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Remembered Today:

Capture of Major Yate


shippingsteel

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Just to add a little military perspective to the defeat that day ... to the top brass it would have seemed a total disaster, but in reality it was a fair outcome in a very bad situation.

The BEF was in retreat and this was a planned holding action against tremendous odds, which by buying the remainder of the Army time to disengage, was partly successful.

To the powers that be it was an undoubted failure ... they lost 38 guns in the action (which was unheard of at that time). So I would imagine plenty of incentive to make awards.

Cheers, S>S

I am well aware they were covering a retirement. I am also aware of how it would look to the public. I am all for bravery awards awarded for the specific acts for which they have been cited providing that the action and circumstances the citation refers to actually took place. Otherwise, it demeans the award and the man himself. The Warrant of the award itself is clear in that it refers to acts of bravery not intentions to commit acts of bravery. Nor does the Warrant take into account the bigger picture of what is happening.

You make it sound as though awards should be given out to make things sound better than they were - which is exactly, I feel, is what happened.

Would you like to expand or explain further as you see it?

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I am well aware they were covering a retirement. I am also aware of how it would look to the public. I am all for bravery awards awarded for the specific acts for which they have been cited providing that the action and circumstances the citation refers to actually took place. Otherwise, it demeans the award and the man himself. The Warrant of the award itself is clear in that it refers to acts of bravery not intentions to commit acts of bravery. Nor does the Warrant take into account the bigger picture of what is happening.

You make it sound as though awards should be given out to make things sound better than they were - which is exactly, I feel, is what happened.

Would you like to expand or explain further as you see it?

If I may say without seeming to patronise, I think that you write very well, and I have enjoyed following this thread, albeit at a safe distance.

I totally agree with what you have said regarding the clarity of the warrant and thus what the awards should all hold in common.

Unfortunately throughout its history the VC has suffered from political (both civil and military) interference from time-to-time and there are some famous cases where the award of VCs has been criticised. Rorkes Drift being an example in case, where it was suggested that regardless of the undeniable (and desperate) bravery shown, the large number of VCs awarded for a single action were in part to assuage and deflect public attention from the disaster at Isandhlwana that immediately preceded it. The award of a VC to Lt Leefe-Robinson for shooting down a zeppelin (within 7-days of the action) was an example (some say the first) of an award impelled by prevailing public opinion (even before spin doctors). Even in the Falklands war there was controversy over the award to Lt Col H Jones.

As regards WW1 and before, in large part some of the awards that seem less deserving to present day eyes were to a significant degree compelled by the paucity of gallantry awards that were available to be awarded in 1914. At that time there was no MC, or MM (nor other Services equivalents) and the DSO was an Order not intended for gallantry (although this changed), so the choices available were limited. If Yates had not received a VC, I believe the only alternative at that time was a mention in dispatches. Clearly someone, somewhere, felt that such a low level recognition was unacceptable.

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If I may say without seeming to patronise, I think that you write very well, and I have enjoyed following this thread, albeit at a safe distance.

I totally agree with what you have said regarding the clarity of the warrant and thus what the awards should all hold in common.

Unfortunately throughout its history the VC has suffered from political (both civil and military) interference from time-to-time and there are some famous cases where the award of VCs has been criticised, Rorkes Drift being an example in case, where it was suggested that regardless of the undeniable (and desperate) bravery shown, the large number of VCs awarded for a single action were in part to assuage and diflect public attention from the disaster at Isandhlwana that immediately preceded it. The award of a VC to Leefe Robinson for shooting down a zeppelin (within 7-days of the action) was an example (some say the first) of an award impelled by prevailing public opinion (even before spin doctors). Even in the Falklands war there was controversy over the award to Lt Col H Jones.

As regards WW1 and before, in large part some of the awards that seem less deserving to present day eyes were to a significant degree compelled by the paucity of gallantry awards that were available to be awarded in 1914. At that time there was no MC, or MM (nor other Services equivalents) and the DSO was an Order not intended for gallantry (although this changed), so the choices available were limited. If Yates had not received a VC, I believe the only alternative at that time was a mention in dispatches. Clearly someone, somewhere, felt that such a low level recognition was unacceptable.

