Western Front tactics in 1917

[Beau Geste]

Thanks Paul

Harry

[salesie]

Harry, I'm not saying that just because it's difficult to prove such matters beyond reasonable doubt we shouldn't try, I'm saying it's impossible to achieve such levels of proof ninety-years on, which leaves us with a balance of probability and we should try our best to gather as much evidence as possible.

Also, I'm not saying the analysis of events is worthless as evidence, I'm saying that only hypothetical and thus highly circumstantial analyses are thus e.g. one of the points raised is the 1917 German withdrawal to the Hindenburg line, I say this example is worthless as evidence to show that Haig was still "attached" to pre-war rides, saying it because he was caught by surprise and the options of the pre-war rides were not available to him i.e. his forces were not positioned nor prepared and he was in no position to follow-up in any other way than he did - this may appear to be the pre-war ride option he chose but closer examination shows he had no options at all. I'm all in favour of the analysis of events, Harry, but not shallow and out of context ones.

But then a counter-argument cropped up saying, IF he had been forewarned of the event he would have done the same because he would have known it was a strategic withdrawal and therefore he would have chosen this particular option from the rides, and followed-up in the same way as he did without being forewarned. I don't know about you, Harry, but I tend to regard circular arguments such as this with a shake of the head and I can spot supposition a mile off i.e. if he had been forewarned is where this counter-argument diverts from reality; the fact is he wasn't forewarned - and therefore Haig would have done this is where it becomes pure supposition; only Haig can give us an answer to what he would have done IF he'd been forewarned, and even then he may have refused to answer such a hypothetical question.

So you see, Harry, I'm certainly not against the analysis of events per se, but I regard those of a hypothetical, full of supposition and out of context nature to be worthless as "evidence" even on a balance of probability level (have another look at some of the other analyses of events on this thread and see how many are out of context, hypothetical and lead to supposition presented as fact - you know, IF he'd done this or IF this had happened or wrong chronology or highly selective in context etc.... not too many, granted, but enough to bring on a shake of the head, and far too many for my liking).

As for dreamer or realist at any given point? I honestly don't know, Harry - you make a very valid point, but I'm not qualified to give a reasoned answer, and I would ask who is? It seems to me that many a highly qualified psychiatrist has tried to fathom the inner workings of the human mind over the years and they still haven't come up with a truly definitive answer. I'm sorry, mate, that particular minefield is way above my league.

Cheers-salesie.

[Crunchy]

Paul,

Thank you. I see and agree the point you are making.

Regards

Chris

[Paul Hederer]

Chris and Harry, you are both welcome.

I thought it interesting some of the similarities and conclusions that were reached on the German side to deal with the concentration of forces on the Western Front. Falkenhayn learned a lot from watching the Allied battles of 1915, and IMHO I think he was on the right track for 1916. Verdun, if executed properly could have produced the results he was hoping for. He made some critical errors, such as underestimating the French and the power of the Somme offensive when it came.

To return to the topic of 1917 tactics, I mentioned that 1918 really showed all the German had learned on the tactical level. This must have been evident earlier during the counter-attack at Cambrai (Nov-Dev 1917). I'm wondering, didn't this set off warning bells in the Allied camp?

Paul

[Beau Geste]

Harry, I'm not saying that just because it's difficult to prove such matters beyond reasonable doubt we shouldn't try, I'm saying it's impossible to achieve such levels of proof ninety-years on, which leaves us with a balance of probability and we should try our best to gather as much evidence as possible.

I agree totally.

I'm certainly not against the analysis of events per se, but I regard those of a hypothetical, full of supposition and out of context nature to be worthless as "evidence" even on a balance of probability level.

And I agree with you here.

As for dreamer or realist at any given point? I honestly don't know, Harry - you make a very valid point, but I'm not qualified to give a reasoned answer, and I would ask who is? It seems to me that many a highly qualified psychiatrist has tried to fathom the inner workings of the human mind over the years and they still haven't come up with a truly definitive answer. I'm sorry, mate, that particular minefield is way above my league.

