Western Front tactics in 1917

[Robert Dunlop]

Thanks, Beau Geste. Your post has pointed to the difficulty of getting a coherent sense from this thread

I agree, of course, with Salesie's view of total war and like him I was gobsmacked to read IS Bloch's comments on how war would develop in the twentieth century. Correct me if I'm wrong, but I interpret the ongoing debate between Robert on the one hand and Salesie on the other as a difference of opinion regarding the sort of victory that was possible during WW1.

This isn't quite right, with respect to my points at least. Coupled with salesie's concerns, this indicates the need for more clarity.

First, I agree that Haig viewed the war with a long-term perspective. Before the war started, he understood that a victory would take several years. Please note that Haig's view was not unique. Bloch's comments were not unique either, and were pre-dated by several decades by at least one other civilian academic.

Second, Haig's long-term view was based on four steps, basically: finding the enemy, engaging/pinning his forces, wearing them down to the point where they break and can be pursued/destroyed. The third phase, wearing down the enemy, was expected to take years.

Third, the key issue under discussion at present relates specifically to the Battle of Third Ypres. This campaign began as part of Haig's long-term plan to wear down the German Army. I believe we are agreed on this. The question is:

Did Haig continue the Battle of Third Ypres for too long because Haig believed Charteris's view that the German Army was about to collapse in 1917 and because Haig discounted Macdonogh's more conservative predictions?

Salesie says yes. I don't, FWIIW.

Robert

[salesie]

Harry, in my opinion the advent of nuclear weapons is the ultimate evolutionary consequence of total-war, and the final proof of its omnipotence. They now make the waging of total-war unthinkable for those with rationale and balanced thinking - no victory, of any kind, is possible.

However, there is always the possibility, as history has shown, that sometimes those with non-rational and unbalanced thinking can rise to power, that's why I believe the rise of Muslim fundamentalism is the greatest threat to our security since the rise of National Socialism in Germany (both, in essence, relying on the blind-faith of its followers to maintain its power-base - the words of mere mortals are irrelevant, no matter how rational, if they contradict the word of God). Don't get me wrong, I regard any fundamentalism to be dangerous (even Christian), but at the moment it is Islam that is on the rise (but that's a debate for another forum).

My views on Haig are summed up by what I said earlier in the thread i.e. "Even at school, I thought the perceived logic of the "Lions led by Donkeys" theme to be flawed. After all, the BEF did beat the most powerful army in the world at the time in a fair fight, especially at 1st Ypres when the German army was fought to a standstill at a time when the material and numerical advantage was skewed greatly in Germany's favour, so a strong case could be made to show that the British professional soldier of WW1 must have been superior to his enemy in almost every way. So, in this sense, how could they be donkeys?

As I've grown older and read more, I still believe the basic logic of my first paragraph to be sound, but I can now see how the description donkey could sometimes be appropriately applied. Take Haig for instance, I don't believe he was a donkey all the time but sometimes how else could he be described? And, I don't believe he was a Wellington at any stage of his career, but sometimes he did show himself to be more than a good and capable commander.

As with most things of this sort, the truth almost certainly falls halfway between the two extremes of the "revisionist faithful" and the ee-aw brigade. (Jesus, I sound like a Liberal Democrat)."

To add to that - I think he was almost certainly the "best" available at the time, simply because of his psychological profile "allowing" him to deal with the inevitable consequences of total-war. But as I said earlier, he was far from perfect - but he was human, and the perfect human is a mould yet to be made.

I would like to go on to what I regard as a vital point about total-war and its relevance to the two opposing "religions" practised by the ee-aw brigade and the revisionists. As I've said earlier in this thread, in my opinion both these extremes fall into the same trap of not drawing a true picture of WW1 and its Generals.

In brief:

The ee-aw brigade, look mainly at the casualty figures and assume from them that the Generals were donkeys of the highest order; stupid, wholly resistant to change and totally unfeeling to the plight of their men. But they seem to ignore the fact that the Generals were not altogether stupid and did change their tactics, and undoubtedly were not inhuman enough to completely ignore the plight of their men. They look for the devil in the casualties, and think they exorcise him by "proving" the revisionists wrong.

The revisionists, look mainly at the smallest detail of individual battles to show that the Generals were not stupid, they did change their methods, and were not unfeeling to the plight of their men. But they seem to ignore the fact that the end-result of the Generals work was exactly the same no matter what they tried i.e. small gains of ground traded for high casualties. They look for the devil in the detail of individual battles, and think they exorcise him by "proving" the ee-aw brigade wrong.

