The "machine guns" of Mons ?

[phil andrade]

Phil,

The final numbers for the dead come from the ZN in the SanB study--it's important to understand this, the two are not divorced. The WIA numbers are much higher for the SanB numbers, that's where your 772,687 additional died of wounds are coming from. ThePaul

But, Paul, the 772,687 men you allude to were not recorded as died from wounds, but posted as killed in action in the SanB.

There is a huge difference here - certainly worth commenting upon. Am I being thick?

Phil.

[salesie]

Salesie, this is the additional material from Joffre's memoirs that is pertinent to the 26th August.

I have quoted the subsequent material relating to the Battle of Le Cateau, including Huguet's pessimistic report about the outcome noting that the British Army 'had lost all cohesion'. There is no mention of the telegram to Smith-Dorrien, though this is not too surprising for when Joffre returned to GQG after the meeting with Sir John, he learned of the virtual collapse of his centre, particularly the French Fourth Army.

"From everywhere there arrived news of weaknesses which made me fear that the morale of the troops was broken; discouragement began to make itself felt in every grade of the army, and even at my own headquarters."

Robert

Robert, I chopped your post to save space.

Interesting contrast between Smith-Dorrien, who in his memoirs publicly acknowledges and thanks Sordet and d'Amade for their "assistance", and Joffre who seems totally focused on Sir John French in his, and makes no mention of the BEF's "assistance" in saving Lanzerac's left flank (even von Kluck had the good grace to praise the fighting qualities of the BEF). Indeed, if we take the Joffre extracts you posted at face value then Joffre gives the impression that the BEF was more of a hindrance than a help and that it needed protecting by the French Army throughout this period - yet, as we know, the BEF was the smallest army in the field by far at that time and it stopped, by skill at arms, the "steamroller" from rolling it over when Lanzerac effectively had it away on his toes and left them virtually isolated and at the "mercy" of the enemy at Mons.

Now the sixty-four thousand dollar question is, and will probably remain unanswerable; did the telegram from Joffre after Le Cateau, that Smith-Dorrien said thanked the BEF for securing the French left-flank, ever exist?

That said, Smith-Dorrien was also critical of Sir John French, but diplomatically so:

Firstly, about the withdrawal from Mons - "At about 11 p.m. a message from G.H.Q. summoned my Chief Staff officer to Army Head-quarters at Le Cateau, about thirty miles away, and it was past 3 a.m. on the 24th when Forestier-Walker returned to my head-quarters to say that the C.-in-C. had, in view of fresh information, decided that instead of standing to fight, the whole B.E.F. was to retire. I naturally asked him for the plan of retirement, and was told that G.H.Q. were issuing none, though he had gathered that the idea was for the I Corps to cover the retirement of the II, but that I was to see Haig and arrange a plan with him.

There must have been some very good reason why four or five hours of valuable time had been lost by sending for staff officers instead of sending the order and plan for retirement directly the Chief had decided on it. It must be remembered that we had prepared for continuing the fight and our fighting impedimenta, such as ammunition columns, were close behind the troops and blocking the roads, and before a retirement could commence, these would have to be cleared away; also that it would take a long time to get the change of orders to the troops, and lastly that I had to find out what Haig was going to do. All this could have been done and the retirement actually begun before dawn had we known in time. As it was, daylight was already breaking when the order reached me and some hours must elapse before the retirement could commence, by which time we should be in deadly grips with the enemy and would have to carry out one of the most difficult operations in war, namely, breaking off a fight and retiring with the enemy close on the top of us. Such were the thoughts which flashed through my mind. However, my staff were quite unruffled ; Forestier-Walker quickly got his retirement orders out, and the invaluable A.Q.M.G., Rycroft got the roads clear by sending the impedimenta off."

And, secondly, about French's pessimism after Le Cateau- "There was a short, sharp action on the morning of the 27th. The 11th Brigade of the 4th Division were just to the south-east of Bellincourt (seven miles north of St. Quentin) when at 9.30 a.m. the cavalry reported enemy in the adjacent villages, and German guns opened fire at a thousand yards range. The Hampshires were ordered to cover the retirement, and Colonel S. C. F. Jackson of that Regiment led his men against the guns, and unfortunately was wounded and made a prisoner. His men, however, although they could not recover their C.O., held on until their Brigade was safe away, and then withdrew. By that night, the 27th, and early the next morning (August 28th) the whole of the three Divisions were south of the Somme Canal, thirty-five miles from Le Cateau, in little over thirty hours. A wonderful performance for troops who were worn out before they left the battle-field ; their spirit, too, was splendid, for they were whistling and singing as they came along. The C.-in-C. came up to see them as they marched again south from Ham on the morning of the 28th, and I was very proud of their carriage. The 15th Brigade of Artillery, which had lost all its guns except two and many of its men, went by the Chief as though they were in the Long Valley.

