TURKISH MACHINE GUNS AT GALLIPOLI

[gilly100]

Talbot Smith, a Duntroon graduate was MID for 25 April and clearly understood the workings of a maxim. Mortally wounded operating one of his units mgs later in the day.

His MID below is attached.

Pretty much says it all

Ian

[Guest]

Nice find gilly. It's mentioned here in the Australian War Memorial

Mike

[Guest]

Major Benjamin Bennett Leane was convinced he was under MG fire. On page 120 (67 of 314) of his excellent journal available online from the Australian War Memorial.

Click

Mike

[gilly100]

Hi Mike

Ironically I downloaded B Leane stuff today, but my poor eyesight did not allow me to quote him. Glad you put it up. Today I noted Derham and Hooper from 5bn decorated or MID for their roles on day one, all mg related, same as Connell, Weatherill, Mason, the list goes on. It is only a matter of time before it all comes out. I am so pleased this debate has forced us to dig so deep and learn even more. Everyone wins in that case and the participants are known properly.

Ian

[gilly100]

More on 10Bn Landing account. The dots indicate Beans shorthand, Bean diaries and notebooks.

Col Weir said "there's no sound". The only they heard was the splash of the oars after we had cast off........ We ...50... when Capt Lorenzo heard a yell. Then one shot rang out from Ari Burnu Knoll- we saw the flash. We could just see the outline of the hill. Then .... started. One mg was ... in front, one on the left, and one a good bit away on the right on slopes of hill.

Well, I am all 10 battalioned out now. Of interest in all of this is who actually captured the Krupps mtn guns on 400 Plateau, men of 9bn, 10bn or both?

Ian

[stevenbecker]

Mate,

Intersting; the 10Bn History gives us this from Weir dated 15 May 1915;

"WE were 50 yards from the beach when the Turks fired the first shot. we shot out into the water about four feet deep."

The unit history makes no coment about MG s or captureing any Mountain guns?

But that history is very short on for details.

The 9Bn History makes a number of coments about being under MG fire, on the way in and during the landing and fighting around Ari Bunu,

But no mention any where of capturing any Mountain guns?

Likewise the 11Bn History makes no mention of capturing these Mountain Guns.

Cheers

S.B

[gilly100]

The big one for me Steve is JC Weatherill, Scout corporal with Talbot Smith. Bean did not catch up with him til late in the Gallipoli campaign, making his notes, which he looks like he forgot about for the OH, although he does mention more than one mg around Ari Burnu, Plugges, Maclagans, which fits 10bn accounts. Talbot Smith was hit first day and died a few days later so no chance there to speak. T Smith is MID, Weatherill DCM and MID.

I remain firmly convinced our blokes encountered early morning mgs and that the Turk records are lacking, for what reason I do not know.

No mgs, no Hotchkiss 10 pounders that were clearly encountered. It is simply too much of a stretch to say they all got it wrong, for whatever reason one chooses to give and therefore begs questions of Turkish records.

Bring in FH area and Baby 700, then add Helles to round it out, and Murrays article stands as the first solid challenge to the 'new' version of events that morning, the latter of which appears to be on shaky ground. My humble opinion for what it is worth. Just too important to lay down and let it go.

Cheers

Ian

[stevenbecker]

Mate,

Your right all accounts mention the only capture of MGs was in the Ari Bunu Area (plugges and such) all other reports give no others captured only they saw or heard them.

Althought the 11Bn does mention two of its officers capturing a MG near Fishermans (in there history)?

I checked a few other BN's but can't find who captured these Mountain Guns around Lone Pine?

Looks like it wasn't the 3rd Bde, Have to try units of the 1st Bde?

Cheers

S.B

[gilly100]

Steve

From all I have read up to now, it appears the mgs at Ari Burnu knoll and Plugges, MacLagans were taken by 9 and 10bn respectively. The capture (and later loss of ) of the 3 Krupps Mtn guns are recorded as 9 or 10bn men, or elements of both, where also an mg with SAA was strapped to dead mules and driver nearby. The FH mg would likely have been withdrawn back up to the heights, going on 7bn and 11bn accounts.

The Hotchkiss 10pdr Mtn guns abandoned in their emplacements on northern Pine Ridge are recorded by 5bn men, but exactly who got there first am not entirely sure. But its recorded that the position was abandoned later that night as the Turks came forward. A Turk mg was dropped and left in the retirement due to helping wounded get back.

Now the Hotchkiss guns do not come up in the Turk OOB for one and we all know the mg argument, back in Maidos til later, all 4 guns, til placed on Hill 165. But given everything that has been dug up, especially of late, questions must be asked. There is little doubt in my mind the Turk records are not completely accurate, given what has been made available thus far. What sits in Turk naval records? What sits in Fortress Command records? What has been left out? We still have the right to question what I feel is an important issue. Historical accuracy.

Cheers

Ian

[stevenbecker]

MAte,

I notice this account by a Berkshire Yeomanry soldiers daling with another hot subject on Gallipoli;

"As one trooper commented amid the din and digging "There is a few digging records being broken," which remark as I remembered it long afterwards just about summed up how high was the morale of the men in such a position. Naturally we were all lying and firing from the prone position and suddenly bullets were striking the ground in front of us and obviously being fired from behind us. It was discovered that they were coining from a large clump of scrub not far behind us. Concentration on that scrub was quick and even more quick was the appearance of a very scantily clad Turkish girl. Our first prisoner; and we found that she was painted a kind of green to match the colour of the surrounding scrub. She had been busy as we knew by the number of identity-discs and watches she had put on her arms and legs. Shem must have been a crack shot and there were other women captured later who had also been well trained."

Now how can we discount this first hand account of such a case, while the use of female soldiers has been discussed in long detail can we always believe first hand accounts?:

I don't know but I adds another dimention to the MG debate and the first hand accounts?

