Western Front tactics in 1917

[salesie]

Robert, it would seem Haig himself disagrees with you:

"At the Council of War on August 5th [1914] he had pointed out that since Great Britain and Germany were fighting for their existence the war would inevitably be a prolonged struggle, and would require the development of the full force of the British Empire to achieve success. The Battle of the Aisne, which enabled him to gauge the fighting qualities of the German troops, confirmed his belief that man-power would ultimately decide the war, and he directed his staff to begin the study of the man-power which the German nation could effectively employ in the field...these studies of German army man-power commenced during these early months at I Corps headquarters, and were developed at each successive stage of Haig's progress in the war, and he rarely allowed more than a day or two to pass without himself inquiring into the developments of this investigation." Source; Charteris, Field-Marshall Earl Haig, page 110.

It seems, that he had the foresight to understand the dire implications of total-war despite his analysis of pre-war Rides. He recognised only 24-hours after Britain declared war that this conflict would be significantly different to what had gone before. And, on the Aisne in 1914 as a mere Corps commander, he confirmed his belief that manpower would ultimately decide the war and he set his intelligence dept the task of monitoring what he viewed as a war-winning facet.

Perhaps you should consider the possibilty that when confronted with the problems of the "new" war, even before taking the field, he realised that pre-war staff-rides bore no comparison and were in effect redundant?

Cheers-salesie.

[Robert Dunlop]

salesie, Haig's prediction to the Council of War is not relevant to the content of post #526. The analysis of the cavalry studies is specifically dealing with the general characteristics of phase 4. Haig's conclusion about the length of the war, as opposed to the stages of war, was based on other considerations. I will address these separately at some later point.

Robert

[salesie]

salesie, Haig's prediction to the Council of War is not relevant to the content of post #526. The analysis of the cavalry studies is specifically dealing with the general characteristics of phase 4. Haig's conclusion about the length of the war, as opposed to the stages of war, was based on other considerations. I will address these separately at some later point.

Robert

Robert, are you seriously trying to say that pre-war cavalry studies are relevant to WW1? That is precisely the main point the "ee-aw brigade" use to say that Haig was a "donkey" - that he took pre-war, out dated and irrelevant ideas with him to fight a modern war!

Perhaps you should read the whole of my last post, particularly the point about Haig's early belief that manpower would be the deciding factor and not just pick up on the point about longevity? And then consider how this vital war-winning factor impinges greatly on your own conclusion (along with the points I made about the flaws in your analysis of the differences between Nivelle and Haig's offensives) i.e. that victory was not possible, no matter what the tactics employed in the field, until the enemy's manpower collapsed - therefore, by definition, it would be a war of attrition not sweeping and brilliant manoeuvre.

When did pre-war Rides ever consider a total-war of attrition? When did they consider a continuous line of defence with no flanks to turn? When did they consider a scenario where cavalry would be completely and utterly useless, except as dismounted infantry? When did they consider a war where the Navy along with Military Intelligence's propaganda and subversion campaigns would play as important a strategic role as the army in the field, that without these other campaigns the army could never hope to win? When did they consider a scenario where two countries would be fighting for their very existence and that the development of the full force of the whole British Empire would be needed to win?

In my opinion, you fall into the same trap as Nivelle i.e. you see tactics as being the deciding factor and that limited warfare considerations can be "scaled up" and applied to total-war - that WW1 was, in essence, a war like all the others that went before it but bigger.

Cheers-salesie.

[Robert Dunlop]

Original Question, Summary of discussion and Current issue posted here: #520.

Focus of current post:

A previous post examined Haig's pre-war understanding of phase 4, and the transition from phase 3 to 4. This post looks at exploitation phases of major retreats on the Western Front, specifically the Franco-British retreat in the first weeks of the war, the German retreat to the Aisne in 1914, and the German retreat to the Hindenburg Line in 1917. These exploitation/retreat examples are compared with Haig's pre-war understanding. The aim is to determine whether there are any features that overlap and, if yes, to assess what, if any, influence these may have had on Haig's thinking about the transition from phase 3 to phase 4 in 1917.

At some point in the Great War, according to the 4 phase approach to war, one or other side was going to 'win' on the Western Front. The key question was: how long would the wearing down third phase last? A fundamental corollary of this question was: how would one tell when phase 3 was ending and phase 4 was beginning? Nivelle chose to force the issue. Based in part on the view that France could not last beyond 1917, he sought to control the future with his planned offensives. For this discussion, the focus is back on Field Marshal Haig.

Before the war, Haig described two types of exploitation/pursuit phase. The enemy behaved very differently according to the nature of the defeat:

1. Pursuit after the local defeat of part of the enemy's forces - some of the enemy forces retreated, often quickly, and the pursuing force captured significant numbers of prisoners. The enemy remained dangerous, however, and was still capable of counter-attacking.

2. Pursuit after decisive defeat of the enemy's forces - which were no longer capable of any major organised resistance. Knowing that a defeat was 'decisive' depended on knowing the status of all of the enemy's forces, and knowing that the majority, if not all, of those forces were retreating and incapable of organised counter-attacks.

The implications were very different for the attacker. In the former case, the retreating enemy was to be pursued but most of the attacking force was held back because of the risk of counter-attack. In the latter case, the attacker had to throw everything into the chase to try and destroy the retreating enemy once and for all. The fundamental differences in these implications warrant further analysis because Haig had clearly been aware of them.

