TURKISH MACHINE GUNS AT GALLIPOLI

[green_acorn]

Gilly,

Don't read the article in the Sydney Morning Herald for 18 March 2014 entitled "Turkish records rewrite story of Anzacs' Gallipoli landing" then. Harvey Broadbent who is the Director of the Gallipoli Centenary Research project at Macquarie University has been going through the Ottoman records held by the Turkish General Staff archives in Ankara for the past eight years:

"The findings, to be made at a speech in Sydney next month and published next year in Gallipoli, The Turkish Defence, also question the familiar idea the Anzacs were met as they went up the beaches by a hail of machine gun fire. ‘‘On the morning of April 25, we have the reports of the first sightings of the approaching Allied fleet and the report of the officer Captain Faik who saw them,’’ Mr Broadbent said. ‘‘It reads like the start of a feature film. ‘‘They are standing on a darkened ridge behind Anzac Cove looking out with the moon shining over the sea and suddenly someone shouts to him: ‘There’s something happening out there, sir.’ ‘Faik lifts his field glasses, looks out to sea and sees the silhouettes of the enemy fleet coming towards him. That’s very early in the morning, 2 1⁄2 hours before the landing.

‘‘The big problem for the Turks was that they only had small units on the shoreline.’’

Mr Broadbent said the Turkish kept their main force at the back and that, tactically, General Liman von Sanders, the German general in charge of the 5th Ottoman army, operated what was known as a defence from the deep. ‘‘The picture you get is one of initial confusion followed by determined action once a decision was made but that decision took a fairly long time, a couple of hours to make,’’ he said.

‘‘They suffered from a lack of machine guns and field artillery, they had a minimal amount of both. ‘‘It is often assumed or has been reported the Anzacs faced machine guns at the landing. Our documents show the opposite, that the Turks didn’t have any machine guns at the landing at Anzac Cove.’’

Cheers,

Hendo

[gilly100]

HI Hendo

I look forward to seeing the myriad first hand Turk accounts, not just Sefik Aker's account and TGS history. Always happy to be wrong if overwhelmingly proven so. So far, I think Brit and Australian first hand accounts are too many to discount despite the reasons explained in Crunchy's good recent book. If one has to go down in flames, one may as well burn brightly! Still always enjoy the study though!

Will have a read of Broadbent,s bit shortly.

Thanks for the tip.

Ian

[Bryn]

Thanks Hendo,

What the SMH haven't mentioned for some reason is that, despite a 'lack' (shouldn't that read 'shortage'?) of machine guns and artillery, there were field guns (artillery) on the 400 Plateau, so if Faik knew about the landing 2½ hours before it happened, I have to wonder why those guns were left in the exposed position they were and alowed to be captured.

And why Aker - who was not present at the time - and others had not been contacted and already be on the spot or at least preparing to move.

Regards,

Bryn

[Guest]

The Sydney Morning Herald. Fantastic. Hopefully they will publish copies of the original documents that have been hidden for 98 years to substantiate these claims. The one massive difference between the two schools of thought is the availability of original material rather than reported material. Let's hope that something concrete comes out of this. MG

[green_acorn]

You guys do realise Broadbent's work is with the official Ottoman (Ottoman Arabic script) archives held by the Turkish General Staff, not the translation of other work. The documents everyone, including Turks have been wanting translated for years. So the actual orders, instructions and reports of the Ottoman Army written in 1915, not something written in the 20's or 30's.

[grantmal]

Thanks Hendo,

What the SMH haven't mentioned for some reason is that, despite a 'lack' (shouldn't that read 'shortage'?) of machine guns and artillery, there were field guns (artillery) on the 400 Plateau, so if Faik knew about the landing 2½ hours before it happened, I have to wonder why those guns were left in the exposed position they were and alowed to be captured.

And why Aker - who was not present at the time - and others had not been contacted and already be on the spot or at least preparing to move.

Regards,

Bryn

Seems a very fair question.

[gilly100]

Hi All

Just to kick start again.

Here is some other stuff from a Turkish source, found and quoted earlier by H Broadbent in 2005 with his book Gallipoli - The Fatal Shore.

From page 41 last 2 paragraphs of said book.

