Lions led by donkeys?

[armourersergeant]

Robert/Chris,

I realise that the two ajoining battalions would co-ordinate the local defence arrangements, they may even have wished to alter, for the better as discussed, the boundary area, they may even have fed back this problem!

My thinking is this, given that the attack has falter, run out of steam, and that intelliegence certainly from VII Corps was telling them that a counter attack was imminent then surely Third Army should have reacted to the wartnings. Regardless of the corps dispositions, surely if VII Corps reported they expected an attack, and according to Haigs diary and Snows, almost to the exact place, and that he had requested extra forces, they should not seemingly have ignored this plee.

That said, it should not have stopped both Corps commanders asking/ co-ordinating a better line of defence between them. We are talking of two 'old' commanders here, obviously well known to each other. Communication should have been reasonable. Both were expereinced officers and perhaps should have taken the precations.

Do we know if the link between the two corps was identified by either corps commanders as a problem? I can only talk in general about the battle, must read a good account!

I wonder if this was a case of looking so hard in one direction and forgetting to look the other!

regards

Arm

[Crunchy]

Hi Arm,

I'll leave the details of the battle to Robert and Jon as they have a much better grasp of them. My explanation is restricted to the mechanics or principles of defence as practicised on the ground.

In reality a boundary is simply a control line between two units to delineate who is responsible for attacking or defending what piece of ground. They are at all levels and a corps boundary will also be a divisional, brigade and battalion boundary the closer you get to the front line. They are normally, but not always, chosen from easily recognisable features on the ground such as a road, canal, river or creek line. On flat featureless ground they are much more difficult to recognise but this should not stop coordination between flanking units from occuring. Coordination between units across a boundary, particularly in defence, is essential and often fraught with problems in ensuring there is no gap that can be exploited by the enemy

Once a battalion captures an objective or piece of ground it is the resonsibility of the battalion commander, and his company commanders, to re-organise their surviving troops for the defence of the ground they hold. This includes coordination with flanking battalions irrespective of whether or not they are in the same brigade, division or corps. The brigade commander should supervise this to ensure the whole brigade defence is tied in and coordinated with the flanking brigades. A coordination point is nominated at some point on the boundary behind the front line - this is where the flanking battalion and brigade commanders meet to tie in the defence between their units. It is pretty much SOP (Standing Operating Procedure) and should be practised in training. The depth battalions and brigades are also being coordinated to tie in the defence in depth.

I am not sure of the extent to which this was carried out in 1917 and the lack of proper coordination may partly be what Maxse is alluding to in his comments.

The divisional and corps artillery would also be tying in artillery DF's (Defensive Fire Targets) on likely enemy approaches and likely enemy FUP's (Forming Up Places) and coordinating this with flanking divisional and corps artillery. Many of the DF's are taken from the map and requests from the battalions and brigades on the ground.

Re-organisation and coordination of a defence immediately after an attack is not an easy task but it is an essential requirement in order to prepare for possible counter attacks. Some of this would be done as part of the attack planning and confirmed on the ground according to what objectives had in fact been captured. Coordination between flanking units is fundamental.

Once the ground was taken, I don't think it was so much a matter of the corps commanders asking for a better boundary, the flanking units were already there. I think it was more a matter of the units on the ground ensuring the defence across the ravine was properly coordinated with inter locking fire, especially given the danger it posed. If the ravine had been within a corps or divisional boundary, the need for ensuring this would be exactly the same. I am not sure how wide the "ravine" is and this may have a bearing on why the coordination was poor and why Sixsmith felt it was not a good choice for a corps level boundary.

The ravine should have had DF's laid on it. One would hope that the infantry ensured MG's and other fire would be capable of firing across and down the length of it, as it would be an obvious enemy line of approach. The problem at Cambrai seems to be that the coordination at battalion and brigade at the corps boundary and across the ravine was poor but Robert and Jon are better placed to comment on this.

You are quite right that the Army and Corps commanders should have been ensuring that the available resources were allocated to divisions and sent forward for the defence, but as in all walks of life, there are never enough resources. I don't know enough about this to make any valid comment.

I hope this is useful.

Regards

Chris

[Robert Dunlop]

It is very useful, Chris. I will dig out some of the detailed descriptions of how the co-ordination process happened in WW1. I agree with your general point about selecting the right type of boundary, and the oversight role that army-level command should play. The devil really lay in the detail. Two major assets, both MG and artillery, were vitally important in this regard. This is because both MG and artillery fire were most effective when used in enfilade. To achieve this, or simply because of the nature of the terrain, it was often necessary for the MG and/or artillery fire to come from the area of your neighbouring unit, rather than rely solely on the ability of a unit to protect its own front. The consequences could be disastrous if insufficient effort was put into co-ordinating everything as closely as possible.

