The "machine guns" of Mons ?

[phil andrade]

This is rather a sad thing to admit....I always drew geat comfort form the story of Mons. Something redolent of the archers of Crecy, Poitiers and Agincourt surrounds our perceptions of that fighting. The fact that Le Cateau was fought on August 26th, the anniversary of Crecy, compounds the impact. The brave, outnumbered old sweats of the BEF making a defiant stand and giving the enemy a terrific shock - it really makes a stirring story. Given the drab, industrialised killing that was to make the Great War so ghastly, it is understandable that we need a legend that depicts the triumph of a "Band of Brothers", which, through individual marksmanship, made havoc with the enemy hosts. The individual defies the mass. In a war that was dominated by artillery, we have a glorious example of Tommy Atkins showing what a true professional can do with his .303 SMLE rifle. It's an emotional thing; something redemptive in a multi million massacre of unknown soldiers. And the name: The Old Contemptibles - superb!. I confess, I am disillusioned, disappointed, upset. Time to grow up.

Phil.

[salesie]

This is rather a sad thing to admit....I always drew geat comfort form the story of Mons. Something redolent of the archers of Crecy, Poitiers and Agincourt surrounds our perceptions of that fighting. The fact that Le Cateau was fought on August 26th, the anniversary of Crecy, compounds the impact. The brave, outnumbered old sweats of the BEF making a defiant stand and giving the enemy a terrific shock - it really makes a stirring story. Given the drab, industrialised killing that was to make the Great War so ghastly, it is understandable that we need a legend that depicts the triumph of a "Band of Brothers", which, through individual marksmanship, made havoc with the enemy hosts. The individual defies the mass. In a war that was dominated by artillery, we have a glorious example of Tommy Atkins showing what a true professional can do with his .303 SMLE rifle. It's an emotional thing; something redemptive in a multi million massacre of unknown soldiers. And the name: The Old Contemptibles - superb!. I confess, I am disillusioned, disappointed, upset. Time to grow up.

Phil.

Throughout this thread, Phil, I've been a little bemused at your apparent readiness to "disbelieve" - but after your latest post I'm really confused by the ease in which you toss aside your "faith" and write-off this story as being mere legend. What do you now find uninspiring/unbelievable about this story - is it the level of the Old-Contemptibles courage? Or, that the stand they made was not defiant enough? Or, that the respect they taught the so-called superior German Army in just four short days was not shocking enough? Or, that the name, Old-Contemptibles, is no longer justified in your eyes? It seems to me, that your answer to all these questions must be yes; because you now believe that they didn't kill Germans fast enough and heavily enough for your own liking, and all based on a few, decidedly iffy, casualty figures.

You no longer see the story of Mons and Le Cateau as being stirring enough for your tastes? Fair enough, but methinks thou doth protest too much!

Cheers-salesie.

[squirrel]

Have read this thread with avid interest and thank you all for the points raised, considered and discussed. I have the feeling that with all the various factors taken in to account we will never know for sure what the German casualties actually were.

As has been said by several contributors, if the German casualties were not heavy then what held them up? Initial losses making any advancing unit overly cautious in following up?

Seems very likely.

I see that a reference has been made to "3rd class shots who had never hit a bull (in the BEF) being unable to miss the targets presented by the Germans".

By 1912, any soldier who could not fire 15 rounds rapid fire with reasonable accuracy was liable to be dismissed for being"unlikely to become an efficient soldier".

By this time also just over 70% of cavalry and just under 70% of infantry soldiers in the British Regular Army were first class shots. Source "Superiority of fire".

Rapid fire, while being reasonably accurate, was used to deny "beaten ground" to the enemy as much as it was to inflict casualties.

FWIW I think the "bloody nose" principle certainly helped cause some confusion and hesitancy in the German units and also the fact they were tired as they had covered a considerable distance to get to Mons let alone further.

The action at Nery also meant that the German Cavalry Brigade involved was unable to carry out their recce duties effectively and therefore allowed the BEF to continue their retreat somewhat more unmolested than they might have expected.

[phil andrade]

Salesie, In truth I don't know what to think, let alone believe.

All honour to Jack for taking the time and trouble to present those statistics of German casualties - let's give him credit for his scholarship, and for his insistence on relying on primary sources. They stand as a huge refutation of our Mons legend. They might be "iffy", but they are the most definitive and authentic available. His other tenet, that the very small number of German graves in the nearest cemetery suggests low German losses, has been challenged by a revelation in another post that perhaps a thousand German bodies were removed in the 1950's to Langemark.

