & 8th Divisions), IV Reserve Corps (7th Reserve & 22nd Reserve Divisions) and II Cavalry Corps (2nd, 4th and 9th Cavalry Divisions), whilst the 3rd Diviion of the II Corps is shown engaged on the 26th at "Cambrai". ******

On the infliction of casualties upon the Germans, here's a couple of quotes: By 10am "a machine gun of the Yorkshire Light Infantry diod excellent work in protectng the left flank of the Suffolks, and that Regiment, suported by the 52nd Field Battery, by steady marksmanship, foiled every attempt of the enemy to build up a firing line near enough to the Britiah position for an attack to be pushed home. By 11 o'clock, however, the position was so serious and casualties in the Suffolks so heavy, that the Manchesters, in brigade reserve, were ordered up to support them....." ; "The Hampshires scored a notable small triumph, when a German battery unlimbered just over 1,000 yards away in the open. With their sights at 1,050 yards, the Hampshires compelled the battery to retire in less than one minute." ; "[The German] artillery subjected the whole line of the 4th Diision to a tremendous bombardment, which grew in volume as the guns in the IV Reserve Corps came up, ahead of their infantry. But there was no moving General Snow's troops. When the Jagers and dismounted cavalry advanced in masses, firing from the hip as they often did, they were cut down and brought to a standstill instantly." ; "The Suffolks - what remained of them - and their supporting detachments of Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were the first to be overwhelmed. They did not succumb easily. Two officers of the Highlanders were noted, calmly shooting down German after German, and counting out their scores aload, as if at a rifle competition [..........] At about half past three in the afternoon, the remains of this fine battalion were rushed by the enemy. Their stubborness and their marksmanship played a great part in covering the retirement of the 5th Division."

One point I raised in my post #212 is I think worth repeating here and expanding upon. It gives a convincing explanation, I think, as to why the German casualties suffered on the 26th August before Le Cateau whilst high, and by no means as negligible as the silence of German sources might suggest, were nevertheless probably proportionately less than those suffered before Mons on the 23rd. This is the account given by Major-General Sir F. Maurice regarding the letter taken by the French from a captured German officer shortly after Mons:

"We have already left Belgium several days, after having fought and beaten the Belgians at Tirlemont, and the British at Mons. The principal tactics of the English consist in entrenching themselves in villages and in opening murderous rifle and machine gun fire. So we can only advance against them with artillery, and reduce these wasps' nests with the fire of our guns. We have too heavy losses if we attack these positions with infantry, because our infantry marches like Blucher."

Maurice firstly points out that this letter confirms British accounts of the effect of their musketry before Mons. But he then goes on to note the change in German tactics - the lesson learned - which the high casualties sustained before Mons caused the Germans to adopt. Maurice writes: "This letter was written about a week after the battle of Mons, and the change in the German tactics to which it refers almost certainly took place in consequence of the experiences of the German infantry on August 23. It is probable, as I have said, that von Kluck, finding that his first plan was producing a frontal attack in which his infantry was making little progress at very heavy cost, changed his plan during the course of the battle........" It seems to me that Maurice, writing in 1919, is making a significant point regarding the differences between the fighting on the 23rd August and that of the 26th, and I'd suggest that this may be the key to the relative lack of presentation by massed German formations at Le Cateau on the 26th to which Jack has referred - the Germans had been so bloodied at Mons on the 23rd that there'd been a discernable shift in tactics induced by fear of incurring similar casualty rates. As a caveat, however, I'd add that this should by no means be taken as suggesting - particularly given the disparity between the opposing forces - that Smith-Dorrien's forces did not inflict a high cost upon their attackers on the 26th, only that, relative to the 23rd, the opportunity given by the German tactics to inflict more did not present itself.

