Western Front tactics in 1917

[Ozzie]

Good to see this wonderful thread back in action.

I sit and read it with awe, as to the knowledge, opinions and dedication of forum members.

Thank you

Kim

[Robert Dunlop]

Thanks Kim. It has taken a while to get at the primary sources. But the additional material is proving very interesting. There is still quite a lot of II Corps War Diary that I have to analyze. Will try and share some of the key findings as I go.

Robert

[Crunchy]

Salesie,

I agree with the thrust of your comments in post #624 about the nature and complexity of total war, of Haig's recognition of the manpower issue as the determinant of the ground war and that looking to explain victory purely through a military tactical/operational prism misunderstands the true nature of total war. War is a complex business and, as you have rightly pointed out, total war is very complex; simple explanations are naïve and misleading.

I may have misinterpreted the weight you give to the military pressure component in this mix. IMO military pressure is more than simply an essential “ally” to the long-term strategic initiatives and other forces in bringing about the ultimate victory. I think it plays the central part in contributing to victory; without the naval, military and air pressure the collapse of a country economically, politically and socially is unlikely to occur. The military component, and by this I include naval and air forces, when applied offensively, tears the heart out of the country’s manpower and economy which in turn leads to social and political destabilization and eventually the loss of will or ability to fight on. In all other respects I support your views.

I also think there are linkages between the strategic initiatives that lead to the ultimate victory and the operations and tactics employed. They are not necessarily direct linkages but success at the strategic level, and the outcome of the war, are dependent on successes at the operational level, which in turn are dependent on successful tactics. I will try and explain my reasoning later in the post

Addressing the question of the objectives of 3rd Ypres, I now have a copy of Sheffield and Bourne's edition of the Haig diaries and war letters. After reading the excerpts for the period preceding the battle it seems clear to me that wearing down the German Army was a primary objective of the battle. While I agree “that he believed the German Army would collapse in mid to late 1917 if pushed hard enough”, I am not so sure that Haig believed 3rd Ypres would be " a war-winning victory” or that the collapse of the German Army was an inevitable outcome of the battle. Nonetheless, I agree the attraction of such an outcome would have been an element of Haig’s thinking prior to the battle, and probably so after the victory at Broodseinde.

On 14 June 1917 Haig wrote, concerning a conference with his Army Commanders, "… there was no departure from the plans I had outlined at the Conference of 7 May. Viz, British and French wear down and exhaust the Enemy by attacking by surprise as far as possible at points where not expected. Finally British will strike the main blow probably in the north. Underlying the general intention of wearing out the Enemy is the strategical idea of securing the Belgium coast and connecting with the Dutch frontier. The nature and size of the several steps which we take towards that objective must depend on our effectives and the replacement of guns [his emphasis] Roughly these are:

1. Capture bridgehead formed of the Passchendaele - Staden - Clerken ridge.

2. Push on towards Roulers - Thourout so as to take coast defences in rear.

3. Land by surprise in conjunction with attack from Nieuport

If effectives or guns inadequate it may be necessary to call a halt after No 1 is gained!"

This indicates to me that, firstly, there were two strategic objectives: wearing down the German Army in hard fighting as part of the Allied aim of exhausting it, and securing the Belgium coast as far as the Dutch frontier. Secondly, that Haig recognized that not all of the objectives might be achieved and that he might have to call a halt to the offensive if he had insufficient resources. Indeed he stated this might occur after only phase 1 had been achieved: the securing of the Gheluvelt – Passchedaele ridge. Implied in this is the recognition the Germans were still quite a formidable opponent and they might not collapse, particularly if the British did not have the necessary resources to bring about this result. In this type of warfare relative strengths is a major factor in achieving success. Thus while wearing down would occur, it might not lead to collapse if there was not an imbalance of relative strengths greatly in favour of the Allies.

