Lions led by donkeys?

[truthergw]

I did look at Haig's Diary for the date you gave. Reading the whole entry and the footnote re The Pope, I do not think it is proof or even strong evidence that Haig was a bigot. That will always be a matter of personal interpretation. The suggestion is not made anywhere that I know of. I think that Haig was reflecting a general suspicion of the Pope's allegiances. I do not have access to Haig's letters and would like to read the whole letter and consider the circumstances of its writing before I accepted that he was a bigot. The diary entry states quite clearly that Charteris was offering evidence that German morale was suffering, MacDonough was saying the opposite. Haig is trying to rationalise this contradiction. The best verdict I could give in the circumstances is one of " not proven".

[Jonathan Saunders]

The diary entry states quite clearly that Charteris was offering evidence that German morale was suffering, MacDonough was saying the opposite. Haig is trying to rationalise this contradiction. The best verdict I could give in the circumstances is one of " not proven".

Bearing in mind Haig is "The Educated Soldier", what evidence existed that the morale of German troops was any different from that of Allied troops? And shouldnt that have been his starting point?

[PhilB]

How would a commander check morale in his own troops and in enemy troops? No use asking Army, Corps, Division commanders etc. They`re not incentivized to admit low morale. So what yardsticks? Desertion rates, sickness rates? And even harder in enemy troops. Little use asking PoWs - they`re possibly a self selecting group anxious to sound cooperative. How do you check morale?

[salesie]

I did look at Haig's Diary for the date you gave. Reading the whole entry and the footnote re The Pope, I do not think it is proof or even strong evidence that Haig was a bigot. That will always be a matter of personal interpretation. The suggestion is not made anywhere that I know of. I think that Haig was reflecting a general suspicion of the Pope's allegiances. I do not have access to Haig's letters and would like to read the whole letter and consider the circumstances of its writing before I accepted that he was a bigot. The diary entry states quite clearly that Charteris was offering evidence that German morale was suffering, MacDonough was saying the opposite. Haig is trying to rationalise this contradiction. The best verdict I could give in the circumstances is one of " not proven".

First of all, Tom, I'm making the suggestion that Haig may have been a bigot, and I'm presenting some evidence to that effect. However, as always, varying interpretations will prevail.

Secondly, in support of this suggestion, I would say that when trying to rationalise the contradiction between Charteris' and Macdonough's intelligence assessments, that Haig, by regarding Catholicism as "tainted" and therefore, by definition, intrinsically unreliable, could not possibly have carried out an unbiased assessment of his own.

Cheers - salesie.

[truthergw]

Charteris told Haig that two companies of Pionieren had refused to fight. They interpreted that as a morale problem and thought it indicative of a wider problem in the German Army as a whole.

[Jonathan Saunders]

QUOTE (Phil_B @ Jan 5 2008, 08:22 PM) <{POST_SNAPBACK}>

How would a commander check morale in his own troops and in enemy troops? No use asking Army, Corps, Division commanders etc. They`re not incentivized to admit low morale. So what yardsticks? Desertion rates, sickness rates? And even harder in enemy troops. Little use asking PoWs - they`re possibly a self selecting group anxious to sound cooperative. How do you check morale?

I dont know what yardsticks could have been used but we do know that Haig personally and continually believed in pressing the attack because the Germans were about to break. Therefore, if the Allied troops and German troops were fundamentally suffering the same experiences and Haig believed the troops under his command were motivated/capable to press an attack aggressively, what grounds from past experience, did Haig have to believe that the Germans were not motivated/capable to resist an attack? How well did he know his enemy?

[PhilB]

I do hope there were some objective methods of estimating (quantifying?) morale. Otherwise, morale is more or less what you want it to be.

[salesie]

Bearing in mind Haig is "The Educated Soldier", what evidence existed that the morale of German troops was any different from that of Allied troops? And shouldnt that have been his starting point?

Jonathan, it would seem, in this context at least, that Macdonough was "The Educated Soldier" in that he used the BEFs morale assessments along with German assessments.

