The "machine guns" of Mons ?

[phil andrade]

The arithmetic of those sanitsbericht figures that Jack presents us with makes grim reading for those of us who, like me, have been weaned on the legends of the Old Contemptibles' superiority. If they are correct, those figures imply that the British, in the last ten days of August 1914, achieved a casualty exchange rate against the Germans that was no better than - indeed, perhaps worse - than that achieved by the French in their disastrous initial encounters in the Battles of the Frontiers. Then again, it is apt to remember that the standard rate of rifle fire attained by the British - fifteen rounds rapid per minute - was rivalled by the French with their soixante-quinze field guns.

Phil.

[Robert Dunlop]

With respect to German musketry training, the following material is summarised from Zuber's book dealing with the Battle of the Frontiers. Specifically, the information is drawn from the chapter entitled 'German Tactics and Training', and the sections within that chapter entitled 'German Markmanship Training and Fire Tactics' and 'Combat Gunnery'.

Zuber notes that the introduction of the Model 1871 rifle led to a significant focus on 'combat marksmanship'. This rifle could be used to engage targets at distances far in excess of what had been possible previously. A 'Combat Gunnery School' was established at Spandau, which is on the outskirts of modern-day Berlin. Exercises were held there, including 'squad, platoon and company graded range-firing exercises' that were mandatory for all infantry. After 1890, these exercises were extended. The creation of 'Major Training Areas (MTA)' played a prominent role in this. These training areas were quite large (typically 5 miles square) and provided permanent facilities for firing ranges and 'all-arms live-fire exercises' throughout Germany.

At the individual level, soldiers were systematically taught how to recognise human figures out to 2,000 metres. Range estimation was particularly important. Recruit training was tested against the ability to move forward, assume a firing position, identify and hit a target that appeared unexpectedly, and participate in squad-level fire and movement. After this initial training, great emphasis continued to be placed on individual markmanship, especially at ranges around 800-1200 metres. Each soldier had a Schiessbuch ('marksmanship book') and the best individual marksman in a company was awarded a 'Schuetzenabzeichen, a coloured cord attached to their epaulette on their Class A uniform'. All company commanders had to attend one of the specialist schools 'in a program similar to the US Army's [current] Master Gunner Course' before taking up command.

Significant training was also given at the squad-, platoon- and company-levels, with particular emphasis on live-firing when possible. The concept of the 'beaten zone' (Garbe) was crucial. Zuber mentions that 'the objective of German fire tactics was to place this beaten zone on the enemy unit. The impact of at least some... rounds would throw up dirt, allowing the platoon leader to judge if [the fire of his platoon] was landing properly and adjusting it if it was not.' For a target at 700 m, it was estimated that aimed rounds would fall between '640m range to 760m'. A variety of drills were used to hone squads and platoons use of the beaten zone. These included 'man-sized silhouettes' pulled backwards and forwards on sleds at various ranges. The figures could be made to appear and disappear (for example by turning them sideways), thereby simulating the enemy bounding forward and then taking cover. Rows of such targets would mimic an enemy moving forward. Large numbers of targets would be used to simulate a superior force. Targets were also set up in cover, such as 'mock villages'. In addition, at least two men were trained to act as range estimators, helping the platoon leader to spot the fall of rounds. All soldiers were trained to call out their observations and to pass information down the line. This was important for enabling other soldiers who were bounding forward and joining the firing line to know what the range estimation was as soon as they arrived.

Tactical live firing exercises were carried out, including training in fire and movement, or managing when a squad or other leader was killed. 'Many units' took these exercises to the battalion and regimental scale, something that was facilitated by the MTAs. Thorough evaluations were carried out, including the accuracy of target estimation, percentage of rounds on target and numbers of targets hit. 'The overall evaluation, however, was dependent on the tactical conduct of the troops'. In each corps, the best company was awarded 'the prestigious Kaiserpreis, (in Bavaria the Koenigspreis) which included a decoration for the company commander, a bust of the Kaiser for the officer's club and a cloth arm insignia for the members of the company'.

Robert

[salesie]

I remember reading somewhere, can't remember exactly where (it may even have been on this forum), that in 1914 a German infantryman, no matter how well trained in musketry, could never hope to match a British Regular's rate of fire and accuracy. The problem being the standard German assault rifle of the day; apparently it only held five rounds and its bolt operating handle came out from the bolt at ninety-degrees, whereas the SMLE held ten rounds and its bolt handle left the bolt at a downwards angle of forty-five degrees. This meant a German infantryman had to re-load twice as often as a British regular, and the SMLE's bolt could be worked much quicker; it could be opened by the little finger and palmed shut, giving a much smoother action and facilitate being held better into the shoulder during cocking thus allowing the aim to be kept more accurately. So, even if training and skills in musketry were equal, the British would always easily out-shoot the Germans in a straight rifle exchange - it could be argued that without superior numbers of artillery pieces, it may well have been Von Kluck who was forced to retreat from Mons, even with his advantage in manpower.