S.B

[gilly100]

Steve

Perhaps we can have someone re write Beans vol1 making note that all these men were lying, completely mistaken or just too inexperienced to tell anything. And a few ill gotten awards as well. It can only be that the Turks were completely honest and complete in their historical accounts and how dare we challenge. May as well throw Beans notebooks, diaries and folders in the bin too. I'm almost ashamed to be Australian at the moment. As for von Sanders, Ozgen and the Turk Colonel, well, perhaps you can sort them out . Should have been on our side, what with their propensity to tell porkies.

Cheers

Ian

[Bryn]

Sadly, Ian, that's what a lot of this thread has revolved around.

Personal opinion about what these soldiers did and didn't know, and could and couldn't recognise. To presume you know everything that these men had done, seen, and heard in their lives, and so be able to pronounce that 'they didn't know this' or 'they couldn't recognise that,' or 'they were too inexperienced to tell something else' is frankly nothing more than arrogance and is embarrassing to read. I notice a trend, as well, to ignore posts that include statements from people who it would be hard to discredit.

Speculate, certainly; offer the possibility that these may have been factors, but don't haughtily present your opinions as 'facts' and expect everyone to meekly toe your line while you try desperately to discredit the many witnesses just because what they said they saw, heard and did isn't convenient to your new theory.

[gilly100]

Mason DCM, Weatherill DCM, Connell DCM, Talbot Smith MID, Derham MC, Hooper MID (or something else, too lazy to check) and no doubt a few others if one looked a bit harder. Brave or foolhardy to discredit all these lads. Same at Helles no doubt.

Ian

[stevenbecker]

Mates,

Let me say again

Sorry but your wrong.

"Brave or foolhardy to discredit all these lads"

I don't discredit them or there accounts, only they are accounts not fact, and as such should be taken with a grain of salt.

While I do not discredit them, we should be aware that not all first hand accounts are 100% correct.

Now you both believe we should do so, but when two people are saying two different things then we need to look deeper.

Now some put there faith in missing Turkish records, but is that the smoking gun?

What if these records prove that there were no MGS at Anzac (as all Turkish personal accounts say?)

These personal first hand Turkish accounts you are saying are also a lie?

So who is lieing the Turks or aussies?

When you have first hand accounts from the Turkish officers and a soldier that morning from the 2Bn 27th Regt who defended against us why discount there view?

Purhaps no one is and there was a lot of mistakes that morning.

While I am prepare to say there may of been one or more MGs (or something like a MG) at anzac, that morning, not the many first hand accounts say, were all over the landing area.

So far aussie accounts mention between six to ten if not more, sadly none of which are mentioned in the Turkish personal accounts, you thnk they would?

I think many of these accounts are wrong or they mixed up the times, or arrival of the MG Companies of the 27th and 57th Regts middle morning. and relate to there fighting after 0900 when the MGS arrived. Particularly those accounts after Ari Bunu and the fishermans hut areas were captured.

Mate he captured three to four MGs, you got to ask your selve about that account?

S.B

[Crunchy]

I have deliberately stayed out of this debate over past year or more as it seems to go round in circles, however, given the accusation thrown at Steve I thought I would post the sub section on machine guns in Chapter 1 and Appendix 3 in the latest version of The landing at Anzac, 1915 which will be released next April. It is an expanded version of the first edition, as is the appendix below. Hopefully they will contribute to a reasonable consideration of the issue.

As Steve says no-one is purposely seeking to discredit any of the Australian accounts of the landing. Each account needs to be considered on its merits against other evidence, not simply taken on face value. As one prominent Australian historian has remarked “just because someone said something happened doesn’t mean it is true.” There are contradictory Australian accounts, and several have been shown to be false or anecdotal. They can’t all be correct so one needs to ascertain the validity of each against a range of evidence. To start with I was convinced the Turks had machine guns covering the Anzac landing but later realised that to base one's case on only the Australian accounts was taking a rather narrow, myopic, and naive view of the issue. Nor was quantity of accounts necessarily a measure of proof. Similarly the award of gallantry medals doesn’t confer accuracy on an account - it simply recognises a gallant action.

To use Mason’s account on the basis he saw machine gun parts at the Shepard’s Hut as evidence of machine guns firing on the Anzacs is to draw a very long bow indeed - the parts might have been there but they do not in any way prove machine guns were in action on the beach. Additionally, in the interests of a balanced view, if one wishes to use Mason’s gallantry award as proof of accuracy then one should also admit that, very sadly, Mason was later dishonourably discharged for stealing and lying, and that both LT Buttle and CAPT Tulloch, who were with Mason, told Bean his account was wrong.

Anyone who has fought in action knows all too well that post action accounts can be exaggerated, distorted, or genuinely mistaken for any number of reasons. One has to look at all sources, and evaluate them against a range of criteria and issues. The Turks had the machine guns, so one ought to give their views some consideration. The Turkish sources show the 27th Regiment only had four machine guns which the commander states he held in reserve near Maidos. This and his employment of them later in the day was in accordance with the prevailing doctrine and the defensive arrangements, and the Turkish army was 50 machine companies short of establishment, so where did the plethora of machine guns that allegedly fired on the landing come from?

The recently discovered photographic evidence I am referring to in the appendix include several photos taken early in the morning of which two are attached below. The others are in the new book. They were found after sifting through 8000 photos taken at Gallipoli and held in the Australian War Memorial's archives. They support Bean's comment in 1946 that ‘Neither then nor at any time later was that beach the inferno of bursting shells, barbed wire, and falling men that has sometimes been described or painted.’

The first photo below shows almost the full length of Anzac Cove and was taken around 5:30 - 5:40am. When blown up I can find what are possibly two bodies on the beach - one beside the fellow bending over in the shadow on the beach, which is probably Sapper Reynolds, the other is beside the fellow walking in the sunlight nearest the shadow. What I thought were two at the waterline in front of the second boat up from the shadow are either packs or rocks as they break up into separate items on magnification.

The second photo was taken around 6am, there is still shadow on the beach to the right, which attests to the early time it was taken. I will add a third photo in the next post which is the first in a sequence of photos which ends with the first one attached below. They are in the P10140 series on the AWM site starting at P10140.004 and finishing at P10140.008.

Anyway, enough from me, I offer the following and leave members of the forum to make up their own minds.