Broadbent writes -

"Some of this defensive activity is clearly apparent in the memoirs of Major Halis Bey, commander of the 3rd Bn, 27th Regt. He noted how each infantry and artillery battalion and company was given their deployment locations according to Von Sanders' tactics. The whole area of the southern end of the peninsula from the north of Suvla Bay down to Cape Helles was detailed, including Ariburnu - the future Anzac Cove area.

(Halis Bey, in his memoirs says below)(Major Halis Bey, Cannakale Raporu, Arma Publications, Istanbul 1975, p91)

2nd Battalion- To be established in the Ariburnu and also Kaba Tepe sector. 7th Company, 3rd Battalion, 9th Mountain Gun Regt with half a machine gun company to be in position on the ridge behind Ariburnu, and from 3rd Battalion as far as the Ariburnu company and at Kaba Tepe, field guns and Nordenfelts will be placed under the command of the 2nd Battalion commander. It is required that the half machine gun company will establish itself behind the position in such a way as to bring the northern shore of the Ariburnu-Kaba Tepe sector under fire.

Are we to discount this(like the Brit and Australian accounts) in favour only of Sefik Aker's records? For me it at the least explains two machine guns at Ari Burnu prior to the Landing. I am surprised I did not see this earlier, although my first copy of HB's book went missing years ago, and I only bought it again last week to read on return to Bali from Gallipoli. What say you from the other camp with no MG's?

Ian

[keithmroberts]

Ian

Would the Nordenfelts be manned by the "half machine gun company" ? I know very little of the structure of the Turkish army, but unless they were regarded as a standard infantry weapon this might be the case?

Keith

[gilly100]

Good question Keith, although the accounts of men under fire on North Beach mainly make comment on MG fire, not Pom Pom, although one account does say 'quick firers'. I am inclined to think the way it is worded, it is MG's, as Nordenfelts are mentioned more separately.

I know on the Gaba Tepe raid by 100 odd 11Bn AIF men on 4 May, one man was hit in the arm by what he recalled as a Pom Pom, presumably a 1 inch variety from memory. It appears some men could distinguish between Pom Poms, MG's and rifles when under fire!

Let's see what others make of all this!

Ian

[Crunchy]

there were field guns (artillery) on the 400 Plateau, so if Faik knew about the landing 2½ hours before it happened, I have to wonder why those guns were left in the exposed position they were and alowed to be captured.

Bryn,

They were mountain guns, not field guns, which had to be broken down and packed on mules before they could be moved. The first field guns arrived on the battlefield at dusk. They were only exposed when the screen covering the beaches fell back and warned Sadik that the Australians were on their heels. They then had to break down the guns and pack them on the mules. This they achieved, but only one gun and the ammunition train got away.

Regards

Chris

[Jeff Pickerd]

Ian,

To quote from Harvey Broadbent’s 2005 publication, “Gallipoli, the fatal shore”, with regard to the ‘machine gun question’ is rather pointless when one takes into account the previous post by Hendo, regarding the article in the Sydney Morning Herald for 18 March 2014 regarding Broadbent’s latest research of the Turkish archives at post 901, 20^th March 2014. Quote: ‘‘The big problem for the Turks was that they only had small units on the shoreline.’’

‘‘The picture you get is one of initial confusion followed by determined action once a decision was made but that decision took a fairly long time, a couple of hours to make,’’

‘‘They suffered from a lack of machine guns and field artillery, they had a minimal amount of both. It is often assumed or has been reported the Anzacs faced machine guns at the landing. Our documents show the opposite, that the Turks didn’t have any machine guns at the landing at Anzac Cove.’’

Before addressing that issue directly it is probably important to give the latest information that I have been able to find on Harvey Broadbent’s research as the Director, Gallipoli Centenary Turkish Archives Research Project, as outlined by the Macquarie University, 16^th April 2014. To use a section of that report which gives an insight to what is to come from his investigations in Turkey, the following should be of interest to us all:

“In 2006, the pilot program lead to a formal ARC-supported project, and a significant cross-country collaboration in partnership with the Australian War Memorial. From 2007 to 2013, Harvey translated more than 2,500 pages of documentation from these archives, and is now putting finishing touches on a 180,000 word book detailing the new primary sources.