That said, I'm at a loss, Robert, where the notion comes from that says well disciplined, well trained riflemen, who are well versed in delivering rapid accurate fire, skilled in fieldcraft and with a highly disciplined and effective system of fire control will be no more effective as those less well trained in such things?

It is true that less disciplined and accurate fire may cause hesitancy in an advance/attack, but surely the length of the pause will depend on the effect of such firing? Highly skilled soldiers soon realise if those firing at them are any good or not, and then their own skills come into play. To suggest that not so skilled rates of fire and accuracy are as good, in this context, as highly skilled and accurate fire is perhaps fanciful - firstly, the more skilled the firing the more deadly and/or suppressing it becomes, and, secondly, such skills can make a few good riflemen seem like many (especially to less well trained and/or equipped troops). If any type of rifle fire is as effective as any other kind then why bother with all the training? Why not just say to any recruit who can hit a barn door at ten yards, "Here's a rifle - you'll do, son."?

Cheers-salesie.

[Robert Dunlop]

German infantryman, no matter how well trained in musketry, could never hope to match a British Regular's rate of fire and accuracy. The problem being the standard German assault rifle of the day; apparently it only held five rounds and its bolt operating handle came out from the bolt at ninety-degrees, whereas the SMLE held ten rounds and its bolt handle left the bolt at a downwards angle of forty-five degrees.

salesie, you are looking too closely at a specific part of a rifle. Metaphorically, you need to take your eyes off the bolt and magazine of an individual rifle, then look up at the combined effect of multiple rifles firing on a beaten zone, ie concentrating their fire. Leaving aside the minor point of whether rate of fire equates with accuracy, there is no question that German infantry could stop British (and any other) infantry advancing in the open with rifle fire alone. It is possible to find accounts where the effects of MG and artillery fire do not feature. In any situation where a firefight lasted longer than a few minutes, which was often the case, there was no advantage in firing off 15-30 rounds per minute. High rates of fire would chew through ammunition in no time. This fact was appreciated by the Germans, who trained their soldiers to adjust the rate of fire to the situation. I have posted on this before but the summary is that it was rare to fire the German rifle at its maximum rate of fire. Despite this, it was still effective.

That said, I'm at a loss, Robert, where the notion comes from that says well disciplined, well trained riflemen, who are well versed in delivering rapid accurate fire, skilled in fieldcraft and with a highly disciplined and effective system of fire control will be no more effective as those less well trained in such things?

I am also at a loss to know where this notion comes from.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

It is true that less disciplined and accurate fire may cause hesitancy in an advance/attack, but surely the length of the pause will depend on the effect of such firing?

salesie, it seems to really bother you that the Germans might have been effective riflemen. Any admission that this might have been the case appears to carry the horrific implication that the BEF were not excellent marksmen. You have conflated two things together, namely hesitancy in advance and hesitancy in attack. I have focused on the former. We have been discussing BEF markmenship in the context of significant engagements, which are the summation of numerous firefights conducted at different geographic sites and at different times on the same day. In whatever way we may wish to the characterise the ability of the individual infantrymen or their collective markmenship, the summary effect is to cause the likes of an army to slow right down in an advance. This happened to both the German Fourth and Fifth Armies when they came up against the French in the Ardennes for example. I don't think you want to ascribe this effect to the French infantry having the same markmenship ability, or the same rifle characteristics, as the BEF?

Robert

[phil andrade]

Do we lay too much store on this legendary British skill in musketry?

Look at this passage from a book I bought in 1965, which was the first I ever possessed about the Great War :

"...The French, who were in support...could not, and cannot today, grasp the rifle fire of the men. That men should fire deliberately, and use their sights, and adjust their range, was beyond their experience. The rifle fire certainly figured heavily in the toll we took, and it must have had a telling effect on the morale of the Boche, for it was something they had not counted on."

This was not a reminiscence of an Old Contemptible who fought in 1914, but a description of the fighting in Belleau Wood in June 1918, and the riflemen in question were US Marines.

Is there a wishful thinking syndrome at work here?

The author of this book went on to write:

"Several of these attacks were beaten off at long range by the marines' accurate rifle fire. There were sharpshooters among them who could hit the bull's- eye three times out of five at seven hundred yards. They had, furthermore, learned to fire the Springfield '03 as fast as a G.I. in World War 11 could fire the semi- automatic Garand. They did this by pulling the trigger with their little finger and working the bolt with their thumb and forefinger. This marksmanship astonished the French and British, who were notoriously poor shots, and, in general, considered the rifle only as something to carry a bayonet on. The Germans, however, were not surprised: their observers in the Civil War had made note of the American "squirrel-shooters" proficiency....."

This has a familiar ring to it, don't you think?

The book, incidentally, is DO YOU WANT TO LIVE FOREVER ! ( dreadful punctuation - no question mark!) and is a polemical account of how the US Marines saved Paris and won the war. It's author is Richard Suskind, and it was published in 1964. It reminds me of Tim Carew's books.

Phil.

[SiegeGunner]

Gentlemen,

We are getting bogged down on a dry battlefield. The facts are that the BEF was obliged to retreat from the field at Mons, but the German army did not, ultimately, win the war.