It would be nice if we had a few qualified psychologists on the thread who could offer some useful insights of the type you describe. I doubt if that will happen but that shouldn't stop us looking at an event and trying to explain it in psychological terms. You say you would rather study events by looking at the writings of those involved or the works of recognised and reputable academics who have studied these events. Indeed most of the postings on The Forum is of this type and rightly so. Having said that it must be borne in mind that those who acted out the events of 1914 - 18 and the academics who, since then, have studied them in great detail possessed their own agendas. Very often these so called empirical academics had a gut feeling about an individual or an event and chose material that would support if not "prove" their point of view. This can be seen very clearly in the early works of people like Basil Liddell Hart and Major General JFC Fuller.

One of the things that is refreshing about Walter Reid's book on 'Haig is that he offers something new and doesn't appear to have "an axe to grind". As I've said before, on page 17 he suggests that Haig had some "quirks of character the most significant (of which) "was a capacity to be carried away by accesses (sic) of optimism which blinded him from time to time to reality". He points out that "this characteristic has not been understood or appreciated". He argues that "(Haig's) rigorous self control, his repression of all emotion, has disguised the fact (he) was, underneath everything , essentially a romantic, a cavalier who dreamed of victories wreathed in drama. Forgive me Salesie for regurgitating again this quote from Reid's book but it seems to me to be of fundamental importance. It might help us to understand some of the decisions taken by Haig after he had been elevated to the post of CinC.

I'm sure I'm not the only Forum member who is mystified by some of the decisions taken by Haig. For example, his desire to use the cavalry to exploit a breakthough during the Battle of the Somme and in later conflicts despite clear evidence that by 1916, this form of attack against German positions was now, pretty much, suicidal. The magnificent but futile and tragic attack on High Wood by The Deccan Horse is a case in point. The counter argument, of course, is that there was no credible alternative, and I appreciate that a cavalry division in The Great War was seen by some as the forerunner of an armoured division today, but I'm not convinced that this was sufficient justification for such a policy and that the "romantic and cavalier" element in Haig's character wasn't at least partly to blame for his desire to get the cavalry involved.

Similarly, a great deal has been said on this and other threads on the way Haig was repeatedly misled by unreliable intelligence but Reid argues that more often than not it was "his own optimism" rather than poor intelligence data that resulted in decisions such as the prolongation of both The Somme and Third Ypres with the most terrible of circumstances.

I could go on giving other examples but I think the point has been made. Like you Salesie, I believe that any analysis should take into account as many relevant factors as possible and I suggest that the point made by Reid on Haig's personality is highly significant in this respect.

Kind regards,

Harry

quote]

[salesie]

Harry, supposition based on a reasonable assessment of the known facts is fine (logical progression), but when it flies in the face of what someone actually said on several occasions I have to voice my unease.

Consider this - As a judge in a civil case (balance of probability proof level), you had to decide the intent with which someone set in action a course of events, would you consider the man's own words, in at least two diary entries and when addressing three conferences (one to the war cabinet) and when addressing an army commander in the midst of that course of events, as having much higher evidential value than a ninety-year old analysis of events by a third party; especially when the man whose intent you were having to pass judgement on could not give his own reasons as to why, when those events unfolded, they didn't appear to be exactly in line with what he said?

Events don't always turn out the way we intended, but that doesn't alter our original intent.

Put it another way - a man sets out to defraud an online bank but fails, and is then charged with conspiracy to defraud. Obviously, his intent would be crucial in deciding the case. His defence is that he planned this as an exercise in computer science and never intended to defraud, proven by the fact that no fraud took place. He calls an expert computer witness to say that from the audit trail on the accused's computer I would have to say that this does appear to be an exercise in computer science, seeing as no funds were secured by the accused. But in his summing up the judge says - I took into account the exercise in computer science scenario, but I found the more compelling evidence to be your diary entries stating that you couldn't understand why a colleague's assessment saying the bank could not be defrauded at this time was so opposite to your own assessment that it could be, as well as your assertions to other colleagues on at least three occasions that the bank was open to being taken for considerable sums and the time was now ripe to reap the benefits - intent to defraud is clear and beyond reasonable doubt, Guilty (not that Haig was Guilty in this context, just misguided).