The same issue surfaced in Operation Michael too. Flank company and battalion commanders sometimes found that their neighbours had disappeared according to the different policy of retreating immediately to the battlezone versus holding the forward zone in numbers, for example.

Robert

[armourersergeant]

Chris,

It does help, as you have put it, as a Store manager, I am tasked with maintaining a shop floor, I then task others to maintain certain sections of that floor area, and so on...

So in this instance perhaps the 'fault' lays in two areas. Firstly the poor choice of Corps boundry and then the ability of the local battalions to 'join' their lines. I guess we should also mention that one of these corps was tired from recent fighting and was under-resourced as a consequence. I guess as with most things it is not as clear cut as we armchair commanders would like it to be.

Many thanks

Arm

[Crunchy]

as you have put it, as a Store manager, I am tasked with maintaining a shop floor, I then task others to maintain certain sections of that floor area, and so on...

Arm,

Yes, that's correct. The other issue to be considered is the scale and scope of the business. In your analogy Haig would be the CEO of a very large corporation, his army commanders would be regional managers, corps commanders would be area managers with three of four branches, and the divisional commander would be the branch manager with several departments, brigade commanders would be department managers and so on.

Another transformation of war that occured at this time was the scope of command. In the 19th Century command on the battlefield was a much more direct relationship. A commander of a "BEF" such as Wellington or even Buller in the South African War also commanded the battle because the small size of the battlefield enabled them to take personal control and direct actions. Wellington could be immediately behind the front line because the range of the weapons of his day was very limited. The size of the armies and their close order deployment limited the size of the battlefield such that Wellington was able to oversee the battle and move from one critical point to the other. He ran the battle. Even at Sedan in 1870 Moltke was able to oversee the battlefield and direct the major actions if he needed to intervene, using highly trained staff officers to ride forward and deliver his directions.

The Great War was on such a scale that this was not possible. By 1916, the size of armies and the range of weapons greatly increased the size and lethality of battlefields and area of operations so that it was impossible for Haig or his senior commanders to be forward directing the actions of brigades. If they did so they would be out of touch with the reserves they were responsible for commiting when and where they were needed. As it was, they did not have the communications to be able to quickly influence or control the battle once it started. Thus delegation and greater levels of responsibility were devolved forward to the smaller units.

This devolved approach to command was introduced by the Prussians in the 19th Century with their famous Auftrag or mission - type orders that expressed the overall goal of the commander, but allowed subordinates to carry out the goal as best they saw fit. Mission-type orders, however, required uniform education and training: that different officers, faced with similar tactical-operational situations, would reach roughly similar conclusions as to the action required. This involved an incredible level of training, wargaming and exercises and a common doctrine that remained relevant to current technology and battlefield conditions. The German Army did this; other Armies did not do it to anywhere near the same extent. As a result of this the German junior officers and NCO's used their initiative much more than their British counterparts.

So in this instance perhaps the 'fault' lays in two areas. Firstly the poor choice of Corps boundry and then the ability of the local battalions to 'join' their lines. I guess we should also mention that one of these corps was tired from recent fighting and was under-resourced as a consequence.

I don't know enough about the battle to comment but it seems that these are two factors that contributed to the success of the German counter attack in this area according to Sixsmith. Whether or not the Corps boundary was a major factor I'm not sure as irrespective of where the boundary is, the units at that point should tie in their defence with the flanking units with interlocking fire to cover any gaps.

I guess as with most things it is not as clear cut as we armchair commanders would like it to be.

Spot on Arm. This is the very issue that Robert and I have been highlighting in various threads. Preparing and fighting battles in the Great War were enormously complex matters with a myriad of issues to consider and action. Once started, battles and battlefields are chaotic places to be in and on. Situations become very confused, leaders are killed, there is smoke and explosions that obscure vision, troops get lost or held up, communications are generally poor, battle situations are not always reported correctly, there are calls for more resources than are available to allocate and the enemy is doing everything possible to defeat you. You do your best with what you have on the ground. Some commanders/battalions were able to do this, others weren't. Sometimes even best efforts aren't enough because the enemy is too strong.

For people to suggest that battles should go according to plan painlessly, much like a board game, is quite unrealistic.