Sub section in Chapter 1:

Machine-guns

In 1914 machine-guns were by no means prolific in any army, with British and German infantry divisions each possessing a mere 24 guns. While the authorised number for an Ottoman infantry division was 12, shortages meant that many divisions possessed far fewer than their entitlement. At Gallipoli the 7th, 9th and 19th divisions (III Corps) were each short one company, while the 3rd and 11th divisions (XV Corps) had only four machine-guns each.

Although they were highly effective weapons when brought into action, in reality, all armies were still coming to terms with the machine-gun and, in the years leading up to the war, there was considerable debate on its employment. In 1914 machine-guns, being significantly heavier weapons, were employed quite differently to the way they are used today, and their employment resembled that of artillery batteries and sections, rather than as an integral element of the rifle platoon as they were to become later in the war when the lighter Lewis gun was introduced. Both the ANZAC and the Ottoman guns were mounted on a tripod, and with the water cooling system the Ottoman gun (MG09) with a heavier tripod weighed over 62 kilograms, although some Ottoman machine-guns had heavier wheeled mounts much like a miniature gun carriage. Together with its boxes of ammunition, the gun was carried in a wagon or by pack animal to provide tactical mobility. When dismounted and manhandled by the crew, these guns were considerably less mobile. Although the British Vickers gun (1912) was lighter and more reliable, the Australian and New Zealand battalions used Maxim guns chambered for the .303 round at Gallipoli. Fed with a 250-round belt, the Maxim was capable of firing 400 to 500 rounds per minute at the sustained rate; however they had an enormous appetite for ammunition and a propensity to overheat which led to jamming. Consequently, training emphasised traversing fire in short bursts of five to 10 rounds, while rapid fire against concentrated targets involved bursts of 30 to 50 rounds. British and German pre-war doctrine generally agreed on their employment on the battlefield in both attack and defence, and either frontally or on a flank. The difference lay in the preferred methods of control and deployment of the guns, and in this the Ottomans followed German doctrine.

The British regarded the machine-gun as a powerful auxiliary, well adapted for close cooperation with the infantry, and a weapon of opportunity delivering concentrated fire against favourable targets. They incorporated the machine-gun within the battalion in a section of two guns under the battalion commander’s control, where the gun was considered better able to support the infantry. However, the British also recognised the utility of massed guns, and allowed two or more sections to be grouped as a battery under the brigade machine-gun officer, where they were used as a powerful reserve for the brigade commander. At the ANZAC landing, for example, the 2nd Australian Brigade brigaded the guns of the 6th and 8th battalions, while those of the 5th and 7th remained under battalion control.

The Ottoman machine-gunners were a separate branch to the infantry. They grouped four guns in a company which was assigned to an infantry regiment (brigade) where they were used as a mobile reserve, or for general support directed by the regimental commander. They were not averse to splitting the company into two platoons (each of two guns) in close support of the battalions, but again this occurred under the control of the regimental commander. Due to the Maxim’s tendency to jam, deployment of single guns was actively discouraged, and in some cases forbidden. Thus while the British preference was to employ the guns at battalion level, the Germans and Ottomans preferred to employ the company as a battery at regimental level, where it was considered their tactical mobility and combined firepower could be better utilised and ammunition resupply was easier.

In both armies, when used in sections (or platoons), the guns were deployed in pairs and sited alongside each other with a spacing of 17 to 20 paces, although contemporary photos taken early in the war show the guns sited closer together. When employed as a battery they deployed much the same as an artillery battery in line abreast, with each pair assigned a specific target, supported by a range finder. In defence, while the guns could be placed in the firing line at the outset, the pre-war doctrine of both armies advocated holding them back as a fire reserve that could ‘respond quickly to a threatened point’ and ‘with decisive effect’. The German regulations cautioned that, while machine-guns were excellent defensive weapons, employing them in a static defence (pre-positioned in the firing line) deprived them of their mobility, whereas using them in active defence (identifying the threat and then deploying them to where the need was greatest) better utilised this scarce and valuable resource. Thus commanders were urged to use their machine-guns as a reserve and deploy them once the point of greatest threat had been identified. Regulations stressed that suitable positions should be reconnoitred beforehand to enable the guns to be brought into action quickly.

The Ottomans also employed pre-Maxim era Nordenfelt guns, sited primarily in their coastal defences given their lack of tactical mobility. The Nordenfelt was a multi-barrelled mechanical machine-gun rather than an automatic one. Mounted on a heavy base, it was produced in various calibres with from two to 12 barrels; those captured at Cape Helles on 25 April were 1-inch, four-barrelled guns. Fed by a vertical hopper magazine carrying a column of rounds for each barrel, they were fired much like a multi-barrelled rifle by pulling a handle back and forth to eject the spent cartridges and insert and fire the new. The rate of fire depended on the speed with which the handle was operated.

