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Remembered Today:

The "machine guns" of Mons ?


i_m_bob

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We need to take care, I think, that we are comparing like with like.
I totally agree, GAC. Which is why it is also very important to note Jack's mention of the impact of British artillery fire on German infantry near Mons.

Then, too, the training in musketry of the British army which had been in place since Ian Hamilton's time at Hythe in 1898 had no equivalent in the pre-war Continental armies.
Have you read detailed accounts of how German infantry refined their musketry skills prior to August 1914? Would it be worth quoting some information on this?

Robert

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I totally agree, GAC. Which is why it is also very important to note Jack's mention of the impact of British artillery fire on German infantry near Mons.

Of course the British artillery also inflicted casualties, and you are right to cite them. However, the German accounts which I and other have referenced concern themselves with the impact of the British small arms fire upon their advancing troops - which they wrongly ascribe to a non-existent preponderance of British machine guns, indicating that what they are really referring to is British musketry.

Have you read detailed accounts of how German infantry refined their musketry skills prior to August 1914? Would it be worth quoting some information on this?

Well I'd certainly be interested to learn how ubiquitously, and for how long, this training had been applied to those German units advancing at Mons. Don't forget, the British Army had been perfecting its musketry skills under the regime introduced by Ian Hamilton for 16 year prior to Mons - it was a core part of their ethos. I've already quoted John Lee's assertion that "A British soldier fired seven times more ammunition on the ranges at Hythe than any conscript in any other European army." It's hard to believe that didn't make a measurable difference in performance on the field.

ciao,

GAC

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Were the Germans delayed in their advance to Mons and further advances?
Are you asking about delays leading up to encounter battle at Mons? Or are you referring to Mons itself? If the latter, then there is no question that the German forces did not achieve their stated march objectives for the day of the battle. This means that the BEF caused delay. Furthermore, the subsequent actions south of Mons leading up to and including le Cateau, further disrupted the momentum of the advance. For example, if you compare the ground covered by the German First Army leading up to the encounter at Mons, versus the distances covered in the immediate aftermath.

If yes then what was the principle cause of the delay?

The combined skills of the BEF infantry, machine gunners (who were infantry but I want to note the impact of BEF MGs), cavalry (both directly through their musketry skills and indirectly through the threat of their mobility), artillery, and logistic support services, who enabled the infantry et al to be consistently resupplied with ammunition. Note that the French Army also inflicted delays on the German advances, as did the heavily outnumbered Germans in the path of the BEF advancing to the Aisne or towards the Lys River, etc, etc.

Robert

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Were the BEF significantly superior at musketry skills than the Germans? If yes than does this explain the delay in the German advance?
The answer to these questions cannot be ajudged, IMHO, on the basis of the ability to delay an enemy force.

Robert

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...the German accounts which I and other have referenced concern themselves with the impact of the British small arms fire upon their advancing troops
GAC, hereto we need to consider 'context'. It is the case that certain types of German accounts quoted in very specific contexts contain these assertions. Thanks to Jack we have also seen that there is other evidence from different German accounts. This merely serves, IMHO, to argue for a cautious interpretation, rather than a definitive view. But that is just a personal perspective, and the great thing about these discussions is that different views drive out more information because of the breadth of knowledge and access to sources of the participants in the Forum.

Robert

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GAC, hereto we need to consider 'context'. It is the case that certain types of German accounts quoted in very specific contexts contain these assertions. Thanks to Jack we have also seen that there is other evidence from different German accounts. This merely serves, IMHO, to argue for a cautious interpretation, rather than a definitive view. But that is just a personal perspective, and the great thing about these discussions is that different views drive out more information because of the breadth of knowledge and access to sources of the participants in the Forum.

Robert

I concur with all you say here, Robert. My own personal perspective (you may not be surprised to learn!) is that I've seen no evidence adduced sufficient to convince me to write off as just another Great War myth the commonly held notion of the superiority of British musketry being deployed with telling effect at Mons. Some subsequent British accounts overegg the pudding, of course, and need to be treated with as much caution as the reluctance of some German accounts to admit casualties or failures during their opening gambit in August 1914. But given the years of uniquely intense training which the British had put into their musketry, combined with so many British and German accounts of the intensity of British fire at Mons, I have little difficulty in accepting that British musketry played the key role, supported by artillery and machine guns, in delaying the Germans on that occasion.

ciao,

GAC

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It appears to be accepted that the BEF did delay the Germans at Mons, the advance from there and also in the subsequent actions including Le Cateau.

