The "machine guns" of Mons ?

[Robert Dunlop]

Could we be up against a bit of French pride here? A contemptibly small British army punching well above its weight would seem to be somewhat unpalatable to French tastes?

Salesie, I don't understand these questions. Could you explain please?

Robert

[salesie]

Well, Robert, it seems that Smith-Dorrien disagrees with you about Mons and Le Cateau:

At Mons, on the eve of battle, 22nd Aug:

"However, that night I was happy in my mind, for official news of the enemy given me indicated no great strength, and I fully expected that the Chief's expressed intention of moving forward again next day would be carried out. I had been given no information of the somewhat serious happenings in the French Army on our right; namely, that it had been forced back, and was already some nine miles south of Mons with a gap of at least nine miles between the right of our I Corps and the left of the XVIII French Corps, thus leaving us in a very vulnerable, indefensible, and salient position. Had I known of this serious situation I doubt much if my night's rest would have been as enjoyable as it proved to be - for I should have been racking my brain as to what the object of our remaining so isolated was and why we did not retire."

At Mons, the night of the 23rd Aug after the day's fighting:

"There is no doubt that the II Corps felt very proud of themselves that night, and justly so; but their losses had been heavy - 1,571 killed and wounded, whereas those of the I Corps had only been 40.

The day, too, had given me great confidence not only in the troops and their leaders but in my own Staff. It had been a great day for testing the latter, as reports, some of them none too rosy, had been coming in a continuous stream, and Forestier-Walker was never for a moment at a loss as to how to deal with them and as to what instructions to issue to remedy a difficult situation.

It was during this afternoon too that Allenby's Cavalry Division was moved along our rear from east to west to take up a position in the neighbourhood of Thulin, a difficult operation, necessitating keeping roads, thronged with battle impedimenta, clear, and this was admirably carried out by the II Corps Staff. The 8th Brigade (Doran's) had heavy work with the enemy, and it was not until 3 a.m. on the 24th that they were back at Nouvelles, three miles south of Mons and the same distance east of Frameries.

The II Corps then stood generally on the line from right to left Nouvelles-Ciply-Frameries-Paturages-Wasmes-Hornu-Boussu, confidently awaiting renewal of the battle at dawn; for the C.-in-C. had issued orders that this was to be done.

At about 11 p.m. a message from G.H.Q. summoned my Chief Staff officer to Army Head-quarters at Le Cateau, about thirty miles away, and it was past 3 a.m. on the 24th when Forestier-Walker returned to my head-quarters to say that the C.-in-C. had, in view of fresh information, decided that instead of standing to fight, the whole B.E.F. was to retire."

It seems, Robert, that the commander of II Corps was unaware that his Corps had been split almost in two. Indeed, it seems he was confidently awaiting the renewal of the battle at dawn on the 24th.

At Le Cateau, on the morning of the 26th:

"I myself was almost pinned to my head-quarters, though once (about noon) I went up to see Fergusson. The only other time I left it was at about 6.45 a.m., when a cyclist brought me a message from Bertry Station, distant about half a mile, saying Sir John French wished to speak to me on the railway telephone. I motored there immediately and heard the voice of the Sub-Chief of the General Staff, Sir Henry Wilson, who had a message to give me from the Chief to the effect that I should break off the action as soon as possible. I replied that I would endeavour to do so, but that it would be difficult, and that I had hoped to be able to hold on until evening and slip away in the dark. Henry Wilson then asked me what I thought of our chances, and when I replied that I was feeling confident and hopeful of giving the enemy a smashing blow and slipping away before he could recover, he replied, " Good luck to you, yours is the first cheerful voice I have heard for three days." With these pleasing words in my ear, which I shall never forget, I returned to my head-quarters. I should mention, however, that before I actually left the station Colonel J. Seely, who had lately been Secretary of State for War, arrived by motor with a similar message from the Chief."

It seems, Robert, that Smith-Dorrien was ordered to break-off contact as soon as possible and not wait until dark as he had originally planned.

Cheers-salesie.

[salesie]

Salesie, I don't understand these questions. Could you explain please?

Robert

Robert, these are rhetorical questions relating to Joffre's memoirs containing no praise at all for the BEF, in stark contrast to von Kluck's views.

Cheers-salesie.

[Robert Dunlop]

It seems, Robert, that the commander of II Corps was unaware that his Corps had been split almost in two.

II Corps Staff were aware of the problem. At 6.40 pm, 3rd Division sent the following message to II Corps.

"The enemy is immediately in front of my main position but up to present has not attacked there AAA He is however working round my left flank Addressed 2nd Corps Repeated 1st Corps"

II Corps replied at 7.22 pm:

"Report if there is immediate danger of centre of Corps being pierced."

3rd Division responded:

"Major CORY left an hour ago to explain situation AAA practically three battns 9th Bde hold FRAMERIES and the position indicated towards the NE and East AAA Three battns under Gen. HAKING have reached FRAMERIES AAA PANARGES was reported held by enemy this evening about 7.0 pm AAA No further news"

I believe that PANARGES is a mis-spelling of Paturages, which is west southwest of Frameries. These are, no doubt, examples of the "reports, some of them none too rosy" mentioned in Smith-Dorrien's quote.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Sir Henry Wilson, who had a message to give me from the Chief to the effect that I should break off the action as soon as possible. I replied that I would endeavour to do so, but that it would be difficult, and that I had hoped to be able to hold on until evening and slip away in the dark. Henry Wilson then asked me what I thought of our chances, and when I replied that I was feeling confident and hopeful of giving the enemy a smashing blow and slipping away before he could recover... It seems, Robert, that Smith-Dorrien was ordered to break-off contact as soon as possible and not wait until dark as he had originally planned.