Appendix 3 — Turkish machine-guns at the landing

With the exception of Peter Hart’s Gallipoli and Ed Erickson’s Gallipoli: The Ottoman Campaign, both the English language books and popular opinion describe the Australians coming ashore under machine-gun fire. The Turks, however, assert that there were no machine-guns on the beaches, there being a single rifle platoon of 85 men at Anzac Cove, and a nine ma rifle squad from Ibrahim’s platoon on the southern end of North Beach. An examination of Australian participants’ accounts reveals contradictions. The war dairies of the 10th, 11th and 12th battalions record landing under heavy rifle and machine-gun fire, while that of the 9th records heavy rifle fire. The clearest example of these contradictions refers to the landing on North Beach, just north of Ari Burnu. Lance Corporal Bert Dixon (letter dated 4 May 1915 printed in The Albany Advertiser on 9 June 1915) and Bugler Fred Ashton (memoir printed in The West Australian on 26 April 1990), both of the 11th Battalion, mention landing under rifle fire, while Lieutenant Arthur Selby, a Duntroon graduate and also of the 11th Battalion, told Charles Bean that there was a ‘pretty hot fire’ on the plateau, but that he did not see any machine-guns and did not think there were any. (AWM 38 3DRL 8042 Part 7). On the other hand, Albert Facey, in his acclaimed memoir, A Fortunate Life, writes that ‘the Turks had machine-guns sweeping the strip of beach where we landed — there were many dead already when we got there. Bodies of men ahead of us were lying all along the beach ... the Turkish fire was terrible and mowing into us ... Men were falling all around me.’ Neither Dixon, Ashton, nor Selby, or other accounts of 11th Battalion and 1st Field Company men who landed on North Beach, mention such heavy casualties. Indeed they speak of light casualties. While Selby was with B Company of the 11th Battalion, Dixon, Ashton, and Facey were in D Company, and would have landed with the second wave in the same place, at around the same time — so why such a significant discrepancy? A search of their respective service records reveals the answer. Ashton was at the landing and was captured by the Turks that afternoon forward of Second Ridge. Dixon was also present and was wounded on 29 April. However, Facey, who enlisted in January 1915 with the Third Reinforcements, did not arrive at Gallipoli until 7 May, 12 days after the landing, thus his account is clearly fabricated as he was never at the landing. Two other members of the 11th who landed that morning also record machine-guns. Lieutenant Aubry Darnell wrote ‘we went clear over a machine gun’ - yet there is no official record of a machine-gun being captured either by the 11th Battalion, or any other unit that day. In a post war unpublished memoir, Corporal Thomas Louch recorded a gun on Ari Burnu ‘two turks in the machine gun nest … got their gun into action … then the picket boat came in and silenced them. The two men were knocked over backwards, taking their gun with them.’ Given it was pitch dark, Ari Burnu would have been well to Louch’s right, and unlike Plugge’s Plateau the knoll wasn’t silhouetted against the skyline in the emerging dawn, he must have had remarkable eyesight, or as a colleague said ‘x-ray vision.’

Sergeant John Swain from D Company of the 12th Battalion, who landed in same area, also mentions machine-guns. In a letter to his mother dated 1 May 1915 (printed in The Albany Advertiser on 5 June 1915) he wrote: ‘There were about 700 Turks on the beach, with machine guns, and as I was among the first to land, we got it, “hot as mustard” but you should have seen them when we got ashore, I never had such a time in my life. It was Ho! for the bayonet, and jab, jab, jab ... It didn’t take long to clear the trenches on the beach, and it was then a scramble up the cliffs.’ Swain’s company landed north of Ari Burnu, but sometime after the 11th Battalion had come ashore, as the tows had to return to the destroyers to pick up his company, which came ashore in the third wave some 20 minutes later. Not only was the number of Turks grossly exaggerated; the only Turks on that area of North Beach were a nine man rifle squad who had long since headed inland. By the time Swain’s company arrived, the first wave was already on Plugge’s Plateau and the Turkish defenders were decamping inland. Exaggeration of the forces and weapons opposing them is not uncommon among soldiers, in fact most accounts overstate the opposition they are facing. It would seem that Facey and Swain didn’t allow the truth to interfere with a good story.

The Fisherman’s Hut, where four boatloads of the 7th Battalion suffered heavy casualties — 80 of 140 men — provides the strongest case for the Australians facing machine-gun fire. Jackson wrote that ‘there appeared to be two machine guns’, and his use of the word ‘appeared’ indicates that this was speculation rather than a definite sighting. Ibrahim wrote of his amazement at the destruction his ‘90 riflemen’ inflicted on Jackson at the Fisherman’s Hut. However, two squads had been detached well to each flank, so we should discount them, leaving seven squads totalling 63 riflemen, plus those with platoon headquarters. Four boats each packed with 35 men made a very concentrated target during the three to four minutes required to cover the last 200 metres to shore. Using conservative figures, say 50 riflemen, firing 15 to 20 rounds a minute for three minutes would have delivered between 2250 and 3000 rounds. With a 10% hit rate, and using the lower figure, 250 rounds would have found a human target, or more than one round per man in the boats, although several of the men would have been hit two or more times. Had two machine-guns also been present, another 500 to 600 rounds a minute, or an additional 1500 to 1800 rounds over three minutes, in a much more concentrated and deadly cone of fire would have torn into the boats. Using the lower figure and a thirty per cent hit rate would have seen an extra 450 rounds rip into Jackson’s men, or a total of 700 rounds - a neat five rounds per man. Under this maelstrom few of Jackson’s men would have remained unhurt. According to Sefik, the 1st Platoon exhausted its ammunition in firing on the initial landing further south, and engaging Jackson’s boats. Recent information from Turkish sources reveal the platoon expended both its first and second line ammunition holdings, amounting to over 7000 rounds for those around the Fisherman’s Hut, which would explain the heavy fire, if not the level of Turkish marksmanship.

It has been suggested that with many Australian ‘first hand’ accounts mentioning landing under machine-gun fire they can’t all be wrong. Quantity of accounts, however, is not necessarily a measure of accuracy. Moreover, it is equally possible all the accounts mentioning Turkish machine-gun fire could be wrong, given they landed in darkness and the machine-guns on the steam pinnaces opened fire just after the initial shots rang out from the heights above. It is a well known tendency for troops under fire, and especially raw and inexperienced ones, to exaggerate the numbers of enemy and weapons opposing them, and claim fire from weapons that are later revealed not to be there. We need to consider where these men were when the steam pinnace machine-guns opened fire. Some accounts are from those in the initial two waves, who landed within ten minutes of each other, and others are from men who were still on the destroyers and transports offshore. The machine-guns on the naval pinnaces opened fire several minutes before the second wave reached the shore, and the pinnaces were between the shore and the men who were on the destroyers or transports. Thus those in the second wave and on the ships further offshore who record machine-gun fire would certainly have heard the Maxims on the steam pinnaces ahead of them, and these would have been indistinguishable from any the Turks are reputed to have. It is highly probable these men would have mistaken the guns firing from the pinnaces for Turkish machine-guns. What of those in the first wave? This author’s own experience under fire in combat, and that of other veterans he has spoken with, is that while different weapons may be distinguishable under light fire, they are indistinguishable as the fire ramps up - it is just an overwhelming cacophony of noise, and one has trouble determining where the fire is coming from, let alone picking out specific weapons from the incessant din. With the sound of the pinnace’s Maxim’s reverberating from the heights in front of and above them adding to the crescendo, it is not inconceivable that those in the first wave also mistook them for Turkish machine-guns. Thus while several genuinely believed they landed under Turkish machine-gun fire, it is not impossible they could have been mistaken, and hence all ‘first hand’ accounts of landing under Turkish machine-gun could well be wrong.