“As a historian, you strive to find out the truth about history. For something as important to Australia as the Gallipoli campaign has turned out to be, it is essential to find out the facts, and we’ve never had a comprehensive account.

What we’ve known of the Turks so far has been general and superficial, from limited sources. Even the Turks haven’t transliterated most of their own documents (from the archaic language of Osmanlinca to contemporary Turkish), so we’re really breaking new ground by doing that – both for Australia and Turkey.”

And probably the most important aspect of these research activities would be: “to publishing the 2,500 Turkish military documents online as a substantial hub of primary sources for future scholars.”

Look forward to that happening next year in time for the 100^th anniversary of the landing at Anzac Cove!

To come back to my opening assertion of not relying upon Broadbent’s 2005 “Gallipoli, the fatal shore” as a reference source for the machine gun question in light of his latest research of the Turkish archival documents, there is also the question of just what he was intimating when quoting the memoirs of Major Halis Bey, commander of the 3rd Bn, 27th Regt. Quote: “2nd Battalion- To be established in the Ariburnu and also Kaba Tepe sector. 7th Company, 3rd Battalion, 9th Mountain Gun Regt with half a machine gun company to be in position on the ridge behind Ariburnu, and from 3rd Battalion as far as the Ariburnu company and at Kaba Tepe, field guns and Nordenfelts will be placed under the command of the 2nd Battalion commander. It is required that the half machine gun company will establish itself behind the position in such a way as to bring the northern shore of the Ariburnu-Kaba Tepe sector under fire.”

From that you have obviously drawn the inference: “For me it at the least explains two machine guns at Ari Burnu prior to the Landing.” I’m afraid I cannot see that as being the case from the order to ‘bring the northern shore of the Ariburnu-Kaba Tepe sector under fire’, two guns positioned at Ari Burnu could not cover the sector indicted from that site, apart from the fact that most of Brighton Beach was obscured by Hell Spit, the range to the beach front being well over a mile away leading to Gaba Tepe was far too great. As for the two Nordenfelt guns, it has been reasonably established within this lengthy discussion that they were in position at Gaba Tepe, and the coverage of the Ariburnu-Kaba Tepe sector was their role.

It is noticed that back in 2005 Harvey Broadbent makes no mention of the account of Lt Col Sefik Bey, he is only first mentioned on page 96 of “Gallipoli, the fatal shore” with his signal at midday to Major Halis to mount a heavy attack on the left flank of the 57^th Regiment.

Also, from the reference at page 91 you have assumed that Major Halis with his 3^rd Battalion were in defensive positions at Ari Burnu (with the half machine gun company) for 4.30 am 25^th April 1915, he and the 3^rd Battalion were not. Harvey Broadbent does not assert that Major Halis was present for the landing at Anzac Cove, and from the 1975 published “Canakkale raporu” by Binbasi Halis Bey, it is established that Major Halis was the acting commander of the 3^rd Battalion of the Ottoman 27^th Regiment, that the 1^st and 3^rd battalions had carried out manoeuvres, with the machine gun company attached, on the night 24^th/25^th April, but by 2.00 am 25^th they were back at their camp in an olive grove outside the town of Maydos.

The answer as to why Harvey Broadbent makes no mention of the 1935 narrative describing the action of the 27^th Regiment as the first Turkish unit to face the ANZAC landing, published by Lt Col Sefik Bey twenty years after the event, probably lies in the fact that the first English language version did not appear until 2007 with the release of H.B.Danisman’s book, “Gallipoli 1915, Day One Plus... 27^th OTTOMAN inf. Regt. Vs. ANZACS”. Denizler Kitabevi. In the same year “Gallipoli 1915, Through Turkish Eyes, Haluk Oral was published, with 500 English language copies being released, here further Turkish accounts from officers of the 4^th Company, 2^nd Battalion of the 27^th Regiment are related outlining the action taken by the three platoons of that company, many taken from original Ottoman documents. The account left by the 1^st Platoon commander, Reserve Lieutenant Ibradili Ibrahim, has been dealt with previously in this topic, and I do not intend to go over that again.