I agree with your points made and indeed made some of them myself earlier in that I believe it was politically motivated more than anything. That his wife and the War Office knew he was not KIA and was a prisoner because she had received a letter from him quite promptly. It could also be said that in the letter to his wife, he might have made reference to his health inasmuch as reassured her he was not wounded, which also seems to be the case, other than his scorched tunic, which indicates it is a miracle he wasn't wounded. At any rate, these things were known well before he was gazetted for the VC. Yet they didn't amend the citation to reflect known facts.

The military have for many years and into modern times considered themselves to be above their own rules and indeed the law too claiming crown immunity. I doubt questions would have been asked at the time and consideration was not given to it coming under scrutiny at a later point as indeed it does now. We cannot judge them then using the standards of today. However, that said, the wording of the citation of the award blurs the facts surrounding his capture considerably and that it does, cannot be ignored. I believe that it has the potential to demean the award and demean who I would consider to be an honourable officer and man. It also brings into question for those historians and researchers: Is the citation of an award for bravery reliable? I would say now, it should be but it isn't, not on its own.

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I agree with your points made and indeed made some of them myself earlier in that I believe it was politically motivated more than anything. That his wife and the War Office knew he was not KIA and was a prisoner because she had received a letter from him quite promptly. It could also be said that in the letter to his wife, he might have made reference to his health inasmuch as reassured her he was not wounded, which also seems to be the case, other than his scorched tunic, which indicates it is a miracle he wasn't wounded. At any rate, these things were known well before he was gazetted for the VC. Yet they didn't amend the citation to reflect known facts.

The military have for many years and into modern times considered themselves to be above their own rules and indeed the law too claiming crown immunity. I doubt questions would have been asked at the time and consideration was not given to it coming under scrutiny at a later point as indeed it does now. We cannot judge them then using the standards of today. However, that said, the wording of the citation of the award blurs the facts surrounding his capture considerably and that it does, cannot be ignored. I believe that it has the potential to demean the award and demean who I would consider to be an honourable officer and man. It also brings into question for those historians and researchers: Is the citation of an award for bravery reliable? I would say now, it should be but it isn't, not on its own.

I concur with all that, especially your final and most telling point.

As for the Crown Immunity, as someone who has served under that now long dead rule I should say in defence of the military that it was not a military rule per se, but one established by the Treasury and intended to protect the public purse (of all government departments, not just the military) from pernicious litigation. In some respects (but not all) I mourn its passing because it has led directly to a risk averse culture that contradicts much that a military force is intended to be.

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Would somebody please summarise, briefly, where the investigation has got to?

1. when was the photo taken

2. where. ditto

3.why. ditto

4.what are the facts of his VC award action, as opposed to surmise. Claims of witnesses to be allowed in evidence with caveats.

5. above all, how and when did the photo reach the English media? That may be the key to genuine understanding, as opposed to surmise, however well informed on the minutiei of uniform and clothing aspects.

As historical background to the school of thought which avers that his VC was not earned, how about the undoubtedly political cascade of VCs awarded for Rorke's Drift? It happens all the time when a defeat needs to be sweetened for the unwashed at Home.

Last but not least spare a thought for any surviving Yate family, idly Googling to see what happened 100 years ago. What can we tell them about the man?

Can anyone answer Grumpy's fifth question, please? A similar question was asked by peteblue in the other Yate thread (post 12) but, as far as I can see, it hasn't been answered there either. It would be interesting to know where and when the photograph was first published.

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One thing is certain - none of us will know really know if Yate deserved it or not as we were not there. Everything is pure speculation.

Bond wrote three* separate accounts and they all differ in some detail. While the VC citation is at odds with Bond's multiple versions of events, this might simply be an understandable attempt to distill a complex action into a single summary event. If one reads the other diaries and first hand accounts and the correspondence between the survivors and the historians of the OH, it is pretty clear this was very nasty fight and a near annihilation of a more than one British battalions - not just the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry. Within the unit Yate was clearly prominent in the trenches and in command of two companies fighting a rearguard action of some intensity over a number of hours. On the extreme right flank with three, possibly four German battalions directly against the KOYLI position, one can only imagine the intensity of the fighting that day.