We know that SD had already 'disobeyed' an order from Sir John French the previous evening. Hence the stand at Le Cateau. It is not clear that Sir Henry Wilson was giving him an order, and SD's response would be entirely in keeping with his previous decision to make a stand. SD further stated that he intended to 'hold on until evening and slip away in the dark'. The order to withdraw came earlier than 'dark'. In contrast to SD's hope of dealing a 'smashing blow', II Corps had to withdraw under severe pressure on the right flank. Sir Alymer Haldane, O.C. 10th Infantry Brigade, wrote:

"I believe the order to retire was sent out shortly after 3.30 pm, when the 5th Division which had borne the brunt of the attack, was in imminent danger of being enveloped, a situation that would have imperilled the safety of the 3rd and 4th Divisions on its left. The order reached me a few minutes before 5 pm, and directed me to cover the withdrawal of the division." ['A Brigade of the Old Army', p 24]

I have double-checked Seely's account of his meeting with SD. Not much to add really:

"Taking the long view, it was the exhaustion of our cavalry which compelled Smith-Dorrien to turn and fight at Le Cateau. I took many messages to General Smith-Dorrien during this period, and I am sure, in my own mind, that Smith-Dorrien had no option but to stand and fight as he did." ['Adventure' p 176]

Robert

[salesie]

You seem to be stuck on pedantic points, Robert, and yet again miss the end-result i.e. II Corps was not sliced in two at Mons, 5 Div was not enveloped at Le Cateau, and von Kluck himself tells us that he tried may times to outflank the BEF in this period but failed.

It seems the German Army came close to achieving many things but ultimately failed in everything it set out to do - from Mons through to 1st Ypres, the German Army failed to knock the BEF out of the war despite several opportunities to do so. It came close more than once, but failed every time. How could this be? Could it just be that the BEF stopped them from slicing it in two at Mons, stopped them from enveloping its right flank at Le Cateau, stopped them from rolling it flat at 1st Ypres, stopped them because what marked the Old contemptibles was the standard they set as fighting men? After all, there must be a reason - the end-result tells us that the BEF was not knocked out of the war, not at Mons, not at Le Cateau, not at 1st Ypres.

This is where your arguments so far fall down, Robert, all they do is tell us how the German Army came close to victory over the BEF, but not why it failed to achieve this victory - coming close is a far cry from succeeding. The British, and some German, accounts actually fit very nicely with the end-result - so far the others, including your points, do not.

Cheers-salesie.

[Ralph J. Whitehead]

I have watched some of the arguments go back and forth on this thread. Both sides are making valid points and at times I think there are two different threads in that the same general idea is being looked at but the people involved are talking about two seperate issues at times.

While I know some things about the period in discussion I get the feeling that it is being looked at in many ways as a separate matter from the rest of the war.

The historical facts are what they are. The events took place, the actions happened, etc. However they also took place when the British army was the junior member of the Allies, France by far was more engaged with the fighting against the Germans as well as the German involvement in Russia and the necessity to assist the Austro-Hungarian armies.

The British soldier was good, in particular the pre-war soldier but these men almost ceased to exist after the heavy fighting in 1914. Questions such as why the British survived the German onslaught, why they were not destroyed, etc. will never be explained in full without looking at every aspect, every front being fought on.

We could ask similar questions why Loos failed, Why Festubert and Aubers Ridge did not succeed, why Fromelles ended in the way it did. Much of it has to do with modern weapons and trench warfare. it is far easier to defend a position while entrenched than to attack over open ground, was the German a better soldier at that time for some reason or was it simply firepower, protective defenses, more reserves. This was experienced by both sides.

I recall reading in several books, names and authors elude me, that the Germans were better at the offensive in many instances and better at counterattacks while the British were considered superior in defense. Is this true? Is this opinion born out by fact? I really do not know.

When looking at any portion of the war the entire picture needs to be reviewed. My interest in casualty issues is not the be all and end all of a discussion. It is a part of the overall picture and while it does not come close to being the answer every question it is also something that should be involved in a discussion as an integral part of the understanding of why things happened the way they did or at least add to the understanding of the outcome of some event.

I am sure at some point the discussion will either find a mutual agreement or leave off with some unanswered points that will be taken up in future threads.

Ralph

[salesie]

You're correct, Ralph, when you say there is a much bigger picture e.g. I believe that a purely military victory in the field, a la Napoleon, Wellington etc., is impossible in total-war, no matter what tactics/operational initiatives are employed by any side, that only long-term strategic initiatives bring about victory by destroying one-side or the other's collective will and/or ability to wage war. And that this wearing down of an enemy takes time - that the "military learning curve" in WW1 was not one-sided, that both sides learnt from each other equally and thus forced an inevitable four-year stalemate, which only ended when these other, strategic, forces eventually made their presence felt - that Germany collapsed politically, economically and socially in the summer of 1918 and, as both a cause and an effect, the morale/collective will-to-win of its people and army collapsed along with it. That said, I also believe that military pressure on the ground is a vital "ally" to these other forces in bringing about ultimate victory - attrition being the most important military aspect in total-war.

