TURKISH MACHINE GUNS AT GALLIPOLI

[gilly100]

An extract from a letter written on 21 May 1915 by Aubrey Darnell, scout officer, 11Bn AIF in the 1st wave of the Landing. Darnell came from a military family in UK but for some time resided in Dublin (father a British Army Senior Chaplain), Ireland where he served around 8 years in the Royal Munster Fusiliers between 1903-11, prior to emigrating to Western Australia. He joined the AIF in August 1914. Darnell was MID for the Landing and later in war was made a DSO and twice more MID. Tragically killed in late September 1918.

Was this man not telling the truth also?

..."Very slowly we crept towards the shore and watched it loom up clearer as the pale dawn blushed in the east. The excitement was tense and electrical. About 3.45am we were about 400 yards off the shore when the crack of a rifle rang out, followed by a roar of machine guns and rifles, and the bullets came like hail, sighing and whining over our heads. Instantly all was life, picquet boats full steam ahead and a gun in the bow of ours let drive and silenced a machine gun first shot. Within a hundred yards of the beach we were cast loose and those at the oars rowed like men possessed. Some were shot and at once others took their place and not a word was uttered. Presently we grounded and in an instant we were in water up to our waist and wading ashore with bullets pinging all around us. A brief pause on the beach to fix bayonets and singing 'This bit of the world belongs to us', much swearing and cheering we charged up a hill so steep in places we could only just scramble up. No firing, all bayonet work. Clean over a machine gun we went....."

The list goes on and on! Swain you can have, but others, I believe were not fabricating or mistaken by maxim pinnace fire.

Ian

[bob lembke]

Ian;

Can this thread still be alive?

I have studied the fighting at Gallipoli for years, mostly from the Turkish/German perspective, in a number of

languages (I rarely read secondary sources), everything I have been able to find, and of course the wider war,

and also the war from the question of materiel, and I find that most people oriented to the Brit/French/ANZAC side

cannot comprehend the state of the equipment of the Turkish Army. (My father fought there, with the Turks, but he

never mentioned machine guns, but he told me too little about that campaign.) Formally the Turks should have had

12 or 16 MGs per division, but at the time of the attack they surely did not have that many. It was a big deal when

the landings started and the German Navy in Constantinople was able to send sailors with 4-5 MGs from their armories.

My father's company was the only German unit there, and they did not have any.

I have a collaborator, a German officer who has been stationed in Turkey for many years, a serious student of the

fighting, and a published author on the topic, and he just sent me a treasure, which I am reading. An 80 page narrative

from another member of my father's

German volunteer company. I am thru almost his entire narrative of his time at Gallipoli, not one mention of a MG. He

was just behind the front line, in a dugout with 10 Turkish infantrymen and 3 Turkish Pioniere, and they had four rifles

between the 13 men. He described how most Turkish soldiers didn't even have shoes, but had to wrap ruined sand bags about their

feet, and most didn't have anything that could be called a uniform, some just wore underwear and a coat over it, or absolutely

tattered civilian clothes. We don't even want to mention the food and water. One problem was that the Turkish Army had lost most

of its gear in the several Balkan Wars that had just concluded. And no weapons could be gotten thru Romania; my father and the

others traveled in civilian clothes with false papers as bank clerks and the like.

The first naval MG detachment (about 30 men) quickly lost all of their MGs, and half their men; but then the Turks gave them

11 Vickers they had taken in a counter-attack. This is described in a small book by Karl Doenitz, later Grand Admiral, then a

young officer on the German light cruiser at Constantinople. But he did not get to go to Gallipoli. Later the Germans sent a

larger naval MG detachment.

Bob Lembke

[gilly100]

Thanks Bob

You are just as entitled to your opinion as anyone else. I believe the no MG argument is yet to be conclusively proven and as you know the sheer scale of MG accounts from Brit Army, Brit Navy and Aussies of all ranks are just too many to explain away as they have been. I am not looking to pick a blue with anyone, but I am sticking to my argument that there are too many accounts at Anzac and Helles in letters, diaries, after action reports, war diaries, unit histories and so on.