* the published history (1929), correspondence with the OH author Atkinson (1918) and his long narrative of the battle that runs to over 3,000 words - part of his personal diary (undated but likely written in 1914 and elaborated on in 1918. certainly the first draft was written before 1918).

While casualties are only a crude measure of a battle's intensity, it is worth remembering that Yate's unit had 600 casualties that day including 48 killed.

The 2nd Bn Suffolk Regt could only muster 111 men the following day with D Coy parading only 16 men. 74 men killed.

The 2nd Bn Manchester Regt only mustered 8 Officers and 240 men at the end of the day.

and so on...

Interestingly the 1st Bn East Surrey Regt war diary records that the King's Own Yorkshire light Infantry retired during the battle - again something at odds with the KOYLI account by Lt Col Bond.

Whilst under this shrapnel fire we were witnesses of three consecutive advances made by different Battalions along the spur to our right front. In each case the Battalion advancing was met by a tremendous shrapnel fire, which eventually drove it back in confusion off the field. It was now evident that a retirement must come shortly. Our men however, in spite of the tremendous shrapnel fire and the disconcerting retirements on the right, held their guard. About 3:00 pm the KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INF on our left commenced retiring and Maj TEW went over there to find out the cause of it. He found a Major of the KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INF leading the retirement, who informed him that they had received the order to retire and that though he saw no necessity for it, they would have to carry it out. As there was now no possibility of holding on alone and to do so simply meant destruction without gaining any advantage, Maj TEW gave the order to retire. To avoid confusion the retirement was carried out by consecutive lines from the rear and was at once met by a tremendous shrapnel and machine gun fire which caused a number of casualties. The Germans rapidly moved up their guns and continued shelling the retreating troops for some hours.

Yate was one of three Majors in the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry present but was commanding B Coy in the Reserve trenches, so there is a possibility that at one stage he was retiring. This runs slighty at odds with Bond's three separate descriptions of the scene. He does not mention the KOYLi, or parts of the KOYLI retiring at any stage. One possible explanation is that the 1st East Surrey's were simply wrong and that the King's Own Yorkshire Light infantry did not retire. More controversy. The loss of the Suffolk's trenches to the right of the KOYLI allowed the Germans to enfilade B Coy trenches and part of D Coy (Wynne's platoon) and they were engaged from many hours in this situation. At around 3:10 pm if Bond's account is correct the KOYLI and Yate would have known they were surrounded on three sides and completely isolated from the rest of the Brigade; Bond states;

"Retirement was out of the question besides no order cancelling that of 6:00 am had been received by 2nd Bn KING’S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INF"

This is at odds with the account left by the 1st Bn East Surrey Regt note they talk about some KOYLI retiring at arount 3:00 pm (see above). The fragments that we do know about Yate's role is that he was prominent and actively organising the line. I have little doubt that he called for his men to charge and few either heard him or responded. There is little doubt in my mind that Yate's intention was to charge, which given the circumstances would have been tantamount to suicide. I have also little doubt that he was an incredibly brave individual. It is distinctly possible that he deserved the VC for his actions that day and the 'charge' with 19 men was simply a rather convenient way of summarising his actions that day .....but this is where the official story falls to pieces. The maths doesn't stack up.

The account say he charged with 19 men, yet there were at least 336 POWs including some wounded and also including 16 Officers. Only one KOYLI Officer died that day. The battalion was nearly at full strength having lost only 3 men killed prior to this date. Assuming some wounded and missing, it would be reasonable to assume somewhere in the region of 950 men started the battle with the KOYLI. 48 were killed. For ease lets assume 50 as there were two deaths the following day, likely I think DOW.... This leaves roughly 900 men alive and the records show 600 Killed, Wounded and Missing.... meaning 550 WIA, MIA and POW (calc: 600 less 50 KIA and DOW) i.e more than two companies worth. The implications are that 250 men got away (900 less 550). We know there were 336 POWs which leaves over 200 who were not made POWs or killed. Either way one cuts this, it is a fairly safe bet that there were more than the 19 men in the charge-that never-happened.