It is my contention that total-war itself is the devil, and that everyone from the lowliest soldier to the highest General is ultimately powerless, from a purely military point of view, in its all-encompassing grip.

The danger with both approaches, in my opinion, is that if the threat of total-war ever rears its head again then:

1) The ee-aw brigade may be seduced into thinking that modern Generals have learnt the lessons of WW1 (partly because of WW2), and seeing as the donkey syndrome has gone then history will not repeat itself. Far less likely, in my opinion, to believe that nuclear war is winnable.

2) The revisionists will be seduced into thinking, because the Generals of WW1 learnt plenty from their experiences (partly as shown by the lower British casualty rates of WW2) and really became highly skilled in their art by 1918 that total-war is winnable in a purely military context. More likely, in my opinion, to be seduced by the "Dr Strangelove syndrome" (so perhaps the more dangerous of the two?).

If a great effort is made to show that neither view is in fact a true and accurate picture, that total-war makes both of these views equally unrepresentative, then we may just have a chance of realising how total-war impinged completely on the way WW1 was fought, and we may just truly understand its main lesson (that total-war itself is the devil). But as long as the ee-aw and revisionist "religions" continue to bombard each other from their entrenched positions, how can the history of WW1 teach us anything of real value?

Cheers-salesie.

[Robert Dunlop]

And, if I took your political argument as fact, I would have to conclude that David Lloyd George, as an elected politician, had no choice but to hold back troops for 1918.

salesie, this is correct. Which is precisely what happened.

After all, according to you, his C-in-C never shared his long-term plans with him, only made reports and statements for political expediency that the C-in-C himself never truly believed, and ultimately these statements proved to be false (as they would undoubtedly do if the C-in-C never believed in them in the first place).

This is not quite what I said. I never mentioned anything about whether Haig did or did not share long-term plans with LG.

If I managed to persuade my bosses to give me as many resources as they could muster, I'd break my back trying to deliver what I'd promised - but for some reason you reckon that in 1917, with 3rd Ypres, that Haig didn't.

This is not what I reckon at all.

My point is: whatever Haig wrote about Macdonogh's predictions, Haig continued to plan for a long drawn-out war, extending into 1918 and even into 1919. The corollary of this observation is that Haig was not totally driven by Charteris' views.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Of course the "newer weapons" we have both referred to were never used to their full potential ( perhaps because of DH's "love affair" with the tried and trusted massed infantry/artillery option ) so we'll never know what might have happened during Third Ypres had the whole range of options been utilised to their full capacity.

If you want to understand the effects of "newer weapons", then it is important to look first of all at the whole war. The contrast between the BEF in August 1914 versus the British Army in August 1918 was huge. The increased firepower, both on land and in the air, was an order of magnitude greater. But the casualties inflicted on the Germans in 1918 were not. Why? Because the enemy always learns and adapts.

Third Ypres illustrates this principle. It is clearer if you study the whole campaign. Within a period of just over three months, significant changes occurred in both the British and German Armies as they sought dominance over the other. Jack Sheldon's book illustrates very clearly how the Germans constantly reviewed what the British were doing, and attempted new ways to nullify it. As demonstrated earlier in this thread, the British and Dominion forces worked equally hard to figure out what the Germans were doing, and then adapted accordingly.

Robert

[salesie]

Did Haig continue the Battle of Third Ypres for too long because Haig believed Charteris's view that the German Army was about to collapse in 1917 and because Haig discounted Macdonogh's more conservative predictions?

Salesie says yes. I don't, FWIIW.

Robert

Not quite right, Robert - I'm saying, and quite clearly and consistently in my opinion, that Haig, contrary to his previous beliefs, realised by 8th October 1917 that total victory was not possible that year (that his earlier acceptance of Charteris' views had been wrong), but that a strong circumstantial case (warranting further research) can be made to say that Haig continued with 3rd Ypres, and lifted Cambrai from a raid-in-force to a full scale assault, for the strategic reasons given in Macdonogh's report of 13th October 1917 (in other words a continuation of phase 3 but with the added strategic need to keep the Germans "busy" in the winter as per Macdonogh's report).

As for your next to last post, I will only say that by breaking that particular paragraph into 3 parts it makes a bit of a monkey of its meaning with regard to its reflections on the logic of your ealier posts.