A study of the morale of the BEF in 1917, based on the soldiers letters home, concluded that the morale of the army as a whole was sound but that the second army, which was bearing the brunt of the fighting at the time, had a somewhat lower morale than the other armies in quieter sectors. In the second army the men's letters where evenly balanced between favourable and unfavourable, whereas in the others the vast majority of letters were favourable - drawing the rather obvious conclusion that morale would move, either up or down, when an individual army's state of action altered. The report also noted that war weariness was evident, and an almost universal longing for peace was expressed, but there was a strong feeling of only one kind of peace is possible and the time had not yet come.

Macdonough had always taken the view that men in highly active sectors would have lower morale and therefore his assessments were based on much broader evidence, both British and German. Whereas GHQ took a narrow view of German morale, basing their evaluations only on the German troops opposite the active sectors of the BEF. Prisoners captured under such conditions would be expected to display signs of demoralisation, as would British troops captured from the second army at the time.

Not only were GHQ's intelligence assessments of German morale "doctored" by Charteris, they were based on flawed thinking to start with. Haig was right; Macdonough’s reports were tainted, but tainted by intellect and accuracy.

Cheers - salesie.

[salesie]

Forgot to add that German soldiers' paybooks and not yet posted or partially written letters home were assessed. Some from prisoners, but many taken from the dead. British intelligence insisted that this kind of evidence be systematically searched for, mostly by specialist clear up teams after the action had moved on, but sometimes great risks were taken to achieve these ends. Letters to assess morale and paybooks to assess attrition rates (as well as to determine the order of battle).

Cheers - salesie.

[Robert Dunlop]

I want to touch on these issues as this thread progresses. At this time I will just lodge my concern about the assumptions being made. Specifically that Haig pressed attacks because he thought the Germans were about to break. This suggests that if he had thought the Germans were not about to break, he would not have attacked. I won't be contributing further on these points at the moment, but just wanted to put a marker in the ground for later.

Robert

[Crunchy]

Just a few points for consideration on the intelligence debate.

At the outset I think Salesie has raised an interesting issue that highlights a flaw in Haig's character; a flaw, I think, that is often seen in people who have a great deal of self confidence and one that is not uncommon in general society.

Firstly, my understanding is that it was not uncommon at that time for a good many Protestants to be prejudiced against Catholics. This prejudice flowed over into all walks of life and could even determine in some instances, whether a man would be given work with a particular firm. Thus Haig's comments regarding Macdonough's religion is not surprising in the context of the times.

Secondly, generally speaking, people are more inclined to accept advice from those they trust, respect and whom they feel comfortable with than those they are uncomfortable with, prejudiced against or whom they don't trust. Thus given Haig's evident prejudice against Macdonough, this probably did affect Haig's judgement when considering Macdonough's intelligence reports.

Thirdly, generally speaking, people are more inclined to accept information that supports what they want to believe or fits with their pre-conceived ideas; they are less likely to accept it if the information is contrary to their views. History is replete with leaders who have rejected sound advice because it does not fit with what they want to believe.

Fourthly, people in the area of operations believe that they have a much better feel for the situation than those who are not. It is the old story of "... we are are closer to the action and understand the situation, what would they know at Head Office?". They are more inclined to accept their own intelligence assessments of than those produced at the strategic level, particularly if there is a considerable difference of opinion.

We also have Tom's comment that Haig did not often change his mind and that he did not welcome critical analysis of his orders. Thus it seems that he was probably susceptible to accepting information and advice that supported what he wanted to believe. Again this is not an uncommon approach by people who have a strong belief in themselves.

Thus , on the one hand, we have intelligence reports from Charteris, whom Haig likes and trusts, produced from information obtained in the area of operations, which support what Haig may have wanted to believe and his pre-conceived ideas. On the other hand we have intelligence reports that are produced at "Head Office" by someone whom Haig is prejudiced against, and probably doesn't trust, and which run counter to both Charteris's reports and what Haig may have wanted to believe. The result is Haig accepts Charteris's overly optimistic assessments and rejects Macdonough's sound advice.

I am NOT suggesting that this is acceptable, I am simply highlighting that given the mix it is not an uncommon human flaw. IMHO it is a mark against Haig in assessing him as a Commander and particularly as a CinC noting, however, he is not alone in this regard.