In WW1, ultimate victory was brought about by a combination of highly aggressive ground forces, the naval blockade and the navy's ability to effectively defeat the U-boat threat, the efforts of British Military Intelligence in their superbly "fought" subversion/propaganda campaign, the wholesale reorganisation of the industrial home-front and the maximum use of the Empire's resources. And, dare I say it, the politicians who, despite the occasional serious internal strife and the delay in realising what was actually needed for victory, kept the whole show on the road, with their diplomatic skills with allies, with their skilful economic balancing act between competing resources, and with their solidity of purpose in pursuing their goal - it was no fluke that the allied "team" out-performed the Germans; effective management of all resources is vital for victory in total-war.

However, the period Aug-Nov 1914 is something of an anomaly - it is a period of open warfare, before the total-war stalemate in the field set in. And, importantly, it is a period when the German Army had no disadvantage in manpower and resources. Consequently, it is a period when the old image that, "the superior German Army was let down badly, stabbed in the back, by the civilians back home," can be shown to be a highly false picture. This is the period that shows us, more than any other period, that in the final analysis the much vaunted German Army simply wasn't good enough in the first place.

Cheers-salesie.

[Robert Dunlop]

I have gathered a selection of personal anecdotes that illustrate German soldiers' perspectives on their training. Some quotes date from after the start of the war. Hopefully, they will be of interest to some readers. The quotes highlight the importance given to markmanship, including the rating of units as a whole and not just individuals, and training for the advance in skirmishing order.

First, from Stephen Westman's book "Surgeon with the Kaiser's Army". He received his call-up 'official letter' in February 1914.

"Our training was centred on firing on the rifle ranges, and I must say that after a few weeks our instructors succeeded in making almost every one of us a first-class shot. The beautiful surroundings of Freiburg, the hills, valleys and forests, were ideal training-grounds, and night marches or night patrolling made us highly efficient for the role we were to play in the near future.

A few days [after the end of July 1914] we began studying maps for the manoeuvres of our division, fixed for September, in the region of the family seat of the Hohenzollerns."

The manoeuvres never took place because of the declaration of war.

The following snippets cover a 4-5 month period. They come from Georg Grabenhorst's book 'Zero Hour' and relate to 1916:

"On this particular day we are marching out with the ninth squad to the rifle range, where we have to have shooting practice at three hundred metres, prone position.

Outside, at the long range, Private Lurtjebam, lying on the firing stand, takes the rifle that Klassen puts into his hands, and thentakes a long steady aim through his round spectacles. [He] fires his five shots without any fuss, and, in spite of mist and snow, scores 7, 9, 9, 9, 10 - 44 points altogether, a good score.

After him comes Pfeiffer, who scores 0, 3, 5, 2, 0. As he misses the target the second time, the O.C. came by - a big man with gold eye-glasses and a cold face, a headmaster in private life. He holds a riding whip in his right hand, like a fountain pen.

The captain scolds the squad for its bad shooting, very short and sharp. 'You must make them do better than that,' he says to the corporal. 'Target practice every morning for them, and remember - the greatest strictness in everything.'"

"Towards the end of the morning we practice deploying and company drill. Everything is done in quick time. For example, when the order sounds, 'Company on the left - form - line!' the column goes on steadily, but everybody's legs already begin to jerk, rifle butts are seized more firmly, and eyes go squinting towards the spot one has to get to - until, on 'Forward - march!' one shies off, half-left, like a frightened horse, towards some larch sapling, beautifully in bud."

"Drill begins. Spread out in skirmishing order, we tear about the rough plough, then throw ourselves down. We are glad to lie for this brief moment on the thistles that go sticking through our trousers into our thighs. Lance-corporals run from man to man, hot and perspiring, testing our aim.

'Run - lie down; run - lie down!' This is what they call working up on the enemy. We count the minutes. The sun stands high over the helmet spikes and seems, nevertheless, to go on climbing. The first hour goes without a pause. The line of skirmishers works down the field. About - march! Back to the top...

Beneath them, the Fourth Company is still skirmishing, making a long line with paces' distance from man to man. One must admit that the O.C. doesn't spare himself; he runs about with us. But he has no pack, no cartridge bet, no rifle. If I call him an ape, that's little enough. I'm ready to wish that he might fall dead in his tracks.

From my upper lip I lick salt, salt, salt.

'Down!'

The sun is shining round my skull, my elbows go boring into the earth. I bite off a parched flower and eat it up. The helmet and sweat blot out the view. What if I stay lying?

'Up!'

Everybody starts up, nobody remains lying, all jump forward. What do they think in jumping forward? They think the same as I do: Torture!

The hunt in the cage is over and the company falls in by the church. That four hours are gone by seems a wonder."

The next quotes come from a book written by an anonymous author "Schlump: The Story of an Unknown Soldier":

"Their home training was to last eight weeks. Six were gone. There recruits were then transferred to Altengrabow, for field exercises. Sergeant-major Bobermin, who kept them on the go with his eternal 'Down flat! Up! Forward! Down flat! Up! Forward!'... addressed them briefly, before they left, to the following effect: 'Attention! You're going to Altengrabow now! For field exercises! You're going to live in barracks from now on. Forward, march!'

They had company exercises. The captain sat on his horse and commanded. The noncoms perspired and looked angry, though they carried no packs, and they vented their rage on the recruits. It was Column Right! and Column Left! and the recruits were made to run like hares through the sand. In the little woods behind the sand hills they had to lie down, take up their weapons in both hands, and pull themselves uphill by digging their elbows in the sand. This was the worst exercise of all. Some of the soldiers were so wild with rage that the tears came into their eyes. At last they were on top. Then

the captain reassembled the company and commanded on the march. 'Blank cartridges - load! Lock! Cavalry attacking on the right! Steady Aim! Fire!' The salvo crashed out, the captain's horse staggered and fell, the captain sprang clear. The horse received a bullet in the neck. The company marched back to barracks. The guilty man was never found."