Regards

Chris

[Robert Dunlop]

By 1916, the size of armies and the range of weapons greatly increased the size and lethality of battlefields and area of operations so that it was impossible for Haig or his senior commanders to be forward directing the actions of brigades. If they did so they would be out of touch with the reserves they were responsible for commiting when and where they were needed.

Arm, to continue with the analogy that you have proposed, significant problems are likely to arise if, having tasked others to manage various sections of the floor, the store manager then spends too much time delving into the details of what each person is doing. Sooner rather than later the manager will find something that is not to his or her liking, or is not being done correctly. If the manager becomes too embroiled in the details of a particular section, then it is possible that problems in another section may arise unnoticed. It is a difficult balance to achieve, especially when first stepping up from section manager to store manager.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Mission-type orders, however, required uniform education and training: that different officers, faced with similar tactical-operational situations, would reach roughly similar conclusions as to the action required. This involved an incredible level of training, wargaming and exercises and a common doctrine that remained relevant to current technology and battlefield conditions. The German Army did this; other Armies did not do it to anywhere near the same extent. As a result of this the German junior officers and NCO's used their initiative much more than their British counterparts.

Chris, this is the accepted wisdom. I just want to place a marker here though. I want to continue to focus of other issues in this thread at the moment, but this is something that I would like to return to later. It is part of the 'Germans learned faster than we did' discussion, IMHO.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

I will dig out some of the detailed descriptions of how the co-ordination process happened in WW1.

Chris, the first example of this process that I read about came from Spears' book 'Prelude to Victory':

'In the early days I was responsible for the liaison from the front trench to the Army Commander and on to GHQ, to whom I ultimately reported. At each echelon there were a Frenchman and an Englishman, from the companies at the front where the two armies joined, up to the Army, and I had to endeavour to be the link between each. Truly a heavy job, especially if it be remembered that all the higher formations has Supply as well as Operations and Intelligence sections, each demanding service. It was necessary to devise carefully-thought-out time-tables which were apt to be upset either by the enemy's action or by a peremptory order from above. Experience alone showed the time required for each task...'

This example made me realise the extent of co-operation and cross-boundary planning that was needed at the junction between the armies of two nations. This made me look out for other examples, and I will share such information as I have built up.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Spears described a little of the process of maintaining liaison between the British and French during the German retreat to the Hindenburg Line:

'By this time it was reckoned that the hour of the cavalry had struck. Our corps cavalry and cyclists were leading the Fourth Army advance, and the French also had some mounted detachments ahead, but the engagement of whole cavalry divisions was quite another matter.

I [had to hunt] for the French cavalry so as to arrange a plan whereby they could first gain and then maintain tough with the British...

I had arrived at a village where I hoped to get information concerning the whereabouts of the divisional headquarters, and seeing some dragoons began to walk towards them.

That evening I had the satisfaction of seeing the French and British flanking units in touch with each other in the village of Damery. In one small village consisting of a single upright wall, the exhilaration of the advance had so far melted the barrier of reserve that usually existed between the allies that I found a group of French and British soldiers who had exchanged helmets and were actually pressing souvenirs on one another, while a little further back, in what was I suppose a company mess in the entrance of a cellar from which the rubble had been removed, a stout and very martial French second lieutenant of about forty-five, bearded and eloquent, was making a long speech to a small group of appreciative British officers. He had in his hand a large tin cup full of something evidently very potent. Whenever he showed signs of flagging, a very tough-looking British subaltern with a twinkle in his eye would call out - "Go on, Major", and this tribute to himself as a man, this recognition by an ally of the fact that this was indeed the rank which should have been his... sent him flying off again.'

An interesting take on a co-ordination point

Robert

[Jonathan Saunders]

Once started, battles and battlefields are chaotic places to be in and on.

Still enjoying the debate but taking a more passive role! But I think its worth pointing out that a significant part of the criticism levelled against senior command is in the planning.

Regards,

Jon

[Crunchy]

I think its worth pointing out that a significant part of the criticism levelled against senior command is in the planning.

Hi Jon,

That is right, however, on what basis or criteria is the criticism of the planning being judged against?

Regards

Chris

[Robert Dunlop]

Jon, your comment brings us neatly back to the planning for Neuve Chapelle. I don't have the same number of primary sources for this battle. With this proviso in mind, here are some general observations.