Nonetheless, on 19 June he wrote of meeting with LG " The PM seemed to believe the decisive moment of the war would be 1918. Until then we ought to husband our forces and do little or nothing, except support Italy with guns and gunners (300 batteries were indicated). I strongly asserted that Germany was nearer her end than they seemed to think, that now was the favourable moment [for pressing her] and that everything should be done to take advantage of it by concentrating on the Western Front all available resources. I stated that Germany was within 6 months of the total exhaustion of her available manpower, if the fighting continues at its present intensity. to do this , more men and guns are required. [emphasis in the original]

This indicates he believed that given all available resources and applying maximum pressure, and hard slogging, there was a strong possibility that the German Army on the Western Front would collapse. As this assessment was made before the Russians finally collapsed in late 1917, and the Germans subsequently began transferring divisions to the Western Front, it may have been a reasonable position to take at the time although, in truth, he was being optimistic in this view. It underlines your point that he did envisage the possibility of a German collapse in late 1917, but the pre-conditions he required were that all available resources should be allocated to the task and the Germans had to be pushed hard enough through intensive fighting. Again, it was a matter of relative strengths and continual pressure if success was to be achieved.

On 21 July he wrote I told Rawlinson (what I had told him before) that in my opinion three situations might arise in which a landing [referring to a landing on the Belgium coast] would be justified – viz

a. If on our attack being launched Enemy gave way in disorder, and we were able to gain ground very rapidly.

b. If Enemy fought a prolonged battle and in the course of it used up his Coast Garrisons.

c. If we progressed and were by degrees advancing from the Clerken – Staden ridge against the Coukelaere – Thourout hills.

This entry, like that of the 14th June, indicates to me that Haig envisaged a hard fought battle and that he might not achieve all of the proposed objectives.

What is evident from his diaries is that the capture of the ridge from Gheluvelt to Passchendaele was an essential first objective (see below) and Haig accepted he might have to call off the battle after it had been secured. This implies an acceptance that the Germans might not collapse. There is no indication from these excerpts that he regarded as a certainty that 3rd Ypres would be the war wining victory. Nonetheless, your point that it was an attraction in mounting the battle is well taken. There is also the possibility that Haig was having two bob each way on the results, which is understandable, as all commanders must plan for best and worst case results.

So what were the objectives of 3rd Ypres? From these excerpts of Haig’s diaries and letters there seems little doubt that one strategic objective was to wear down the German Army, hopefully to the point where they would collapse. The other was securing the Belgium coast as far as the Dutch frontier. This second objective offered significant strategic advantages to the Allies and disadvantages to the Germans, if it could be achieved.

Securing the Belgium coast to the Dutch frontier would capture all of the Belgium ports used as submarine bases by the Germans. While the convoy system had recently been introduced at this stage of the war and was showing success in reducing the submarine threat, depriving the German Navy of its submarine bases in Belgium would make their job of waging the submarine offensive more difficult by extending sailing time from ports in Germany. This was the argument being put forward by the Admiralty, although they were probably overstating the case.

A more significant advantage was the potential to turn the German right flank and offer a more direct route into Germany. Provided the British Army could advance on a sufficiently wide front, in order to provide a subsequent position with some depth, and secure the Belgium coast to the Dutch border (an advance of some 70km) this would give the Allies the advantage of sitting on and to the rear the German right flank. They would then be in a position from which to threaten the German lines of communication in Belgium and the rear of the German line immediately south of them, as well as having a shorter route by which to threaten or invade German territory. Were the Allies to actually reach German territory this would have a direct impact on the German political and social scene. Such an advance into Belgium, however, would extend the front line for both armies and the only advantage in this instance would be if the Germans had less manpower with which to man that line than the Allies had. If this were so, they would have been stretched to do so more than the Allies, thus weakening their line and reserves along the Western Front. Thus the advantages of seeking a decision in Flanders were considerable.

Importantly, the second strategic objective would also facilitate the first. These threats to the German right flank, and Germany itself, would certainly draw the Germans into fighting hard to forestall them and to regain any ground that was lost by employing costly counter-attacks (as occurred). If the Allies were successful, there was no real opportunity for the Germans to withdraw north for any great distance and maintain a straight front anchored on the sea, due to the Dutch border being at their backs. Thus fighting hard to retain this sensitive area would satisfy the Allied objective of wearing down the German Army to the point of exhaustion. To do this without exhausting oneself was the key issue.