You quote Hamlet at me. Let me quote back "...Give me the man that is not passion's slave.."

I realise that in regard to Mons, I have been "Passion's Slave", and this despite more than 40 years of reading about the Great War.

Phil.

[Jack Sheldon]

I wonder if it is worth a short consideration about the difference between attacking and defending in in the 1914 campaign. As long before as the American Civil War, it was demonstrated what an advantage the defence had, even if it was fighting from very rudimentary trenches and individual scrapes, armed only with rifled muskets. In both the battles we have looked at so far, the BEF fought from hasty defensive positions; the Germans had to advance in the open - and we have discussed what happened and what the consequences were: the German First Army was checked and unwilling or unable to press quite so hard for the remainder of the retreat, but of course the advance went on.

What happened when the boot was on the other foot? Here I am thinking of the initial fighting for the Aisne heights. The Germans just managed to close a gap and scramble a thin line of defenders into position before the arrival of the British troops, thanks, amongst other things, to a successful delaying action at the Aisne bridges, then what happened? Er, the BEF was shot to a standstill in two days, with I Corps suffering 3,500 casualties on 14th September alone. 1st Cameron Highlanders lost over 600, 1st Coldstream Guards, 1st Loyals, 2nd Sussex, 2nd Grenadier Guards and 3rd Coldstream Guards each lost over 350 casualties.

Any of these figures starting to ring a bell with anyone?

Jack

[Chris Henschke]

Rapid fire, while being reasonably accurate, was used to deny "beaten ground" to the enemy as much as it was to inflict casualties.

Squirrel post 128

What is 'beaten ground' and why would you try to deny it to the enemy? I've never heard that term.

Chris Henschke

[squirrel]

Essentially, covering an area with fire to prevent an enemy using it for manouvrering, forming up, appproaching a position etc.

Used by infantry and at times cavalry with small arms and later in the war by machine guns and artillery.

[phil andrade]

I wonder if it is worth a short consideration about the difference between attacking and defending in in the 1914 campaign. As long before as the American Civil War, it was demonstrated what an advantage the defence had, even if it was fighting from very rudimentary trenches and individual scrapes, armed only with rifled muskets. In both the battles we have looked at so far, the BEF fought from hasty defensive positions; the Germans had to advance in the open - and we have discussed what happened and what the consequences were: the German First Army was checked and unwilling or unable to press quite so hard for the remainder of the retreat, but of course the advance went on.

What happened when the boot was on the other foot? Here I am thinking of the initial fighting for the Aisne heights. The Germans just managed to close a gap and scramble a thin line of defenders into position before the arrival of the British troops, thanks, amongst other things, to a successful delaying action at the Aisne bridges, then what happened? Er, the BEF was shot to a standstill in two days, with I Corps suffering 3,500 casualties on 14th September alone. 1st Cameron Highlanders lost over 600, 1st Coldstream Guards, 1st Loyals, 2nd Sussex, 2nd Grenadier Guards and 3rd Coldstream Guards each lost over 350 casualties.

Any of these figures starting to ring a bell with anyone?

Jack

Those casualties are very heavy, Jack ...shocking, in fact. Presumably comparatively few of those 3,500 1 Corps casualties on September 14th were prisoners, and it must be the case that more British troops were actually killed on the Aisne that day than at Le Cateau.

Yes, the race for the Chemin Des Dames does bring the events in Virginia in May and June 1864 to mind. Exhausted armies struggled to reach and hold crossroads at Spotsylvania and Cold Harbor, with the Confederates winning by inches. Temporary earthworks were thrown up, and the attacking yankees were shot flat.

Is there any indication that German rifle fire was as pre-eminent in stopping the British attacks on September 14th as British musketry had been in repulsing the Germans on August 23rd?

I have read that German heavy and high trajectory artillery gave them a distinct advantage over the British in the Aisne fighting.

Phil.

[Chris Henschke]

Sorry, Squirrel, I still don't understand the term as you used it in post 128. The way you describe it sounds like it is something like an area or feature, like ground of tactical importance, key terrain or vital ground, that should be denied to the enemy.

Your explanation sounds like the method by which it is denied. Are you confusing it somehow with the term beaten zone (between first catch and last graze)?