Just before the Chief came up I had met an officer of the 4th Division whom I had known for years. I had a short talk with him, and, noticing that he was not quite in his usual spirits, asked him if anything was the matter. He replied it was " the order " he had just received from me. He then went on to explain that an order had come to his Division a short time before saying the ammunition on wagons not absolutely required and other impedimenta were to be unloaded and officers and men carried to the full capacity of the transport. He went on to say that the order had had a very damping effect on his troops, for it was clear it would not have been issued unless we were in a very tight place. I told him I had never heard of the order, that the situation was excellent, the enemy only in small parties, and those keeping at a respectful distance, and that I was entirely at a loss to understand why such an order had been issued. Further, that I would at once send to Divisional Head-quarters to say the order was to be disregarded. My counter-order actually reached the 3rd and 5th Divisions in time, but the 4th Division had already acted on the order, burning officers' kits, etc., to lighten their wagons.

So when I met the Chief I told him of this order, being fully convinced someone had issued it by mistake. However, when Sir John told me it was his order and emphasised the necessity for it by refusing to accept, what he called, my optimistic view of the situation, there was nothing more to be said. Later on I ascertained that the order had come from G.H.Q. when I was away, and, being a C.-in-C's order of an urgent nature, my administrative Staff had rightly circulated it at once. It was unfortunate, for had I seen it I should have protested to G.H.Q. before circulating it and I feel sure the Chief would have cancelled it on learning the true situation, and thus have saved an increase of suffering to those who by acting on it sacrificed their spare clothes, boots, etc., at a time when they urgently needed them."

Cheers-salesie.

[ph0ebus]

Hi all,

I originally had posted this question in the 'Other Aspects of the Great War' section, and it was suggested I add my query to this thread as there are members here who may know the answers. Should this be in the wrong place, my apologies.

My question arises from my research into my grandfather's war experiences, as a Kriegsfreiwillige in the Imperial German Army's Feldartillerie Regt. Nr. 43, in Batteries 4 and 9. He was wounded by poison gas in Vilosnes while with the 4th Battery on October 17, 1916, and was termed 'Lightly Wounded'...this was taken from the Regimental History.

I am hoping someone knows how German Army casualties were sorted into the four classifications they used:

Dead

Severely wounded

Lightly wounded

Lightly wounded and remained with unit

Dead is pretty clear. However, what criteria were used to categorize someone as Lightly Wounded versus Severely wounded? Does it relate to the type of wound, recovery time, or some other criteria? Any insight into this would be greatly appreciated. I am trying to get a sense as to what that designation meant for my grandfather and perhaps estimate how long he might have been out of action before being returned to the front as a part of 9 Batterie.

Thanks,

-Daniel

[Paul Hederer]

But, Paul, the 772,687 men you allude to were not recorded as died from wounds, but posted as killed in action in the SanB.

There is a huge difference here - certainly worth commenting upon. Am I being thick?

Phil.

Phil,

No, the 772,687 men are listed as WIA in the SanB, not KIA. There is no difference between the numbers, just in the way they are recorded.

The SanB and ZN are two different things. You're trying to compare apples and oranges. For the purposes of studying the cost in lives for Germany in the war you have to use both sets of numbers--one a monthy casualty reports, the other a longterm study of final disposition. For the SanB the war ended in 1918, for the ZN the war ended in 1933.

If uncle Freidhelm was wounded in 1916 was later classified as died of wounds in 1922 he is listed as WIA in the SanB and in the final count of dead in the ZN. This makes sense--he still carried as a casualty at the time his wounds occured in the SanB, but if he didn't die until six years later why would he be carried as anything else? He would be carried as "not fit for further duty," in the SanB.

I think your fixating a bit on the KIA figures. You can't pin the later died of wounds into a certain date. There was not an office, who when a man later died of wounds, went back and posted him as KIA for the day he was wounded. That would be insane.

Paul

[PeterH]

Here's a Mons veteran's account and sketch map published in 1969.(Letter to the Editor:Purnell's History of the First World War).

David Hannah was with the KOSB at Les Herbieres:

The machine gun section to which I belonged had taken up a position in the top room of a fairly large white house which stood on the canal bank:in his account of the fighting Captain Bloem refers to this house quite often.We had a splendid view and a wonderful field of fire...at about noon we saw our first Germans.At a distance of about five or six hundred yards half right,a body of grey-clad men came hurriedly through a gateway and then extended smartly to their right..advanced in short sectional rushes covered by heavy fire by those not engaged,many of their bullets directed at(and hitting) the white house.Soon we came into action,and our machine gun traversed the whole length of the German line..by the way,the firing which came from Bloem's right rear could not possibly have come from a machine gun section of the East Surreys..the East Surreys were to our left and front.It possibly came from the unit on Bloem's right..the German 52nd Regiment--that had arrived at the scene of the fighting rather later than Bloem's men.

[phil andrade]

Phil,

No, the 772,687 men are listed as WIA in the SanB, not KIA. There is no difference between the numbers, just in the way they are recorded.

Paul

Paul,

This would explain my difficulty. I appear to have misunderstood the German text of the SB, which is written in an extraordinary Gothic style. I thought the 772,687 were posted as killed in action.

