Western Front tactics in 1917

[Beau Geste]

Thank you Robert for your postings. I'm afraid, however, that I'm beginning to feel a little "punch drunk" and have lost the thread somewhere back there. I think I'll withdraw and rest for a while.

Harry

[PhilB]

In one week`s time, and after 502 posts, this thread is one year old. Time for some kind of conclusion gents? It`s much longer than the actual 3rd Ypres campaign!

[Ozzie]

Ah, but Phil, the education it has given us.

Mind you, most of it is way above my head, but I have learnt a hell of a lot from it.

Cheers

Kim

[PhilB]

Well, my old boss said "If you can`t put it on one side of A4, I dont want to see it!" Concentrates the mind.

[Robert Dunlop]

Thanks for the feedback, Harry. It is a very helpful, and timely, reminder. As you can tell, there is such a lot of material that I have collated on these issues. There is more to come. I will press on, but will also attempt to be clearer about how things fit together. Hopefully, this will improve the continuity somewhat, as well as expose the logical process that I am following, or at least I think I am following .

Phil, I won't be creating an A4 summary yet. Personally, it is not satisfying when people trade A4 summaries over fundamentally important issues. I want to share the base information first, and then I hope that others will at least understand how my A4 summary was derived, when it does see the light of day.

Robert

[stiletto_33853]

Robert,

Do please press on, been a very good and informative thread so far and one that I read as often as possible.

Andy

[Robert Dunlop]

Thanks Kim and Andy. As you can appreciate, it takes some effort to transcribe the details. I enjoy it, but it is helpful to get your feedback, whether you agree with any of the conclusions or not

Robert

[salesie]

QUOTE (Phil_B @ Feb 6 2008, 10:58 AM) <{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Well, my old boss said "If you can`t put it on one side of A4, I dont want to see it!" Concentrates the mind.

I've been attempting to debate a conclusion virtually since I entered this thread, but to no avail. We're still getting a seemingly endless deluge of transcripts from the work of several authors (in some cases perhaps breaching copyright?), and thus we see the opinions of these scribes, and in at least one case the counter opinions of other published writers, but very little in the way of Robert's own reasoned opinion.

It seems to me, this thread is verging on a crusade of almost religious proportions on Robert's part. As such I'm becoming frustrated and of the strong opinion that the whole thing is rapidly becoming pointless. For a few days now, Einstein's words keep popping into my head i.e. "If they can't explain their theories in simple terms then they don't truly understand their own theories." (Meaning the same as Phil_B's A4 anecdote but perhaps a little more to the point?).

I'll try one more time to end phase3 and instigate phase4. Robert, here are the two summaries of the impression I get from your postings:

1) My unease stems chiefly from what I see as a plethora of highly detailed tactical/operational analysis being posted (in itself, obviously conducted with spoonfuls of hindsight and highly selective in its context) leading to an overall impression of; given the strategic necessities and the almost insurmountable operational difficulties, the British Generals, all in all in 1917, did a pretty good job.

2) "Robert, it seems we have gone full circle i.e. many more posts from you basically saying that: apart from a few misunderstandings and little fits of jealousy, the senior staff of the BEF were all more or less in tune in their thinking, and that, in the main, fairly clear objectives were set, and the battle-plans they produced were bloody marvellous really."

Both pretty much say the same thing - Is this a fair reflection of your own opinion, Robert?

Cheers-salesie.

[Robert Dunlop]

No, salesie. It isn't.

Harry, I have been reflecting on your comment, which led me to read back over your earlier posts. You raised a couple of concerns. One as around Haig's 'lack of "singularity of purpose" or hesitancy and confusion if you like'. This formed the main focus of my responses, based around Travers' work. The sequence is not quite as in the book. So far the review has mainly dealt with the period leading up to July 31st. I don't propose dealing with the subsequent evolution of the purpose of Third Ypres right now. But it is something to come back to.

Your second concern was around the issue of Haig being overly concerned with tactical details, which you clarified in this post:

 

I don't believe we have discussed this further. Earlier on in the thread, I posted one of the few descriptions of Haig's analytic processes that I have come across. Did you see this post?

 

Is it akin to the sort of thing you were concerned about?

If yes, I don't propose addressing this further at the moment. There is another thread that might be more suited to discussing this issue at some later time.

Meanwhile, I will continue posting details on Nivelle and d'Alenson's development of their war-winning campaign. I believe it can give a deeper insight into what it would have meant for Haig to pursue the idea of winning the war in 1917.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Nivelle's goal had been to begin the campaign as quickly as possible. At the very least, however, the British Army had to side-step south and take over more of the front line. This would allow Nivelle to build up his mass de manouevre, the huge body of men and equipment that sat poised behind the main break-through attempt and then pushed forward through the gap. Haig promised that the changeover would be completed in late February.

