Western Front tactics in 1917

[Robert Dunlop]

Moving ahead now to 14 June:

"I presided at Conference with Army Commanders at HQ First Army, Lillers, at 11 am. Some 40 officers were present. The Agenda included:

1. General situation

2. Situation in front of each Army

3. Future plans

As regards the latter, I stated that there was no departure from the plans I had outlined at the Conference of 7 May. Viz. British and French wear down and exhaust the Enemy by attacking by surprise as far as possible at points where not expected. Finally British will strike the main blow probably in the north."

The last sentence suggests Haig thinks the main blow will be at the end of the phase 3 wearing down process. Haig continues, however:

"Underlying the general intention of wearing out the Enemy is the strategical idea of securing the Belgian coast and connecting with the Dutch frontier [no mention of decisive defeat of the German army].

The nature and size of the several steps which we take towards that objective will depend on our effectives and the replacement of guns [emphasis in original].

Roughly these are:

1. Capture bridgehead formed of the Passchendaele-Staden-Clerken ridge.

2. Push on towards Roulers-Thorout so as to take coast defences in rear.

3. Land by surprise in conjunction with attack from Nieuport.

If effectives or guns inadequate, it may be necessary to call a halt after No. 1 is gained!

Meanwhile it is desirable to mislead the Enemy as to our next point of attack." Source: G Sheffield & J Bourne (eds). 'Douglas Haig: War Diaries and Letters 1914-1918. p. 299-300. ISBN 0297847023

Robert

[salesie]

Robert, your posts are becoming decidedly non sequitur again.

From my post # 387:

At a meeting with the War Cabinet, June 1917, Haig told them: "Germany was nearer her end than they seemed to think, that now was the favourable moment for pressing her and that everything possible should be done to take advantage of it by concentrating on the Western front all available resources. I stated that Germany was within 6 months of the total exhaustion of her available manpower, if fighting continues at its present intensity." Source, R Blake (ed) The Private Paper of Douglas Haig 1914-1919, London, 1952, p240.

Charteris's comment on Haig's statement is noteworthy: "D H gave the definite opinion that if the fighting kept up at its present intensity for 6 months, Germany would be at the end of her available man-power. This is going rather further than the paper I wrote to DH on the 11th June (ia/35273). It depends on Russia . But my words were 'It is a fair deduction, given a continuance of the effort of the Allies, etc., etc. That includes Russia, but it does not differ materially from DH's bolder statement. Source, Charteris, At GHQ, op. cit., p233.

These two, clearly sourced, quotes, show that in June 1917 Charteris felt capable enough to calculate when the "end" would come in 1917. This is only a month after your unsourced quote attributed to him says that he couldn't, and from that you draw the conlusion that Haig/Charteris never expected phase 4 in 1917 (contrary to several posts in which you agree they did, along with Joffre and God knows who else). Your other, later posts, along with unsoured quotes, are clearly a step back to your extremely narrow tactical/operational thinking.

Robert, I really must stop debating this matter with you - in my opinion, we're simply going round in circles - you've see-sawed between saying Haig didn't expect phase 4 in 1917, to accepting that he did, and now back to that he didn't. I cannot hold my temper any longer in the face of a lack of logical progression and outright contradictions from you, and I don't wish to be barred from the forum by tearing your capricious intellect apart.

Over and Out.

Cheers-salesie.

[Robert Dunlop]

Apologies for leaving out the sources. I have gone back and added these to each post.

There has been a specific chronology to the posts. Now I have reached the point in Haig's diary that is quoted in the previous post #428. The quote is dated Tuesday 19 June [1917], which is 5 days after the quote in post #427. Here is the full context, which casts a different light on what Haig was saying. Forgive the duplication of the two sentences quoted above, but I have included the emphases, which also clarify the intent IMHO:

"The members of the War Cabinet asked me numerous questions all tending to show that each of them was more pessimistic that the other! The PM seemed to believe that the decisive moment of the war would be 1918. Until then we ought to husband our forces and do little or nothing, except support Italy with guns and gunners (300 batteries were indicated). I strongly asserted that Germany was nearer her end than they seemed to think, that now was the favourable moment, and that everything possible should be done to take advantage of it by concentrating on the Western Front all available resources. I stated that Germany was within 6 months of the total exhaustion of her available manpower, if the fighting continues at its current intensity (emphases in the original). [To do this, more men and guns are necessary]." Source: G Sheffield & J Bourne (eds). 'Douglas Haig: War Diaries and Letters 1914-1918. p. 300. ISBN 0297847023