Furthermore, there is a contradiction in the Australian accounts. While several from the first wave mention machine-guns, other accounts either make no mention of them, or simply refer to rifle fire, while at least one openly disputes the later stories and newspaper accounts of landing against heavy opposition. Indeed, some veterans spoke of landing against light opposition. A good number of accounts mentioning landing under machine-gun fire are clearly anecdotal, written well after the event by men who were not in the initial wave, or even at the landing, and relying on hearsay. Rumours run rife amongst troops, and a comment or opinion by one soldier is often taken as fact by others, and repeated with a verve of authenticity. Accounts of the 2nd Brigade landing in Anzac Cove under machine-gun fire are problematic; the 3rd Brigade had captured the heights above the cove, and the 2nd Platoon had departed before the first units of the 2nd Brigade (7th Battalion) arrived at around 5:30am. ‘Pompey’ Elliot, who led them, makes no mention of machine-guns as they came ashore, only shrapnel.

Yet the accounts that mention hearing machine-gun fire, clearly influenced Bean when he wrote Volume I of the Official History. On the morning of 25 April Charles Bean, watching from a transport offshore, described the initial firing in his diary, writing that he could hear the ‘sound of continuous rifle fire’ (AWM 38 3DRL 606-4-1). In Volume I of the Official History he writes: ‘From the top of Ari Burnu a rifle flashed. A bullet whizzed overhead and plunged into the sea. A second or two of silence ... [sic] four or five shots as if from a sentry group. Another pause — then a scattered, irregular fire growing fast ... Each steamboat carried a machine gun in her bows, not to be used except by order of the senior officer of the troops in the tow. The picket boat, with Major Salisbury’s tow of the 9th Battalion, immediately backed out and began to fire, her small gun pointing up towards the flashes on the edge of the plateau above.’ (Volume I, pp. 252–53) Other primary sources agree that the machine-guns on the steamboats opened fire immediately after the initial Turkish rifle shots. Later (page 254), Bean introduces the first of several Turkish machine-guns: ‘a machine gun was barking from some fold in the dark slopes north of the knoll; another was on the knoll itself or on the edge of the plateau above and behind it’ while, a page later, he writes: ‘A fierce rifle fire swept over the men.’ On page 256 another gun is identified: ‘north of the point where the 11th landed, a machine gun in the foothills 500 yards to their left was shooting into the men ...’ while, on page 257: ‘From the left hand edge of the plateau above could be seen the flash of a machine gun.’ On page 270 Lieutenant Colonel Clark directs Lieutenant Rafferty to silence a machine-gun on the beach north of Ari Burnu, but in describing Rafferty’s advance to the Fisherman’s Hut there is no mention of finding it or being fired on by a machine-gun, nor did Rafferty mention encountering one. On page 271 Bean writes that, as Tulloch came ashore, ‘A machine gun on some height beyond Walker’s Ridge was playing on them.’ When Jackson’s boats approached the Fisherman’s Hut after dawn he wrote: ‘When about 200 yards from the shore the enemy, who were entrenched on a knoll behind the Fisherman’s Hut and a knoll about 500 yards south-east, opened fire on the boats with machine-guns and rifles’, conveniently ignoring Jackson’s account that there ‘appeared to be two machine-guns’ (7th Battalion War Diary April 1915). (my emphasis). In Bean’s account the Turkish machine-guns mount up to twice the number held in the 27th Regiment’s machine-gun company, and in two locations where the Turkish Official History maps show they had no troops.

It is noteworthy that Bean’s history and credible first-hand accounts speak only of ‘hearing’ machine-guns, ‘seeing flashes in the dark’ or, in the case of Jackson, speculation. Nor did any unit war dairy or official report mention capturing a machine-gun on 25 April, as would be expected given that they, like artillery pieces, were prized captures and were always recorded, even in 1918 when they were far more commonplace. Had one been on Ari Burnu, as Bean and Louch suggest, it would have been extremely unlikely that the Turks could have manhandled the 62-kilogram monster, together with the water cooling apparatus and ammunition boxes up the steep slope of Plugge’s Plateau ahead of the Australians who, according to Bean’s account, swiftly scaled the height, and captured one of Turkish riflemen from that section. Not only is the spur a steep climb, but it ends in a sheer three to four foot ‘cliff’ where it meets the plateau. Yet there is no mention of finding any machine-gun, or its ancillaries at Ari Burnu, only a claim by Bean that a pit for machine-guns was found on the knoll.

The only first hand account of a machine-gun being captured in the cove is an article written by ‘No 94’ published in The School Paper of the Queensland Education Department in April 1916 and reprinted in C.M. Wrench’s Campaigning with the Fighting 9^th. It is written in the same dramatic style as Swain’s letter and there are discrepancies in the article. Approaching the beach in the first wave, the author writes that suddenly ‘machine gun and shrapnel broke upon us’ and of ‘boat after boat’ being broken up. Yet the leading waves were not subjected to shrapnel as the single Turkish field gun at Gaba Tepe did not fire until after the 9th Battalion had landed. Given only the one gun at the promontory fired on the landing, it could hardly have broken up ‘boat after boat’. He also describes smashing the gun up, a remarkable feat given the sturdiness of a Maxim. Neither Bean nor the 9th Battalion’s war diary mentions this capture. The article has the distinct tone of the heroic written for public consumption and morale. While Oliver Hogue’s Trooper Bluegum At The Dardanelles describes the capture of a machine-gun and the killing of the German officer with it, this was based on hearsay from a witness who was not at the landing, and Hogue didn’t arrive at Gallipoli until mid-May. Nor were there any German officers with Faik’s company.