When the Great War broke out, Germany sought a decisive result on the Western Front. The German Armies pivoted on fortress zone near Verdun, with the First Army sweeping through Belgium and into northern France on the outer edge. The goal had been to get outside the French (and British if they joined the war) and destroy them. The strong German right flank stretched beyond the Franco-British left wing, and threatened an envelopment. After various encounter battles, including Mons and Charleroi, the Franco-British forces fell back in retreat. To the advancing German forces, it was very clear that the British and French were falling back. Bloem noted "The enemy had vanished. The traces of a hasty departure... were everywhere apparent: broken-down carts, burnt supplies and so on..." - signs that the enemy had retreated quickly. But Bloem also knew that these signs were "not of a disorderly rout [as there were] no rifles or equipment lying about..." Bloem's perspective was a very localized, that of a company commander in the one of the many units of the German right wing First Army. The bigger picture was very dramatic. As hoped, the German right wing advanced deeper into French territory, and the French centre left was giving way. The Verdun fortresses held firm, as did the new defensive line from there to the Swiss border. In the German General Staff, "a spirit of intemperate optimism again pervaded the German High Command. On September 1st, the anniversary of Sedan, the Emperor returned in high spirits from a visit to the Crown Prince's Army, and Von Moltke inspected the ruins of the little French fort of Longwy, noting with satisfaction the devestating effects of the German heavy artillery. Von Moltke, Von Stein and Tappen, all three looked to the future with enthusiastic confidence. Only the First Minister of War, Von Falkenhayn, struck a discordant note. Alone of those in high authority in Luxembourg, he had personally visited the Headquarters of Von Hausen, the Duke of Wurtemburg and the German Crown Prince [Commanders of the German 3rd, 4th and 5th Armies respectively], and he had returned frankly sceptical.

'It isn't a battle won, it's an orderly retreat,' he said. 'Show me your trophies and your prisoners.' Though unheeded, Von Falkenhayn's point was well taken." Source: S. Tyng. "The Campaign of the Marne". pp. 169-70. Pennsylvania.

The Miracle on the Marne dramatically ended the German advance. Joffre out-manoeuvred his counterpart, thereby opening up a gap between the German First and Second Armies. The British and French forces counter-attacked; the Germans had to fall back. At the small unit level, the British experience paralleled Bloem's. There was evidence of a rapid retreat but the German rearguards offered continual resistance and there weren't many prisoners.

Charteris wrote at the beginning of the German retreat (7th September, 1914) that:

"DH is very dissatisfied with the information he has been provided with so far, and very critical of GHQ who he says are not trusting their Intelligence service sufficiently. He says that Macdonogh, the head Intelligence man at GHQ is very good, [my emphasis] but cannot make himself felt against Wilson. Certainly, most of the forecasts made by GHQ to us have been wrong, and all the French forecasts.

...though we were told that the Germans were in full retreat, there was still opposition from rearguards. Actually, our own troops, though the men were very keen, moved absurdly slowly, and DH spend the day going from one Divisional HQ to another to try to urge them forward. The cavalry were the worst of all, for they were right behind the infantry. This was gall and wormwood to him, for he had always been first and foremost a cavalry officer.

...for the first time we had the delight of seeing German troops (cavalry and infantry) running away from our fellows. But the Germans had fought bravely and well, and there was then no signs of disorder; that was to come later." Source: Charteris. op. cit. pp. 28-29.

On 9th September, Haig 'sent out special airoplane reconnaissance and... the Enemy seemed to be in full retreat...'. Interestingly, and seemingly in line with his pre-war writings, Haig saw that the 5th Cavalry Brigade was not pursuing vigorously and 'explained to [Chetwode, GOC 5th Cavalry Brigade] that a little effort now might mean the conclusion of the war.' In a supplementary note, Haig later added "[The Enemy was running back. It was the duty of each one of us to strain every effort to keep him on the run.]" Source: Sheffield and Bourne. op. cit. p. 69

Charteris echoed this in his description of the 10th September:

"Although the Germans had, as always, fought well, there was no doubt this day about it being a general retreat. The road was littered with equipment they had thrown away, and there was every sign of disorder. We captured a lot of prisoners. At one place, two bunches, one of 400, and the other of 1,000, threw their hands in and I was busy examining them for most of the afternoon. There was a mixed bag of cavalry, infantry and Jäger. But they threw no light on the reason for the German retirement. One thing seems quite certain. The German Army retreating is a very fragile weapon. It will break quickly if we keep it on the run." Source: Charteris. op. cit. pp. 30-31

The German retreat to the Hindenburg Line in 1917 also largely caught the Allies by surprise. Once they realised the retreat was underway, they were mainly dealing with rearguards, just like the German retreat to the Aisne in 1914. The British chose to use advance guards to maintain close contact. The French tried to use major cavalry forces but these proved unwieldy and easily disrupted by the organised and determined rearguards. Further evidence of the strategic nature of the withdrawal included in the systematic and deliberate destruction of the area between the front line and the Hindenburg Line. Sheffield and Bourne do not include any quotes from Haig relating to the withdrawal.

Summary:

Three major retreats took place on the Western Front before the commencement of Third Ypres. In each case, there were few prisoners captured. During the German retreat to the Aisne, some signs of disorder were noted by Charteris but the overall impression was of effective rearguard actions that delayed the British and French in their pursuit. In truth, each of these examples were strategic withdrawals, rather than disordered retreats. The key point is that the attacking enemy struggled to know the precise significance, even after the withdrawals began.

Prior to the withdrawals commencing, there did not appear to be clear evidence that a transition was about to occur.

Despite his early prophecy that the war would be a long one, Haig reacted to the German retreat in September 1914 as if it 'might mean the conclusion of the war'. This was in keeping with his pre-war views about how phase 4 should be carried out if the enemy had suffered a decisive defeat.

Robert

[salesie]

Robert, according to Charteris "The Battle of the Aisne, which enabled him to gauge the fighting qualities of the German troops, confirmed his belief that man-power would ultimately decide the war, and he directed his staff to begin the study of the man-power which the German nation could effectively employ in the field..."

Though not C-in-C at the time, why would Haig not initially try to exploit such a retreat, even at Corps level - why would he look a potential gift-horse in the mouth? But it wasn't the retreat to the Aisne which convinced him, it was the German army's fighting qualities when preventing allied exploitation on the Aisne that confirmed his view about manpower being the deciding factor in this "new" war - if he didn't test them, how could he have effectively gauged their abilities?

As you say, it's extremely difficult to know when an army's manpower/morale is about to collapse (though a bit easier to judge when it has actually collapsed). After all, enemy troops don't walk around with placards advertising the fact that their bolt is about to be shot. Accurate and trustworthy intelligence is vital in making such judgements, without it the decision to go on with or to stop an offensive relies on gut-feeling only, and the wrong move could end in disaster by giving the phase 4 advantage to the enemy (as Nivelle almost succeeded in doing).