In the full context, Haig was addressing a specific issue, as he perceived it. Haig believed that LG was saying that phase 3 should stop - no more wearing out. Then somehow phase 4 would happen in 1918. Haig was saying that phase 3 must be continued now, and with all possible resources.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Beau Geste, I would like to return to one of the important points that you raised in post #412:

Despite this confidence [that the war would be won in 1917], Haig, did not display the singularity of purpose that one might have expected vis a vis the operational details of the attacks on the Passendaele Ridge and beyond. The objectives were changed more than once and the type of offensive ( a "rush through" or a "step by step" limited objectives advance" ) was also left surprisingly vague on more than one occasion .

The broad strategic intent of Third Ypres was clear and consistent throughout. As we have seen, this was defined much earlier, and was the basis for the first plans as far back as February 1916. As late as June 14th 1917, Haig stated to his Army Commanders, those who would be responsible for executing Third Ypres, that the general intent was to wear down the enemy. The campaign's strategic context was equally clear, namely securing the Belgian coast up to and as far as the Dutch border. Within that strategic context, Haig defined a series of clear steps. All of the aforementioned were consistent with what had been decided previously.

In looking ahead from June 14th to the end of the Battle of Third Ypres, we will need to evaluate the point that 'Haig did not display a singularity of purpose' in more detail. Before doing that, however, it is important to place these considerations in the context of the military planning and execution of a campaign, ie a series of battles. I have never been in the military, let alone command any formations of men, let alone a whole army. Everything that I raise must be taken in this light. It is a very very incomplete understanding, both of the military in general and of command in the First World War in particular. To date, my strong impression is that a campaign, let alone a battle, cannot be conducted in a haphazard fashion. The enormous challenges in shifting the entire point of attack of the British army led to the very early thinking and planning for Third Ypres, as we have seen. Again, my strong impression is that once the ball is set rolling, the C-in-C must give very clear direction (ie orders) to the next chain of command (ie the Army Commanders), and so forth. Clear objectives must be set. These cannot be changed quickly. The detailed review of August and early September 1917, published earlier in this thread, showed that it took approximately 6 weeks for the detailed analysis of the German defensive strategy made by Charteris to filter through into a change in British offensive strategy. This all took place, however, within the clear operational framework laid out by Haig on 14th June, namely that the first phase was focused on capture of the whole Passchendaele-Staden-Clerken ridge.

Robert

[Beau Geste]

Harry, in my opinion the advent of nuclear weapons is the ultimate evolutionary consequence of total-war.

Hello Salesie.

I wholeheartedly agree. Not too long ago you and I were involved in a thread that posed the question whether or not the conflict of 1914 - 18 was the first world war. If I'm not mistaken, we discussed this particular topic then. Of course you're right, it seems ironic perhaps but nuclear weapons are designed never to be used. Their purpose is to deter aggression and is based on the misleadingly simple idea that if one state uses them against another, that "injured state" will be able to retaliate and destroy the attacker. This has worked so far even after the development of tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons that possess a yield far smaller than those of an "intercontinental" capability. The idea that their low yield would allow them to be used on the battlefield is frought with danger. A lot of "war studies" experts believe that the psychological impact of the use of any weapon of this type could lead to rapid and uncontrolled escalation.

However, there is always the possibility, as history has shown, that sometimes those with non-rational and unbalanced thinking can rise to power, that's why I believe the rise of Muslim fundamentalism is the greatest threat to our security since the rise of National Socialism in Germany (both, in essence, relying on the blind-faith of its followers to maintain its power-base - the words of mere mortals are irrelevant, no matter how rational, if they contradict the word of God). Don't get me wrong, I regard any fundamentalism to be dangerous (even Christian), but at the moment it is Islam that is on the rise (but that's a debate for another forum).

Absolutely. Again I agree with you completely.

Irrationality is particularly difficult to defend oneself against and the mere thought that someone "unbalanced" could get hold of a some small, portable but frighteningly powerful nuclear device is what nightmares are made of.

The perceived logic of the "Lions led by Donkeys" theme (is) flawed.