Accounts quoted show that some German units were surprised by the volume of the BEF's small arms fire from rifles and/or machine guns or both.

Does this not then indicate that the musketry skills of the BEF were superior to anything that the Germans had expected or found in their own training?

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I have little difficulty in accepting that British musketry played the key role, supported by artillery and machine guns, in delaying the Germans on that occasion.
GAC, there is no doubt that the rifle formed the core of the defence across the breadth of the BEF position at Mons. The supporting role of artillery was limited by the natural terrain, and both artillery/MGs were proportionally less than later in the war. The preponderance of the rifle was true for all armies of course. Based on the performance of other armies in the same type of situation, ie defending against a numerically superior enemy, the level of competence in musketry could have been less and the same outcome would have been acheived IMHO. Either that or we should have to accept that other infantry were just as proficient in musketry. As important, if not more so, was the ability to co-ordinate rifle fire across a broad front. I don't mean getting everyone to fire at once. But units can only deliver effective fire if they themselves are not under fire, especially from the flank or rear. Mutual support and effective use of terrain, as well as a clear understanding of the potential threats on the flanks and efficient resupply during battle, are vital to an effective delaying action. More so than the ability to fire x versus x minus y rounds per minute.

None of these comments are meant to detract from the levels of musketry skills achieved by the infantry (and the oft-forgotten cavalry). I have read many accounts of how the British trained at Hythe (and in India as well).

Robert

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There are clues that the German Army were not expecting the British Army to present much in the way of opposition. " Contemptible little army ", " I'll send a policeman to arrest them ", Bloem's remarks already quoted. There is definite information that the Germans intelligence was at fault and they were not expecting to come up against the British in any strength, at Mons and consistently failed to appreciate the strength of the BEF or their line of march at Mons and Le Cateau. Is it possible then that a factor in the checks given, was that the BEF was in greater than expected numbers and fought much more effectively than envisaged.

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As important, if not more so, was the ability to co-ordinate rifle fire across a broad front. I don't mean getting everyone to fire at once. But units can only deliver effective fire if they themselves are not under fire, especially from the flank or rear. Mutual support and effective use of terrain, as well as a clear understanding of the potential threats on the flanks and efficient resupply during battle, are vital to an effective delaying action. More so than the ability to fire x versus x minus y rounds per minute.

Again, there is little you say that I would disagree with. The British were ideally placed to take advantage of the advancing German's exposure. To return to Edmonds;

But the positions of the British infantry were so well chosen and concealed that the German artillery failed to discover them, and hence the progress of the German infantry was both slow and costly. In any case, the attack upon the bridge of St Ghislain was stopped while still three hundred yards distant from the Canal by the accurate fire of the West Kents and the machine guns of the Yorkshire Light Infantry and the half company of the Scottish Borderers, on the left of the bridge, who all alike had excellent targets, and took advantage of them to the full, with little loss to themselves.*

And again, describing the action around Les Herbieres:

[About] 1.30pm he [the Germans] attacked with two battalions of the 52nd in mass, advancing across the open at a range of six hundred yards. Such a target was all that the British could wish for; another company of the East Surreys had by this time joined the one astride the embankment; and three platoons of the Suffolks had also come up to cover their left flank, and their rapid rifle fire, combined with long bursts at selected objects from the remaining machine gun at the barricade, mowed down large numbers of the enemy and scattered the rest. At this point, therefore, the Germans were decisively repulsed with very heavy loss, and with trifling casualties to the East Surreys.*

* My bold italics.

Source: Military Operations France & Belgium 1914, vol I, pp. 71 -72.

