Capture of Major Yate

[seaforths]

Seaforths. you might want to read my post more carefully. I did not say we should only discuss the things I like. I simply said "debating whether someone deserved a VC or not is arguably rather pointless".

Personally I have no interest in debating whether someone got a VC or not. Others may find this aspect interesting and that is their prerogative. Good luck to them. It's just not for me and that is my prerogative. If the thread had been titled 'Did Yate deserve his VC?" I doubt I would ever have clicked on the thread. The other aspects I find are far more fascinating. Good luck with your research. MG

Sometimes, it is not what is said it is how it is said that affects its perception by others.I would like to think we all seek to learn. However, we are all at different levels of knowledge in different areas. I would never have considered the use of awards as propaganda nor have examined more closely how they were conferred if it hadn't been discussed. I do have some interest in the awards and VCs and I feel that area of the thread was drawing to its natural conclusion.

If a thread ceases to interest me, I leave it alone. If certain aspects continue to interest me I will continue because I realise that sometimes it will swing in different directions and return to those aspects. I don't post parting shots if my intention is to leave it alone, I don't feel it necessary.

On a lighter note, I do seem to be having some luck with my research.! Following on from Wyliecoyote's good advice I have been tracking down the OOB's from all the Bayerische Landwehr-Infanterie-Regt on the record as at August 1914. All so far have been safely allocated away in the 5th, 6th and 7th Armee sectors as Reserve troops. Except for one regiment which was missing. I then found one tiny reference on the net, just a single mention. It was somebody's grandfather's service details, which stated the unit was 'immobile', and used 'guarding prisoners'. Something you don't see every day ... will keep you posted.

Cheers, S>S

Nice work! I think WylieCoyte in his post earlier has established that they were not, in some areas, so well prepared for war regarding equipment and uniform. Those less prepared being used in a supporting role further back makes total sense.

I read through that link you posted and they listed three references if you scroll to the very bottom but nothing directly relating to the photograph. You can't tell which reference applies to what. However, if the photograph and 'anecdotal' information go together, it might have been published in a post war book or similar publication rather than in a newspaper. If you think about it, they would hardly want to publish a photograph in British press at the time showing him as he is, utterly shattered and surrounded by his captors. It may however, have been published in another country, say German press and/or a neutral country may have published it - America still being neutral at that time, it would have an English written caption.

[shippingsteel]

It may however, have been published in another country, say German press and/or a neutral country may have published it - America still being neutral at that time, it would have an English written caption.

That's exactly what I have been thinking ... America is the obvious candidate for having it written up (in English) at such a 'delicate' time for British public sentiment. Needs checking.

Cheers, S>S

[Guest]

I promised in an earlier post to provide Bond's narrative of Le Cateau written sometime between 1914 and 1918. This was part of his correspondence with Atikinson in 1918. It is a verbatim copy of an original typewritten document annotated and signed by Bond. I have little doubt that this docuement was used as the foundationfor Bond's account in the 1929 published history, with some changes. The only changes I have made is to capitalise the unit names and place names and surnames. There is a very good map in the RA account of the action attached at the bottom, which gives a much better idea of what was going on around the KOYLI and the proximity to the Suffolks etc. MG

26th Aug 1914. (Wednesday). At 2:35 am, orders were received detailing arrangements for a renewed retirement. The order to stand to at 3:30 am was repeated. The orders specified the part to be played by the 2nd Bn KING’S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INF in Rear Guard. It was to hold on, in conjunction with the KING’S OWN SCOTTISH BORDERERS on its left, to the position of trenches at present covered by our outpost Company, until 11:00 am, by which time the Divisional train would be clear. “If the situation permits” the Rear Guard was then to retire. From the time of arrival of these last orders, the Battalion had less than one hour to prepare. Supplies had to be distributed from the 1st line wagons which had arrived over night; new maps to be got at and the Battalion then had to go forward in the dark and take up a position not previously reconnoitered. C Coy (Capt LUTHER), was ordered to occupy the high ground overlooking the village of LE CATEAU, South of the BAVAI – REUMONT road. This was too extended a position for one Company to hold. North of the road, D Coy (Maj TREVOR), carried on the line parallel to the LE CATEAU – CAMBRAI road and West of it. North of D Coy, the trenches between that Company and those to be occupied by the KING’S OWN SCOTTISH BORDERERS were allotted to A Coy (Maj HEATHCOTE), whose Company, already on outpost, had to be concentrated.

B Coy, (Maj YATE) were held in reserve and ordered to dig themselves in near the crest of the slope which overlooked the line of trenches. The trenches already dug existed only North of the road. They were disconnected and sited in parallel straight lengths at intervals to oppose the approaches from the East. The great road to CAMBRAI, which ran along their front, was in some cases only about 500 yards distant. It formed a valuable covered approach for the enemy, who concentrated under the cover of its banks without exposing themselves. The road was edged with Poplar trees.

Each of the three Companies in the firing line had to dispose of its half-Companies in local support as best it could, using their field entrenching tools to throw up what cover they could in the time at disposal.

Before 6:00 am however, dispositions were greatly changed. The position thinly occupied by C Coy, obviously high ground of the utmost importance, was handed over for occupation by the 14th INF BDE, with Lt Col STEVENS’ Brigade of RFA and the 52nd Howitzer Bty. C Coy were brought across to the North of the road and assigned a position generally in support of A Coy. One Platoon of C Coy, under Lt WILLIAMS, remained in the position of reserve and continued to deepen the trenches already commenced and now vacated, by B Coy. Other trenches of the same system were occupied by the Battalion Signallers and Battalion HQ. In order to defilade the trenches now occupied by the MANCHESTER REGT Battalion of the 14th INF BDE, B Coy was moved by the Brigadier General to a new position facing South East in the ditches on either side of the REUMONT road. As the North side of the road was higher than the South, they formed two tiers of fire and were able to produce considerable concentrated fire effect. A culvert under the road was used as a channel of communication between the two firing lines. They were fronting the village of LE CATEAU with a range of vision of about 600 yards to their front and covering with their fire a low depression of the ground over which the enemy attacking from the East must advance to reach the trenches of the MANCHESTER REGT Battalion. The left Platoon of B Coy was detached about 60 yards, half each side of the road, under Lt HIBBERT. Next to the left, the position of B Coy and of its supports, remained unaltered. That of A Coy, again to their left, was a little extended, its left Platoon being in close touch with the KING’S OWN SCOTTISH BORDERERS and its right in touch with D Coy but the trenches being disconnected, inter-communication was impossible when once the action had commenced.