Again I have to agree with you but this time only partially. As you point out the BEF did beat the most powerful army in the world in a fair fight, especially at 1st Ypres when the German army was fought to a standstill. I'm not sure though that one can deduce from this that "the British professional soldier of WW1 must have been superior to his enemy in almost every way" I think I would agree if we are just talking about the "old contemptibles" that fought so magnificently in 1914 at Mons and First Ypres but I would have to be convinced that your more general sweeping statement is necessarily the case.

(However) I can now see how the description 'donkey' could sometimes be appropriately applied. Take Haig for instance, I don't believe he was a donkey all the time but sometimes how else could he be described? And, I don't believe he was a Wellington at any stage of his career, but sometimes he did show himself to be more than a good and capable commander.

Yes, in some earlier postings on this thread I erroneously got the impression that you viewed DH as a visionary who knew exactly what he was doing every inch of the way. As I explained in my opening posting on this thread, I found it difficult to "tune in " to the argument coming in as I did so late. I think your statement that "as with most things of this sort, the truth almost certainly falls halfway between the two extremes of the "revisionist faithful" and the ee-aw brigade" is a fair and balanced assessment. I also agree that "he was almost certainly the "best" available at the time". I particularly like your point regarding Haig's "psychological profile". I think it was his ability to make decisions that he knew would inevitably and increasingly result in heavy losses and retain his sanity and sense of purpose that set him apart. As you say he was far from perfect : his tactical acumen and control during Third Ypres and in the Spring and Summer of 1918 for example is questionable.

It is my contention that total-war itself is the devil, and that everyone from the lowliest soldier to the highest General is ultimately powerless, from a purely military point of view, in its all-encompassing grip.

I need some clarification here Salesie. What you seem to be arguing is that in a conflict like WW1 or WW2, the constraints imposed by its very nature removes any "freedom of action" on the part of those taking part. I can see that victory must be sought through a combination of actions directed not just at the enemy on the battlefied but his support base 'back home' as well. Having said that, officers and men still retain a great deal of freedom in those areas you refer to as "purely military". No battle is so constraining that it can only be fought one way and that is true from the level of grand strategy down to the choices open to platoon leaders in the front line.

Kind regards

Harry

[salesie]

Apologies for leaving out the sources. I have gone back and added these to each post.

There has been a specific chronology to the posts. Now I have reached the point in Haig's diary that is quoted in the previous post #428. The quote is dated Tuesday 19 June [1917], which is 5 days after the quote in post #427. Here is the full context, which casts a different light on what Haig was saying. Forgive the duplication of the two sentences quoted above, but I have included the emphases, which also clarify the intent IMHO:

"The members of the War Cabinet asked me numerous questions all tending to show that each of them was more pessimistic that the other! The PM seemed to believe that the decisive moment of the war would be 1918. Until then we ought to husband our forces and do little or nothing, except support Italy with guns and gunners (300 batteries were indicated). I strongly asserted that Germany was nearer her end than they seemed to think, that now was the favourable moment, and that everything possible should be done to take advantage of it by concentrating on the Western Front all available resources. I stated that Germany was within 6 months of the total exhaustion of her available manpower, if the fighting continues at its current intensity (emphases in the original). [To do this, more men and guns are necessary]." Source: G Sheffield & J Bourne (eds). 'Douglas Haig: War Diaries and Letters 1914-1918. p. 300. ISBN 0297847023

In the full context, Haig was addressing a specific issue, as he perceived it. Haig believed that LG was saying that phase 3 should stop - no more wearing out. Then somehow phase 4 would happen in 1918. Haig was saying that phase 3 must be continued now, and with all possible resources.

Robert

Try as I might, Robert, I can't ignore this one.

Why do you think the addition of two sentences at the beginning allows you to completely ignore the last sentence?

The sentences you add don't change the context; they only increase the detail of, "I strongly asserted that Germany was nearer her end than they seemed to think." (Being the first sentence of the quote I used). The additional sentences only add froth, because the first sentence I used clearly shows a discrepancy in thinking between Haig and the War Cabinet so why do we need more detail as to the nature of this discrepancy?