Just because someone does not mention MG's, hardly means there were none is one point I would make. You can quote 13 men sharing 4 rifles and I have no reason to disbelieve that. I can quote left behind rifles and MG parts at Shepherds Hut on 25 April early morning. For me the mystery is more about where did the MG's come from if the MG companies were held back? Still happy to be in the current minority.

Ian

[stevenbecker]

Mate,

Your right for each account that mentions MGs there are many that don't.

But does MG parts confirm a MG or just MG parts, but what parts are they talking about?

All acounts mention the capture of MGs in there war diaries, but there are no accounts that sumerise the capture of any MGs during the morning at Anzac.

We can say for sure that the MG Company from the 27th Regt arrived mid morning and caused many losses.

There and many accounts that mention MGs that morning and some accounts refer to there being over run, but no where is there recorded any captured guns in the offical records.

IF these accounts are correct what happened to the guns?

IF a gun was taken there was a lot of documents to record there capture as MGs were a valuble resourse for us as well as the Turks, but there are no offical records to back up these captures when chasing the Turks from the 2Bn/27th Regt up the hills of Anzac.

Dispite all the accounts I have read and placed on this site which detail the captured of guns, they don't show up in offical records and so they disappeared, if they were there?

S.B

[gilly100]

This from AWM4 1/42/3 part 2 General Staff HQ 1st Australian Division

A 5 page typed report on ops of the 1st Aust Div to GOC Aust and NZ Army Corps dated 7 May 1915

......

4- .......... While in the tows and during the landing the troops were under machine gun and musketry fire and enfilade shrapnel fire from KABE TEPE. An accurate statement of losses incurred during disembarkation cannot be obtained; it is feared there were many casualties....

[stevenbecker]

Gilly,

This statement is ambigous, as it is confusing.

While there were heavy losses at say the Fishermans hut there were not the whole slaughter as on the British beaches.

MG firing while it could be Turkish, it was more then likely British as stated by other sourses from the small ships.

The statement "during the landing the troops were under machine gun and musketry fire" sounds bad but more then likely it was musketry fire from the well disaplined and vetern fighting unit as was the 2Bn 27th Regt. and the MG fire was British suporting the landings.

But again while I can quote you any number of sourses that give the Turkish MG's at Anzac, none were ever recovered during the morning to be officaly accounted for?

We can go around as we are but unitll some fresh sourse can explan these missing MG's at the landing we are left to wonder.

Why is it that we fail to give the Turkish rifleman the victory that morning and have to explan it by the Turks having all these MG's, or as in later sourses in Egypt and Palestine we say the MGS were manned by Germans or under command of a German officer.

The Turkish soldiers was at this time mostly veterns having just fought a war in the Balkans, most had been under arms for some time and dispite the gap from 1913 to 1914/15 most were trained men, who's officers were well trained and had been under arms for some time.

Could we say the same about our own Aussies forces or even the British units?

S.B

[Guest]

Could we say the same about our own Aussies forces or even the British units?

S.B

As far as the infantry units of the British Amy that landed at Helles on that day they were mostly Regulars*. The Divison had Regular Infantry and Artillery (including I believe L Battey that had fought at Nery) with Territorial Support Arms. For the purposes of the landings, the regular infantry were involved. Having been stationed overseas the battalions would all have been at full strength ut still short of War Establshment which would require Reservists to make up the difference. To further complicate matters the Army restricted men under the age of 19 from serving overseas so these men were taken out and replaced with Reservists who were mostly ex Regulars. The 29th Div had arrived in England in early January 1915 and would have received Reservists at this stage. Looking at a large sample of around 30 overseas battalions, they took on average around 280 Reservists each to replace under-aged men and unfit men. Given the time lag between the outbreak of war and the landings there was plenty of time to bring training up to the required standards. The messages from the BEF in France would have spurred them along. Indeed there are some men who served in France then went to Gallipoli, although there are no reliable sources on numbers.

There is evidence from the BEF in France and Flanders that the Reservists were out of condition in August 1914, but this would have been sorted by April 1915. The diaries show that the 29th Div spent many days training for amphibious landings in the weeks before the landings. There is considerable detail on this.