Turning now to the linkages I mentioned earlier. Before Roulers and the Belgium coast could be taken it was absolutely necessary to secure the whole ridge running from the Gheluvelt Plateau to Passchendaele. Haig recognized this had to be the priority effort of the initial offensive. On 28 June in discussing the offensive with Gough he wrote: “ I urged the importance of the right flank. It is my opinion vitally important to occupy and hold the ridge west of Gheluvelt and cover our right flank and then push along it to Broodseinde … the advance should be limited until our right flank has really been secured on this ridge”. The question of whether or not Gough gave sufficient weight to this portion of the battlefield is the issue Robert and I are currently looking at.

Wearing down the German Army at a faster rate than the Allies’ own armies, and being capable of making the tactical advances needed to secure the various operational objectives, and consequently securing the strategic advantages offering, was a matter of developing superior tactics. The successful tactics had to enable the Allies to capture ground and hold it against German counter attacks at a higher cost in manpower to the Germans than to the Allies. IMO, Plumer demonstrated these tactics at Messines, Menin Road, Polygon Wood and Broodseinde. But these tactics depended on good weather and dry ground, as occurred in the above four battles. Unfortunately for the British, abnormally high rainfall for the area occurred in August and October- November. The August rains in 1917 were twice the average rainfall for that month and this had a negative impact on the British offensive.

I have banged on a bit here Salesie, but I am seeking to demonstrate, within the sphere of military pressure, the linkages between developing the correct tactics and operational focus in order to achieve the desired strategic outcomes that, in the end, contribute to destroying the enemy will or ability to continue fighting. As you have said, this occurs along with other factors and strategic initiatives if ultimate victory is to be achieved but I contend that military pressure is the major ingredient in achieving that victory, rather than being an essential “ally”.

Cheers

Chris

[salesie]

First class summary, Chris, which contains nothing I cannot agree with. Particularly liked your two-bob each-way analogy. (My dear old Gran couldn’t afford four-bob; she used to have a Tanner each-way).

I was perhaps vague in my assertion that military pressure is an essential ally - by military I meant ground forces alone. In my opinion, victory in total-war requires maximum effort from the whole team i.e. in WW1, victory was brought about by a combination of highly aggressive ground forces, the naval blockade and the navy's ability to effectively defeat the U-boat threat, the efforts of British Military Intelligence in their superbly "fought" subversion/propaganda campaign, the wholesale reorganisation of the industrial home-front and the maximum use of the Empire's resources. And, dare I say it, the politicians who, despite the occasional serious internal strife and the delay in realising what was actually needed for victory, kept the whole show on the road, with their diplomatic skills with allies, with their skilful economic balancing act between competing resources, and with their solidity of purpose in pursuing their goal - it was no fluke that the allied "team" out-performed the Germans; effective management of all resources is vital for victory. (I've left out the Air Force because I believe that in WW1 its importance was not strategic per se, though in later conflicts it became vitally important through technical advances).

It's seems such a pity that the politicians didn't keep their end up post-war, when their lack of foresight "lost" the peace (but, as I said earlier, that's for another thread).

Cheers-salesie.

[Robert Dunlop]

Some interesting comparisons. I have created a series of charts based on the artillery allocations noted in the GHQ reports for the end of June 1916 (beginning of Battle of the Somme) and the end of July 1917 (beginning of the Third Ypres campaign).

First, the percentage of artillery allocated to 4th Army in 1916:

Compared with percentage allocated to 5th Army in 1917:

Now a comparison of the total numbers of guns

Broken down for field guns (and 60 pdrs):

And heavy artillery:

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

The following graph illustrates how the 18 pdrs were allocated within Fifth Army, comparing II Corps with the rest of Fifth Army:

Robert

[Crunchy]

Robert,

Thank you for those charts.

I have been thinking about the issue of number of guns allocated to a front and the subsequent calculation of the number of guns per yard of front, or yards of front per gun, in support of an attack, which is used by some historians as some measure of what, I am not quite sure. The inference appears to be that the number of guns per yard is some measure of the weight of fire per yard of ground on the enemy trenches. While the number of guns per yard is a useful measure of the allocation of artillery I am not sure we can then transpose that to a useful effect of fire on the ground. As solders we were more concerned with the "weight of shell" or rounds on the target, that is the effect on the objective and the nullification of flanking fire, etc that could disrupt the attack.