This is perhaps where the propaganda machine starts its spinning. Le Cateau was in part poorly executed. Battalions were not able to extricate themselves and disengage without catastrophic loss - KOYLI and Suffolks in particular. It may be that Yate was a deserving VC winner and the authorities simply saw an opportunity to promote his actions as a last stand and heroic charge. This would have helped distract the public from the realities of the partial failure of Le Cateau - this was after all the first set piece after Mons in a War that the British Public in their ignorance had allegedly been condition by the press to believe it would be all over by Christmas - and yet here was the British Army in full retreat after less than a week and about to report nearly 8,000 casualties at Le Cateau. I think Yate might simply have been an unsuspecting victim of the authorities' desire to spin the events in a more symbolically hero-romantic way. Essentially his actions become a metaphor for the whole BEF and a clever piece of propaganda. This is only one possibility and is of course subjective.

None of us will ever know what exactly happened and it may be pointless to even try and analyse the events. Personally, when I see gigantic differences in accounts on this magnitude I find it interesting. It might tell us more about the British propaganda efforts than the acts of incredibly brave people such as Yate. One of the problems of VC actions (and more than one VC was awarded for this action) is that they tend to obfuscate all other aspects of the battles. MG

War Diary of 2nd Bn KOYLI:

26th Aug 1914. Wednesday. During last night A and B Coys were on outpost duty. The Brigade stood to arms at 2:30 am and received orders to take up a rear guard position facing south with the town of LE CATEAU some 1,000 yards on right front of the line. C and D Coys in new line, A and B Coys in support. At 6:00 am the orders were cancelled and a new order to occupy the whole position for defence were received.
7:00 am to 4:00 pm: The battle of LE CATEAU.- see Appendix I [below]
Casualties: See Appendix 2.
4:00 pm. By 4:00 pm the whole Division was in retreat and no attempt at reorganisation could be made until it reached ESTRÉES where what is left of the Battalion collected in a field. Pouring rain and very cold.
26th Aug 1914. APPENDIX I. ACTION of LE CATEAU.
Reference was diary for 26th . Orders to entrench and fight in position received . The position was hurriedly entrenched, 2nd Bn KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INF being in the front line on the West of the main CROIX-REUMONT road near the B in BRIQUETERIE with the 14th INF BDE on the immediate right and 2nd Bn KING'S OWN SCOTTISH BORDERERS on our left.
5:0 am. The enemy opened artillery fire on the extreme left, probably directed against our 4th DIV which we understand was in action some 10 miles off. Later on the enemy developed a strong attack against the spur South of LE CATEAU occupied by the 14th INF BDE.
The enemy could make very little headway to our immediate front owing to our much better position so that they concentrated most of their attack against our right.
After some hours of very severe fighting the position fell into the enemy's hands this rendering our position very precarious if not untenable. In the mean time our trenches had been subjected to a very heavy fire from artillery, infantry and machine guns. The artillery fire was so heavy and so effective that our own guns could make but little impression being vastly outnumbered.. As soon as the right spur fell our guns were enfiladed and those placed in close support of the infantry could not get into action.
3:00 pm. By this time the enemy had succeeded in finally establishing themselves on our right and it became evident that a general retirement was inevitable as all our trenches were subjected to a very heavy enfilade fire from infantry and machine guns and our own artillery was almost out of action.
As we afterwards learnt the whole of the Battalion Staff had been killed earlier in the action by a shell bursting in the trench. The retirement was therefore effected very much later than would otherwise have been the case owing to no order being received. It was largely owing to this that the Battalion suffered such heavy losses as not only were the trenches exposed to very heavy enfilade fire for some considerable time but also troops retiring up the glacis slope in the open were subjected to terrific bursts of fire from rifle, machine guns and artillery who could concentrate their whole attention on successive positions retiring, there being no answering fire.
APPENDIX II. LIST OF CASUALTIES INCURRED AT LE CATEAU, 26th AUG 1914
OFFICERS.
Name Nature of Casualty Remarks
Lt Col R C BOND DSO Killed W P Since reported by War Office as living
Maj C A L YATE Reported Killed
Capt L SIMPSON MVO Dangerously wounded and missing
Capt A C G LUTHER Reported killed
Capt A R KEPPEL Reported killed
Capt C H AKROYD Killed
Capt W E GATACRE Killed
Lt C H RAWDON Killed
Lt B N DENISON Killed Since promoted Captain
Lt W H de W UNETT Reported Captured Since promoted Captain
Lt T REYNOLDS Missing
Lt G C WYNNE Reported Killed W P
2 Lt J B NOEL Reported killed
2 Lt T B BUTT Seriously wounded
2 Lt H B HIBBERT Missing
2 Lt RITCHIE Killed
Capt F C LEDGARD (YORKSHIRE REGT) Killed
Lt J B NOEL (EAST YORKSHIRE REGT) Reported killed Since reported at Base
Totals
Officers Sergeants Corporals Buglers Privates Total
18 21 22 7 532 600
Map courtesy of TNA. Shown here for research purposes only. Crown Copyright. WO 95/558/1