Not only do some Australian primary sources mention only rifle fire, the Ottoman sources dispute the siting of any machine-guns covering the beaches. In Bean’s account there are at least six separate guns firing on the Australians as they landed, plus another two at the Fisherman’s Hut, yet the 27th Regiment only had four, which Sefik says were not deployed with the 2/27th, but held in reserve near Maidos, and were only brought forward after 6.00 am. The 57th’s machine-gun company departed Boghali after 8.00 am. So, given the significant shortage of these weapons in the Ottoman Army, where did this plethora of machine-guns come from? Certainly not from the 27th or 57th regiments. This question has never been answered by those advocating the Turks had machine-guns covering the beaches.

Considering the issue tactically. While Bean’s history only mentions single Turkish machine-guns firing from different locations at the initial landing, in the doctrine the Ottomans operated under the machine gun company deployed the four gun company in line as a single fire unit, much the same as an artillery battery, or if circumstances demanded the company could be divided into two platoons with the two guns in each platoon deployed side by side, and contemporary photographs taken of Turkish machine guns in the field show this to be the case. Deploying the guns singly was actively discouraged. Thus Bean’s account does not reflect the tactical employment of machine guns by the Ottomans. Moreover, the doctrine advocated that the guns not be placed up front in a static defence, but be held in reserve under regimental control until the point of greatest threat was determined, and then be deployed to counter that threat, which is eminently sensible given the scarcity of the weapons, and their weight and hence relative lack of mobility once battle was joined. Sefik states he held his guns in reserve under regimental control with the rest of his battalions, which reflects Liman von Sander’s defensive plan, and the prevailing doctrine of the day. More pertinently, if the Turks were not expecting a landing at Anzac Cove or along North Beach, why would they deploy every gun Sefik had on the extreme left flank, rather than covering the more likely landing beaches either side of Gaba Tepe, where they believed any landing in the area would be made? Similarly, if the defensive posture was to hold the coast lightly with powerful reserves held centrally so as to respond quickly to the point of assault, why would Sefik deploy these valuable and scarce assets on the coast, and at the least likely point of assault? Nor is Plugge’s Plateau a suitable place to site a machine-gun. It offers no fields of fire except at long range out to sea or well along North Beach, and such fire would be plunging, the poorest use of machine-gun fire. No soldier worth his salt would deploy a machine-gun there, and the Ottomans were well-trained troops. The only known ‘machine-guns’ deployed on the beaches were the two mechanical Nordenfelts at Gaba Tepe, 3000 metres from Hell Spit which was at the extreme range of the weapon.

Nor does the photographic evidence showing Anzac Cove very early in the morning support the view the Australians landed under machine gun fire and suffered heavy casualties, as depicted in film and television. The eight photographs of Anzac Cove taken between an hour and three hours of the initial landing, including the recently discovered one covering almost the whole of the cove except for the extreme southern end, show the beach remarkably free of corpses - with only two probable but indistinct corpses evident. Only one photograph, taken around 8am, clearly shows a body lying near the water’s edge. If machine-guns had opened up on Anzac Cove, the photographic evidence shows they were ineffectual.

Considering a wide range of evidence, and other considerations, not just from the very narrow focus of some of the Australian ‘first hand’ accounts, it is highly likely that many of those who claim to have landed under machine-gun fire were genuinely mistaken, thinking the noise of the Maxims on the pinnaces were Turkish guns. Other accounts have been found to be false and exaggerated, and others are clearly anecdotal and based on hearsay. Furthermore, several of the Australian accounts support the Turkish claim there were only riflemen covering the beach. While most Australians would like to believe their forefathers couldn’t be wrong, or fabricate what occurred, and the landing was an heroic effort against heavy machine-gun fire, after hours of sifting and evaluating a range of evidence, both Australian and Ottoman, in this author’s view, the results suggest there were no Turkish machine guns covering the Anzac beaches on the 25th April 1915.

[Crunchy]

The third photo which would have to be one of the earliest taken of the landing on the beach at Anzac Cove.

[gilly100]

Nice photos Chris

No doubt debatable what time to be precise.

This from Beans notebooks

"We saw a few wounded, a very few... I think about half a dozen poor chaps were also lying there dead with overcoats or rugs thrown over them. ...Most of these were carried away around northern part of beach and away along Northern beach where they were laid out together, about 30 of them...of our own men, about a dozen were dead at the foot of Ari Burnu, six were taken off from there in boats. Most of the damage done was further north.."

At least we now know where the bodies were placed. We did not before.

No one seems to want to comment much on what von Sanders, Colonel Harun Rascheid Bey and A Ozgen had to say on availability of naval mgs and casualties at Anzac, but it is fine to write off all the allied naval and army accounts cart blanche. No discussion on the Hotchkiss weapons encountered at northern Pine Ridge in their pre landing prepared emplacements, which brings the Turk OOB into question, as it has been questioned before well back in the thread. No questions on POW intel indicating mgs from ships to 9 Div pre landing. Until ALL the Turk records have been viewed and processed, Murray's article rightfully questions the new yarn. History is fluid I have been reminded.

I do feel the men's accounts, and by default the men themselves, have been discredited. Mason gets slam dunked for messing up in UK and WF, but this should not automatically besmirch his Landing account.Tulloch's words get used, except for his account of mg fire going up Walkers on landing. Buttle is not fully clear on his recollections.

Two locations with spare mg parts, and yet Aker comments they had none for their 4 gun team on Hill 165 that first day. Why have precious parts forward deployed if your doctrine says otherwise, unless of course our blokes are mistaken yet again, or there were other guns. Certainly reason to start digging deeper.

Facey gets ruled out as a liar, yet going over every B103 service and casualty form for every man of 1st, 2nd and 3rd reos of 11Bn indicates some of these men landed, and perhaps a few that the records don't say. Having perused hundreds and hundreds of these files, one does come across some where dates are incorrect or movements are missed altogether. His book indicates a humble man of principle, so I am not yet ready to close the door on Facey. I am sure his family feel the same.

When the Turks give a more balanced account, other than what we have now, which is not everything, perhaps even their comrades, the Arabs, Syrians and Germans might be accorded more space. That is their job.