Cheers-salesie.

[Robert Dunlop]

salesie, this goes back to your earlier quote from a previous post?:

by May/June 1917 there's ample evidence to show he [Haig] believed he was in phase 3 and moving towards phase 4.

Robert

[salesie]

salesie, this goes back to your earlier quote from a previous post?:

Robert

I fail to see the relevance of this, Robert - I've clearly and consistently said that up until early October 1917 Haig believed phase 4 was achievable that year, as per Charteris' assessments (and that would include May/June 1917). Are you becoming confused with the chronology of the thing - or trying to show how consistent my posts have been?

Cheers-salesie.

[Robert Dunlop]

salesie, apologies but the chronology was not entirely clear. I think I have it now but please bear with me as I did not get this right before. Is the following correct?:

From May until circa 8th October, Haig believed that the German Army was fast approaching the point where he could move from phase 3 (wearing down) to phase 4 (pursuit/destruction/surrender). This belief was based on Charteris' reports [strong evidence for these points].

Around 8th October, Haig realised that Charteris was wrong, and that Macdonogh was correct. This led to a continuation of Third Ypres, as well as an upgrade in Cambrai. Haig's aim, in keeping with Macdonogh's conclusions, was to continue in phase 3 and abandon phase 4 in 1917 [strong circumstantial case for these points, but needs more research].

Robert

[salesie]

salesie, apologies but the chronology was not entirely clear. I think I have it now but please bear with me as I did not get this right before. Is the following correct?:

From May until circa 8th October, Haig believed that the German Army was fast approaching the point where he could move from phase 3 (wearing down) to phase 4 (pursuit/destruction/surrender). This belief was based on Charteris' reports [strong evidence for these points].

Around 8th October, Haig realised that Charteris was wrong, and that Macdonogh was correct. This led to a continuation of Third Ypres, as well as an upgrade in Cambrai. Haig's aim, in keeping with Macdonogh's conclusions, was to continue in phase 3 and abandon phase 4 in 1917 [strong circumstantial case for these points, but needs more research].

Robert

Pretty much as I see it, Robert - but three points.

1) You make it sound as if Haig had the choice whether to abandon phase 4 or not - he didn't, he never had any such control at any stage. All he could do at any point was to maintain the military pressure until phase 4 presented itself.

2) Around 8th October 1917, Haig's intention was to "shut-down" for the winter after realising phase 4 was not achievable that year, but by the 16th he'd changed his mind (about shutting down not about phase 4) and decided to continue with 3rd Ypres and upgrade Cambrai. The question is why this change of mind - I say there is a strong circumstantial case that Macdonogh's 13th October report influenced him.

3) The biggest puzzle is Haig's diary entry of 15th October 1917 - saying Macdonogh must be so wrong because his sources are tainted by Catholicism. At the moment, I assume he referred to Macdonogh's earlier reports and had not seen the 13th October report yet - one of the main reasons why further research is needed.

Cheers-salesie.

[Robert Dunlop]

Thanks, salesie.

1) You make it sound as if Haig had the choice whether to abandon phase 4 or not - he didn't, he never had any such control at any stage.

Apologies for the lack of clarity. I do not mean that Haig had the choice to abandon phase 4. I agree with your comment. What I was trying to describe is your point that, if I have understand correctly, Haig believed (from May, roughly, to October) that phase 4 was fast approaching and might be executed in 1917, as a result of Charteris' reports. Not that Haig had the choice to abandon phase 4, but rather he decided in October 1917 that phase 4 would not occur so quickly.

Robert

[Beau Geste]

Hello Robert,

I think I covered the points you raise in your second and third paragraphs (in my posting #395). However, I didn't, realise that Bloch was only echoing the view of someone else when he described the future nature of total war. I'd appreciate it if you would let me have details so that I can familiarise myself with this work.

This campaign (Third Ypres) began as part of Haig's long-term plan to wear down the German Army.

I agree.

Did Haig continue the Battle of Third Ypres for too long because Haig believed Charteris's view that the German Army was about to collapse in 1917 and because Haig discounted Macdonogh's more conservative predictions?