Unfortunately, GHQ's intelligence assessments were wrong in 1917. Flawed because formed from too narrow a base i.e. they relied solely on captured German paybooks to assess manpower, and on reports from prisoners taken only from active fronts to assess morale. Paybooks alone were too small a sample, and prisoners taken from active fronts were bound to show lower morale than their less active comrades. When ample reserves remained, their morale would be much higher when hurled into the fray.

Indeed, a study of the morale of the BEF in 1917, based on soldiers letters home, concluded that the morale of the army as a whole was sound but that the second army, which was bearing the brunt of the fighting at the time, had a somewhat lower morale than armies in quieter sectors. In the second army the men's letters where evenly balanced between favourable and unfavourable, whereas in the other armies the vast majority of letters were favourable - drawing the rather obvious conclusion that morale would move, either up or down, when an individual army's state of action altered. Macdonogh had always taken the view that men in highly active sectors would have lower morale and therefore his assessments were based on much broader evidence, both British and German, and he used a broader base for manpower assessments. As we've already seen, GHQ's and Macdonogh's assessments of German manpower/morale collapse were some six months apart in 1917 (this related to some 500,000 men no less), Charteris said late 1917, Macdonogh said late spring 1918 (both before Russia collapsed).

So, at 3rd Ypres why would Haig not continue? The signs of impending collapse are extremely difficult to spot, but GHQ's own assessments (Charteris') placed the German collapse in manpower squarely in late 1917, and this went along with Haig's own thoughts when saying in his diary (October 15th 1917) that Macdonogh's contrary assessments were so wrong, and it also tied in with his belief that the German's made a grave mistake in not continuing longer with their attacks at 1st Ypres.

Well before 1917, Haig had no thoughts at all about irrelevant staff-rides - so why don't you stop looking at pre-1917 to find answers that are not there, Robert, and look to 1918 for the real evidence that shows manpower and morale were the key factors to victory and not tactical considerations?

Cheers-salesie.

[Robert Dunlop]

Original Question, Summary of discussion and Current issue posted here: #520.

Focus of current post:

A previous post (#530) reviewed 3 major retreats on the Western Front prior to May 1917. A contrast was noted between Haig's handling of the German retreat to the Aisne in 1914 versus his handling the German retreat to the Hindenburg Line in 1917. This contrast will be explored in more detail, then compared with the planning for Third Ypres.

During September 1914, the Germans conducted a strategic withdrawal to the Aisne. From Haig's perspective, the withdrawal appeared to be a major retreat that was becoming more disordered each day. In contrast to his pre-war prediction of a long war, Haig interpreted the retreat as an opportunity to win the war - 'might mean the conclusion of the war.' The opportunity was not definite, but it did inform Haig's approach.

In keeping with his pre-war views about a defeated enemy (phase 4), Haig attempted to vigorously pursue with all of his forces. He personally visited all of his units to get them to hurry. He also took personal risks to corroborate his judgements, including personal reconnaissances of the front line that brought him under machine gun fire on one occasion.

Haig's approach in September 1914 was not the same as the pursuit of an enemy whose decisive defeat was not possible. This was the other scenario that he had outlined before the war. In this scenario, only some of the forces would have been sent in pursuit. The majority of forces would have been held back in case the enemy counter-attacked. This approach was seen during the German retreat to the Hindenburg Line. Haig did not attempt to get all of his reserves involved in the pursuit. The local Army Commanders conducted the pursuit with relatively small forces comprising combined arms advance guards. Infantry, field artillery and cavalry pushed forward against the German rearguards.

The contrast between the two approaches reflects, in part, the different perspectives that Haig held. In the first instance, he could clearly see what has happening in front of his corps, and he knew from liaison officers that the same thing was happening in front of his immediate neighbours. Although Haig had a very high regard for Macdonogh, Haig was not getting Macdonogh's assessments, only those of members of GHQ who disregarded Macdonogh. Haig therefore conducted the retreat according to his view as a Corps Commander.

During the German retreat to the Hindenburg Line, Haig had a complete overview, not only of the Western Front but also the global perspective. Although the retreat took place across a wide front, the goals of the retreat appeared clear. On February 25th 1917, Charteris wrote:

"The German retirement has begun. Yesterday his front-line position was found empty, and today although there is strong opposition, he seems to be definitely on the move, back to his main line of defence."

Charteris went on later to indicate that "while it is feasible that the number of prisoners taken during this month, and the correspondingly heavy losses and other casualties, may have induced the Germans to withdraw from their immediate line of trenches, it is most improbable that these casualties alone would cause them to withdraw as far as the Hindenburg Line."

He concluded that the retreat did not reflect impending collapse of the German Army. He postulated the reasons for the retreat to be:

"a. To gain time for training new German divisions now being identified, or for the development of an offensive elsewhere.

b. To place at a disadvantage any attack on a large scale by the French and British on the Arras-Somme front.

c. To draw us from our present prepared trenches over ground in which communications would be bad and supply arrangements would be difficult.

d. To obtain a larger striking force for decisive action elsewhere.

Any, or all, of these would be sufficient to justify a strategical withdrawal, but against them must be weighed the great moral disadvantage of a withdrawal, even when voluntary, over a space of from 20 to 30 kilometres unless the withdrawal is accompanied by a striking success elsewhere, or followed by a successful counter-stroke in the same area." Source: Charteris. op. cit. pp. 197-8

In other words, the enemy remained dangerous and was creating the capacity to counter-attack if necessary. Hence the different approach to the follow-up of the retreat. The entire capability of the British Army was not applied to the pursuit.

The planning of Third Ypres has been reviewed previously in this thread. Just to be very clear, the precise details of the September 1914 and February 1917 pursuits are not directly releveant. It is the principles underpinning these pursuits that has some relevance. Third Ypres was not planned as an all-out assault with the primary intent of breaking-through. This point is clearly illustrated in the comparison between Third Ypres and Nivelle's offensives. Some contingency was made in case the German Army in Flanders collapsed. The contigency (Gough's plans for the advance from the 3rd line to the Red Line) was equivalent to the pursuit of the Germans in 1917, not the all-out chase of 1914.

Summary:

There appears to have been a distinct difference between Haig's approach to the transition to phase 4 in two specific battles - the Battle of the Marne 1914 and the follow-up to the Battle of the Somme in 1917. The first illustrated the total committment to pursuit, indicative of decisive defeat. The latter illustrated the use of partial forces in pursuit of a still-dangerous enemy. The planning for Third Ypres was consistent with the latter approach.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Original Question, Summary of discussion and Current issue posted here: #520.