Finally, returning to Smith-Dorrien, and going back for a moment to the question which began this thread, I find myself wondering about the German officer informant quoted by Corbett-Smith on the belief that "every one of you carries a portable Maxim with him." I had initially assumed that Corbett-Smith was relaying a first hand account of a conversation with that officer - he refers to "the German officer who gave me these details...." However, given Smith-Dorrien's later statement on the Germans and machineguns and the fact that he heavily annotated Corbett-Smith's proof sheets prior to publication it seems possible at least that Smith-Dorrien himself may be the original source to whom the German officer made the remark. Given that French had his Adjutant-General sieze these proof sheets, and claimed to still have them in his possession in 1919 when his own 1914 was published, it's a question that might be easily answered if these annotated proof sheets still exist amongst French's Papers. If it turns out that the reference to the German officer's comments on the British and machine guns are in the main body of Corbett-Smith's text on the proof sheets rather than being introduced via Smith-Dorrien's annotations, then it will still have been confirmed that Corbett-Smith's German officer is the source for Smith-Dorrien's later remarks on the subject.

ciao,

George

* Liason 1914, by Major-General Sir Edward Spears, Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1930, p.p. 224-225.

** Mons, Retreat to Victory, by John Terraine, Batsford, 1960, p. 155; Military Operations France & Belgium 1914, compliled by brigadier-General J. E. Edmonds, vol I, 2nd edition, 1925, p. 184.

*** Forty Days in 1914, by Major-General Sir. F. Maurice, Canstable, 1919, pp. 104-105.

**** Terraine, op cit p. 143.

***** Edmonds, op cit p. 182.

****** Ibid.

[Jack Sheldon]

I think we must have crossed in transmission George. I am just going to read carefully through your post and cordially invite your thoughts on my previous one.

Jack

[George Armstrong Custer]

I think we must have crossed in transmission George. I am just going to read carefully through your post and cordially invite your thoughts on my previous one.

Jack

Indeed! Your last two posts weren't there when I began putting mine together - something I've had to do intermittently through the morning in between other things. I'll get back to you this evening sometime.

ciao,

George

[truthergw]

.....................

I remain unrepentant about my contention that the SB was not tampered with. It's such an obscure and heavy going piece of material as to deter would be censors. How many people would read it? There is nothing in its conclusions about German casualties which smacks of supression or distortion.

Phil.

Enough people would read it to make it worth publishing. You miss the point. If Goebbels thought anyone would read it and it did not project the Nazi picture, he would suppress it. We are all aware of the astonishing attention to detail which the Nazis brought to every facet of their government. That may well be the most chilling part for many, to see how important mundane detail was to them in their extermination campaign. To think they would allow the publication of an official history which did not chime with their view is to ignore their history completely.

[Jack Sheldon]

George

Many thanks for that very useful post. I am currently wondering why both sides 'identified' forces way in excess of those actually present in the firing line at Le Cateau. Kluck, perhaps, was trying to seek reasons why he failed to annihilate II Corps. If he could pump up the figures and get others to believe him, he may have felt his case was enhanced. [There is a quote from Kluck in the March on Paris concerning the manoeuvering of his Corps before and during the battle, if anybody is interested.]It clearly cut no ice in Germany. The Official History Der Weltkrieg Vol I, published in 1925, which, just for the record, refers to it as Die Schlacht bei Le Cateau [The Battle of Le Cateau] does not actually go into this at all. It simply states that General Sixt von Armin, Commander IV Corps, 'recognised swiftly that this was more than a series of minor clashes during a pursuit and issued a corps order at 12.15 pm to provide a unified framework for the attacks of his divisions, which up until then had been conducted separately.' It goes on to identify accurately which German forces were committed at Le Cateau, describes how events unfolded and criticises the cavalry for wasting time hanging around Cambrai, contributing nothing and Kluck and his Chief of Staff for not being far enough forward to grip the situation and regrets that, 'the opportunity to inflict a decisive blow on the right flank was not exploited.'

Just to repeat, the only German forces which fought at Le Cateau were from the German IV Corps. As I mentioned in my Le Cateau introduction, which Salesie dislikes, First Army was off balance. I do not believe it expected to fight at Le Cateau at all and so it was completely unready to tackle what happened. If all its forces had been available to deploy and had there been enough space for them to do so, then the long listing of what Kluck had up his sleeve, which you have drawn to our attention, would be relevant and the other conclusions correct. But the fact is, due to intelligence failures and incompetent cavalry work, the German army was in no position to bring its superiority to bear. This failure meant that II Corps only had the opportnity to shoot at six German regiments, some cavalry, artillery and three, arguably four, German Jaeger battalions. There were no other German forces on the battlefield or within the range of British weaponry durng the period II Corps spent there and I fully accept that those which were may have behaved more cautiously than some did at Mons - very sensible too I would say.

