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Remembered Today:

Western Front tactics in 1917


Mat McLachlan

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General Rawlinson's detailed proposal was, strikingly similar to what actually took place in 1917.

Thank you Robert,

I need to think about this before responding in detail.

My main point though was that there was a difference between Haig, the strategic visionary and Haig the battlefield tactician. The former never lost sight that victory could only be achieved in a total war setting, by exerting continuous pressure (stage three) on the German army so as to wear him down ready for the decisive battle (stage four). The latter was, in my opinion, a relatively average tactician. This might appear an indictment of the great man but it isn't meant to be. Haig had many admirable qualities: his strength of character, defined for example in his ability to accept the huge losses that were inevitable in a total war situation; his tremendous self confidence shown in the way he dealt with the criticism he had to endure from London and elsewhere; his choice (with some exceptions perhaps) of senior commanders; his support of those he placed in positions of responsibility and so on.

However, as Ive said before, he wasn't perfect and his more important "failings" tended to manifest themselves in the area of tactics. Of course, this in itself is not necessarily a major drawback. A CinC is there to design the strategy of an operation, to decide on a plan of action, not necessarily to get involved in the fine details of how it will be carried out. It's my contention that DH didn't always do this and in consequence didn't always make things easy for his subordinate commanders.

Kind regards

Harry

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No problem, Beau Geste. I wasn't expecting a reply at this stage. This material is still scene-setting. It covers the period before Travers picked up the story.

Just one point of clarification if I may. You mention in the last sentence that "DH didn't always do this...". It is not quite clear to me what "this" is. Is it "design the strategy of an operation", "decide on a plan of action", or "not necessarily get involved in the details of how it will be carried out"? Or is it all three?

Robert

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In late 1916, Plumer was invited to submit a plan for the Ypres campaign. I don't have the written request for this. Nor do I have the details of Plumer's plan. On the 6th January 1917, GHQ send the following "Letter to Second Army":

"With reference to your G.352 dated the 12th December, 1916, giving your plan for offensive operations north of the river Lys, the Commander-in-Chief desires me to draw your attention to the following points with a view to recasting the plan.

1. The operations north of the river Lys will not take place until after the subsidiary British attacks elsewhere and main French offensive operations have been carried out. It is therefore to be anticipated that the enemy will have been severely handled and his reserves drawn away from your front before the attacks north of the Lys are launched.

Under these circumstances, it is essential that the plan should be based on rapid action and entail the breaking through of the enemy's defences on a wide front without any delay.

2. The plan, as submitted by you, indicates a sustained and deliberate offensive such as has been carried out recently on the Somme front. In these circumstances the enemy will have time to bring up fresh reinforcements and construct new lines of defence.

3. The object of these operations is to inflict a decisive defeat on the enemy and to free the Belgian coast.

The immediate intention is to break through the enemy defensive systems on the approximate front Hooge-Steenstraat with the object of securing the line Roulers-Thorout and, by advancing in a north-easterly direction, to threaten the coast defences in rear."

Lt General Kiggell concluded by requesting Plumer to resubmit his plans by the 31st January, 1917.

Two days later (8th January), GHQ issued "Instructions for the Formation of a Special Sub-section of the Operations Section of the General Staff". Lt-Colonel Macmullen was tasked with forming a special sub-section "with the object of working out a plan of operations to take place north of the river Lys."

The instructions continued:

"Shortly, the idea is for the British to operate on the Vimy, Arras, and ancre fronts, in conjunction with attacks by the French armies [as outlined by Nivelle, but pre-empted by the German withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line]. If the French are successful in driving the Germans back, we shall put all our efforts in to help them and there will be no necessity for the operations north of the river Lys.

If, on the other hand, the French do not succeed in their efforts to force the Germans back and thus fail to clear the Belgian coast, the French will take over from us probably up the Ancre river, and we shall switch as rapidly as possible to carry out our operations on a large scale north of the river Lys.

4. The object of our operations north of the river Lys is to clear the Belgian coast this summer. The War Cabinet attaches the greatest importance to the liberation of this coast.

5. [describes the splitting of the Second Army front into two sectors, with Rawlinson and Fourth Army moving into the salient]

Northern Sector (Fourth Army: Sir Henry Rawlinson).

Objectives, in the first instance: Roulers, Thorout, astride the two railways, thence north-east to clear the coast and get in rear of the German coast defences.

6. Sir Herbert Plumer made out a scheme for the northern and southern sector attacks in the shape of a steady, deliberate advance similar to the Somme battle. The Commander-in-Chief rejected this. The whole essence is to attack with rapidity and push right through quickly. It must not be forgotten that this attack will be delivered subsequent to attacks by the whole of the French armies and a portion of the British army. The Germans are likely to be disorganized and weak.