As Liaison Officer, Spears played a role in ensuring the take over went as smoothly as possible. He was off sick for a short while but on returning to work, he noted:

'Frequently I watched tests and experiments being carried out which were designed to establish how fast the infantry and the supporting guns could be rushed forward in Nivelle's great offensive. In these tests, it was found that, with a limited objective, the artillery could not only keep pace with the infantry but was always well ahead of it as regards time.

Every known strong point of the enemy, carefully established by aerial photography, was minutely studied and a separate plan for its capture devised. The rate at which the infantry was to advance came in for constant discussion. In conformity with the new tactics, the attacking first line was to rush forward for five kilometres. This was considered to be the maximum depth they were capable of attaining in what was in reality one bound (for the passage of troops within the divisions was to take place with practically no halt), so as to reach the German artillery positions in the first dash.' Source: Spears. op. cit. p. 90

Spears noted that the projected speed of attack was based on the French experience of July 1st 1916 on the Somme. He recalled the rapid movement of the French tactical formations on that day, 'quick and elastic, securing their objectives with a trifling loss'.

At this point, it is worthwhile noting the difference between this plan of attack versus Gough's plan of attack on 31st July 1917, as presented above. Gough's plan was for several steps, with periods of consolidation. Fresh troops would take up the next step. The final step in the case of II Corps started around 3kms from the start line and required an advance up to 5kms. This was the same distance as d'Alenson planned. The difference was that the French were going to rush the whole distance with the same forces. In II Corps' case, the last step was contingent, and required an order to initiate it. I believe this is the strongest evidence for the difference between a 'rush through' and a 'step by step' approach. Gough's approach was nothing like d'Alenson's plan, excepting the distance of the final objective from the start line.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Rawlinson, whose Fourth Army was responsible for the take over, was extremely worried about the French plans, given that he was on their immediate left flank. He quizzed Spears closely about the French preparations, and 'he would follow with his finger the development of this or that complicated section of the [French] scheme elaborately set out with a wealth of references, figures and lines on the map, then he would shake his head and say "The Boche is up to something, all this is very fine and large, but these immense preparations are giving him ample time to do it, whatever it is". "He is up to something," he would repeat. We did not know that Joffre in his retirement was saying the same thing...'

Spears noted another very important characteristic of the war-winning preparations. 'By a curious mental process which I found hard to analyse, for nothing whatever happened to justify it, some French generals engaged during this period in a kind of outbidding of each other's most optimistic prognostications as regards both the objectives they hoped to reach and the rapidity with which they expected to attain them. These hopes were no doubt fanned by the attitude of the GQG, whose enthusiasm found combustible material at the different headquarters always ready to kindle under the warm rays of approval of higher authority.'

General Mangin proved to be the greatest optimist. 'His attack was now to press headlong until it reached the Serre, thirty kilometres from the French front line, in pursuance of General Nivelle's idea of a break-through to the north on the general axis Craonne-Guise.' Mangin even went so far as to specify that his infantry would advance at the rate of 100 metres per 3 minutes for the first 3 kms.

Rawlinson was right. Suddenly it became apparent that the Germans were pulling out, bound for the Hindenburg Line. Everything was about to change.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Pierrefeu picked up the mood in GQG:

'As early as February the rumours of a coming offensive began. The highest hopes were built on it. Colonel d'Alenson's intimates spoke highly of his ability and decisive mind, and said that he would impart a wonderful force to the operation. The large number of troops which the Commander-in-Chief was to employ in the attempt to break through the German line were spoken of. Already the locality of the coming operations was marked on the map. The British launched daily assaults, faultlessly carried out and successful in securing for them numerous prisoners. We were full of confidence in them. But as the days went by the offensive still delayed. General Micheler came often to GQG, and we expected every time that he went back to his Headquarters that the attack would be made. But GQG had not finished the preparatory work. We had rarely been so impatient. To tell the truth, we began to grow stale, and thought the event so long announced was unduly delayed. Towards the end of February the English attacks on the Ancre brought about a tremendous excitement. The Germans retired before our Allies, at first slowly and reluctantly, and then on their own will.' Source: Pierrefeu. op. cit. pp. 138-9

Note the early assumption that the retreat had started as a direct result of the assaults that were taking place.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Pierrefeu continues:

'It was no longer a battle, it was becoming a retreat. Then, like a train of powder, the news spread. "The Germans are going back..." The information bulletins of the G.A.N. [the French Army Group in the vicinity of the retreat] were feverishly consulted; every day they contained something fresh. Without a doubt, the enemy unwilling to withstand the shock of the coming offensive, had preferred to retreat. How far would they go? To the Meuse? Throughout the GQG the satisfaction was profound. But almost immediately experienced officers realized that this withdrawal had nullified the preparations for the offensive.'

Everyone except d'Alenson:

'But the Third Bureau remained silent and sphinx-like. If the retreat was mentioned to them, they replied only with ironical smiles. In reality, the Third Bureau and Colonel d'Alenson did not believe in the German retreat.' Source: Pierrefeu. op. cit. pp. 139

Third Bureau argued that the Germans could not voluntarily let go of ground. They were soldiers first and foremost, and abandoning hard-won ground, especially if it was to be used as a bargaining chip, was simply not consistent. 'They forgot that a retreat under certain circumstances may be a strategic move.'