Jack

[phil andrade]

Enough people would read it to make it worth publishing. You miss the point. If Goebbels thought anyone would read it and it did not project the Nazi picture, he would suppress it. We are all aware of the astonishing attention to detail which the Nazis brought to every facet of their government. That may well be the most chilling part for many, to see how important mundane detail was to them in their extermination campaign. To think they would allow the publication of an official history which did not chime with their view is to ignore their history completely.

Yes, Tom, having visited the mansion at Lake Wannssee I fully appreciate the Nazis' attention to detail. What was the "Nazi picture" of the Great War? Hitler himself had fought the British at Langemark in 1914, and he held them in high regard for their martial qualities. Is it your view that the SB history was a function of Nazi censorship?

Phil.

[truthergw]

Yes, Tom, having visited the mansion at Lake Wannssee I fully appreciate the Nazis' attention to detail. What was the "Nazi picture" of the Great War? Hitler himself had fought the British at Langemark in 1914, and he held them in high regard for their martial qualities. Is it your view that the SB history was a function of Nazi censorship?

Phil.

As George has ponted out and I think most people would agree, a large part of the Nazi myth was to portray the German Army in 1918 as undefeated in the field. The version assiduously pushed in schools and in academic history was that the Army was betrayed at home by Jews and communists etc. Hitler made great play of having been a front line soldier. I do not believe that any historical work however dull, which went against that mythology would have been allowed to be printed or gone un ' corrected ' if already in print. Nazi discrimination and enforcement of their dogma did not start with the war. It was well in force several years before that.

I thought I would add that it would not be necessary for a Nazi official to edit these figures. The people producing the figures would have been well aware of what was expected. Many archivists would have been ex officers and possibly not too averse to gilding the lily where the Army's reputation was seen to be at stake. I have a pamphlet of Ludendorff's which blames the defeat at the Marne on von Moltke and accuses him inter alia of dabbling in the occult and, along with Hentsch, of taking part in an international conspiracy of freemasons. Published 1934. This was the sort of stuff that was being pumped out at the time of the SB.

[phil andrade]

As George has ponted out and I think most people would agree, a large part of the Nazi myth was to portray the German Army in 1918 as undefeated in the field. The version assiduously pushed in schools and in academic history was that the Army was betrayed at home by Jews and communists etc. Hitler made great play of having been a front line soldier. I do not believe that any historical work however dull, which went against that mythology would have been allowed to be printed or gone un ' corrected ' if already in print. Nazi discrimination and enforcement of their dogma did not start with the war. It was well in force several years before that.

I thought I would add that it would not be necessary for a Nazi official to edit these figures. The people producing the figures would have been well aware of what was expected. Many archivists would have been ex officers and possibly not too averse to gilding the lily where the Army's reputation was seen to be at stake. I have a pamphlet of Ludendorff's which blames the defeat at the Marne on von Moltke and accuses him inter alia of dabbling in the occult and, along with Hentsch, of taking part in an international conspiracy of freemasons. Published 1934. This was the sort of stuff that was being pumped out at the time of the SB.

To cut to the quick of it, you subscribe to the view that the figures in the SB, which are germinal to Jack's argument that the BEF did not inflict the spectacular losses on the Germans at Mons/Le Cateau that we have been led to believe, are suspect because they were produced at a time of rigorous Nazi control and censorship. Am I correct in stating this?

Phil.