Neither Sir Herbert Plumer nor Sir Henry Rawlinson have been told officially what their own tasks are to be."

Robert

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At this point, it might be worth quoting from Travers:

"Another major difficulty was that the objectives for the Passchendaele offensive went through several changes before Haig informed his army commanders on 5 July 1917 what the final plans were. Originally, in January, the idea had been to rush the offensive right through to clear the Belgian coast [no reference is provided but I presume Travers is referring one or both of the above]. This was modified, although mainly in order to reach the coast in stages, yet at the same time it was intended to capture the Passchendaele Ridge. Now there was some doubt as to which was the primary objective. " Source: T. Travers. 'How the War was Won', p. 12. ISBN 0415076285

I will resume with Travers' account in a moment. At this point, however, it is very important to note that Travers has been very selective in his starting point. The January idea 'to rush the offensive right through' was not the original idea. Reaching the coast in stages had been set out by Rawlinson and GHQ previously.

The aforementioned note does not obviate the seeming problem of Haig being 'inconsistent'. On face value, it appears to increase the level of inconsistency. First one thing, then another, then back to the original... Context is all important here. By January 1917, the Germans had been beaten back to their jump-off line at Verdun and had been pushed back on the Somme by the combined Franco-British offensive. The retreat to the Hindenburg Line had not taken place but Nivelle was now planning his huge breakout offensive. The strategic context appeared different in January 1917. Even so, Haig ensured that caveats were present throughout the instructions:

"The operations north of the river Lys will not take place until after the subsidiary British attacks elsewhere and main French offensive operations have been carried out."

"...anticipated that the enemy will have been severely handled and his reserves drawn away... before the attacks... are launched"

"if the French are successful in driving the Germans back [ie the main French offensive operations are continuing], we shall put all our efforts in to help them and there will be no necessity for the operations north of the river Lys"

"The Germans are likely to be disorganized and weak"

If Haig had stuck rigidly to the January 1917 concept of attack, and the military context had played out like it did (French attack failed early; German reserves reduced but not by much; German army not "disorganized and weak"), then Haig would have fallen into precisely the same trap that Nivelle did. Nivelle was so fixated on his plan that when the Germans pre-empted it with their withdrawal, Nivelle did not fundamentally review his plan. The consequences are well known. I will review this issue in more detail at a later time, but the upshot was that Nivelle's persistence with his plan created severe uncertainty within many of his Army Commanders. There was a near revolt before the attack even got underway.

We still need to examine the Travers' observation that there was "some doubt as to... the primary objective".

Robert

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Quite apart from the caveats associated with the January instructions from GHQ, it is also worth examing the plan that Lt. Col. Macmullen and his team came up with:

"Memorandum by Operations Section, General Staff GHQ

(Submitted 14th February, 1917)

Summary of the Proposed Operation in Chronological Order

1. To take over from the Belgians up to Noordschoote immediately the switch from the south is decided on.

2. To take over from the French at Nieuport as soon as possible after the switch from the south is decided on.

3. The capture of the enemy's front line from Ontario Farm [a mile west of Messines] to Peckham (Spanbroekmolen) by Second Army as soon as possible after the switch from the south is decided on.

4. On Zero Day a simultaneous attack by the Second and Fourth Armies on a front from St Yves to Lizerne [1/2 mile south of Steenstraat] with the object of penetrating to a depth of approximately 1,500 to 2,000 yards.

5. On Zero + 2 day, or earlier, if found possible, an attack by the Fourth Army on the enemy's third line north of the Ypres-Rouler railway, combined with an attack supported by a strong force of tanks on to the Becelaere-Broodseinde line. Second Army to push forward simultaneously to a line running from the Ypres-Comines railway by Gheluvelt to Becelaere.

6. The attack on Zero + 2 Day to be followed immediately by a rapid continuation of the advance by the Fourth Army towards the line Roulers-Thorout, Second Army taking over the defensive flank up to Broodseinde.

7. An attack at Nieuport as soon as the main advance has reached the neighbourhood of Cortemarck [7 miles north of Westroosebeke], or earlier if the enemy shows signs of great demoralization.

8. The continuance of the attack at Nieuport on the following day, combined with a landing on the coast at and south-west of Middelkerke Bains."

In the detailed discussion section of the memorandum, there is the following:

"General Idea

1. The operations proposed take the form of breaking through the enemy's defences on the front from St Yves to Steenstraat (approximately 30,000 yards), the formation of a defensive flank along the Messines-Wytschaete Ridge and on via Gheluvelt, Becelaere and Broodseinde to Moorslede, and an advance north-east via Roulers and Thourout. After a definite stage has been reached in the main advance an attack is proposed at Nieuport and a landing on the Belgian coast."

