The "machine guns" of Mons ?

[salesie]

Thank you, Tom. Like you, I see no problem in SD making an alternative decision on the basis of the circumstances facing II Corps. This approach was acknowledged in the Field Service Regulations, as you say. The German Staff had a similar approach too. I have additional material about the circumstances facing II Corps, including transcripts of the several messages that flowed between II Corps and the divisions, etc. Smith-Dorrien's account is one of many, and thank you for posting the material from Maj Gen Forestier-Walker.

My comment was made in response to salesie's quote, highlighted above. I was noting that SD was not bound to follow the Operation Order, which is why I put 'disobeyed' in single quotes. This was not meant to infer that SD was wrong or that he was wrongfully disobeying GHQ's Operation Order. Salesie had suggested that SD broke off the Battle of Le Cateau because he was ordered to do so on the morning of the battle. I am suggesting that he broke earlier than he had expected to because of the effective pressure from the German attack on the right wing of II Corps. Given that SD had already made a decision on the 25/26 to hold the line until the evening of the 26th, if possible, I believe it is entirely possible that SD did not change his mind as a result of an 'order' on the morning of the 26th.

Robert

Robert, I was pointing out that seeing as Smith-Dorrien had never intended to hold the field at Le Cateau then the order from GHQ on the morning of the 26th probably influenced his planning. He says himself that pressure on his right flank was the reason he gave the order to retire, that this pressure told him the time was right, but please note the retirement plans were already with the divisional commanders - these plans, because they had been issued earlier, must have been for a withdrawal in daylight and not for after dark as was his original intent, otherwise he would have needed to issue a whole new set of retirement orders given the vast difference between day and night-time movements:

"After six hours' fighting we were holding our own everywhere, and every effort of the enemy to come on was defeated; but the strain was beginning to tell on our exposed east flank, and at 1.40 p.m. Colonel Gathorne Hardy, of my Staff, who was watching events for me at 5th Divisional Head-quarters at Reumont, brought me a message from Sir Charles Fergusson, saying his troops were beginning to dribble away under their severe punishment, and he feared he would be unable to hold on until dark. The Germans had already penetrated between his 13th and 14th Brigades, had practically wiped out the Suffolks, had brought up guns to short ranges, and were shelling heavily his own head-quarters at Reumont. The Division had stood to the limit of human endurance, and I recognised that the moment had arrived when our retirement should commence, and, requesting Gathorne Hardy to hurry back to Fergusson and tell him to order an organised retirement at once as the best means of saving a disastrous rush to the rear, I put in motion the plans already in possession of Divisional Commanders. These were to the effect that, when they got the order, they were to commence retiring by Divisions along the roads allotted to them. My Chief Staff Officer thereupon sent out the necessary instructions, saying the retirement would commence from the right."

Successfully breaking off contact during daylight is one of the most difficult of military movements and I would suggest that the German pressure on the BEF's right flank, though sufficient for Smith-Dorrien to put in motion his pre-planned withdrawal, was not of sufficient intensity to interfere with that retirement.

Robert, no one is suggesting that the German Army was not a formidable foe - but I've noticed a trend of late amongst some to fall into the same trap as Germany did herself i.e. to grossly overestimate German military prowess whilst seriously underestimating the capabilities of the Allies, and that this gross over-estimation flies in the face of the failure of the German Army to achieve any of its objectives at any stage of the war - it fails to take account of the fact that coming close is a far cry from succeeding, and that such mistaken notions can disguise failure as success.

Cheers-salesie.

[Robert Dunlop]

...no one is suggesting that the German Army was not a formidable foe

salesie, I am glad that you clarified your position on this. Your post here suggested otherwise.

I've noticed a trend of late amongst some to fall into the same trap as Germany did herself i.e. to grossly overestimate German military prowess whilst seriously underestimating the capabilities of the Allies

It is interesting to view this perception alongside Smith-Dorrien's memoirs. The last segment that you quoted is very important in considering what happened at Le Cateau. On the eve of the Battle of Le Cateau, we noted that SD, in his words, "was feeling confident and hopeful of giving the enemy a smashing blow and slipping away before he could recover". If we concentrate our attention on his first sentence in the last segment quoted, SD said "After six hours' fighting we were holding our own everywhere, and every effort of the enemy to come on was defeated..." Stopping our analysis at this point would indeed suggest that the German attack was overestimated. Further on, however, we read of the serious problems facing 5th Division, where Fergusson's "troops were beginning to dribble away under their severe punishment, and he feared he would be unable to hold on until dark [which is consistent with SD's earlier thought about timetable]. The Germans had already penetrated between his 13th and 14th Brigades, had practically wiped out the Suffolks, had brought up guns to short ranges, and were shelling heavily his own head-quarters at Reumont." With the right flank elements of 5th Division getting near breaking point, SD quite rightly issued the order to disengage and retire. This strongly suggests that the German attack was effective enough in this sector to force the retirement, effective enough to disrupt SD's hope to deliver a "smashing blow and slipping away before he could recover".

Having established that the German attack was more effective than is often given credit, then we can turn and review how SD and the BEF responded. The German attack was not effective enough to envelop II Corps. As you point out, the BEF managed to achieve a very difficult manoeuvre - breaking off from the enemy in the midst of a battle, especially when under significant pressure. If the German attack had not achieved so much, then we might say "BEF won and then left the battlefield under no pressure, big deal". It could be (and was) argued that the Germans should have achieved more. They didn't, but that does not detract from what the BEF achieved either. We mustn't forget that Sordet (thanks to Joffre's intervention) helped in this by shoring up the left flank, but credit to SD and to II Corps! There are lots of additional positive aspects that we have not touched on, such as the rapid and unquestioning handover of command of 1st Cavalry Brigade to SD from Allenby, so that SD could use 1st Cav Bde to discover exactly what was happening to his retiring forces, not just act as rearguards to II Corps.