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Some further quotes from Ludwig Renn's book 'War'. These relate to an infantry advance in the first weeks of the war, having just crossed into France:

"'To your rifles!' came a shout from outside. Two shrapnels burst over the next house. We ran for our rifles and baggage.

'Platoons advance in open formation!' cried the Lieutenant.

We deployed over a bright green field. Zip! Zip! it went past us.

'Lie down!' shouted Sergeant Ernst.

We flung ourselves down on the wet grass. To the right there was a tree behind whose thick trunk Corporal Pferl, our section commander, threw himself."

Renn now describes the disconcerting effects of being under sustained shrapnel fire, then:

"'Ernst's platoon! Up! At the double!' bellowed the sergeant.

I tore myself to my feet and advanced. We came to a slope falling abruptly.

'Lie down!' bellowed Ernst.

I looked round me. Where were the shells falling now? A few rifle bullets whizzed from the hollow.

'The French are straight in front there in the bushes! At nine hundred yards - fire!' barked Ernst.

'Advance by sections!' bellowed Ernst.

'Lamm's section!' cried the one year's man on my left. 'Ready! Up! At the double!'

We ran forward, Lamm in front. A stone wall with a thin line of bushes lay before us.

'Halt!' shouted Lamm. 'At eight hundred yards!'

We threw ourselves behind the wall. He was a lad, the one year's man! And in the garrison he had not even become a lance-corporal, because he could not give an order.

'On the retreating Frenchmen!' cried Lamm. 'At a thousand yards - fire!'

Right enough! Small bands were popping out of the bushes and sneaking back. We fired hurriedly, but we did not seem to hit anyone.

The French soldiers disappeared into a wood. Our firing ceased."

Robert

[Ralph J. Whitehead]

However, the period Aug-Nov 1914 is something of an anomaly - it is a period of open warfare, before the total-war stalemate in the field set in. And, importantly, it is a period when the German Army had no disadvantage in manpower and resources. Consequently, it is a period when the old image that, "the superior German Army was let down badly, stabbed in the back, by the civilians back home," can be shown to be a highly false picture. This is the period that shows us, more than any other period, that in the final analysis the much vaunted German Army simply wasn't good enough in the first place.

Cheers-salesie.

While this is correct in many ways Salesie we come back to the overall picture, even in the opening days of the war. Your opinion is one way of looking at the situation. Another could be the German army was fighting on fronts in Russia and France/Belgium and as such inflicted serious losses on both the French armies and the Russian armies in this period while maintaining an advance into several countries.

They also faced issues of simply being exhausted from the advance, as much as the British and French were exhausted in the initial withdrawal. Reconnaissance, while good at times was still not perfect and as such there were times certain assumptions were made incorrectly, etc.

The Germans should never have sent the corps east right before the battle of the Marne, they would have served better in France and I believe arrived too late in the east to help that situation. While they may not have achieved everything they desired, plans were altered, situations changed from pre-war estimates.

An example of the last section is the sudden ammunition shortage, artillery and small arms ammunition. Their consumption far outstripped their pre-war estimates and the armies were told to conserve if possible.

So looking at the opening months from another perspective is that great success was achieved but not everything, everywhere. If the German army had only the French and British armies (Belgians too) to contend with, using all of their resources in infantry and artillery as well as cavalry at hand I wonder how the Allied armies would have done? An interesting idea for another thread possibly?

Ralph

P.S. That stab in the back nonsense was a simple way to excuse the actions of the war and while it may have served a purpose when it was used does not really address all of the issues facing Germany during the war. Too bad it was ever thought of at all.

[Robert Dunlop]

Westman's quote refers to the field tactical training (Felddienstübungen) conducted within the German army. Each year there would be a three- to four-week spell of company through brigade training carried out in the major training areas. Division and corps training took place over a two-week period in September, as noted by Westman. The training exercises included practice in things like meeting engagements, rear guard and breaking off, envelopment and pursuit, and night attacks. After-action reports (Gefechtsberichte) covered 'the situation, information on the enemy, orders received, troop-leading procedures and commander's decisions, movements and "combat", including a well-drawn sketch'. Exercises were critiqued by higher level commanders. Zuber notes that several AARs of pre-war training exercises have survived, providing considerable details and evidence for wide range of scenarios that were practised at different levels of organisation.

Robert

[Pete1052]

The different attack formations used by the German army in 1914 could mean that there was no single prescribed way of doing things, or if there was it was not percolating down to the regiment and battalion level where training was being conducted. If the latter were the case it could mean that sergeants and captains were teaching things the way they'd been taught them several years earlier, the latest manual be damned. About 35 years ago the U.S. Army made an effort to standardize its training when it became obvious that the same tasks were being taught in different ways at various army schools. There were also variations in "official" terminology as well. One of the reasons for standardizing things was that it made the testing and evaluation of soldiers and units more objective. Standardization had its benefits but it also inhibited flexibility and innovation at the local level, particularly when instructors felt they had to adhere to a canned script when training soldiers. That was particularly the case when there was an inspector present with a clipboard and a pen.