As for character traits of realsit and dreamer, everyone has them in varying degrees - here's a little insight into how Haig and Charteris' relationship was viewed by one member of their staff:

General Sir James Marshall-Cornwall served on Haig's Intelligence staff as a GS02 (Major) in 1916 & 17, and apparently, according to his unpublished memoirs held at the Intelligence Corps museum, he did not care too much for Charteris and the influence he had on Haig i.e. "I soon discovered that the views held by Charteris, and reported by him to Sir Douglas Haig, regarding Germany's manpower reserves, morale and economic resources, differed widely from the estimates made by the Director of Military Intelligence at War Office, Major-General George Macdonough [sic], and submitted by him to the CIGS, Sir William Robertson. Macdonough [sic], assisted by Colonel Edgar Cox, the head of MI3, combined the best Intelligence brains at the disposal of the country. Charteris, however, with breezy optimism, disregarded the sounder and more cautious forecasts, which emanated from the War Office and were submitted to the War Cabinet. Consequently the GHQ Intelligence Summaries seemed designed to bolster up our own morale rather than to present a true picture of the enemy's strength and fighting qualities."

According to Marshall-Cornwall, Charteris' main objective was to maintain Haig's morale i.e. "He felt that his principal duty was to sustain the morale of his chief by painting the situation in the rosiest colours and ignoring unpleasant factors. This motive inevitably led to a combination of suppressio veri and suggestio falsi...but Charteris honestly thought that by suppressing all pessimistic evidence about enemy potential, morale and physical, he was strengthening his chiefs determination to win the war."

If true, and I've not yet seen any reason to doubt Marshall-Cornwall's judgement, and given that accurate and trustworty intelligence is vital when planning, would this "overly optimistic and false intelligence", given Haig's one continuous battle beliefs, not have "seduced" Haig into believing the end of the wearing down phase (phase 3) was much closer than it actually was? But, given Haig's confidence in his own judgement, was Haig in fact "seduced" by Charteris during 1916/17 up until Charteris' replacement in December 1917 (and Charteris' successor said his influence continued after he was replaced - source available if needed)? If true, whose "fault" would it have been; would the "blame" lie with Charteris for operating what on the face of it would appear to be a sucking up exercise - or with Haig for relying so much on Charteris' own calculations about the morale and resources of the German army and people when so much at odds with those of Macdonogh, plus the implications of Haig’s Catholic smear and the distinct possibility that Charteris was simply telling Haig what he wanted to hear? Or would both be equally culpable? (if any culpability at all when fighting a war of attrition?)

To put it bluntly, was this a case of a lion (Haig) taken for a ride by a donkey (Charteris)? Or a pair of donkeys braying in tune with each other? (not meant as a smear but a spur to stimulate further debate)

Cheers - salesie.

[Beau Geste]

Hello Salesie,

Thank you for yet another interesting and and carefully considered response.

I get the impression though that we might be talking about different things here. If we are, it's probably because of the lack of clarity in my last two posts. You appear to have interpreted my comments on the impact of Haig's personality as if I'm suggesting it's an either / or situation. That it was his "personality quirks" that made him behave the way he did and that statements made by himself on several occasions, or indeed comments emanating from those who came into contact with him are, in some way, of less or no significance.

This is NOT what I have been trying to convey. Like you I feel that there is much value in the traditional approach which you describe clearly and as a consequence of a great deal of painstaking research we have a very clear indication and understanding of what motivated Haig during his time as CinC. However, that doesn't necessarily mean we have the whole picture. Perhaps we never will have but when someone comes along with a new slant on things (NOT to replace the methodology that already exists but to support it) I for one can't see anything wrong with that.