Hopefully we have laid to rest the concern about interest in German accounts demeaning the BEF performance. Rather it enhances our understanding, IMHO. As to the issue of grossly overestimating German performance to the extent of ignoring what they did not achieve, I guess some people may think this way. It has been a while since I personally have come across modern writers who espouse such a view (Samuels probably being the most immediate example that comes to mind). Jack Sheldon most certainly doesn't.

Robert

[salesie]

Robert, the anecdote I posted earlier seemed to be highly pertinent to the BEF's part in the war Aug-Nov 1914, and to my point about the collective German psyche overestimating its own military prowess.

Now, I've never heard of Samuels, Robert, and the only piece of Jack's work that I've read is his introduction to the Le Cateau Guidebook, and in this introduction you're right that Jack does not ignore what the German Army did not achieve - the problem is he completely ignores II Corps' role in bringing about this lack of German achievement, putting the German failure at Le Cateau purely down to lack of good intelligence from poorly performing German cavalry and to Smith-Dorrien's extreme good luck in pulling off a miracle. As I said earlier in the thread - this work of Jack's, despite him saying his writing partner gave the British point of view, is wholly one-sided and therefore highly misleading, in that it completely ignores any action-reaction between the opposing forces. In other words, it's akin to explaining the loss of the Titanic without mentioning the iceberg. Obviously, I disagree with this approach, seeing it as a prime example of the trend I mentioned earlier - prime because, in this case, it doesn't just underestimate the capabilities of the BEF, it ignores them completely; writing them off as simply being lucky b*gg*rs (I know that Jack praised the BEF to an extent early in the thread, but as Smith-Dorrien says of the Germans after Le Cateau, he failed to expatiate on this basic praise).

.

Also, Robert, I find your own search for the devil in the detail, despite your assertions that you seek a balanced perspective, to be leaning towards this trend's inherent, and in my opinion fatally flawed, viewpoint i.e. I constantly have to remind you that the outcome (at Mons, at Le Cateau, at 1st Ypres) makes your sometimes highly pedantic points somewhat unbalanced and therefore misleading - your theorising needs to add up to the end-result or the equation does not balance.

And that, Robert, is my take on all of this - look at the outcome (the end-result) and work back from there to see whose accounts balance the equation; see whose accounts don't create a paradox with the end-result.

Cheers-salesie.

[salesie]

It seems, Gentlemen, that now is a good time to ask several question that have been running around in my head for some time. There are many posts on this forum telling us that "new" information from the mostly untold story from the "other-side" will increase our knowledge, and that there is much more to come from barely researched German language sources. The following two posts are typical examples of a message that of late seems to be taking on almost messianic proportions on this forum:

From Halder: "I wish I could add more to the debate, but I am a Wehremacht historian principally who dabbles de temps en temps with the Great War. But I share with Jack, Paul and Ralph a deep passion that the accounts of both World Wars have been badly one-sided - at times to the point of being misleading. Jack in particular has done WW1 historiography a great service - and this is widely acknowledged - with his studies of the German Army on the Western Front."

From Robert: "I am not of the school that says the Germans were absolutely wonderful, the British were absolutely rubbish - the sort of thing that Samuels inferred in his book "Command or Control? Command, Training and Tactics in the British and German Armies, 1888-1918". But neither am I content to stop with the accepted accounts published in English. My capacity to read and understand German is very limited by comparison to others on this Forum. Thankfully, we have the services of several members who have lifted our knowledge of the 'other side' to new levels."

Before anyone ventures to answer the following questions, I should point out that I'm not talking about the minutiae of individual actions, but that I am seeking an answer as to why certain individuals have a "deep passion" to redress a wrong (they must view the current picture of the German Army as wrong otherwise why would their passion be deep?) and/or why they are not happy with the historiography so far. In other words, I'm trying to discover the true essence of their passionate "malcontent" at our current levels of understanding.

First of all, precisely how have we been mislead by accounts of both World Wars, what misconceptions do you believe these so-called one-sided accounts have given us of Germany and its army? And, secondly, in what way does the "new" research from German sources clear up our so-called misconceptions? And, lastly, what undiscovered knowledge do you believe is lurking in these "forgotten" archives that will right the wrong that you believe has been perpetrated on the memory of the German Army?

Cheers-salesie.

[Paul Hederer]

Salesie,

My research has been focused mainly on the German Army in relation to Verdun, and I have a strong interest in Falkenhayn. There has been a lot written about Verdun that is incorrect, and a good, comprehensive military history of the battle has yet to be written. Thus my interest and research focus. Hopefully there is a book at the end of this very long tunnel. I would have to say I am just as interested in the French Army, and this is understandable given my area of interest.

I don't think the German Army has suffered any wrongs in portrayal. On the contrary, it seems to be mostly protrayed (in both World Wars) as some kind of ultra-efficient war machine by uninformed writers parroting war-time propaganda.

I do think there is a lot to be learned from archival research. That goes for any aspect of the war, especially the German side, which suffered the loss of so much of its documentation and only (relatively) recent return of the the majority of the surviving files. For example, I've been very struck at the acrimonious relationships that permeated the German command structure, and just how injurious those relationships were at various points of the war.