Ian, as you know, I do speak, nor can read, the Turkish language, and as for the Ottoman Anatolian script, or as the Macquarie University have termed it, ‘Osmanlinca’, that is a total mystery to me. Therefore all English translations of the old Ottoman script must be taken at face value from the Turkish sources who have published such translations. In the past much has been made of the time lapse with most of the published Turkish accounts of the landing, this may be true, but virtually all of those accounts have been drawn from the original period documents of each writer, and in a number of cases the official Ottoman army documentation. As I have indicated it will be a wonderful resource to have the 2500 plus Turkish records digitally available next year, hopefully many of these questions as to the Turkish side of the campaign will be answered.

Jeff

[Crunchy]

Jeff,

It would be interesting to know the date of the entry of Halis’s diary. I have a copy of his dairy, but cannot read Turkish. I asked Professor Mesut Uyar, a former Turkish infantry officer now at ADFA who has studied the Gallipoli campaign closely, for his thoughts on the entry.

He replied Reference to your question I checked the diary of Halis and did not find the quote you had sent me. There is no message on 25 April talking about machine guns in Halis’s Diary. Your forum friends seemed to make mistake by confusing previous diary entries with the ones on 25 April. There are several diary entries for example on 19 March mentioning machine gun company at the frontline (I mean near coastline). However if you read the ones a few days before the landing and on 25 April you see very clearly that machine guns were far away from the coast on that particular day.

The reason I queried it is, that prior to Liman von Sanders taking command of 5th Army in late March, the Turkish defence was forward with most units covering the beaches. Ed Erickson discusses this in his Gallipoli: The Ottoman Campaign. His map 2.1 of the Turkish dispositions on 31 March shows the 27th Regiment deployed from Ari Burnu to Buyuk Misirlik ( north of Suvla Bay), with two battalions on the coast and one, together with the MG company, in reserve around Anafarta. When Liman von Sanders took command these dispositions changed to holding the coast lightly with strong central reserves. In the first week of April a redistribution of units took place. The 27th Regiment was moved south, with one battalion covering the beaches from the Fisherman’s Hut to Semerely Tepe, south of Kapa Tepe, and two battalions and the machine gun company in reserve at Maidos.

Harvey is overseas at the moment, but I will ask him about the quote when he returns to see if we can clarify when it was written. In reading my manuscript of The Landing at Anzac, 1915 he replied the content on the Turkish side was correct according to the full range of Ottoman primary sources he has. In a long discussions with him last November he confirmed those sources supported my account, and that there were no Turkish MG’s covering the beaches, and Kemal’s counter attack did commence around 12:30pm. Ed Erickson also read the manuscript and stated the account was accurate according to his research in the Ottoman archives. I have had many discussions with Mesut, who has the full range of primary sources of the 27th and 57th Regiments, and he states the machine guns of the both the 27th and 57th Regiments were in reserve at Maidos and Boghali respectively on 25th April.

Regards

Chris

[Guest]

I can't see any machine guns here? Click

Mike

[Jeff Pickerd]

Thanks Chris,

I am unsure as to just which quote of Major Halis you have forwarded to Professor Mesut Uyar, possibly it is the chapter two, "Damn the Dardanelles!" note 20. "Canakkale Rapora", page 91, but regardless, I will be very interested to hear his thoughts.

Upon going back over chapter three, "The fatal shore" of Harvey Broadbent's book, I see I have missed an earlier reference to Lt Col Sefik Bey (Aker) arising from the quote of Captain Faik,, commander of the 4th Company, 2nd Battalion, 27th Regiment, on page 54, note 2. "Captain Faik, quoted by S. Aker, Canakkale-Ariburnu Savaslari ve 27 Alay, Askeri Mecmua [Military Journal] 1935, TGS." This seems even more curious that Harvey Broadbent does not quote further from Lt Col Sefik with regard to the Turkish defence from 4.30 am other than Captain Faik?

It would seem from the Sydney Morning Herald article that he has now considered this, and possibly found further evidence from the Turkish archives.