The important thing to draw from this discussion is that one-sided history is no longer tenable.

Mick

[59165]

"Several of these attacks were beaten off at long range by the marines' accurate rifle fire. There were sharpshooters among them who could hit the bull's- eye three times out of five at seven hundred yards. They had, furthermore, learned to fire the Springfield '03 as fast as a G.I. in World War 11 could fire the semi- automatic Garand. They did this by pulling the trigger with their little finger and working the bolt with their thumb and forefinger.

Phil.

Phil,

not aimed against you(sorry for pun) but the passage quoted.

700 yds open sights shooting using,ok. your little finger?

Alright,I know it doesn't mean 4 rounds per second like a Garand,which isn't pertinant as no non auto rifle could compare to this....

Who ever wrote this has well edited it.You can fire quick using thumb,fore finger & 'lil finger(as this thing off utube shows badly;

or this one shows extremely badly; ooh,wheres me shoulder?

& heres it done sort of properly;

& this is the best example but thumb/little digit ,no.I dont know if SMLE shooting compares to Springfield stuff.I'd have to ask the Simpsons about that but you can see that accuracy is not paramount here so 700 yds is out the window.50?

Maybe.

Dave.

[Pete1052]

The rifle marksmanship of the U.S. Marines during the Great War was impressive but it has been exaggerated to the point that it has become one of the cherished legends of the U.S. Marine Corps. It seems to me that something of the same thing has happened with the folklore about the marksmanship of the Old Contemptibles at Mons. Both of the services (as well as the old prewar U.S. Army regulars) were indeed well trained in marksmanship but I doubt that every one of their men was a world-class crack shot.

[59165]

Pete,your so right but,we as Brits have won more than several battles 'cos of our volley fire/platoon fire,ever since the days of the thin red line.We battered you lot with volley fire ,given the chance yet learned more about skirmishing from the American conflict/Battle to put a Geordie on the throne, than from anyone except maybe the French,& look what happened to them

That's where our Army 1st used the Green Jacket.1st use of camo by us & that we learned from you lot.

& all were/are called Riflemen.

[Pete1052]

Rifle units and Rifle Green uniforms in the British army trace their origin to the old 60th Foot, the "Royal Americans," a colonial unit in Pennsylvania during the Seven Years War, what we call the French and Indian War. After our Revolution remnants of that unit are said to have formed the nucleus of the organization that eventually became the King's Royal Rifle Corps.

[salesie]

Robert, I should have resisted the urge to get involved in such pedantic theorising. However, leaving aside artillery considerations, I've given you the reasons why the BEF punched above its weight in the open warfare of 1914, and why the massive German and French armies didn't. If you wish to continue believing that skill-at-arms played no part in the BEF's role in these events (when in such small numbers compared to the "big" two) then I'm happy to leave you with your beliefs about beaten zones etc. all I will say is that it is clear to an ex-soldier that you don't understand the concepts of well disciplined fire-control and how it impacts on the effectiveness (or not) of small-arms fire.

Siege, you're absolutely right that one-sided history is untenable - I'm on record on this forum in saying the very same thing on numerous occasions. If you look at my earlier postings in this thread you'll see that I'm critical of Jack's introduction to the Le Cateau Guidebook on those very grounds. And, I hope that you will also see that in this thread I've maintained that action/reaction (two-sided cause and effect) is vital in understanding such topics.

Cheers-salesie

[Jack Sheldon]

I owe everyone a reply. I produced fairly lengthy piece of Sunday, my computer gobbled it as I was about to post and I could not face starting again then and there. I am just pursuing another line of enquiry to see if I can come up with a convincing case for the Germans believing they were facing machine guns, rather than rifle men and will re-post. Salesie. I think I mentioned this before, but will repeat it here. I wrote a German introduction to the Le Cateau guidebook. Nigel wrote the British one, which precedes it. As co-authors we had different points to make, but both are there side by side, for the reader to draw his own conclusions. The Le Cateau guidebook, like the joint one we wrote about Vimy, is two sided in its approach. They thus differ from almost every other Battleground book.

Jack

[phil andrade]

The historiographical element of this discussion is becoming more apparent.

It seems that some accounts of the war need to embellish the role of the individual soldier and his rifle, almost as if to reasure us that, even in the most impersonal of industrialised massacres, there is still scope for the human to prevail over the machine.

The account of the US Marines at Belleau Wood demonstrates this. I daresay the Belgians cherish the same feelings about the initial stand of their troops at Haelen, Liege and the Gitte in the earlier part of August 1914. Surely the French have inumerable episodes from which to draw this kind of inspiration - their own marines made a superb account of themselves keeping the Germans at bay near Dixmude in the Ypres/Yser fightng in the autumn of 1914. The stands of the Old Contemptibles at Mons, Le Cateau and Ypres engender the same reaction for the British.

I was nurtured on Tim Carew's stories about the 1914 battles. I love them. After the Sheldonian revelations about the casualties reported by German units at Mons, my image of that battle has been cut down as drastically as the German infantry advance is supposed to have been by British musketry.