At least to my thinking you are mixing an interest in a subject, and a conviction that one side of the war has not been portrayed in anything like a complete manner, with some kind of imagined crusade.

I like football too. Just because I'm interested in football doesn't mean I think that it's been dealt some type of injustice by baseball fans!

Paul

[Steven Broomfield]

Surely, Salesie, it isn't wrong to want to know what happened on the other side of the hill? For instance, if the Umpteenth Battalion of the Loamshires were 'wiped out' on the 31st June, wouldn't it be interesting to read that the 1st UpperMosel Grenadiers opposite lost how ever many men, how the Grenadiers issued their orders, what the Grenadiers did after 'wiping out' the Loamshires, and that (actually) the Loamshires offered up 850 POW. I'd say that alone would be interesting.

Having read Jack's books, I have to say that whatever opinions of the rights and wrongs of the war, and who started it (all of which Jack has utterly avoided), I have been struck by how little I knew, how much I have learned, and (above all, oddly) how much my admiration for the Tommies, Canadians, Frenchmen, Anzacs, etc, etc, who faced such a committed and wily army has actually increased.

As Sassoon said:

When you are standing at your hero's grave,

Or near some homeless village where he died,

Remember, through your heart's rekindling pride,

The German soldiers who were loyal and brave.

I don't think Jack, et al, are trying to correct any wrong other than the simple one - that we don't know what happened the other side of the hill.

I, for one, am impressed and pleased that they've started. More power to them.

[salesie]

Paul, fair enough - so Halder wasn't speaking for you when he said "But I share with Jack, Paul and Ralph a deep passion that the accounts of both World Wars have been badly one-sided - at times to the point of being misleading."

Steven, right or wrong doesn't come into it - I'm a writer myself and would never dream of trying to make any subject-matter taboo (with a few exceptions, of course, such as paedophiles publishing "instruction manuals", and like that stupid b*st*rd Peter Snow virtually giving the Argies the plan of attack on the BBC on the eve of the assault on Goose Green). I'm simply trying to get to the essence of the reasoning behind the trend I mentioned earlier - is it a simple case of iconoclasm or something else? Halder's post would suggest something else (at least on his part).

Cheers-salesie.

[Paul Hederer]

Paul, fair enough - so Halder wasn't speaking for you when he said "But I share with Jack, Paul and Ralph a deep passion that the accounts of both World Wars have been badly one-sided - at times to the point of being misleading."

Steven, right or wrong doesn't come into it - I'm a writer myself and would never dream of trying to make any subject-matter taboo (with a few exceptions, of course, such as paedophiles publishing "instruction manuals", and like that stupid b*st*rd Peter Snow virtually giving the Argies the plan of attack on the BBC on the eve of the assault on Goose Green). I'm simply trying to get to the essence of the reasoning behind the trend I mentioned earlier - is it a simple case of iconoclasm or something else? Halder's post would suggest something else (at least on his part).

Cheers-salesie.

Salesie,

Big difference in thinking accounts are one-sided and your description of the "passionate malcontent" on some imagined crusade to right the wrongs done the memory of the German Army.

It's true most accounts of the war in the English speaking world are one-sided. That doesn't mean that some injustice has been done to the German Army. I'd rather say that falls into a disservice to readers.

As far as being misleading, sure you could say that too. A lot of information out there on the German Army in English, and accounts of its actions, are just plain wrong. I think what Halder, as well as the as the gentlemen he mentions share, is the belief that there is a lot to be learned and gained by bringing German accounts and information to light in the English speaking community.

We can't have an accurate and whole picture of any historical event unless we have a balanced presentation of the facts as known. Even if one's focus is the Allied side of things there is an awful lot to be learned by looking at the other side.

I recently took a trip to Verdun, and visited the museum on the battlefield for the first time in 10 years or so. I was with a few people had not been before, so we spent a good deal of time reading the placards. I was appalled at how many times I had to say, "Uh, well no, that's not really right." As we went through the texts. Anyone coming to the museum and focusing on the French Army at Verdun and the battle itself would have had a skewed view of what had actually happened due to the inaccuracies related in relation to German intentions and actions.

Through my interests and research it has been my honor to get to know Jack, Ralph, Richard (Halder), and Robert, as well as other forum members here who have not taken part in this discussion a bit better. Through the wonder of the internet I have been privileged to come into contact with a wider circle of researchers and academics as well, many who are professional historians with a focus on German history. In all the discussions we've had I can't recall someone putting forward as a motivation trying to "right the wrong" done the German Army in history. I've heard numerous expressions of regret at how little of the German material available has been translated and published for the English speaking community to read. That, I think, I could present as a common thread for all these gentlemen--along with an honest desire to present the most accurate picture possible of their particular area of interest and expertise.

I think that you are confused in that an interest in a subject does not imply an unbalanced affection for its object. Objectivity is, and always will be the key to good historcial research and study.

The lowest common denominator in this whole bloody mess was the soldier--whether he was British, Indian, French, American, Bulgarian, or German. They all deserve to have their stories told.