Jeff

[Crunchy]

To come back to my opening assertion of not relying upon Broadbent’s 2005 “Gallipoli, the fatal shore” as a reference source for the machine gun question in light of his latest research of the Turkish archival documents, there is also the question of just what he was intimating when quoting the memoirs of Major Halis Bey, commander of the 3rd Bn, 27th Regt. Quote: “2nd Battalion- To be established in the Ariburnu and also Kaba Tepe sector. 7th Company, 3rd Battalion, 9th Mountain Gun Regt with half a machine gun company to be in position on the ridge behind Ariburnu, and from 3rd Battalion as far as the Ariburnu company and at Kaba Tepe, field guns and Nordenfelts will be placed under the command of the 2nd Battalion commander. It is required that the half machine gun company will establish itself behind the position in such a way as to bring the northern shore of the Ariburnu-Kaba Tepe sector under fire.”

From that you have obviously drawn the inference: “For me it at the least explains two machine guns at Ari Burnu prior to the Landing.”

Hi Jeff,

This one.

Regards

Chris

[Jeff Pickerd]

Chris,

That is the one I thought it might be, Harvey Broadbent gives reference to it as being from the book of Major Halis Bey, "Canakkale Rapora", at page 91 of that book, not taken from Major Halis' diary. That is all I can tell you as I do not have a copy of the book, and unsure if it is published in English. I would have to assume that Major Halis was referring to Divisional orders prior to the 24th April, as by the morning of the 25th it was only the platoons of the 2nd Battalion who manned the Ari Burnu defences.

Jeff

[Crunchy]

Hi Jeff,

Canakkale Rapora is Hali's "diary", although it is not a diary as such. More a collection of the orders received and given. I have a copy from Halis's grandson (in Turkish). The documents on p91 are dated 14/15 March 1915. Entries for April start on p113.

Cheers

Chris

[stevenbecker]

Mates,

I was rereading my copy of Erickson's "Gallipoli" when I notice a strange coment on page 45, relating to reinforcements sent to the Fifth Army before April.

It states that "Ottoman Comand sent several MG Companies and four Jandarma Bn's and an artillery Bn".

Most accounts only mention the one Jandarma Bn (called the Bursa Bn) and that was with the 9th Div and reinforced Helles during the 26 April, but no mention of where or who the several MG companies were ?

But concidering the placement of units of the 5th Army, they could be anywhere on the Gallipoli peninsula or on the eastern side.

S.B

[Crunchy]

Hi Jeff,

Mesut has looked it up and replied:

In the old edition (1975, 2000) it is 25-27 March. it was the pre-Sanders defence period. So no great wonder to see the machine gun company at the coastline. But you know von Sanders enforced his concept at the end of March and machine gun formations were reassigned as part of strong reserves away from coastline. It is not an exact translation I should say some sort of a summary. The translator add some information not provided (like unit numbers) and neglected others (like the company at Kabatepe).

[Crunchy]

Steve,

The MG companies were a different branch to the infantry, so were not organic to the infantry regiment. They were assigned and re-assigned to an infantry regiment depending on the situation and need. This was largely because the Ottoman Army was 50 MG companies short of establishment.

The Turkish Official History show that machine gun companies were allotted to the following regiments at the time of the landings:
3rd Division - 32nd Regiment ( 31st and 39th regiments without machine guns)
5th Division - 13th, 14th and 15th regiments (full complement)
7th Division- 19th and 21st regiments (20th Regiment without machine guns)
9th Division - 25th and 27th regiments (26th Regiment without machine guns)
11th Division - 33rd Regiment (126th and 127th regiments without machine guns)
19th Division - 57th and 72nd Regiments (77th Regiment without machine guns)
Hence across the six divisions, they were short seven machine gun companies or 38% of the authorised establishment.

Ed has confirmed these allocations from his sources.

Regards

Chris

[gilly100]

Hi Jeff and Chris

Thanks on the clarification of Halis Bey references. Was worth the query from my standpoint, which is yet to change. Interesting also on Steve's post. Looking forward to all the records coming out.

Ian

[stevenbecker]

Chris,

Yes mate I agree with your outline of MG companies.

I believed either the 5th Army was sent these Regt MG companies from unknown Regts, or they were the Naval MG Companies raised from the German fleet.

As to the Naval MG Co's, I always thought they were raised after the British landings and not before?

And the Regt MG Co's where could they come from and where did they go?

But considering German/Turkish operations after Sanders took over they must have been used in reserve some where, possibly up north to counter the fake landings.

But your right the Turks had that narsty habit of detaching their MG companies and moving them around the place.