Chris Henschke

[phil andrade]

Whether it was one thousand, three thousand or five thousand Germans who were killed or wounded at Mons, the fact that an inordinately large proportion of them were hit by British rifle fire might account for some of the perceptions of that battle. A man who fells his enemy with a rifle shot is more likely to experience the "personal" nature of combat than a man who fires indirectly with artillery. He is more likely to see the advancing foe. Each shot gives a recoil; every round expended gives a soldier a more direct and personal engagement with the fight than the gunner or machine gunner experiences: he sees his enemies fall...even if they fall to the ground to seek cover, the impression is dramatic, and it seems that great numbers of them are being killed or wounded. Perhaps only a fraction of the enemy who are seen to fall are actually hit, but the image must be evidence of the effectiveness of musketry. In the American Civil war there was a battle in Georgia in 1864, almost exactly 50 years before Mons. Confederate soldiers entrenched on Kenesaw Mountain repulsed a Northern attack. Every Southern rifleman, wrote a Confederate veteran, was satisfied that he had shot at least twenty yankees in that battle. The evidence of slaughter was overwhelming : at least six thousand dead or wounded Northern troops were estimated to have been lying in front of the Confederate trenches. The post war accounting revealed that the true number was 2,500. Perhaps we have a Mons syndrome here. The sensation of inflicting loss, especially when rifle fire is involved, exceeds the reality of the actual damage.

Phil.

[truthergw]

............A man who fells his enemy with a rifle shot is more likely to experience the "personal" nature of combat than a man who fires indirectly with artillery. He is more likely to see the advancing foe. Each shot gives a recoil; every round expended gives a soldier a more direct and personal engagement with the fight than the gunner or machine gunner experiences:........................

Phil.

At the time of Mons, the artillery was field artillery. In line with infantry and often last to leave the field. Aimed directly at advancing enemy. Firing shrapnel at advancing troops with the aim of killing and wounding as many as they could. Much the same goes for MGs. That is what soldiers do. They kill the guys on the other side. They practise and drill over and over, how to kill as many approaching enemy as they can and hopefully avoid being killed themselves. There is no poetry or drama in it. That is supplied by poets and dramatists later on.

[phil andrade]

The veterans who recounted their experiences of Mons were not poets and dramatists ( well, one or two might have been.)

They recalled that they could not miss, and that the Germans went down in heaps.

Maybe firing a rifle imparts a sense of individual effectiveness that exceeds that experienced when firing a more "mechanised" weapon.

I wouldn't know, having never "smelt powder". I hope I might be forgiven for trying to imagine.

Phil.

[Pete1052]

What is 'beaten ground' and why would you try to deny it to the enemy? I've never heard that term.

Here's a current definition from a U.S. Army manual:

Beaten Zone. This is the pattern formed by the rounds within the cone of fire striking the ground or the target. The size and shape of the beaten zone changes as a function of the range to and slope of the target. Gunners and automatic riflemen should engage targets to take maximum effect of the beaten zone. The simplest way to do this is to aim at the center base of the target. Most rounds will not fall over the target, and any that fall short will create ricochets into the target.

[salesie]

I wonder if it is worth a short consideration about the difference between attacking and defending in in the 1914 campaign. As long before as the American Civil War, it was demonstrated what an advantage the defence had, even if it was fighting from very rudimentary trenches and individual scrapes, armed only with rifled muskets. In both the battles we have looked at so far, the BEF fought from hasty defensive positions; the Germans had to advance in the open - and we have discussed what happened and what the consequences were: the German First Army was checked and unwilling or unable to press quite so hard for the remainder of the retreat, but of course the advance went on.

What happened when the boot was on the other foot? Here I am thinking of the initial fighting for the Aisne heights. The Germans just managed to close a gap and scramble a thin line of defenders into position before the arrival of the British troops, thanks, amongst other things, to a successful delaying action at the Aisne bridges, then what happened? Er, the BEF was shot to a standstill in two days, with I Corps suffering 3,500 casualties on 14th September alone. 1st Cameron Highlanders lost over 600, 1st Coldstream Guards, 1st Loyals, 2nd Sussex, 2nd Grenadier Guards and 3rd Coldstream Guards each lost over 350 casualties.

Any of these figures starting to ring a bell with anyone?