The planning for Neuve Chapelle began after the two British Armies were created on 25th December, 1915: First Army in the south (with responsibility for Neuve Chapelle) commanded by Douglas Haig; and Second Army in the north, commanded by Smith-Dorrien. Even before this date, Haig had been analyzing the battles of 1914:

'15 December 1914

Very little energy displayed by the 8 Brigade of the 3rd Division, II Corps in pressing the attack. Their methods are much the same as at Spion Kop and Vaal Krantz in South Africa where the whole Army looked on at the couple of battalions attacking. In my opinion there are only 2 ways of gaining ground either, a. a general offensive all along the front, with careful preparation of artillery at special chosen points in order to dominate the Enemy's artillery at specially chosen points, [and] use of trench guns, mortars, hand grenades, etc. to occupy the Enemy's attention everywhere, and press home in force at certain points [where not expected.] The other method b. is to sap up, as in seige warfare. This is a slow business especially in wet ground. It is sad to see the offensive movement by the British Army 280,000 strong resolve itself into an attack of two battalions!'

Note the specific mention of dominating the enemy's artillery. This lesson was not new to the Great War of course. There was, for example, a specific reference to this in Haig's book 'Cavalry Studies', published in 1907.

Even before the planning for Neuve Chapelle, Haig had been placing things in a state of preparedness:

'24 December

At 11 am I presided over a meeting of GOC Divisions and CRA, CRE and General Gough to consider best method of carrying on operations under the new conditions. We discussed:

1. a. Trenches [size, depth and state, nature of revetment, etc]

b. Care of men. Not to put into wet trenches up to their knees in water as has been done [in parts of the front]

2. Nature of Defence

It must be active, otherwise the enemy will advance and blow in our trenches with 'minen werfer' as he did to the Indians.

3. Trench Mortars. Personnel to be gunners or specialists.

4. Hand Grenades. Keep enemy at a distance as long as possible. Use outposts entrenched.

5. Local Attack. As in the old days: Bomb throwers, Bayonet party; Attacking body, with flank detachments, etc

6. General Attack. I asked GOCs to get to know the ground so as to be ready for a general advance when the time comes...'

Even after the formation of First Army, lessons were being drawn in relation to defence as well as attack. For example, after the Germans attacked Givenchy, Haig noted on 18th January 1915:

'I receive report on the defences of Givenchy from Lt Gen Monro Commanding I Corps. The general scheme of defence is

1. Fire trenches with support trenches within bomb-throwing distance (15-25 yards)

2. A second line, called the 'Village Line', embracing the buildings along the main roadway of Givenchy village, and continued in a southerly direction to the canal. In close support of this are the a. 'Keep' (near the church) and the b. Redoubt to be constructed just north of canal in soil heap with minor work between them.

3. A third line along the road running north from Pont Fixe to road junction 800 yards north of Pont Fixe.'

Here we see a description of multiple lines of trenches supported by strongpoints. The recommendations have come up from Monro.

At the same time, the Germans were drawing lessons and reappraising their offensive plans as well. More on this anon.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

After the British Armies were formed, Sir John French asked Haig and Smith-Dorrien to submit plans for offensives early in 1915. French decided on Haig's option to attack Neuve Chapelle, which had been taken by the British in 1914 during the race to the sea but recaptued by the Germans in October 1914. On 6 February 1915, Haig:

'...motored to Merville and saw Sir Henry Rawlinson Commanding IV Corps who returned home from leave in England last night... I told him... that my plan was to operate against Neuve Chapelle... I told him to prepare a scheme and put forward proposals for the capture of Neuve Chapelle. I hoped to be ready for this operation in about 10 days time. He was to treat this as very secret.'

On March 6 1915, Rawlinson wrote in his diary:

'Douglas Haig is just the person to have at the head of affairs, for you may be sure that if the thing can be done, he, at all events, possesses the character and determination to put it through. The new régime at GHQ is not settling down into good working order ['Wully' Robertson had taken over from Sir Archibald Murray]. Plans are being thoroughly worked out and discussed scientifically, instead of being undertaken hurriedly and without due consideration. Altogether things look hopeful for the army's spring campaign.'

In the meantime, planning had moved forward in fits and starts. The British 8th Division history noted that 'as early as 3rd January instructions from IV Corps Headquarters had emphasized the fact that the capture of Neuve Chapelle was the first task in front of the division. Meanwhile, the garrison was to be harrassed constantly by artillery, rifle and machine-gun fire.' These comments predate Haig's conversation with Rawlinson. They do coincide with the general concepts espoused by Haig - facilitating general preparedness for an offensive, and harassing the enemy. Boraston and Bax noted that 8th Division were happy to comply because the German occupation of Neuve Chapelle was proving troublesome. Snipers made effective use of the buildings and the observation advantage meant that German gunners could easily engage the British defenses from Aubers Ridge.