The 122nd, 123rd and 124th Field Btys had come into position almost in the line of our supports, the 124th on the right, immediately to the left rear of B Coy.

A narrow sunk country road running East and West from the direction of LE CÂTEAU to the village of TROIS VILLES, marked the left of B Coy and divided this Company from the supports of D Coy. Near the junction of this road with the big REUMONT road, the 124th Battery was in position and the sunk road was full of horses and limbers etc.

The net result of these alterations in the dispositions for the 2nd Bn KING’S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INF was that the HQ, with B Coy and one Platoon of C Coy, were left South of the country road, while the whole of the rest of the Battalion was in position North of it and a deep narrow road filled with artillery etc cut diagonally across the ground between the two halves of their position. To the right of the 2nd Bn KING’S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INF, the 14th INF BDE was in full view and close touch.

Before 6:00 am, an order was received in the Brigadier General’s handwriting as follows:

“Orders have now been changed. There will be no retirement for the fighting troops. Fill up your trenches as far as possible with water, food and ammunition.”

Later, Lt Col KINCAID-SMITH of the II CORPS HQ staff rode up and reposted the order for “no retirement”. This order was given to the signallers to be conveyed to all our Company Commanders and Sgt WILLINGTON, Signalling Sergeant, reported that this had been done. The Brigade Provost-Sergeant rode up to Battalion HQ to enquire for the exact position of the Battalion Commander and to communicate the position of the Brigade HQ (which was not connected by telephone) and the position of the Brigadier General. He distinctly indicated the distant tree called ARBRE on the map as the latter’s position and repeated this when questioned. Messengers sent to this position returned, unable to find the Brigadier. However, communication by messenger with the Brigade official HQ was established and an answer to a message asking that Lt UNETT, Brigade MGO, should be permitted to take command of the Battalion machine guns for the day, was received in the affirmative and Lt UNETT arrived accordingly about 6:00 am and took over the machine guns from Lt DENISON, whose services were needed with his Company.

Tea was distributed from the Battalion cooker before 6:00 am, at the Battalion HQ position. Later, after the Companies had sent back their Company ammunition animals, which were now collected with the Battalion transport under the Quartermaster near the place where the Battalion had bivouacked, the ammunition carts were brought up in turn, at a trot and offloaded alongside the Battalion HQ position. The boxes of ammunition were distributed to Companies by hand, by the Signallers, as far as was found possible.

Some time after the action had commenced, Lt UNETT moved his guns from the left of our position, where they had a poor field of fire, to the extreme right, taking up his position 30 yards South of the REUMONT road, on the right flank of B Coy. Lt RAWDON, Transport Officer, after bringing up spare ammunition and ordering the 1st Line Transport back, obtained permission to join his Company in the firing line.

The first shots in the day were fired before 6:00 am by some German cavalry who were reconnoitring almost up to the lines. Not long after, enemy’s guns came into action. One of the first guns ranging, threw a shell into our Regimental transport position.

The high ground now occupied by the SUFFOLK REGT Battalion on our right, became the centre of an attack. The enemy poured a concentrated gun fire on our Batteries all along the line. The town of LE CATEAU appeared to be occupied by the enemy from the very first. His formations issued from the woods some miles East of LE CATEAU and could be seen advancing in mass towards LE CATEAU. Also, three large bodies of troops appeared to disappear into the low ground South of the town and to be pushing round the South of this position occupied by our Division.

The ridge held by the SUFFOLK REGT Battalion was taken and again reoccupied by the Battalion in counter-attack. From the time that it was again occupied by the enemy, B Coy and the right Platoon of D Coy (Lt WYNNE), were constantly engaged, their fire was directed to prevent any further advance along the high ground and coming from an unexpected quarter, was apparently very effective.

Towards 3:00 pm, they witnessed an advance of dense masses of the enemy, of the strength of two Battalions, who swept over the crest and down through turnip fields beneath the ridge. Allowing them to advance about 100 yards down the forward slope, they reserved their fire and then all opened “Rapid”. The losses of the enemy were numerous and the whole mass moved back and disappeared again behind the ridge. Half an hour later, the enemy advanced again more cautiously and it was then seen that he stretched far away to the South West, enveloping our right. This constituted the third attack of the Germans in this quarter, which gained ground slowly, gradually concentrating their fire on B Coy, until they almost enfiladed them from the South West. The attack came from the direction of LE CATEAU. By Lt HIBBERT’s range card, the ridge was distant 600 yards and fire was opened on the massed attack at 500 yards distance.

Lt WYNNE’s Platoon was the connecting link between B and D Coys and was across the corner of the angle where their lines produced would meet and was very much exposed to fire.

In order to support the attack on the ridge, the enemy, taking advantage of the cutting through which the CAMBRAI road ran, brought up a Battery of machine guns and established them there. These guns were very troublesome all the day.

Lt UNETT had called for volunteers to dig his guns into their position South of the road. The shrapnel fire was plastering the ground. L/Cpl KING and Pte MITCHELL volunteered. When in position, he opened fire about 8:30 am on the enemy attempting to enfilade the SUFFOLK REGT from a small round wood North East of them and threw back successive attacks along the ridge. Later, one gun was knocked out by a shell. Sgt HUNN was wounded and about 2:20 pm, when the 14th INF BDE had retired and his right flank was open, he found it necessary to withdraw the remaining gun. The gun was carried into a trench of B Coy’s and Lt UNETT, with the tripod, came back to the Battalion HQ trench. The ground between the two was swept by a close and concentrated rifle fire by this time and Lt UNETT could not be permitted to attempt to bring the gun back to the place where his tripod was. The gun was broken up before capture in the trench.