Jack

"Jack, we're not discussing attack versus defence nor what happened on the Aisne, we're discussing your proposition that the Germans suffered very light casualties at Mons. Though I must say that your last post could be viewed as an attempt to say: of course, the Germans suffered high casualties at Mons and Le Cateau; they were attacking and the BEF were defending, and the proof is just look at what happened when the roles were reversed. If so, would this not contradict your earlier assertions?

Also, this notion of the Germans advancing over open ground at Mons is beginning to be mentioned too regularly for my liking - back to Smith-Dorrien's memoirs:

"My own head-quarters were at Sars-la-Bruyere, south-west of Mons and Frameries, some six miles from the former and three from the latter. That afternoon I motored round the outposts and reconnoitred the positions as far as I had time, for the distances were great and my presence at my head-quarters, with so much to arrange, was necessary for a considerable part of the daylight available. In my hasty survey I had come to the conclusion that, from a fighting point of view, our position was a very difficult one. The ground on the enemy's side of the Canal commanded it from comparatively short ranges, and was densely wooded, giving them the advantage of a covered approach. Any idea of fighting a serious action on the outpost line was therefore out of the question, although such a thing in any case would have been impossible in view of the enormous extension of the Corps, covering as it did twenty-one miles with only two Divisions.

I came to the conclusion that our only hope, if attacked in force, would be to hold a less extended position in rear on which the outposts could fall back. This, however, was not very encouraging, as although the ground rose considerably on a general line some two to three miles south of the Canal it was so broken up by the pitheads and wired enclosures, and so thickly covered with houses, that any organised effective defence must involve great risks. To obtain an accurate idea of the unsuitability of the ground, I recommend a careful study of the graphic description given in the Official History, written by Brigadier-General J. E. Edmonds, C.B., C.M.G., R.E., from which I quote the following (page 63) :

" The space occupied by the II Corps in particular, within the quadrangle Mons-Frameries—Dour—Boussu, is practically one huge unsightly village, traversed by a vast number of devious cobbled roads which lead from no particular starting-point to no particular destination, and broken by pit-heads and colossal slag-heaps, often over a hundred feet high. It is, in fact, a close and blind country, such as no army had yet been called upon to fight in against a civilised enemy in a great campaign."

Then on our right was the salient town of Mons, open to fire from north, east, and west, and quite indefensible, situated as we were.

However, that night I was happy in my mind, for official news of the enemy given me indicated no great strength, and I fully expected that the Chief's expressed intention of moving forward again next day would be carried out. I had been given no information of the somewhat serious happenings in the French Army on our right.."

Then we have the words of Lt. Col R.C. Bond DSO, an eye-witness who commanded 2nd KOYLI at Mons and Le Cateau (taken prisoner at the latter), from his book, The King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry in the Great War, published in 1929, pages 719/720:

"...About 1 p.m. the German attack developed along the whole front, the German infantry working forward to occupy positions closer to the canal by wading up the wet ditches which branched from the canal. The defenders were soon heavily engaged throughout the length of the position...

... It seemed certain that the Germans would attempt to rush the crossings under cover of darkness or that they would cross further west to turn the flank of the division. The actual order to the K.O.Y.L.I, to retire to the prearranged position by Wasmes was not received till after 10 p.m. Meanwhile the small woods on the northern bank of the canal, in which the enemy could collect before rushing the bridges, were carefully searched from time to time with bursts of rifle-fire along the bank. The effect of this firing was made known to the prisoners-of-war in Torgau later in the year when they were visited by the Lt.-Col. of a German infantry regiment who had been wounded; when visiting them he spoke of the great losses sustained by his regiment in the fight for the Mons canal on the 23rd particularly after dark. He said that some battalions were concentrating in a little wood prior to a rush to cross the bridge at Herbieres; that the British troops had apparently discovered the concentration and poured such a deadly fire into the wood that the place was turned into a shambles and the battalions had to be with-drawn.

A number of Belgian refugees came over the half-broken bridge, among them a voluble young priest with a tale of the retirement of the Germans away to the north. There was a suspicious calm in the enemy's position, and German bugles had been sounding further and further away. The priest's story was not believed; fire was still opened at intervals into the belt of trees. Suddenly the position held by the defenders became lit up by the white light from enemy rockets and the suspicion that the enemy was lying low on the far side was confirmed."

Col. Bond's words would also seem to give a classic example of beaten ground (or suppressing fire as it is also known).

Cheers-salesie.