Here is something from the text : can you please explain to me what it means? Sorry if I copy incorrectly.

an Berwundung ( gefallen ) 772,687

an Berwundung bei ber truppe 61,704

an Berwundung in dem Lazarreten 227,349

I am very aware that I might have failed to understand the individual letters, let alone the meaning of the text.

Are you saying that the 772,687 were not killled in action, but died from wounds?

If that's the case, no wonder I have been so confounded and confused!

Phil.

[Tom A McCluskey]

Peter,

Thanks for the piece by David Hannah, it possibly answers something that I had my own doubts about. When you look at the position of the East Surrey's MGs, to Bloem's Battalion; the direct fire, or an arc of fire, would need to be miraculous to beat a pattern along the Germans (when you look at the lay of the land, cover, and obstacles); not only that, the machine-guns would need a separate observation team to communicate with the guns.

Aye

Tom McC

[Robert Dunlop]

Peter, I would just like to echo Tom's thanks. It was Captain Wynne who reported that the enfilade fire came from British sources. He worked on the British Official History. It would be interesting to see what source/s he had access to.

The description of the German advance is interesting: advancing by sections rushing forward, covered by rifle fire.

Robert

[Ralph J. Whitehead]

Hi all,

I originally had posted this question in the 'Other Aspects of the Great War' section, and it was suggested I add my query to this thread as there are members here who may know the answers. Should this be in the wrong place, my apologies.

My question arises from my research into my grandfather's war experiences, as a Kriegsfreiwillige in the Imperial German Army's Feldartillerie Regt. Nr. 43, in Batteries 4 and 9. He was wounded by poison gas in Vilosnes while with the 4th Battery on October 17, 1916, and was termed 'Lightly Wounded'...this was taken from the Regimental History.

I am hoping someone knows how German Army casualties were sorted into the four classifications they used:

Dead

Severely wounded

Lightly wounded

Lightly wounded and remained with unit

Dead is pretty clear. However, what criteria were used to categorize someone as Lightly Wounded versus Severely wounded? Does it relate to the type of wound, recovery time, or some other criteria? Any insight into this would be greatly appreciated. I am trying to get a sense as to what that designation meant for my grandfather and perhaps estimate how long he might have been out of action before being returned to the front as a part of 9 Batterie.

Thanks,

-Daniel

Daniel, I have often wondered what the exact categories were as well. So far I have not come across any specific references to the methods used by the German army.

In reviewing thousands of casualty details I have come to a personal assessment of these categories. As you stated, dead is dead. In regard to slightly wounded (lightly wounded) it appears this was a non life threatening wound, not incapacitating but required additional medical treatment at a local military hospital and a short recovery period.

Slightly wounded, remained with the regiment indicates to me a slight flesh wound, minor injury that the battalion medical staff could handle and since it was not debilitating the man could remain with the regiment and perform most if not all duties until fully healed.

Severely wounded would mean to me a serious injury, head shot, multiple gun shot wounds, etc. that would require a stretcher to be evacuated to the local military hospital and then probably to a larger facility behind the lines or in Germany and the recovery could be extensive, surgery could be required, amputations, etc.

If anyone has come across the criteria being used I would appreciate it if they could post it here.

Ralph

[Paul Hederer]

Hello Ralph and Daniel,

I did some digging in the "Sanitaetsbericht über das deutsche Heer, (deutsches Feld- und Besatzungsheer), im Weltkriege 1914-1918," volume III, but these defintions are not explained.

These are all the categories I could find, please feel free to add if I've missed anything.

gefallen

gestorben an seinen Wunden

schwer verwundet

leicht verwundet

leicht verwundet bei der Truppe

vermißt

tödlich verletzt

schwer verletzt

leicht verletzt

tödlich verunglückt

in Gefangenschaft

Paul

P.S. I'm wondering if we shouldn't start another thread to discuss the various German casualty themes that have come up here, but don't have much to do with the original thread.

[Robert Dunlop]

Here is an interesting description of the initial German 17th Infantry attacks, as witnessed by elements of the 15th Hussars, who were operating as divisional cavalry. B and A Squadrons operated together on 23rd August:

"Patrols were pushed forward to hold the bridges at Obourg, Havre and Thieu. These positions were taken up without difficulty, but shortly afterwards the German advance commenced. The experiences of these advanced posts were almost indentical. The enemy, in more or less close order, advanced against the bridges, only to be met by the fire of the men holding them.

The Hussars were at first delighted at the excellent targets their opponents offered, and at first imagined that they had a very easy task before them. But as a matter of fact the drama had only just commenced. For the enemy, after a short halt, once again advanced to the attack; but this time in extended order, and supported by artillery. The attacking troops consisted of the 17th Jaeger [sic - almost certainly a misreading of the Gothic "I" for Infantry as a "J"] Division. They advanced in a series of short rushes, supported by heavy covering fire.

The handful of men holding the bridges were soon driven from their positions, and about 11 am fell back upon the rest of the squadron in position about Villers St Ghislain. The Germans did not delay very long in following up their initial success, and a strong column of all arms deployed against the village."