I do not have the ability to copy the original map and sketches that accompanied this proposal. I will, however, try and create a near exact replica and post it for you.

These plans were passed over to Gough when he was tasked with planning Third Ypres.

Note that the plans do not envisage an all out race for the sea in one step. They comprise a series of steps, albeit with short intervals between. One of the caveats alludes to the success factor that would determine if the plan could be executed quickly, namely "if the enemy shows signs of great demoralization". This success factor is only linked with the decision to attack out of Nieuport, not with the earlier phases. There is no doubt that the GHQ planning team were recommending a rapid attack:

"Moreover, an attack of the Second Army as a first [separate] phase is opposed to the idea underlying the whole scheme, which is a heavy surprise attack followed by a rapid break through... It is considered, therefore, that the Zero Day for both Second and Fourth Army attacks should be the same."

Robert

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It is important to note that even the 'rush through' plan consisted of steps. Travers differentiated the plans as "rush[ing] the offensive right through to clear the Belgian coast" versus the subsequent plan "modified, although mainly in order to reach the coast in stages". Travers is not correct on this point. From the map and from the description of the first plan, the only fundamental difference between the two plans was the timing of the steps/stages.

Robert

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To summarise: Haig's strategic overview to his army commanders i.e. "Underlying the general intention of wearing out the Enemy is the strategical idea of securing the Belgian coast and connecting with the Dutch frontier" is, when logical progression is applied, giving 3rd Ypres the strategic aim of a war winning victory...
Thank you, salesie. If I understand correctly, from what Haig said to the British Army Commanders, they would have inferred indirectly what he did not say to them but did say to Lloyd George. This indirect inference was based on the shared military view that a break-through and capture of the Belgian coast would result in the rolling up of the German defences elsewhere and the defeat of the German army. I will return to this point later.

Robert

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Thank you, salesie. If I understand correctly, from what Haig said to the British Army Commanders, they would have inferred indirectly what he did not say to them but did say to Lloyd George. This indirect inference was based on the shared military view that a break-through and capture of the Belgian coast would result in the rolling up of the German defences elsewhere and the defeat of the German army. I will return to this point later.

Robert

Not quite, Robert. My point is: From what Haig did say to his army commanders, they would/should have understood that a breakthrough and capture of the Belgian ports and an advance on the Dutch border would be a war winning victory (i.e. a significant defeat of the German army, unprecedented in the war to date, and a fatal blow to the U-boat campaign etc. from which it is extremely hard to envisage a German recovery) not from what he didn't say to them.

On the face of it a subtle change in emphasis, but highly important. I repeat, from what Haig did say to his army commanders and not from what he didn't say.

You obviously missed the strategic importance of such an event in your interpretation of Haig's words (your post #427) but would/should an army commander?

Cheers- salesie.

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Now to examine the more detailed concerns raised by Travers. I will continue with the issues about the objectives. Travers listed other problems but these will be addressed later:

In the end, Haig wanted to do both [clear the Belgian coast and capture the Passchendaele Ridge], and therefore neither objective was given the full attention it deserved. Haig's instructions on 5 July read that the Fifth Army would secure the Passchendaele Ridge, then after 'very hard fighting lasting perhaps for weeks' there would be more rapid progress northeast to gain the line Thourout-Couckelaere, where the offensive would continue up north to join up eventually with a Fourth Army offensive along the coast from Nieuport to Ostend. There was also to be an amphibious landing, with tanks, on the coast, but this would take place only if the main Passchendaele offensive had already made the coast 'practically untenable' for the enemy. Haig also wrote that the first aim of the offensive was to drive the enemy off the ridge from Stirling Castle to Dixmude, which was puzzling since Dixmude was not part of the ridge, but was far to the north and could not have been part of the Fifth Army offensive, or even of the French participation on the north flank. However, the net result of these several objectives was that some of the key figures involved, including Haig, Plumer and Jacob, were more concerned with the immediate problem of capturing the Passchendaele Ridge, while others, such as Gough, Rawlinson, Davidson and Robertson, were more involved in what type of offensive 31 July would be - either a rush-through, or a step by step limited objectives, advance.
Source: Travers. op. cit. pp. 12-14.