Focus of current post:

The planning of Third Ypres has been contrasted with the planning for a decisive breakthrough and pursuit of a broken enemy, which is what would have been required to end the war in 1917. The contrast is further heightened when considering Foch's views on operational planning for the end of the war in 1918.

Haig's planning of Third Ypres was not consistent with an all-out attack on the Germans to seek decisive defeat. This point is further illustrated by contrasting the nature of the operational plans with the following memorandum from Foch after he was appointed Generalissimo in 1918. The date indicates that the memo was issued towards the end of the war as the signs of a general German collapse became more evident:

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED ARMIES,

Senlis, Oise, October 25, 1918.

1st Subsection, 3rd Section, G.S.

No. 5174

MEMORANDUM

The operation plans of the French Fourth Army and the American First Army anticipate for these armies an attack on fronts of limited objectives, to be reached successively.

Such methods, in force for a long time during the war of position, can still be appropriate in certain special cases where only a limited result is desired. However, it cannot be used as a general thing, because it can only produce limited results.

Limiting beforehand the progress of troops to lines placed on the map, preventing the troops in consequence from taking advantage of the opportunities which always present themselves after a successful start, the command by its restrictive orders compromises the final result and in any event makes it more costly.

Important results like those which we are striving for in the present situation, and in the presence of an enemy whose losses from attrition are daily mounting, can only be hoped for by a rapid advance as deep as possible.

Troops launched in an attack need only know their direction of attack. On this direction they advance as far as possible, attacking and maneuvring against the enemy who resists, without any attempt at alignment, the most advanced units working to assist the advance of those who are checked for the moment. They work, therefore not toward lines indicated a priori according to the terrain, but toward the enemy, with whom they do not lose contact once they have gained it.

F. FOCH

The point of quoting this memo is to reinforce the understanding of how a transition from phase 3 to phase 4 would be planned. Foch is advocating that the step by step approach is not appropriate when enemy is perceived to be on the point of collapse.

Summary:

Haig's planning for Third Ypres contrasts with Foch's plans for pressing the Germans in late 1918. This further reinforces the fact that Third Ypres was not primarily planned as a 'win the war in 1917' campaign.

Robert

[salesie]

I'm sorry, Robert, but I have to say your last two posts look like propaganda.

Your comparison of the German retreat to the Aisne in 1914 and their withdrawal to the Hindenburg line in 1917 in order to prove your point is fallacious enough, seeing as the former was forced on them by the allied victory on the Marne and the follow-up was a direct continuation of that battle, and the latter was a strategic decision by the Germans, under no direct military pressure, that took the allied staffs by surprise. But when you add your "own spin" to these events I begin to get annoyed i.e.

You make it look as though Haig alone decided to vigorously pursue the enemy to the Aisne, but that is a completely false picture. Haig was a Corps commander, not C-in-C or even an army commander so his "independence" would have been limited - the truth is the whole allied line was advancing from the Marne in hot pursuit of the Germans not just Haig's Corps.

As for the 1917 withdrawal - the truth is that Haig (along with everyone else) was taken by surprise in the middle of planning for the Nivelle offensive, and his forces would have been neither in position nor adequately prepared to do anything other than follow-up as they did - they were caught flat-footed and in no position to exploit anything.

This comparison is even more spurious than your Nivelle/Haig comparison.

And your posting of the Foch memo seems to be bordering on desperation - by October 25th 1918, the allies didn't just "perceive the enemy to be on the point of collapse" they knew full-well they had in fact collapsed and that the end was near, which changes the whole context of this memo in this debate (phase 4 had been underway for almost three months, it wasn't the transition from 3 to 4).

Cheers-salesie.

[Robert Dunlop]

Original Question, Summary of discussion and Current issue posted here: #520.

Focus of current post:

Haig's pre-war evaluation of the final phase of battle is compared with Haig's post-war assessment in his final Despatch, published in April 1919. The same theme is noted, that of all-out effort to complete victory at the end of the wearing down phase.

As noted previously, Haig published a final Despatch in which he likened the whole war to the various stages of a single battle between equals. The text of Part 2, entitled 'Features of War', is reproduced here:

http://www.1914-1918.net/haigs_last_despatch.htm

Two paragraphs warrant closer inspection. After Haig describes the wearing down process, he goes on to note:

"The greatest possible pressure against the enemy's whole front must be maintained, especially when the crisis of the battle approaches. Then every man, horse and gun is required to co-operate, so as to complete the enemy's overthrow and exploit success."

This paragraph aligns with the previous quotes on Haig's pre-war analysis of what was required to destroy an enemy. Maximum effort was a key feature. Unlike Nivelle's offensives, and unlike the efforts of the Allied forces in late 1918, the campaign of Third Ypres was not fought with maximum effort being applied simultaneously. There was not even maximal simultaneous effort of the British Army. This supports the hypothesis that Haig did not plan or execute Third Ypres as a war-winning battle.

The following paragraph in Haig's Despatch is of some interest, but it does not constitute evidence for or against the thinking behind Third Ypres, IMHO, in that it was written retrospectively.

"In former battles [the wearing down] stage of the conflict has rarely lasted more than a few days, and has often been completed in a few hours. When armies of millions are engaged, with the resources of great Empires behind them, it will inevitably be long. It will include violent crises of fighting which, when viewed separately and apart from the general perspective, will appear individually as great indecisive battles. To this stage belong the great engagements of 1916 and 1917 which wore down the strength of the German Armies."

Summary:

In his final Despatch, Haig summarised what was needed when the end of the wearing out phase was reached. He noted the need for a simultaneous all-out supreme effort to achieve victory. This point mirrored his pre-war concept of the decisive stroke. It does not match with the way in which Third Ypres was planned or executed.

Robert

[Beau Geste]

I have been following your posts Robert with great interest but despite everything you have written , I am still finding it difficult to view Haig as the incredibly intelligent and perceptive person you claim him to have been.