The mention of Aubers Ridge brings us to a key issue of debate. Prior and Wilson ('Command on the Western Front') noted that Haig received the formal request on February 8th from General French for offensive plans, two days after the first conversation with Rawlinson. They went on to conclude:

'Haig was no doubt anxious that such operations should be conducted on his front rather than on that of Smith-Dorrien's Second Army. Yet Smith-Dorrien could propose an attack of considerable tactical importance, namely the capture of the Wytschaete-Messines Ridge. Against this, the storming of an insignificant village in order to straighten out the line might well seem not worthy of consideration.

Haig's first step, therefore, was to increase the scope of Rawlinson's operation so as to include objectives whose capture, it might seem, would have far-reaching consequences. He also held out the possibility of joint action with the French. The attack would take Neuve Chapelle in the first rush and would then push forward to the Aubers Ridge.'

In support of their hypothesis, P&W quote from Haig's diary dated 12 February, 1915:

'In my opinion it is better to advance from this [First Army's] front rather than from Ypres, because we can directly co-operate with the French about Arras which is the main theatre... The French will not co-operate at Ypres and if we drive the enemy back from Ypres we soon come up against a strong position on the Lys, and then the forts of Lille.'

They go on to note:

'The whole scope of the operation had thus considerably widened since Haig first requested a plan from Rawlinson. Whether the resources at IV Corp's disposal, while possibly sufficient for an attempt at straightening the line, were adequate for a thrust towards Lille was not a matter which appeared to be engaging Haig.'

These analyses are, IMHO, typical of the biased and inaccurate assessments of P&W. They appear to be working backwards from pre-conceived views about Haig.

Co-operation with the French forces had been muted as early as December 1914. Doughty ('Pyrrhic Victory') records that 'a few days [after January 15] Sir John [French] informed the French liaison officer at his headquarters of his willingness to support a French offensive with an operation on his own. Sir John was interested in a combined offensive, with his forces attacking near La Bassée (and ultimately Neuve-Chapelle) and the French Tenth Army attacking near Vimy Ridge.'

Haig was in agreement with French's proposal, which need reflect nothing more than a commonly held understanding about the synergistic potential between the British and French efforts. Haig wrote in his diary after the meeting with Sir John French, on 13 February that:

'He [sir John] asked me regarding my proposal for taking the offensive. I explained my plan for taking Neuve Chapelle... He agreed, and said that he would prefer to take the offensive on my front, rather than at Ypres because 1. He wished me to carry out the operation as he could never be certain of getting satisfactory results from Smith Dorrien, and 2. my troops were better...'

There can be little doubt that Sir John's antipathy (putting it mildly) towards Smith-Dorrien played an important, if not the most important, part in his decision to support Haig's plan. There is nothing to support the idea that Haig added Aubers Ridge to the plan in order to sway Sir John.

Robert

[Jonathan Saunders]

Hi Jon,

That is right, however, on what basis or criteria is the criticism of the planning being judged against?

Regards

Chris

Based on several things, not least evidence of aptitude, and particularly on what should have been known (strategically and tactically) and on interpretation of previous battles/lessons. I'll be following Robert's analysis with interest.

Regards,

Jon

[Robert Dunlop]

Lest anyone think that Aubers Ridge is a long way from Neuve Chapelle, I have superimposed a map of the Neuve Chapelle battlefield onto the Cambrai battlefield. The towns of Neuve Chapelle, Aubers, and Illies are marked in an awful purple colour (apologies) and labelled.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Rawlinson's response to Haig's first request for a plan was described by P&W as 'somewhat odd. He did not attempt to come up with an outline plan himself, but passed the whole problem to his two divisional commanders. One of them, General Capper, did not (as far as can be discovered) ever respond. But General Davies, in charge of 8th Division, did produce 'A Memorandum on the Attack of Neuve Chapelle'.' Haig does mention a response from Capper on 2 March, so P&W must be referring to the initial discussions at the outset.

Haig received Rawlinson's documents when 'at 11 o'clock I motored to Merville and saw Sir Henry Rawlinson Commanding IV Corps. I impressed on him the necessity for keeping plan secret. He agreed and said he was doing all he could to divert attention [from Neuve Chapelle] to an attack at Fauquissart and Trivelet. He handed me two papers marked 'Secret' - 'Notes on the attack on Neuve Chapelle', and 'Points for consideration in the attack on Neuve Chapelle'.