post-55873-0-60301100-1399833158_thumb.j

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Can anyone answer Grumpy's fifth question, please? A similar question was asked by peteblue in the other Yate thread (post 12) but, as far as I can see, it hasn't been answered there either. It would be interesting to know where and when the photograph was first published.

Having trawled the Times and the British Newspaper Archives there are 63 separate articles on Yate, all essentially repeating the same facts and none with the Photo. Do we know the photo was actually put in the British press? It would seem to be counter to press controls at the time and not particularly positive propaganda. The earliest reference I have found is Sep 17th, The Times which is quoting a Blackwood's magazine article of an earlier date. Widespread VC related newspaper reports citing the charge with 19 men. MG

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Having trawled the Times and the British Newspaper Archives there are 63 separate articles on Yate, all essentially repeating the same facts and none with the Photo. Do we know the photo was actually put in the British press? It would seem to be counter to press controls at the time and not particularly positive propaganda. The earliest reference I have found is Sep 17th, The Times which is quoting a Blackwood's magazine article of an earlier date. Widespread VC related newspaper reports citing the charge with 19 men. MG

SPOF posted a link to his citation in The Gazette and if I recall from a previous thread, the image appeared in the Shropshire Star. I will check that thread now. I would be interested to know whether it appeared in German press beforehand. A Norwegian newspaper report was seen on Major Yate but not relative to the circumstances surrounding his capture nor his VC and as far as I am aware there was no photograph.

If I also recall correctly, Grumpy was a participant in that thread - there are another two previous threads.

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One thing is certain - none of us will know really know if Yate deserved it or not as we were not there. Everything is pure speculation. ...

Bond wrote three* separate accounts and they all differ in some detail....

I have also little doubt that he was an incredibly brave individual. It is distinctly possible that he deserved the VC for his actions that day and the 'charge' with 19 men was simply a rather convenient way of summarising his actions that day .....but this is where the official story falls to pieces. The maths doesn't stack up.

This is perhaps where the propaganda machine starts its spinning. Le Cateau was in part poorly executed. Battalions were not able to extricate themselves and disengage without catastrophic loss - KOYLI and Suffolks in particular. It may be that Yate was a deserving VC winner and the authorities simply saw an opportunity ... I think Yate might simply have been an unsuspecting victim of the authorities' desire to spin the events in a more symbolically hero-romantic way. Essentially his actions become a metaphor for the whole BEF ...

None of us will ever know what exactly happened and it may be pointless to even try and analyse the events. Personally, when I see gigantic differences in accounts on this magnitude I find it interesting. It might tell us more about the British propaganda efforts than the acts of incredibly brave people such as Yate. One of he problems of VC actions (and more than one VC was awarded for this action) is that they tend to obfuscate all other aspects of the battles. MG

Martin a fantastically detailed account. Thank you and I will take the time to re-read it again tonight.

Re the VC and propaganda - I very much agree with you.

Re. Bond. Did you see my post number 96 page 4 of this thread? That was Yate's own account according to what he told Breen who was to have escaped with him until things went a bit awry. That report was written in 1919. He seems to have discussed a lot of things with Yate but that is hardly surprising as they were colluding to escape together.