[truthergw]

I have not yet made up my mind. I am aware that German propaganda was produced during the great war and long after it, albeit for different reasons. I have a few examples on my shelves. I believe that Jack and George are both sincere in their beliefs and are producing evidence to support their arguments. I will weigh that evidence before I come down on one side or the other, if indeed, I do not decide that the question is still open. I am of a rather sceptical turn of mind, inclined to reserve judgement until utterly convinced. If pressed, I would admit to leaning more toward the British view but very little and very reluctantly. I am normally more inclined to go with the numbers. Of course this is a salutory reminder that numbers do not fall from a great databank in the sky. They are collected and collated and rounded and corrected by people with their own agendas and their own levels of ability. History is a product of society and we would be very short sighted not to take some cognizance of that society when we study the history. Nothing new there. Herodotus, Father of History is also known as Father of Lies.

[Robert Dunlop]

"... in the column formations preceded by skirmishers, which had often been noted by British observers of the German manoeuvres"

*** Forty Days In 1914, by Major-General Sir F. Maurice, published by Constable, 1919, pp. 79-80.

GAC, just a quick follow-up to this quote, which might give the impression that this was the standard attack formation of the German infantry. By 'German manoevres', I presume Maurice was referring to die Kaisermanöver. These were the annual manoeuvres that were attended by several military observers from different countries, including England. They were one of the few visible outputs from the German General Staff. It has been reported that up to 100,000 men were involved. Until von Moltke was appointed, however, the 'manoeuvres' were heavily influenced by the Kaiser. They were more like a showcase for his theatrical/military tendencies. The highly stylised manoeuvres were more reminiscent of Napoleonic methods, and must have been a great source of embarressment to the General Staff. In any event, von Moltke acted quickly to bring a modicum of utility to the manoeuvres. Annika Mombauer ("Moltke and the origins of the First World War" ISBN: 9780521019569) noted that in 1912 'an important change in the staging of manoeuvres was... noted by foreign observers. Under Moltke's auspices, war games became classified information, even ranked as top secret documents with restricted access, for fear of allowing the enemy insight into Germany's war planning. It was becoming increasingly difficult for officers from foreign armies to be present at manoeuvres and observe the proceedings. The British military attache, Colonel Frederick Trench, commented on the increasing secrecy surrounding the manoeuvres, and the new measures which aimed at preventing observers from acquiring any real information about the training of the German army. In Trench's words, their attendance was now a 'waste of time'..."

Francis Grenfell, an English cavalry officer, managed to attend the 1912 event "as a spectator". He was suspected of being a spy and "a few days later, when he came back from watching the manoeuvres, he found a police inspector in his room who presented him with a letter saying that he must leave Dresden in twelve hours and Saxony in twenty-four" ('Francis and Riversdale Grenfell' by John Buchan). He managed to get back in by appealing to a friend's father, who happened to be the Saxony Chancellor, Baron Metzsch. A colourful insight into Francis Grenfell, but the key point is that von Moltke was trying to prevent ready access to information about how the infantry were being trained. As Haig's memoirs illustrated, British and other officers would use the likes of the manoeuvres to quizz their German counterparts on what was happening behind the scenes with training, etc.

As noted before, the German infantry training programme included markmenship as a core skill. Training was also given in the variety of types of attack. There was a strong emphasis on fire and manoeuvre, right down to the equivalent of squad level. Jack's recent posts provide ample evidence of how this played out on the Le Cateau battlefield. We need to be very cautious about Maurice's remarks, and not assume that the observations from earlier Kaisermanöver can be generalized to the German First Army in August 1914.

Robert

[phil andrade]

I have not yet made up my mind. I am aware that German propaganda was produced during the great war and long after it, albeit for different reasons. I have a few examples on my shelves. I believe that Jack and George are both sincere in their beliefs and are producing evidence to support their arguments. I will weigh that evidence before I come down on one side or the other, if indeed, I do not decide that the question is still open. I am of a rather sceptical turn of mind, inclined to reserve judgement until utterly convinced. If pressed, I would admit to leaning more toward the British view but very little and very reluctantly. I am normally more inclined to go with the numbers. Of course this is a salutory reminder that numbers do not fall from a great databank in the sky. They are collected and collated and rounded and corrected by people with their own agendas and their own levels of ability. History is a product of society and we would be very short sighted not to take some cognizance of that society when we study the history. Nothing new there. Herodotus, Father of History is also known as Father of Lies.