[salesie]

While this is correct in many ways Salesie we come back to the overall picture, even in the opening days of the war. Your opinion is one way of looking at the situation. Another could be the German army was fighting on fronts in Russia and France/Belgium and as such inflicted serious losses on both the French armies and the Russian armies in this period while maintaining an advance into several countries.

They also faced issues of simply being exhausted from the advance, as much as the British and French were exhausted in the initial withdrawal. Reconnaissance, while good at times was still not perfect and as such there were times certain assumptions were made incorrectly, etc.

The Germans should never have sent the corps east right before the battle of the Marne, they would have served better in France and I believe arrived too late in the east to help that situation. While they may not have achieved everything they desired, plans were altered, situations changed from pre-war estimates.

An example of the last section is the sudden ammunition shortage, artillery and small arms ammunition. Their consumption far outstripped their pre-war estimates and the armies were told to conserve if possible.

So looking at the opening months from another perspective is that great success was achieved but not everything, everywhere. If the German army had only the French and British armies (Belgians too) to contend with, using all of their resources in infantry and artillery as well as cavalry at hand I wonder how the Allied armies would have done? An interesting idea for another thread possibly?

Ralph

P.S. That stab in the back nonsense was a simple way to excuse the actions of the war and while it may have served a purpose when it was used does not really address all of the issues facing Germany during the war. Too bad it was ever thought of at all.

Ralph, no "great successes" were made by the German Army in the West, and not just in the opening months; the German Army failed to achieve any of its objectives at any time during the war in the West. As I said earlier, coming close is a far cry from succeeding.

The German Army in the West suffered from no serious manpower or material shortages during those opening months (though the BEF did), so why include the what-if that says, "if only the German Army had just the French, British and Belgian armies to deal with"? If the German Jackboots had not stepped over the Belgian border then it would only have had the French Army to deal with in the West - if Germany hadn't been so arrogantly over-confident in its own military prowess, and crossed the Belgian border, then Britain would probably not have committed to the land war on the continent (something it had assiduously tried to avoid for some time). I could say, what-if the BEF had had four or five times the number of British regulars in the field than it did, then how far do you think the German Army would have got? But I don't deal in what-ifs, the end-result means that I don't need to use red-herrings to try and make failure look like success!

Exhausted troops, difficulties in reconnaissance and ammunition shortages were common to both sides - indeed, the tiny BEF in 1914 could not rotate its men in the line virtually at all, and problems with ammunition shortages caused a most serious and far reaching political crisis in Britain in 1915 - but the British rose to the challenge, and eventually solved the problem in no small measure. The fact is, that Britain, Germany's nemesis, was totally unprepared for the war, but its tiny standing army was, fortunately, highly professional, and by 1914 the French Army had closed to a degree the massive gap in ability with the German Army that existed in 1870/71.

The bottom line is, that Germany grossly overestimated its own military prowess whilst seriously underestimating the capabilities of the allies (and made exactly the same mistake again in 1939). And, the period Aug-Nov 1914 highlights this fatal flaw in the collective German psyche more than any other period of the war.

Cheers-salesie.

[Robert Dunlop]

I have collated together all of the references posted in this thread so far from British first-hand accounts relating to the effects of BEF rifle fire and/or descriptions of how German infantry advanced:

4/Middlesex (Mons)

1.

2nd Suffolks (Le Cateau)

2.

2nd Duke of Wellingtons (Le Cateau)

3.

3rd Worcesters (Le Cateau)

4.

1st Rifle Brigade (Le Cateau)

5.

1 QORWK (Mons)

6.

7.

KOSB (Mons)

8.

15th Hussars (Mons)

9.

2nd Gordon Highlanders (1st Ypres)

10.

Royal West Kents

11.

12.

2 Royal Irish Rifles

13.

Gordon Highlander

14.

Various British regimental histories (Le Cateau)

15.

16.

2/KOYLI (Le Cateau)

17.

1 E Lan R

18.

Apologies if I have missed any out.

Robert

[salesie]

Seeing as it's gone "all quiet on the Western Front", here's an anecdote that some members may find amusing:

Frederick the Great of Prussia asked Sir Robert Sutton at a review of his tall grenadiers if he thought an equal number of Englishmen could beat them.

“Sir,” replied Sir Robert, “I do not venture to assert that; but I know that half the number would try.”

Naval and Military Anecdotes, 1824

Cheers-salesie.

[Tom A McCluskey]

"We know that SD had already 'disobeyed' an order from Sir John French the previous evening."

What order, and when was this please?

Aye

Tom McC

[Robert Dunlop]

Tom, this was Operation Order No. 8 issued by GHQ on 25/8/1914 and received by II Corps at 9 pm that same day.

Robert

[salesie]

Tom, this was Operation Order No. 8 issued by GHQ on 25/8/1914 and received by II Corps at 9 pm that same day.

Robert

What did this order say, Robert?

Cheers-salesie.

[Robert Dunlop]

Section 5 contains the material relevant to II Corps:

"The II Corps, with the 19th Bde., will move in echelon and fall back in the general direction of Beaurevoir - Prémont - La Sablière.

The billeting area for to-morrow night being from Beaurevoir [exclus.] to La Sablière."

This is about 10-15 km southwest of Le Cateau.

Robert

[salesie]

Section 5 contains the material relevant to II Corps:

"The II Corps, with the 19th Bde., will move in echelon and fall back in the general direction of Beaurevoir - Prémont - La Sablière.

The billeting area for to-morrow night being from Beaurevoir [exclus.] to La Sablière."