Initially, I thought that Bond might have an axe to grind of some sort with Yate, hence a different version of events to that stated in the citation but having read Breen's account according to Yate himself. I firmly believe that:

1. Yate was not wounded.

2. There was no charge and while the intent might have been there, they were overrun and he was disarmed.

3. As 1 and 2 are not supposition but now from two different sources then the VC was not within the terms of the Warrant and therefore the events in citation published with regard to Yate were propaganda.

In addition, the Camp Commandant, who was later removed as he was considered unsuitable in that post stated that he had been told that that Yate was suicidal and had tried to shoot himself with his revolver as he was captured. He also tried to jump from a moving train on the way to Torgau. Breen did not mention this but he did say that Yate thought no officer should be captured alive. As for the train incident, It could well be attributed to an escape attempt rather than a suicide attempt.

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After all the analysis [and excellent input from Martin G]. we are left with the undeniable fact that Major Yate was awarded the VC.

Thank you for your service, Major Yate VC, and may you Rest in Peace long after this thread runs out of steam.

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Having trawled the Times and the British Newspaper Archives there are 63 separate articles on Yate, all essentially repeating the same facts and none with the Photo. Do we know the photo was actually put in the British press? It would seem to be counter to press controls at the time and not particularly positive propaganda. The earliest reference I have found is Sep 17th, The Times which is quoting a Blackwood's magazine article of an earlier date. Widespread VC related newspaper reports citing the charge with 19 men. MG

Not the Shropshire Star. I was wrong and that referred to a modern article.

I wonder if S78 might know where he sourced the photograph as he originally posted it in that thread. SS might also let us know his source as he posted it at the start of this thread unless of course he copied it across from the thread S78 started.

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...we are left with the undeniable fact that Major Yate was awarded the VC...

Not according to the Army Lists - strange that...

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Not according to the Army Lists - strange that...

which year months please?

After his death was acknowledged he would not be listed, so there is only a very small window in which his VC could be credited, and, from memory, the monthly AL publication had a two month hiatus in September and October 1914.

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which year months please?

After his death was acknowledged he would not be listed, so there is only a very small window in which his VC could be credited, and, from memory, the monthly AL publication had a two month hiatus in September and October 1914.

I was sure I had posted this earlier in the hope that someone might enlighten me as to whether he and possibly others had been missed off erroneously or whether it was a case that they were not listed if they were awarded posthumously. I said that the two men gazetted with him were in the lists of 1914 but he wasn't nor was he in any subsequent lists I could see. I guess now I have the answer. I can take it from that he would not appear in the list if he was dead and that he died 2 months before he appeared in The Gazette and in fact his citation there shows him as deceased.

I did mean to follow it up myself and look for others awarded the VC posthumously to see if their names were in the Army List but it slipped my mind until now.

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To be perfectly frank, debating whether someone deserved a VC or not is arguably rather pointless. I am not sure where this takes us in our advancement of knowledge. The history of the VC is itself fraught with anomalies and inconsistencies. My interest in this story is exploring inconsistencies between first hand accounts and in particular the differences in Bond's accounts and the various diaries. It is of mild and passing interest that it happened to be a VC action. I would rather VCs were not part of the story as they tend to distort how events are perceived and understood such is the intense focus. Far more interesting is the idea that Le Cateau is depicted in British historiography as a tactical success. Technically that might be the case but the execution was far from optimal.

For anyone wishing to really dive deeply on this I would recommend reading the OH correspondence in the CAB files at TNA. As the jigsaw puzzle that was the Retreat from Mons was put back together one can feel the stark realisation among the Historical Section that the action was was not quite the success it was portrayed at the time - I might add for understandable reasons. Atkinson is almost tearfully apologetic in parts of his his correspondence. Personally having waded through most of the relevant material I think assessments of Le Cateau and indeed the whole Retreat from Mons need a major re-think. I don't think it was the brilliant success that many authors seem to think it was.