Phil.

[truthergw]

The original post asked for the source of Smith Dorrien's belief that the the Germans thought the British Army had many more MGs at Mons than they did. Since then, we have wandered a little but always enjoyably. May I list the open questions as I see them?

Do we have a source.

Do we think that the Germans , in fact, thought they were up against a lot more MGs than they were.

Were the British troops better trained in musketry than the French and Germans.

Were the Germans slowed down at Mons and Le Cateau more than we could expect, specifically , by superior musketry skills of the BEF.

I should say that recently I have been reading some books on the political situation in the opening decade of the century and the Germans seem to have been thought of as having by far the best army in Europe, i.e. the world. Germany being an extremely military society in all its aspects, it would seem strange if such a thing as musketry was not given the same minute attention as every other aspect of their military build up.

[Jack Sheldon]

I am going to tackle three points - but in separate posts this time, in case my computer or server acts up again. These are:

How I came to the conclusion that British claims of German casualties at Mons and Le Cateau were exaggerated.

Was rifle fire mistaken for machine guns by the Germans?

German criticism of German infantry tactics at Mons

Let me begin with casualties. My suspicions about this were aroused when I was asked to provide the 'enemy paragraph' at a series of stands during a regimental 'Old Contemptibles' battlefield tour some years ago. This caused me to read into the campaign and to obtain relevant German regimental histories, in order to see if we could pin down who did what to whom. In almost every case we could; the consequent interlocking of accounts adding to our confidence that we had a good approximation to the real story. Initially I did not question the Mons accounts because numerous German histories described their casualties as 'heavy', as indeed did von Kluck himself: 'The obstinate fighting for the crossings of the Mons-Conde canal on the 23rd August in which both sides suffered heavy losses was the prelude... to a four days' uninterrupted battle.' The March on Paris p 48

Le Cateau was rather different. I was at that time not aware of Smith Dorrien's comments about the extent of German casualties, but did know about Edmonds assertion that, 'there is no doubt they were stupendous.' 'Stupendous' was not defined but, bearing in mind that the British belief at that time was that their own casualties were 7,800, it seemed clear to me that 'stupendous' had to be taken to mean substantially in excess of the British losses and therefore, to amount to at least 10,000. We can quibble about the figure, but that is the one I went looking for, because I thought that authentic tales at the stands of swathes of Germans being cut down would confirm what 'everyone knew' about the campaign.

I began with the German regiments which fought against the British 5th Division. The battles were known to be intense and to have begun relatively early. British casualties had been high. Three of the battalions alone had suffered nearly 1,700 between them: 2 Suffolks 720, 2 Manchester 353, 2 KOYLI 600. I assumed, therefore, that the three German regiments committed against the British right flank must have ceased to exist, but when I checked, I came up with figures of: IR 72 - 1 officer and 21 OR KIA, 5 officers, 1 officer deputy and 87 OR wounded, with 4 missing; IR 26 - 4 officers and 57 OR KIA, 12 officers and 247 OR wounded and 347 missing (although the majority turned up later); IR 66 - 5 officers and 75 OR KIA, 18 officers (7 only slightly) and 398 OR wounded. I am not making light of these figures. Over 900 confirmed and and unknown additional figure for the missing of IR 66 gives a figure somewhere over 1,000. However, my next thought was that if none of these regiments had been annihilated and only six altogether even entered the battle, somewhere there had to be a tale of complete and utter devastation of German infantry, because First Army committed very few troops to the fighting line at Le Cateau - certainly far fewer than the 57,000 of II Corps + attachments.

Just to make this clear. The Germans fought the main battle with troops of IV Corps, which comprised 7th and 8th Divisions, each of which had four regiments. However 14 Bde (IRs 27 and 165) were not deployed at all until after the battle, so the entire load was taken by the three regiments named above, plus Fus R 36 and IRs 93 and 153. To cut a long story short, the worst casualties I could find were those of IR 93, with 6 officers and 112 OR killed (including Oberst Louis von Arnim, the commander and the senior casualty from either side that day), 9 officers and 306 OR were wounded. Incidentaly, a lot of these casualties occurred during the fight for Beaumont and were caused by shrapnel. Add to those some casualties amongst the Jaeger battalions, a few from Higher Cavalry Commander II and a handful from the artillery (FAR 75, operating from exposed positions near Rambourlieux farm, for example, suffered only one fatal casualty - Major Hinsch) and we are in the rough area 2,000 - 2,500.

These figures all came from regimental histories, so could not be guaranteed, which is exactly like the situation pertaining to British regimental histories and war diaries. For example, the figures in the diary of 1 Middlesex concerning Le Cateau read, '2 officers wounded, two OR KIA and 36 wounded. 74 missing, but many more probably.' Even with these figures caveated, it was almost certainly going to be impossible to make the German figures add up to many more than 2,000, perhaps 2,500, making German losses for Le Cateau approximately one third of those believed to have been suffered by II Corps. This I would now amend to one half, in view of the fact that British figures are now thought to be nearer to 5,000. Because this did not seem to be a particualrly 'stupendous figure', I then turned to check what was meant by 'heavy' at Mons - and these figures have already appeared elsewhere. The German figures were, pehaps, about twice as high as British ones during that battle.