This is about 10-15 km southwest of Le Cateau.

Robert

It seems, Robert, that things were not quite as simple as you imagine, it was not a simple case of disobeying orders i.e. Smith-Dorrien mentions operational order no.8 in his memoirs, and gives the reasons why he considered he needed to depart from it. Please take note of his reference to Field Service Regulations, (sub-para. iii. of para. 13 of Section 12 of Part I), which places responsibilty on the local commander to depart from the letter of previous orders if changed circumstances demand it. Also note, his message to GHQ informing them of his need to depart from his previous orders, and to the reply from GHQ giving him a free hand as to his method of standing at Le Cateau but to make every endeavour to continue the retreat (in line with Wilson's telephone call and Seely's arrival at the railway station, mentioned in an earlier post).

From this, Robert, it seems that not only was Smith-Dorrien acting fully within regulations but that he acted with French's eventual approval.

"My Staff established our Head-quarters at the village of Bertry, where I joined them at dark and awaited news of the arrival of my scattered troops. In the course of the afternoon, as far as I recollect about 6 p.m., I received a note from the Sub-Chief of the General Staff, Henry Wilson, saying the Chief had told him to warn me that orders would shortly be issued for continuing the retreat instead of standing at Le Cateau. The actual General Head-quarters' order reached me at 9 p.m., and my order to the II Corps to continue the retirement next day was issued at 10.15 p.m.

It will be difficult for any reader to realise the fog of war which surrounded us that night. Communication was most difficult, and although the Corps signallers, under that most resourceful of men, Major A. B. R. Hildebrand, R.E. (now Brigadier-General, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.), performed miracles with their wires and cables, it was impossible to find out the positions of units until hours after they reached them. Then it was not as if I only had the II Corps to deal with, for mixed up with them, fighting and retiring together, were the Cavalry Division, the 19th Infantry Brigade, and the 4th Division, none of which were under me, but were reporting their movements to and getting their orders from General Head-quarters, twenty-six miles to the rear. It is true that General Head-quarters issued an order timed 1 p.m. 25th August, placing the 19th Brigade under the II Corps, but it was then with the Cavalry Division, miles away, and heaven knows when it got the order. I only succeeded in collecting them next morning, when they were starting south from the town of Le Cateau. It appears that they had reached that place at 10 p.m. the night before, and, thoroughly exhausted, had dumped down in the marketplace and were resuming their retirement at 6 a.m. when my order caught them. This latter ear-marked them as my own reserves for the day, and most valuable they proved: a busy time of it they had, now supporting one part of the line, now another, and finally forming a rear-guard which, with that of the 15th Brigade, stubbornly covered the retreat of the 5th Division. The Brigade consisted of 2nd Royal Welch Fusiliers, 1st Scottish Rifles, 1st Middlesex, and 2nd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, and were then commanded temporarily by Lieutenant-Colonel Ward of the Middlesex in the absence of the Brigadier, Major-General L. G. Drummond. At last, about 8 p.m., I got news of the 3rd Division ; the main bodies of the 8th and 9th Brigades had reached the vicinity of their allotted positions about Audencourt and Inchy respectively about 6.30 p.m.; but there was still no news of the 7th Brigade, nor did I get any until the small hours of the 26th, and then to the effect that it had reached its destination at Caudry about midnight, but with the loss of the 2nd Royal Irish Rifles, part of the South Lancashires, and the 41st Battery R.F.A. Next day I heard that these units had reached Reumont and bivouacked there at 2 a.m., and had only rejoined their Brigade at 9 a.m. when the battle was pretty lively. Of the Cavalry Division and 4th Division I had no news, for they were not under me, though I had been given permission to call on the latter Division for help should I require it.

Rumours were afloat during the evening that the I Corps were heavily engaged, and reports came in that heavy firing was heard in the direction of Landrecies. This was serious as, if they were not nearer than that, it meant a gap of eight miles between the right of my Corps and the left of the I Corps. Thus it will be gathered that, with the exception of a few units of the 5th Division, no fighting units were on the position before dark, that a great many of those of the II Corps were on the move until after midnight, and that the 4th Division only reached the position at daylight next day. I specify " fighting units," as all transport and impedimenta accompanied by baggage guards, cooks, clerks, sick, etc. had moved off from our line positions on the night of the 24th about midnight and had therefore mostly reached their new positions in the course of the next morning, so a large number of men were to be seen cooking, washing, and waiting for the arrival of their Corps. I mention this as a good deal has been written on the subject as evidence that troops were in camp early, for I feel sure these detachments I have mentioned were mistaken for the actual fighting troops—Map 9 of the Official History illustrates clearly the scattered situations of the troops on the night of 25th-26th August.

However, some of the fog was cleared away by the arrival of General Allenby, accompanied by his G.S.O.I, Colonel J. Vaughan (now Major-General, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.) at my head-quarters at 2 a.m. Allenby told me his troops were much scattered, two and a half brigades being about Catillon, five miles east, and the other one and a half brigades at Viesly, six miles north-west of Le Cateau, that his men and horses were pretty well played out, and that he could not get into touch with General Head-quarters. He wanted to know what I was going to do, saying that unless I could move at once and get away in the dark, the enemy were so close that I should be forced to fight at daylight. I then sent for Major-General Hubert Hamilton, the Commander of the 3rd Division, whose head-quarters were close by, and asked him whether his troops could move off at once or at any rate before daylight, and his reply was very definite that the 3rd Division could not move before 9 a.m. The 5th Division were if possible in a worse plight, being more scattered, whilst of the 4th Division, which, though not under me, I could not possibly leave in the lurch, there was no news, except that they had last been seen after dark still in their positions south of Solesmes, covering the retirement of masses of transport and fugitives jammed up in the roads.