Yes, I agree that he was something of a visionary, in the sense that he recognised, quite clearly, that the nature of war between great powers whose armies, and social systems are roughly equal had changed dramatically. In other words, that victory in a “total war” could only be achieved when one side had achieved a total and complete ascendancy over the other

I also agree that he was a remarkable man in other ways too . Lord Beauchamp, for example, described him as “a man of a rare and single minded devotion to duty” and that aspect of his character is clearly evident in everything I’ve read about him. However, I am still finding it difficult to accept that he was quite as remarkable as you seem to suggest.

Walter Reid in his book “Douglas Haig: Architect of Victory” described him as “a great administrator” ( the man who ‘invigorated and inspired the greatest application of science and technology to warfare that military history had known’). However, He goes on to argue that any attempt to describe DH as a “great captain is at least “questionable”. Because of this administrative capacity I can quite believe that he was capable of “developing memories of the future” with their own “inbuilt flexibility” as you suggest in #482, but whether he was capable of implementing these options as conditions changed in quite the way you suggest is open to debate.

Reid draws attention in particular to a personality flaw that might well be of real significance in this respect: his tendency “to be carried away by excesses of optimism which blinded him from time to time to reality”. Haig is often portrayed as “a man possessing rigorous control, able to repress all emotion but underneath he was a romantic, a cavalier who dreamed of victories wreathed in drama”.

Salesie, in #483, introduced a fifth scenario “the trading of small gains of ground for high casualties”. I know he will correct me if I’m wrong but I think he was suggesting that, in a very real sense indeed, the strategy and tactics employed at Third Ypres were remarkably similar to those employed on The Somme. In other words, there was little evidence of the "inbuilt flexibility" you referred to in this sense anyway.

The mind of Haig, the realist, was deeply entrenched in phase three, the need to maintain pressure on the German army so as to make phase four possible sometime in 1918. In the mind of Haig, the romantic, however, there was always the dream that a major breakthough might be possible. If there is a reason for prolonging the battle for the ridge and the village of Passchendaele at such high cost in human life that had to be it.

Kind regards,

Harry

[Robert Dunlop]

Thank you very much, Harry. You have touched on several important points. Your last sentence is particularly significant, as it relates to an issue that we did not consider in any detail early on in this thread, namely the continuation of Third Ypres past the point of diminishing returns. I need to give your post some further thought.

Robert

[salesie]

Salesie, in #483, introduced a fifth scenario “the trading of small gains of ground for high casualties”. I know he will correct me if I’m wrong but I think he was suggesting that, in a very real sense indeed, the strategy and tactics employed at Third Ypres were remarkably similar to those employed on The Somme. In other words, there was little evidence of the "inbuilt flexibility" you referred to in this sense anyway.

The mind of Haig, the realist, was deeply entrenched in phase three, the need to maintain pressure on the German army so as to make phase four possible sometime in 1918. In the mind of Haig, the romantic, however, there was always the dream that a major breakthough might be possible. If there is a reason for prolonging the battle for the ridge and the village of Passchendaele at such high cost in human life that had to be it.

Kind regards,

Harry

Not quite, Harry - I'm saying that, no matter what the tactics employed, no matter if any flexibility was built in and/or applied, the end-result of the battles of 1917 were, in essence, the same as those of 1916 i.e. they traded small gains in ground for high casualties. A subtle but important difference if accepting my contention that in total-war no war winning victory in the field is possible, no matter what the tactics, until a collapse in manpower and morale of one side or the other occurs e.g. the German collapse in August 1918 (their spring offensive managed to do what Nivelle's offensive almost achieved a year earlier; handing phase 4 advantage to their opponent).

Your last paragraph is interesting and pretty much aligns with my own thoughts. This seems to be the crux of the matter for Robert - but, whereas Robert, apart from a few posts, seems to rely on the interpretation and comparison of events, no matter how far removed in time and/or reality, I prefer to place greater emphasis on the actual words of Haig, especially those in his diary written at the time. I still believe from the evidence, and on the balance of probability, that Haig falsely believed that a collapse in German manpower was imminent in late 1917. Whether that was the belief of Haig the realist or Haig the romantic I've no idea, mate.

Cheers-salesie.

[Crunchy]

Hi Harry,

As Robert has already said you have raised a number of important points and your last paragraph is a very interesting view.

I don’t think Robert is suggesting that Haig was an incredibly intelligent and perceptive person. My reading of his posts is he is demonstrating that Haig understood the fundamentals of his profession very well, and better than a number of his contemporaries, and he knew when and in which situations to apply them. I also feel there were other of his colleagues who were similarly knowledgeable.

The four phases of war that Robert mentions Haig applied to fighting the war; finding the enemy, engaging/pinning the main force, wearing down/destroying it and exploitation were not necessarily Haig’s own ideas per se. These four phases had been long recognized in fighting battles, campaigns and wars. Grant’s campaign of 1864-65 against Lee in Virginia, although it was one part of a two-pronged strategy, is an example of finding, engaging/ pinning, then wearing down the enemy by attrition followed by exploiting success through a pursuit that forced Lee to surrender at Appomattox. The Bohemian campaign of 1866 provides an example of the four phases in a quick war where the pinning and destroying of the main force was achieved in one decisive battle followed by exploitation towards Vienna to force the Austrian Government to surrender.

Nor was Haig the only British general that envisaged a long war requiring large armies. Kitchener expressed this view from the very start of the war. I am not sure if Haig viewed it as such as early as Kitchener did, particularly given his comment during the pursuit of the Germans to the Aisne.

Pursuit is one form of exploitation, but it requires certain pre-conditions and in the Indian staff ride example that Robert presented to us Haig set those pre-conditions. “When the enemy cavalry was defeated, they 'broke, and fled in great confusion.” A pursuit is really only applicable when an enemy suffers a major defeat and his withdrawal is disorderly or it is rapid and there is the chance that it can be made disorderly by applying pressure. A pursuit cannot really be made in the true sense of the object (ie to completely destroy or unhinge a force before it can take up a strong defensive position) if the enemy is able to withdraw in a reasonably orderly fashion with strong rearguards to contest the victor's advance. It becomes a pursuit when cohesion in the defeated force breaks down and by the pressure of a pursuit the retreat is turned into a rout or complete destruction of the force.