Before looking at each of the key individuals mentioned, there is one thing that should be cleared up. Travers mentions the ridge from Stirling Castle to Dixumude. He says that mention of Dixmude is 'puzzling since Dixmude was not part of the ridge.' Travers appears to be suggesting that Haig made a mistake. Travers is wrong, however. The following map illustrates what Haig was referring to. I apologise for the poor quality of the map itself. It had to be shrunk right down. I drew the contour lines before shrinking the map. The 20- and 40-metre contours are drawn in. The ridge line is very clear, sweeping right up to Dixmude.

post-1473-1201956037.jpg

Robert

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During the day, I have thought about the issue of muddled objectives. Clearing the coast vs capture Passchendaele Ridge. Travers is saying that these dual goals caused a major problem. There was lack of clarity about whether to 'rush through' or take a step by step approach. Gough is regarded as the 'rush through' general. Before looking at the individuals' views of these issues, it seemed important to step back a moment and take a high level view. The following two maps may be helpful. First, a map of the high level objectives as given to Gough by Haig on 18th May. The details are quoted here:

 

The map shows both major intermediate objectives (1st and 2nd) with purple dotted and dashed lines respectively. I have added a dotted red line. This was the furthest limit to the advance on 31st July, as set by General Gough. It should be noted that this line was reached, and even surpassed, in several areas to the north and in the south. It was not reached in centre of the attack. Even so, the map still provides a wider context, putting the whole debate about just how far to push on day one into proper perspective:

post-1473-1201978657.jpg

Robert

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This next map is even more important. It puts the Ypres front into the context of the whole Western Front. There is a red blob near the top left corner of the map, which illustrates what would have happened had the Passchendaele-Staden line been reached. If the Franco-British armies had 'cleared' the coast, it is still possible to recognise how relatively insignificant this would have been in the context of rolling up the Western Front:

post-1473-1201978959.jpg

Robert

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Hello Robert,

The comprehensiveness of your posting is not only really helpful, it's amazing.

In posting #453 you ask if I was referring to a. the design of the strategy of an operation, b. decide on a plan of action or c. decide how it should be carried out. It is c I was referring to.

I have stressed several times that DH really understood the type of war the allies were involved in and what was required to win it. To this end the strategy that he asked Rawlinson and then Plumer to produce an operational plan for was, of course, his. I have no doubts about that nor have I said anything inconsistent with that view in any of my posts. If I disagree with things that have been said it's in the "fine detail", the actual tactical decisions needed to put those plans into practice. The choice of commander, the reluctance to get involved in areas he had given Gough responsibility for even though he was aware of the difficulties and dangers facing the 5th Army on 31st July 1917 and so on. In other words the "nitty gritty" which he had delegated to others.

I am NOT questioning or criticising Haig's strategic foresight or acumen.

Kind regards,

Harry

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Thank you, Harry. Your area of concern is very clear. The 'fine detail' is important, and I have just been trying the set the overall context before getting to these issues. Please let me know if any such 'fine detail' is overlooked in the forthcoming discussions. As you will appreciate, it is difficult to keep everything together. For the moment, I am sticking to an analysis of Travers' work. This helps provide a nice framework for preparing responses. It may mean, however, that something is missed.

Robert

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When Travers highlighted the problem of muddled objectives, he listed three generals on the side that were 'more concerned with the immediate problem of capturing the Passchendaele Ridge': Haig, Plumer and Jacob (in contrast to 'others [who] were more involved with what type of offensive 31 July would be'). Haig's name is interesting. This is quite the opposite interpretation from Haig being preoccupied with the destruction of the German army in 1917. I want to come to back to Haig after reviewing all of the other names.

Jacob's inclusion is easy to account for. He was GOC II Corps. The high ground was his responsibility. Jacob's focus was, and absolutely should have been, that sector which had been assigned to his corps. The immediate problem lay squarely in his realm of responsibility. But the situation is not as simple as Travers makes out. The following quote demonstrates why. It comes from Lord Moyne, who was a Staff Officer in 74th Brigade. The brigade was attached to II Corps prior to the 31st July attack, via its parent unit the 25th Division. On 23 July 1917, Lord Moyne wrote:

"For the purpose of the forthcoming attack we had been put into the 2nd Corps in the 5th Army. Jacob was a very good soldier... While we were at Fruges, Jacob came and addressed us one day and talked the most arrant nonsense I ever heard about the function of the 5th Army, who in the next few days were to drive the Germans right out of Belgium. He told us that we should go on living in shell holes until the War was brought to an end by the complete defeat of the Boche."

I have no idea if Jacob truly believed what he was saying. Let us assume he did. What did he plan for II Corps. A systematic advance with three objective lines, the furthest of which stopped short of Zonnebeke and well short of Passchendaele. It illustrates how generals could hold hold two things in juxtaposition: a long term goal, and the practical details of a limited objective attack. The latter was their job.

Plumer's inclusion puzzles me, at least with respect to the period leading up to 31st July. Plumer had no direct responsibility for the attack in Fifth Army's sector. His job was still important, ie to protect Fifth Army's southern flank and to deceive the Germans into thinking there would be an attack towards Lille. Once Plumer was given overall responsibility in late August, then Passchendaele fell squarely into his realm of responsibility. Plumer's reasons for taking Passchendaele, as related by his Chief of Staff Harington, are well known to us from earlier in this thread. He wanted the high ground before the Winter set in, so that his troops would not have to suffer being overlooked by the Germans again.