So when your "mutual support and effective use of terraine" are combined with "the ability to fire x versus x minus y rounds per minute", the results can be devastating. In my view, one complements the other - which was the whole point of the British Army's training regime. You also rightly point out that "units can only deliver effective fire if they themselves are not under fire, especially from the flank or rear", and as can be seen from the above quoted account of Les Herbieres, such flank protection on the part of the British was not fortuitous but deliberate, demonstrating an effective command and control at work, another factor often overlooked.

As you say, the British development of musketry training was brought from the Indian Army to the British home forces. This was begun by Sir Ian Hamilton who had introduced the underlying principles in India before taking up the command at Hythe. And again, as you also point out, the musketry of the cavalry deployed as mounted infantry is often overlooked and only the infantry are mentioned in that respect. An insistence on improving the musketry of the cavalry was one of Haig's pre-war mantras which paid dividends in 1914.

ciao,

GAC

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"QUOTE (squirrel @ Sep 19 2008, 11:52 AM)

Were the BEF significantly superior at musketry skills than the Germans? If yes than does this explain the delay in the German advance?

The answer to these questions cannot be ajudged, IMHO, on the basis of the ability to delay an enemy force."

Robert,

Concerted accurate fire (effective fire), not only kills and wounds, but it also prevents movement by pinning the enemy down. I have mentioned this before. Innacurate, scattered fire does not do this.

Reference The Loop (Nimy): The British knew that they could not hold this position, and the Germans knew this too - which is why there was a fall back position. There was plenty of terrain to provide cover (From rifle fire) and not a lot of open killing ground for the defending troops, who couldn't give a unified action due to the lay of the land and terrain (some of which was a built-up area) and in addition, were subjected to quite a serious German bombardment - which couldn't be reciprocated by the British Field Artillery (again, due to the shape of the land), I hasten to add. The terrain was totally wrong for any form of unified action agains the German advance. The fact that in a difficult position to defend, with little in the way of quick and effective communication (with access and sight of a whole battalion), says a great deal in my opinion about the professionalism, determination, and musketry - considering they have no supporting fire from the RFA.

Reference the Aisne: are we reading about the same battle? Plus, it looks like the Aisne is being used to determine that German musketry was as good as the BEF. The battle of the Aisne, and well many commentators on here know, was fatally flawed due to 'The British Divisions went into action piecemeal with no concerted plan of attack'. To me this looks more like a lack of cohesive: planning, command, and control. Not, as is alluded to , German musketry being at an equally high standard - although, granted, as the British were attacking*** this would afford them every best advantage. German shrapnel was effective during this battle at a distance of two miles before reaching the German lines. Also, with reference to the 2 Royal Irish Rifles, J F Lucy talks about digging in 200 yards in front of the Germans. This would not be possible if effective rifle-fire was being issued (direct or indirect).

On the day that his brother is killed and as they are advancing, they experience the following: 'The line staggered under this ferocious smash of machine-gun, rifle - and shell fire...With hot throats the remainder of us went on, as there is no halt in the attack without an order. The wood on our left, through which the other company was advancing, seemed on fire, as it sparkled with bursting enemy shells, and then became almost hidden under a pall of rolling smoke. The wood was a shell-trap and the company had 'bought it' as the troops curtly say.

This is only one account and it is late. However, I have never once read about the prowess of German musketry in these initial stages of the war (or at any other really). Additionally, it is recorded in several first-hand accounts, the deterioration of the standard of musketry in the British Army as the war drags on - so it must have been good or a decent benchmark had been set at somepoint near the start of the war.

Let us not lose sight of two other factors as well.

1. The SMLE, by virtue of the fact that it had a 10-round magazine meant that more rounds were already in the weapon than any other army in the field.

2. Put this rifle in the hands of a professional well-trained soldier, then the drills and skills associated with its handling and application become second nature - and generally the inculcated drill sees the soldier through battle. Part-timers and amateurs are seldom, if at all, subject to the same rigours so suffer from skill fade, or never get to a particularly high standard. This is almost a given and isn't, as far as I'm concerned, worth arguing about much more.

Back to Mons, 2nd Royal Irish Rifles - From There's a Devil in the Drum by J F Lucy:

"For us the battle took the form of a well-ordered, rapid rifle-fire at close range, as the field-grey human targets appeared, or were struck down".