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

This is an opportunity to review Zuber's material on the pre-war German approach to infantry assaults. He notes that "the infantry attack on a deployed enemy was the baseline tactic for all German attacks". Encounter attacks were to be conducted along the same lines, but more quickly "with less reconnaissance and preparation time". The latter type of attack was "more likely to begin at short ranges, leading to violent close-range firefight and quick assault".

Officer reconnaissance patrols of infantry, cavalry, artillery and engineers would scout ahead of the main body. A protective infantry screen would be formed in front, and then the artillery deployed. The range would be 3-4000 m. Artillery would then conduct preparatory fire, targeting enemy artillery if possible (counter-battery fire) and infantry locations. Under cover of the artillery barrage, the infantry assault force would use whatever cover was available to move closer to the defenders. A typical infantry company front was 150 m, with the platoons deployed in depth. The main thrust of the attack would be reinforced, whereas holding or pinning forces might be lighter.

The tendency was for infantry to remain in columns for as long as possible, screened by skirmishers and patrols. The advance would be carried out systematically, with designated phase lines based on terrain features if sufficient preparatory time was available to define these lines.

When the main assault forces came under fire, the forward platoons would deploy into a skirmisher line. They would advance using cover and terrain concealment if possible. If the terrain was open, the idea was that the skirmisher line would be thinner and would be formed further away from the objective. The initial deployment might involve 1 1/2 to 2 platoons per company, with the remainder following in 'platoon or squad column'. When the advancing skirmish line was close enough, the firefight would begin. Fire would be directed on the known or suspected enemy position using the methods that I have described before. The goal was to gain fire superiority, which was heralded by a slackening of the enemy fire and visible evidence of increasing numbers of enemy infantry vacating the defensive position.

The achievement of fire superiority heralded the signal to advance, with some units advancing under the covering fire of others - known as 'fire and movement'. "The size of the advancing unit depended on the effectiveness of the enemy fire. If the fire was weak, not much covering fire would be needed and large groups - platoons or half platoons - could bound forward. If the fire were strong, perhaps only a squad or even an individual soldier could advance."

Zuber notes that "German doctrine emphasised that the infantry firefight could easily be hours long and drawn out, and could not be rushed". As with the British equivalent, the field regulations placed a strong emphasis on not having a 'one size fits all' approach.

Next some information on how the training for these tactics was carried out.

Robert

[salesie]

...The goal was to gain fire superiority, which was heralded by a slackening of the enemy fire and visible evidence of increasing numbers of enemy infantry vacating the defensive position.

The achievement of fire superiority heralded the signal to advance, with some units advancing under the covering fire of others - known as 'fire and movement'. "The size of the advancing unit depended on the effectiveness of the enemy fire. If the fire was weak, not much covering fire would be needed and large groups - platoons or half platoons - could bound forward. If the fire were strong, perhaps only a squad or even an individual soldier could advance."

Zuber notes that "German doctrine emphasised that the infantry firefight could easily be hours long and drawn out, and could not be rushed". As with the British equivalent, the field regulations placed a strong emphasis on not having a 'one size fits all' approach.

Next some information on how the training for these tactics was carried out.

Robert

Robert, it seems that these theories were either forgotten or not learnt by at least some German troops - here's an eye-witness account from Cpl Charlie Parke, 2nd Gordon Highlanders at 1st Ypres:

"My first experience of strafing set me stiff with raw fear, especially when the German artilleryman started searching for his length; at the outset there was an interval of about eight minutes between consecutive shots, eight minutes of apprehensive waiting to discover whether the gunner's search for length would bring death, an early wound ticket out of the mess, or a miss with more attendant waiting tension. The German fire-power was tremendous, the British artillery being exceedingly minimal in comparison.

We could see some movement in the trees some 1,000 yards away. Time was meaningless in those pre-battle nervous moments but it would be about eight o'clock in the morning when the enemy came from out of the trees, packed shoulder to shoulder. The Germans wore grey uniforms which, when massed, gave a suggestion of a blue hue. They started advancing at a fast march pace, firing their rifles into the air, an exercise that killed nobody but was just another of the Hun's frightening tactics. At 800 yards we started intermittent firing, approximately six rounds per minute. At 400 yards the enemy increased the speed of charge to a slow double, but at the same time we switched to rapid fire. It was bloody murder, the grey masses fell like ninepins, the man behind climbing over his dead comrade and continuing the advance. It was as though those brave men had been told by their ruthless, ambitious Kaiser that they could walk through bullets.

After rapid fire for approximately fifteen minutes, the wooden casing over the barrel of our rifles became too hot to hold, so the men would either use the webbing sling to protect their left hand or scoop soil and grass from the top of the parapet as a heat shield. That first day the Hun made seven charges, always literally shoulder to shoulder in four rows and always with the same result, the wholesale slaughter of the cream of German manhood. That first day drew to its close the same way it had started, with constant strafing of the British lines; mounds of dead, wax-moustached Germans littered no-man's-land. Through the noc-turnal hours, we could hear the enemy removing their wounded but we never fired at an enemy we couldn't see and to waste bullets was sacrilege."