Robert

[Crunchy]

Robert,

Please keep going with the informative posts you are providing.

The vast bulk of this Forum is about seeking and exchanging information about the Great War and its participants so as the gain a better understanding of the issues and people associated with it. You are supplying us with that in abundance and doing it in a manner that allows us to make our own judgments on what is presented, rather than simply seeking to thrust your own views upon us. Your sources are wide ranging and provide us new insights into many of the issues under discussion. That the quotes are extensive is very useful as they provide a fuller context of the subject than some of the short, highly selective quotes that seek to draw a narrow interpretation from the material. While I don't always agree with your conclusions, you are providing us with much food for thought. Keep them coming please.

Congratulations on the courtesy you have displayed in discussing the issues and ignoring snide remarks that seek to denigrate your contribution by attempting to ridicule you personally.

Best wishes

Chris

[salesie]

Robert,

Please keep going with the informative posts you are providing.

The vast bulk of this Forum is about seeking and exchanging information about the Great War and its participants so as the gain a better understanding of the issues and people associated with it. You are supplying us with that in abundance and doing it in a manner that allows us to make our own judgments on what is presented, rather than simply seeking to thrust your own views upon us. Your sources are wide ranging and provide us new insights into many of the issues under discussion. That the quotes are extensive is very useful as they provide a fuller context of the subject than some of the short, highly selective quotes that seek to draw a narrow interpretation from the material. While I don't always agree with your conclusions, you are providing us with much food for thought. Keep them coming please.

Congratulations on the courtesy you have displayed in discussing the issues and ignoring snide remarks that seek to denigrate your contribution by attempting to ridicule you personally.

Best wishes

Chris

You may see certain comments as being "snide", Chris - but the truth tends to hurt. I've made several attempts to broaden the context of this debate in order to prevent its depth from outreaching its narrowness i.e. by trying to discuss the fact that other, highly significant, factors were also in play - factors which impacted greatly on events at the front (especially in securing final victory); point out that the Western Front did not operate in a vacuum. I've attempted to show that by virtually ignoring the important interactions that these other, easily forgotten, "fronts" had with the Western Front then just as false an image is painted as the ee-aw brigade’s.

My final word on the subject is that: no matter how deep the penetration, a narrow front remains a narrow front and the deeper the penetration then greater the risk of a false picture taking hold.

Cheers-salesie

[Beau Geste]

No, salesie. It isn't.

Harry, I have been reflecting on your comment, which led me to read back over your earlier posts. You raised a couple of concerns. One as around Haig's 'lack of "singularity of purpose" or hesitancy and confusion if you like'. This formed the main focus of my responses, based around Travers' work. The sequence is not quite as in the book. So far the review has mainly dealt with the period leading up to July 31st. I don't propose dealing with the subsequent evolution of the purpose of Third Ypres right now. But it is something to come back to.

Your second concern was around the issue of Haig being overly concerned with tactical details, which you clarified in this post:

http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/i...st&p=851813

I don't believe we have discussed this further. Earlier on in the thread, I posted one of the few descriptions of Haig's analytic processes that I have come across. Did you see this post?

http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/i...st&p=625960

Is it akin to the sort of thing you were concerned about?

If yes, I don't propose addressing this further at the moment. There is another thread that might be more suited to discussing this issue at some later time.

Meanwhile, I will continue posting details on Nivelle and d'Alenson's development of their war-winning campaign. I believe it can give a deeper insight into what it would have meant for Haig to pursue the idea of winning the war in 1917.

Robert

Thank you Robert.

I will have to read through your comments again on Travers. I'll come back to you on this.

For some reason I couldn't open st&p 851813 but I have reread st&p 625960 and yes, as you said, it does suggest a concern for detail that people like Travers tend to ignore or play down.

Kind regards,

Harry

[Robert Dunlop]

Phil, I have been giving further consideration to your A4 summary suggestion. I don't want to reduce the size of the quotes, if this means judging what material has to be deleted. This only increases the risk of bias, which, as salesie pointed out, is already high given that I am choosing the material anyway. But you, along with others, are pointing to a bigger issue. Without some form of 'summary', it is difficult to keep track. It feels like a 'top and tail' is needed. Brief context and rationale for post at the top, then a summary of key points at the bottom. I will give it some more thought, and perhaps experiment a little. Feedback, positive or otherwise, would be great.

Thanks

Robert

[Beau Geste]

Phil, I have been giving further consideration to your A4 summary suggestion. otherwise, would be great.

Yes please Robert, I agree wholeheartedly with Phil on this one a "key points summary" would be very useful to all of us I'm sure.