A friend (ex Gunner) has been doing some research on the artillery programme in support of the Australian attack on Fromelles on 19th July 1916. To date his research bears out the doubts I have had about guns per yard of front as a measure of anything useful. I am not sure of the actual figures and his research has some way to go before he is finished but to give a flavour of what is coming out of it. While the number was, say 4 guns per yard of front in support of the attack, that does not translate as 4 guns per yard of enemy front line. The artillery programme, like all of them, was fired over some depth and against different targets, for example counter battery fire, the wire, the second line of trench (which turned out to be a mere ditch) etc. The end result was that the targets engaged during the bombardment were dispersed both in width and depth resulting in quite considerably fewer guns actually firing on the German front line and its garrison during the entire bombardment, it was more like yards of front per gun.

I am not sure what we can actually deduce from the number of guns allocated to a frontage on its own, other than being a crude measure of the allocation of resources. A better indicator, IMO, would be what we can deduce from the artillery programme on individual targets. That would give us the number and weight of rounds fired on each target, which is a better measure of possible effectiveness. That would take an enormous amount of work and I am not sure it gets us anywhere other than to highlight the fact there are never enough resources to do achieve the result you would like to.

What do you, and any other members, think? Is there a useful deduction we can draw from the number of guns per yard other than the allocation of guns?

Cheers

Chris

[Robert Dunlop]

Chris, I am in total agreement with you. At the moment, all we can say is that II Corps received a generous proportion of the artillery that had been provided to Fifth Army. We already know from other evidence that there were factors that reduced the effectiveness, notably the weather.

I now have the complete list of heavy and siege batteries that were allocated to II Corps. A preliminary scan shows that 90% of these batteries have war diaries in the NA. I will track each one down and review whatever information is available at the individual battery level. Doing the same for the field artillery should also be possible, as I have the complete list for these units as well.

Robert

[Pete1052]

I don't think statistics on guns per yard of front are a particularly useful indicator of anything for the planning of operations. Possibly those figures have some meaning at the strategic level for comparison of the weight of metal possessed by opposing sides. If I recall correctly it was the French who began deriving those ratios when the war became a stalemate--in other words, when the conventional wisdom about maneuver warfare had proven to be wanting. Doctrine for the command and contol of British artillery assets above division level was fairly nonexistent in 1914 and procedures for it had to be improvised during the war, as is discussed here.

[Paul Hederer]

I'll take a contrarian line on the number of guns per yards of trench issue. I wouldn't discount it out of hand as if it were some device invented by modern-day arm-chair historians. These formulae were used by British planners on the Western Front (and the other combatants as well) during the war for a general idea of the needed allocation of guns to a length of front.

If we take a close look at artillery fire missions in general you see some of the same principles involved. How did a battery commander know how many shells he had to fire to destroy a length of trench, or an objective? He used a firing table, calculated the range, dispersion, area of target and orientation, and came up with a figure that gave him the probable number of shells he needed to fire to achieve the hits he needed to perform his mission--desctruction, supression, harrassment.

The number of guns per yards of trench formulae are not a modern historian's contrivance. They were used by artilleryman on all sides during the war. The German standard, by the way, was one heavy battery per 150 meters of trench.

As a planning tool I can see the value of this. It's a general rule of thumb for battery allocation, when 100's of batteries are involved. It is simplistic and general, but it was used for planning purposes by all sides. I seriously doubt it all the artillerists on all sides were dunderheads. The batteries per yards of trench rule is no more eccentric than the reccomended daily allocation of shells per gun based on the type of fighting involved.

Paul

[Pete1052]

Guns per yard or meter of trench isn't a metric that was invented by historians after the war and I'm not criticizing Robert for including the charts that he made. However, it was not a planning factor that I was ever taught at any of the artillery schools I attended 30 years ago; I suspect that it was factored into the planning process circa 1916 when fighting had become bogged down into inconclusive trench warfare.