He then goes on to give an opinion:

"The thin khaki line at Ypres stood its ground. The con-temptible little army repelled the Kaiser's crack divisions. I believed then, and I still believe, that the Germans lost the war at Ypres in 1914. If the Hun couldn't pass a thin line of troops, then how were they going to stop hundreds of thousands of British reinforcements?"

Zuber was right, there was no "one size fits all approach" in the German Army. In this action (and others, documented earlier in the thread) there were no skirmish lines, no fire and movement, no winning of the fire-fight before advancing, just artillery preparation followed by seven attempted German storm assaults, which, according to the report from the German FAR3 posted by Jack earlier, "…had been proven in hundreds of battles since the time of Frederick the Great; although no enemy had been able up until now to withstand, it carried with it unnecessarily high casualties among the officers and men which, for the most part, were disproportionate to what was achieved. Therefore, the infantry losses in the Battle of Mons were considerable, although, had more patience been shown, the majority of them could have been avoided."

From Mons through to 1st Ypres we see plenty of examples of German Infantry attempting their storm assaults, which no enemy had been able to stand against until meeting outnumbered British Regulars in 1914. Theory is one thing, Robert, but reality is sometimes quite another.

Cheers-salesie.

[phil andrade]

Powerful imagery indeed, salesie.

In a footnote to the one of the chapters on The First Battle of Ypres, Conan Doyle's history of The British Campaign, 1914, cites the casualties of the Prussian Guard in its attack of November 1914, culminating in the fight at Nonneboschen on November 11th, at 1170 dead, 3991 wounded and 1719 missing. These are, apparently, the official returns for the Guard. Any idea as to the strength of the establishment? This would make comparisons with British casualties instructive - First Ypres was notorious for the obliteration of battalions of the BEF. I wonder how the German casualties, on a per centage basis, compare.

Phil.

[salesie]

Powerful imagery indeed, salesie.

In a footnote to the one of the chapters on The First Battle of Ypres, Conan Doyle's history of The British Campaign, 1914, cites the casualties of the Prussian Guard in its attack of November 1914, culminating in the fight at Nonneboschen on November 11th, at 1170 dead, 3991 wounded and 1719 missing. These are, apparently, the official returns for the Guard. Any idea as to the strength of the establishment? This would make comparisons with British casualties instructive - First Ypres was notorious for the obliteration of battalions of the BEF. I wonder how the German casualties, on a per centage basis, compare.

Phil.

You should know by now, Phil, that I find casualty rate comparisons to be far from instructive - that, in my opinion, such comparisons are shallow and meaningless when used in isolation, and thus highly misleading when trying to understand the true significance of these actions. Consequently, I will repeat some of the words of Farrar the Para, a British fighting-General as well as a historian, who says "the tale of losses is too continuous to sustain an impact; the mind becomes saturated with figures".

The following are the words of General Anthony Farrar-Hockley (Farrar the Para), from his book, Death of an Army, subtitled, the first battle of Ypres in which the British Regular Army was destroyed, published 1967, pages 180/181, when he sums up the Old Contemptibles achievements:

"...For a little while the attacks dragged on. Attempts were made by the Germans to secure positions of advantage for the trench warfare of the gathering winter. They did not succeed. The line settled. German units began to move back from Flanders en route to Poland. The British handed over to the French their sector of the line between Zonnebeke and the Ypres-Comines railway. I Corps went back for a short spell of rest and refitting. The 8th Division arrived and, with the 7th, reconstituted IV Corps under Rawlinson. Soon the whole Expeditionary Force was settled in and behind the line from Ploegsteert Wood to La Bassee.

No; not the whole Expeditionary Force. It would never be whole in the original sense again. Typical of its battalions, 2nd Highland Light Infantry was relieved on 16th November by the French to set off'... marching through Ypres to Bailleul and losing an officer and four men by shellfire on the way. Out of all the officers and men mobilized at Aldershot a bare three months before, there were now scarcely thirty left.'

The tale of losses is too continuous to sustain an impact; the mind becomes saturated with figures. It is true, too, that the total number of their casualties is insignificant in comparison with those suffered on the Somme or in the attempt to clear the Ypres ridge again in 1917. But it is not for the number fallen, much as they were mourned, that they deserve to be remembered; or for their courage and patriotism - they were, after all, doing their duty as professional soldiers, holding the ring while their countrymen took up arms. What marks them is the standard they set as fighting men, holding for weeks a wide sector of attack against an enemy four to seven times their strength.

Falkenhayn might write after the war, 'That which had to be attained under any circumstances, if the war was to be carried on with any hopeful prospects, was attained' - that is, stabiliza-tion of the western front from the Alps to the sea. But that was not what he had aimed at. He had aimed to break through to Calais.

It is only fair to say that the allies too had hoped to envelop the enemy line or to break through, but the point is that while it was most desirable for them to do so it was not essential. It was essential for the Germans. Time was not on their side, notwithstanding the errors of their adversaries.