It would be useful to get Chris Henderson's (aka Green_Acorn) comments about the use and abuse of intelligence given his professional experience in this field.

Returning to Salesie's original question. You raise an interesting point about Charteris's reports "seducing" Haig into believing the "wearing down phase" was much closer than it was. It may well have done; in the sense that his advice probably supported what Haig may have wanted to believe.

I doubt, however, that there is a direct correlation between Haig's too ready acceptance of Charteris's assessments of German morale and "the number of men who died" because of it. I agree that enemy morale is one element considered in the planning. The deductions one draws from it are associated with "likely enemy reactions". We would need to know what these deductions were and what effect they had on the planning of the operations to make any valid comment.

I am also inclined to agree with Robert's comments in post #360, if indeed the assumption being suggested is "that if he had thought the Germans were not about to break, he would not have attacked."

Cheers

Chris

[Jonathan Saunders]

At this time I will just lodge my concern about the assumptions being made. Specifically that Haig pressed attacks because he thought the Germans were about to break. This suggests that if he had thought the Germans were not about to break, he would not have attacked.

But this misleading belief shaped the strategy and tactics employed. It is not that the BEF would never have attacked the enemy line but how they attacked the enemy line.

[Chris_Baker]

QUOTE (Phil_B @ Jan 5 2008, 09:07 PM) <{POST_SNAPBACK}>

... objective methods of estimating (quantifying?) morale ...

I don't know the answer to this myself but it is a great question. The answer will lie in the records of GHQ and the Intelligence, which are there in abundance, notably at Kew. Has anyone looked at that? Can we lift this element of the discussion onto facts rather than supposition?

[salesie]

I want to touch on these issues as this thread progresses. At this time I will just lodge my concern about the assumptions being made. Specifically that Haig pressed attacks because he thought the Germans were about to break. This suggests that if he had thought the Germans were not about to break, he would not have attacked. I won't be contributing further on these points at the moment, but just wanted to put a marker in the ground for later.

Robert

I don't think anyone is suggesting that Haig would not have attacked if he didn't believe the Germans were about to break. I'm certainly not, given Haig's faith in his own one continuous battle doctrine, that would be a ludicrous thing to suggest - he would have continued with phase 3, the wearing down phase, possibly forever.

That's a touch unkind, even Macdonough assessed that Germany would run out of sufficient troops in spring/early summer 1918 at the present rate of loss (August 1917) this was in contrast to Charteris' assessment that Germany would be exhausted of men by Christmas 1917 (Both assessments assumed that Russia would still be in the war).

The point I'm making is that if his judgement were affected then so was his planning, and the C-in-C's plans effect the whole strategy and tactics employed and thus the conduct and course of the battle. In late 1917 I'm sure the German Staff in Flanders were feeling just like Wellington and saying, "They came on in the same old way and we stopped them in the same old way" (I'm sure someone will correct this if I've misquoted, but I think the point will be made anyway).

Cheers - salesie.

[Crunchy]

But this misleading belief shaped the strategy and tactics employed. It is not that the BEF would never have attacked the enemy line but how they attacked the enemy line.

In what way do we believe these beliefs shaped how the British attacked the enemy line (ie the tactics used)?

There are a great many issues that are considered when determining tactics in the attack (that is how we attack or fight) and most of them revolve around the enemy's defensive tactics, the nature of the terrain, the enemy's defensive posture and the weaponry employed by both sides. From my experience enemy morale or his ability to resist is not a principal factor in determining tactics per se but it does lead to a consideration of the enemy's likely reaction in a particular attack. This in turn may influence force ratios and reserves to be used, the phasing of objectives, allocation of troops to task and having forces ready to exploit a breakthrough or conduct a pursuit of a routed enemy. The tactics used to attack the line are one thing, the continuing effort to achieve the breakthrough is quite another. IMHO, it is with regard to this latter point that Jonathan's comment "we do know that Haig personally and continually believed in pressing the attack because the Germans were about to break." is valid.

Furthermore, I am not sure that Haig was the only CinC on the Western Front who was seeking a breakthrough that could be exploited in order to bring the war to a close. I recall that some of the French plans envisaged a breakthrough and when the Germans finally resumed the offensive in 1918 they were seeking to do the same thing.