Bill

I have dredged around in Les Armees Francaises dans la Grande Guerre as promised. Normally this exercise is the best cure for insomnia known to man, but on this occasion, I did at least find what I was after. It is contained in a letter from Foch to Joffre (Groupe d'Armees du Nord, Etat-Major 3eme Bureau No 9007 Secret, dated 24 mai 1916). This appears as Annex 537 to Tome IV, 3rd Volume, 1st Volume of Annexes. By this date, Foch had revised hs plans several times in the light of reduced availablity of assets. In February the intention had been for the French to attack with two armies on a 40km front south of the Somme. This was to have involved 42 divisions supported by 946 heavy guns and howitzers and almost 1,700 field guns. The 7 day bombardment was to have fired 3 million shells.

On 20 May, Joffre outlined finally what Foch would be allocated and Foch replied as mentioned above. The critical part of his reply is as follows (less accents!)

'Il importe tout d'abord, de se rendre compte de l'etendue que ces moyens permettent de donner a notre attaque. Comme je vous l'ai deja expose dans ma lettre du 4. mai, cette etendue est determinee non pas tant par le nombre des D.I. que par le chiffre des canons qui leur ouvrent le chemin, - et, parmi eux, ce sont les canons court qui reglent la mesure de l'attaque. Leur nombre est de 120 (112 de 155 C; 8 de 120 S). A raison de 8 pieces par kilometre, ce nombre nous permet d'attaquer sur un front de 15 kilometres. Les chiffres indiquees pour les autres calibres permettent de doter ce front de 15kil. des mortiers et des canons longues necessaires, et de constituer, a l'aile de l'attaque, un important groupement de canons longs. Il est donc possible de faire, sur cette etendue de 15 kilometres, une attaque convenablement conditionee en artillerie; viser plus large, avec les moyens qui nous sont donnes, serait nous condamner a l'impuissance et a des pertes lourdes et inutiles.'

So on this basis the attack frontage selected itself - Maricourt to Foucaucourt. If any of the French is not quite clear, get back to me. The key points are that the number of guns, especially short barrelled heavy howitzers, required at 8 per km, determined the width that could be attacked and not the number of divisions of infantry available. The other point is that Foch stated that if an attempt was made to attack a wider frontage with the materiel allocated it would, ...'condemn us to impotence and large numbers of useless casualties.'

Voila!

Jack

[Paul Hederer]

Guns per yard or meter of trench isn't a metric that was invented by historians after the war and I'm not criticizing Robert for including the charts that he made. However, it was not a planning factor that I was ever taught at any of the artillery schools I attended 30 years ago; I suspect that it was factored into the planning process circa 1916 when fighting had become bogged down into inconclusive trench warfare.

Pete,

Exactly--Why would guns per yards of trench be be something you were taught in the 1970/80's? I doubt your instructors ever envisaged you being in a situation even remotely resembling the Western Front 1915-1918. It would be a bit like Great War gunners being taught to ricochet solid shot.

It's always important to examine a process in the context of the time it's being used.

Paul

[Crunchy]

Thank you for your comments Robert, Pete and Paul.

Paul, thank you for the link and for the information it referred to during the Great War.

I know we were taught that a field battery could cover an area of, IIRC, 150 X 150 metres and a field regiment an area, IIRC, 250X250 metres. (Correct me if I am wrong Pete.) But that was concerned with the area which the fall of shot would cover from specific fire units, not any measure of effectiveness on the ground.

Paul, your example that a German heavy battery was allocated to bombard 150 metres of enemy trench is a different issue to one I am enquiring about. In that sense it is a useful measure because it is talking about the number of guns against a specific target, but then again different rates of fire on different sections of the target produces different effects on the ground.

The number of guns per yard of front of the battle zone is a different issue. I agree that it is a general rule of thumb. But a rule of thumb for what purpose, other than to give a crude measure of the number of guns allocated in relation to the width of the battle zone? That is what I am trying to ascertain.