Robert

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Now to the second list of names: Gough, Rawlinson, Davidson and Robertson '[who] were more involved in what type of offensive 31 July would be - either a rush-through, or a step by step limited objectives, advance'. Gough will be kept over until 2nd last, before Haig.

Robertson was CIGS. His views on the type of attack are of some interest. As Robertson himself pointed out, however, the final decision about how to fulfill the general mission set by the War Cabinet was Haig's. The British Official History notes that Robertson's views differed from Haig's, but he continued to support Haig in efforts to get more men and guns. Robertson had not direct control over Gough, so whatever views Robertson may have had were of no consequence in determining Gough's plans.

Davidson's inclusion is interesting. He was Brigadier-General, Operations Section, GHQ at the time. This means he reported to Haig. On 26th June 1917, Davidson issued a detailed memorandum. Basically, he questioned the distant objectives that Gough had set for Fifth Army on 31st July. This memorandum, and Gough's reply have been discussed before in this thread. Suffice to say that Davidson felt the advance should be not less than 1500 yards and not more than 3000 yards. In other words, Travers would fit this into the step by step approach, with a step being less than 3000 yards. The corollary seems to be that Gough was going for a 'rush through' and not a step. This is not correct. Take II Corps, commanded by Jacobs. They had four clear objective lines, as described in 8th Division Operation Orders of the 22nd July, 1917:

"The objective of the II Corps is to secure the following general lines:

i. [First Objective] Shrewsbury Forest-Stirling Castle-Bellewaarde Ridge (Blue Line).

ii. [second Objective] Dumbarton Lakes-Herentage Chateau-Westhoek Ridge (Black Line).

iii. [Third Objective] Tower Hamlets-Veldhoek-Polygon Wood-Potsdam (Green Line).

iv. [Fourth Objective] If opportunity arises, the Molenaarelsthoek-Broodseinde Ridge (Red Line)"

I will create a map to illustrate these objective lines, overlaid with Davidson's recommendation. Note that the 4th objective was conditional.

Robert

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This next map is even more important. It puts the Ypres front into the context of the whole Western Front. There is a red blob near the top left corner of the map, which illustrates what would have happened had the Passchendaele-Staden line been reached. If the Franco-British armies had 'cleared' the coast, it is still possible to recognise how relatively insignificant this would have been in the context of rolling up the Western Front:

post-1473-1201978959.jpg

Robert

Insignificant, Robert? If an advance on the Dutch border after capturing the Belgium ports had become an actuality, then the whole German Right-flank would have been turned and your red-blob would have increased to a substantial arc of red across the top of your map. The whole North/South German line would then have been in severe danger of being rolled up in enfilade as well as being taken in the rear, thus causing a general German withdrawal to stabilise their line. And, even if the Germans did manage to hold a line along the whole right flank of the Allied advance to the Dutch border without a general withdrawal then the subsequent bulge in their line (expand the red on your map to the Dutch border to actually see this bulge) would highlight just how significant the danger to their whole line would have been i.e. a substantial proportion of the German army would have been in severe danger of being cut off from the German border itself.

However, such talk is purely academic and a bit of nonsense really - we both know, as well as Haig did, that no breakthrough was possible, whether by a rush through or stepped assault, until a collapse of German army manpower/morale occurred, as Haig believed it would at some point in late 1917 (believed it right up until early October 1917), so if the Hindenburg line had been smashed through at 3rd Ypres and the German right-flank turned then how long do you imagine phase 4 would have lasted in 1917 (with such a collapse in German manpower/morale)? One hundred days or longer - or perhaps even less?

Cheers-salesie.

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Here is the map of II Corps' objectives. The Blue, Black, Green and Red Lines are all indicated. In addition, I have overlaid a purple area that is based on Davidson's comment about:

"a deliberate and sustained advance, [by which I mean] a succession of operations each of two or three days' interval, each having at its object the capture of the enemy's defences, strongpoints or tactical features, to a depth of not less than 1,500 yards and not more than 3,000 yards."

post-1473-1202026393.jpg

Robert

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From the above map, it can be seen that the essential difference between Gough's plan and Davidson's proposal was the Fourth Objective (Red Line). Davidson was arguing that this was too far for a deliberate attack. His argument was based, quite rightly, not on a concern about whether the attacking troops could get that far, but whether they could be protected by artillery if they did get that far. Davidson was concerned about the ability of an organized German defence to counter-attack and cut-off/destroy/force back such an advanced line.