However, to maintain true context, even with the two additional sentences, your summary should read: "In the full context, Haig was addressing a specific issue, as he perceived it. Haig believed that LG was saying that phase 3 should stop - no more wearing out. Then somehow phase 4 would happen in 1918. Haig was saying that phase 3 must be continued now, and with all possible resources" (end of your summary)...because Germany was within 6 months of the total exhaustion of her available manpower, if the fighting continued at its current intensity (phase 4 in 1917).

The last sentence of the quote is the all important crux of the matter, because it adds substance to Haig's assertions; it gives the reason why he made such strong representations (if not, why would he end his diary entry with it and not leave it out as you did in your summary/interpretation - he obviously believed its relevance to be more important than you do).

Cheers-salesie.

[salesie]

Apologies, Harry, it should have read: It is my contention that total-war itself is the devil, and that everyone from the lowliest soldier to the highest General is ultimately powerless, from a purely military point of view in the avoidance of high casualties, in its all-encompassing grip.

Basically saying that everyone, in one form or another, is a victim of total-war.

Cheers-salesie.

[Robert Dunlop]

Harry, you will see the same concept developed in this thread too:

 

Robert

[Beau Geste]

Hello Robert,

Please don't apologise for your lack of a military background, your postings indicate a clear understanding and interest in the subject. Some of the most celebrated analysts on war have never seen the inside of a barracks let alone served and commanded men. I served for 26 years but I am not silly enough to suggest that that gives me an advantage. Escorting the queen on ceremonial occasions, serving in an armoured recce regiment as a junior and senior NCO, and as an officer in the RAEC provided me with very few useful insights.

The broad strategic intent of Third Ypres was clear and consistent throughout. As we have seen, this was defined much earlier, and was the basis for the first plans as far back as February 1916. As late as June 14th 1917, Haig stated to his Army Commanders, those who would be responsible for executing Third Ypres, that the general intent was to wear down the enemy. The campaign's strategic context was equally clear, namely securing the Belgian coast up to and as far as the Dutch border.

I agree with this paragraph entirely. Haig was a sufficient visionary to have understood the total nature of the war his forces were involved in. He understood that limited victories on the battlefield might well be possible (First Ypres for example) but that to defeat Germany per se would take all the energy and commitment that the allied powers could muster against not only the German armed forces but Germany and its government and population as well.

However, possessing the levels of perception and understanding needed to recognise the nature of the war he was involved in and to be able to formulate, in broad detail, the strategy needed to emerge victorious is quite different to the the skills needed, on a day to day basis, to fight that war.

Yes he was convinced that in the Summer and Autumn of 1917 the allies were in the third stage of his overall strategy, that the 'general intent' was, as you say, to "wear down the enemy". I agree with that point entirely. However, it is my belief that DH was no military genius. As Salesie has pointed out in an earlier thread, "Haig was no Wellington" and he made what, in retrospect, can be seen to be serious tactical mistakes that cost enormous losses for relatively little practical gain.

The early confusion regarding the type of attack to be employed on 31 July (rush through or step by step); the choice of Gough to lead it ( a man whose word and perhaps intellect he thought should be "taken with more than a grain of salt" - Travers) and despite the fact that he was something of a "bull in a china shop" who wouldn't listen to or accept advice ( for example regarding his troublesome right flank). The extension of the battle into the winter and so on all suggest that the clarity and purpose needed to use and control troops on the ground effectively wasn't always there.

I understand that Gough's gung-ho type character seemed ideal for the rush through type of attack that Haig preferred and that Plumer had recommended but on balance the decision to put Gough in command is at least questionable.

To date, my strong impression is that a campaign, let alone a battle, cannot be conducted in a haphazard fashion.

I'm sure you are right Robert but I have an equally strong impression that not even Douglas Haig was omniscient. For all his attempts to "dot the 'i's and cross the 't's" he would, like any human being, have been anxious, and he would have known that the intelligence on which he was basing his decisons was not, and could not, be perfect. Mistakes weren't only made, they were inevitable. My posting wasn't meant to be an indictment of Haig; on the contrary I believe he was a remarkable soldier, as Salesie has pointed out "the best available" but he wasn't perfect.

Kind regards,

Harry

Apologies, Harry, it should have read: It is my contention that total-war itself is the devil, and that everyone from the lowliest soldier to the highest General is ultimately powerless, from a purely military point of view in the avoidance of high casualties, in its all-encompassing grip.