Cheers

Chris

[Crunchy]

QUOTE (Phil_B @ Jan 6 2008, 08:07 AM) <{POST_SNAPBACK}>

I do hope there were some objective methods of estimating (quantifying?) morale. Otherwise, morale is more or less what you want it to be.

Phil,

Gauging an enemy's morale is an imprecise art and is not easily quantified except at the extremes (very high or very low) when very clear indicators are evident and these instances are rare. In most instances it is a subjective assessment based on prisoner interrogation, captured letters, diaries and other documents, immediately previous enemy performance, whether a unit has been under constant fighting for a long period, etc. In most instances it cannot be applied across the board as there will be some formations/units/individuals with good morale and others with lower morale and it is always best to err towards good morale rather than underestimating it. In this particular case it appears Charteris did make it what he wanted it to be.

Cheers

Chris

[Jonathan Saunders]

From my experience enemy morale or his ability to resist is not a principal factor in determining tactics per se but it does lead to a consideration of the enemy's likely reaction in a particular attack.

But the enemy's ability, or rather their assumed inability, to resist was a major consideration for Haig leading up to the 1st July offensive on the Somme and waves of men going forward in full kit to press on and occupy (not necessarily fight for) the furthest enemy lines and breakout beyond them if the opportunity arose - his plans included for the cavalry to occupy the high ground as far away as Monchy. For this, Haig expected the available infantry reserves to be needed by Third Army for their attack to the south of Arras - not by Fourth Army to fight for first, second, third line etc.

From Haig's diary for 27 June 1916: I then visited Rawlinson at Querrieu. He has ordered his troops to halt for half an hour and consolidate the Enemy's last line! Covered by an artillery barrage! I said this must depend on whether the Enemy had reserves available and on the spot for counter-attack. I directed him to prepare for a rapid advance: and, as soon as the last line had been gained, to push on advanced guards of all arms as "a system of security" to cover his front."

Its quite clear that Haig is under-estimating the German morale and ability to resist in his direction of the battle plans. Rawlinson having originally planned for bite and hold and a much smaller penetration into the German line.

Furthermore, I am not sure that Haig was the only CinC on the Western Front who was seeking a breakthrough that could be exploited in order to bring the war to a close. I recall that some of the French plans envisaged a breakthrough and when the Germans finally resumed the offensive in 1918 they were seeking to do the same thing.

But the position of Britain was completely different. Up until 1917 the French were motivated by ridding their land of an occupying force. The Germans offensive of March 1918 was a desperate last throw of the dice to put themselves in a favourable position for armistice negotiations. What was Haig's motivation and why did he have a preoccupation with a breakthrough? Why did he allow himself to be seduced by the breakthrough theory when he had previously believed in the need for attritional battles? Why did Haig believe the morale of the German army would fail and acquiesce to his plans for a breakthrough?

[Terry_Reeves]

Sorry , but this gets worse by the minute. I'll ask again, where is the hard evidence of Haig's alleged religious bigotry? Those who wish to condemn Haig should at least do it on the basis of fact and not supposition and assumption.

By the way, the phrase Lions led by Donkey's refers to all of the General Staff. For the anti-Haig "experts" on this thread try researching Haig's staff properly - you may get a suprise.

TR

[salesie]

As late as 2nd October 1917, when 3rd Ypres had been in progress for a couple of months, Haig was still clinging to the belief that the Germans were close to collapse as per Charteris' intelligence assessments. At a conference he expressed the view that, "Continued defeats, combined with the long duration of the war, had tended to lower the enemy's morale. The time may come shortly when the enemy's troops will not stand up to our repeated attacks, or when he may not have sufficient fresh troops immediately available to throw into the battle. The enemy failed to take advantage of his opportunities on 31st October 1914, and did not push forward when his repeated attacks had exhausted the British forces on the Ypres front. We must be careful not to make the same error." From the Haig diaries OAD 645 Record of a conference held at 2nd Army HQ, Cassel, at 11am 2nd October 1917.