The first time I could check the figures against those published in the San-Bericht was a couple of years later. Although not broken down by battles, it was clear to see that they were consistent with the results derived from the histories.

On the basis of this explanation, I contend that the German army had twice as many casualties as the BEF at Mons and that BEF casualties at Le Cateau were double those of the German army. I belive, further, that Smith Dorrien was mistaken and Edmonds a fantasist.

Jack

[George Armstrong Custer]

Smith Dorrien was mistaken and Edmonds a fantasist.

Coming after your praise of German sources, Jack, that's quite a pejoratively intemperate assertion - particularly in regard to Edmonds. I'm busy this afternoon, but I'll get back to you on it.

ciao,

GAC

[Jack Sheldon]

Oh dear I did not mean to be unduly provocative. I am waiting with interest to see someone produce at least rough order British figures concerning German casualties, so that we can attempt to reconcile the differences. As far as Edmonds is concerned and as I have mentioned elsewhere in this thread, he has form on twisitng and distorting figures to suit his own case. This applies without a shadow of a doubt to the Somme and Passchendaele, so in my book, that makes him an unreliable witness.

Jack

[phil andrade]

As far as Mons is concerned, I had taken a rough stab at German casualties, based on the compilations you had provided in an earlier post, Jack. I came up with a figure of roughly 3,000, including 500 KIA - but that was for two days, August 23rd and 24th, implying that far from being double the British loss, the German count had been somewhat lower, the BEF suffering 1,600 on August 23rd and 2,000 on August 24th. That being said, the British lost a very large proportion of their casualties as prisoners, and if we allow for about 1,000 in that category, we arrive at a reckoning of 3,000 German killed or wounded compared with 2,500 British. Even that is hardly evidence of great superiority in British firepower effect - as we all acknowledge, infantry attacking in the open are bound to take heavier losses than defenders under cover, and a ratio of 6 to 5 against the Germans is not what we would expect, especially from musketry as renowned as that of the 1914 British.

If I had not seen those tabulations that you had gleaned from German Regimental histories, I would have confidently reckoned that German losses on August 23rd alone amounted to 3,000 killed or wounded, an estimate that you support in your post 191, Jack.

In volume 1 of his history THE FIRST WORLD WAR ( will there ever be a volume2?), Hew Strachan gives a succinct account of the Battle of Mons, page 221:

" The BEF had the advantage of prepared positions where it could develop the firepower of the infantry. But...Tactically, the line of the Mons canal was no better suited for defence than that of the Sambre: the canal itself did not constitute a major obstacle, and the buildings and pit- heads of the area obstructed fields of fire. On the right of the British position a bend in the canal created a salient which became exposed to German artillery as Kluck's attack developed purpose and effort. The Germans broke into smaller groups and advanced by rushes, finding as they closed that the British were having to fire high because of the canal embankment and that once within they were less exposed to its effects..."

It's almost as if Strachan is hereby providing us with the answer to our difficulty in reconciling our traditional image of the battle with the statistics of the sanits bericht.

If we are to accept those figures as correct, then I suppose we must allow for 3,000 German casualties for August 23rd/24th, 2,500 for Le Cateau and 1,750 for all the other affairs in that ten day period. Just for the record, there is some significance that in his report of the dramatic night time fight at Landrecies, Sir John French wrote "...it is estimated that, in a very few minutes, no less than 800 to 900 dead and wounded Germans were lying in the streets."

The German official casualty count for this engagement was 127.

Phil.

[Jack Sheldon]

This is an attempt at the rifles/machine guns question. We have already discussed elsewhere the quotation about MGs behind every bush which appears in Die Schlacht an der Yser und bei Ypern 1914 and I have cited several more mentions of small arms fire in that same book, where there is no such scope for misinterpretation. I have now completed the same exercise for another monograph in the same series, entitled Die Schlacht bei Mons.

p28 'Under this protection the infantrymen of IR 85 approached Obourg. Heavy rifle fire from the occupied station buildings [where, it will be remembered, there was a machine gun] hit the 3rd Bn and prevented a further advance towards the bridge.'

p 32 'As the leading part... approached the southern exit of the town, it was suddenly engaged with heavy rifle and machine gun fire.'

p 35 'Everywhere where they tried to pick their way forward between the spread-out and numerous farmsteads of the villages of Tertre, Ghlin and Nimy, they came under fire from infantrymen behind cover.'

p 36 'Well dug in and completely hidden from the attackers, the enemy lay concealed between houses on the far bank and opened up a murderous fire.'

p 37 'Suddenly things came to life over there. First there were individual shots, then heavy rifle fire; machine guns joined in and the British batteries sent the first of their greetings.'

p 38 [This involves Grenadier Regt 12] 'From the southwest, at point blank range, came Infanteriefeuer' [small arms fire. This can also mean rifle fire].