One of these errors, often remarked upon, was the retention of the Ypres salient long after all the ground of tactical signifi-cance had been captured by the Germans. The soldiers who came later could not understand the policy. Historians surmise that its retention was due to an obsession by the senior commanders for holding ground - any ground - rather than release it to the enemy gratuitously. But some at least, however mis-guidedly, felt that the army should hold on to what it could because they had fought for the ground; they had hallowed it with the blood and bodies of comrades with whom they had soldiered all over the world through a lifetime. The old British Army with its venial faults and marvellous quality had died there in its defence. They could never forget that. Neither should we."

Any casualty comparison is irrelevant - the old BEF held the line to the death, but hold it they did, despite being assaulted by a determined and far bigger, stronger German force. What marked them (the BEF at 1st Ypres) was the standard they set as fighting men, holding for weeks a wide sector of attack against an enemy four to seven times their strength - don't let any statistical mumbo-jumbo tell you otherwise.

Cheers-salesie.

[Robert Dunlop]

The pre-war German infantry assault doctrine was subjected to formal testing in major training areas, an innovation introduced in the 1850s by Prince Friedrich Karl. Zuber reviews one such test, the results of which were presented as a lecture and then published as a secret document within the Bavarian Army. The lecture described the exercise, and the assumptions that underpinned it, as well as provided the evidence for these assumptions from live-firing tests. The exercise simulated a brigade-size attack across open ground, within the context of a larger corps size operation. The attack started at 2.1 km from the 'enemy' defensive line. The brigade began by deploying the regiments alongside each other. Four front line battalions each placed 2-3 companies in the front line, giving a total of 10 companies extending across 1,500 m.

The first phase involved forming up the brigade in cover and then explaining how the attack would take place. The second phase involved the attacking infantry getting with 'medium' rifle range, crossing about 1 km of ground to within 1200 m of the defensive line. The first wave of skirmishers went forward with intervals of 5-6 metres, based on the effects of live-firing tests with rows of targets at these ranges. The men ran forward in bounds. NCOs and 'officer leaders' would re-organize the men at the end of each bound. Within half an hour, the first wave was in position, although the author of the report noted that this would probably translate into five hours on the real battlefield. Further waves from the attack elements moved forward in bounds and strengthened the firing line.

Once the firefight began, the supports and reserves moved forward. The supports also advanced in open order by bounds. They would send replacements forward into the firing line as needed, as well as carry ammunition forward. Reserves came forward 'at 300 to 400 m intervals, in a single line and at a walk so long as they did not take effective fire.' Once the reserves began to take casualties, then they too moved in bounds.

After a prolonged firefight, the 'front line began to advance using fire and movement'. Zuber relates how live-firing tests had been used to estimate the effects of different ways to advance. Ideally, an entire platoon would move forward but, as noted in a previous post, enemy fire might dictate the movement of smaller groups, even individuals. Smaller groups were harder to hit. Moving quickly was better than low-crawling over longer distances, based on the live-firing tests conducted for targets moving forward 80 m, whereas low-crawling was better for shorter distances.

Live-firing exercises had also been used to estimate the potential effect of suppressing fire during an advance. In 1903, tests were carried out using an earlier type of ammunition (Type 88) fired by groups moving in short bounds from 1200 to 1000 m from a set of targets during a 22 minute period. One quarter to one third of defending targets (head-sized) were hit. Repeats of this test in the mid-1900s with Type S ammunition showed an increased effectiveness of 40-50%.

During the exercise, the rates of advance to contact were varied. The final assault was initiated on the left flank of the attack with the signal "s s s" - the 's' standing for 'Sturm' or 'assault'.

All such exercises, whether for testing or training purposes, were limited by the lack of a real enemy. Nonetheless, they provided opportunities for German infantrymen to learn the basic skills of fire and movement before they got onto the battlefield.

Robert

[salesie]

Robert, all this looks good on paper. However, all armies trained its soldiers in various ways. And, the German Army, in spectacular fashion given its much vaunted reputation, failed to achieve any of its objectives in the West, at any time during the war, even when manpower and materials were in its favour such as at 1st Ypres - why do you think that was?

Cheers-salesie.

[Robert Dunlop]

Salesie, your question indicates that the purpose of my posts is not clear. I am illustrating alternative views about how the German army conceived of and trained for the infantry assault in the lead-up to WW1. The purpose of this is to provide a reference point for analysing the British descriptions of German infantry assaults in the battles of Mons and Le Cateau, within the context of this discussion.

I am very aware of several accounts, such as the one that you quoted from First Ypres, just as there are almost identical accounts from German riflemen seeing down British assault troops. This discussion, however, has a different focus. With respect to the opening weeks of the war, it is interesting to understand how and why the Germans performed consistently across the Battle of the Frontiers. Prior to any of Lanrezac's mischiefs, the BEF position at Mons was rendered untenable by the German attack on 23rd August. We are beginning to see differences in the British descriptions of how the German infantry went about their attacks. Not all descriptions point to lines of German soldiers being shot down in waves. Otherwise, why would the deep penetrations into Mons itself and to Paturages have occurred? As opposed to all German soldiers lying dead in front of the British lines.

We have touched on the broader issue about why the Germans failed in their attempt to defeat the Allied forces in August/September 1914. Our cursory review pointed to the importance of issues other than infantry assault tactics in determining the outcome of campaigns and wars.