Harry

[Robert Dunlop]

Let me try the following. I propose referencing much of the 'header' in subsequent posts until such time as there is a significant change in focus. It is not expected that others would adhere to this format, given that the onus is on me to bring more clarity to the sequence and significance of the posts that I am responsible for:

Original Question: If massed advances with distant objectives were a mistake [1916], and well-planned but limited advances were also the wrong way to go [late 1917 - successful in gaining ground but too costly in casualties], was there any alternative in 1917? A supplementary question was posed in post #3 - could Third Ypres have been been better done?

Summary of discussion to date (with respect to current issue under discussion) :

1. Detailed review of alternative plan for Third Ypres, accompanied by study of the first 6 weeks of the campaign. Conclusions posted here: posts #331, 332, and 333 (page 14)

2. Concerns were raised about the validity of the detailed review as it gave the impression that 'the British Generals, all in all, in 1917 did a pretty good job' (post #340; page 14). Further discussion raised the 4 phase concept of war, as espoused by Haig in his final dispatch. Phase 3 related to the wearing down of the enemy. Phase 4 related to the final destruction of the enemy once the wearing down process was completed.

Current issue under discussion:

1. Evidence was presented that from May 1917 to early October 1917, Haig discounted Macdonogh's view that Phase 4 would not occur until 1918 and that Haig believed Charteris' view that Phase 4 would happen in 1917 (see posts #409 and 410, p. 17, for summary). The Battle of Third Ypres began during this time.

2. An alternative view has been presented, namely that during the period in question (May to October 1917) Haig did not primarily plan or execute Third Ypres as if the war was going to end in 1917.

3. Currently, the planning and execution of Nivelle's war-winning strategy for 1917 are being examined. The aim is to use Nivelle's approach as a model for how a C-in-C would plan to complete phase 3 and then transition to phase 4 in 1917. This model will then be compared with Haig's strategy for the Third Ypres campaign.

4. The evidence presented so far confirms that Nivelle was primarily aiming to finish the war in 1917, and that his chef de cabinet, Colonel d'Alenson, was responsible for the planning. The plan itself involved pinning the German forces across a wide front, drawing in the German reserves, then breaking through the line in one sector with a large 'mass de manoeuvre'. Preparations including training of infantry and artillery to break through rapidly. These preparations were interrupted by the German retreat to the Hindenburg Line.

Focus of current post:

The following map illustrates how the German retreat affected Nivelle's first plans. It confirms why several French generals realised that the retreat would nullify the then current plans. The approximate final line at the end of the retreat (the Hindenburg Line) is indicated with black dotted lines.

Conclusion from the current post:

In the previous post relating to this current issue (# 514), it was noted that GQG Third Bureau (Operations) Staff did not appear to acknowledge the significance of the retreat with respect to their plans. This raises the possibility, as previously suggested by Spears (post #498, p. 20), that a strong focus on and desire to win the war in 1917 led to a failure to accurately interpret what was happening. This possibility will now be explored in more detail.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Original Question, Summary of discussion to date, and Current issue under discussion posted here: #520.

Focus of current post:

In the last post (# 520), the possibility was raised that GQG Third Bureau (Operations) Staff were so focused on the 1917 war-winning strategy that they misinterpreted the significance of the German retreat.

Pierrefeu described what happened:

'It was a curious thing that, in spite of its authority, the Third Bureau convinced nobody. About March 10th a wave of indignation swept through GQG. For the first time I heard Staff officers themselves criticize adversely the blind obstinacy of the Operations Department. Our inaction was held to be monstrous. Was the Operations Department responsible for this, or was the Commander-in-Chief and his chef de cabinet? It is impossible to say exactly. Future events showed us, at all events, that the Commander-in-Chief had refused to believe, in spite of everything, in the German withdrawal. It was know that he had replied to Franchet d'Esperey, who had informed him of the enemy's movement, that it was impossible to rely on so improbable hypothesis.

In short, on March 15th, when the result of the serious enterprise which been decided upon in the direction of Crapeaumesnil was known, it was impossible any longer to doubt the German retreat. Consternation reigned among the General's entourage, and only gloomy faces were to be seen. The offensive prepared with so much care had become void.' Source: Pierrefeu. op. cit. pp. 140-41

Spears provides more direct evidence. At the beginning of March 1917, Rawlinson and his neighbour, General d'Esperey, realised that the German retreat was underway. Given the build-up and preparations for Nivelle's first plan, d'Esperey felt that it was vital to launch the attack then and there. He requested permission from Nivelle, on several occasions but to no avail.

'It was not till the 7th that General Nivelle answered d'Esperey's letter of the 4th, and a more astonishing document than his reply can hardly ever have been produced during the war.

"On the front of the G.A.N. [French Army Group North] (wrote General Nivelle) there is no material indication which allows one to conclude that the voluntary withdrawal of the Germans will extend to this region.

There seems little likelihood that the enemy will abandon without fighting, and indeed without resisting to the utmost, one of the principal pledges that he holds on our soil, that is to say the line nearest Paris, which includes Roye, Noyon, and Soissons.