[Chris Henschke]

Here's a current definition from a U.S. Army manual:

Beaten Zone. This is the pattern formed by the rounds within the cone of fire striking the ground or the target. The size and shape of the beaten zone changes as a function of the range to and slope of the target. Gunners and automatic riflemen should engage targets to take maximum effect of the beaten zone. The simplest way to do this is to aim at the center base of the target. Most rounds will not fall over the target, and any that fall short will create ricochets into the target.

Pete, I am not asking what the definition of a beaten zone is. Read Post 128. Then read post 134.

[Jack Sheldon]

Salesie

I regret to have to point out that you are putting words in my mouth. If you review all my posts in this discussion you will not be able to point to any post where I claimed that German casualties were 'light' at either Mons or Le Cateau. What I do maintain is that repeated British assertions of the numbers of casualties the BEF inflicted during two holding engagements are exaggerated - grossly at times. I have indicated how even well-respected authors toss around figures which any examination of the German figures (despite my caveats) show to be in the realms of fantasy. I also dispute the fact that my statements are 'assertions'; they are based cautiously on the best information available to me and I quote my sources in case anybody else wishes to check them.

Notwithstanding that fact, other contributors have described the German casualty figures as 'decidely iffy', or similar words, but on what basis? I know of no work from any other belligerent comparable with that completed in Germany which, after years of painstaking effort produced the Sanitaetsbericht. It is meticulously detailed, carefully produced and gives us, as a minimum, rough order figures likely to be very close to the truth.

The thread has thrown up two possible sources for these long-held exaggerated views about casualties. Smith - Dorrien wrote, 'That the enemy suffered a very serious blow and losses far heavier than ours...are facts beyond dispute.' Well he would say that, wouldn't he? - especially because the original figures for British casualties, then current, are also too high. Then of course we have the words of Edmonds in the BOH, also concerning Le Cateau, 'The losses in gaining the 'success' are not mentioned; there is no doubt that they were stupendous.' Well, sez who? Who was around on the battlefield to check the German figures after the fighting had moved on?- certainly not the BEF, so what, apart from wishful thinking, is the basis for these statements? Personally I would not trust anything that Edmonds says about German casualties. He has plenty of form for twisting, distorting and lying about figures to suit the case he was trying to make - vide his treatment of these in the case of the Somme and Third Ypres, so what sort of a witness is he?

Moving on. The only point I was making, in raising the question of the Aisne, is that, relative skills aside, 'bloody noses' are precisely what could be expected to be inflicted by defenders against attackers. In the case of the BEF, the defence at Mons and Le Cateau successfully checked the Germans. In the case of the Aisne, the German defenders brought the BEF advance to a juddering halt.

Fields of fire are, of course an interesting point and actually quite difficult to check, even by visiting battlefields today. The two reasons are rapid urban development and increased tree cover around villages and towns since 1914 - largely attributable to a dramatic reduction in coppicing trees for firewood. There were places where covered approaches were available at Mons, but others, such as the Grenadier 12 battlefield, where it was much more open. Both sides used slag heaps and tall buildings to improve observation and to place machine guns. Where this was done skilfully, both sides enjoyed considerable local advantages. Le Cateau is rather different. Much of the battlefield is quite unaltered and the open views are huge, as anybody who has walked the ground will know. Admittedly this cut both ways. On the one hand German regiments attacking against centre and left of the British line were quickly exposed and pinned down, often for long periods, by units of 3rd and 4th Divisions; on the other, once the Germans got machine gun crews up onto the area of the present day water tower 400 metres east of where the Montay - Reumont road crosses the Cambrai-Le Cateau road, they simply slaughtered men and horses in the area near the Suffolk Memorial and, in conjunction with a bold infantry flanking movement, rendered the entire British right flank untenable.

Jack

[Robert Dunlop]

FWIIW, I totally support Jack's raising the issue of the Aisne in the context of this debate. One could get the impression that the superb musketry skills of the BEF caused significant delays in the German advance. The German infantry, by comparison, were seemingly much less competent. If there was a quantum difference between the two forces, then one would have expected the BEF to perform significantly better than the Germans when it came the BEF's turn to advance. They did not. Indeed, there were many instances where the BEF infantry were significantly held up by no less than German cavalry armed with lowly carbines, for example in operations just north of the La Bassee canal after the Battle of the Aisne. Furthermore, the reason that the opportunity of First Marne came about was not principally because the BEF caused delays to von Kluck's advance, though this undoubtedly helped. If the French infantry (and artillery) had not also caused delays to the rest of the German forces along the majority of the battlefront, then Joffre would not have been able to concentrate a new army on von Kluck's right flank.