What I am taking from Robert’s posts is that Haig understood these pre-conditions and when to apply them and that he understood the conditions under which exploitation could occur. Haig would have drawn on his ideas, pre-war studies and experience and applied them in his planning of operations, which is different to tactics. The principles were the same, what was new to him was the strategic situation and the means to overcome the strong defensive advantage the Germans had.

If we look at the withdrawals that Robert mentioned and Third Ypres this is recognizable but I will do this in a separate post. I think it is important in considering Robert's current posts to differentiate between tactics and operations (Robert is discussing operations) and understand, which I sure you do, that Haig's studies and experience pre-war are a valid consideration in trying to understand the man.

Cheers

Chris

[Crunchy]

If we look at the withdrawals that Robert mentioned in the light of exploitation and the conditions under which it might occur and then consider Haig's intent in planning Third Ypores.

In the Retreat from Mons, Von Kluck's 1st Army may have had an opportunity of destroying or routing the BEF by constant pressure after the first encounter. The BEF was greatly outnumbered and II Corps in particular was in a difficult situation. But the British were not a defeated force and were withdrawing in an orderly fashion. Von Kluck sought to destroy the BEF by applying constant pressure on II Corps and outflanking the BEF. His objective may have been achieved had Smith-Dorrien not turned and fought at Le Cateau. By giving the Germans a bloody nose he was able to break contact between Von Kluck's Army and the BEF and thus relieve the constant pressure the Germans had applied to that point. From this time on the BEF was not seriously threatened during the remainder of the retreat. This, I think, illustrates the difficulty of exploiting success even when one force has a decided advantage over its opponent.

In the Advance to the Aisne, Haig had the perspective of a Corps commander and thus would not be aware of the full strategic picture. Nonetheless, the situation he saw to his front and flanks was one of an enemy in retreat. Keegan calls the German retreat “orderly but precipitate”. Under these conditions Haig was seeking to apply pressure on the retreating Germans in an effort to break up the cohesion of their withdrawal and not give them time to take up a defensive position, in concert with the rest of the BEF and the French. I certainly didn't read into Robert's comments that he was the only one who sought to do this.

Salesie’s view that “the whole allied line was advancing from the Marne in hot pursuit of the Germans”, is not borne out by contrary views that the Allied advance, and particularly that of the BEF, was too slow. Cyril Falls states “it was a crawl”, Liddell-Hart suggests that the slowness of the advance “proved fatal to the chance of converting the German retreat into a disaster”, Terraine states that the British advance was not dashing and displayed too much caution, Spears writes of French criticism “that the British advance had been unconscionably slow” but points out that Conneau’s Cavalry Corps [French] had been behind the British until it drew level with them on the 10th September. Isselin points out that it was a cavalry job to pursue the enemy and gives a detailed example of Foch urging the French 9th Cavalry Division to display more aggressiveness as they were moving too slowly. Both Spears and Isselin mention the impact of the wet weather on 10th/11th September had on further slowing the advance. It was in this environment that Haig was urging his divisions and cavalry brigade to maintain pressure on the Germans. Indeed there is evidence that Haig had not envisaged a long war at this time given his remark “ … that a little effort now might mean the conclusion of the war! The enemy was running back. It was the duty of each of us to strain every effort to keep him on the run”. In essence, Haig was urging his subordinates to maintain pressure so the Germans would not have the opportunity to establish a strong defensive position because, as Robert has pointed out, from his perspective as a Corps Commander he recognised the conditions and saw an opportunity of unhinging the German retreat.

Conversely, in the German withdrawal to the Hindenberg Line, while it is correct to say that it took the Allies by surprise, the circumstances of applying pressure to unhinge the withdrawal did not exist even had they known that a withdrawal was imminent. The Germans were a cohesive force and were withdrawing to a strong, pre-prepared defensive position covered by strong rearguards. Robert is simply pointing out that now, as CinC BEF, Haig would have had the strategic view and recognised that it was not a general withdrawal but a carefully planned withdrawal of one part of the line. A look at the map would demonstrate that the withdrawal was intended to shorten the line and Haig recognised that the conditions for exploitation of a defeated enemy did not exist.

Turning now to Third Ypres. From what I have read of Haig’s operational plan it would seem that it was not cast in terms of winning the war or indeed of simply wearing the enemy down to achieve Phase 4 of the war, as has been discussed in this thread. Rather, as Robert has indicated, the original plan was to drive the Germans from the high ground and then clear the Belgium coast for the strategic reasons of capturing the ports and removing the U Boat bases in that area. Given that the campaign only achieved the first objective of capturing the high ground at horrendous cost to both sides and any further exploitation was out of the question, the view that it was originally intended to be a wearing down operational may be a proposal or justification in hindsight. That it had a severe impact on German, and British manpower is not denied but I am inclined to agree with Robert that this was not the original intent of the campaign and that Haig did not envisage that “Phase 4 of the war” would result from it. The view that Haig initially sought to achieve "Phase 4" or should have even considered it as the objective of the campaign, IMO, is suspect and driven by hindsight after the event.

Cheers

Chris

[Paul Hederer]

Not quite, Harry - I'm saying that, no matter what the tactics employed, no matter if any flexibility was built in and/or applied, the end-result of the battles of 1917 were, in essence, the same as those of 1916 i.e. they traded small gains in ground for high casualties. A subtle but important difference if accepting my contention that in total-war no war winning victory in the field is possible, no matter what the tactics, until a collapse in manpower and morale of one side or the other occurs e.g. the German collapse in August 1918 (their spring offensive managed to do what Nivelle's offensive almost achieved a year earlier; handing phase 4 advantage to their opponent)....

Cheers-salesie.

Salesie,

You make some very good points in this post. This does not seem to have been a unique opinion. To widen this discussion just a bit, at the end of 1915 General von Falkenhayn came to basically the same conclusion as you outlined above. I think he came to the right conclusion, but his response and execution for 1916 were flawed in execution (Verdun). The basic problem being that Germany was in a poor position to carry on a war of attrition. Falkenhayn was provided with intelligence that France was on the verge of collapse at various times (sound familiar?).

I would argue that if you then look at Ludendorff's execution for 1918, he was guilty of substituting tactics for strategy, as was mentioned in another post.