Dr John Bourne, Director of the Centre of First World War Studies at Birmingham University described Walter Reid's book as "both fair and just". He went on to say that "the author has the historian's eye, which can see the significance of the apparently inconsequential". In other words, he sees Reid's book, "Douglas Haig, The Architect of Victory" not as a replacement of works that already exist and have done so much to help us understand those turbulent years, but as an addition that might help us comprehend, even better not only what he achieved but also the interactions that existed between himself, his subordinates and London.

Surely Salesie, any attempt to improve even further the excellent work carried out by so many respected WW1 scholars has got to be beneficial.

Kind regards,

Harry

[Robert Dunlop]

Harry, apologies but I have been travelling with work. Does Walter Reid cite any specific examples of Haig's over-optimism with respect to Third Ypres?

Robert

[salesie]

Harry, I don't see it as an either/or situation. I see psychological evaluation of these events as an impossible factor to quantify, simply because it would add a myriad of further complications that even numerous eminent psychiatrists/psychologists after years of study/experimentation have failed in their attempts to come up with any truly definitive answers - the workings of the human mind are, for the most part, still a mystery.

However, that said, I think it's pretty certain that character traits do effect the way we behave as well as effect what and how we say things - otherwise they wouldn't be character traits. But as I said earlier, Harry, this sort of thing is way above my league.

As for Reid's book, I've never read it but if it's contents are the "proof" of its title then I fundamentally disagree - Haig was not the Architect of Victory, Haig did not win the war.

My reasons for making this statement were given in another thread only a couple of days ago i.e.

"I too sit in the middle when it comes to Haig - but I've never been a member of the ee-aw brigade, even as a schoolboy in the 1950's/60's I reasoned that we won so they couldn't be complete donkeys.

However, I'm on record in this forum as being just as uneasy with the devout "revisionists" (sorry about the tag, but it's stuck and won't be changed now) as I am with the ee-aw brigade. In my opinion, the extreme wings of both these "religions" paint false images. The ee-aws see Haig as the devil himself but the "revisionist faithful" see him as "God", the man who won the war.

I think we all know, by heart, the detailed ee-aw arguments, so I'll briefly expand on my unease with the "devout revisionist" position:

1) Military operations on the Western Front, though vitally important, were not by themselves war-winning. Consequently, Haig was not the sole architect of victory - but one of the team.

2) Virtually ignoring the extremely important naval contribution paints a false image of how the war was won - because here lies another architect in the team. Just a quick thought as to what would have happened without the naval campaign soon shows how the BEF would have had a very different war.

3) Completely ignoring the propaganda/subversion campaign conducted by British Military Intelligence (its like never seen before or since) misses yet another in the team. Bit harder to criticise for missing this one, though - seeing as most intelligence work is secret by definition - but the evidence is there if inclined to look.

4) By regarding the politicians simply as incompetents who interfered with "God's" work misses the importance of the chief architect, especially in a democracy; they're the ones who kept the whole thing running, not just the Western Front - and despite my dislike of saying so, they're the ones, despite their apparent flaws (just as Haig had flaws), who made it possible for Britain to wage total-war and to eventually win the bloody thing."

I accept that "Devil" and "God" are a little over the top when applied to the many authors on either side of the Haig debate, but just about right when viewing some of the posts in this forum, and I may have done Reid an injustice by never having read his book, Harry, but it is my strong contention that Haig was not the Architect of Victory - how could he be in total-war?

Cheers-salesie.

[Paul Hederer]

Ah, this is an HAIG DEBATE. I see it now. Sorry to have interrupted with any mention of western front tactics 1917 I feel a bit like I've stumbled into a group at a party only to discover everyone is discussing their vasectomies!