Everything I've read on this particular topic would suggest that Haig became "over confident" and believed, for whatever reason, that the war could be won in 1917. For example, in June of that year he told Robertson that Germany was near to breaking point and Rawlinson that all one had to do was "press the Germans on all fronts and the war could well be finished in 1917". It seems to me that the influence of Charteris was significant throughout this period and despite the doubts expressed by others, Haig was still acting on the information supplied by his intelligence chief. For example, in late August Charteris had informed DH that "the German 1918 class of recruits had all been called up and that the 1919 class would start to appear in in July 1917 and would be finished by October "provided fighting is severe." It was information such as this that Haig wanted to hear and which probably helped to generate the level of confidence that he displayed prior to Third Ypres.

Despite this confidence, Haig, did not display the singularity of purpose that one might have expected vis a vis the operational details of the attacks on the Passendaele Ridge and beyond. The objectives were changed more than once and the type of offensive ( a "rush through" or a "step by step" limited objectives advance" ) was also left surprisingly vague on more than one occasion . Perhaps DH was torn between optimism and caution. Optimism brought about by the confident reports emanating from his intelligence chief and caution being impressed upon him by people like Rawlinson (who had obviously learnt from his experiences on 1st July 1916), Robertson and, of course, the War Cabinet.

In the late Autumn, the ridge itself and the village of Passchendaele took on what appears to have been of considerable (some would claim 'inflated' importance to Haig). He is supposed to have said that "when we get the ridge we've won the war." In somewhat less dramatic language he justified the continuation of Third Ypres by claiming that "we shall have excellent artillery positions and complete cover behind our starting line". In other words, DH was contradicting what he was supposed to have said earlier by now accepting that the war would continue into 1918 and that the ridge would be a useful jumping off place to begin this next offensive".

Was the continuation of Third Ypres justified ?

Haig obviously thought so (it continued exerting pressure on the Germans) and, not surprisingly, so did Charteris. I believe that the influence of Charteris on Haig was highly significant and was an important factor in many of his decisions including those at Third Ypres. Whether he extended the battle into the winter because of the influence of Charteris I've no idea but it might well have been an important factor. In a message to McDonough in November 1917 Haig's intelligence chief argued that the taking of the village was of "great tactical importance. "Tim Travers ( "How the War was Won" ) on the other hand suggests that in the latter stages of Passchendaele "Haig did not clearly know what he wanted" that Passchendaele had somehow become "symbolic" and Haig was prepared to pay any price for its capture. It's possible, therefore, that if Travers is right then Carteris's input might well have been highy significant indeed.

In terms of your second point, when one takes into account the relatively limited results of the battle, the casualty figures, the fact that soon afterwards the BEF were forced to give up the salient caused by the occupation of Paschendaele so as to get a better defensive line, one has to conclude that it was an offensive that went on too long.

Kind regards,

Harry

[Robert Dunlop]

Thanks, Harry. I will need to respond to your post in several parts. Apologies.

Bloch published at the very end of the 19th Century and into the early years of the 20th Century. I don't know to what degree Bloch was influenced by Delbrück, but the latter was a German academic who published throughout the last quarter of the 19th Century. Delbrück even reviewed Bloch's book when it appeared in 1899.

Two authors will give you insights into Delbrück's contributions. They are Foley ('German Strategy and the Path to Verdun: Erich von Falkenhayn and the Development of Attrition, 1870-1916' ISBN 0521841933) and Echevarria ('After Clausewitz: German Military Thinkers Before the Great War.' ISBN: 0700610715). Echevarria also reviews Bloch's work. The review is not too flattering I am afraid:

"Although historians have claimed that Bloch's methodology was positivistic, and although he presented massive amounts of data in his work, his conclusion was not really based on that data. A careful reading of his six-volume work (not the abridged English edition, which most historians agree is misleading) reveals that his conclusion was a foregone one, developed before his mountain of statistical data was amassed. Bloch was more interested in combating militarism and in making the world safe for venture capitalism than in arriving at an objective conclusion about the nature of modern warfare. He wanted to pursuade modern statesmen not to use war as a political instrument and therefore had to convince them that war was too costly to serve their aims. However, his argumentation was simply too tendentious to be persuasive, requiring great leaps in logic and a suspension of critical thinking - inexcusable in a work of six volumes. Although Bloch's cause may have been a worthy one, it was undermined by his lack of intellectual honesty."

Interesting, but I cannot comment on the veracity or otherwise, having never read Bloch's original work.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

For example, in June of that year he told Robertson that Germany was near to breaking point and Rawlinson that all one had to do was "press the Germans on all fronts and the war could well be finished in 1917".