p 40 [Gren 12 again] 'Competing with each other, ignoring the rapidly mounting casualties: British machine gun and shrapnel fire was literally tearing holes in their ranks...' [N.B. No rifles mentioned, but on the next page]

p 41 [we see] 'As the infantrymen attempted to push on towards the canal between the houses, they were suddenly hit with heavy Infanterie- und Machinengewehrfeuer [rifle and machine gun fire].

p44 [st Ghislain] 'Other companies remained pinned down, the alertness of the enemy machine gunners meant that every attempt [to move] failed.' [No rifles again]

p 47 'By midnight and despite the enemy machine gun fire it was possible to construct a temporary bridge.'[No rifles again]

p 55 '36 Brigade and moved to south of Hyon and as far as the Trouille sector. As dawn broke, there was a revival of rifle fire.'

There are occasional mentions of machine guns in the regimental histories, usually in association with the presence of other infantrymen, or rifle fire. Generally the location of these MGs is what would be expected; e.g. IR 84 has them located up on the bridge abutments on the far side of the canal, but in other places the references are to MGs placed on the flanks, or sending down enfilade fire which is to be expected.

Here is a thought. If the origin of this idea is from the writings of one or more journalists, there may be evidence in the newspapers. If anybody is able to go to the Newspaper Library in Colindale and spend some time with the papers of autumn 1914 something interesting may turn up. All I am willing to say at the moment is that I have not so far seen any conclusive proof in any German book that the German army confused rifle and machine gun fire and, although I shall go on checking, I should be extremely surprised to find a reference to that effect. There may be places where some approximation to the idea appears, but I suspect that some German authors may have built up the number of machine guns they were facing, so as to place their own performance in a better light; even though they must have known, from the relatively few machine guns they captured along the way, that they were not very numerous.

Finally - and here I should welcome the views of others with personal knowledge - I personally find it hard to swallow this story. I was a professional infantryman throughout my career and I cannot imagine any circumstances where I might have confused the two types of fire except, possibly, for a very short time. The firing signature of a machine gun, its distinctive cyclical rate and the way a tight burst of machine gun bullets cracks as it passes overhead is quite different to the effect produced by rifles. Although locating enemy fire is often far from easy, once spotted 'from behind every bush', to quote a phrase, it would not be difficult to differentiate between heavy fire from a point where a machine gun is located and that from a firing line. Even at one metre spacing, a 1914 company line would have spread out a good 150 metres and was probably in practice wider. In addition, although propellant was so-called smokeless by 1914, that is far from saying that it was totally invisible, especially to someone with an optical aid of some kind - and we know that German company officers carried telescopes routinely. Not only that, rifles of that period had no flash eliminators, so in any sort of low light conditions, the flashes of a firing line would be clear, distinct and unmistakeable.

Jack

[Jack Sheldon]

Phil

Yes I was having a mental blockage. I thought that the total British figures were 1,600. Too many figures whizzing round in the head!

Jack

[Robert Dunlop]

If you wish to continue believing that skill-at-arms played no part in the BEF's role in these events...

salesie, I have never suggested this.

all I will say is that it is clear to an ex-soldier that you don't understand the concepts of well disciplined fire-control and how it impacts on the effectiveness (or not) of small-arms fire.

What I have consistently sought is to demonstrate that German infantry were capable of well-disciplined fire-control from the outset of the war. Rather than try to denigrate the capability of the BEF in this regard, I want to ensure that we do not label the infantry of the other major powers as incompetent with the rifle. Not as good, perhaps... but this is not the same thing.

Robert

[Jack Sheldon]

This is a short quote from the history of Field Artillery Regiment 3 which should be of interest:

'For many years, the British army with its good riflemen and long service soldiers, which almost amounted to an army of NCOs, had only fought colonial wars. All its members, therefore, were well acquainted with everything to do with bush warfare and small scale operations, not to mention ambushes and other tricks. Their exploitation of the ground and its development at night for defensive purposes was absolutely masterly...

During the morning of 24 August [refers to the fighting for Frameries] the British, who were manning well constructed positions, let the Germans close up on them. Their firing tactics were to open fire at close range, so that our casualties were considerable, because the infantry did not wait for the artillery fire to become effective... In close quarter battle, the British were extremly tough and frequently allowed bayonet fighting to break out.

Against this was set the German style of attack. In this the infantry opened fire at medium range, from about 500 to 700 metres and began to win the fire fight with the enemy position. Then, without waiting for the artillery to achieve its full effect, there would be the launch of a violent charge with the infantry all in line, accompanied by great shouts of 'Hurra!' The oficers were deployed ten paces to the front and were involved directly in the break in to the enemy position.

Although this procedure in the attack had been proven in hundreds of battles since the time of Frederick the Great; although no enemy had been able up until now to withstand a German storm assault, it carried with it unnecessarily high casualties among the officers and men which, for the most part, were disproportionate to what was achieved. Therefore the infantry losses in the Battle of Mons were considerable, although, had more patience been shown, the majority of them could have been avoided.'