At about 2:45 pm, Lt UNETT was sent back to the Brigade HQ to explain the position of our exposed right flank and to ask for assistance to recover the ground on our right. The Brigade HQ had, however, been moved. He reported also that the WEST KENT REGT Battalion which had been entrenched in our rear about 100 yards back was apparently moving back to a position further in rear.

The firing line of D Coy, other than Lt WYNNE’s Platoon, was heavily engaged to its front and also with the enemy machine gun Battery on its right front. When casualties were heavy, Capt SIMPSON led a reinforcing party from the Company support line, under heavy fire and got into the advanced trenches. He was himself wounded in getting there, Lt NOEL was wounded about the same time. Further to the left, at about 11.30 am, Lt BUTT, with 11 Pl of C Coy, reinforced the firing line, Sgt PATTERSON (whose promotion to a commission dated from this day) bringing up the second half of the Platoon. They continued to occupy this position until badly enfiladed from a position North of them, which was occupied by the enemy after the retirement of the KING’S OWN SCOTTISH BORDERERS. At about 3:30 pm, when the position was quite untenable, they attempted to retire to a position in rear. Lt BUTT was now wounded and Sgt PATTERSON killed.

Some of A Coy trenches were nearer the KING’S OWN SCOTTISH BORDERERS position. Sgt MARCHANT was in the nearest, representing the extreme left. He was able, with the fire from his trench, to prevent the enemy from bringing up machine guns to their new position but could not prevent the occupation of the high ground by infantry. His trench was unsupported and he was unable to effect a retirement and was eventually overrun by the enemy.

At about 3:25 pm, Maj HEATHCOTE and Capt LUTHER attempted to reinforce the A Coy trenches, occupied up to this time by Capt GATACRE. The ground however, was swept by rifle fire and only about a dozen men reached Capt GATACRE. Capt LUTHER was wounded. A great number of casualties occurred during this rush, including 2 Lt HITCHIE, who was killed. Capt GATACRE’s trenches were overrun by the Germans some little time afterwards. Lt DENISON was left mortally wounded in the head. Though blind he had continued to encourage his men in the trench until he became insensible. He died in hospital at MONS some weeks later.

The line of resistance was rolled up from left to right. A Coy had come into action about 8:00 am, when D Coy also opened fire. B Coy, waiting for a dense target, opened fire generally some time after 11:00 am. By the time of capture, ammunition was completely exhausted in the front line trenches. Half the Battalion reserve of ammunition had been brought in before the action. After the action commenced it was impracticable to bring further carts up or to distribute the ammunition by hand to Companies.

The enemy’s artillery bombardment, which had been directed in great measure on our field guns, succeeded in silencing our guns an hour or so after 12:00 pm. At about 1:00 pm there was a lull. The gun teams had been shot to pieces. One gun came out with a team of three horses. At about 1:30 pm the battle was renewed; the shelling and machine gun fire was directed on the infantry trenches exclusively, the enemy infantry generally gaining ground on the ridge West of LE CATEAU.

Some time before 3:00 pm, the whole of the ridge West of LE CATEAU was in the hands of the enemy.

By 3:10 pm, it was known to us that the WEST KENT REGT, the reserve Battalion of the Brigade, had been retired to a position in rear. The higher ground occupied originally by the KING’S OWN SCOTTISH BORDERERS was in the occupation of the enemy. The position occupied by the 2nd Bn KING’S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INF was now surrounded on three sides but it was obvious that the Brigade as a whole was occupying a position a little distance in rear. Retirement was out of the question besides no order cancelling that of 6:00 am had been received by 2nd Bn KING’S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INF.

A very heavy and accurate fire was directed on the trenches before the end. At about 4:20 pm, the final rush came. In B Coy, Maj YATE gave the order to meet it with a charge but the number of men near him able to support it was so small that his desperate call met with practically no response. Maj YATE himself, with other Officers of his Company, was overpowered and disarmed. Lt HIBBERT had been wounded.

The Battalion HQ trench was the last to go.

The single field gun, which had been brought away, continued to fire down the road from a position in rear, while the enemy were overrunning the 2nd Bn KING’S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INF trenches.

For some little time the Germans had been sounding our “Cease fire” and attempts were also made by them to call upon the 2nd Bn KING’S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INF to surrender but Maj YATE, who commanded the firing line, refused to allow a flag to approach.

Besides 16 Officers, 320 rank and file were captured (wounded and unwounded).

On the 29th Aug, Maj GRAY, RIF, was brought down the REUMONT road to LE CATEAU as a prisoner. Our dead were still unburied then, though there were burying parties at work over the fields. Maj GRAY counted the dead on both sides of the road, chiefly in the B Coy trenches alongside the road. He counted 62 bodies.

Sgt CLARKE, whose commission was to date from the 26th Aug also, was killed in a B Coy trench in the act of firing, by one of the last shots fired.

As to the German troops with whom we were immediately engaged, the following is quoted from Lt WYNNE’s diary, from an entry made immediately after he had been taken prisoner:

“We were taken into the yard belonging to the remains of a farm at the crossroads and placed under a strong guard there. The troops that had captured our position and who now guarded us belonged to four different Regiments, the 26th, the 66th, the 72nd and the 3rd Guards Regt.”

R C BOND Lt Col

2nd Bn KING’S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INF

Note: References are to the maps issued by the War Office for use on mobilization.

[shippingsteel]

Does anyone have a list of all the known POW camps that were in operation back in Germany during the time in question.? (So that would be August/September 1914)

And is there any further indication of those which Yate was transferred between, apart from Magdeburg and Torgau.? I am going to need to do some cross-referencing.