Paul

[Robert Dunlop]

The history of the East Surrey Regiment arrived yesterday. The 1st Battalion was involved in the Battle of Mons. They took up post astride the Condé Canal on the 22nd August. I will post a map of the positions of the various companies. Essentially, C Company held the right bridge-head, B Company the left, D Company the centre, and A Company in reserve, about 500 yards in rear of the Battalion Headquarters. Here is the pertinent section of the British Official History first:

"Further to the left, the 13th Brigade still held its position on the canal, though the fire of the German artillery steadily increased in the course of the afternoon. The enemy, indeed, pushed forward three batteries to within twelve hundred yards of the canal about St. Ghislain, and smothered the 13th Brigade with shells, but did remarkably little damage. Indeed, it was not until about 6 pm, when guns were brought up within close range, and destroyed the barrier over Les Herbières road bridge that the Scottish Borderers withdrew to the southern bank. The East Surreys (14th Brigade) withdrew their advanced parties from north of the canal about the same time. The battalion then retired by alternate companies to the position ordered near Thulin, south of the Haine. Nevertheless in this quarter the Germans were unable to make the slightest progress..."

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Now for account from the East Surrey's regimental history:

"The three East Surrey companies in the outpost line were all in position by 6 pm [on August 22nd] and soon started work on their position.

At dawn on the 23rd a patrol under Captain R.C. Campbell went forward and examined the woods and railway as far as Hautrage Station. No Germans were seen, and the railwaymen were busily engaged in removing locomotives and railway carriages to the rear of the British line.

The Commanding Officer, finding at his early morning inspection how much foreground there was to be cleared in front of the right bridge-head, ordered the reserve company, A, forward and placed it under Major Tew's orders. The Brigade was also asked to send two companies of the Suffolks, who were in Brigade Reserve, with the Brigade tools, to assist in the work of clearing. With the help of A Company and one of the Suffolk companies, a clear field of fire varying from 300-500 yards was obtained by noon, and three trenches, 4 1/2 feet deep, were well hidden.

The morning had opened misty and wet, but about 10 am the sky cleared. Soon after midday firing began further away to the right of the East Surrey position, and by 1 pm fired also was opened against C Company's trenches. Part of the Suffolk company which was clearing the ground in front was consequently drawn into them. It must be mentioned that shortly before the German attack opened Major Tew sent Lieut. Schomberg across the road bridge on his right, held by the K.O.S.B., and arranged with that battalion that neither it nor the East Surrey would withdraw without first informing the other. Major Tew immediately reported this arrangement to Lieut.-Colonel Longley, who further arranged that each battalion should hold on to its position till after dark, and issued orders to that effect to the Battalion. He then sent the D.C.L.I. on his left, to propose a similar pact with them, but found that this battalion had already fallen back from the canal, in accordance with orders received, to take up a position south of the Haine, a small river south of the canal. He then arranged that Major Tew should blow up the railway bridge, when compelled to retire, without waiting for further orders, and that this should be the signal for the road bridge held by B Company to be blown up also."

To be continued...

Robert

[salesie]

Paul, Ok so Halder was speaking for you as well as himself. You've explained your general academic interest, and that you hope your research will lead to a book, but not the essence of your quest i.e. you tell us that, "It's true most accounts of the war in the English speaking world are one-sided. That doesn't mean that some injustice has been done to the German Army. I'd rather say that falls into a disservice to readers." Surely, this is an oxymoron; if a disservice is done to the reader then it must follow that the same disservice is done to the subject-matter?

Then you go on to say, "As far as being misleading, sure you could say that too. A lot of information out there on the German Army in English, and accounts of its actions, are just plain wrong. I think what Halder, as well as the as the gentlemen he mentions share, is the belief that there is a lot to be learned and gained by bringing German accounts and information to light in the English speaking community." Then a little later you say, "In all the discussions we've had I can't recall someone putting forward as a motivation trying to "right the wrong" done the German Army in history. I've heard numerous expressions of regret at how little of the German material available has been translated and published for the English speaking community to read." Surely, Paul, if you believe that much of the information on the German Army is "just plain wrong", and you don't stop at expressions of regret and you go on to make your beliefs public then you are in fact attempting to right the wrong?

As I said earlier, I would never dream of calling your quest wrong per se, never dream of attempting to make any subject-matter taboo, but it seems to me that contradictory, generalised answers to my specific and highly pertinent questions do a disservice to the readers of this thread - do we not deserve to know the precise details of the misconceptions you believe we carry, and why?

All of which brings me back to my earlier questions - First of all, precisely how have we been mislead by accounts of both World Wars, what misconceptions do you believe these so-called one-sided accounts have given us of Germany and its army? And, secondly, in what way does the "new" research from German sources clear up our so-called misconceptions? And, lastly, what undiscovered knowledge do you believe is lurking in these "forgotten" archives that will right the wrong that you believe has been perpetrated on the memory of the German Army?

Cheers-salesie.

[SiegeGunner]

As I said earlier in the thread - this work of Jack's, despite him saying his writing partner gave the British point of view, is wholly one-sided and therefore highly misleading, in that it completely ignores any action-reaction between the opposing forces.

Salesie,

If this is your view of an account that you consider to be wholly 'from the German perspective', can you please explain why the same is not true of accounts wholly from the Allied viewpoint.

How can we understand the 'action-reaction between the opposing forces' if only the Allied end of the equation is represented?

You appear to think that anything that needs to be said about German actions and reactions can be quite adequately covered by Allied observations, analysis and deductions – which I find reminiscent of the once-prevailing view that female rôles in plays should be acted by men, because women could not be trusted to play them properly.

Historians are quite used to comparing, contrasting, and where necessary attempting to reconcile, different accounts of the same events from different Allied sources. In this thread, for instance, we have seen material from a variety of British and French sources. Why, then, should it be a problem to include German accounts in equations of which they are also an integral part?