I am not sure it is necessarily a useful planning figure for artillery, nor does my Gunner colleague. From my limited experience as an infantryman, artillery planning is done by identifying all of the targets needed to be engaged, the type(s) of gun required against each and assessing the level of fire unit of that gun type(s) needed to engage it. Then one determines how many fire units, at what rate of fire and over what period are needed on each target. As usual there are never enough resources to do all one wants to and trade offs have to be made. Thus the number of guns per yard of front seems to be a consequence of the planning.

The point I was making in my previous post is that one sees guns per yard of front (ie width) of the battle zone (usually encompassing all types) mentioned in histories, or discussions, sometimes as a comparison between battles, with the inference that the artillery bombardment was better or more effective because the number of guns per yard of front was heavier. I am questioning whether such a simple correlation can be made. To simply say x guns per yard of front was used at battle A but x plus y guns per yard of front were used at battle B tells us only that the ratio of artillery was greater at Battle B than Battle A. So What?, as we were taught in conducting the "Military Appreciation". Surely, the issue is concerned with the actual effect required on the ground, the type of targets needed to be engaged, the dispersal of targets in the battle zone and the type of fire being used. At the moment, the only area I can see where a reasonable comparison might be made by using number of guns per yard of front is in assessing the relative effectiveness of two creeping barrages and even then we need to consider the type of guns used, the rate of fire employed and the time the guns fired on each barrage line.

I am seeking what is the actual usefulness of simply using "number of guns per yard of front of the battle zone" in historical analysis of the use of artillery. It is relation to a project.

Cheers

Chris

[Robert Dunlop]

There is a clear difference between using guns per yard as a rough and ready planning tool versus a post-hoc assessment of effectiveness. Paul, I have seen the same measure used by British planners in 1917. Of course, the measure was not the be-all-and-end-all of the artillery planning process, and I know that you are not suggesting that this was the case for the German army. Chris, I am with you completely in disregarding post-hoc analyses based on this measure. The other mistake is to regard tons of shells fired as being an adequate measure of effectiveness.

Robert

[Paul Hederer]

There is a clear difference between using guns per yard as a rough and ready planning tool versus a post-hoc assessment of effectiveness. Paul, I have seen the same measure used by British planners in 1917. Of course, the measure was not the be-all-and-end-all of the artillery planning process, and I know that you are not suggesting that this was the case for the German army. Chris, I am with you completely in disregarding post-hoc analyses based on this measure. The other mistake is to regard tons of shells fired as being an adequate measure of effectiveness.

Robert

Yep,

I'm with you both on this. Chris, you referred to the number of batteries to yard of battle zone. I must admit I haven't seen this, only the guidance for guns per yards of trench. I haven't read much about the British army in the war.

Artillery is a wonderfully complicated subject. I can't speak to it from the British perspective, but I know from the German perspective there was a set allocation of guns per meters of trench, but this was only intended as a planning guideline. Artillery allotted to Corps was allowed to conduct fire missions across unit borders and they were often shifted back and forth as the need arose--no matter what Corps boundry they fell within. This flexibility would annul any rigid reckoning of "weight" of guns either during the war, or in post-war analysis.

There are inherent strengths to firing laterally across boundries--namely flanking fire, especially on trenches, which is much more effective and much desired.

Chris, I think to answer your question as you put it about guns per yard of battle front as a yardstick of something concerning effectiveness or weight of bombardment it probably isn't of much use. There are so many factors involved (as you pointed out).

A lot of clues on artillery effectiveness can be guaged by the narratives. For the German side I've found this very valuable. One example I can think of is the failure of the German guns to take out the French "Sternwerk" at Verdun in the first days of the battle. 21cm mortars were allocated for the task, but due to an error in target calculation the mortars fired to the side of the target (unobserved fire). The 21 cm mortar was a wonderfully precise weapon and the error left a very nice tight grouping of shell craters off the side of the untouched position. This observation was lamented on by the infantry after they had stormed the position.

It's interesting what you're trying to determine (as I understand it). I'm working on the almost the same type of project in relation to Verdun. It's been extremely interesting, and I've learned a lot. In fact, I'm off to the archives in Stuttgart on Thursday to get copies of all the firing tables I can get my hands on for various German guns.