In any case it is impossible to base a decision on a hypothesis.

I decide therefore not to change in its general lines the plan of operations for 1917."

So much for the denial of self-evident facts, but the hesitation and contradictions revealed in the latter part of this document were almost as extraordinary.

"As regards the eventualities that may arise on the front of the G.A.N., two main possibilities may be considered:

1. A withdrawal of the enemy before the date of the attacks.

2. A withdrawal while the attacks are in progress.

It is obvious that the important point is to obtain, in the first place, precise information as to the attitude of the enemy, and to find out at what moment he intends to withdraw if this is his intention. The result could be obtained by frequent raids, in the first case, and by reconnaissances during the preparation, in the second.

If the retreat takes place, it can be followed up energetically, but only employing the strictly necessary effectives, so as to create reserves of which I can avail myself on other parts of the front as circumstances may develop.

In the arrangements which the G.A.N. may desire to study in the event of a possible German retreat on its front of attack, it is important not to change the plan as a whole except in the case of its being absolutely impossible to do otherwise.

The attack prepared by the G.A.R. (Reserve Army Group, which constituted the exploitation force that would break out into the German rear areas) should not be influenced by any retreat that may be envisaged. This attack should, naturally, be conceived and executed with all the greater strength so that it may become the principal attack. The reserves that may be created on the G.A.N. front may be employed to reinforce or to prolong the attack of the G.A.R. Instructions have already been given in this sense, so that the preparation of the ground and all the necessary dispositions relative to an extension of the front of attack east of Reims may be pushed forward as rapidly as possible."

To the staff of the G.A.N. the procrastinating attitude of the Grand Quartier, as revealed by this document, seemed nothing short of a scandal.' Source: Spears. op. cit. pp. 210-11

Conclusion from the current post:

There is strong evidence that GQG was so committed to their plan that they failed to interpret the significance of the German retreat correctly. This failure significantly undermined the credibility of GQG. Both of these observations should be included in a model of what happened when a C-in-C planned as if Phase 4 would occur in 1917.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Original Question, Summary of discussion to date, and Current issue under discussion posted here: #520.

Focus of current post:

In the last post (# 521), evidence was provided of the intransigence of GQG in the face of the German retreat. This post reviews the subsequent actions of GQG as the retreat occurred, and in preparation for the next offensive once the German's had reached the Hindenburg Line.

Doughty notes:

"[Despite telling d'Esperey there was no need to change the plan, Nivelle] nonetheless had his staff consider alternatives for the possibility of a German withdrawal.

A few days later, after the German intention to withdraw became obvious, Nivelle adjusted the mission and composition of his army groups. Shortening of the front line, he later stated, enabled him to have sixteen additional divisions, including artillery. Although he made only a few changes in his instructions for Micheler's Reserve Army Group, he strengthened Pétain's Central Army Group and ordered it to participate in the main offensive by attacking twenty-five kilometres east of Reims. Through a series of incremental changes, he had transformed Joffre's concept of sequenced attacks (two large attacks followed by a surprise attack) into a powerful frontal assault, and he now had only the British making a large supporting attack." Source: Doughty. op. cit. pp 335-6

It is not so clear that Nivelle's second offensive was meant to be war-winning decisive battle. Pierrefeu and Spears both suggest that it was still d'Alenson's burning intent. I only have Spears' quote from the concluding paragraphs of Nivelle's directive to his Army Group and Army Commanders, issued on April 4th:

"All Armies will draw up their plans for the exploitation phase in the broadest and boldest spirit. Thus the British Armies having captured Douai and Cambrai will advance on Valenciennes, then on Mons, Tournai and Courtrai, constantly broadening their action towards the north.

The first objectives of the G.A.N. in the exploitation phase will be the railways leading from Hirson towards Cambrai, Valenciennes and Maubeuge" Source: Spears. op. cit. p. 327.

The following map illustrates that, on the face of it, Nivelle was planning for the end of Phase 3, the shorter lines, and then Phase 4, the longer but lighter lines penetrating deep into northern France. Nivelle referred to this as 'exploitation', which would fit with Phase 4.

By April 4th, however, Nivelle was under extreme pressure. There was a near revolt of his senior commanders, and there was now serious concern with the French government too. The idea of a frontal assault, especially against the strong, and getting stronger, Chemin des Dames was only tempered by Nivelle's assurance that the whole thing would be called off after 48 hours if it did not succeed. Thus, Nivelle issued a supplementary note to his Army Group Commanders on April 4th:

"I have prescribed in my directive that the exploitation stage of the forthcoming operations should be undertaken with all the necessary vigour and audacity, and I am convinced that no leader will fail to display these essential soldierly qualities. But, so as to avoid any false interpretation, I think I must add that audacity should not be taken to mean temerity. Because any operation is carried out with decision, audacity and rapidity - 'when lightning can be used it should be preferred even to cannon' - it does not mean that any of the measures intended to forestall surprise, reduce losses, etc, should be neglected.