Mick

[salesie]

Salesie,

If this is your view of an account that you consider to be wholly 'from the German perspective', can you please explain why the same is not true of accounts wholly from the Allied viewpoint.

How can we understand the 'action-reaction between the opposing forces' if only the Allied end of the equation is represented?

You appear to think that anything that needs to be said about German actions and reactions can be quite adequately covered by Allied observations, analysis and deductions – which I find reminiscent of the once-prevailing view that female rôles in plays should be acted by men, because women could not be trusted to play them properly.

Historians are quite used to comparing, contrasting, and where necessary attempting to reconcile, different accounts of the same events from different Allied sources. In this thread, for instance, we have seen material from a variety of British and French sources. Why, then, should it be a problem to include German accounts in equations of which they are also an integral part?

Mick

Well, Mick, why assume I have a problem with the inclusion of German accounts? It seems to me that the questions I pose are an attempt to find out exactly why the Allied accounts are "just plain wrong and therefore highly misleading" (as stated by several members of this forum); I'm actually giving those who believe that the German side has been sorely neglected an opportunity to summarise their case, I'm actually trying to understand the essence of their "quest". Are you still suggesting, as you did earlier, that the disseminators of these notions should not be asked questions about the specific reasoning leading to their conclusions simply because they can translate German into English? After all, if the Allied accounts are "just plain wrong and therefore highly misleading" then surely it is in everyone's interest to know precisely how and why?

It seems to me, Mick, that the problem lies with those who see pertinent questions that try to get to the heart of the matter as being uncalled for?

Cheers-salesie.

[Paul Hederer]

"...archives that will right the wrong that you believe has been perpetrated on the memory of the German Army..."

Salesie,

You're the only one who keeps saying the German Army was wronged. As I explained I've not heard it said amongst the circles I frequent, nor do I believe this myself, so unfortunately I can't help you on this issue.

"...Allied accounts are just plain wrong..."

That's not what I wrote. I wrote of accounts available in English are often plain wrong. This is a statment on literature available to readers in English, not a statment of veracity based on wartime alliance. Yes, a lot of what is available in English on the German Army is wrong, in that it is incomplete, or factually not accurate. There is a lot of German material out there that is never used to balance accounts of the war. With balance I mean give as much accurate and pertinent information on both sides for a given time period, so that the reader can have the fullest understanding possible. Balance does not mean fair, even, just or unjust. It's not a matter of lose or win for one side if the word count covering their forces is higher than that of the other army.

A good example of the work left to be done can be illustrated in this month's "War in History." Author and historian Gerhard P. Groß demonstrates clearly the value of continued archival research in his response to Terrence Zuber's conclusions on the von Schlieffen plan. If something so crucial and elemental to our understanding of the war as the vS plan is still being debated as a result of recent archival research then this clearly shows the value of this work in relation to the Germans, and our understanding of the war.

Now, what I just wrote about the German Army I could cut and paste to apply to the Russian Army in the Great War as well. Oh my, now I'm applying it to an Allied Army as well. I hope your not going to to bring up me trying to "right the wrong what was done the poor Russians."

Paul

[Robert Dunlop]

Continuing with the East Surrey's account:

"As soon as the German attack opened, Captain Benson, commanding C Company, who had been in consultation with Major Tew, went forward with the officer commanding the front platoon of A Company, Lieut. D. Wynard, to decide on the best way of reinforcing the right fire trenches when necessary. The two officers crossed the canal by means of a barge which had been moored across it under the railway bridge and walked forward towards the nearest fire trench. When they had advanced about fifty yards, machine-gun fire was directed on them and Captain Benson was hit at once, and fell to the ground mortally wounded.

When Captain Benson became a casualty, the command of C Company devolved on Captain R.C. Campbell, who was at the time in charge of the fire trenches of the company on the west of the railway embankment. On the fire in front becoming much brisker, Captain Campbell... went first to the left of his line, where he found 2nd Lieut. Ward coolly controlling the fire of his men, who were holding two trenches.

Throughout the morning various contradictory orders were received by the Battalion as to the holding of the canal position and as to when a retirement would take place, and owing to the rapid development of the attack, it would seem that the officers and men in the trenches on the west of the railway were not aware that a retirement might, under certain circumstances, take place before darkness came on.

On the east of the railway the German attack was heavy, their infantry coming on extended at one pace interval and supported by a large number of machine guns. The 1st Battn. East Surrey, however, held their ground firmly and inflicted heavy losses on the Germans. Attempts by the latter to cross the railway embankment, in order to attack the left trenches of C Company in flank, were also defeated with heavy loss by the machine-gun section excellently handled by Lieut. Darwell.

At about 4 pm the attack on the trench east of the railway became serious, and Lieut. Wynyard advanced, as had been arranged by Captain Benson, with about fifty men and reinforced the trench at a critical moment. Fighting at very close quarters took place, and Lieut. Wynyard was severely wounded in the arm, but the position was held.

At about 6 pm the battalion on the right of the East Surrey was suddenly compelled to fall back from the road bridge which it was holding, its defences having been destroyed by artillery fire at close quarters. In consequence of this retirement, Major Tew saw that it was necessary to withdraw his troops to the south bank of the canal, and also to retire the machine-gun section from the position which had enabled it hitherto to sweep the railway.