Basically saying that everyone, in one form or another, is a victim of total-war.

Cheers-salesie.

Thank you Salesie. That makes sense.

Kind regards,

Harry

[Beau Geste]

Robert Dunlop said:

Harry, you will see the same concept developed in this thread too:

 

Robert

Thank you Robert,

Harry

[Robert Dunlop]

(end of your summary)...because Germany was within 6 months of the total exhaustion of her available manpower, if the fighting continued at its current intensity (phase 4 in 1917).

salesie, I am more than happy for this addition to the summary. It re-emphasizes the problem. Only 5 days before, Haig was standing in front of his Army Commanders, and other officers. It was a major Conference. This was Haig's opportunity to gee up the very men who would be responsible for prosecuting the war against the Germans. The Army Commanders, not the War Cabinet, are the agents of victory on the ground. What does Haig say?:

"We are nearly there. Just a few months more and the Germans will collapse. Let's really go at it now. Any questions? No? Let's do it!"

No. He sets out a strategic intent - capture the ports and advance to the Dutch border. Then he sets out stages. Finally, he suggests that it may only be possible to achieve Stage 1, the capture of Passchendaele Ridge if there aren't enough effectives and guns.

What a stark contrast to the meeting with LG and the War Cabinet days later. Then Haig is faced with the idea that phase 4 can occur in 1918 without any need to execute phase 3. Haig says that the war will be over in 6 months if he has the effectives and guns. From the Charteris quote you provided, even Charteris was taken aback by what Haig predicted.

How do you explain this difference in Haig's views between the two meetings?

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Harry, is this what you mean by the Haig's lack of "singularity of purpose"?:

The early confusion regarding the type of attack to be employed on 31 July (rush through or step by step)

When you say "rush through", what do you mean?

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Haig's next quote of relevance after the 19th June was on 10 July:

"Charteris, reporting on situation, stated that political situation in Berlin seemed critical. Confidence in their Army and in the success of the submarine blockade of England seems to be waning.

As regards our own front, Enemy still retaining inferior divisions on the Ypres front, and no reinforcements have appeared in that sector yet. On the other hand, the coast sector has been reorganised, marines being detailed to guard the coast, and regular infantry the land front." Source: G Sheffield & J Bourne (eds). 'Douglas Haig: War Diaries and Letters 1914-1918. p. 303. ISBN 0297847023

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

From 28 July:

"Charteris reported that 5th and 6th German Divisions have gone to Russia and further confirmation of 1st and 2nd Guard Divisions on Eastern Front has been received. There seems now to be little doubt but that Germany is making a strong effort to knock out Russia. This is all in favour of our operation here. Also it seems possible to me that she may 'knock' Russian together with her blows!"

Charteris' prediction, or at least Haig's interpretation of it, is not congruent with the idea that the German army is fast approaching phase 4.

Robert

[Beau Geste]

Harry, is this what you mean by the Haig's lack of "singularity of purpose"?:

When you say "rush through", what do you mean?

Robert

Hello again Robert,

In post #412 I suggested that prior to Third Ypres there was a marked contrast between Haig's strategic view that the war could end in 1917 and his tactical decision making and control of events leading up to and after July 31st 1917. On the one hand there was a marked confidence in his statements and decision making but on the other this "singularity of purpose" was lacking. I've suggested that he became hesitant and prone to error in his short term tactical decision making and that this led to the sort of errors I've referred to elsewhere on the thread.

Kind regards,

Harry

[Beau Geste]

Harry, is this what you mean by the Haig's lack of "singularity of purpose"?:

When you say "rush through", what do you mean?

Robert

"Rush through" as opposed to a "limited objectives advance". It would appear that in January the plan was to rush the offensive right through to clear the Belgian Coast.This was later modified in order to reach the coast in stages yet at the same time to capture the Passchendaele Ridge. According to Travers, these changes affected his commanders in different ways. Haig himself, Plumer and Jacob were concerned with the immediate problem of capturing the Passchendaele Ridge while Rawlinson, Gough, Davidson and Robertson were more concerned with what type of offensive July 31st would be. It is this type of tactical confusion I referred to earlier - a lack of "singularity of purpose" or hesitancy and confusion if you like.