Paul

[salesie]

Ah, this is an HAIG DEBATE. I see it now. Sorry to have interrupted with any mention of western front tactics 1917 I feel a bit like I've stumbled into a group at a party only to discover everyone is discussing their vasectomies!

Paul

Better that, Paul, than contemplating their navels. And, I'd like to point out that for most of 1917 the only aggressive army on the western front was the BEF, so discussing western front tactics in 1917 without Haig would be akin to debating the October revolution without Lenin. Do you not feel that Haig had at least some small impact on tactics in 1917?

Cheers-salesie.

[Beau Geste]

Harry, I don't

... clip ... Harry you do not need to quote complete posts especially long ones ... delete the quote before you post your own messages. Thank you. ...clip...

Cheers-salesie.

Hello Salesie,

When I started to read this posting, my first and admittedly premature reaction was "just semantics". I should have known better. Your offerings always possess a great deal of depth and they always make the reader think. This one was no exception and there is very little in it that I can disagree with.

Of course, what you say in your opening paragraph is perfectly true. Psychological analysis in depth is always difficult, some would say impossible, to achieve. However, just because "the secrets of the human mind" are difficult to unlock", doesn't mean that one should give up trying. As you said yourself, "character traits do affect the way we behave..................... as well as how we say things" and for this reason alone, Reid deserves credit for what he is trying to achieve.

I also have to agree with your four point summary (incidentally I would appreciate the title of the thread you refer to) that scotches the idea that Haig was the 'architect of victory' because my interpretation of the nature of total war, and how victory in that sort of conflict can be achieved, matches your own. Of course, Haig was only one member of the team but I think I'm on safe ground when I say that he was perhaps one of, if not 'the', major player. Anyway, Reid's book is on Haig not the victory of 1914-18 per se so to discount his theory just because you disagree with the title of the book is a little unfair.

I'm off to Bournemouth in the morning to a regimental reunion and hopefully I'll get the time time over the next week to really get into it rather than the sort of "scanning" I've been doing these past few days.

Kind regards,

Harry

[Beau Geste]

Ah, this is an HAIG DEBATE. I see it now. Sorry to have interrupted with any mention of western front tactics 1917 I feel a bit like I've stumbled into a group at a party only to discover everyone is discussing their vasectomies!

Paul

Hello Paul,

Your posting made me smile and that doesn't happen too many times on The Forum. Salesie beat me to the draw with his response but I have to admit that I was sufficiently anxious about the change of direction that my post (#536) caused and Robert Dunlop's sudden silence, that I PMd him.

He was able to reassure me on this point.

Kind regards,

Harry

[salesie]

Harry, try not to get too drunk in Bournemouth (as if) - here's the thread you asked for:

Cheers-salesie.

[Beau Geste]

Thank you my friend.

I will do my honest best but I have to admit, I'm not too optimistic.

Harry

[Paul Hederer]

Hello Paul,

Your posting made me smile and that doesn't happen too many times on The Forum. Salesie beat me to the draw with his response but I have to admit that I was sufficiently anxious about the change of direction that my post (#536) caused and Robert Dunlop's sudden silence, that I PMd him.

He was able to reassure me on this point.

Kind regards,

Harry

To you all,

I'm glad my post was taken in the spirit it was meant. Sometimes humour can fall flat in the electronic and dead-pan venue of the internet.

An awful lot of good and informative points have been brought up here. The point I wanted to raise indirectly with my short posts is that perhaps there simply was no solution to the stalemate that was the Western Front. We can talk about more effective barrages, improved intergration of aircraft, infantry tactics, and the like, but none of them were able to effectively break the lines and maintain an advance to get the war moving again. I think it took all of these tactical innovations, with a few decades to absorb and produce doctrine, to change the way of war.

I've heard the saying, "General Motors won the war," in reference to the Second War. This is not meant to offend or detract from the efforts of any of the Allies--it simply means that the productive capacity of the Allies for mechanised warfare was the deciding factor. This did not exsist 20 years earlier.