Paul

[Pete1052]

Sanders Marble's "The Infantry Cannot Do with a Gun Less": The Place of the Artillery in the BEF, 1914-1918, available online by clicking here, includes some discussion of artillery pieces per yards of frontage in Chapter 3, "Attack, 1914-16." For instance, Note 63 states, "Experience from 1916 led to a general standard of 25 yards per gun for 1917. The Second Army set an 'ideal' of 25-30 yards per gun in September 1915, but on this basis there were insufficient heavies for any sizable attack." Note 64 says that one heavy piece per 30 yards was desired in January 1916. Lest we become too carried away, however, these allocations were for support of specific offensive operations in sectors of defined lengths, and not for the distribution of artillery assets within the BEF as a whole.

Last night I looked at a 1983 copy of U.S. Army Field Manual 6-20, Fire Support in Combined Arms Operations, and found nothing at all regarding the number of tubes per length of frontage. These ratios cannot have been a central part of Great War artillery doctrine if they vanished without a mention 65 years later. (Perhaps the concept has been subsumed into the force structure planning process; tactically, it's not something the average artillery officer below the rank of colonel or general concerns himself with.) When these guns-and-yards figures are cited in contemporaneous Great War documents I think it is important to look at the context in which they are mentioned. We should avoid giving undue importance to the concept.

[Paul Hederer]

Sanders Marble's "The Infantry Cannot Do with a Gun Less": The Place of the Artillery in the BEF, 1914-1918, available online by clicking here, includes some discussion of artillery pieces per yards of frontage in Chapter 3, "Attack, 1914-16." For instance, Note 63 states, "Experience from 1916 led to a general standard of 25 yards per gun for 1917. The Second Army set an 'ideal' of 25-30 yards per gun in September 1915, but on this basis there were insufficient heavies for any sizable attack." Note 64 says that one heavy piece per 30 yards was desired in January 1916. Lest we become too carried away, however, these allocations were for support of specific offensive operations in sectors of defined lengths. and not for the distribution of artillery assets within the BEF as a whole.

Last night I looked at a 1983 copy of U.S. Army Field Manual 6-20, Fire Support for Combined Arms Operations, and found nothing at all regarding the number of tubes per length of frontage. These ratios cannot have been a central part of Great War artillery doctrine if they vanished without a mention 65 years later. (Perhaps the concept has been subsumed into the force structure planning process; tactically, it's not something the average artillery officer below the rank of colonel or general concerns himself with.) When these guns-and-yards figures are cited in contemporaneous Great War documents I think it is important to look at the context in which they are mentioned. We should avoid giving undue importance to the concept.

The German artillery expert Colonel Bruchmuller in his postwar work "Die Deutsche Artillerie in den Durchbruchschlachten des Weltkrieges," cites in the section entitled "force calculation" for artillery one factor as being something very much resembling the frontage formula. He reckons one heavy battery for every 150 meters of enemy infantry position or one battery every 100 meters at the breakthrough point. In addition to this calculation he adds that the number of enemy batteries must be taken into account as well as OP's. The low trajectory count is made by calculations of enemy communications routes, headquarters, bridges, and quarters.

It would seem that at least for the Germans the batteries per amount of front seems to have been an accepted concept in planning.

Paul

[Crunchy]

Again, thank you Robert, Paul and Pete. Very interesting observations.

Paul and Pete, the information regarding the guide of yards per gun and battery is interesting. Perhaps it was a rough guide, or shorthand, as to minimum requirements in the initial planning estimates. Nonetheless, it seems we are in agreement regarding using it as a measure of effectiveness or comparison in historical post analysis.

Again, thanks guys. Your comments are much appreciated.

Regards

Chris

[truthergw]

As an interested onlooker, may I thank the contributors. This latest inquiry as to the usefulness of density of guns. It is simply a shorthand is it not. The artillery was used in ways not foreseen before the war and so new methods and new metrics would be required. Useless to say that X hundred 18 pounders and Y dozen howitzers were employed without some indication of the extent of front on which they were being used. The next step is natural, so many guns per yard or yards per gun. To an artilleryman, not a very helpful description but surely a legitimate one for the analyst or historian. The amount of artillery employed is not an indication of how well planned a battle was but a distinct lack of artillery without an offsetting factor would surely point to a weakness in the plan. The use to which the artillery was put was probably at least as important as its numbers, in its success but we would still like to know how many guns there were and what they were attacking.