On the contrary, a Commander who advanced without being properly covered at adequate distance, who attacked a position occupied by the enemy without carrying out the necessary preparation, would incur the most serious responsibility. The success of an operation does not depend only upon the audacity of its conception and the vigour of its execution but also upon the care with which it has been prepared." Source: Spears. op. cit. p. 327-8.

This note introduced a level of caution into the exploitation phase. In any case, the final outcome is well known. The attack produced minimal successes, nothing like the pre-assault hype had suggested. The French Army literally stopped in its tracks, and it took Pétain to redress the severe blow to the offensive spirit and morale of the army.

Conclusion from the current post:

It is less clear that Nivelle's actual offensive was meant to end the war in 1917. The exploitation objectives would suggest so. If this was the case, then another type of offensive can be added to the model, namely a frontal attack on an extremely wide frontage, followed by deep exploitation.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Original Question, Summary of discussion, and Current issue posted here: #520.

Focus of current post:

This post pulls together information from previous posts on the current issue (see posts #486-488, 491-500, 511-514, 520-522). It proposes a model of the characteristics of a 1917 war-winning strategy, based on an analysis of the Nivelle offensives (1 aborted; 1 carried out)

Nivelle and d'Alenson believed they had a war-winning strategy for 1917. The strategy was consistent with the completion of Phase 3 (wearing down) and the execution of Phase 4 (exploitation; destruction of the enemy) in 1917. The planning and execution of this strategy were characterised by:

1. The need to recruit the maximum number of resources (both British and French) into the battle as possible. Nivelle went so far as to get the support of the British War Cabinet for reinforcing the British Army and for placing Haig under his direct command.

2. Total dedication to the concept of winning the war in 1917, to the exclusion of other scenarios. At first, this created enthusiasm for the strategy. When this dedication caused significant misinterpretations of subsequent events, most notably the German retreat to the Hindenburg Line and the subsequent plans to attack the strongest German defensive positions on the Chemin des Dames, the credibility of Nivelle and d'Alenson came into serious question, both politically and militarily. There was a near revolt of many French senior commanders, which required the intervention of the politicians.

3. When the reality changed but the strategy did not, the C-in-C had to resort to compelling many commanders to execute the strategy.

4. A very wide attack frontage. In both plans, the British were to play a significant role on the left flank of the frontage. They (in addition to the French Army Group to their right in the first plan) were to pin the Germans and draw in their reserves. Two alternatives were considered for exploiting the initial pinning/wearing down manoeuvre:

a. Attack on a second narrow front with the aim of quickly and completely rupturing the German line and then passing through an entire Group of Armies to exploit the break-through (Phase 4) deep into German-held territory.

b. Attack on a wider front with multiple Army Groups, each of which was also responsible for exploiting (Phase 4) successful break-throughs.

5. Training the French troops and artillery in rapid push-through tactics, involving initial continuous (ie not step by step) advances of many kilometres through the German defenses.

Conclusion:

Several characteristics of a 1917 war-winning strategy have been analysed, based on Nivelle's first (aborted) and actual offensives. These characteristics will now be compared with Haig's planning and execution of the Battle of Third Ypres.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Original Question, Summary of discussion, and Current issue posted here: #520.

Focus of current post:

This previous post (#523) characterised the features of Nivelle's 1917 war-winning strategy. The current post compares the planning and execution of the Battle of Third Ypres.

Haig was aware of the details of Nivelle's and d'Alenson's plans for both offensives (see posts #494-496, p. 20, for the correspondence re the first plan). Bearing this in mind, each characteristic of the French plans is compared and contrasted with Third Ypres.

1. The need to recruit the maximum number of resources (both British and French) into the battle as possible. Haig did elicit support from the French for Third Ypres. They provided a minority of the forces directly involved in Third Ypres. As the French Army recovered, they also undertook small operations (by comparison) elsewhere on the Western Front (such as the Battle of Malmedy in October 1917). Even with the French contingent, the total number of resources for Third Ypres was significantly less than the resources for Nivelle's offensive. The resources were even less than those allocated just to the proposed left flank attack of Nivelle's first offensive.

2. Total dedication to the concept of winning the war in 1917, to the exclusion of other scenarios. Haig explicitly considered and planned for multiple scenarios. The outcome of July 31st was rapidly analysed, and then a new offensive strategy was implemented.

3. When the reality changed but the strategy did not, the C-in-C had to resort to compelling many commanders to execute the strategy. There were disagreements about the precise tactics for day one of Third Ypres. There was no equivalent in the British Army to the behaviour of Nivelle and d'Alenson in compelling Army Commanders to do something they were opposed to.