As the evidence of the Aisne suggests, German musketry was not significantly worse than the BEF. Again I would recommend Zuber's book. Even when the French rifle fire was less than impressive, in the manner that Tom described above in response to my recommendation, the German advance was halted and delayed. It was not simply a question of the direct effects of musketry (and artillery). Any contact with major resistance slowed an advance, even if there weren't many casualties. In part this was due to operational concerns about what else might be lurking nearby, obscured by the fog of war.

The following quote describes the experience of a German company commander during the action at Longliers on 20th August, 1914. Note the description of how the beaten zone was observed and adjusted. Trained observers were used to monitor the beaten zone:

" [12th Company, 88th Infantry Regiment] avoided casualties by moving in platoon bounds until it reached terrain that provided cover against French fire, which permitted it to move forward to a firing position 700m from the suspected enemy position. The French troops were still invisible, but the company began taking heavy fire and sustained casualties. Suddenly, the French troops could be seen moving across a mowed field, from one hayrick to another, towards a rail line which ran halfway up the hill. 12/88 adjusted its fire onto these troops; the impacts of the German bullets, throwing up puffs of dirt, were clearly visible. The beaten zone of 12/88 was on target. But 12/88 lay in open ground also, exposed and taking casualties; the company commander ordered it to advance to the next covered position, which was the same railway line the French were heading for. 12/88 conducted squad and platoon fire and movement until it reached a ditch next to the railway line, which provided excellent cover - unless the French crossed the rail line, at which point the entire company would be enfiladed. The company commander therefore ordered his troops to assault to the other side of the rail line. The '10 or 20' surviving French troops on the other side surrendered; the hillside and ditch were filled with dead and wounded French troops, testimony to the accuracy of 12/88 rifle fire."

Robert

[squirrel]

Chris,

Robert's post above gives an example of a "beaten zone" used in action.

[George Armstrong Custer]

One could get the impression that the superb musketry skills of the BEF caused significant delays in the German advance.

Robert, I take it that you do not mean to imply by that that the delay caused by the BEF at Mons was not significant?

As the evidence of the Aisne suggests, German musketry was not significantly worse than the BEF. Again I would recommend Zuber's book. Even when the French rifle fire was less than impressive, in the manner that Tom described above in response to my recommendation, the German advance was halted and delayed.

And do you mean to imply that the the corollary of what you say here is that the superiority of British Army's musketry in 1914 was, per se, a myth?

ciao,

GAC

[Robert Dunlop]

...you do not mean to imply by that that the delay caused by the BEF at Mons was not significant?

GAC, you are correct. That is not what I am implying. To put it another way, the fact that the BEF caused a delay at Mons cannot be ascribed, IMHO, to superior British musketry. Just to be clear, this statement should not be interpreted to mean that that BEF musketry was not superior (forgive the double negative).

And do you mean to imply that the the corollary of what you say here is that the superiority of British Army's musketry in 1914 was, per se, a myth?

I am strongly advocating that we should not overstate or overestimate the superiority of the BEF infantry musketry, especially in light of further evidence that is available now.

Robert

[truthergw]

I am starting to lose my bearings here. Can I summarise the position thus;

On one side the view is, there is good evidence to believe that the BEF were not significantly better than the German Army in musketry skills. The checks delivered at Mons and Le Cateau were to be expected inasmuch as, all else being equal, the defence had the upper hand on the attacking side. The actions on the Aisne are adduced as evidence.

On the other side, the view is, the BEF were heavily outnumbered by the German forces opposing them and the checks delivered at Mons and Le Cateau must therefore owe something to superior musketry skills.

Zone = ground.

Have I got that right or would someone like to point out where I am wrong.

Good discussion upto now.