Cheers, S>S

[trajan]

... The page does not indicate the source but this being a Yorkshire-based page, then possibly, just possibly, a local Yorkshire paper? ... But even if that is the case, where did they get it from!

That's exactly what I have been thinking ... America is the obvious candidate for having it written up (in English) at such a 'delicate' time for British public sentiment. Needs checking.

Cheers, S>S

The reason I suspect a Yorkshire or at the very least a UK-based origin for the original source of this of-published photograph in the form we have it - that is, cropped and with a caption - is its detail... I doubt if many people in America would have been interested in the fact that "... he commanded one of the two companies of the 2nd Yorkshire Light Infantry..." and were probably highly likely to know anything about Le Cateau. Yes, the original photograph came from somewhere else, but the caption here indicates - to my mind - a UK origin for this.

I do take the point that, in a sense, the photograph could be seen as one capable of encouraging a rather demoralising response when viewed among the 'people at home'. But the publication of this one follows the award of the VC. In which case, to the contrary, the image could be seen as that of a brave man from a 'home' (i.e., Yorkshire) regiment, who had fought to the last and who has suffered the indignity of being captured - but look at how he stands, head and shoulders above his guards! And perhaps that was why it was cropped, to emphasise his height when compared to those standing next to him?

Trajan

PS: Incidentally I had overlooked earlier today that the photograph caption mentions his VC, so that gives a terminus ante quem of 24 November 1914 for its publication with caption.

[seaforths]

Good points Guys.

Pope-Hennessy is regarded as the usual source - a description and map of the POW camps. Torgau seems to have come under Magdeburg for administration purposes. I will be on the PC in a little while so I can post a link to Pope-Hennessy. I'm not sure Magdeburg was secure enough for them at that time and they were held in a warehouse there. Whereas they had managed to put them in huts in Torgau. (According to "The War Behind the Wire'). At the time of their capture, I get the feeling Magdeburg was acting as administrator and transitory place rather than a permanent camp. In truth, they weren't prepared for the numbers captured and were dealing with the situation ad-hoc.

Major Yate was certainly considered a local hero even before WW1. I have a feeling that I pointed out the caption related to his VC. I can't remember without trawling through the posts. I would never discount that it might have been published in British press. However, the Germans seem to have been able to get an article published in the Norwegian press. I have never seen the full article only a reference made on his record to the fact it was published in Norway and it did concern him. It was related to Yate but not to this topic. The thing that might narrow it down more with regard to dates would be a publication in German press with a German caption - if that occurred. Something like that might have an article expanding on the circumstances of the photograph.

Edit: While it might have appeared in other countries, I would doubt if it named Major Yate and might be within a more general article regarding British losses etc. making it more difficult to find.

[MartH]

Has anyone looked at the Yorkshire post back issues, or asked them if they are off line to see if they ran the story in 1914 with photograph?

[seaforths]

Does anyone have a list of all the known POW camps that were in operation back in Germany during the time in question.? (So that would be August/September 1914)

And is there any further indication of those which Yate was transferred between, apart from Magdeburg and Torgau.? I am going to need to do some cross-referencing.

Cheers, S>S

As per Pope-Hennessy easier to find on my PC than trawling for the link there are several variations on the archive site but not all have included the map. However, here is the map and brief pieces on Magdeburg and Torgau:

[seaforths]

Something else that might be helpful (or not) as the case may be is the second book that Bond wrote 'Prisoners Grave and Gay'. I am struggling to find a copy outside a library and it seems that libraries that do have it are a long way from me and it is reference only, so no inter-library loan. However I have found a link to an electronic copy that is also inaccessible because of copyright. Not that helpful then...but it does allow you to search within the book to let you decide whether you think it might cover what you are looking for so a little helpful. As you might see here from the link, I searched for 'yate' within the book and got 8 hits:

http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt/search?q1=yate&id=wu.89100064401&view=1up&seq=9

Try the word 'cateau' it gets 17 hits. My point is that it might either provide more clues or muddy the waters even further.

Edit: last line added after initial post.

[trajan]

That's exactly what I have been thinking ... America is the obvious candidate for having it written up (in English) at such a 'delicate' time for British public sentiment. Needs checking.

Cheers, S>S

... I doubt if many people in America would have been interested in the fact that "... he commanded one of the two companies of the 2nd Yorkshire Light Infantry..." and were probably highly likely to know anything about Le Cateau. ...

PS: Incidentally I had overlooked earlier today that the photograph caption mentions his VC, so that gives a terminus ante quem of 24 November 1914 for its publication with caption.

SS, You are usually so quick on the draw that I guess you must have been asleep when I posted no 152 as I left a nice little clue for you to discover there... The clue? My PS, drawing attention to the caption... Why would a USA paper describe Yate as being "in the hands of the enemy"? Poetic licence is certainly possible, but in or around late 1914, when this photograph with this caption was published, the Germans would hardly be described by an American paper as "the enemy" - although "his enemies" or "his enemy", is possible, but this is specific - "the enemy". So, the photograph we have with the caption is from an English-language country involved in the GW! Anyone near York and/or the archive of the Yorkshire Post? Failing which I will e-mail the editor about a centenary commoration of Le Cateau suggesting that they check their archives!

Trajan

[shippingsteel]

From the weapons and uniform of his captors, I do not think these troops were anywhere near Le Cateau. I think they are the POW camp guard well back in the rear.

So this is the line I've been working on putting some evidence towards. Specifically I believe they are the POW camp guard somewhere in Germany, as that is where the camps were.

From the uniforms these troops are wearing I don't think they ever left Germany (the colour being so obsolete) but they would have quite happily been put to use in home service roles.

So where there is smoke there is fire (or at least a small flicker - I still can't link it to Torgau) because it does appear that the Bavarian Landwehr were being used as prison camp guards.