On the German side Falkenhayn came to this realisation (stalemate situation) perhaps earlier than any other commander, but in the end was damned for his vision. Niville broke an army with his attempt, as did Ludendorff a year later.

Looking back, and trying to keep an open mind, I just don't see any alternative to the attritional battles waged primarily by the Allied forces.

Paul

[salesie]

I pretty much agree with your points, Paul - just two comments.

1) In September 1914, on the Aisne, Haig confirmed his belief that manpower would decide the war - therefore he recognised it would be a war of attrition very early in the war.

2) As for WW2, don't forget the very high attrition rates of the Eastern front (worse than WW1 in many instances) which "wore down" the German army - manpower again reared its very ugly head.

Cheers-salesie.

[Robert Dunlop]

salesie, in post #387 p. 16 you said: "I think it's pretty clear that a near collapse of the German army was a prime motivator in Haig's mind when he set 3rd Ypres on its way on 31st July 1917"

You noted that the prime motivator lasted from May 1917 to early October 1917.

You cited the following evidence "for" this:

1. Haig's statement to War Cabinet in June 1917, quoted in post #387

2. Haig's reference on October 2nd to the mistake that the German army made in not following through on their attacks in the Battle of First Ypres, quoted in #387

3. Haig's statement on October 15th about his perceived inaccuracy in General Macdonogh's report, quoted in post #381 along with Macdonogh's report of 13th October 1917.

4. The statement to the War Cabinet is linked to Charteris' over-optimistic estimates of impending German collapse. See quote in post #387 for example.

I provided the following evidence "against" this:

1. The planning for Third Ypres began in early 1916. When Haig launched the campaign in 1917, there was no fundamental difference between early 1916 and July 1917 in the strategic intent of the campaign or the step-wise implementation. The primary strategic intent was to occupy the Belgian Coast and destroy the U-boat threat.

2. When Third Ypres was started on July 31st, it bore no comparison to the war-winning attempt by General Nivelle. Third Ypres was fought over a narrow front (by comparison), with only partial involvement of British Army, and no attempt to breakthrough (Gough's plans for day one did not include a breakthrough of the deepest defensive line on Passchendaele Ridge). There was a contigency to exploit a collapse of the German Army in Flanders, but this did not include detailed planning for a break-out. The planning and execution of Third Ypres was not consistent with either Haigs pre- or post-war definition of what was entailed to convert a wearing down phase into a pursuit/destruction phase.

3. Haig's record of his June 1917 meeting with his Army Commanders (see post # 427), in which he stated that it might not even be possible to attain the first of his intermediate objectives in 1917, the capture of Passchendaele Ridge, let alone the defeat of the whole German army.

In response my posts, you noted "I prefer to place greater emphasis on the actual words of Haig, especially those in his diary written at the time" (post #538 p22). Given this preference, I now want to examine Haig's quote about Macdonogh in detail. Sheffield and Bourne present the information somewhat differently from your source:

"Charteris reports that on 12 October 2 pioneer companies of the 233rd Division 'refused to attack'. This is another direct instance of insubordination in German Army and consequent loss of fighting spirit. Yet it is stated in a note by the DMI War Office dated 1 October (WP 49) 'The moral of the troops in the field gives no cause for anxiety to the German High Command'. I cannot think why the War Office Intelligence Department gives such a wrong picture of the situation except that..." Source: Sheffield and Bourne. op. cit. p336. The remainder of the quote is as your source provided.

It should be noted that Haig was referring to a very specific sentence within a very specific report. Leaving aside the mention of Macdonogh's Roman Catholic background for a moment, Haig was concerned about Macdonogh's conclusion with respect to the moral of the German troops was not causing concern to the German High Command. By inference, Haig felt that it was causing concern. Haig is citing a 'wrong picture' of a very specific 'situation', namely the German High Command's supposed lack of concern.