What strikes me is how similiar the problems were for both sides. Haig seems dogged by the persistent impression that he was a bad commander. I think he was just in the wrong place at the wrong time and was the man who carried out the only strategy available. If Haig was a bungler then so were Falkenhayn and Ludendorff. I think the only reason Ludendorff has an aura of competence was that he managed to lose the war in a spectacular manner through the 1918 offensives!

Paul

[Crunchy]

Hello Paul,

Interesting point you have made about Ludendorff's contribution to losing the war although I am not sure that the tactics per se were the primary cause of his contribution. I think that the statement "in total-war no war winning victory in the field is possible, no matter what the tactics, until a collapse in manpower and morale of one side or the other occurs" is a self evident truth and that we have to be careful about placing too much emphasis on tactics as winning wars. Nonetheless, the point you have raised is thought provoking.

As I am sure you would agree, tactics are concerned with the way in which forces fight at the level of battles or when in contact with the enemy rather than being war winning means in themselves and that wars are won by a much broader combination of factors; being in the realm of operations and strategy as you have implied in your comment about Ludendorff.

I take your point about the impact of the tactics that Ludendorff employed during the offensive in 1918. However, were the tactics per se at fault or was it his division of the German Army's manpower into storm troop divisions and lesser divisions and then placing the burden of the fighting on the storm troops, that crippled the fighting power of the German Army after his offensives had been stopped? Conversely, if you have included this division "of labour" as a fundamental element of those tactics then, in this sense, they had a major and negative strategic impact on the German Army when his operations failed to achieve their strategic objectives.

Best wishes

Chris

[Beau Geste]

Not quite, Harry - I'm saying that, no matter what the tactics employed, no matter if any flexibility was built in and/or applied, the end-result of the battles of 1917 were, in essence, the same as those of 1916 i.e. they traded small gains in ground for high casualties. A subtle but important difference if accepting my contention that in total-war no war winning victory in the field is possible, no matter what the tactics, until a collapse in manpower and morale of one side or the other occurs e.g. the German collapse in August 1918 (their spring offensive managed to do what Nivelle's offensive almost achieved a year earlier; handing phase 4 advantage to their opponent).

I'm sorry Salesie, in my attempt to limit the size of my response I have given the wrong impression. I agree with you on this important point . In an earlier posting I did align myself with your view that in a total war situation "no war winning victory in the field is possible" until a total collapse of the type you describe occurs.

I prefer to place greater emphasis on the actual words of Haig, especially those in his diary written at the time. I still believe from the evidence, and on the balance of probability, that Haig falsely believed that a collapse in German manpower was imminent in late 1917. Whether that was the belief of Haig the realist or Haig the romantic I've no idea, mate.

I can understand this. However, DH was a vain man in the sense that he was already thinking ahead and was concerned about how he would be remembered once the war was over. According to Reid he asked his wife to begin work on his biography during his involvement with Third Ypres. It's possible that this concern with his post war reputation and image coloured his diary entries and, in some instances, perhaps reflected Haig the dreamer rather than Haig the realist.

Kind regards,

Harry

quote]

[salesie]

Hello Paul,

Interesting point you have made about Ludendorff's contribution to losing the war although I am not sure that the tactics per se were the primary cause of his contribution. I think that the statement "in total-war no war winning victory in the field is possible, no matter what the tactics, until a collapse in manpower and morale of one side or the other occurs" is a self evident truth and that we have to be careful about placing too much emphasis on tactics as winning wars. Nonetheless, the point you have raised is thought provoking.

As I am sure you would agree, tactics are concerned with the way in which forces fight at the level of battles or when in contact with the enemy rather than being war winning means in themselves and that wars are won by a much broader combination of factors; being in the realm of operations and strategy as you have implied in your comment about Ludendorff.

I take your point about the impact of the tactics that Ludendorff employed during the offensive in 1918. However, were the tactics per se at fault or was it his division of the German Army's manpower into storm troop divisions and lesser divisions and then placing the burden of the fighting on the storm troops, that crippled the fighting power of the German Army after his offensives had been stopped? Conversely, if you have included this division "of labour" as a fundamental element of those tactics then, in this sense, they had a major and negative strategic impact on the German Army when his operations failed to achieve their strategic objectives.

Best wishes

Chris

It seems to me that the prime reason why the spring offensive failed stems back to the self-evident truth of total-war i.e. that allied manpower and morale had not collapsed (though the British line was thin because of the men held back for "home defence") so whatever the Germans did, no matter how they were organised, the offensive was always going to end in failure - the tactics and/or organisation of forces only affected the time it took reach the point of failure, and, of course, this time there would be no recovery in manpower/morale for the Germans.

Cheers-salesie.

[Beau Geste]

I don’t think Robert is suggesting that Haig was an incredibly intelligent and perceptive person.

You could be right. It's just that it has come across to me that way. Incidentally there is no way in this world that I was criticising or "having a go" at Robert. I admire not only his scholarship and industry but also his patience and good manners.

My reading of his posts is he is demonstrating that Haig understood the fundamentals of his profession very well, and better than a number of his contemporaries, and he knew when and in which situations to apply them. I also feel there were other of his colleagues who were similarly knowledgeable.

Yes I agree. His background helped of course even though in The Great War he found himself in an entirely different situation to any he had experienced before. In this context I agree with Salesie. He understood the nature of total war and the requirement needed to achieve victory.

The four phases of war that Robert mentions Haig applied to fighting the war; finding the enemy, engaging/pinning the main force, wearing down/destroying it and exploitation were not necessarily Haig’s own ideas per se. These four phases had been long recognized in fighting battles, campaigns and wars.

Precisely. It is these "stages" I refer to above.

Nor was Haig the only British general that envisaged a long war requiring large armies.

Agreed.

What I am taking from Robert’s posts is that Haig understood these pre-conditions and when to apply them and that he understood the conditions under which exploitation could occur.

Me too. Roberts posts have been excellent and very helpful indeed. As one pal put it "what an education" or words to that effect.

I think it is important in considering Robert's current posts to differentiate between tactics and operations (Robert is discussing operations) and understand, which I sure you do, that Haig's studies and experience pre-war are a valid consideration in trying to understand the man.

Absolutely. If I have one minor criticism, it is that I have experienced some difficulty communicating because, at times, I have been talking about Haig's influence on tactics as opposed to operations.