Of all the Bavarian Landwehr-Infanterie-Regiments the only one not in an Infanterie-Brigade and not attached to an Armee Korps, just happens to have 5 battalions guarding the prisons.!

Cheers, S>S

[seaforths]

SS, You are usually so quick on the draw that I guess you must have been asleep when I posted no 152 as I left a nice little clue for you to discover there... The clue? My PS, drawing attention to the caption... Why would a USA paper describe Yate as being "in the hands of the enemy"? Poetic licence is certainly possible, but in or around late 1914, when this photograph with this caption was published, the Germans would hardly be described by an American paper as "the enemy" - although "his enemies" or "his enemy", is possible, but this is specific - "the enemy". So, the photograph we have with the caption is from an English-language country involved in the GW! Anyone near York and/or the archive of the Yorkshire Post? Failing which I will e-mail the editor about a centenary commoration of Le Cateau suggesting that they check their archives!

Trajan

Sorry Trajan,

You are of course correct to point out that vocabulary choice regarding the caption on the image we are looking at. I thought that perhaps what we are looking at is from a book or other publication possibly post war UK but the photo might not have appeared in UK press at the time. It may have appeared in other countries but with a different caption nearer to the time - and not necessarily referring to Yate. That would make it difficult to track down as the name reference wouldn't help in a search.

[trajan]

... Of all the Bavarian Landwehr-Infanterie-Regiments the only one not in an Infanterie-Brigade and not attached to an Armee Korps, just happens to have 5 battalions guarding the prisons.!

That's interesting! Looking forward to hearing more! In my very quick run through of the posts between mid-Saturday and this Monday morning I did see one asking if we were getting anywhere with this and so yes, a consensus (inshallah!) on the photograph having been taken some time after capture at a camp...

Slowly but surely catchee monkee...!

Trajan

[SteveMarsdin]

Anyone near York and/or the archive of the Yorkshire Post?

As far as I am aware the Yorkshire Post archive forms part of the resource of the British Newspaper Archive and a search on "Yate" and "Le Cateau" and "VC" unfortunately doesn't reveal any contemporary account with photo in that paper.

[trajan]

Now, dare I possibly muddy the waters further? Quite by chance I found this unattributed photograph on the web with no description that I could find, of what are German soldiers with funny hats like the 'kepi' in the infamous photograph. Hopefully Wyliecoyote will spot this (if he doesn't then I'll PM him!), and can identify them for us!

It is at http://htbo.tripod.com/w058.jpg on a webpage on the WWI experience of the well-known Austrian Herr A.H., at http://htbo.tripod.com/ht6.html

Trajan

[seaforth78]

Now, dare I possibly muddy the waters further? Quite by chance I found this unattributed photograph on the web with no description that I could find, of what are German soldiers with funny hats like the 'kepi' in the infamous photograph. Hopefully Wyliecoyote will spot this (if he doesn't then I'll PM him!), and can identify them for us!

It is at http://htbo.tripod.com/w058.jpg on a webpage on the WWI experience of the well-known Austrian Herr A.H., at http://htbo.tripod.com/ht6.html

Trajan

w058.jpg major-yate-kepi.jpg

Bravo! Mystery solved, but I doubt that SS would agree

[wyliecoyote]

Shoulderboards are too small for me to see, is it b.R.I.R. 16? There were 2-3 Bavarian Reserve units that were uniformed like this in 1914-1915.

[seaforths]

I promised in an earlier post to provide Bond's narrative of Le Cateau written sometime between 1914 and 1918. This was part of his correspondence with Atikinson in 1918. It is a verbatim copy of an original typewritten document annotated and signed by Bond. I have little doubt that this docuement was used as the foundationfor Bond's account in the 1929 published history, with some changes. The only changes I have made is to capitalise the unit names and place names and surnames. There is a very good map in the RA account of the action attached at the bottom, which gives a much better idea of what was going on around the KOYLI and the proximity to the Suffolks etc. MG

26th Aug 1914. (Wednesday). At 2:35 am, orders were received detailing arrangements for a renewed retirement. The order to stand to at 3:30 am was repeated. The orders specified the part to be played by the 2nd Bn KING’S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INF in Rear Guard. It was to hold on, in conjunction with the KING’S OWN SCOTTISH BORDERERS on its left, to the position of trenches at present covered by our outpost Company, until 11:00 am, by which time the Divisional train would be clear. “If the situation permits” the Rear Guard was then to retire. From the time of arrival of these last orders, the Battalion had less than one hour to prepare. Supplies had to be distributed from the 1st line wagons which had arrived over night; new maps to be got at and the Battalion then had to go forward in the dark and take up a position not previously reconnoitered. C Coy (Capt LUTHER), was ordered to occupy the high ground overlooking the village of LE CATEAU, South of the BAVAI – REUMONT road. This was too extended a position for one Company to hold. North of the road, D Coy (Maj TREVOR), carried on the line parallel to the LE CATEAU – CAMBRAI road and West of it. North of D Coy, the trenches between that Company and those to be occupied by the KING’S OWN SCOTTISH BORDERERS were allotted to A Coy (Maj HEATHCOTE), whose Company, already on outpost, had to be concentrated.

B Coy, (Maj YATE) were held in reserve and ordered to dig themselves in near the crest of the slope which overlooked the line of trenches. The trenches already dug existed only North of the road. They were disconnected and sited in parallel straight lengths at intervals to oppose the approaches from the East. The great road to CAMBRAI, which ran along their front, was in some cases only about 500 yards distant. It formed a valuable covered approach for the enemy, who concentrated under the cover of its banks without exposing themselves. The road was edged with Poplar trees.

Each of the three Companies in the firing line had to dispose of its half-Companies in local support as best it could, using their field entrenching tools to throw up what cover they could in the time at disposal.