If I offended you Steve it was not my intention, so apologies there, but my thoughts remain the same. This debate is not over by a long shot, nor should it be.

cheers

Ian

[Bryn]

Sorry, I seem to have missed something. Exactly what was the 'accusation thrown at Steve'?

And as for 'Each account needs to be considered on its merits against other evidence...' Who is doing that?

[Rockturner]

Chris,

I believe your methodology is flawed. Accusing men of bending the truth is a negative way to go about proving your theory of no machine guns at the landing. I think any historian worth his salt can differentiate between a good yarn and the truth.

I am sure Bert Facey's family would be upset to know you had accused their relative of fabricating the story about being a First Lander in his book A Fortunate Life. In fact, I know they were upset when they found out. After veiwing a number of Facey's medical and pension files I am sorry to say I was unable to find any mention of him discussing the the subject of landing on 25 April. However, I went away from this exercise firmly believing that Facey, being a non - drinker and a non - smoker, to be of good character, honest, forthright and a good worker, as much as his war caused injuries permitted. So I have no problem stating that I believe he was telling the truth when he said he landed when he did.

As for his service records indicating he was Taken on Strength with the 11th Battalion on 7 May, I think you will find this was an administative issue. You see in the book The Fighting Tenth by Cecil Lock on p.109, it states that the 3rd Reinforcements joined the battalion in the line on 7 May. So I would suggest that the men's service records were held back at Cairo and this is the reason why many of the 3rd Reinforcement's service records from the 10th and 11th Battalions show 7 May as being their Taken on Strength date. This being. due to the fact that this was the day the clerks annotated the men's records.

Further to Facey's situation, it should be realised that there were 32 Scouts and their officer from each of the three battalions who landed in the First Wave. This group was made up of eight men from each of the four companies of the 9th, 10th and 11th Battalions. In the case of the 11th battalion, I think it would be fair to say that the 2nd and 3rd Reinforcements [24 in total] were brought on strength to make up for the shorfalls due to the Scouts landing. Ian Gill has already alluded to the fact that the taller men were selected to fill the gaps in the ranks and as Facey was over six foot tall it appears he was one of these who were chosen. Also Tulloch, a 3rd Reinforcement officer who at six foot two inches tall took Darnell's place in B Company due to Darnell leading the Scouts from the 11th Battalion.

As Ian said in post 1067 History is Fluid. Perhaps we need to remind ourselves of this fact now and again.

LonerangerVC

[stevenbecker]

Mates,

Thanks Chris for your detailed coment, I wish the others would be as detailed.

While I follow your line and can agree with most of it, I am not ready to give up as yet?

As to Gilly and Bryn I take no offence while I do feel slited when you failed to qualify your remarks and just state, von Sanders, Colonel Harun Rascheid Bey and A Ozgen.

When we have gone through these men and they do not suport your view that MGS were at Anzac, but in coastal defences like the forts along the narows.

While I don't know about all accounts you have to question many of these accounts by aussies that morning, while some can be discredited others can not, but are they wrong or just mistaken or are they spot on?

You seam to think the Turks have failed to account for all these MGS, when they don't write about them, like they under took some conspericy not to write about MGs at Anzac that morning?

Since most of there accounts were writen after the war there was some reason not to do that and to only mention Rifle fire and not MGs any where near them?

I don't see that?

Could these men/officers fight a major action and not write about all that was suporting them that morning, since they include very detailed accounts of there men and the weapons they have, why leave out the MGS?

When aussie reports stated so many MGS about the Anzac beaches why no coment by the Turks?

I am sorry but when you fail to say that some of these aussie accounts maybe wrong, and just say the Turks are wrong, then you discredit your selfs.

Cheers

S,B

[gilly100]

Steve

I believe most of the accounts are correct as they recorded them. Of course there are accounts that gild the lily, no doubt equally so on both sides.

Tulloch accounts are used when it suits and left out when it doesn't accord ones theory. I happen to disagree with that methodology.

If I can point you to p124 and 125 of our 10 LH history I sent you, you will see how I dealt with a trooper who was in the charge at the Nek. One Roland Peake. His account was most fanciful, which I told his family gently who supplied the letter and who kindly gave permission to use it. I think I know falsehood when I see it. The Peake letter is important to the book and I might say it was handled decently. I had offered Chris a copy of my book, as he kindly sent me his and what with his family connection, but he declined the offer.

A few of us have put up all manner of what we think is good legitimate stuff. It all gets written off. No one offers explanation on the Hotchkiss guns, despite compelling info, all of which was found was put up. No one explains the error in OOB. If you're in the know on this please explain so we all learn a bit more.

The POW intel says 9th Div got mgs by 22 April from ships and fortress command, backed by German and Turk officers. If that does not make those in your camp start questioning Turk records, perhaps nothing will.

Dunno what else to tell you. You can think I discredit myself, just a mere mozzy bite in the grand scheme of this debate.

Proud our records in Australia are so open and transparent. Wonder what chance I would have in Turkey of same.

I don't want to offend you or anyone else, but it still remains proven beyond doubt on no mgs at early landing. Am sure there are quite a few who feel same, but perhaps wisely choose to just read our argy bargy.

Cheers

Ian

[Crunchy]

Hi Steve,

Thank you for your comment, and I respect your view that you are not fully convinced there were no Turkish MG’s covering the Anzac beaches, but at least you are prepared to consider it and evaluate a broad range of evidence. I appreciate your quest to find credible evidence of Turkish MG’s. While I have come to the view there were none, I am willing to be corrected.

This will always be a controversial issue and people will have their own opinion on the matter one way or the other. In fact I owe Bryn and Ian a debt, as they forced me to seek out sources they quoted some time ago (where I could find them) and study them in an effort to resolve the matter.

I have, however, been humbled by the considerable support for my case from prominent and well respected, academic, and professional military historians (eleven Australian, four British, three New Zealand, and one US), together with others from this forum and the general public and former and currently serving members of the Australian Army. One fellow, whose grandfather landed with the 11th Battalion, stated "Granddad always told us they landed against light opposition." Additionally five people approached me through my publisher to say they believe Facey’s book is false in other respects than the two issues I found in his service record. One of the correspondents had first hand knowledge of the book’s origins and advised that much of it was concocted, and wasn’t actually written by Facey - apparently his submission was three small notebooks of almost unintelligible writing.