And even more pertinent is Disraeli's maxim that the are lies, Damned Lies and STATISTICS!. Forgive me for pressing the point with these casualty statistics, Tom.

For the life of me, I cannot make up my mind either. I don't think that the SB tabulations are an assortment of lies, I really don't.

But I do notice the disparities, as mentioned in my previous posts. And it's also hard to cope with the notion of so many British accounts of Mons being rubbish. No doubt there were exagerations, but it's no good "leaning over backwards" either.

If the glorified British myths of Mons are Hubris, then the SB figures posted by Jack are Nemesis.

Phil.

[salesie]

Sorry, Gentlemen, for retiring from the "fray", but due to a work "emergency" I had to take an unexpected overnight stay in Devon without access to the www.

However, it seems that I've missed very little; the debate seems to have become somewhat circular, in that the same points are being raised over and over again, in a slightly different format but the same points nonetheless. It seems to have become bogged down in minutia. So, because the end-result (the bottom line) can be lost in such minutiae then I'd like to get back to the bottom line as I see it.

Jack strongly implies that German casualties at Mons and Le Cateau were nowhere near as high as popular British folklore would have us believe (though he seems to have changed his mind about this at Mons and is now concentrating on Le Cateau). Whereas counter arguments to this view have been offered. But, after all the excellent debate, it is my view that the bottom line is still relatively simple and in danger of being lost:

Jack can offer as many figures as he likes, as much statistical evidence as he likes, as many descriptions of German troop movements as he likes, and issue as many challenges as he likes for others to do the same, but the points he raises still fail to explain why the so-called superior German steamroller did not roll-over and flatten the BEF at Mons and Le Cateau. His introduction to the Le Cateau Guidebook puts it down to Smith-Dorrien and his II Corp's lucky escape due solely to Von Kluck's poor intelligence. But it's been demonstrated in this thread that the intelligence was equally poor for both sides, so logic says that if everything else was equal, except for the size of the opposing forces, then the BEF must have been more adept at handling a situation when "blinded" by the fog of war than the German First Army was. In other words, British generalship, flexibility in command and control, and last but not least their skill-at-arms must have been superior, otherwise they would have been rolled-over and flattened, would they not? Unless, of course, you believe in luck, and that lady luck struck the same place more than twice (remember that Mons and Le Cateau were not the only actions where the BEF "got lucky" and the steamroller failed to roll).

You are asked to believe by Jack that the steamroller failed to roll not because its casualties were heavy, asked to believe that the German First Army, in just three short days, gained a more than healthy respect for the BEF when its casualties were light. But, apart from a few overblown theories about small-arms fire and control, we are offered no plausible explanation as how the German Army, with its apparent disdain for such a contemptibly small army, should gain such respect for it in so short a time without being given a very bloody-nose indeed.

As I said in an earlier thread, I'm happy to let readers of this thread make their own minds up about the opposing views - all I ask is that when deliberating they don't loose sight of the bottom line amidst all the window-dressing.

Cheers-salesie.

[George Armstrong Custer]

We need to be very cautious about Maurice's remarks, and not assume that the observations from earlier Kaisermanöver can be generalized to the German First Army in August 1914.

Robert

An interesting point Robert, as is your observation that "The highly stylised manoeuvres were more reminiscent of Napoleonic methods, and must have been a great source of embarrassment to the General Staff." However, I'd point out that Maurice makes his comparison with manoevres of that style in the context of the rueful line in the letter taken from a captured German officer by the French which he had just quoted: "We have too heavy losses if we attack these positions with infantry, because our infantry marches like Blucher." Which fits in rather well with your own Napoleonic analogy, don't you think?

George

[truthergw]

When the German forces went to war, three elements were involved. The active armies, reserves and landwehr. Is it not possible, even likely, that the landwehr and even some of the reserve units, would not be employing the latest tactics? We have reports of mass approaches as late as 1st Ypres resulting in the Kindermord. It seems to me that approach by column and line of skirmish may well have been employed at Mons and Le Cateau.

[George Armstrong Custer]

To cut to the quick of it, you subscribe to the view that the figures in the SB, which are germinal to Jack's argument that the BEF did not inflict the spectacular losses on the Germans at Mons/Le Cateau that we have been led to believe, are suspect because they were produced at a time of rigorous Nazi control and censorship. Am I correct in stating this?