The order to retire was signalled to C Company by Lieut. Darwell. The signal was seen by the troops in the trenches on the east of the railway, and the portions of A and C Companies occupying them were successfully withdrawn, crossing the canal by the barge mentioned above, their retirement being covered by the fire of the remainder of A Company, which had been posted on the south bank of the canal. It would appear, however, that the signal to retire was not observed by 2nd Lieut. Ward's and Lieut. Morritt's platoons, who, on the west of the railway, had successfully held their trenches against heavy attacks throughout the afternoon, and the evacuation of the trenches on the east of the railway enabled the German infantry to swarm over the embankment and advance against their right and rear."

Some men from 2nd Lieut. Ward's platoon managed to get back but many of the infantry in these two platoons were captured. Once the last survivors got across the canal, the final bridge was blown as darkness fell.

Robert

[Halder]

Paul, Ok so Halder was speaking for you as well as himself.

No, I think Paul can more than adequately speak for himself - and has done so repeatedly in this thread. As for myself, I find it utterly depressing that our history of both world wars is so one-sided, chiefly for no other reason than laziness in not reading foreign-language sources. If I read another account of Mons which merely quotes Bloem as the German source, or Jünger for the Somme, or Paul Carell for Normandy, I'll scream. It would be like reading a German account of the Somme and only featuring Haig's diary, or Normandy and only quoting Montgomery. The sources are out there. There are hundreds of them. I know because many line my bookshelves. It costs money, it takes time, but it is worth it.

So frustrated was I by our one-sided approach to history that I wrote this:

http://www.amazon.com/Germans-Normandy-Ric...475/ref=ed_oe_h

I shall continue to shed light "on the other side of the hill" with what limited knowledge and skill I possess. I can only hope far more able writers and scholars do the same, for we shall all be richer for their efforts.

All of which brings me back to my earlier questions - First of all, precisely how have we been mislead by accounts of both World Wars, what misconceptions do you believe these so-called one-sided accounts have given us of Germany and its army?

Well, for a start, I can tell you that the image of the German soldier in Normandy as portrayed in The Longest Day is very wide of the mark. Most Landsers were confident of victory in Normandy in 1944 - until the moment the Allies landed, as revealed by their personal diaries and letters. They were most certainly not resigned to defeat, although their morale fairly quickly shattered.

Take too Ludendorff's "black day" quote re: August 8 1918. It was a black day. It was not the black day, yet English-speaking historians take it as read. It makes a good soundbite, but it's not borne out by the facts.

And then there's the Polish campaign and the "birth of Blitzkrieg". My study of the campaign has shown that it was not won by the German tanks but largely by the infantry, aided by the panzers and the Luftwaffe.

There are, I'm sure, many more examples fellow forum members could provide.

[salesie]

"...archives that will right the wrong that you believe has been perpetrated on the memory of the German Army..."

Salesie,

"...Allied accounts are just plain wrong..."

That's not what I wrote. I wrote of accounts available in English are often plain wrong. This is a statment on literature available to readers in English, not a statment of veracity based on wartime alliance. Yes, a lot of what is available in English on the German Army is wrong, in that it is incomplete, or factually not accurate. There is a lot of German material out there that is never used to balance accounts of the war. With balance I mean give as much accurate and pertinent information on both sides for a given time period, so that the reader can have the fullest understanding possible. Balance does not mean fair, even, just or unjust. It's not a matter of lose or win for one side if the word count covering their forces is higher than that of the other army.

Paul

OK, Paul, I'm happy to re-word my questions using your own criteria; after all, when making such far reaching statements you must understand the basis on which your own conclusions are founded.

How is a lot of what is available in English on the German Army wrong; how is it incomplete or factually not accurate?

And, how and why do these flaws in the English language accounts affect our current understanding of the German Army?

And, what is contained in the German language sources that will repair the faults-lines in our current perceptions of the German Army (perceptions brought about by incomplete and factually not accurate English language accounts)?

Cheers-salesie.

[salesie]

No, I think Paul can more than adequately speak for himself - and has done so repeatedly in this thread. As for myself, I find it utterly depressing that our history of both world wars is so one-sided, chiefly for no other reason than laziness in not reading foreign-language sources. If I read another account of Mons which merely quotes Bloem as the German source, or Jünger for the Somme, or Paul Carell for Normandy, I'll scream. It would be like reading a German account of the Somme and only featuring Haig's diary, or Normandy and only quoting Montgomery. The sources are out there. There are hundreds of them. I know because many line my bookshelves. It costs money, it takes time, but it is worth it.

So frustrated was I by our one-sided approach to history that I wrote this:

http://www.amazon.com/Germans-Normandy-Ric...475/ref=ed_oe_h

I shall continue to shed light "on the other side of the hill" with what limited knowledge and skill I possess. I can only hope far more able writers and scholars do the same, for we shall all be richer for their efforts.

Well, for a start, I can tell you that the image of the German soldier in Normandy as portrayed in The Longest Day is very wide of the mark. Most Landsers were confident of victory in Normandy in 1944 - until the moment the Allies landed, as revealed by their personal diaries and letters. They were most certainly not resigned to defeat, although their morale fairly quickly shattered.

Take too Ludendorff's "black day" quote re: August 8 1918. It was a black day. It was not the black day, yet English-speaking historians take it as read. It makes a good soundbite, but it's not borne out by the facts.

And then there's the Polish campaign and the "birth of Blitzkrieg". My study of the campaign has shown that it was not won by the German tanks but largely by the infantry, aided by the panzers and the Luftwaffe.

There are, I'm sure, many more examples fellow forum members could provide.