4. A very wide attack frontage. The following map illustrates the dramatic difference in the width of attack frontage and the potential impact of a subsequent clearing of the coast versus the exploitation of Nivelle's second plan:

Note the British attack front has been more clearly delineated for Nivelle's second plan. This enables a clearer comparison between that front (the Battle of Arras) and Third Ypres, ie they were very similar by comparison with Nivelle's entire plan. Salesie, it is my opinion that Haig's Army Commanders were well aware of this contrast during Haig's briefing on June 14th, 1917.

a. Attack on a second narrow front with the aim of quickly and completely rupturing the German line and then passing through an entire Group of Armies to exploit the break-through (Phase 4) deep into German-held territory.There was nothing remotely equivalent to the mass of manoeuvre, even allowing for the reduced scale of the British attack. The forces designated to 'exploit' a collapse of the German Army on July 31st were small advance guard forces with a fixed objective line (the Red Line). There wasn't even the equivalent of a single British Army waiting behind Gough's Fifth Army.

b. Attack on a wider front with multiple Army Groups. The breadth of attack has been illustrated in the map above.

5. Training... in rapid push-through tactics. This was not how the vast majority of British assault troops of Second and Fifth Armies were trained before Third Ypres. They were trained in taking and consolidating the (by comparison) small steps.

Conclusion:

A comparison of Nivelle's war-winning offensives and Haig's battle of Third Ypres indicates that the latter was not primarily planned as a war-winning offensive.

Robert

[salesie]

Robert, no full answer yet, because I believe your conclusion, based on the differences between the planning for the two offensives, is missing two important differences and one vital similarity, and I would like you to factor these in to any re-assessment.

1) The similarity is the end-result was that both offensives traded small gains in ground for high casualties (ignoring the fact, for the time being, that Nivelle's offensive almost brought about phase 4 in Germany's favour by virtually destroying the morale of his own forces, and Haig's 3rd Ypres didn't). This brings in the concept that no matter what the tactics employed, until a collapse in manpower/morale of one side or the other, then total-war makes a mockery of them.

2) I have seen no evidence that Nivelle held Haig's 4-phase doctrine. It seems to me that Nivelle, after his limited, but highly symbolic, tactical successes at Verdun, with his use of creeping barrages and subsequent close infantry/artillery co-ordination, believed that these tactics could be successfully "moved up" in scale. He believed that the German line could not stand against such tactics, and that victory in the field, a la Napoleon, was a certainty against an enemy far from being "worn out" and even strengthened by a strategic withdrawal - in other words, he didn't understand total-war and was of the opinion, after his limited success at Verdun, that he was the "best" General who had discovered the "best" tactics and that he would win the war in the field by his masterstroke.

Of course, Haig held no such view, and was convinced that any breakthrough would only come when his opponent was "worn out" and consequently any breakthrough would be a war-winning event.

3) You seem to focus your comparison on tactical analysis alone. I would suggest, though, that Haig's own words, in at least two diary entries, in his briefing at two conferences and the war cabinet meeting and his "we have no alternative, Hubert, we must continue," talk to Gough, are powerful evidence to show Haig believed that a collapse in German manpower/morale would occur in late 1917. His own words, mind, not a tactical comparison between two offensives whose commanders held fundamentally different beliefs.

Cheers-salesie.

[Robert Dunlop]

Original Question, Summary of discussion and Current issue posted here: #520.

Focus of current post:

It has been proposed that Haig considered the war to be divided into 4 phases, based on a 4 phase model that he defined pre-war. The final phase consisted of exploitation of the 3rd wearing down phase. This post examines Haig's pre-war view of transition between phase 3 and phase 4. The aim is to cast further light on the current issue through this analysis. Specifically, the military characteristics of these phases, and how the transition between phase 3 & 4 was recognised in battle (as opposed to an entire war), will be reviewed from Haig's perspective pre-war.

Prior to the Great War, Haig published 'Cavalry Studies'. These studies arose from an analysis of five Staff Rides that took place in India between 1903-06. During this time, Haig was the Inspector-General of Cavalry in India. The concept of Staff Rides was copied from the German General Staff's method of training. For the British, a Staff Ride was organised by a small group of officers, typically 4 including General Haig as the Director. A general problem would be set, for example the declaration of war and reports of an invading force approaching. The staff and other officers would be issued local maps and would have to reconnoitre the terrain, then compose orders. Each day's activities and conclusions would be studied, the 'outcome' of the day's 'operations' would be made known, and the next set of tactical problems would be posed. There was a logical sequence in the problems that were set.

Two of the Staff Rides are of particular relevance to the current issue. The First Study was entitled 'Jhelum' (Source: D. Haig. 'Cavalry Studies'. pp. 37-89. London). It is not appropriate to present the entire study. The General Idea was that two 'countries', a Northern State and Southern Empire, were separated by the river Indus, the north-east border of Scinde, and the Baluchistan frontier. A 'European Power' acquired control over the Northern State, and had just launched an invasion of the Southern Empire. The British officers were on the side of the Southern Empire. Their main objective was to be the 'thorough annihilation' of the Northern Field Army.