The hero-romantic school of military history has created rather a large number of myths on this episode of our history that need to be dismantled. The Retreat from Mons is to the British something akin to Gallipoli for the Australians. It is sacred territory shrouded in reverence and mythology. It is a hallowed ground and any view that runs against the accepted narrative will I think run risk of meeting strong resistance. Challenging accepted views does not necessarily mean one is doubting the commitment and raw courage of the participants. Technology is allowing us to process archive material at a pace that could barely be imagined only 10 years ago. This is enabling us to broaden and deepen our research on an unprecedented level. It is inevitable that we will reassess history as new information becomes available, indeed one might argue it is a necessity.

The collective intellectual capital that forums such as the GWF can harness is one small part of this. I doubt anyone reading this long thread (and the sibling threads) can honestly say they have not learned something. I certainly have and I am richer in spirit for it because it makes me think and challenges my preconceptions. The day that stops will be a very sad day. I am probably going to drop out of this this thread because I don't think I can add any more and VCs don't interest me very much. The info on German uniforms and equipment and clothing was simply fascinating, so a big thank you to those who shared their knowledge on this.

I am about to start a thread on Le Cateau. MG

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So sorry. Thought the thread was titled 'The Capture of Major Yate' surely encapsulates everything that surrounded his capture including debate of the award? Just because particular parts do not interest you does not mean they should be omitted. I have absolutely no interest in bayonets whatsoever but I have found the debates surrounding them interesting.

How arrogant are you to say we should only discuss things you like!

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SS might also let us know his source as he posted it at the start of this thread unless of course he copied it across from the thread S78 started.

I actually came across the photo whilst doing some research on the battle. It was illustrated on THIS page with an even more controversial account, so that is why I got interested.

I then followed up the photo and found it already on the forum, which I copied across. There are numerous versions of various sizes shown on Google Images. All original source.?

Here is the attached commentary from that quoted page ...

"Major C.A.L. Yate commanded one of the companies of 2nd King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry and was in command of the 2 companies in the forward positions. Yate failed to receive the order to retreat and continued to resist the German attack. Finally Yate was left with 19 uninjured men. He led them in a desperate charge against the German infantry. All 19 became casualties or prisoners. Yate was wounded and captured. Yate was held at the Torgau Officers’ Prisoner of War Camp, from which he made several escape attempts. Yate escaped for the last time, and it is believed that when challenged by German civilians, he cut his own throat with a razor. Major Yate was awarded a posthumous Victoria Cross for his conduct at Le Cateau. Major Yate was an experienced soldier, having fought on the North West Frontier of India, and in the South African War, in which he was wounded. Yate was a highly competent linguist, holding the Interpreter Qualification for French and German and other languages. In 1904, Yate was attached to the Japanese Army during the Russo-Japanese War. He was awarded 2 decorations by the Japanese Emperor. Yate seems to have adopted the Japanese belief that a soldier should never be captured. This may explain his suicide. On the other hand, it is reported that Yate was interviewed at the prisoner of war camp by 2 officers from the German security services, following which he was highly agitated and pressed his need to escape. Although this is not reported in any of the accounts relating to Yate, it may be that he was employed on clandestine work in Germany before the War, using his fluency in German, and that he feared that he might be tried and shot for those activities as a spy. His VC is in the KOYLI rooms in the Doncaster Museum."

Cheers, S>S

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So sorry. Thought the thread was titled 'The Capture of Major Yate' surely encapsulates everything that surrounded his capture including debate of the award? Just because particular parts do not interest you does not mean they should be omitted. I have absolutely no interest in bayonets whatsoever but I have found the debates surrounding them interesting.

How arrogant are you to say we should only discuss things you like!

Now don't start acting like a "petulant child", haha.! :lol: But seriously, I do very much agree with what Martin has said. The medal business is a distraction and is meaningless really (to me personally).

My motivation in raising the topic was to learn more about the man, and what drives someone to so determinedly pursue escape against the odds. Personally the action he took at the end (in my mind) to perhaps regain some of his lost "honour" (remember his background in Japanese culture) says volumes about the man's character. And this to me warrants respect, and further investigation to maybe try to get to the bottom of what exactly happened in that POW camp.