P&W noted that the earlier document from Davies suggesting a sapping operation. No date is given for this document. They mention that Rawlinson reformulated Davies' first plan to include a heavy bombardment followed by a storming of the German defences.

In any event, P&W wrote that 'Rawlinson proposed a two-phase plan in which Neuve Chapelle village would be isolated by the IV and Indian Corps on the first day and then subjected to converging attacks on the second. What these papers lacked, apart from appreciation of the of the wider enterprise, was specifics. They contained no proposals about the actual employment of of infantry: which units were to make the initial attack, at what hour they were to go over the top, or how their movements were to be integrated with what Rawlinson had deemed the all-important role of the artillery.'

Recall that Haig had met with Trenchard on 16th February to discuss aerial reconnaissance and observation for artillery. On the 18th, Haig 'went on by motor to Estaires and went to the top of the church tower from which a good view is obtained of Aubers village and the surrounding countryside. Major Charteris (who is in charge of the Intelligence Service of the First Army), Brigadier General Mercer CRA and Straker ADC were with me. One gets a good idea of the nature of the country. Aubers village stands out very clearly and is on a ridge which seems to rise gradually up to it.' Haig was scouting out the terrain over which the attack would take place.

Haig 'was quick to point out [the] deficiencies' in Rawlinson's plans in a written reply dated the 19th February. '[Your two papers] deal with the general principles on which an attack on any defended locality protected by trenches and obstacles shall be conducted - please put forward a scheme for this particular operation... I hope to discuss your scheme at the conference at Merville on Monday 22nd inst. So please get to work on it at once.' At this point, Rawlinson acknowledged that he had not spoken 'with any of my subordinates for I deem secrecy to be of the first importance.' Haig responded 'it is absolutely necessary to take some of your subordinates into your confidence in this matter in order to have their detailed proposals for carrying out your orders...'.

The 7th Division history gives no clue as to what contribution Capper made. The 8th Division history records, however, that 'on the 20th February General Davies submitted his first scheme for the capture of the village; the general idea being for an attack by two brigades between Sign Post Lane and Moated Grange, where the German trenches were weakest, followed on the second day by an assault upon the village from the north, taking the village defences

in flank.' Haig rejected Davies' plan as being too complicated and told Rawlinson to try again. Davies scheme had called for a difficult and dangerous change of direction in the attack, and the pause would have allowed the Germans to recover.

It seems that Rawlinson went back to his Division Commanders again. On 23 February, Haig visited IV Corps and spoke to Brigadier General Dallas, BGGS IV Corps, ie a senior Staff Officer. 'I asked what action had been taken as result of my conference yesterday. He replied that at a meeting yesterday afternoon the problem of an attack on Neuve Chapelle had been given to GOC 7th as well as the GOC 8th Division to work out! I said that the time for setting schemes had passed. It was now for the Corps Commander to order a certain Divisional general to give his order of attack... If any Commander did not do what was required he should be dismissed. If each problem was to be given to 2 Commanders where are we to stop? Why not give the Brigadiers' scheme to 2 Brigadiers and so on. The idea is ridiculous.'

On 22 February, Haig 'held conference regarding plans for offensive... I went into the plans sent in at some length, and insisted on the necessity for methodical preparation, and that every individual man should know exactly what his task was. Thanks to the wonderful map of Enemy's trenches which we now had as the result of the aeroplane reconnaissance it was now possible to make our plans very carefully beforehand...'

Rawlinson's next proposals were received by Haig on 28 February. The plans, however, were still not adequate. The 8th Division history records that 'after a conference at Army Headquarters a fresh scheme was submitted, whereby the attack from Pont Logy southward was to be undertaken by the Indian Corps and the northern portion of the attack by the IV Corps; the whole to be treated as one day's operation. The enlargement of the plan entailed a reconsideration of methods, and ultimately the advantages of greater simplicity and easier co-operation with the Indian Corps led to a decision in favour of direct attack upon the village, thereby avoiding the risk of the breakdown of some essential detail in a more complicated scheme.'

Haig 'had meeting with Sir H. Rawlinson at 12.30 [on 2 March] regarding his proposed plan. As to the general scheme, I said that our objective was not merely the capture of Neuve Chapelle. I aimed at getting the line Illies-Herlies, and then to break the enemy's front. It seemed to me desirable to make our plans with the definite objective of advancing rapidly, (and without any check) in the hope of starting a general advance. The scheme of the 8th Division and that sent in by General Capper of 7th Division seemed to indicate a very limited objective.'