Harry, do you have an exact quote from Haig to Robertson?

I presume that the Rawlinson quote was from June 1917. In one sense, "if the Germans could be pressed on all fronts then the war could well be finished in 1917", Haig's comment is understandable. Quite clearly, however, this was an impossibility on the Western Front at that time. The French had the bigger army and occupied more of the front. Clearly, however, they were not going to be pressing on all their front in the foreseeable future. Haig knew this when he made the statement to Rawlinson.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Harry, you raised several issues about Third Ypres. I will respond to these, but I would like to discuss salesie's points, which have a bearing on your issues.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

When considering the May-October time period, it is important to note that the decision to fight in the Ypres Salient occurred well before then. The series of posts starting here:

 

contain details of the planning process, which began as far back as 1915. The first detailed plan was Rawlinson's, which was published in February 1916.

The British Official History notes that in 1916:

"At a further meeting of the French [Joffre] and British Commanders-in-Chief it was agreed to launch a spring offensive by British and French forces in the Somme and Aisne sectors respectively, after which the main effort would be transferred to Flanders where operations would be continued throughout the summer chiefly by British troops. By this series of wearing down battles it was expected that the remaining reserves of the German Army would be consumed to such an extent that a break-through by combined British and French forces on the Western Front, with the resultant victorious end of the War, might be possible before the close of the year.

The decision to make the main effort of the year in Flanders complied with an instruction of the War Committee of the British Cabinet on the 26th October [1916], confirmed at a meeting on the 23rd November, that there was 'no measure to which the Committee attached greater importance than the expulsion of the enemy from the Belgian coast.' The instruction was elaborated by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff in a letter to General Joffre explaining that... the British Government desired that the occupation of the Ostend and Zeebrugge should form one of the objectives of the campaigns in 1917.

As a result of the decisions of the Chantilly meetings, General Plumer had again been asked, on the 17th November [1916] to submit plans for a Flanders offensive." Source: J Edmonds (ed). British Official History: Military Operations France and Belgium 1917 Vol II, pp. 8-9. ISBN 0898391660

Thus, the decision to fight in Flanders in the latter part of 1917 cannot be attributed to Charteris (there has been no suggestion of this in the thread so far, indeed we have agreed that the decision was part of a longer-term plan to ensure defeat of the German Army. I am just setting the foundation for further discussion), but was based on the military and political significance of area.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Note the British Official History implies that the possibility of victory in 1917 was considered by Joffre and Haig. More accurately, the BOH describes a significant level of uncertainty - "might be possible" - which is associated with 'a break-through'. The break-through, had it occurred, would have been the prelude to the "resultant victorious end of the War...".

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Joffre's memoirs record his hopes for 1917 after the October Chantilly Conference. 'I considered that the harvest sown by our combined efforts in 1916 would certainly be reaped in 1917.

On November 29th, I assembled at my headquarters, along with Sir Douglas Haig, the generals commanding our groups of armies. Once the Bapaume salient was reduced, Haig's intention was to push the main body of his forces northward, so as to make an attack in Flanders and thus open up the way for a disembarkation on the Belgian coast between Nieuport and Ostend.' Source: Joffre. 'The Memoirs of Marshal Joffre: Vol 2'. London. p 514.

Robert

[salesie]

Robert, It seems we've gone full circle in our little debate - back to the pragmatist versus the theorist.

I prefer the pragmatic approach that doesn't lose sight of the end-result, and regard any theory that contradicts the end-result as nonsense. You prefer the theory, whether the end-result bears this out or not.

Two Reviews of Bloch's work: One posted by you, one by me:

Yours, by Dr Antulio J. Echevarria II (Historian and U.S. Military Staff Officer):

"Although historians have claimed that Bloch's methodology was positivistic, and although he presented massive amounts of data in his work, his conclusion was not really based on that data. A careful reading of his six-volume work (not the abridged English edition, which most historians agree is misleading) reveals that his conclusion was a foregone one, developed before his mountain of statistical data was amassed. Bloch was more interested in combating militarism and in making the world safe for venture capitalism than in arriving at an objective conclusion about the nature of modern warfare. He wanted to persuade modern statesmen not to use war as a political instrument and therefore had to convince them that war was too costly to serve their aims. However, his argumentation was simply too tendentious to be persuasive, requiring great leaps in logic and a suspension of critical thinking - inexcusable in a work of six volumes. Although Bloch's cause may have been a worthy one, it was undermined by his lack of intellectual honesty."