At this very time, major concerns were being noted by the German Army Group Commander (who was from Bavaria) responsible for the defence of Passchendaele Ridge:

'Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria: Diary Entries

11 October 1917

"Our forces along the main battle front in Flanders are still thoroughly mixed up and confusion reigns in the various formations. It is really worrying that the fighting ability of our troops is reducing all the time and that all the means we have employed to attempt to counter the oppressive superiority of the enemy artillery have failed to have any effect. Because we are involved in a battle for time, there remains nothing for it, but repeatedly to give ground in order to force our opponents to waste time as they move artillery forward"' Source: Sheldon. op. cit. pp228-9.

Haig's October 15 quote about Macdonogh must also be taken in the context of Haig's view on Macdonogh noted by Charteris in September 1914:

"[Haig] says that Macdonogh, the head Intelligence man at GHQ is very good" Source: Charteris. op. cit. p28.

Robert

[salesie]

I'm sorry, Robert, but you're playing semantics, and once again you ignore the end-result completely:

The end-result is that Macdonogh's assessments were correct, and Charteris/Haig's assessments were not - on this point, you have either forgotten or chosen to ignore my post #531 which shows why Charteris got his assessments of manpower/morale consistently wrong i.e. his manpower assessments were based on paybooks alone (too small a sample) which made GHQ's assessments of German strength some 500,000 men less than Macdonogh's. And morale assessments were based on reports from prisoners, captured letters etc. from the active front alone, when even BEF morale assessments of their own armies in 1917 stated that men on active fronts had lower morale than those in quieter areas but this morale would alter, either up or down, when the active status of units changed (not surprising really). Therefore, when the reserves that Charteris believed to have been "attrionalised" were thrown into the fray their morale would initially be much higher than the troops they were sent to replace or reinforce.

Macdonogh recognised all this and his reports had been formed from a much broader base for years - it's a pity Haig didn't remember how good he thought Macdonogh was back in 1914, but back then Macdonogh's reports agreed with Haig's own view, in 1917 they didn't. Or was this sea-change in opinion of Macdonogh's abilities because Haig didn't know in 1914 that Macdonogh was Catholic? Or if he did know, had he discovered in the intervening three years that Catholics were tainted?

Now for the semantics, Robert:

Haig, by including the first two sentences is linking the third sentence, cause for concern etc., to Charteris' reports (the first two sentences) and saying Macdonogh is wrong compared to his own man (no change there - we already knew that). As for Crown Prince Ruprecht's thoughts (which Haig wouldn't know anyway), he was the army commander on the active front and not part of the High Command who would see the bigger picture of manpower reserves and morale (Macdonogh had a much broader intelligence base, including spy-rings etc. so was much better placed than GHQ to assess the thoughts of the German High Command). Ruprecht's thoughts are just window dressing, Robert, in this context a red herring.

However, the greatest disappointment I have with your thinking on this, Robert, is with you not linking Charteris and Ruprecht's thoughts and thus seeing the proof of GHQ's error - both were assessing the active front alone, Ruprecht as the army commander, as would be expected, assessed his own troops when in the midst of this action, and as we have seen they would be expected to show lower morale, but Charteris as GHQ intelligence chief should not have been focused on such a narrow perspective.

But Charteris and Haig's error is compounded by the fact that the Director of Military Intelligence himself (not some minion, and a man Haig had praised before) was actually showing them the error of their ways and had been writing contrary reports to Charteris' for some time. But what does Haig say in his diary: He can't understand why Macdonogh's reports should be so wrong except that he is a Catholic and therefore his sources must be tainted - he doesn't give any supposed errors in Macdonogh's assessment as his reason he thinks them to be so wrong, he doesn't even ponder that Macdonogh might be right and Charteris wrong, he simply blames Macdonogh's Catholicism for saying that he is so wrong in believing that German manpower/morale collapse is not close at hand.