"The leading Germans fired standing 'from the hip', as they came on, but their scattered fire was ineffective, and ignored."

"Our rapid fire was appalling even to us, and the worst marksman could not miss, as he only had to fire into the 'brown' of the masses of the unfortunate enemy, who on the fronts of two of our companies were continually and uselessly reinforced at the short range of three hundred yards."

"We were not without casualties, but for such a terrifice lot of shooting they were very few indeed, and were actually least we had in any battle of the war. Only three or four men were killed and the same number wounded. Most of the German shrapnel shells had burst too high, and their rifle fire was hopeless."

Aye

Tom McC

*** AMENDMENT BY ME: I have written 'attacking' here, but it was more like an advance to contact. The 2nd Royal Irish Rifles were in extended line, which, in the circumstances of the German Defence, proved to be a fatal mistake. As the Battalion got over the skyline, the Germans had all the advantage that comes with a reverse slope, coupled with decent entrenchments, which the hesitancy of the British gave them time to do.

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Back to Mons, 2nd Royal Irish Rifles - From There's a Devil in the Drum by J F Lucy:

"Our rapid fire was appalling even to us, and the worst marksman could not miss, as he only had to fire into the 'brown' of the masses of the unfortunate enemy, who on the fronts of two of our companies were continually and uselessly reinforced at the short range of three hundred yards."

"We were not without casualties, but for such a terrific lot of shooting they were very few indeed, and were actually least we had in any battle of the war. Only three or four men were killed and the same number wounded. Most of the German shrapnel shells had burst too high, and their rifle fire was hopeless."

Thanks for that Tom. The conclusion of your Royal Irish Rifles account ties in in a remarkably consistent manner, as far as rapidity of firing, the high casualties inflicted, and the low casualties sustained are concerned, with the conclusions on the West Kents, the Yorkshire Light Infantry, the Scottish Borderers and the East Surreys from the Official History as quoted in my last post:

[......] "the accurate fire of the West Kents and the machine guns of the Yorkshire Light Infantry and the half company of the Scottish Borderers, on the left of the bridge, who all alike had excellent targets, and took advantage of them to the full, with little loss to themselves."

"[......] "and their rapid rifle fire, combined with long bursts at selected objects from the remaining machine gun at the barricade, mowed down large numbers of the enemy and scattered the rest. At this point, therefore, the Germans were decisively repulsed with very heavy loss, and with trifling casualties to the East Surreys."

ciao,

GAC

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Gentlemen, it seems we have an unambiguous bottom line in this debate. We have a few German casualty statistics against plenty of contradictory eye-witness evidence (not to mention the logic of cause and effect), mainly from British troops who did the fighting but also from a German officer who was in the thick of it.

I find this rather telling this far into the debate i.e. apart from Bloem's account we have been offered no German eye-witness evidence saying anything at all about Mons and Le Cateau, only a few, decidedly iffy, casualty figures. Could it be that Smith-Dorrien nicely sums up the German view of these two actions - "That the enemy received a very serious blow, and losses far heavier than ours, and gained a wholesome respect for the efficiency of British troops are facts beyond dispute, and the failure of their official accounts to expatiate on the battle is ominously suggestive of their being none too proud of the results." *My bold italics*

"Of their being none too proud of the results", does this also apply to modern-day Junkerphiles - is this yet another case of lies, damn lies and statistics?

Cheers-salesie.

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I regret that I am tied up today, but I shall get back to you all tomorrow with a reply that does not rely on labelling or name calling. I am happy to be challenged by anyone and shall issue a few of my own tomorrow which, I hope, will tease out some reasoned responses. Oh and just to give you one to be going on with, Salesie, could you please be ready with a full explanation as to why Smith Dorrien was so sure that, 'German losses [were] far heavier than ours.' Many thanks in advance.

Jack

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I regret that I am tied up today, but I shall get back to you all tomorrow with a reply that does not rely on labelling or name calling. I am happy to be challenged by anyone and shall issue a few of my own tomorrow which, I hope, will tease out some reasoned responses. Oh and just to give you one to be going on with, Salesie, could you please be ready with a full explanation as to why Smith Dorrien was so sure that, 'German losses [were] far heavier than ours.' Many thanks in advance.