Jack

[Robert Dunlop]

Thanks, Jack. The notion of 'win the firefight' related, as I understand it, to the achievement of fire superiority. The ability of the attacker to bring sufficient fire to bear on the defender as to cause the latter to stay under cover and not fire back, or even retreat. A close analysis of Bloem's account, for example (as it is the most widely known), reveals one of the problems in estimating when fire superiority had been achieved.

Firstly, an instance which illustrates how the tactic worked. It occurred when Bloem's men were advancing through Belgium. The advance guard infantry section had come under fire from a village near Courtenberg:

"'Lieutenant Grabert' I shouted back, 'halt there with your section and wait for orders.' I went on up to the ridge and there, two hundred yards in front, Osten was in position, firing hard at the edge of the village. The enemy's fire was coming from the boundary hedges of the gardens and from the attic-rooms of the houses, and there were rusty red as well as thin grey puffs of smoke, showing that civilians as well as soldiers were firing at us. I signalled to Grabert to come on, and a few minutes later his section was on the ridge. I jumped up and went forward with them, and in three long rushes we had reached and reinforced Osten's line, out of breath, and a whole chorus of swallows twittering all about us.

'Open fire, Grabert! Aim just below the roofs.' And soon a hail of bullets was rattling against the house, tiles and brick-dust flying. Still the cracks of sporting rifles, showing that civilians were also engaged, and through my Zeiss glasses I could clearly see how our fire was gradually forcing the enemy to leave the garden hedges and double back, man by man, into the houses, and nearly every one was a civilian. One of them ran across the open towards the cover of a wood. 'Don't let him escape, lads!' And he didn't; he lay there dead in mid-field.

The enemy's fire died down, and on the flank, where C Company was attacking, it completely ceased. 'B Company!' I shouted, 'Forward at the Double.' In one long spurt we got to within fifty yards of the garden hedges, lay down, and fired a final volley into them. 'Fix bayonets - charge!' Up again and on, as if doing a drill on the parade ground.' The attack succeeds with no casualties."

Of note, the opposition did not appear to be significant in number and were likely a combination of regular and irregular forces (the latter were probably Belgian Garde Civique). Courtenberg is west of Louvain, and is now on the outer edge of Brussels near the airport. The action is not mentioned by name in "La Belgique et la Guerre", but any regular army would likely have been rear guards or stragglers from either the Belgian 3rd or more likely the 6th Infantry Division.

It is interesting to contrast this with what happened against the BEF.

Near Tetre, Bloem's company broke cover into open(ish) ground descibed as a "long, flat, marshy-looking meadow". Immediately they came under a volley of rifle fire, clearly identified as such, which caused a handful of casualties. There were some farm and other buildings on the left. Bloem's men overpowered an officer patrol of the British 19th Hussars in this vicinity and then spread out to advance again. This bought on another volley of rifle fire and some casualties. Although the field seemed 'open', Bloem came upon an embankment that offered some protection. He was able to observe "among the buildings away at the far end of the meadow... a faint haze of smoke". Bloem ordered his men forward again, crossing the embankment and then a ditch but coming under fire again. At this point, he shouted "'Down! Open fire - far end of the meadow - range 1000 yards!'". The advance continued in shorter and shorter rushes across "broad water-logged drains and barbed wire fences that had to be cut through." At about 500 yds from the canal bank (ie 2/3 of the way

across the meadow), Bloem and his men hugged the ground. The officers then performed the oft-quoted sharing of champagne before attempting to resume the advance. Bloem noted that the British enfilade MG fire (the East Surrey's MG

section) from the right had died down.

Now Bloem noted that "from now on the English fire gradually weakened, almost ceased. No hail of bullets greeted each rush forward, and we were able to get within 150 yds of the canal bank. I said to Graeser: 'Now we'll do one more 30-yard rush, all together, then fix bayonets and charge the houses and the canal banks.'"

Perhaps Bloem had mistaken the fall off in English fire for the equivalent of the effect of German rifle fire superiority, as happened in Courtenberg. He was very wrong.

"The enemy must have been waiting for this moment to get us all together at close range, for immediately the line rose it was as if the hounds of hell had been loosed at us, yelling, barking, hammering, as the mass of lead swept in among us.

'Down!' I shouted... Voluntarily and in many cases involuntarily, we all collapsed flat on the grass as if swept by a scythe.'

Now Bloem's unit came under heavy fire "from the strip of wood that jutted out into the meadow to our right rear". Bloem assumed this was friendly fire but signalling with the red communication flag and frantic whistle blowing by the NCOs did not diminish the fire. In fact it was coming (presumably) from the MG section and part of C Company, East Surrey Regiment, BEF. Bloem and the remnants of his unit were pinned until nightfall, suffering further casualties during that time.

This episode illustrates another important feature of the BEF infantry, their fire discipline. It was not just a question of firing quickly and accurately. It was also knowing when to fire for greatest effect.

Just for interest, I have attached a section of map on which I have plotted, to the best of my ability, the movements of Bloem's company and some of the terrain features that he mentioned. Unfortunately, the map did not have the wood off to Bloem's right.