The profile of the battalions that landed would not have been dramatically different from the men who fought with the BEF in 1914 and whose marksmanship, professionalism and character is often commented on. Given the lower requirements for Reservists in overseas battalions (UK based battalions deployed with around 60% Reservists) one could argue that the 29th Div was one of the better trained Divisions of the period. Its subsequent reputation might be some indication.

If the Annual returns and the monthly returns are any indication, the British Army had reasonably high turnover. The average age of an Infantry soldier in Aug 1914 was 25 years and 2 months and the average age of an Infantry Regular Reservist was 30 years and 1 month. A reasonable proportion of the latter group would have seen action in South Africa however the terms of service changed in the interwar years from 3 and 9 to 9 and 3. The Regulars preferred to take on Reservists who had most recently left the Army (for obvious reasons) so the UK based battalions would have had the first bite. the 2nd Bn South Wales Borderers records the average age of its men on landing in England was 25.

Given the extremely high casualty rates in the BEF in 1914 with most battalions seeing over 100% casualties, the drain on available Reservists was heavy. By the end of 1914 some Regiments were running out of trained men (six Regiments actually ran out of trained men in early 1915) so the 29th Div arrived in England when there was a manning crisis. I don't know for sure but I suspect the Reservists that went to the infantry battalions of the 29th Div were probably a mix of Section B men with a lot of Special Reservists and (older) Section D men. The point here is that the bottom of the barrel was in sight for many Regiments. It would have varied across Regiments and those with historically high recruiting bases and the Regiments that had shifted from a four battalion structure to a two battalion structure in the inter-war years would have had a large surplus of Reservists.The Lancashire Fusiliers has over 1400 fully trained Reservists in early January that the 1st Bn could pick from. In sharp contrast the South Wales Borderers' Reserve Battalion only had 287. If we remember it was sustaining another battalion in the field in Flanders at the time, it is likely that the 2nd Bn may well have taken some Kitchener men who would be close to completing 6 months' training.

The manning would certainly not have been homogeneous; at one end there would have been highly trained but inexperienced young men and at the other end there would have been older men out of condition who would have had to be retrained in the new equipment. Their experience in the Boer War would have been a mitigating factor and the fact that the 29th Div had plenty of time to get prepared and possibly learn from many of the mistakes made in the BEF.

The British Army had also done major training exercises in amphibious landings in the inter-war period. I am not sure how many units or men in the 29th Div had taken part in this but the anecdotal evidence slightly suggests many of the lessons were forgotten.

The Official Historian of the BEF claims that the men who embarked in August 1914 were the best trained and best equipped Army that had ever left Britain (or words to that effect). I have little doubt he would have applied that to the 29th Div as well. One thing is certain: they would be familiar with the sound of a machine gun and from years of standing in the butts they would be familiar with the sound of incoming fire.

Lastly the 2nd Bn South Wales Borderers had some limited experience in Tsingtao. Due to casualties here the battalion required 234 Reservists to make up numbers.

MG

* 29th Div had 11 Regular Battalions and one Territorial Battalions - the 1/5th Royal Scots.

[gilly100]

I concur Martin. There are numerous accounts of many Australians that would have loved the chance of getting a commission in the 29th Div. They were very highly regarded. I will post something more detailed on Helles shortly.

Ian

[gilly100]

AWM4 1/4/1 part 2 Formation HQ MEF March April 1915

Report of Landing of 29th Division in the neighborhood of Cape Helles April 23-27th

15- The landing place west of SEDDEL BAHR and south east of Cape Helles............. The whole of this high ground was lined with Turkish Infantry, in well concealed trenches. Pom Poms and machine guns commanded the beach from the high ground on the left and machine guns were concealed in the walls of the Old Fort.....

20- Turning now to the landing NW of Cape Helles, 6 tows from HMS Euralyus and 2 from HMS Implacable stood in about 6am towards the shore. The landing here was no less well defended than that near SEDDEL BAHR. A thick row of wire entanglement extended the whole length of the beach close down to the waters edge, and machine guns had been concealed in the cliffs on the west flank commanding the approach to this....