Mesut Uyar and Harvey Broadbent are both publishing books from Turkish primary sources and memoirs next year, and both state there were no MG's on the beach. In the discussions I have had with Mesut, who is fluent in the original arabic script, on the Turkish sources that do mention machine guns he says one has to know the dates when the primary documents were written, and understand two points: the Turkish machine gunners were in a different branch than the infantry (hence the LH Studies Centre source where a Turk stated he was recruited as a machine gunner but was enlisted as an infantryman, - 5th Company, 2/27th Regiment which was positioned in reserve 2km behind Gaba Tepe and not at Anzac Cove or North Beach); and that initially they did have MG's near the beaches but they were withdrawn with the redistribution of forces after Liman von Saunders took over - thus we are not being selective in using Turkish sources but considering them in the context they were written. What Ian doesn't recognise is that he is doing exactly what he is accusing me of doing.

There is no point in arguing with them - they are not prepared to seriously consider any wider evidence and issues. I don’t think many people care whether the guns were there or not anymore - the thread has taken on the quality of a broken record.

Regards

Chris

[Bryn]

Steve, it's been pointed out to me that perhaps you and others have assumed my post (1062) was aimed at you. It wasn't.

Unless I specifically use their name, as I have just here with you, nobody should assume I'm reacting just to their post/s. It was in fact, as it specifically said, directed to Ian, and the comments in it were general comments on the feeling I get from others that I'm just being 'difficult' and should 'fall into line.'

[Bryn]

The presence or otherwise of machine guns at the Landing long ago stopped being the primary issue for me.

It's become now an issue of whether we seriously consider primary sources, each on its own merits, or we just pick one or two that are easily debunked, and, drawing a very long bow, use them to 'prove' that everyone else was mistaken or lying because they disagree with another primary source. That's certainly the lazy way to do it, but I doubt that it's the best.

So at the risk of being a 'broken record' I'll repeat what I said: These accounts have not been disproven. Until they have been, they will remain, for me, a cause of doubt.

It's stated here and there that this 'battalion' or that did not mention mg fire at the landing, as if this proves there were none and now we can all stop thinking about it. While this sounds convincing to some, it has to be remembered that 'a battalion' does not make an entry in a War Diary: a single individual does. I have read hundreds of first-hand accounts by soldiers at the landing. Some don't mention even rifle fire. That is not in any way proof that there were no rifles present. So at the risk of stating the bleeding obvious, someone NOT mentioning MGs is also not proof that there were no MGs. One person says there were MGs; another person says nothing. Assumption - there were no MGs. That's not logical.

And Chris, your statement to Steve that [ian and I] ‘are not prepared to seriously consider any wider evidence and issues' is a personal opinion about someone you don't know. And it’s precisely that - the assumption that any of us knows exactly what these witnesses did and didn’t carry with them in the way of knowledge, past experiences and abilities - that has been one of the main flaws in the arguments against the allied accounts. ‘I know what he knew and didn’t know’ doesn’t cut it.

In fact I am quite prepared to, and do, consider all evidence and issues. I’m apparently just not as easily convinced as some others. While I shouldn't have to justify myself to you, for the sake of others reading the discussion I'll let you know that I spent a lot of time during the almost two months that I was in Gallipoli this year talking with Bill Sellars and Haluk Oral about Turkish sources, OOB, etc., and examining documents and ground. I have to agree that it's all very convincing. And yet, these allied accounts (except an easy one or two) remain un-discredited and, indeed, almost completely unexamined, and can't be just wished away. And on that basis I'm still not prepared to believe they can all be wrong. So your statement about me not being prepared to consider wider evidence is completely wrong and translates - to me - as 'not prepared to agree with you.'

[gilly100]

Chris

At the risk of prolonging the life of a broken record I would add the following. Please endure this first ramble.

Being a humble tradesman with an abiding interest in military history and not personally knowing any 'professional' academics and historians I can use this analogy.

When I ran out of sparky work in north west WA, I would come back to Perth and work with a time served, qualified carpenter who raised a team of roof carpenters for subcontract work in the Perth housing game. Extremely hard yakka, and one of his roofies was a non time served fella who just worked his way into the game. There was no difference in their work ethic or the quality of work. Outstanding roofing team all round.

Bit like some other, dare I say amatuer historians, whose knowledge on some aspects of military history could quite easily put the 'known' academics to shame who have good jobs in the military history field. Good luck to the latter. Most of them are quite good in my opinion.

As for being myopic and so on, I agree that most of what I put up is allied accounts, but I know Aker, have the Turk GS Histories and a few other non allied accounts. How I could get access to more, please advise. So far it appears to be Erickson, Travers and HB. No online stuff like AWM, without even going to translation.

While I respect your service, army career (who wouldn't? ) and history degree, dare I be so cheeky to refer you to my opening ramble. At the end of the day it boils down to research, and a few on the other camp have done volumes with the access available to us. I still think much of what you have written makes sense, apart from the myriad credible allied accounts, coupled with Murray Ewen's recent article, the latter of which you appear not to address or give thought to. Steve, to his credit, has, although I think once the naval effort to force the straits was lost, the Turks got busy on getting ready for amphibious landings, including the Gaba Tepe area . That's when we think the naval guns were utilised as Murrays article says.

As for Bert Facey, I will do some more digging on that. I think we have found numerous other accounts that perhaps you missed, and some of them appear credible to this bloke. What has been made available in Turk records and what has not, most don't know.

Glad you have corrected your Turk mg to MG09 on a tripod. Darnell was 11Bn scout officer as well.

No one is perfect. God knows, I made a few blues in my part of the 10LH history we wrote. I still churn over it when I am in the prescence of people like Jeff Pickerd, Steve Becker and a few other light horse 'experts'.

Happy to play the broken record until the record is straight.

Cheers

Ian