A meeting was held by Haig with the key commanders and staff on 5th March. The various meetings with artillery commanders during the intervening period has been documented earlier in this thread. Haig also spent some time with various brigadiers, especially in the Indian Corps. Before recounting the content of Haig's 5 March meeting, there is one specific issue to consider - the planning or not for the German strongpoints.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

German OHL had decided to focus of the Eastern Front during the spring of 1915. The Neuve Chapelle area was very thinly held, hence the very significant advantage in manpower that the British enjoyed. Wynne ('If Germany Attacks') estimated the advantage to be forty-eight British battalions versus three German battalions in the immediate area. British GHQ 'calculated that, allowing for the arrival of the additional German reinforcements from reserve on both flanks, not more than 4,000 additional rifles would be expected within twelve hours, though a further 16,000 might arrive from Sixth Army reserver near Lille within twenty-four to thirty-six hours. There was little of the fog of war.'

The German front line defences comprised sandbag breastworks, around 5' thick. A direct hit could punch a hole in the defence. The barbed-wire was only on a double row of 'knife-rests'. Several German commanders wanted a second line of trenches, but the option was refused by the Corps Commander and by Crown Prince Rupprecht, who were both fearful that the presence of a continuous line to the rear would cause the front line troops to give way too easily. There were, however, a number of concrete machine gun nests and strong points (Stützpunkte) constructed behind the forward breastworks. These were not manned until the time of an attack. Wynne noted that 'in the event of an attack they were to be garrisoned by machine-guns of the support company and to act as centres of resistance (Anklammerungs-punkte). Their existence was known to British GHQ, but their importance was not sufficiently appreciated.'

Prior and Wilson stated that 'a key component of the German defences seems to have escaped the attention of the British commanders. About 1,000 yards behind the German front was a series of concrete strongpoints designed to hold machine-gun nests once battle had been joined.' P&W acknowledge Wynne's 'claims that the existence of these strongpoints was known to British GHQ, but we can find no evidence to support this.'

I don't know of any direct evidence. The British artillery barrage map clearly illustrates the targetting of most of the areas described in detail by Wynne, and plotted on his sketch map no. 1. The barrage map is illustrated below, with the areas highlighted in red. You may be able to make out the black scallop marks within the red ovals. It was one thing to target these areas, quite another to destroy them. But that is a different story.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

The mention of Charteris in Haig's diary entry prompted me to re-read the relevant section of his book 'At GHQ'. He had just taken up the post. He wrote on February 11:

'Intelligence work teaches scepticism, if it teaches nothing else. Nothing can be accepted until it is confirmed from at least two other independent sources, and if it appears inherently improbable, it requires confirmation from at least one other source. The Head Intelligence Officer at GHQ has scepticism developed to the highest point. His strongest affirmation is that "Something or other appears not improbable," that means it is practically certain. DH [Haig] demands more than this. Everything that goes to him has to be sharply divided into Fact, Probability, Possibility, Improbability but reported, and he holds me responsible that everything is in its proper category. I think he is right. "Not improbable" is rather like a miss in balk, playing for safety. But [General] French, at the beginning anyhow, did not trust the Intelligence, and that "Not Improbable" was an obvious and necessary measure of precaution.'

On March 3, Charteris wrote:

'There has been a most exasperating hitch in our plan. Originally, we were planning an attack as an operation simultaneous with, but independently of, three great attacks by the French away to the south of us. The suddenly GHQ told us that Joffre had decided that the French army under General Maud'huy, immediately on our right, was also to attack in far greater strength than we could muster, so our attack would only be one flank of a big battle. I went over to consult with the Intelligence of the French army on our right regarding the information in their possession, and discovered that there was a big gap between the left of their attack and the right of ours.

DH went himself to see Maud'huy and found that his attack was dependent on our extending our front line up to the left flank of his attack. If we take it on, we shall not have enough troops for our attack. It looks as if either our attack or Maud'huy's will have to be cancelled - in any case both cannot go on, and that means there is no chance of a break-through of the German line in this area. Personally, I do not think there was ever much chance of a break-through, although the French are in better condition and spirit than they were last October.

Our own British Army is still far too small to have any chance of doing more than make a small gap, not enough for a big break.'