What was Gough thinking of when he set such a 'distant' objective? Firstly, we can say he was not trying to get to the coast on day one! Not even remotely close. The Red Line is short of the Passchendaele-Staden objective, which in itself was only the first major objective. This illustrates how a C-in-C will set a series of distant objectives, the first of which becomes the Army Commander's immediate focus. The first major objective then gets broken down into a series of more manageable objectives at Corps level, on so on down the chain of command. There was no lack of clarity about how the first major C-in-C objective was going to reached. An army cannot afford to be unclear.

Second, the thinking behind the Red Line is best illustrated by a detailed analysis of the 8th Division's Operation Order, given that this division was responsible for getting to the Red Line in II Corps' sector.

In 8th Division's sector:

"5. The attack on the Blue and Black Lines [First and Second Objectives] will be made by the 24th Brigade (on the right) and 23rd Brigade (on the left).

6. The attack on the Green Line [Third Objective] will be made by the 25th Brigade which will advance from its dug-outs at Halfway House not later than Zero + 4 hours, but in such time as to be formed up behind Westhoek Ridge by Zero + 6 hours. They will then advance up to the line of the protective barrage so as to follow close up to it when it lifts at Zero + 6 hours 28 minutes.

7. At Zero + 7 hours 10 minutes, the 24th Brigade will take over the whole of the Black Line [second Objective] from 23rd Brigade which will be ready to move forward on receipt of orders about Zero + 7 hours 50 minutes to a position of readiness east of Hannebeek.

8. The advance to the Red Line [Fourth Objective] will be in three stages and will be carried out by the reserve battalion, 25th Brigade, assisted by tanks and B Squadron 1/1st Yorkshire Dragoons.

The advance at each stage will consist of pushing out strong cavalry and infantry patrols with tanks, supported by larger bodies to secure localities.

The patrols, their objectives and those of the tanks will be definitely told off before the commencement of operations.

Should the enemy be found to be in weak strength to be contesting our advance, he will be driven in by the troops mentioned above: should he be found to be in strength, it is NOT [emphasis in the original] the divisional commander's intention to attack him on Z Day; the leading troops of the 25th Brigade will establish themselves on a line within assaulting distance of whatever line the enemy is holding."

It is very important to examine this part of 8th Division's Operations Orders in some detail. There are three clear and distinct phases to the attack.

1. Push forward to the Second Objective and then pause.

2. Push forward from the Second to the Third Objectives and then stop.

3. If ordered to do so, advance in three stages from the Third Objective to the Fourth Objective

The Mission forces for step 3. are clearly different from those carrying out the deliberate attacks. Step 3. is set up as a classic exploitation and pursuit, not a deliberate attack. It is predicated on a weak enemy defense that is easily 'driven in' by a small but combined arms (infantry, tank and cavalry) force.

The 8th Division Commander clearly recognised that Step 3. might not even be possible. If the Germans had collapsed on his front, then the exploitation was only going to proceed to the Red Line on day one, not to the whole of the first major objective, and definitely not to the coast.

In other words, the 'rush through' was not that far, and it was wholly contingent on the collapse of the German forces, not upon a deliberate attack from the Third to Fourth Objectives. If the latter was needed, then the response was clear. There would be no rush.

The difference of opinion between Gough and Davidson was not as significant as many have made out. It was definitely not about the difference between a short advance versus a rush all the way to the coast!

Robert

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There is one last point to make about Davidson's inclusion in the list. By separating the names into two lists, Travers suggests that Haig and Davidson were in different camps. Davidson reported to Haig. He was part of GHQ. Although Davidson's 26th June Memorandum starts with "I am of opinion..." and not with the usual "The Commander-in-Chief desires me to draw to your attention... [or similar]", I believe it is extremely unlikely that Davidson could have issued the Memorandum as some personal note without Haig's approval. In essence, Davidson and Haig were working as one.

Robert

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Travers has included Rawlinson in the list. This is extremely interesting because Rawlinson had no responsibility for the battle in the Ypres sector. He was responsible for the attack from Nieuport and for the coastal landing operation. In this sense, he was dependent on the outcome of Gough's efforts. But Rawlinson was clearly told that his operations were contingent. Rawlinson had to get clearance from Haig before the coastal operations got underway. So why did Travers include Rawlinson at all?

The answer becomes clear in the rest of Travers' discussion. Rawlinson made several comments in his diary, to Robertson, and to Haig about Gough's plan for day one. Rawlinson described what Travers' believed, so Travers included him in the list. Rawlinson had expected to lead Fourth Army up the slopes of the Passchendaele Ridge. He had been given the remit originally. However:

"May 7 - I [Rawlinson] attended the Army Commanders' Meeting at Doullens today, and, as I expected, I found that DH [Haig] had decided to make the switch to the north; but I was very much disappointed when I heard that Gough is to have the northern part of the attack, and that when I have been relieved down here I am to go into reserve. This is a blow, as I had been looking forward to that northern attack, though it is a difficult one. DH said nothing to me directly about it and, of course, I said nothing to him, though for a moment I was tempted to remind him that he had told me I was to have it" F. Maurice. 'The Life of General Lord Rawlinson of Trent', p 190. London.