Richard, at least you've tried to answer one of my questions, which does you credit. However, when I originally posed my questions I did say, "Before anyone ventures to answer the following questions, I should point out that I'm not talking about the minutiae of individual actions, but that I am seeking an answer as to why certain individuals have a "deep passion" to redress a wrong (they must view the current picture of the German Army as wrong otherwise why would their passion be deep?) and/or why they are not happy with the historiography so far. In other words, I'm trying to discover the true essence of their passionate "malcontent" at our current levels of understanding."

You've answered my queries in part, but I'm more concerned with how, for example, the "black day" analogy you criticise (coincidentally, a point I agree with) actually affects our overall understanding of the German Army? It seems to me that whether it was "a" black day or "the" black day is, in the final analysis, immaterial, in that in the following one-hundred days the German Army didn't have too many good ones. It seems such a trivial point to arouse the passions you obviously feel?

I'm not trying to understand the minutiae of individual actions/campaigns, there are plenty of examples of factual inaccuracies, on both sides, to make that a forlornly endless debate, and I regard such examples as window-dressing that takes the eye away from the window itself. I'm trying to understand the essence of your passionate belief that the German Army has suffered a disservice in our collective psyche.

Cheers-salesie.

[Paul Hederer]

OK, Paul, I'm happy to re-word my questions using your own criteria; after all, when making such far reaching statements you must understand the basis on which your own conclusions are founded.

How is a lot of what is available in English on the German Army wrong; how is it incomplete or factually not accurate?

And, how and why do these flaws in the English language accounts affect our current understanding of the German Army?

And, what is contained in the German language sources that will repair the faults-lines in our current perceptions of the German Army (perceptions brought about by incomplete and factually not accurate English language accounts)?

Cheers-salesie.

Hello Salesie,

No, no--not repair any fault lines of perception of the German Army--better said provide a better understanding of the war. It all ties together, no one element stands on its own to form a better understanding of the conflict.

You asked for examples--an example of omission-Falkenhayn. He was Minister of War from 1913 onwards. He was Chief of Staff from late 1914 until August 1916. Not exactly a minor figure during the war.

You could read his "General Headquarters 1914-1916," but you'd only have his own attempt at justification, and have no real idea of the man, or an objective survey of his actions. Beyond that there is nothing. Holger Afflerbach's superlative "Falkenhayn. Politisches Denken und Handeln im Kaiserreich," will probably never see the light of day in English.

Alistair Horne wrote of Falkenhayn in his book the "Price of Glory," "...of the man we know nothing." He might have been more accurate if he had written, "...of the man we know nothing, in English." On my bookshelf sit four different biographies of Falkenhayn written between 1926 and 1996--all in German, none translated or published in English. This on arguably the most important man in the German army for the first two years of the war.

Just think how much poorer literature on the British effort and our understanding of the war would be without the library of books on Haig alone, not to mention Murray, Robertson and Wilson.

Salesie, I am trying to answer your questions. Half the time I have to backtrack and get your words out of my mouth before I even start. I see you asking questions but unfortunately not listening to the answers. I'm sorry, but I simply don't buy the whole "redress the wrong done the German Army" and "passionate belief that the German Army has suffered a disservice" line. I would say that there is a sin of ommision. As Halder (Richard) wrote, the sources are out there in German--they're just not used.

You seem to believe interest in the Germans equals partisanship. Sometimes interest can be coupled with objectivity and result in something really meaningful--especially when discussing historical study.

As I wrote before, this is not a uniquely German problem when discussing the war. The same is true concerning Russia. There was great hope that a flood of new books on Russia's war effort would reach the world in English when the doors of the former Soviet archives were thrown open--this has not happened as of yet.

Paul

[Halder]

No, no--not repair any fault lines of perception of the German Army--better said provide a better understanding of the war. It all ties together, no one element stands on its own to form a better understanding of the conflict.

As I wrote before, this is not a uniquely German problem when discussing the war. The same is true concerning Russia. There was great hope that a flood of new books on Russia's war effort would reach the world in English when the doors of the former Soviet archives were thrown open--this has not happened as of yet.

Hi Salesie,

I think Paul's opening line sums my attitude up perfectly. I don't think we'll fundamentally change the opinion of the German Army, but we can plug many many gaps and provide people with a much more rounded view of the war. The same can equally be said in English for the roles of France, Italy and Russia - the latter especially.

I began this mad hobby 25 years ago not out of any 'deep passion' to redress a wrong. I wanted to know why one nation was at the hub of two global conflicts in a generation and why a civilised nation which fought with the inscription Gott mit uns on its belts committed atrocities which will forever burden it. I'm still looking for answers and I don't think I'll ever get them, but I'll keep searching.

People like Paul and Jack are much better able to understand the military strategy and tactics of Germany's conduct of the war as they're military men. Me, I'm a simple journalist and narrative historian. I look for a good 'story' and try to tell it. Tactics and strategy rather bore me. I'm much more interested in combat experiences, combat morale, combat motivation, the experience of the ordinary soldier. And there are still many, many, many stories to tell in English from both world wars.

Why does Ludendorff's "black day" quote arouse my passions? Chiefly because it's dredged up by lazy historian after lazy historian. It was as much a black day for Ludendorff as it was for the Army. For me, there are succession of black days: the Chemin des Dames, the Second Marne, August 8 and so on. To simply focus on one ignores the others. It doesn't alter the overall fact that the Germans lost or that the 100 days was one long succession of defeats, to be sure, it's just 'bad history' to concentrate on that singular quote.

I became an author because I became fed up with picking up books from the library and thinking "that's just plain wrong"... before rashly deciding "I could do better". Whether I have "done better" - or not - I'll leave to the judgment of others.