Harry

[salesie]

salesie, I am more than happy for this addition to the summary. It re-emphasizes the problem. Only 5 days before, Haig was standing in front of his Army Commanders, and other officers. It was a major Conference. This was Haig's opportunity to gee up the very men who would be responsible for prosecuting the war against the Germans. The Army Commanders, not the War Cabinet, are the agents of victory on the ground. What does Haig say?:

"We are nearly there. Just a few months more and the Germans will collapse. Let's really go at it now. Any questions? No? Let's do it!"

No. He sets out a strategic intent - capture the ports and advance to the Dutch border. Then he sets out stages. Finally, he suggests that it may only be possible to achieve Stage 1, the capture of Passchendaele Ridge if there aren't enough effectives and guns.

What a stark contrast to the meeting with LG and the War Cabinet days later. Then Haig is faced with the idea that phase 4 can occur in 1918 without any need to execute phase 3. Haig says that the war will be over in 6 months if he has the effectives and guns. From the Charteris quote you provided, even Charteris was taken aback by what Haig predicted.

How do you explain this difference in Haig's views between the two meetings?

Robert

I would explain it by saying that Haig has/had a different style of command to you. "We are nearly there. Just a few months more and the Germans will collapse. Let's really go at it now. Any questions? No? Let's do it!" (Your interpretation of how Haig would address his men if believing phase 4 was close at hand). I would say the reality versus the theory, the rah-rah-rah merchant versus the composed commander, after all he was a bit more than the captain of the school football team.

As for Charteris being taken aback? I'll use his own words to see if he was actually gobsmacked - "This is going rather further than the paper I wrote to DH on the 11th June (ia/35273). It depends on Russia . But my words were 'It is a fair deduction, given a continuance of the effort of the Allies, etc., etc. That includes Russia, but it does not differ materially from DH's bolder statement."

"...does not differ materially from DH's bolder statement" seems a far cry from being taken aback, mild surprise maybe?

Now a question for you, Robert - Given Haig's 3 years previous experience of the Western Front, and his belief in being embroiled in the midst of phase 3 (the wearing out phase), and his belief in the German mistake at 1st Ypres, how do you suppose he imagined he'd be able to breakthrough and "capture the ports and advance to the Dutch border"? By some new and all-powerful tactical brainwave? By some inspirational sweeping manoeuvre? By divine intervention? Or by bringing about a collapse in German army manpower/morale?

Being a betting man, here's my book:

By some new and all-powerful tactical brainwave - 250/1

By some inspirational sweeping manoeuvre - 1000/1

By divine intervention - 10/1 (these odds are fairly low because we all know that Haig was a devout Scot's Presbyterian and must have fervently believed God was on his side - so it's a better possibility than the first two that he believed this is how he'd be able to advance to the Dutch border after capturing the Belgian ports in 1917).

By bringing about a collapse in German army manpower/morale - 1/100 (for the uninitiated this is the long odds-on favourite, known by some as a Banker bet)

It easy to guess where my money would go - where's your bet going, Robert? Or is there an alternative I can add to the list?

Cheers-salesie.

[Robert Dunlop]

salesie, I will respond to your post in reverse order. Haig told his Army Commanders how the general intent of capturing the coast would be achieved. By a series of steps:

1. Capture bridgehead formed of the Passchendaele-Staden-Clerken ridge.

2. Push on towards Roulers-Thorout so as to take coast defences in rear.

3. Land by surprise in conjunction with attack from Nieuport.

With respect to Charteris' reaction, I am happy to go with the description 'mild surprise'. It is interesting to me that Charteris was even surprised. This suggests that even Charteris had not heard Haig describe the situation in this way before.

Which leads back to my question. How do you explain the significant discrepancy between Haig's comment to Lloyd George and the War Cabinet, versus Haig's comments to his Army Commanders only 5 days before?

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Harry, thanks very much for the clarification. Your reference to Travers was helpful. I have got down my copy of "How the War was Won: Command and Technology in the British Army on the Western Front: 1917-1918" and have re-read the relevant chapter "Paralysis of Command". It will take me a while to compile a full response, but I will analyse Travers' points in more detail.