Jack

No need for me to wait until the morrow, Jack. You wish me to offer a full explanation as to Smith Dorrien's assertions? I would never be so presumptuous to speak in a definitive manner as to his reasoning - but I will state the self-evident truth about his statements i.e. that he was actually there, that he actually commanded the Corps that dealt both stopping blows to Von Kluck's First Army, that he would not only have seen, read and heard many of the too numerous to mention messages from his hard-pressed units (otherwise how could he have commanded the action), but, also, he would, beyond all reasonable doubt, have spoken to many of the men who actually fought the action, both at the time and later (first hand eye-witness accounts, a few of which have been used as sources for this thread to back-up the veracity of his words).

It seems to me that not only is he highly qualified as a Primary source, but in a court of law he would easily qualify as an expert witness and, thus, his "evidence" would be readily admissible. And, just to give you a taste of the close-contact, expert nature of his "evidence" here's another short extract from his Memories of Forty-Eight Years Service, chapter twenty-four.

"Again, I shall not attempt a full description of the fighting, but shall confine myself largely to my personal experiences...

...We were not left long in doubt as to the chances of an action, for even whilst the C.-in-C. was talking to us at 6 a.m., though we did not know it at the time, our cavalry was in contact and the 4th Middlesex on outpost about Obourg were exchanging shots with the enemy. It was a Sunday morning, thick and wet at first, but clearing later became a lovely day. The church bells were sounding, and there were streams of people in every village in their black Sunday clothes going to church as if nothing unusual was happening.

At, as far as I recollect, about 9 a.m. I motored to the left of my outpost line at Pommeroeul, and leaving the car crossed the bridge and saw an interesting scrap between the Cornwalls and German scouts. I then passed along east on the south side of the Canal when about 10 a.m. the first German shell I had seen fired burst on the road just in front of my car close to Jemappes. The German guns, however, had been busy opposite Mons some time earlier, and this was natural from the nature of the enemy advance, which was more or less in the form of a left wheel, their outer or right flank coming on to the Canal last; in fact, some of our troops remained north of the Canal until 6 p.m.

It was a day of desperate and heavy fighting, especially on our right about Mons. In that salient and on the hill to the south-east of it, " Bois la Haut," the 8th and 9th Brigades were tried to the utmost, the 4th Middlesex losing half their strength; but they more than held their own and eventually fell back, evacuating the salient with the greatest skill, and at nightfall, although somewhat retired, our line was still unpenetrated. There was, however, a moment when the danger of penetration was very serious.

At about 7 p.m. a report came in saying that the enemy had penetrated the line near Frameries and were swarming through that village. I had no troops left, and all I could do was to request the 5th Division to push out to their right, which they did by sending the 1st Bedfords to Paturages. Knowing the gap was appreciable owing to the left flank of the 3rd Division in retiring having failed to join up with the right flank of the 5th Division, and that if the Germans' realised it there was nothing to prevent their pushing through in large numbers and rendering our position untenable, I sent the following message to G.H.Q. :

" To G.H.Q., G 271, August 23rd. Third Division report at 6.47 p.m. the Germans are in front of his main position and are not attacking at present, they are, however, working round 3rd Division on left flank. If it should appear that there is a danger of my centre being pierced I can see no course but to order a general retirement on Bavai position. Have I your permission to adopt this course if it appears necessary ? From II Corps, 7.15 p.m. (Signed Oxley, Colonel.) "

If the opinion of the General who commanded II Corps in these actions, when backed-up by a mountain of eye-witness evidence from his men, cannot be recognised as valid then what on earth can?

Cheers-salesie.

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Before this excellent thread descends into a private quarrel, may I just say that the published conclusions of Generals after a battle can be shown to be anything from partially to completely mistaken. In his book of 1920s, Von Kluck was still completely mistaken as to the numbers of British he had fought against at Mons, where they had come from and where they retired to. Haig's reactions to 1st July 1916, allowed to stand after being known to be wrong, do not give a true description of that day's events. I for one would like to see some sort of data to back up S-D's memoirs.