The following arguments passed through my mind:

a. It must be a long time after daylight before the whole force covered by rear-guards can get on the move.

b. The enemy are in force close to our billets (for such Allenby had impressed on me).

c. To turn our backs on them in broad daylight with worn-out men suffering from sore feet will leave us a prey to hostile cavalry supported by infantry in motors.

d. The roads are encumbered with military transport and civilian fugitives and carts, some still on the enemy side of our position, and time to allow them to clear off is essential.

e. The I Corps is reported to be engaged some miles northeast of us and to retire would expose their flank to the full brunt of Von Kluck's troops.

f. The Cavalry Division can be of little help in covering our retreat, for this Allenby had told me.

g. Our infantry have proved their staunchness and astounding accuracy with the rifle, our gunners are a marvel, and if Allenby and Snow will act under me, and Sordet will guard my west flank, we should be successful in giving the enemy a stopping blow, under cover of which we could retire.

Well do I remember the dead silence in the little room at Bertry when I was rapidly considering these points and the sigh of relief when, on my asking Allenby if he would accept orders from me, and he replied in the affirmative, I remarked : " Very well, gentlemen, we will fight, and I will ask General Snow to act under me as well." The die was cast, and it is lucky it was, for it appeared afterwards that the 4th Division did not commence moving back from opposite Solesmes until long after dark, the rear Brigade not until midnight, and only reached the fighting positions allotted to them on the west of the II Corps from Fontaine-au-Pire to Wambaix (a front of three miles) after daylight on the 26th. They were very weary, having journeyed straight from England, detrained at Le Cateau on the 24th, and marched thence at I a.m. on the 25th eight or nine miles to Solesmes, been in action there all day, and marched back over ten miles in the dark to their position, which was reached after dawn on the 26th. The unfortunate part about this Division was that it lacked the very essentials for a modern battle. It had none of the following: Divisional Cavalry, Divisional Cyclists, Signal Company, Field Ambulances, Field Companies R.E., Train and Divisional Ammunition Column, or Heavy Artillery. Let the reader think what that means—no troops to give warning, neither rapidly moving orderlies nor cables for communication, no means of getting away wounded, no engineers, who are the handy men of an army, no reserve ammunition, and no long-range heavy shell fire—and yet the Division was handled and fought magnificently, but at the expense of losses far greater than, if they had been fully mobilised.

Having decided to fight, there was a good deal for my Staff to do. General Head-quarters had to be informed, a message had to be sent to General Sordet to tell him and ask him to guard my west flank, and Snow had to be asked if he would fight under me, and last, but not least, carefully detailed orders for the battle had to be drawn up and circulated. Forestier-Walker, who was a very clear thinker and rapid worker, soon got all this done. To make certain that General Sordet should get the request, in addition to my message to him, a wire was sent to General Headquarters asking them too to invoke his assistance.

General Snow received my message about 5 a.m. just as he was issuing orders to retire, and readily consented to remain and fight vnder my orders. Snow wrote to me subsequently as follows : " When you sent to me the morning of the 26th to ask if I would stand and fight, I ought to have answered: ' I have no other choice, as my troops are already engaged in a battle of encounter, and it must be some hours before I can extricate them "

The message informing General Head-quarters is referred, to in the Official History) p. 136, as follows : "A lengthy message was dispatched by II Corps at 3.30 a.m. to General Head-quarters St. Quentin by motor-car, which was received there about 5 a.m., informing Sir John French in detail of the decision taken." It was acknowledged by a reply, sent off from General Head-quarters at 5 a.m., which, after giving the latest information, concluded: "If you can hold your ground the situation appears likely to improve. Fourth Division must co-operate. French troops are taking offensive on right of I Corps. Although you are given a free hand as to method this telegram is not intended to convey the impression that I am not as anxious for you to carry out the retirement, and you must make every endeavour to do so."

This reply cheered me up, for it showed that the Chief did not altogether disapprove of the decision I had taken, but on the contrary considered it might improve the situation. Consciousness that I was acting entirely without G.H.Q. approval would not have lightened my burden, especially as I had another master to consider, namely. Field Service Regulations, which direct (sub-para. iii. of para. 13 of Section 12 of Part I) : "If a subordinate, in the absence of a superior, neglects to depart from the letter of his order, when such departure is clearly demanded by circumstances, and failure ensues, he will be held responsible for such failure.""

Cheers-salesie.

[Tom A McCluskey]

Robert,

Cheers for the clarification. Like Salesie, I see no problem with disregarding an order that circumstances have dictated should no longer be carried out - a policy endorsed by Field Service Regulations.

Here is more on the situation, by Maj Gen Forestier-Walker:-

THE BATTLE OF LE CATEAU

Statement by Major-General G. T. Forestier Walker

1. During the whole of the period covered by the retreat from MONS I Was B.G.G.S. of the 2nd Corps.

2. At about 2 a.m. on the 26th, General Allenby arrived at 2nd Corps H.Q. and interviewed the Corps Commander. I was present during the whole of the interview.