Before 6:00 am however, dispositions were greatly changed. The position thinly occupied by C Coy, obviously high ground of the utmost importance, was handed over for occupation by the 14th INF BDE, with Lt Col STEVENS’ Brigade of RFA and the 52nd Howitzer Bty. C Coy were brought across to the North of the road and assigned a position generally in support of A Coy. One Platoon of C Coy, under Lt WILLIAMS, remained in the position of reserve and continued to deepen the trenches already commenced and now vacated, by B Coy. Other trenches of the same system were occupied by the Battalion Signallers and Battalion HQ. In order to defilade the trenches now occupied by the MANCHESTER REGT Battalion of the 14th INF BDE, B Coy was moved by the Brigadier General to a new position facing South East in the ditches on either side of the REUMONT road. As the North side of the road was higher than the South, they formed two tiers of fire and were able to produce considerable concentrated fire effect. A culvert under the road was used as a channel of communication between the two firing lines. They were fronting the village of LE CATEAU with a range of vision of about 600 yards to their front and covering with their fire a low depression of the ground over which the enemy attacking from the East must advance to reach the trenches of the MANCHESTER REGT Battalion. The left Platoon of B Coy was detached about 60 yards, half each side of the road, under Lt HIBBERT. Next to the left, the position of B Coy and of its supports, remained unaltered. That of A Coy, again to their left, was a little extended, its left Platoon being in close touch with the KING’S OWN SCOTTISH BORDERERS and its right in touch with D Coy but the trenches being disconnected, inter-communication was impossible when once the action had commenced.

The 122nd, 123rd and 124th Field Btys had come into position almost in the line of our supports, the 124th on the right, immediately to the left rear of B Coy.

A narrow sunk country road running East and West from the direction of LE CÂTEAU to the village of TROIS VILLES, marked the left of B Coy and divided this Company from the supports of D Coy. Near the junction of this road with the big REUMONT road, the 124th Battery was in position and the sunk road was full of horses and limbers etc.

The net result of these alterations in the dispositions for the 2nd Bn KING’S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INF was that the HQ, with B Coy and one Platoon of C Coy, were left South of the country road, while the whole of the rest of the Battalion was in position North of it and a deep narrow road filled with artillery etc cut diagonally across the ground between the two halves of their position. To the right of the 2nd Bn KING’S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INF, the 14th INF BDE was in full view and close touch.

Before 6:00 am, an order was received in the Brigadier General’s handwriting as follows:

“Orders have now been changed. There will be no retirement for the fighting troops. Fill up your trenches as far as possible with water, food and ammunition.”

Later, Lt Col KINCAID-SMITH of the II CORPS HQ staff rode up and reposted the order for “no retirement”. This order was given to the signallers to be conveyed to all our Company Commanders and Sgt WILLINGTON, Signalling Sergeant, reported that this had been done. The Brigade Provost-Sergeant rode up to Battalion HQ to enquire for the exact position of the Battalion Commander and to communicate the position of the Brigade HQ (which was not connected by telephone) and the position of the Brigadier General. He distinctly indicated the distant tree called ARBRE on the map as the latter’s position and repeated this when questioned. Messengers sent to this position returned, unable to find the Brigadier. However, communication by messenger with the Brigade official HQ was established and an answer to a message asking that Lt UNETT, Brigade MGO, should be permitted to take command of the Battalion machine guns for the day, was received in the affirmative and Lt UNETT arrived accordingly about 6:00 am and took over the machine guns from Lt DENISON, whose services were needed with his Company.

Tea was distributed from the Battalion cooker before 6:00 am, at the Battalion HQ position. Later, after the Companies had sent back their Company ammunition animals, which were now collected with the Battalion transport under the Quartermaster near the place where the Battalion had bivouacked, the ammunition carts were brought up in turn, at a trot and offloaded alongside the Battalion HQ position. The boxes of ammunition were distributed to Companies by hand, by the Signallers, as far as was found possible.

Some time after the action had commenced, Lt UNETT moved his guns from the left of our position, where they had a poor field of fire, to the extreme right, taking up his position 30 yards South of the REUMONT road, on the right flank of B Coy. Lt RAWDON, Transport Officer, after bringing up spare ammunition and ordering the 1st Line Transport back, obtained permission to join his Company in the firing line.

The first shots in the day were fired before 6:00 am by some German cavalry who were reconnoitring almost up to the lines. Not long after, enemy’s guns came into action. One of the first guns ranging, threw a shell into our Regimental transport position.

The high ground now occupied by the SUFFOLK REGT Battalion on our right, became the centre of an attack. The enemy poured a concentrated gun fire on our Batteries all along the line. The town of LE CATEAU appeared to be occupied by the enemy from the very first. His formations issued from the woods some miles East of LE CATEAU and could be seen advancing in mass towards LE CATEAU. Also, three large bodies of troops appeared to disappear into the low ground South of the town and to be pushing round the South of this position occupied by our Division.

The ridge held by the SUFFOLK REGT Battalion was taken and again reoccupied by the Battalion in counter-attack. From the time that it was again occupied by the enemy, B Coy and the right Platoon of D Coy (Lt WYNNE), were constantly engaged, their fire was directed to prevent any further advance along the high ground and coming from an unexpected quarter, was apparently very effective.

Towards 3:00 pm, they witnessed an advance of dense masses of the enemy, of the strength of two Battalions, who swept over the crest and down through turnip fields beneath the ridge. Allowing them to advance about 100 yards down the forward slope, they reserved their fire and then all opened “Rapid”. The losses of the enemy were numerous and the whole mass moved back and disappeared again behind the ridge. Half an hour later, the enemy advanced again more cautiously and it was then seen that he stretched far away to the South West, enveloping our right. This constituted the third attack of the Germans in this quarter, which gained ground slowly, gradually concentrating their fire on B Coy, until they almost enfiladed them from the South West. The attack came from the direction of LE CATEAU. By Lt HIBBERT’s range card, the ridge was distant 600 yards and fire was opened on the massed attack at 500 yards distance.

Lt WYNNE’s Platoon was the connecting link between B and D Coys and was across the corner of the angle where their lines produced would meet and was very much exposed to fire.