Cheers, S>S

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:D SS Thank you for all of the extra information. I think he was extremely brave and honourable. Yes, I agree the VC is a distraction but an inclusive one nonetheless and I for one have learned an awful lot about how they were conferred and used (rightly or wrongly) in some instances, to influence or assuage the public. Which in a way, adds further insult to the men using their bravery in such a way. However, moving swiftly on.

There is something like 125 pages in his file and I have been through it and revisited it but I cannot find any reports of him attempting to escape from Magdeburg. The only other reference is the attempt to jump from the train but that is not to say he didn't try and he was very persistent so I would be surprised if he didn't. The reason the escape was brought forward was because he had been interrogated once and he knew they were coming back.

His previous background is also relative to the photograph and where it was taken. Did they know who they had and his background? Is that why they chose to release the image of him and not the others who were captured. They guy was a hero not just of WW1 either and that would have been immediately obvious to them from his medal ribbons. German intelligence wasted no time getting to work on him.

Also, if the uniforms in the photograph are not 72 IR who Yate has told Breen disarmed him then who were processing the POWs further back. A march backwards into a holding pen followed by another march back to where? To be transported away. A railway map would be handy at this point.

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How arrogant are you to say we should only discuss things you like!

Seaforths. you might want to read my post more carefully. I did not say we should only discuss the things I like. I simply said "debating whether someone deserved a VC or not is arguably rather pointless".

Personally I have no interest in debating whether someone got a VC or not. Others may find this aspect interesting and that is their prerogative. Good luck to them. It's just not for me and that is my prerogative. If the thread had been titled 'Did Yate deserve his VC?" I doubt I would ever have clicked on the thread. The other aspects I find are far more fascinating. Good luck with your research. MG

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On a lighter note, I do seem to be having some luck with my research.! Following on from Wyliecoyote's good advice I have been tracking down the OOB's from all the Bayerische Landwehr-Infanterie-Regt on the record as at August 1914. All so far have been safely allocated away in the 5th, 6th and 7th Armee sectors as Reserve troops. Except for one regiment which was missing. I then found one tiny reference on the net, just a single mention. It was somebody's grandfather's service details, which stated the unit was 'immobile', and used 'guarding prisoners'. Something you don't see every day ... will keep you posted. :)

Cheers, S>S

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Generally when we see the shoulder boards rolled, it is because the troops had been marching with their tornister packs, the shoulder boards were rolled to prevent damage from the pack straps.

... but I would like to say that the state cockades look like the typical Bavarian style, slightly larger than the Reiches cockades. They will normally appear all white, as the light blue circle in the cockades are rarely clear and visible in many of these period photos. Still not very clear but for me about 70% sure. The one rifle does appear that it could be a Gewehr 88 by the hint of the protruding magazine.

Had lots of other things to do yesterday so only now am I catching up with posts here. To begin with, though, thanks wyliecoyote for these and you other posts on this topic - all highly informative! I had wondered in an earlier post of mine if the size of the lower cockade might be informative, having seen one photograph of a Bavarian whose field hat did seem to sport a large lower one!

Trajan

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And now having gone through all of the amazing number of posts, we are almost back at the start - who are the soldiers in the photograph! But on the journey to here again we have all learn a lot (I, for one, had never heard of the battle of Le Cateau before, although I had heard about the Mons debacle). Before going any further along this road, though, especial thanks to Wyliecoyote and Martin G for their contributions... And let's have the original publication of the photo sorted out as well!

TTFN

Trajan

PS: I'll be replying to those PM's later - sorry for the delay!!!

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Just to add this, the only other version of the photo that I have seen anywhere else, the one I referred to above with bits of the text from an adjoining column showing, but with no real clue as to how to read these. This image is posted on http://www.yorkshireindexers.info/wiki/index.php?title=YATE,_Charles_Alilix_Lavington_VC

The page does not indicate the source but this being a Yorkshire-based page, then possibly, just possibly, a local Yorkshire paper? As we can narrow the date it was published to after news of his survival reached home and before his escape and suicide, then that should make the search of the Yorkshire papers easier. But even if that is the case, where did they get it from!

Trajan

post-69449-0-46321200-1399882469_thumb.j

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