21- The Lancashire Fusiliers, after the tows had been cast off pulled in the shore under a heavy fire of machine guns and rifles. The first lot to land literally hurled themselves over the wire entanglement, leaving a long line of corpses on the beach and on the wire, mown down by rifle and machine gun fire......

Were these more experienced troops wrong as well?

Ian

[keithmroberts]

29 Div may have been regulars, but for the Lancashire Fusiliers this was their first engagement of the war. having returned to the UK to form part of the new 29 Div they had been previously stationed in Karachi where surely their experience of machine gun fire from hostile forces would be comparable to that of the Anzac forces. That is nil.

The debate about confusion and perceptions has surely been addressed fully in this thread, and the only conclusive material that could be produced would have to come from Turkish records. So far they seem pretty clear, although obviously there are more to be studied and translated.

Keith

[stevenbecker]

Mates,

Of cause my coments relate to our landing at Anzac, not at Helles and the British forces.

The 26th Regt and its suport units also fought hard battles against heavy British odds and the use of the MG Comapny at Helles is recorded.

This is not the case at Anzac where there was no MG company until later in the morning with the arrival of the main units of the 27th Regt and later the 33rd Regt under Kemal..

No aussie soldier had seen fighting since the Boer war and the MG was not in general use during that war.

Many officers and soldiers with milita service had seen and heard MG's during the inter war years and possibly under traning in Egpyt not not in any large scale firing and been under fire of these guns.

Concidering the ampitheatre of Anzac Cove beaches the sound of any MG, Turkish or Allied would have sounded around the Beaches and could have come from any where.

While I agree many personal accounts do mention the over running of Turkish MG's on Anzac, as yet no offical document records any capture of such guns?

Thats my only point here.

Cheers

S.B

[RobL]

To back up Keith's comments, experience wise I'm not sure what combat experience many of any of the men in 29th division would have had, apart from pot shots taken at them in India - apart from the possibility of Boer War veterans (and even then I'm not aware of Boers making much use of them)

[Crunchy]

Mates,

I was rereading my copy of Erickson's "Gallipoli" when I notice a strange coment on page 45, relating to reinforcements sent to the Fifth Army before April.

It states that "Ottoman Comand sent several MG Companies and four Jandarma Bn's and an artillery Bn".

Most accounts only mention the one Jandarma Bn (called the Bursa Bn) and that was with the 9th Div and reinforced Helles during the 26 April, but no mention of where or who the several MG companies were ?

But concidering the placement of units of the 5th Army, they could be anywhere on the Gallipoli peninsula or on the eastern side.

S.B

Steve,

I have had a reply back from Ed Erickson re your query above as follows;

I would agree that your assumptions make sense, however the histories are not clear about where the MGs go to. Likewise, they are not clear about the actual numbers - I think that "several" is two, actually.

For sure, one appears to have gone to the 19th Inf Regt. The 7th ID has only one MG Coy in the 21st IR on 4 November 1914 and by 25 April it has the two coys (in the 19th and 21st IRs).

For sure, Istanbul sent a Hotchkiss MG Coy on 5 April - which was organized as the Heavy MG Coy of the 72nd Regiment on arrival in the staging area of the 19th Division.

The 5 ID is not "full complement" as each coy appears to have two guns vice the 4 that are authorized (total 6 in the division).

Cheers

Chris

[stevenbecker]

Chris,

Interesting.

The coment about the 5th Div with only 6xMG's sounds strange but not unkown.

Both Div's of the II Corps (5th and 6th Divs) both show all Regts with MG Companies (six MG Companies) for both Div's.

If in fact the 5th Div had only 6 guns did the 6th Div also had that amount?

Can you also ask Ed Erickson about a question I posed on another site about the comand o the 13th And 12th Div's.

I wrote, this about his coments of LtCol Selahattin Adil

Erickson's book "Gallipoli The Ottoman Campaign" published in 2010.

Page 226 lists the units during the fighting at Anzac Sept to Dec 1915 which shows the change over of command of the 12th Div.