Yet, by October 8th he seems to have changed his mind, seems to have come closer to Macdonough’s assessment. From the Haig diaries, OAD 652, 8th October 1917, He wished to send, "...as many officers and men as possible on leave between the cessation of this offensive and the commencement of the next. The armies have undergone almost superhuman exertion and hardships during the last few months, and unless the demands made on them during the winter are reduced to a minimum they cannot be expected to respond fully to the further heavy calls entailed by a renewal of the offensive next year.

In 6 short days he has accepted that the war will now continue into 1918, and therefore he wanted to rejuvenate as many men as possible, yet the Flanders offensive went on. Even when Gough informed Haig on the night of 16-17 October that tactical 'success was not possible, or would be too costly under such conditions, and advised that the attack should now be abandoned'. Haig replied, 'But, my dear Hubert, we have no alternative. We must continue.' (source IBID)

Why continue with 3rd Ypres? Haig realised by 8th October that the hoped for collapse of the Germans was not going to happen, he's also made it plain his armies needed a rest after the exertions of 1917 in order to be in the best condition possible for the fighting in 1918, so why continue for several more weeks with no hope of true success? Because of the state of the French army? To attract German reserves to Flanders and away from Cambrai? To secure a better line for the winter? Realising that phase 4 was not close to happening, a continuation of the wearing out phase?

Whatever his reasons for continuing the offensive into November 1917, I think it's pretty clear that a near collapse of the German army was a prime motivator in Haig's mind when he set 3rd Ypres on its way on 31st July 1917, and even in very early October it also seems clear that it was still at the forefront of his thinking, not least of all in not making the "same mistake" as the Germans at 1st Ypres.

Cheers - salesie.

[salesie]

Sorry , but this gets worse by the minute. I'll ask again, where is the hard evidence of Haig's alleged religious bigotry? Those who wish to condemn Haig should at least do it on the basis of fact and not supposition and assumption.

By the way, the phrase Lions led by Donkey's refers to all of the General Staff. For the anti-Haig "experts" on this thread try researching Haig's staff properly - you may get a suprise.

TR

I'm sorry, Terry, I seem to have offended your "faith". But it seems to me that when a man writes in his diary that the Director of Military Intelligence no less, gives such a wrong picture (as opposed to his own man's assessments) on the sole grounds that he is Roman Catholic (no mention that Macdonoughs calculations were flawed only that his sources must be tainted because they are catholic) then I would say that's pretty good evidence for bigotry and warrants further research, even by the faithful.

Also, bear in mind, that history has shown Macdonough's assessments, and assumptions for the future, as being very accurate indeed.

I repeat the "offending" passage: October 15th 1917, Haig wrote in his diary, "...it is stated in a note by the DMI War Office that the morale of the troops in the field gives no cause for anxiety to the German High Command. I cannot think why the War Office Intelligence Department gives such a wrong picture of the situation except that General Macdonough is a Roman Catholic and is (perhaps unconsciously) influenced by information from tainted (i.e. catholic) sources."

Cheers - salesie.

[IanA]

As late as 2nd October 1917, when 3rd Ypres had been in progress for a couple of months, Haig was still clinging to the belief that the Germans were close to collapse as per Charteris' intelligence assessments. At a conference he expressed the view that, "Continued defeats, combined with the long duration of the war, had tended to lower the enemy's morale. The time may come shortly when the enemy's troops will not stand up to our repeated attacks, or when he may not have sufficient fresh troops immediately available to throw into the battle. The enemy failed to take advantage of his opportunities on 31st October 1914, and did not push forward when his repeated attacks had exhausted the British forces on the Ypres front. We must be careful not to make the same error." From the Haig diaries OAD 645 Record of a conference held at 2nd Army HQ, Cassel, at 11am 2nd October 1917.

Yet, by October 8th he seems to have changed his mind, seems to have come closer to Macdonough’s assessment. From the Haig diaries, OAD 652, 8th October 1917, He wished to send, "...as many officers and men as possible on leave between the cessation of this offensive and the commencement of the next. The armies have undergone almost superhuman exertion and hardships during the last few months, and unless the demands made on them during the winter are reduced to a minimum they cannot be expected to respond fully to the further heavy calls entailed by a renewal of the offensive next year.