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Haig's 5 March briefing to key commanders and staff was summarised by him:

'1. We are embarking on a serious offensive movement with the object of breaking the German line. There is no idea of merely taking a trench here, or a trench there. My object is to surprise the Germans, and push forward to the Aubers Ridge with as little delay as possible [emphasis in the original], and exploit the success thus gained by pushing forward mounted troops as quickly as possible so as to threaten La Bassée from the northeast in which direction there are no fortifications.

The keynote of all the work is offensive action. Bombing parties must act offensively trying to get forward on to the flanks. Infantry will advance first to Enemy's front trenches, then beyond the village, next to the Bois de Biez and Aubers Ridge.

Commanders must therefore carefully consider the employment of their reserves so as to maintain the forward movement.

2. At the same time, the principle of securing the ground already gained must not be overlooked...

3. It may be necessary to advance the operations to a date before th 10th either on account of the French situation on our right, or on account of Germans anticipating in attacking first...

4. I Corps and 7th Division must be ready to push in at any period, even in the first morning of the attack. Arrangements must be made for artillery support with a view to this eventuality...'

Despite Haig's intent for the attack to push forward as quickly as possible, he noted in his diary that at the end of the briefing:

'Rawlinson and Davies thought it would be well to stop for the day after reaching east edge of village - I said 'No'. The effect of this great mass of artillery which we have, must be most demoralising, consequently the advance must be as rapid as possible to take advantage of the demoralization caused by a heavy bombardment.'

It was during this meeting that the artillery scheme was finally agreed, as mentioned before.

Prior and Wilson note that 'this conference at last drove Rawlinson to act on the matter of wider objectives. On 6 March, with the battle just four days away, he asked his divisional commanders for the first time to examine the possibility of an advance beyond Neuve Chapelle to Aubers Ridge. Even then there was little urgency - the divisions were to give him their views in writing by the night of the 7th.

Rawlinson clearly remained sceptical about the possibility of a rapid advance beyond Neuve Chapelle. On the same day as he wrote to his divisional commanders, he recorded in his diary that Haig desired an advance on Aubers Ridge 'in the event of not serious opposition'. Patently, Haig had admitted no such qualification. But Rawlinson then produced yet another reason for the delaying the advance once the village had been captured - the need to wait for the Indian Corps to attack the Bois de Biez. Haig would have none of this, telling Rawlinson that 'each attack if boldy pursued would directly help forward the other'. Haig's exhortations had plainly failed to convert Rawlinson into an enthusiast for the larger scheme.'

The only other point to make is that the co-ordination/planning for the cavalry contribution was haphazard. Haig mentioned that Hubert Gough and Colonel Greenly, then GSO1 2nd Cavalry Division came to see him by 'a mere chance' on 7th March. The cavalry were still under General Allenby at this time, and the decision to use them had to be approved by GHQ. Haig and Allenby had met together prior to the 7th.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Just as a matter of interest, does anyone have further information on General Francis John Davies' military experience prior to 1913?

Thanks

Robert

[armourersergeant]

This is all I have, from centre for first world war studies, Birmingham uni.

http://www.firstworldwar.bham.ac.uk/nicknames/davies.htm

Not much I am afraid. Will keep searching, may have a picture somehwere

Arm

[Robert Dunlop]

Thanks, Arm. It would be fascinating to know what prior experience might have led Davies to first suggest a sapping operation for Neuve Chapelle.

Robert

[armourersergeant]

I am often at pains to find out were a commander came from, more so than where he went to. Why was Haig like he was, because of what he expereinced in younger days. We all learn from our experinces. when I research a General, I pay much attention to his early life and career. My current chap C G Rawling was not just a soldier, of reput, but a explorer and author!

Nothing on Davies I am afraid. if you really wanted to know, you could try the Birmingham Uni website and look for a contact e-mail address to Dr John Bourne. I would ask him, but not trying to be funny, I ask too much as it is. Already sent one off to him today.

regards

Arm

[Robert Dunlop]

On another note, IV Corps was not the only corps to be involved in the Neuve Chapelle operation. The Indian Corps also played a significant role. I do not have much information on the planning process used by Willcocks. According to Haig's diary, Willcocks was in England on leave on 3 March, returning 4 March. It is not clear when Willcocks went on leave but Haig did meet with his BGGS, Brigadier General Hudson. Do any of the recent books on the Indian Corps cover this aspect in any detail?

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Arm, it has been very helpful getting your input on various generals. Thanks for tip re Dr Bourne. I won't tell him that you suggested I email

Robert