Page 227 lists the units at Helles Sept 1915 to Jan 1916 which shows the command offciers of the 13th Div.

Erickson gives the date of this change over as 12 Sept 1915 from LtCol Selahattin Adil with Col Havik (Albert Heuck) replacing him in the 12th Div. 12 Sept 1915

My reading of Erickson looks like the 13th Div arrived at the Helles Front around that time (V Corps under Gen Fevzi along witth the 14th Div under LtCol Kazum) and Erickson shows the 13th Div with the Commander as Col Hovik and CofS as Salahattin Adil.

Its possible he made a mistake and Salahattin Adil was the Temp Commander from Col Hovik of the 13th Div.

Possibly Col Hovik was wounded or ill or sent some where else?

Inquries confirmed that LtCol Selahattin Adil took comand of the 13th Div from Col Hovik on the 18 Sept 1915 and possibly remained till he became the commander 11th Corps in June 1916

The inquiry answer came from this mate;

Steve

What books of Erickson are you referencing? I can't find where your are pulling your info.

I am using:

On Yillik Harbin Kadrosu (Roster of Ten Years of War). Units, commanders and staffs of the Balkans, WW1 and the War of Independence.

Türk Istiklâl harbi’ne katilan Tümen ve daha üst Kademelerdeki Komutanlarin Biyografileri (Biographies of commanders of divisions and higher echelons that participated in the Turkish War of Independence).

Various officials as needed.

Ordered to Die indicates V Corps arrived in July (page 90). Gallipoli indicates July as well (pages 129, 136).

Biyografileri states Selahattin took command of the 13 Division on 18 September.

I believe that the two exchanged commands as the 13th Division was withdrawn to Keşan in October to begin recreating the strategic reserve. Selahattin takes command of the 11th Corps in June 1916. Kadrosu page 82 footnote 8 on the movement of the 13th Division.

Pista! Jeff

Cheers

S.B

[Crunchy]

Chris,

Interesting.

The coment about the 5th Div with only 6xMG's sounds strange but not unkown.

Both Div's of the II Corps (5th and 6th Divs) both show all Regts with MG Companies (six MG Companies) for both Div's.

If in fact the 5th Div had only 6 guns did the 6th Div also had that amount?

Can you also ask Ed Erickson about a question I posed on another site about the comand o the 13th And 12th Div's.

Steve,

I think it is explained by the shortage of MG's in the Turkish army (according to Ed some 200 guns or 50 companies short of authorised establishment). Thus some companies were only at platoon strength (two guns), in order to spread the joy. The 5th Division orbat in the Turkish Official History shows the three infantry regiments in the division (the 13th, 14th and 15th) each having a two gun MG company attached to them.

Not sure about 6th Division. It was sent to Gallipoli in June 1915, joining XVI Corps on the Gulf of Saros at the neck of the peninsula, while its 18th Infantry Regiment proceeded south to Helles and Anzac. it wasn't part of II Corps, which initially comprised 4th and 5th Divisions. HQ II Corps and 4th Division were removed from the 5th Army orbat almost immediately after being assigned - Erickson Gallipoli: The Ottoman Campaign p 45 - leaving 5th Division as an independent division reporting directly to 5th Army.

I will chase up your other query.

Cheers

Chris

[Crunchy]

Steve,

As to your query in post # 939 Ed has clarified as follows:

I'm using Ismet Gorgulu's "On Yillik Harbin Kadrosu" - it shows that Selahattin Adil took command of 13 Division at Helles on 12 September 1915 and was replaced by Havik who took 12 Division (page 95). Captain Samli Cemil was the CofS of 12 Division.

It also shows on page 82 that on 12 September (the same day) Selahattin Adil took command of 13 Division (with Captain Celal as his CofS). Havik is previously listed as Hovik by Gorgulu.

Page 227 is obviously in error. Both Selahattin Adil and Havik are commanders of the 12th Division with a changeover date of 12 September. Gorgulu does not clarify why the two commanders "swapped" divisions. I don't know where the 18 September date comes from, unless it took Selahattin six days to get down there and take command.