General Allenby described the positions of his troops so far as he knew them, and stated that they were very exhausted. He also gave later information as to the progress made by the enemy that had until then been received by the 2nd Corps, especially as regards its threat to the left flank of the British. He expressed the strong opinion that, unless the Corps was to incur the risk of being pinned to the ground, the units should be put in march with the least possible delay, and should be clear of the position before it was light enough for the enemy to attack.

3. It was manifestly impossible to carry out this suggestion. Some of the units had only reached the position by midnight or later, and some had not reported “in” at the time of this interview.

All the infantry of the 3rd and 5th Divisions were very exhausted, and would be slow in getting on the move.

As B.G.G. S., I pointed out to the Corps Commander that a change in orders could not possibly reach the smaller units, under the circumstances, without considerable delay, and that it would be impossible at that late hour to get the tired troops on the march, much less clear of the position before daylight. It was a question, therefore, whether to adhere to the orders previously issued, or to do the best in the time at our disposal to perfect the defensive arrangements which had already begun the day before, and to accept battle.

The decision of the Corps Commander was prompt and definite, to accept battle.

4. I cannot now remember to what extent, if any, the Corps Commander discussed the pros and cons, but the opinion of my-self and the other members of the Staff was, and in my own case still is, as follows:-

If, as appeared certain from General Allenby’s information, the enemy attack should catch the Corps in front (i.e., normal front) and flank in the act of moving off, the result would almost certainly be disastrous to us.

On the other hand, there was every prospect of our being able to put up a good fight by holding the ground on which we stood. The enemy would be bound to suffer terribly, and there was a fair prospect that we could hold him off until night and then continue our march, knowing that he would be in no position to pursue.

At the worst, we could with confidence count on checking the enemy to such an extent as to ensure the safety of the 1st Corps.

G. Forestier Walker

Major General

Wilton, 3/8/19.

Aye

Tom McC

[Robert Dunlop]

It seems that Smith-Dorrien was ordered to break-off contact as soon as possible and not wait until dark as he had originally planned.

Thank you, Tom. Like you, I see no problem in SD making an alternative decision on the basis of the circumstances facing II Corps. This approach was acknowledged in the Field Service Regulations, as you say. The German Staff had a similar approach too. I have additional material about the circumstances facing II Corps, including transcripts of the several messages that flowed between II Corps and the divisions, etc. Smith-Dorrien's account is one of many, and thank you for posting the material from Maj Gen Forestier-Walker.

My comment was made in response to salesie's quote, highlighted above. I was noting that SD was not bound to follow the Operation Order, which is why I put 'disobeyed' in single quotes. This was not meant to infer that SD was wrong or that he was wrongfully disobeying GHQ's Operation Order. Salesie had suggested that SD broke off the Battle of Le Cateau because he was ordered to do so on the morning of the battle. I am suggesting that he broke earlier than he had expected to because of the effective pressure from the German attack on the right wing of II Corps. Given that SD had already made a decision on the 25/26 to hold the line until the evening of the 26th, if possible, I believe it is entirely possible that SD did not change his mind as a result of an 'order' on the morning of the 26th.

Robert

[Tom A McCluskey]

Also, from Maj A. F. Becke’s book The Royal Artillery at Le Cateau (written in 1919):

On the 26th August, 1914, the most powerful and best equipped fighting machine ever put into the field up to that time, flushed too with the joy of a campaign successfully opened, had been opposed in a bitter fight by a force of half its strength that stood undauntedly at bay to bar its further onrush. By the end of that day the attackers had been beaten to a standstill, and so mauled they that their only desire was to allow the 2nd Corps to continue its withdrawal from the field unmolested, save by the sullen boom of the German guns; and their unsupported fire at this moment was the sure proof of the discomfiture suffered by the German host.

For four days the pressure and pursuit had been those of a conquering army. But the action of Le Cateau, fought on the 26th August, 1914, changed the character of the pursuit of the German army and thereafter it degenerated into a respectful pursuit by mounted troops and mobile detachments only.

It is worth remembering too, that Joffre had some half-decade before, purged the army of defensive principles and formed his ‘assaulting’ army whose central model was Plan 17. In contrast to the attacking tactics of the French, the Germans were now faced with a determined, skilled, and well-trained foe that was fighting defensively which was quite contrary to how the French were fighting.

Aye

Tom McC

[Robert Dunlop]

I would like to pause for a moment, and pick up on some points that Ralph made. Sometimes it seems that we are discussing two separate issues. If I raise the possibility that the German army performed in a competent fashion, this appears to be interpreted to mean that the BEF was not competent. From my perspective, however, it makes the performance of the BEF even more impressive. It is one thing to be proud of a well trained professional army that shot down rows and rows of Prussian automata. How much more so if the BEF was up against a tough formidable opponent. IMHO, we do not need to hide any of the mistakes that were made, or the limited tactical successes achieved by the Germans. They do not detract from the overall. But they do give us insights, IMHO, into some of the issues that the BEF had problems with later in the war. And any such issues should make us more, not less, proud of what was achieved.

I am not of the school that says the Germans were absolutely wonderful, the British were absolutely rubbish - the sort of thing that Samuels inferred in his book "Command or Control? Command, Training and Tactics in the British and German Armies, 1888-1918". But neither am I content to stop with the accepted accounts published in English. My capacity to read and understand German is very limited by comparison to others on this Forum. Thankfully, we have the services of several members who have lifted our knowledge of the 'other side' to new levels. Should this new knowledge be accepted without question? Of course not, and it is great that we debate these issues robustly. So thank you for raising questions, challenging information and conclusions.

Robert