Robert

[salesie]

Salesie, your question indicates that the purpose of my posts is not clear. I am illustrating alternative views about how the German army conceived of and trained for the infantry assault in the lead-up to WW1. The purpose of this is to provide a reference point for analysing the British descriptions of German infantry assaults in the battles of Mons and Le Cateau, within the context of this discussion.

I am very aware of several accounts, such as the one that you quoted from First Ypres, just as there are almost identical accounts from German riflemen seeing down British assault troops. This discussion, however, has a different focus. With respect to the opening weeks of the war, it is interesting to understand how and why the Germans performed consistently across the Battle of the Frontiers. Prior to any of Lanrezac's mischiefs, the BEF position at Mons was rendered untenable by the German attack on 23rd August. We are beginning to see differences in the British descriptions of how the German infantry went about their attacks. Not all descriptions point to lines of German soldiers being shot down in waves. Otherwise, why would the deep penetrations into Mons itself and to Paturages have occurred? As opposed to all German soldiers lying dead in front of the British lines.

We have touched on the broader issue about why the Germans failed in their attempt to defeat the Allied forces in August/September 1914. Our cursory review pointed to the importance of issues other than infantry assault tactics in determining the outcome of campaigns and wars.

Robert

Robert, you're right, I am unclear about the point you're trying to make with your references to German pre-war training methods. The fact is, from the varying British and German eye-witness accounts we've seen, that the German training methods you talk about were not consistently applied in the field - that the old storm assault was still used as late as 1st Ypres despite the bloody noses given to the German Infantry when trying the old methods in earlier encounters with the BEF. We've also seen, from German reports, that the "new" methods didn't fare too much better - these German reports tell us that the BEF, well-schooled in colonial wars, were adept at concealment and held their fire until the last moment, thereby drawing German units, when using fire and movement tactics, into their killing zones (Bloem's report being a prime example of this).

It seems to me that any reference to pre-war German training methods is pure window dressing. The fact is, that whether old or new, the German tactics didn't work, as they had against other armies in the past, when meeting the BEF - in my opinion, the only way the German Army could advance against the BEF in 1914 was by using its vast superiority in men and artillery (which also made the difference when stopping the BEF on the Aisne), but even this advantage did not prevent the BEF from fighting the mighty German Army to a standstill at 1st Ypres.

All armies trained - and those training methods would always make the "home" team look good, make them the winners - what really counts, is what happens on the battlefield not on the training ground.

Cheers-salesie.

[Robert Dunlop]

It seems to me that any reference to pre-war German training methods is pure window dressing. The fact is, that whether old or new, the German tactics didn't work, as they had against other armies in the past, when meeting the BEF - in my opinion, the only way the German Army could advance against the BEF in 1914 was by using its vast superiority in men and artillery

Salesie, this is an interesting conclusion. Jack's analysis of Le Cateau showed that II Corps was not assailed by a 'vast superiority in men and artillery'. Smith-Dorrien's defensive position was unhinged on his right flank by a numerically inferior force (see Jack's post here for the comparative numbers of brigades). A closer examination of Mons shows that the BEF's 4 infantry divisions and one cavalry division were assailed by 6 infantry divisions.

but even this advantage did not prevent the BEF from fighting the mighty German Army to a standstill at 1st Ypres.

This statement gives a false impression of what happened at 1st Ypres. At the very least, you should acknowledge the huge part played by the French. On more than one occassion, they provided additional forces that enabled the BEF to consolidate and continue defending. If these reinforcements had not been forthcoming, then the BEF's line would not have held in some places.

Robert

[Crunchy]

Salesie and Robert,

I think there might be an explanation for the discrepancy between the tactics Robert has related from Zuber's book, and presumably used at Mons in August 1914, and those as observed by the 2nd Gordons soldier at 1st Ypres in October - November 1914 which Salesie has highlighted.

The Germans who fought in August and September 1914 were from the trained regular and reserve divisions mobilised at the beginning of the war. These were well trained at unit level, presumably in the tactics Zuber describes. Those that fought at 1st Ypres were a mixture: those same fully trained divisions mobilised in August and the untrained volunteer divisions raised at the beginning of the war. According to John Keegan, The First World War, these divisions were raised from volunteers who had not previously undergone military training. Because Germany had needed to conscript only 50% of the annual class of men of military age to fill the ranks of the peacetime army, a pool of five million untrained men aged from twenty to forty five were available for war service. Like the British, these men had responded to the outbreak of war by volunteering in huge numbers. They received two months basic training and then left for the front, where ten of these divisions were thrown into the fighting at 1st Ypres in the third week in October.

The 2nd Gordons fought with the 7th Division at 1st Ypres and according to The Long, Long Trail, the 7th fought at the Battle of Langemark, 21st -24th October 1914. According to Keegan the relatively untrained divisions attacked between Langemark and Ypres in the same period and it was these formations that the 2nd Gordons would have encountered. This may explain the difference in attack tactics between those outlined by Zuber and those observed by the 2nd Gordons. It is highly unlikely that after only two months basic training the volunteer divisions would have achieved any level of proficiency in unit level tactics and thus would probably have relied on attacking in mass with little finesse.