Here's a note that Haig wrote in reply to WP49 (the note of Macdonogh's he thought to be so wrong). Note the lack of any mention of tainted Catholicism in this more open summary (if he'd been candid Haig must have known the storm this smear would cause back in London), and also note the implicit confirmation that GHQ relied on intelligence gathered from active fronts:

"The statements referred to [in W.P. 49] appear to me to represent the situation in a far more unfavourable light than is justified by evidence contained in various captured orders, letters and other documents, by prisoners' statements, and by the experience of our officers and men in recent fighting." Source: Ibid., papers relating to 16 October 1917.

So, if he thought Macdonogh so wrong, by definition Haig must have believed GHQ's assessment that a collapse in German manpower to be very close indeed.

Cheers-salesie.

PS: in your opening summary, you missed my reliance on Haig's own words on three other occasions.

[Beau Geste]

Harry, apologies but I have been travelling with work. Does Walter Reid cite any specific examples of Haig's over-optimism with respect to Third Ypres?

Robert

Hello Robert,

Nice to have you back. So far I have only scanned parts of the book. I'm off today to Bournemouth to a regimental reunion and then on into Cornwall to visit my son and his family. I'll be away a week and during that time I hope to be able to spend some time studying what he says about Third Ypres.

Kind regards,

Harry

[Robert Dunlop]

Harry, I hope the reunion goes really well. Look forward to catching up when you get back.

Robert

[Paul Hederer]

I pretty much agree with your points, Paul - just two comments.

1) In September 1914, on the Aisne, Haig confirmed his belief that manpower would decide the war - therefore he recognised it would be a war of attrition very early in the war.

2) As for WW2, don't forget the very high attrition rates of the Eastern front (worse than WW1 in many instances) which "wore down" the German army - manpower again reared its very ugly head.

Cheers-salesie.

Salesie,

On point one I don't find it hard to beleive that Haig came to this conclusion. Before the war Moltke the younger concluded that if Germany could not win the war quickly it would be come to attrition and Germany would most likely lose, so Haig gains no big points there.

But were the Somme and Ypres launched as attritional battles, or were they attempted breakthroughs that degenerated into such?

Paul

[Robert Dunlop]

Paul, when you suggest 'breakthroughs' as one of the options, do you mean breakthroughs with the intent of winning the war immediately after the breakthrough occurred?

Robert

[Paul Hederer]

Paul, when you suggest 'breakthroughs' as one of the options, do you mean breakthroughs with the intent of winning the war immediately after the breakthrough occurred?

Robert

Hello Robert,

That's a good question. No, I don't mean breakthrough in the sense of a final war-winning rupture.

Paul

[salesie]

Salesie,

On point one I don't find it hard to beleive that Haig came to this conclusion. Before the war Moltke the younger concluded that if Germany could not win the war quickly it would be come to attrition and Germany would most likely lose, so Haig gains no big points there.

But were the Somme and Ypres launched as attritional battles, or were they attempted breakthroughs that degenerated into such?

Paul

I was no more trying to score points, Paul, than you were when mentioning Ludendorff's thinking in 1915. Shall we call it a 1-1 draw - or go for a replay?

As for the Somme and 3rd Ypres being launched as breakthrough or attritional battles? In my opinion the answer is both i.e.

Surely, no commander plans to lose or draw any battle (especially one long continuous battle i.e. the war itself) so breakthrough must be the ultimate aim, otherwise why bother? And seeing as that in total-war no war-winning purely military victory in the field is possible without a collapse in manpower/morale of one side or the other - then, in my opinion, Haig's basic thinking was probably, if attrition depletes the manpower of the enemy enough then breakthrough will occur (end of phase 3, on to phase 4), and if no breakthrough the attrition inflicted will bring the eventual defeat of the enemy one step nearer (continuation of phase 3).

It seems to me in total-war, which I believe Haig understood to a large degree in a military context (though I believe he failed to fully understand the vital military/socio-economic interactions), that breakthrough and attrition are inexorably linked - like Siamese twins, joined at the head and equally sharing one brain, you can't have one without the other, they're inseparable.

Cheers-salesie.