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Before this excellent thread descends into a private quarrel, may I just say that the published conclusions of Generals after a battle can be shown to be anything from partially to completely mistaken. In his book of 1920s, Von Kluck was still completely mistaken as to the numbers of British he had fought against at Mons, where they had come from and where they retired to. Haig's reactions to 1st July 1916, allowed to stand after being known to be wrong, do not give a true description of that day's events. I for one would like to see some sort of data to back up S-D's memoirs.

What you say about memoirs, Tom, is generally correct - but, in this instance, Smith-Dorrien's assertions are amply backed-up by many eye-witness accounts from those who actually fought (some of which have already been seen in this thread). I'm certain that the weight of this evidence far out-weighs any notoriously unreliable casualty head-counts (with or without health-warnings).

Cheers-salesie.

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Concerted accurate fire (effective fire), not only kills and wounds, but it also prevents movement by pinning the enemy down. I have mentioned this before. Innacurate, scattered fire does not do this.
Tom, I totally agree. If, however, the outcome of interest is the ability to slow an enemy advance, then 'effective fire' does not have to be of the standard attributed to the BEF infantry in August 1914. In other words, an enemy unit would have to be absolutely totally incompetent with the rifle to not cause a delay in an advancing force. Even inaccurate, scattered fire from a reasonable size unit (ie not a few individuals) will actually cause an advancing unit to begin deloying, which takes time. Then there is a delay as the advancing force's firing line begins to thicken, and other units begin to move towards what might be the flank/s of the defending force. Artillery in the advance guard will move forward to take up overwatch positions. Ammunition resupply units will begin to move into position, which means the route forward must be cleared to some degree for them. All of which takes time. As the firefight develops, the enemy will stick it out for a variable length of time. Most often, the result will not be determined by the volume of fire directed against defenders from their front, but by the threat to the flanks (such as occurred at Nimy). The broader the defensive position, the longer it will take, unless a big hole appears when a unit suddenly flees to the rear. Even then, however, an attacking force will still take an age to get back to the situation where an advance can be continued.

An attacking force, especially of the size we are considering ie an army, is not an agile entity. Hence my point. The degree of accuracy and concertation (apologies, this word betrays my involvement some EC-funded R&D projects) of fire from defenders is not the major determinant of the delay in an advance. Put another way, you cannot use the outcome of 'enemy advance delayed = true' with the observation 'infantry firing = BEF' to deduce that the musketry skills of the BEF were better than the Germans or French or Turks or Russians or Romanians...

Please note that I am not saying that BEF musketry skills were not better. My assertion is that the outcome of delaying an enemy advance cannot be used to deduce this.

Robert

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I'm certain that the weight of this evidence far out-weighs any notoriously unreliable casualty head-counts (with or without health-warnings).

And I am at a loss to understand why impressions, perceptions and anecdotes should be regarded as historically more reliable then figures compiled by the people who actually treated the wounded, buried the dead, wrote the "...regret to inform you" notifications and the "killed in action" annotations, and sent up the requisite number of replacements.

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And I am at a loss to understand why impressions, perceptions and anecdotes should be regarded as historically more reliable then figures compiled by the people who actually treated the wounded, buried the dead, wrote the "...regret to inform you" notifications and the "killed in action" annotations, and sent up the requisite number of replacements.

And I seem to recall that on at least two occasions the point has been made, even by the disseminator of the figures in question, that the majority of the German records were destroyed in the fire-storms of WW2, and, therefore, such figures cannot be officially authenticated. Consequently, we are left with opinion, impression and perception as to their validity.

Cheers-salesie.

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And I seem to recall that on at least two occasions the point has been made, even by the disseminator of the figures in question, that the majority of the German records were destroyed in the fire-storms of WW2, and, therefore, such figures cannot be officially authenticated. Consequently, we are left with opinion, impression and perception as to their validity.

Cheers-salesie.

The Sanitaetsbericht figures are the result of years of research by an official government commision into German casualty figures during the war. They are exhaustive, and, well, er official.

Volume III also includes a great deal of explanitory text on how the figures were compiled. There is no reason to question that they are the most accurate figures compiled. They even contradict the German Official History figures, but after reading their reasoning it's easy to see why.