In order to support the attack on the ridge, the enemy, taking advantage of the cutting through which the CAMBRAI road ran, brought up a Battery of machine guns and established them there. These guns were very troublesome all the day.

Lt UNETT had called for volunteers to dig his guns into their position South of the road. The shrapnel fire was plastering the ground. L/Cpl KING and Pte MITCHELL volunteered. When in position, he opened fire about 8:30 am on the enemy attempting to enfilade the SUFFOLK REGT from a small round wood North East of them and threw back successive attacks along the ridge. Later, one gun was knocked out by a shell. Sgt HUNN was wounded and about 2:20 pm, when the 14th INF BDE had retired and his right flank was open, he found it necessary to withdraw the remaining gun. The gun was carried into a trench of B Coy’s and Lt UNETT, with the tripod, came back to the Battalion HQ trench. The ground between the two was swept by a close and concentrated rifle fire by this time and Lt UNETT could not be permitted to attempt to bring the gun back to the place where his tripod was. The gun was broken up before capture in the trench.

At about 2:45 pm, Lt UNETT was sent back to the Brigade HQ to explain the position of our exposed right flank and to ask for assistance to recover the ground on our right. The Brigade HQ had, however, been moved. He reported also that the WEST KENT REGT Battalion which had been entrenched in our rear about 100 yards back was apparently moving back to a position further in rear.

The firing line of D Coy, other than Lt WYNNE’s Platoon, was heavily engaged to its front and also with the enemy machine gun Battery on its right front. When casualties were heavy, Capt SIMPSON led a reinforcing party from the Company support line, under heavy fire and got into the advanced trenches. He was himself wounded in getting there, Lt NOEL was wounded about the same time. Further to the left, at about 11.30 am, Lt BUTT, with 11 Pl of C Coy, reinforced the firing line, Sgt PATTERSON (whose promotion to a commission dated from this day) bringing up the second half of the Platoon. They continued to occupy this position until badly enfiladed from a position North of them, which was occupied by the enemy after the retirement of the KING’S OWN SCOTTISH BORDERERS. At about 3:30 pm, when the position was quite untenable, they attempted to retire to a position in rear. Lt BUTT was now wounded and Sgt PATTERSON killed.

Some of A Coy trenches were nearer the KING’S OWN SCOTTISH BORDERERS position. Sgt MARCHANT was in the nearest, representing the extreme left. He was able, with the fire from his trench, to prevent the enemy from bringing up machine guns to their new position but could not prevent the occupation of the high ground by infantry. His trench was unsupported and he was unable to effect a retirement and was eventually overrun by the enemy.

At about 3:25 pm, Maj HEATHCOTE and Capt LUTHER attempted to reinforce the A Coy trenches, occupied up to this time by Capt GATACRE. The ground however, was swept by rifle fire and only about a dozen men reached Capt GATACRE. Capt LUTHER was wounded. A great number of casualties occurred during this rush, including 2 Lt HITCHIE, who was killed. Capt GATACRE’s trenches were overrun by the Germans some little time afterwards. Lt DENISON was left mortally wounded in the head. Though blind he had continued to encourage his men in the trench until he became insensible. He died in hospital at MONS some weeks later.

The line of resistance was rolled up from left to right. A Coy had come into action about 8:00 am, when D Coy also opened fire. B Coy, waiting for a dense target, opened fire generally some time after 11:00 am. By the time of capture, ammunition was completely exhausted in the front line trenches. Half the Battalion reserve of ammunition had been brought in before the action. After the action commenced it was impracticable to bring further carts up or to distribute the ammunition by hand to Companies.

The enemy’s artillery bombardment, which had been directed in great measure on our field guns, succeeded in silencing our guns an hour or so after 12:00 pm. At about 1:00 pm there was a lull. The gun teams had been shot to pieces. One gun came out with a team of three horses. At about 1:30 pm the battle was renewed; the shelling and machine gun fire was directed on the infantry trenches exclusively, the enemy infantry generally gaining ground on the ridge West of LE CATEAU.

Some time before 3:00 pm, the whole of the ridge West of LE CATEAU was in the hands of the enemy.

By 3:10 pm, it was known to us that the WEST KENT REGT, the reserve Battalion of the Brigade, had been retired to a position in rear. The higher ground occupied originally by the KING’S OWN SCOTTISH BORDERERS was in the occupation of the enemy. The position occupied by the 2nd Bn KING’S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INF was now surrounded on three sides but it was obvious that the Brigade as a whole was occupying a position a little distance in rear. Retirement was out of the question besides no order cancelling that of 6:00 am had been received by 2nd Bn KING’S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INF.

A very heavy and accurate fire was directed on the trenches before the end. At about 4:20 pm, the final rush came. In B Coy, Maj YATE gave the order to meet it with a charge but the number of men near him able to support it was so small that his desperate call met with practically no response. Maj YATE himself, with other Officers of his Company, was overpowered and disarmed. Lt HIBBERT had been wounded.

The Battalion HQ trench was the last to go.

The single field gun, which had been brought away, continued to fire down the road from a position in rear, while the enemy were overrunning the 2nd Bn KING’S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INF trenches.

For some little time the Germans had been sounding our “Cease fire” and attempts were also made by them to call upon the 2nd Bn KING’S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INF to surrender but Maj YATE, who commanded the firing line, refused to allow a flag to approach.

Besides 16 Officers, 320 rank and file were captured (wounded and unwounded).

On the 29th Aug, Maj GRAY, RIF, was brought down the REUMONT road to LE CATEAU as a prisoner. Our dead were still unburied then, though there were burying parties at work over the fields. Maj GRAY counted the dead on both sides of the road, chiefly in the B Coy trenches alongside the road. He counted 62 bodies.

Sgt CLARKE, whose commission was to date from the 26th Aug also, was killed in a B Coy trench in the act of firing, by one of the last shots fired.