This raises the possibility that Rawlinson's comments were tainted by jealousy. In any case, he should have been focusing on his own task, not pontificating on Gough's. Several writers have drawn attention to the lack of preparation when Rawlinson's forces took over the Nieuport area from the French. They note that Rawlinson should have ensured that there was adequate artillery coverage in place before the infantry changed places. In the event, the Germans launched their pre-emptive Operation Strandfest, which virtually eliminated the Nieuport salient and made it much harder for Rawlinson to fulfill his coastal attack mission.

Robert

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Here is one of Travers' mentions of Rawlinson:

"In regard to the first problem - the emphasis on the ridge - one incident is of telling interest. This occurred when Haig told Rawlinson in early July 1917 that the key to Gough's attack was the Stirling Castle - Becelaere ridge (essentially the Passchendaele Ridge), and that this must be taken first before any other advance took place, and Rawlinson agreed but said that more important was the question of limiting Gough's objectives in the offensive. In fact, the problem of the ridge was directly related to the other problem, the breakthrough, or a step by step advance. Not only was the ridge a very formidable defensive obstacle, but there were particular problems on the right of the ridge, where not all of the high ground was included in the offensive, thus producing a vulnerable right flank." Source: T. Travers. op. cit., p. 14.

Travers is incorrect when he suggests that Stirling Castle-Becelaere ridge is "essentially the Passchendaele Ridge". It was part of the Passchendaele Ridge. Stirling Castle-Becelaere runs west-east, whence the ridge turns NE towards Passchendaele. The tactical considerations of this east-west section have been considered earlier in this thread. From the previous discussions, it was not necessary for the British take all of the reverse slopes of the ridge. The Germans had not done this prior to Third Ypres. The key was taking the ridge lines and sufficient slope to obtain observation over all German gun positions and forming up areas. Travers is correct in identifying the high ground as crucial. In the early part of this thread, we established that Gough also appreciated this, giving II Corps more artillery and infantry resources.

Robert

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Let's assume that Rawlinson wasn't miffed, that he understood the detail of what Gough and his subordinate commanders were planning, and that, most important of all, Rawlinson was in a position to dictate what was happening. Here is the next series of points from Travers that include mention of Rawlinson:

"Rawlinson's diary entries at this time are very instructive, starting with 25 June 1917 when Rawlinson learned for the first time of the discussions at GHQ regarding an unlimited attack. On 29 June, Rawlinson had a long talk with Robertson and advised him to 'hold on to Goughie's coat tails and ordering him [Gough] only to undertake the limited objectives and not going beyond the range of his guns'." Source: T. Travers. op. cit., p. 14-15.

Was Rawlinson attempting to influence Haig via Haig's boss? I am unsure. I do not have access to Rawlinson's original diary entry so the full context is not clear.

" Then on 3 July 1917, Rawlinson talked with Haig and

'urged him to make Goughie undertake deliberate offensives without the wild 'hurroch' he is so fond of and leads to so much disappointment. The rule is that they must not go beyond the range of their guns or they will be driven back by counter-attacks. I am not sure that DH [Haig] will insist on this with sufficient strength and I fear that if he does not the attack may fail with very heavy losses'." Source: T. Travers. op. cit., p. 15.

There is no mention of this conversation in the extracts from Haig's diary quoted in Sheffield and Bournes' book. This only means that either Haig did not deem it important enough to record, or Sheffield and Bourne did not deem it worthy enough to include. It cannot be clearly established that this conversation induced Haig to change his approach to Gough's planning of Third Ypres.

"No doubt Rawlinson was remembering his own problems at the Somme, but his advice was ignored and on 21 July 1917 Gough declared that he was optimistic his Fifth Army would be able to get the (second) green line, and also, he hoped, the (third) red line, on the first day. (As it turned out, the red line was not obtained in the centre and south of the attack until 20 September 1917.)" Source: T. Travers. op. cit., p. 15.

There are errors of fact in the above. The Green Line was the third objective. As the map shows above, the Green Line was at the accepted limit of the step, by Davidson's standards even if not by Rawlinson's standards. Let's assume that the error is with the colour and not the count of the line. The second line was the Black Line. It was within acceptable reach, by Rawlinson's standards. Gough's 'optimism' related to securing one or other of these two lines. Even supposing that Rawlinson's had been given attention, it cannot be said that Gough 'ignored' the advice in declaring his optimism.