Robert

[salesie]

salesie, I will respond to your post in reverse order. Haig told his Army Commanders how the general intent of capturing the coast would be achieved. By a series of steps:

1. Capture bridgehead formed of the Passchendaele-Staden-Clerken ridge.

2. Push on towards Roulers-Thorout so as to take coast defences in rear.

3. Land by surprise in conjunction with attack from Nieuport.

With respect to Charteris' reaction, I am happy to go with the description 'mild surprise'. It is interesting to me that Charteris was even surprised. This suggests that even Charteris had not heard Haig describe the situation in this way before.

Which leads back to my question. How do you explain the significant discrepancy between Haig's comment to Lloyd George and the War Cabinet, versus Haig's comments to his Army Commanders only 5 days before?

Robert

Robert, I answered your question thus, in the very first paragraph of my last post: "I would explain it by saying that Haig has/had a different style of command to you. "We are nearly there. Just a few months more and the Germans will collapse. Let's really go at it now. Any questions? No? Let's do it!" (Your interpretation of how Haig would address his men if believing phase 4 was close at hand). I would say the reality versus the theory, the rah-rah-rah merchant versus the composed commander, after all he was a bit more than the captain of the school football team."

Perhaps Charteris' surprise was that he'd been sacked at the end of 1917 for his flawed and sycophantic assessments, when his chief had valued them so highly, highly enough to use them in the War Cabinet meeting. Take note that the quote is from Charteris' own book, published well after the event in 1931. But we'll just have to agree that we have different interpretations on Charteris' "mild surprise" - it's not really the crux of the matter.

Now please answer my question; not just give a list of tactical/operational objectives. Or by giving this list as an answer are you saying that you believe that the 250/1 shot, by some new and all-powerful tactical brainwave, was how Haig imagined he'd be able to breakthrough and advance to the Dutch border after capturing the Belgian ports in 1917? If so, what new and all-powerful tactical brainwave have I missed?

Just in case I've misunderstood, I'll repeat my question: "Given Haig's 3 years previous experience of the Western Front, and his belief in being embroiled in the midst of phase 3 (the wearing out phase), and his belief in the German mistake at 1st Ypres, how do you suppose he imagined he'd be able to breakthrough and "capture the ports and advance to the Dutch border"? By some new and all-powerful tactical brainwave? By some inspirational sweeping manoeuvre? By divine intervention? Or by bringing about a collapse in German army manpower/morale?"

Cheers-salesie.

[Robert Dunlop]

salesie, apologies if I was not clear in my answer. I don't suppose that Haig imagined any of the options that you outlined. Haig gave a clear indication that he would use a series of steps. Furthermore, he clearly stated that it might not be possible to "the capture of the ports and advance to the Dutch border" in 1917.

Robert

[salesie]

salesie, apologies if I was not clear in my answer. I don't suppose that Haig imagined any of the options that you outlined. Haig gave a clear indication that he would use a series of steps. Furthermore, he clearly stated that it might not be possible to "the capture of the ports and advance to the Dutch border" in 1917.

Robert

Robert, the steps he outlined are tactical not strategic considerations, and I can't understand why you keep trying to give them strategic merit. Also, Haig said that "The nature and size of the several steps which we take towards that objective (advance on the dutch border after securing the Belgian ports) will depend on our effectives and the replacement of guns," but surely he secured adequate resources at the War Cabinet meeting five days later? However, let's look a little closer at these two meetings as per his diary entries:

It is my contention that there was no difference in substance between what Haig said at the meeting of 14th June 1917 with his army commanders, and what he said at the War Cabinet meeting held five days later on the 19th - no difference in substance but he did use different terminology i.e.

At the 14th June meeting, Haig laid out his tactical/operational objectives (as per your list) but also added strategic considerations alongside these.

From his diary (and your post #427), "As regards the latter (future plans), I stated that there was no departure from the plans I had outlined at the Conference of 7 May. Viz. British and French wear down and exhaust the Enemy by attacking by surprise as far as possible at points where not expected. Finally British will strike the main blow probably in the north."

Your comments on this in post #427: "The last sentence suggests Haig thinks the main blow will be at the end of the phase 3 wearing down process. Haig continues, however: "Underlying the general intention of wearing out the Enemy is the strategical idea of securing the Belgian coast and connecting with the Dutch frontier" [no mention of decisive defeat of the German army]."