The ten-day returns are still available for periods of the war. Most of the figures for the Verdun battle still exist. After a lot of research at the BA-MA archives and comparing the Sanitaetsbericht figures I would go with the Sanitaetsbericht figures as more accurate. It may well be that the figures for 1914 are squirreled away somewhere, but finding them would be difficult in the system that is the BA-MA.

I'm not sure that looking through the original records would bring us anything--who of us has 40 people and ten years of free time? Could we do better than the official commision?

How would we "officially authenticated" them anyway? Of what organization are we officials? <_<

Some great points brought up on supression and pinning versus killing when it comes to fire in combat--this is a very complex subject.

Paul

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Have been following this thread,and learnt much.Riveting.

Was wondering,what any of the Battalion diaries of the units involved said about this period.Does any one have a diary of the relevant period?..if so any mention of German casualties/machine guns etc?

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The Sanitaetsbericht figures are the result of years of research by an official government commision into German casualty figures during the war. They are exhaustive, and, well, er official.

Volume III also includes a great deal of explanitory text on how the figures were compiled. There is no reason to question that they are the most accurate figures compiled. They even contradict the German Official History figures, but after reading their reasoning it's easy to see why.

The ten-day returns are still available for periods of the war. Most of the figures for the Verdun battle still exist. After a lot of research at the BA-MA archives and comparing the Sanitaetsbericht figures I would go with the Sanitaetsbericht figures as more accurate.

I'm not sure what looking through the original records would bring us anything--who of us has 40 people and ten years of free time? Could we do better than the official commision?

How would we "officially authenticated" them anyway? Of what organization are we officials? <_<

Paul

Now, now, Paul, you're well aware that we are not officials of any organisation, just as you are well aware of what I meant when using that phrase. And surely there is at least some doubt surrounding the Sanitaetsbericht figures? I note that they were published in 1934, the year being significant because that well known academic Hitler and his cronies were controlling all publications in Germany by that time, do you not feel that such figures produced by this so-called authoritative work would fit-in nicely with their historical slant on events during WW1 and thus would have been "passed" as OK for publication instead of for burning?

But, the disseminators of such figures in this thread cast doubt as well:

In post #51 Jack tells us: "One of the problems in making authoritative remarks is that we are in the hands of the historians, who varied in how they used the contents of war diaries, casualty returns etc. I tend to trust Rolls of Honour. They were usually compiled with the utmost care and integrity, because they served to honour the fallen and, in the German army which has no memorials to the missing, for example, often these entries in regimental histories are the only record that an individual fought and died."

Then in post #53 he says: "The figures come with a health warning, because I have had to extract them from the regimental histories. Although I have no reason to doubt what they contain, the destruction of the Prussian archives in April 1945 means that there is no way of verifying them from primary sources. That said, I imagine that they are reasonably correct."

Jack's opinion is that they are only reasonably correct because there is no way of verifying them from primary sources.

Then Phil told us in post #107 that: "Jack uses the official German Medical History for the source of his casualty figures. These statistics were compiled meticulously, and their provenance seems authentic and definitive.

There is, though, a significant disparity between these figures and those that were released by the German government during the war. To illustrate this, the official German casualty list released on October 31st 1917 gave a total of 1,138,768 army combat fatalities on all fronts. This, it must be stressed, was the actual total of killed and died of wounds recorded by that time. It does not allow for hundreds of thousands of missing who were, in reality, dead, and nor does it include soldiers who died of disease or accident. Now the German Medical tabulations give a much lower figure of fatalities. By July 31st 1918, even after the huge losses in their spring and summer offensives, the total from that source was 1,061,740, suggesting a very significant understatement: that the German government acknowledged a significantly higher total of battle deaths seven months previously, when the most gigantic fighting on the Western Front was yet to occur, suggests that the Sanitatsbericht figures, however carefully tabulated, might be incomplete in so far as its count for killed and died of wounds is concerned."

Hundreds of thousands of missing who in reality were dead are not included, and big discrepancies in the two sets of figures - any explanation for this, could the publication date be significant?

Cheers-salesie.