It may also be the case that relatively untrained volunteers were used as replacements for the losses sustained by the trained divisions during August - October 1914, which would have diluted the proficiency in attack tactics of the units in those formations.

Cheers

Chris

[salesie]

Salesie, this is an interesting conclusion. Jack's analysis of Le Cateau showed that II Corps was not assailed by a 'vast superiority in men and artillery'. Smith-Dorrien's defensive position was unhinged on his right flank by a numerically inferior force (see Jack's post here for the comparative numbers of brigades).

A closer examination of Mons shows that the BEF's 4 infantry divisions and one cavalry division were assailed by 6 infantry divisions.This statement gives a false impression of what happened at 1st Ypres. At the very least, you should acknowledge the huge part played by the French. On more than one occassion, they provided additional forces that enabled the BEF to consolidate and continue defending. If these reinforcements had not been forthcoming, then the BEF's line would not have held in some places.

Robert

Robert, you know as well as I do that Le Cateau was only ever fought as a temporary holding action - which succeeded in its intent; II Corps always intended to withdraw relatively quickly. And, both here and at Mons, it wasn't the number of the enemy actually in contact with the BEF that formed the operational necessities; after Lanzerac's "hasty" and "unannounced" withdrawal, it was the total manpower available to von Kluck, as well as his vast superiority in artillery, that made both positions untenable for permanent occupation by the BEF - but, both fields were not taken by German force-of-arms on the actual day. And, also, there is the little matter of Joffre's conveniently forgotten telegram to GHQ thanking the BEF for securing the French Army's left flank with their actions at Mons and Le Cateau.

Do you believe that Smith-Dorrien, a man who acknowledges and thanks in his memoirs certain French forces for their assistance, was lying about this telegram, which Joffre seems to ignore completely in his own memoirs? After all, von Kluck had no doubts about the BEF's role in those early days, I quote: "I always had the greatest admiration for the British Expeditionary Force. It was the wonderful kernel of a great Army. I have already said it in my book. The way the retreat was carried out was remarkable. I tried very hard to outflank them, but I could not do so. If I had succeeded the war would have been won.' " Could we be up against a bit of French pride here? A contemptibly small British army punching well above its weight would seem to be somewhat unpalatable to French tastes?

Jack may well have his own calculations, and you seem to favour Jack's version along with Joffre's view about the BEF, but both differ from British accounts (and von Kluck's view) of these actions - and that, in a nutshell, is what this tread is all about i.e. whose accounts do we actually believe?

Now, as far as 1st Ypres is concerned, you seem to be taking the line that Joffre took in his memoirs i.e. that the BEF were more of a hindrance than a help and needed protecting by the French Army. Sure, some French assistance was sought and given. But if I have to choose between your conclusions, Robert, an amateur historian (though very knowledgeable), who, by his own admission, has no military experience at all, and the conclusions of a man who is no mean historian (writing many books), and who rose from the ranks in WW2 to become a General of the British Army (fighting many actions at all ranks) then, I'm afraid, that I have to say your conclusions come a poor second in my mind.

I'll happily stick with Farrah the Para's opinion: What marked them (the BEF at 1st Ypres) was the standard they set as fighting men, holding for weeks a wide sector of attack against an enemy four to seven times their strength.

Cheers-salesie.

[salesie]

Salesie and Robert,

I think there might be an explanation for the discrepancy between the tactics Robert has related from Zuber's book, and presumably used at Mons in August 1914, and those as observed by the 2nd Gordons soldier at 1st Ypres in October - November 1914 which Salesie has highlighted.

It may also be the case that relatively untrained volunteers were used as replacements for the losses sustained by the trained divisions during August - October 1914, which would have diluted the proficiency in attack tactics of the units in those formations.

Cheers

Chris

Chris, I've chopped your post to save space.

You're right about the differing training levels of German troops to an extent, but we have other examples in this thread of German storm assaults being attempted as early as Mons (one from a German source at Mons). It seems to me that there was no consistency in German Infantry assault tactics throughout the period Aug-Nov 1914.

Cheers-salesie.

[Robert Dunlop]

Robert, you know as well as I do that Le Cateau was only ever fought as a temporary holding action - which succeeded in its intent; II Corps always intended to withdraw relatively quickly.

Salesie, I do indeed know that. The key point is that II Corps was forced to withdraw during the course of the battle, not after the battle concluded. Smith-Dorrien could not have held on longer without exposing more and more of his force to destruction and/or encirclement on the right. The Germans forced the timing of the withdrawal through their efforts on the battlefield.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

And, both here and at Mons, it wasn't the number of the enemy actually in contact with the BEF that formed the operational necessities; after Lanzerac's "hasty" and "unannounced" withdrawal....

Salesie, I am not talking about the operational necessities. The issue of Lanrezac's withdrawal was not relevant to what happened to the BEF at Mons on the 23rd August. It was the "enemy actually in contact" that nearly split II Corps in two on August 23rd, not the rest of von Kluck's forces that were not in contact.

Robert