Mine, By Dr Michael Occleshaw (British Historian):

"Completed sixteen years before the Great War, Bloch, a Jewish banker from Warsaw, approached his task with an open mind unfettered by theory or by past and inapplicable experiences (he was completely non-military). It took years of solid, painstaking devotion to write and was based entirely upon independent research, receiving neither encouragement nor financial support from any official quarter. Of this monumental labour, only the sixth volume was ever translated into English.

Neither the full version nor the single-volume translation ever seems to have gained any currency amongst the British military hierarchy, although in Russia the Tsar went so far as to make it recommended (but not required) reading for his Staff officers. What the General Staffs would have found was hardly calculated to inspire acceptance, for Bloch's hypothesis was that the war of the future would not be a replay of the Napoleonic Wars or even of 1870-1, to be decided in a matter of hours or days in a single clash on some obscure field of which no one had ever heard. On the contrary, Bloch argued, the array of fearsome modern weapons and the nature of modern society made such an outcome wishful thinking, since the armies would be unable to press their attacks to a conclusion. Instead he foresaw, with an icy logic based on an intensive study of contemporary weaponry, industry and society, a prolonged and devastating struggle which would drag on through ponderous and pitiless years, years in which no ravishingly clever stratagem, or splendidly timed and executed manoeuvre, could ever yield the victory so earnestly sought. The next great war, he predicted, would not be decided through the struggles of the fighting man, but its resolution would lie in the grim and indifferent hands of famine and social upheaval.

In Bloch's dire vision the soldiers in the line would be more preoccupied with survival than with victory, driven to seek shelter in the belly of the cold earth from the storm of metal which would fill the air and accordingly, 'Everybody will be entrenched in the next war. It will be a war of entrenchments. The spade will be as indispensable to a soldier as his rifle,' with the unlooked-for consequence that the act of fighting would have little in common with the traditional, straightfor-ward contest over open ground in which the soldiers would measure their skill, their physical and moral superiority against each other in the time-honoured way.

It appears extraordinary in its foresight. None of the General Staffs, for all their professional expertise and close concentration on the technical aspects of their profession, could discern the character of the coming cataclysm, with the exception of a few seers like Kitchener and Haig, crying in the wilderness.

Wars between great powers are only won quickly when there is a significant disparity between the opposing powers in society, weaponry, technique or, more rarely, commanding genius. In 1870-1 the decisive disparities lay in the facts that Prussia possessed a mass conscript army, a speedy mobilization and a modern General Staff, and Napoleon III did not. By 1914 everybody had taken urgent steps to ensure that they, too, possessed these attributes, and everybody was on a more or less equal footing."

It is clear that Echevarria shares your view, Robert, that theory is more important than the accuracy of Bloch's predictions. Whereas Occleshaw clearly regards Bloch's foresight as being clearly in line with what actually happened in "the next great war" as the most important concept. What I find particularly amusing is Echevarria's last sentence, "Although Bloch's cause may have been a worthy one, it was undermined by his lack of intellectual honesty." Seeing as Bloch's predictions were pretty much spot-on, what does this say about Echevarria's intellectual honesty? (Perhaps I shouldn't be surprised though, for the past few decades a good number of the American military staff have been seriously debating the winability of nuclear war).

Now, on to your post about 3rd Ypres being planned way back in 1916 - I'm afraid it's just window dressing again, Robert. As you very well know, right from the very beginning Haig, along with Kitchener, saw a war lasting three years, placing phase 4 squarely in late 1917. And, I've made it clear all along that I believe Charteris formed his reports on what he knew Haig wanted to hear and that Haig was happy to listen to them because they were exactly what he wanted hear (otherwise why would he not listen to Macdonogh's?). It wasn't Charteris who dictated policy and planning it was Haig - he and Charteris were a mutual appreciation society - with Charteris ensuring his chief very rarely saw anything negative.

The timing of the start of the planning for 3rd Ypres is irrelevant to my point - Haig was convinced that phase 4 would appear in late 1917 right up until early October 1917 (when the folly of this view dawned on him). So whether the planning started in 1916 or 1917, or even 1914 for that matter, Haig's belief that German army manpower/morale would collapse in late 1917 always ran contrary to the calculations of Macdonogh.

Cheers-salesie.