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There is also the memoir of a German officer which Jack mentioned in one of the earlier posts ( 51). This officer was supervising the burial of the dead on the battlefield of August 24th, and recorded that his men buried more German dead than British. Hardly a conclusive piece of evidence, I confess, but a pertinent one.

Phil.

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Reference the Aisne: ...it looks like the Aisne is being used to determine that German musketry was as good as the BEF.
No, Tom. I was very careful in the way this was worded: "As the evidence of the Aisne suggests, German musketry was not significantly worse than the BEF" (emphasis added). Your subsequent point is important:

The battle of the Aisne, and well many commentators on here know, was fatally flawed due to 'The British Divisions went into action piecemeal with no concerted plan of attack'. To me this looks more like a lack of cohesive: planning, command, and control.
Might not the same mitigating circumstances apply to the German attacks at Mons? I raise this point to illustrate how difficult it is to judge the effectiveness of BEF musketry versus German musketry.

Assuming for a moment that BEF musketry was superior, the point about the German withdrawal to the Aisne and the British advance to the north of La Bassee is that German musketry was still very effective when used in defense. Mention has been made of the BEF's performance during the defence of the Ypres Salient in late 1914. The French and Belgians also helped stop the German attacks. Had their musketry not been effective (which is not saying that it was as good as the BEF) then the BEF would have been completely surrounded or would have had to join a general withdrawal to avoid this. Please note that even the French dismounted cavalry contributed to this defeat of German intentions. Here is an excerpt from 'Chasseur of 1914' that illustrates the effectiveness of carbines:

"'Then, dominating the tumult, we heard their trumpets sounding the short, monotonous notes of the Prussian charge.

I leaped back into the trench.

"Independent fire!"

The whole French line burst into a violent and deafening fusillade. Each man seemed full of blind rage, of an exasperated lust for destruction. I saw them take aim rapidly, press the trigger, and reload in feverish haste. I was deafened and bewildered by the terrible noise of the firing in the narrow confines of the trench. To our left, the machine-gun section of my friend F. kept up an infernal racket.

But the German line had suddenly dropped to the ground. Would they dare to come on again? We hoped so with all our hearts, for we felt that if we could keep our men in hand, and prevent them from firing at random, the [Pg 211]enemy could never get at us. But, above all, it was essential to economise our ammunition, for if we were short of cartridges, what resistance could we offer to a bayonet charge with our little carbines reduced to silence?

The Germans must have been severely shaken, for they seemed afraid to resume the attack. Nothing was moving in the bare plain that stretched before us. During this respite an order came from the officer in command, passing from mouth to mouth:

"Hand it on: No firing without the word of command."

Then silence fell on our trenches, heavy and complete as on the landscape before us. Suddenly, on the place where the enemy's riflemen had thrown themselves on the ground, we saw a slim shadow rise and stand. The man had got up quietly, as if no danger threatened him. And, in spite of everything, it was impossible not to admire the gallantry of his act. He stood motionless for a second, leaning on his sword or a stick; then he [Pg 212]raised his arm slowly, and a hoarse voice yelled:

"Auf!" [up!]

Other voices repeated the word of command, and were answered by renewed "hurrahs!" Then the heavy line of riflemen sprang up and again rushed towards us:

"Fire! Fire!"

Once more our trenches belched forth their infernal fire. We could now plainly see numbers of them fall; then they suddenly threw themselves on the ground just as before. But instead of crouching motionless among the beetroot they began to answer our fire. Innumerable bullets whistled about us. I noted with joy that my men remained perfectly steady; they were aiming and firing deliberately, whereas at other points the fusillade was so violent that it cannot have been efficacious. I was very glad not to have to reprove my brave Chasseurs, for the uproar was so terrific that my voice would not have carried beyond the two men nearest to me. I calculated the number of cartridges each of them must have in reserve; twenty-five,

perhaps thirty. How would it all end? I was just thinking of ordering my troop to cease firing, in order to reserve my ammunition for a supreme effort, if this should be necessary.

But something happened which checked this decision. F.'s machine-guns must have worked fearful havoc among our assailants, for suddenly, without a cry and without an order, we saw them rise and make off quickly right and left in the fog."

I have left in reference to the machine-gun section as it clearly contributed as well.

Robert

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