I agree with everything you say here Chris. However, I simply don't see how one can study and analyse the actions taken by an individual without considering the impact of that person's character and personality. Academic studies on people like Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin, VI Lenin, Winston Churchill et al would have been worthless had their authors not included an analysis of their personal characteristics and how these influenced their perceptions and decision making.

Kind regards,

Harry

[salesie]

I prefer to place greater emphasis on the actual words of Haig, especially those in his diary written at the time. I still believe from the evidence, and on the balance of probability, that Haig falsely believed that a collapse in German manpower was imminent in late 1917. Whether that was the belief of Haig the realist or Haig the romantic I've no idea, mate.

I can understand this. However, DH was a vain man in the sense that he was already thinking ahead and was concerned about how he would be remembered once the war was over. According to Reid he asked his wife to begin work on his biography during his involvement with Third Ypres. It's possible that this concern with his post war reputation and image coloured his diary entries and, in some instances, perhaps reflected Haig the dreamer rather than Haig the realist.

Kind regards,

Harry

quote]

A valid point, Harry - it's not unknown for some to delude themselves (or attempt to delude others) with their diary entries. But I still believe the evidential value of such things is higher than hypothetical and highly circumstantial evaluations of events, especially when coupled with Haig's own words at several conferences and to Gough. The problem is, though, that proof beyond reasonable doubt is impossible to find with such matters and we can only go with a balance of probability to form an opinion - yer pays yer money and takes yer chances.

There is another possibility, though, one I mentioned in an earlier post i.e. given Haig's strong assertions to the War Cabinet in June 1917 that German manpower collapse was within six months of becoming a reality, and as a result the politicians granting extra resources, he may have simply been "busting a gut" to deliver with 3rd Ypres (hoping against hope) which could also explain why Cambrai was lifted from a raid-in-force to a full scale offensive?

Cheers-salesie.

[Crunchy]

However, I simply don't see how one can study and analyse the actions taken by an individual without considering the impact of that person's character and personality. Academic studies on people like Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin, VI Lenin, Winston Churchill et al would have been worthless had their authors not included an analysis of their personal characteristics and how these influenced their perceptions and decision making.

Harry,

I absolutely agree with you. Your comment regarding Haig the realist and Haig the romantic is something I have never heard before and it something worth bearing in mind when considering why he continued with Third Ypres after the October rains set in, especially when he advised Gough to wait until the ground dried out after the August rains. I am sure his personality and character would have played a considerable influence in his decision making cycle.

Best wishes

Chris

[Beau Geste]

A valid point, Harry - The problem is, though, that proof beyond reasonable doubt is impossible to find with such matters and we can only go with a balance of probability to form an opinion - yer pays yer money and takes yer chances.

I agree Salesie but just because it's difficult to prove "something beyond reasonable doubt" doesn't mean we should ignore it completely. As you know as well as anybody, decisions are never taken 'in a vacuum' so to speak. Any analysis of events that are as important as those under review on this thread at the moment should, at least attempt to build into the equation something as important as this.

There is another possibility, though, one I mentioned in an earlier post i.e. given Haig's strong assertions to the War Cabinet in June 1917 that German manpower collapse was within six months of becoming a reality, and as a result the politicians granting extra resources, he may have simply been "busting a gut" to deliver with 3rd Ypres (hoping against hope) which could also explain why Cambrai was lifted from a raid-in-force to a full scale offensive?

"Busting a gut" Was he merely misguided, or did he use it as a ruse to obtain extra resources from a War Cabinet that was something less than 'supportive' at this time ? Or, alternatively, was it an example of Haig "the dreamer" hoping that despite the scale of the problems confronting his forces in the second half of 1917, the sort of victory that could end the war was, indeed perhaps, within his grasp after all ?

I know it's difficult Salesie to build into the model the sort of characteristics I'm talking about. To ignore them though seems to me to be less than sensible.

Kind regards as always,

Harry

[Beau Geste]

Hello Paul,

My interpretation of what began in March 1918 has convinced me that at that time Germany came very close indeed to winning The Great War. I'd be interested to read your opinion on this and, perhaps, to hear what you think were the alternatives ( if there were any) to the tactics employed.

Kind regards,

Harry

[Paul Hederer]

Hello Paul,

Interesting point you have made about Ludendorff's contribution to losing the war although I am not sure that the tactics per se were the primary cause of his contribution. I think that the statement "in total-war no war winning victory in the field is possible, no matter what the tactics, until a collapse in manpower and morale of one side or the other occurs" is a self evident truth and that we have to be careful about placing too much emphasis on tactics as winning wars. Nonetheless, the point you have raised is thought provoking.

As I am sure you would agree, tactics are concerned with the way in which forces fight at the level of battles or when in contact with the enemy rather than being war winning means in themselves and that wars are won by a much broader combination of factors; being in the realm of operations and strategy as you have implied in your comment about Ludendorff.

I take your point about the impact of the tactics that Ludendorff employed during the offensive in 1918. However, were the tactics per se at fault or was it his division of the German Army's manpower into storm troop divisions and lesser divisions and then placing the burden of the fighting on the storm troops, that crippled the fighting power of the German Army after his offensives had been stopped? Conversely, if you have included this division "of labour" as a fundamental element of those tactics then, in this sense, they had a major and negative strategic impact on the German Army when his operations failed to achieve their strategic objectives.

Best wishes

Chris

Chris,

I'm saying the tactics were good the strategy was lacking.

Paul

[Paul Hederer]

Hello Paul,

My interpretation of what began in March 1918 has convinced me that at that time Germany came very close indeed to winning The Great War. I'd be interested to read your opinion on this and, perhaps, to hear what you think were the alternatives (if there were any) to the tactics employed.

Kind regards,

Harry

Hello Harry,

I'm guessing by the responses I didn't word my post very well. Sorry for that. I think the tactics were good, the strategy was lacking. The 1918 offensives showed all the Germans had learned during the war at the tactical level. I don't think the offensives were well coordinated/thought out in their strategic objective(s). The Germans broke the trench lines, but maintaining any type of momentum during the Great War was well-nigh next to impossible. Logistics were a problem. Racing foot-soldiers against trains was also problematic--the train was sure to win.

Paul