The Southern Empire cavalry commenced operations by crossing a river and then advancing to contact with the enemy cavalry. Once contact was established, the main cavalry force manoeuvred and attacked their counterparts. When the enemy cavalry was defeated, they 'broke, and fled in great confusion northwards, being pursued by the 1st Brigade, whilst the two other Brigades rallied in the rear.' Source: Haig. op. cit. p. 69 This was an example of phase 4 with respect to the limited action between the two cavalry forces. The main enemy force was still intact. Even so, some points bear close inspection:

1. Only a portion of the successful force was sent in pursuit. Haig noted: 'As regards pursuit, Warnery has written: "Only a squadron in disorder can gallop as fast as another in disorder!" So the squadrons most engaged should pursue at top speed. There can be no middle course - either pursue at top speed, or rally at the halt. Squadrons pursuing in this manner, however, are lost should some fresh hostile squadrons come upon the scene: a reserve is consequently indispensable during a pursuit."

2. The defeated enemy fled quickly, ie they were routed.

3. The pursuing force 'picked up many prisoners'. Another widely-recognised characteristic of a rout.

The next stage of the Staff Ride represented the manoeuvring of the Southern State forces against the now 'blind' Northern Field Army. Blind because their all-seeing cavalry had been driven back. The Southern State cavalry now moved forward and made contact with the Northern Field Army. Falling back gradually with delaying actions, the cavalry slowed progress of the enemy until the Southern State infantry forces had concentrated at the site of the major action intended to defeat the Northern Field Army. The enemy strikes first against a Southern corps to its front. A second Southern corps is now launched on a counterstroke against the exposed Northern flank. A decisive defeat is inflicted on the Northern Field Army, who fall back.

'The Cavalry Division operates by Brigades in succession on the enemy's western flank to interrupt his retreat. Infantry press the enemy directly in rear.' Haig then poses the question:

'How should this pursuit be carried out? - Rather than suffer delay by [directly] engaging the enemy's [retreating] troops... it would seem more effective for the Cavalry Division to move upon the enemy's... flank. Meanwhile the Infantry and Artillery press the enemy directly in the rear. But this immediate pursuit cannot produce decisive results; it must be completed by the employment of every man of the troops which took part in the battle and before such a pursuit by the bulk of the Infantry and Artillery can be organised, some time will probable elapse. Units will, in many cases, have to be reformed: ammunition filled up: rations and forage drawn from the rear, etc. The cavalry are, however, responsible that touched is maintained, and if the whole of the Cavalry Division is to be withdrawn in indirect pursuit, some system of maintenance of direct pursuit must at once be organised by making use of the squadrons of Divisional Cavalry.

If doubt exists as to the road taken by the enemy's main forces [as was] the case after Ligny, Königgrätz, Wörth, etc, the freshest horses must be sent on patrol at once, and reconnoitring be carried on widely along every possible road by which the enemy can have retreated, or some railway junction or other important centre on his line of communications must be aimed at.

The pursuit must be pressed without rest by the whole of the Cavalry, and without regard to sparing the horses or men. After a victory, an Army can dispense with its Cavalry, provided the fruits of victory have been reaped. Napoleon himself said "I do not wish the horses to be spared if they can catch men... Take no heed of the complaints of the Cavalry, for if such great objects may be attained as the destruction of a whole hostile Army, the State can afford to lose a few hundred horses from exhaustion."' Source: Haig. op. cit. p. 86-87

This type of pursuit is quite different from that described after a local battle. One thing has to be borne in mind. The vigorous pursuit depends on being clear that the main enemy force has been defeated and in is headlong retreat. If these things are clear, then Haig is agreeing with Napoleon's view - chase them hard with cavalry. Note also, however, that Haig is also advocated annihilation by a Cannae-like manoeuvre. Ultimate defeat requires getting round the retreating enemy and cutting them off, not just chasing them.

The Third Study (Aurangabad) reinforces these last points. The details are of the study are not relevant. Haig's conclusion when 'the general attack was successful' was:

'The pursuit: as many squadrons and guns as possible were thrown upon the enemy's demoralised columns so as to harass their retirement. The 4th Brigade seems the most likely to be available first, since its role was to guard the flank. Only a limited number of squadrons would, however, be sent in direct pursuit. The bulk of the squadrons and guns marched rapidly... to seize a position on the enemy's line of retreat, whence to attack him both by mounted and dismounted action. This should complete the enemy's rout, and give decisive results.' Source: Haig. op. cit. p. 182

Conclusion:

In Haig's pre-war analysis of the exploitation/pursuit phase, two variations were described:

1. Pursuit after the local defeat of part of the enemy's forces. Only part of the attacking force was used in pursuit, if at all, in case the other enemy forces counter-attacked the pursuing force.

2. Pursuit after decisive defeat of the enemy's forces. This required as many of the attacking forces be involved as possible. In addition to the direct chase by divisional cavalry, infantry and artillery, the independent cavalry would also be used to get around the retreating enemy, thereby surrounding his forces and inflicting a decisive defeat/annihilation. This approach was analagous to the German concept of "Vernichtungsstrategie".

Robert