[Robert Dunlop]

We have seen that Joffre expressed the possibility of victory in 1917. What about the other side of the lines? Charteris was not the only person playing the numbers game. Foley noted:

'As Falkenhayn again contemplated a major offensive in the west [in late 1915], the Intelligence Section of OHL drew up a number of reports assessing the manpower available to the Entente armies. In mid-November 1915, they estimated the French Army, including the 1916 Class, which had not yet reached the front, to be around 3 million men. This number was 400,000 less than had been available at the war's outbreak, indicating to the Germans that French strength had peaked. The Intelligence Section further estimated that, under everyday conditions, the French were losing 70,000 men per month. At this rate of "wastage", German intelligence anticipated that by September 1916 the French Army would be experiencing severe shortages and would be forced to call up its younger classes earlier and earlier to meet the anticipated shortfall in manpower. The Intelligence Section believed that the 200,000 men of 1917 Class would be used up by September 1916. This meant the French would be forced to call up their 1918 Class in June 1916 to be ready to meet the shortfall in September. Of course, any offensive action [Verdun] would only speed this process.' Source: Foley 'German Strategy and the Path to Verdun: Erich von Falkenhayn and the Development of Attrition, 1870-1916'. p 183. ISBN 0521841933)

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

As interesting as Foley's comments are, our focus remains on Haig and Charteris. Joffre's "optimism" is of indirect relevance. It could be regarded as equally misplaced as Haig's. Joffre's "promotion" can be regarded as the price paid for his "optimism". Nivelle was now the C-in-C for the French forces on the Western Front. Before May 1917, Haig was confronted with a definitive plan to break-through and destroy the Germans. Nivelle was out to finish the war in 1917. No 'ifs' or 'might be possibles'. Spears' picks up the story in his account 'Prelude to Victory':

'Nivelle came to London and attended conferences on January 15th and 16th. His visit was an immense personal success. General Nivelle was delightful, and explained his methods in a most enchanting way... The plan which General Nivelle explained and developed to the British soldiers and Ministers completely altered the scope and balance of that settled at Chantilly, although it retained the general framework of Joffre's conception.

The Franco-British forces were still to attack on the Aisne, at Arras and to the south of that town, but the front of the attack was greatly extended and was to include the extremely strong German positions on the plateau of Craonne. The British, instead of assuming the main burden of the assault, were to be relegated to a secondary role.

[The] main attack was to be delivered as soon as it was evident that the subsidiary [Franco-British] attack farther north had made its effect felt, that is when German reserves had been drawn to it, and was to take place in the shape of a terrific, violent and sudden blow, to be delivered by the three Armies of a new Group to be formed, to be known officially as the G.A.R. - Groupe des Armées de Réserve. To the initiated, however, these initials stood for 'Groupe de Réserve de Rupture'. This Group was to comprise one million two hundred thousand men. The artillery preparation, no longer to be confined to the first line, was to cover the whole depth of the enemy's position. The assault was to be pressed up to and beyond the enemy's last line of defence, and was to include his heavy artillery positions. The infantry, closely supported by field artillery, was to advance under a continuous barrage preceding the men by seventy metres. The waves of infantry following each other closely were not to allow themselves to be held up by undestroyed hostile defences. They were to pass these, leaving them to be dealt with by supporting columns.

The whole operation was to take from twenty-four to forty-eight hours. If by that time it had not proved successful it was to be discontinued. If on the other hand a breach of sufficient width was made, a torrent of reserves was to be poured in, rolling up the enemy's line, while the cavalry pressing forward, was to paralyse and destroy his communications.' Source: E Spears. 'Prelude to Victory'. pp. 41-43. London.

Nivelle's plans were altered by the pre-emptive German retreat to the Hindenburg Line. But the purpose remained unchanged. Everything was focused on breaking out and destroying the German army in France. Two things are of special note, IMHO. Far from embracing Nivelle's plan, Haig and Robertson were deeply concerned about it. They argued against it, but were overruled.

Secondly, there is Nivelle's plan itself. Nivelle was attempting to turn phase 3 into phase 4. The nature and details of the plans illustrated what an army had to attempt to achieve this transition. There was no parallel attempt made by Haig during the May-October. None of the battles in the Third Ypres campaign came close to the way that the Chemin des Dames offensive was planned.

Robert

[salesie]

No surprise that every side were playing the numbers game, the surprise would be that they were not - though it would seem the British alone actually had a few people who could accurately count (Macdonogh's department at the War office).