Phil.

Phil you still seem to be missing the essential point, which is that every source produced under the auspices of the Nazi state is inherently suspect. One of the reasons for this is spelled out by Tom:

thought I would add that it would not be necessary for a Nazi official to edit these figures. The people producing the figures would have been well aware of what was expected. Many archivists would have been ex officers and possibly not too averse to gilding the lily where the Army's reputation was seen to be at stake.

In my opinion that observation is right on the money. Ian Kershaw has called the process "Working towards the Fuhrer" - a phrase which delineates how the Nazi state operated by delegation and a reliance upon self-motivated state servants interpreting and enlarging upon the centralised directives of the dictatorship. Robert Gellately, for instance, is an historian of the Third Reich who has demonstrated from the Gestapo's archives that that organisation could not have achieved the grip of fear that it did without the active collusion of the populace - they relied on denunciations (and the fear of denunciation) from "ordinary" Germans in order to exercise state control of the nation rather than attempting the impossible task of having a Gestapo agent on every street corner, workplace and place of entertainment. Even the family home environment was not safe from denunciations of one family member to another, or neighbour on neighbour. The publishing industry - like others - was Nazified. As far as the specific issue we're looking at here is concerned, I'd remind you that the records in question were compiled by State servants initially under the Reichswehr and completed and published under the Nazis. Jack's own Appendix III to The German Army on the Somme has already been quoted more than once on the motivations at play in the histories published under the auspices of the Reichswehr. How much more caution must be exercised when using sources which emerged under the Nazis is, in my opinion, a key point to consider in this discussion. One final thought - Nazi Germany didn't suddenly emerge from nowhere to exist in a vacuum for 12 years - the Reichswehr became the Nazi Wehrmacht as Weimar policemen became Gestapo officers and so on. The Nazi party itself was largely created by and made up of Great War veterans - often via the Freikorps movement (a process brilliantly explored by Robert G. L. Waite in his seminal Vanguard of Nazism: The Free Corps Movement in Postwar Germany, 1918-1923.) And many of the less attractive beliefs of the Nazis were far from uncommon amongst sections of the Imperial and Weimar armies - an area explored in detail in Wolfram Wette's The Wehrmacht: History, Myth, Reality. Many of those with traditional Conservative and nationalistic viewpoints which subscribed to such ideas were without doubt responsible for either compiling or sanctioning many of the German histories of the Great War during the period 1918 - 1945. It is why, when push comes to shove, I would not personally be prepared to overturn decades of British scholarship in official histories, the accounts of British regimental histories or the memoirs of British soldiers solely because German accounts or statistics produced 1918-45 do not support them. These sources need to be used and cited with extreme caution IMHO.

ciao,

GAC

[Robert Dunlop]

Which fits in rather well with your own Napoleonic analogy, don't you think?

Absolutely, GAC. And doesn't fit at all well with the material that Jack has compiled from British sources, nor with my own studies on this. Leaving aside material from German sources. There may have been instances but it is by no means certain that these instances can be generalized IMHO. Indeed, there may be other good explanations why such instances occurred, in the same way (but not necessarily for the same reason) that at least one BEF unit was caught bunched up at Le Cateau and suffered very heavy casualties as a result.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

It is why, when push comes to shove, I would not personally be prepared to overturn decades of British scholarship in official histories, the accounts of British regimental histories or the memoirs of British soldiers solely because German accounts or statistics produced 1918-45 do not support them. These sources need to be used and cited with extreme caution IMHO.

GAC, lest anyone is unclear on this, this part of the discussion revolves around a very specific aspect of British scholarship, namely British historical interpretations of what happened to the Germans with respect to casualties caused. It is not, as far as I can tell, about invalidating British historical accounts with respect to what they did, and is definitely not about invalidating the skill and performance of the BEF infantry. It is not where I am coming from, and unless I have misread Jack, it is not where he is coming from either. Any account by one side that seeks to interpret what happened to the other side should also be treated with caution, IMHO.

Robert