[George Armstrong Custer]

Thanks for that clarification, Robert. If I can make two points. Firstly, I agree that we ought not to stray into the territory of ascribing superhuman qualities to the BEF and its skills. Nevertheless, it is a demonstrable fact that the musketry deployed by the British caused German accounts to overestimate the number of machine guns which the British were deploying against them on these occasions [these accounts have already been quoted on this thread]. Secondly, we need to be cautious, I think, in comparing what British musketry did at Mons with what the Germans inflicted at the Aisne. For whilst most accounts solidly agree that it was the concentration of British musketry which bloodied the German nose at Mons, what sources do we have for the preponderance of German musketry in causing casualties at the Aisne? For instance, Zwel is quoted by Edmonds as follows:

The [German] 27th Reserve Brigade, however, was wavering, and reported that it was attacked by very superior force. [......] Vital support was given by the two 8-inch howitzer batteries, which were brought into action south of Chamouille in the valley of the Ailette. The howitzers*, about 12.30 pm, succeeded in stopping an attack threatening the left flank of the 27th Reserve Infantry Brigade.

*My emphasis.

Source: Militsary Operations, France & Belgium 1914, ed by J. E . Edmonds, vol. I p. 363.

We need to take care, I think, that we are comparing like with like. Then, too, the training in musketry of the British army which had been in place since Ian Hamilton's time at Hythe in 1898 had no equivalent in the pre-war Continental armies. It would be wrong, I think, to disregard this as a factor and to conclude that there was little difference in terms of musketry skill between the combatants in the late summer of 1914.

ciao,

GAC

[salesie]

Salesie

I regret to have to point out that you are putting words in my mouth. If you review all my posts in this discussion you will not be able to point to any post where I claimed that German casualties were 'light' at either Mons or Le Cateau. What I do maintain is that repeated British assertions of the numbers of casualties the BEF inflicted during two holding engagements are exaggerated - grossly at times. I have indicated how even well-respected authors toss around figures which any examination of the German figures (despite my caveats) show to be in the realms of fantasy. I also dispute the fact that my statements are 'assertions'; they are based cautiously on the best information available to me and I quote my sources in case anybody else wishes to check them.

Notwithstanding that fact, other contributors have described the German casualty figures as 'decidely iffy', or similar words, but on what basis? I know of no work from any other belligerent comparable with that completed in Germany which, after years of painstaking effort produced the Sanitaetsbericht. It is meticulously detailed, carefully produced and gives us, as a minimum, rough order figures likely to be very close to the truth.

.

Jack

Jack, I'm not putting words into your mouth - I'm detailing my interpretation of your own words, but, if you like, I will alter my use of "assertions on your part" i.e. you strongly imply throughout the thread that German casualties were "light" at Mons and Le Cateau, otherwise why compare them to the "tossed around" British figures if not make this very point?

I was the one who described your figures as "decidedly iffy", on the basis of:

a. Your agreement that, in the final analysis, casualty figures are irrelevant. If irrelevant, then do they not become "iffy" - in that, if taken at face value then they become misleading?

b. Your own, carefully worded, health warnings.

c. A mountain of eye-witness evidence contradicting your figures (several of which have been detailed in this thread).

d. And perhaps the most important of all, for the reasons I've personally detailed in earlier posts i.e. on the basis of cause and effect, your figures throw up a paradox, a paradox which has yet to be adequately explained away. And, when you move the focus to principals of attack/defence and on to the Aisne you further highlight this paradox i.e. this shift in focus could be viewed as an attempt to say: of course, the Germans suffered high casualties at Mons and Le Cateau; they were attacking and the BEF were defending, and the proof is just look at what happened when the roles were reversed. In the context of this debate, is this not the logical consequence of your change in focus - leading to a contradiction of your own implied conclusions earlier in the thread?

Don't get me wrong, Jack, I'm not saying that your own calculations are "iffy" per se, but I am saying that, based on the above, your sources and your conclusions most certainly are - and if we move the debate on to local tactical details and considerations then the paradox you highlight will never be answered; it will be lost in a myriad of tactical irrelevances.

I could also point out that your own sources "would say that, wouldn't they?" but I won't be so ungracious.

Cheers-salesie.

[squirrel]

Good summation Tom - I was becoming more than a little confused myself.

Perhaps the questions should be:

Were the Germans delayed in their advance to Mons and further advances?

If yes then what was the principle cause of the delay?

If no then was there a delay?

Were the BEF significantly superior at musketry skills than the Germans?

If yes than does this explain the delay in the German advance?

If not then what caused the delay?

[Robert Dunlop]

Perhaps it is worth adding that, on the one hand, there is a widely-espoused view that the Germans consistently thought that they were facing more machine guns than were actually present but, on the other hand, there is evidence that many German observers could distinguish between rifle and machine gun fire, and that the effectiveness of British infantry musketry was recognised as such.

Robert