[Robert Dunlop]

Chris, I have started the process of reviewing seige and heavy battery war diaries. So far, most of the diaries have provided detailed coordinates for the location of the respective batteries. About 50% give detailed co-ordinates of the targets that were engaged. This will enable us to map the locations and their respective targets. A similar proportion give details about how the shoots were observed (ground, aeroplane or kite balloon), or not. If the remaining diaries follow the same pattern, then we will have a pretty good idea about the effects of the weather.

In one of the siege battery diaries, I came across a copy of the complete timetable and target lists for all of the counter-battery work. This is quite a find. There wasn't time to process it on this visit. Guess what is on the agenda for Saturday

Robert

[Crunchy]

Tom,

No argument with your position about knowing the number of guns employed, if that is simply what the historians are doing. I agree that at the time it could well have been shorthand and a rough guide for initial resource planning estimates.

Robert,

Enjoy Saturday.

Cheers

Chris

[Robert Dunlop]

Chris, will do! Meanwhile, here is an interesting example of the intelligence reporting from II Corps. The following is the assessment of German artillery on II Corps' front on 28th June 1917:

"The principal shelling of our front trenches and the ZILLEBEKE area is caused by a large and active group of batteries South of the Polygon Wood and around POLDERHOEK and POEZELHOEK in the squares J.15.b and d., J.16.a.b.c.d. and J.17.a, supplemented by a certain number of batteries firing N.W. from the X Corps area, while the H.V. guns are grouped behind these between REUTEL and BECELAERE in the squares J.11.c. and d. and 18a.,b.,c., and d. The principal shelling of YPRES from our area appears to come from batteries still active in the WESTHOEK Group. Some of the batteries North of the POLYGON Wood in J.3 also appear to fire down on the ZILLEBEKE Area, and H.V. guns shelling our back areas, in addition to those at BECELAERE, are suspected in the neighbourhood of LANGEMARCK. A 10 cm gun in J.23.b is suspected of firing on DICKEBUSCH."

I will add these to a map to illustrate the concentrations of German guns at that time. On Saturday, I will follow through on the remainder of the daily information reports. The details in these reports are fascinating. Here are some of the section headers relating to operations:

"Operations

- Hostile Artillery Activity

- Our Artillery

-- Air Activity

-- Our Action

-- Fires & explosions [reports from R.F.C.]

- Movements and Artillery Targets

- Patrols

- Defences

-- Rear lines

-- Machine guns

-- OPs

- Enemy Dispositions

- Photography

- Signals [used by enemy]

Part II

- Identification of our Order of Battle by the Enemy

- Summary of Official Communiques

- Photos taken [with some analyses appended]"

Robert

[green_acorn]

Gents,

I'm coming into this thread unprepared, but to Chris's question of the value of the guns per yard issue, may I offer the thought that it may have a basis in morale and propaganda. It would seem to me that, in the first instance, the vast majority of the soldiers and civilians who would not comprehend the complexity of the artillery war would be comforted by the superiority and in the second, the populace of friendly, enemy and neutral nations would be "impressed" by amount of steel and the "throw weight" overwhelming the opponent.

As always I am impressed and greatful to those who contribute to this thread, the level of professional knowledge which illuminates history is tremendous and I thank you.

Kindest,

Hendo

[Robert Dunlop]

Hendo, your point is a very interesting one. While I am not certain that this the primary reason for the proxy measure, there is no doubt that this information had the effect that you described. My Grandfather, who fought on the Somme, at Messines and during Third Ypres, could remember the detailed numbers. He expressed pride that the British and Dominion forces were able to keep increasing their artillery support for these major battles.

Robert

[green_acorn]

Robert,

I have no doubt it was not the primary reason, indeed morale and propoganda would be peripheral benefits, I can also see it being a useful tool for the generals trying to explain to individual politicans and the War Cabinet some of the issues, it does make it easier for us novices to comprehend.

Cheers,

Hendo