I have no information about Hovik/Havik's status in command after 12 September.

Cheers

Chris

[stevenbecker]

Chris,

Thanks mate, and thank Ed for his help also.

Pity more researchers don't look harder at our Turkish opponents during this peroid and later.

Cheers

S.B

[Crunchy]

Steve,

Thanks passed to Ed.

Agreed, although there are two books coming out from the Turkish perspective at Anzac. Harvey Broadbent's on the campaign in the Anzac sector from April to December based on his research of primary sources in the Turkish archives, and Mesut Uyar's on the 25th April at Anzac using his vast knowledge of Turkish primary sources and accounts. Additionally Ed's new book will look at command at the operational level during the campaign.

Cheers

Chris

[Crunchy]

Steve,

Additional information to your query at post #939 from Professor Mesut Uyar at UNSW at ADFA.

I checked from the memoir of Selahaddin Adil. According to his account he received the order of exchanging commandership of 12^th and 13^th IDs on 12 September. He was shocked and unhappy with this order. He unwillingly handed over command to Albert Heuck and took over 13^th ID. He was not sure of the reason behind this decision. His bitter relations with von Sanders might be one reason. His previously good relations with the Second Army Commander Vehib Pasha (he took over the responsibility of southern group facing Helles on 9 July) might be another alternative reason. Or combination these two reasons might be the ideal reason.

Cheers

Chris

[stevenbecker]

Chris,

I hate to do this but can you get Ed to confirm what officer these are and are they the same men?

I wrote on another Turkish site to confirm;

IN our discussion about Selahattin Adil these officers showed up but under three different names.

Are they the same man or different?

Its known that Albay Albert Heuck 13. Tümen komutanı (13th Div) was German but is Colonel Hovik (Havik) the same man?

I believed they were but can that be confirmed by our Turkish mates.

Cheers

S.B

[Crunchy]

Steve,

He is the same man. Mesut Uyar replied:

There is no doubt about it. He is Albert Heuck. All documents(Ottoman and German) confirming that he was the guy. The problem is related with Arabic script. It is always difficult to write foreign names in Arabic. Foreign names are written according to spelling. So Heuck is written in Arabic “he vav ye kaf”. If you don’t know the original Latin writing you can transliterate it Hevik, Hoyk, Huyk, Heyk etc. However Havik transliteration is far cry.

and Ed:

I don't know of a way to check this. The Ottomans phonetically transliterated European words and names into Ottoman Turkish and then, on the back end (after the mid-1920's), the Turks re-transliterated the Ottoman words and names phonetically back into into modern Turkish. This explains why there is such an incredible variance in the modern spelling of Ottoman names and words.

Somewhere on the axis history web site is a list of Germans who served in the Ottoman Empire in WW1.

My best guess is yes, it's the same fellow.

Cheers

Chris

[stevenbecker]

Chris,

Many thanks again, nice to confirm.

S.B

[gilly100]

A letter from 1168 Pte 'Les' Parsons, a 1st reo of 11th Bn AIF, written from Malta on 4 August 1915.

....the first day we made our landing in the early hours of the morning we were surprised by the enemy and had to jump into the sea up to our necks with water, no time to row to shore, the Turks kept up a severe fire from their machine guns and rifles. We could not reply and lost a lot of men before we reached the shore; by that time our blood was boiling to get at grips with them. We fixed bayonets and charged up the steep cliffs, captured a machine gun and got them on the run up the first ridge...

Leslie Parsons survived Gallipoli only to fall on 3rd September 1916 at Mouquet Farm serving with the 51st Bn AIF.

Ian

[Guest]

Does the actual letter survive Ian?

Mike

[gilly100]

Does the actual letter survive Ian?

Mike

Hi Mike

Yes, it is what looks like an original typed letter written to a family friend, a Mr Williams. From AWM records. There are many. I will post parts of another shortly, a member of a machine gun section. Both the latter man and his MG officer Dixon Hearder record landing under mg fire. Seems they managed to get their guns up and into action with a bit of effort of course. Surely machine gunners would know if it were pinnace MG'S or not?

Yours unconvinced and in minority

Ian