In 6 short days he has accepted that the war will now continue into 1918, and therefore he wanted to rejuvenate as many men as possible, yet the Flanders offensive went on. Even when Gough informed Haig on the night of 16-17 October that tactical 'success was not possible, or would be too costly under such conditions, and advised that the attack should now be abandoned'. Haig replied, 'But, my dear Hubert, we have no alternative. We must continue.' (source IBID)

Why continue with 3rd Ypres? Haig realised by 8th October that the hoped for collapse of the Germans was not going to happen, he's also made it plain his armies needed a rest after the exertions of 1917 in order to be in the best condition possible for the fighting in 1918, so why continue for several more weeks with no hope of true success? Because of the state of the French army? To attract German reserves to Flanders and away from Cambrai? To secure a better line for the winter? Realising that phase 4 was not close to happening, a continuation of the wearing out phase?

Whatever his reasons for continuing the offensive into November 1917, I think it's pretty clear that a near collapse of the German army was a prime motivator in Haig's mind when he set 3rd Ypres on its way on 31st July 1917, and even in very early October it also seems clear that it was still at the forefront of his thinking, not least of all in not making the "same mistake" as the Germans at 1st Ypres.

Cheers - salesie.

I think you have underlined one very important factor in Haig's thinking. I am convinced that his personal involvement with 1st Ypres made a deep impression. A very little more push from the Germans and they would have broken through. Who could tell whether a little more effort from the allies might not break the German resolve?

His comments at the conference were for public consumption and anyone in his position, be it an army commander or a managing director of a business, sometimes has to stand up and put a favourable gloss on a situation in order to boost morale.

As for there being no alternative to the continuation of the fighting in Flanders - could it have been an attempt to retain the focus of the German command so that the disastrous deterioration of the French army was not exploited as it might have been?

[salesie]

I think you have underlined one very important factor in Haig's thinking. I am convinced that his personal involvement with 1st Ypres made a deep impression. A very little more push from the Germans and they would have broken through. Who could tell whether a little more effort from the allies might not break the German resolve?

His comments at the conference were for public consumption and anyone in his position, be it an army commander or a managing director of a business, sometimes has to stand up and put a favourable gloss on a situation in order to boost morale.

As for there being no alternative to the continuation of the fighting in Flanders - could it have been an attempt to retain the focus of the German command so that the disastrous deterioration of the French army was not exploited as it might have been?

In my opinion, Ian, the problem was, although Haig believed the German position in late summer/autumn 1917 was very similar to that of his own corps at 1st Ypres and therefore ripe for exploitation, he had very good and accurate intelligence that said the situation was far from what he believed it to be. He chose to ignore this intelligence in favour of Charteris' "flawed" and "doctored" intelligence assessments which were designed to tell him what he wanted to hear, designed to fit in with his own ideas.

And bear in mind, this was not just any old intelligence he ignored, it was from the Director of Military Intelligence himself and proved to be extremely accurate - yet, it would seem that his sole reason for ignoring it was that it was tainted by Catholicism. Surely, given the attrition rates at 3rd Ypres, this warrants further research?

Cheers - salesie.

[charlesmessenger]

Salesie

You should put Haig's diary entry about McDonogh and his 'tainted sources' in context. In August 1917 the Pope of made a peace initiative, which led some British newspapers to accuse him of being pro-German. I suspect that it was this that influenced Haig, rather than his own engrained antipathy.

In fact Haig cannot be accused of being a religious bigot. If you look elsewhere in his diary you will see that he frequently voiced his frustration at the way in which the various churches tended to go their separate ways rather than pull together. In his entry of 30 March 1916 he expressed his delight at seeing three parsons of different persuasion actually standing together and taking to one another. They included an RC padre. He went on in the same entry to rail about the divisoons between the high and low wings of the Church of England.

Padre William Drury supports this fracturing of Christianity. He recorded that when in Egypt he had to sign an undertaking not to hold interdemoninational services with other chaplains.

Charles M

[Chris_Baker]

I am going to SHOUT here. WILL YOU PLEASE STOP QUOTING ENTIRE POSTS!! JUST DELETE THE ENTIRE QUOTE OR SNIP IT DOWN. Thank you.

[IanA]

Sorry Chris. I tried 'snipping' t'other day and by the time I had finished, the original post had been zapped. I'll do it in future.