[salesie]

Hello Salesie,

Salesie, I am trying to answer your questions. Half the time I have to backtrack and get your words out of my mouth before I even start. I see you asking questions but unfortunately not listening to the answers. I'm sorry, but I simply don't buy the whole "redress the wrong done the German Army" and "passionate belief that the German Army has suffered a disservice" line. I would say that there is a sin of ommision. As Halder (Richard) wrote, the sources are out there in German--they're just not used.

Paul

Paul, I am listening to your attempts at answers, the problem is they're non-answers (even when I re-word my questions using your own criteria). Every one of your "answers" has been a self-contradictory, generalised attempt to justify your assertions that "a lot of information out there on the German Army in English, and accounts of its actions, are just plain wrong...in that it is incomplete, or factually not accurate." You tell us you are on a quest to write better history, "to provide a better understanding of the war" - if the version you wish to put forward is "better" than our current understanding then, logically, you must have a good idea as to the specifics of why our current perceptions of the war are not as good as the version you wish to write. Yet, with every answer you fail to be specific.

It seems to me, Paul, that you don't truly understand your own quest - and admitting that fact would be fair enough, we've all had an urge to do something without knowing the precise reason why. But when you keep making firm statements telling us that we've all been mislead and that you and your "partners" will shed light, from German language sources, on our misconceptions then you really need to be much more specific as to how and why - otherwise, if your answers to specific questions about your quest "to provide a better understanding of the war" remain self-contradictory and generalised then how much faith can we place in the conclusions you have/will draw from your own research?

Cheers-salesie.

[salesie]

Hi Salesie,

I think Paul's opening line sums my attitude up perfectly. I don't think we'll fundamentally change the opinion of the German Army, but we can plug many many gaps and provide people with a much more rounded view of the war. The same can equally be said in English for the roles of France, Italy and Russia - the latter especially.

I began this mad hobby 25 years ago not out of any 'deep passion' to redress a wrong. I wanted to know why one nation was at the hub of two global conflicts in a generation and why a civilised nation which fought with the inscription Gott mit uns on its belts committed atrocities which will forever burden it. I'm still looking for answers and I don't think I'll ever get them, but I'll keep searching.

People like Paul and Jack are much better able to understand the military strategy and tactics of Germany's conduct of the war as they're military men. Me, I'm a simple journalist and narrative historian. I look for a good 'story' and try to tell it. Tactics and strategy rather bore me. I'm much more interested in combat experiences, combat morale, combat motivation, the experience of the ordinary soldier. And there are still many, many, many stories to tell in English from both world wars.

Why does Ludendorff's "black day" quote arouse my passions? Chiefly because it's dredged up by lazy historian after lazy historian. It was as much a black day for Ludendorff as it was for the Army. For me, there are succession of black days: the Chemin des Dames, the Second Marne, August 8 and so on. To simply focus on one ignores the others. It doesn't alter the overall fact that the Germans lost or that the 100 days was one long succession of defeats, to be sure, it's just 'bad history' to concentrate on that singular quote.

I became an author because I became fed up with picking up books from the library and thinking "that's just plain wrong"... before rashly deciding "I could do better". Whether I have "done better" - or not - I'll leave to the judgment of others.

Thanks for that, Richard - I can understand the "need" to tell a cracking good yarn, but I'm a writer of fiction, (not that there's much difference between that and some so-called non-fiction, whatever the language), and I don't even suggest that I'm on a quest to clear up a general misconception gleaned from misleading history as you do in many of your posts in this thread.

I remember when I was a young soldier in the 1960's; I read several novels by Sven Hassel, whose subject matter was a German infantry unit on the Eastern Front in WW2. They were page-turners, and I found myself being engrossed by the characters and the excellent story-lines to such an extent that I empathised with the characters and even felt sympathy when some of them were killed or horribly wounded. However, after reading several of these excellent novels, a switch went off in my brain - what was I doing, what was I falling for? The men portrayed here were defending a most hideous and terrifying regime, a regime that would willingly and gladly have turned my own country into a mere slave-state of the Nazi Empire, they were part of an army that perpetrated the most awful genocide on anyone who stood in their way, or who they saw as being less human than themselves. Even in my late-teens my empathy and sympathy gave way to stark reality.

So, Richard, my judgement on your quest is more of a warning really - getting down to the human level, telling the story of the ordinary soldier can easily make us lose sight of reality. It can be misleading in itself, from a historical point of view.

Cheers-salesie.

[Dragon]

I think that from an historical point of view it would be far more misleading and, worse, intellectually dishonest to regard academic study of German sources as partisan and suspect because of what we know the Germans did in the Second World War.

[George Armstrong Custer]

I think that from an historical point of view it would be far more misleading and, worse, intellectually dishonest to regard academic study of German sources as partisan and suspect because of what we know the Germans did in the Second World War.

I don't think it's the study of these sources which is partisan and suspect Gwyn (though the conclusions drawn may be), but rather the content of sources produced under the auspices of the Reichswehr 1919 - 1935 and the Wehrmacht 1935 - 1945. And it would be particularly intellectually dishonest for a researcher to ignore the implications of the fact that anything appearing between 1933-1945 did so under the Nazis.

ciao,

GAC

[salesie]

I think that from an historical point of view it would be far more misleading and, worse, intellectually dishonest to regard academic study of German sources as partisan and suspect because of what we know the Germans did in the Second World War.

And I think that you need to read the relevant posts again, Dragon. Your point is the main reason why I was careful to answer Paul and Richard's posts separately!

Cheers-salesie.