Robert

[Tom A McCluskey]

I have not had the chance to reply, but here it is:

“The battle of the Aisne, and well many commentators on here know, was fatally flawed due to 'The British Divisions went into action piecemeal with no concerted plan of attack'. To me this looks more like a lack of cohesive: planning, command, and control. - Tom McC

Might not the same mitigating circumstances apply to the German attacks at Mons? I raise this point to illustrate how difficult it is to judge the effectiveness of BEF musketry versus German musketry.” - Robert Dunlop

Robert,

The answer to this is no. We are now comparing apples and pears. These are two extremely different battles under extremely different conditions.

At Mons we see a confident and numerically superior German force involved in a deliberate attack against an enemy that is outnumbered, and intends to delay (not hold), on ground not of its choosing, but has to as it is conforming to a large battle line.

At the Aisne, we see a tired-out BEF having been involved in: Mons, the Retreat, the Marne and now the Aisne, which is not up to strength (not fully reinforced). That is up against an enemy which is properly dug in, reinforced by a Corps from Mauberge, has the advantage of its numerous long range guns, situated on high ground, with 2 intentions:

1. Holding ground, come what may.

2. Pushing the Allies back into the Aisne.

Plus, to top it all, the weather was poor.

With this in mind, I don’t see how one could be the converse of the other.

Field craft:

At the individual level, soldiers were systematically taught how to recognise human figures out to 2,000 metres. - Quote from Zuber

No offence, I read this and chuckled, because something must be lost in translation. I think this must be a body of men and not an individual soldier (which it could easily be confused as). With the naked eye, (most ex-soldiers/marines will remember the PAM 2, Judging Distance lesson - by appearance method), the body tapers to a wedge at 600 metres with no sign of the head. Beyond a kilometre you cannot judge distance with this method (using the naked eye and appearance), and at 2 kms you won’t see an individual. Some members of the forum will have sat on that cold hillside, whilst this lesson is being conducted, either receiving it and practicing it, or delivering this lesson to recruits (with the old magnetic board).

Musketry

You mention French and Belgian musketry being effective, but, how many men are covering per yard? At what range are the targets? Do they have artillery support in abundance? Do they have sufficient cover with machine guns? What type of ground is involved? These factors need to be considered.

Peacetime shooting at targets and practicing to be a battle-shot, are two different disciplines and require different skills. Again, let us not forget some of the salient lesson that some of the BEF soldiers (JNCOs, SNCOs, WOs and Officers) took with them to France. Lessons bitterly learned and turned in procedures and tactical doctrine from experience gained in South Africa. Skills such as scouting, judging distance, defending, breaking away from a contact, which are manifest in FSR 1909 & Musketry Regulations, along with other non-service publications such as: The Defence of Duffer’s Drift:

http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/cs...ton/Swinton.asp

‘After this initial training, great emphasis continued to be placed on individual marksmanship, especially at ranges around 800-1200 metres’ - Quote from Zuber

Robert, I read this and it pained me too. To any soldier, this reads as very ambitious, and not too realistic – unless again, something is lost in translation. Ranges like these are designed for collective area-shooting, not individual fire. Have a go yourself with iron sights, it would be a chance encounter if the round hit the target. But it should be in the area of the target…if you could see the target. At Mons, as is reported, the British were pretty difficult to see/locate. I would be interested to to see the size of the target that the Germans are using at 800-1200 meters. Additionally, I would hazard that a the great majority of individual riflemen, using iron sights and the MK 1 eyeball, turned live rounds into empty cases, (without much success) against human-sized targets over 600m away.

Other lessons the British learned, and put some corrective action into, were the embryonic battle drills: locating the enemy, target indicating, also winning the fire-fight and suppressive fire – made all the easier with the rifle that could fire the most rounds before a reload: the SMLE.

Here’s an example of a section, during the Battle of the Aisne identifying a German machine gun and engaging it, from J F Lucy’s There’s a Devil in the Drum (page 180):

This was more perilous than shots going over our heads, because the bullets ricocheted, shrieking like some infernal cat-fight all about us, but it was better than being hit direct. By lucky chance or instinct I saw the enemy machine gun. There it was, mounted daringly on the roof of a cottage, close to the left side of a chimney, about six hundred yards away, and directly to my front. With all my strength I shrieked the range, described the target, and ordered five rounds rapid fire [Fire Control Order]. There was a heartening response as we opened fire at the first and only target we had seen in this terrible attack [The Aisne].

In about four seconds some thirty bullets were whistling about that dark spot near the chimney as we slammed in our rapid fire, glad to have work to do, and gloriously insanely, and incredibly the German gun stopped firing and it was quickly withdrawn behind the roof [an unusual example of winning the fire-fight and suppresive fire, with riflemen of the BEF pitted against a machine-gun].

‘Fire at the roof below the ridge of the house, about three feet down,’ I ordered exultantly, and I could have whooped for joy. I was now commanding effectively. Damn the rest of the enemy fire. Their rifle-fire was always poor anyway, and blow the shells. They might hit you and they night not

Anyway, hope this is of interest,

Aye

Tom McC