I cannot for the life of me, Robert, understand how you can strongly imply that by Haig not mentioning it in "Janet and John" fashion that this means no decisive defeat of the German army was in his mind? By logical progression it means exactly that. To breakthrough and capture the Belgian ports and advance to the Dutch border would entail smashing through the Hindenburg line in Flanders, which would then outflank the whole German line leaving it in danger of being rolled up in enfilade, causing the Germans to commence a major withdrawal (because the BEF advancing on the Dutch border after smashing the line would mean any German counter-attacks had failed)...and so and so on. Robert this would be a war winning victory; the German army in retreat after suffering the biggest defeat in the history of the war to date, the Belgian ports in allied hands thus fatally damaging the U-boat campaign etc. etc.

To summarise: Haig's strategic overview to his army commanders i.e. "Underlying the general intention of wearing out the Enemy is the strategical idea of securing the Belgian coast and connecting with the Dutch frontier" is, when logical progression is applied, giving 3rd Ypres the strategic aim of a war winning victory, just the same, in substance, as saying to the War Cabinet that "Germany was nearer her end than they seemed to think, that now was the favourable moment for pressing her and that everything possible should be done to take advantage of it by concentrating on the Western front all available resources. I stated that Germany was within 6 months of the total exhaustion of her available manpower, if fighting continues at its present intensity."

Different terminology, Robert, but the same end result; planning a war winning victory in 1917.

I don't know why Haig used different terminology but I can guess. Perhaps he thought that his army commanders were capable of applying logical progression to military matters and thus didn't need it spelling out "Janet and John" fashion, but that the politicians were not and did need a bit of the old "Janet and John"?

Cheers-salesie.

[Robert Dunlop]

Harry, I have found the 'rush through' reference that Travers refers to. Before quoting it, here are some extracts from Sir Archibald Murray's General Staff Memorandum of 12th November, 1915:

"1. Main object of the proposed operations. On the 28th October [1915] the Admiralty expressed a wish that the question of joint naval and military operations on the Belgian coast should be considered. The Admiralty Staff were of the opinion that it was of utmost importance in the interests of the Expeditionary Force to deprive the enemy of his submarine bases at Ostend and Zeebrugge, because the use of these ports by the Germans constituted a growing danger to the transport of troops and supplies across the Channel.

3. Ulterior objects of the operations: The effect of the operations, if successful, would not be confined merely to preventing the enemy using Ostend. If Ostend could be occupied, long range guns could be mounted for the bombardment of Zeebrugge. The operations would furthermore exercise a marked moral effect in Holland, a factor which may prove of great importance at a later stage of the war when there may be a chance of inducing that country to intervene on our side. In view of the probable decisive effect which such intervention would exercise, no chance should be lost of impressing Holland with our ability to secure the Belgian coast line as a preliminary to driving the enemy out of Belgium."

Point 2. presented the possible plan of operations, which involved an infantry attack up the coast with naval gunfire support.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Harry, Haig first issued 'Instructions for Preparation of Plan for Northern Operations' on 7th January, 1916. The instructions were directed at Rawlinson and are quoted here:

 

General Rawlinson's detailed proposal is quoted in the subsequent posts in the above thread. The accompanying map made the plan very clear, but I don't have the ability to scan it unfortunately. It was, however, strikingly similar to what actually took place in 1917.

Robert

Edited 1 October , 2019 by spof

[Robert Dunlop]

On 5th March, 1916, there was a 'GHQ Memorandum' on the 'Project for Operations in Flanders and Belgium':

"1. The object in view is to defeat or drive back the hostile forces in North-West Belgium, occupy the country north and west of the general line Ypres-Roulers-Bruges and free the Belgian coast line.

2. [covers the distribution of German forces in the Ypres area]

3. From the above it is obvious that, in order to achieve the object laid down in paragraph 1 :

a. The French must take over again a certain portion of the line now held by us.

b. That not only the French but all our Allies should attack simultaneously in order to hold and use up the hostile strategic reserves.

c. That our operations themselves must be designed with a view to holding the hostile troops all along our front and, if possible, drawing the German reserves away from our main line of advance."

The Memo then provides details of six stages. The Fifth Stage involves "[securing] the Passchendaele position", followed by an "advance in the general direction of Staden". The Sixth [and final] Stage involved an "advance to be made on Roulers-Thorout. An attack from Nieuport to be made simultaneously with this advance and followed, if the Germans are falling back, by the special [amphibious] operation. [end of memorandum]"

Robert