As to the German troops with whom we were immediately engaged, the following is quoted from Lt WYNNE’s diary, from an entry made immediately after he had been taken prisoner:

“We were taken into the yard belonging to the remains of a farm at the crossroads and placed under a strong guard there. The troops that had captured our position and who now guarded us belonged to four different Regiments, the 26th, the 66th, the 72nd and the 3rd Guards Regt.”

R C BOND Lt Col

2nd Bn KING’S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INF

Note: References are to the maps issued by the War Office for use on mobilization.

Another brilliantly informative post - thank you! Having read this and your #133 again, several thoughts. The loss of life is tragic beyond belief as was the case of major encounters. Was it avoidable? Probably not. They seemed to be the victims of the communication methods of the day. The circumstances changed so quickly, they couldn't communicate the orders quick enough and when they did, they didn't always get through. The question arising is could they have foreseen what was about to occur and acted quicker than they did in giving the order to retire? That may have saved lives.

I have read at least one published division history and one published book of memoirs written a few years after the war and the authors on occasion, refer to the War Diaries. I was quite surprised that they would still have access to them at the time. At times, when the wanted to clarify or were lacking in information both authors stated within the text that they used the war diary. Perhaps others referred to their War Diaries in their writing too but didn't make reference to them when they did. It might perhaps account for Bond's variations in that he might have tried to align what he was doing with other diaries. A 3000 word record is quite a comprehensive piece of writing and perhaps his later writings were an abridged version of events.

I am often surprised at the difference between battalions, brigades and divisions as to what is happening around them and how, particularly with divisions, they can be contradictory. However, given the circumstances they were in, I suppose that is only to be expected. Written retrospectively, total recall of hugely tense events must have been very difficult.

I still feel Yate in particular was incredibly lucky not to be shot with his revolver in his hand. Many a time those still stubbornly resisting and firing were shot or bayonetted on the spot.

As far as I am aware the Yorkshire Post archive forms part of the resource of the British Newspaper Archive and a search on "Yate" and "Le Cateau" and "VC" unfortunately doesn't reveal any contemporary account with photo in that paper.

I'm glad someone checked! Thanks for that and, as they say, curiouser and curiouser. I wonder if the regimental museum could shed any light on the source of the photograph and when it first appeared in the British press or a British publication.

[seaforths]

SS - just to highlight the difficulty again of pinning down a particular German unit to that photo, some railway maps courtesy of IWM and TNA. The first two are extracts from French railway maps of 1914 and the third is from Railway Map of Germany and Poland 1916. This third one is also annotated and Magdeburg is also circled - a margin note to this map appears to state 'mn trunk lines in blue pencil.

[seaforths]

Map two shows the lines going as far as Cologne and Aix la Chapelle:

Third map picks up from Aix la Chapelle and Cologne area and into Germany:

[shippingsteel]

SS - just to highlight the difficulty again of pinning down a particular German unit to that photo, some railway maps courtesy of IWM and TNA.

Yes thank you for those maps Seaforths. I agree the task of identifying the unit is difficult, and I believe can only be done by a process of elimination, which I have followed.

The beauty of the photo being dated so early in the war, means there are reams of information that clearly state where certain units were stationed at beginning of the war.

Also many of the units that took part in the war were not mobilised yet at that time, so they didn't even exist in the field. The OOB information from that period is very specific.

I will continue to investigate this as far as I can, but from what I have seen so far I am relatively satisfied with the identification of the unit. BUT, I only have myself to please.

Cheers, S>S

[trajan]

Shoulderboards are too small for me to see, is it b.R.I.R. 16? There were 2-3 Bavarian Reserve units that were uniformed like this in 1914-1915.

Thank you! More grist to the mill! I have personally never seen anything like those hats on a German soldier before, and I did wonder at first if they might be Austrian, but not with those bayonets...

Trajan

[trajan]

I still feel Yate in particular was incredibly lucky not to be shot with his revolver in his hand. Many a time those still stubbornly resisting and firing were shot or bayonetted on the spot.

I'm glad someone checked! Thanks for that and, as they say, curiouser and curiouser. I wonder if the regimental museum could shed any light on the source of the photograph and when it first appeared in the British press or a British publication.

Yes, Yate was lucky - revolver knocked out of his hand, as you noted in an earlier post...

I couldn't get on the the regimental web-site yesterday but I did e-mail the editor of the Yorkshire Post suggesting a search through the archives for contemporary posts might be a nice thing to do so as to have a commemorative article published in late August...

Trajan

[trajan]

... I will continue to investigate this as far as I can, but from what I have seen so far I am relatively satisfied with the identification of the unit. BUT, I only have myself to please.

Cheers, S>S

Hope you feel able to share!

Interesting remark of Wyliecoyote's, raising the possibility that the 'kepi' might, just might, be a Bavarian hat!

Trajan

[seaforths]

The images and input of Wyliecoyte has been...just brilliant. For someone who has never had an interest in uniforms and weaponry - I've been absolutely fascinated by it!

In some of the reading I have done regarding POWs, it seems that Germany (as others did too) used men who were fit to serve but not fit to fight. That is not to say of course that some of them didn't fight, they did. They had seen action, fought, been wounded and were no longer fit to return to a fighting unit. In reading, it has been commented on by the prisoners that it was their guards that had seen action who were more often kinder or more sympathetic toward them than the others.

Returning to the photograph, they seem to be standing under an opening of some sort. An archway? White building in the background with an open door and a window top right? I don't think it is a farm. It also occurs to me that actually moving the prisoners back from the front. The front was probably moving away from them at a very quick pace. Even in the space of 24 hours, they would have found themselves further in the rear even if they hadn't moved at all.

As there were trains to/from Le Cateau, I doubt they would have marched them anywhere else, of course the line might have been commandeered very quickly to bring up supplies etc. but most probably used to take them away. Would that then involve taking them through Le Cateau itself to the train?

Just thinking in writing so to speak...

Edit: typo