Here's London's view on GHQ's intelligence dept, headed by Charteris (his graph is the one mentioned):

"Battles were being fought principally to cause a drop in that graph - showing a further decrease in enemy man-power. It was decided that it wasn't good enough (even given that the graph was accurate, which the wretched thing never was)." Source, Charteris Papers, loc. cit., The Pioneer, 27 June 1929.

Cheers-salesie.

[salesie]

Secondly, there is Nivelle's plan itself. Nivelle was attempting to turn phase 3 into phase 4. The nature and details of the plans illustrated what an army had to attempt to achieve this transition. There was no parallel attempt made by Haig during the May-October. None of the battles in the Third Ypres campaign came close to the way that the Chemin des Dames offensive was planned.

Robert

What about the end-result though, Robert? Nivelle or Haig; different planning techniques but same objective (phase 4 in 1917) and identical end-result, no breakthrough no victory in 1917. The strategic omnipotence of total-war at work again!

Cheers-salesie.

[Robert Dunlop]

Now to Haig himself. May 1st:

'Charteris reported on the situation. Enemy's reserves have still further been drawn upon and only 10 divisions remain available on Western Front. Documents also captured showing that orders were issued on 7 February and 12 March to reduce infantry battalions to 650 men fit for field service and 50 men fit for duty or labour. This is a distinct sign of shortage of men. Each company will be equipped with 3 light machine guns [the steady increase in automatic and other intrinsic support weapons was how every country adapted to decreasing numbers of 'riflemen' in infantry units].

An order, signed by von Hindenburg, was also captured, signed 13 April, ordering a reduction of food ration for the troops and in consequence of 'the considerable shortage of cereals'...

The Enemy has already been weakened appreciably but time is required to wear down his great number of troops. The situation is not yet ripe for the decisive blow. We must therefore continue to wear down the Enemy until his power of resistance has been further reduced.

The cause of General Nivelle's comparative failure appears, primarily, to have been a miscalculation in this respect, and the remedy now is to return to wearing-down methods for a further period the duration of which cannot be calculated yet.

I recommended that the pause [which is forced upon us in] vigorous offensive operations be utilised to complete measures for clearing the coast this summer.

Success seems reasonably possible. It will give valuable results on land and sea. If full measure of success is not gained we shall be attacking the Enemy on a front where he cannot refuse to fight, and our purpose of wearing him down will be given effect to. We shall be directly covering our own most important communications, and even a partial success will considerably improve our defensive positions in the Ypres salient and thus reduce the heavy wastage which must otherwise by expected to occur there next winter as in the past.' Source: G Sheffield & J Bourne (eds). 'Douglas Haig: War Diaries and Letters 1914-1918. p. 288-9. ISBN 0297847023

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

At the beginning of the period in question (May to October 1917), Haig is saying:

1. Optimistic assessments from Charteris

2. Despite these assessments, the enemy is not weak enough. More wearing-down is needed.

3. General Nivelle tried to transition too quickly, and failed.

4. Third Ypres will be a wearing down operation. It will wear down the Germans because they cannot refuse to defend the high ground and the coast. Third Ypres may or may not succeed in clearing the coast. If it is only partially successful, then the British army in the Salient will be better placed for the winter. In other words, Haig is still able to hold a view of the longer-term future in juxtaposition with the possibility of short-term success. The latter is not defined as the final destruction of the entire German army.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

May 3rd, Haig met with General Pétain, Nivelle's replacement:

'I had a long talk with Pétain. I put my case more or less as follows:

Are we agreed on 'principles' i.e. that the Enemy must first be worn out before a decisive attack is launched and a pursuit begun?

Next as to 'method'? I aim at capturing and consolidating [emphasis in original] as much ground as can be prepared [beforehand] by our artillery - then push on advanced guards. Meantime, bring forward guns in preparation for another advance. The advance will probably soon be held up, but as the wearing out process of the Enemy continues, a moment will come [time unspecified] when our advanced guards and cavalry will be able to progress.' Source: G Sheffield & J Bourne (eds). 'Douglas Haig: War Diaries and Letters 1914-1918. p. 290. ISBN 0297847023

The idea of advanced guards and cavalry progressing may seem completely out of touch to some. It was precisely, however, the experience of the British and French forces in pursuit of the German retreat to the Hindenburg Line. Haig is describing something from the recent past, not just some fanciful idea for the future.

Robert