The second error of fact relates to the '(third) red line'. The Red Line was the fourth objective. Concern centred on the furthest limit of Gough's advance. This suggests that it is the colour of the line that was important, in which case Gough's confidence in reaching the first objective line was valid, and that his "hope" of reaching the Red Line was just that - hope in contrast to confidence. As we have seen from 8th Division's OpOrds, Gough's "hope" was translated into a contingent plan using a pursuit force of advance guards, not a deliberate attack force. Rawlinson may not have been party to these details. There was no reason why he should have been, because he was commander of Fourth Army not C-in-C or commander of Fifth Army.

"On 30 July, the eve of the offensive, Gough expressed great optimism that the attack would be a 'sitter' (that is, a sitting or easy target), but after the costly difficulties of the actual offensive of 31 July 1917, Rawlinson was able to report on 1 August 1917 that Haig had finally decreed limited objectives and 'no Huroosh! I am glad we have learned this at last.' Finally, on 5th August 1917, Rawlinson wrote that Gough was converted from his 'hurrush' style of attack to limited objectives, although on 9 August 1917, Rawlinson and his chief of staff, Montgomery, still felt it necessary to send a memo to GHQ outlining the utility of limited objective attacks, especially because of German defence in depth and counter-attack tactics." Source: T. Travers. op. cit., p. 15.

Travers' has been very cautious in describing the outcome of the first day. He has not called it a failure. The attack was not a failure. Huge gains were made along all parts of the line. Several corps reached, and in some places surpassed the Green Line, as Gough confidently predicted. II Corps did not, though the Black Line was reached on the left. The difficulties of day one were not particularly costly, indeed the losses were rather modest on the day. Rawlinson's comments hint at jealousy being the motive.

I do have some further information about the 9th August reference. Travers' says that "Rawlinson... felt it necessary to send a memo to GHQ..." This is not quite correct. In his diary, Rawlinson wrote:

"August 8. - A letter from GHQ arrived this morning, pointing out that the new German tactics were to organize defence in depth, and rely chiefly upon counter-attack. Should not, they ask, our major tactics be altered to meet them by limiting our objective and reducing the numbers of troops on the front of the assault? This is what I advocated before [emphasis in the original] the battle on the Somme, and I have always been in favour of it. I am replying in this sense, welcoming the limited objective." F. Maurice. op. cit., p 198.

Robert

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If an advance on the Dutch border after capturing the Belgium ports had become an actuality, then the whole German Right-flank would have been turned and your red-blob would have increased to a substantial arc of red across the top of your map.
salesie, I have found a reference as to what two generals thought at the time:

On October 1 1917, Rawlinson recorded a conversation he had with Henry Wilson. This conversation followed a meeting with Trenchard where Rawlinson "pressed upon him the desirability of continuing the coastal offensive, but he would not commit himself to any definite opinion on the subject.

At the Travellers', I had a long talk with Henry Wilson. He is opposed to the Flanders attack. I jotted down his points and my replies:

ii. The capture of Ostend and Zeebrugge will not win us the war, and their importance to the Navy has been greatly exaggerated.

iii. Clearing the Germans from the coast won't help in order to preserve the spirit of the French nation. The capture of Mézières would be more important than the capture of the coast.

My answer:

ii) Both the Government and the Admiralty have been continually impressing Haig with the importance of preventing the Germans from using Ostend and Zeebrugge as submarine bases. It will be of no use to win the war on land, if England is starved out by German submarines.

iii) To give the French time to recover, we must keep the Germans occupied. They must either fight on the coast or give it up. If we attack towards Mézières, the Germans will do what they did at the beginning of the year - go back to another Hindenburg Line. Then they will attack the French farther south." Source: F. Maurice. op. cit., p 198-99.

Rawlinson wanted the coastal landing to take place, but he recognised that it was about "keep[ing] the Germans occupied", not turning their right flank.

Robert

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Before moving on to Gough, here is a quote from Davidson. It was published after the war:

"The objects before the British in delivering the offensive in Flanders were briefly, from a strategical point of view, to pin the German Army to the British front in the North and draw in their Reserves; and from a tactical point of view:

a. To free Ypres by gaining the Passchendaele ridge which lies in a semi-circle round the eastern side and dominates the town and surrounding country.

b. To gain the Passchendaele ridge, thereby commanding with long-range gunfire the enemy's communications through Roulers and his submarine bases at Ostend and Zeebrugge.

c. To exploit to the full any tactical success gained (for this special preparations were made)." Source: http://www.firstworldwar.com/battles/ypres3davidson.htm (last accessed 3 Feb 2008)

Robert

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