And with so few MG's in units, they were a valuble resourse that would never be left alone to be over run in advance positions, some thing the Turks never did during the war, they were always suroundered by troops and died hard defending them.

Thats why I am inclinded to dismiss these stories of MGs at Anzac, dispite the reseach I 've done in trying to prove there were..

S.B

[Crunchy]

Steve,

Naval MG Companies raised from the German fleet. As to the Naval MG Co's, I always thought they were raised after the British landings and not before?

My understanding on the German MG's is the same as yours. They were sent to Gallipoli after the landings, arriving sometime in May, but I haven't been able to pin down the date.

And the Regt MG Co's where could they come from and where did they go? I'll check with Ed, but I am pretty sure the MG companies mentioned by Ed ,as having been sent to the peninsula, were the one's attached to some of the infantry regiments, but I will check with him.

Concerning the "Regt MG Co's", as mentioned earlier, there were no "Regimental MG companies" per se. An MG company (different branch of service than infantry) would be attached to an infantry regiment when needed. Much like artillery would be attached to a brigade. One of the Turkish sources I read was critical of the fact that when the 26th Regiment replaced the 25th at Cape Helles, just prior to the landings, the MG company with the 25th wasn't passed to the 26th, but went into reserve with the 25th.

But considering German/Turkish operations after Sanders took over they must have been used in reserve some where, possibly up north to counter the fake landings. As above, I believe they were attached to regiments that didn't have them. I wonder how many MG companies Ed was writing about as being sent to Gallipoli.

And with so few MG's in units, they were a valuble resourse that would never be left alone to be over run in advance positions, some thing the Turks never did during the war, they were always suroundered by troops and died hard defending them.

Looking at the German doctrine of the day, which the Ottoman Army trained on, When employed as a battery they deployed much the same as an artillery battery in line abreast, with each pair assigned a specific target. In defence, while the guns could be placed in the firing line at the outset, the doctrine advocated holding them back as a fire reserve that could “respond quickly to a threatened point” and “with decisive effect”. The German regulations cautioned that while machine guns were excellent defensive weapons, "employing them in a static defence" ( pre-positioned in the firing line) rather than "an active one" (identifying the threat and then deploying them to where the need was greatest), deprived them of their mobility. When on the defensive, commanders were urged to use their machine guns as a fire reserve that could respond quickly to the threatened points.

While the preference was to concentrate the guns as a battery in line abreast or they could be detached in pairs, sited side by side, but never singly because of the tendency for the Maxim to jam, and hence the need to maintain fire on the assigned target. The photos of Turkish MGs deployed show this as well. When Sefik brought his attached MG company up he deployed them on Hill 165, but gave each platoon (two guns) a different task, one to support the 1/27th's attack on Lone Pine, and the other to support the 3/27th's push towards Mortar Ridge.

Thats why I am inclinded to dismiss these stories of MGs at Anzac, dispite the reseach I 've done in trying to prove there were..

I agree, but I have no doubt that some of the troops in the first two waves heard MG fire, but mistook the fire from the MG's on the steam pinnaces for Turkish MG's, especially with the noise reverberating from the high ground, thus they wrote what they believed at the time. It would have been a cacophony of noise. It was still pretty dark when they landed, and didn't become light until Plugge's Plateau was reached - civil dawn was at 4:55am - so they wouldn't have been able to see much. The only accounts I dismiss are those that can be proven to be a fabrication, such as Bert Facey's and SGT John Swain, and those who landed after the first two waves. Those in the third wave were on the transports and the fire they heard would have been the combined noise of the MG's on the pinnaces and the Turkish riflemen on the heights.

In Appendix 3 of my book, i looked at accounts of five men who "landed" at the same place (North Beach) LT Arthur Selby (11th Bn) said he didn't see any Turkish machine guns, and din't believe there were any, Bugler Dixon and LCPL Dixon (11th Bn) mention only rifle fire. Both Bert Facey (11th Bn) and SGT Swain (D Coy 12th Bn) both claim to have landed under machine gun fire - Swain also says they encountered 700 Turks on the beach and got stuck into them with bayonet before heading up the cliffs. However, Facey wasn't at the landing (his service record shows he was 3rd reinforcements and arrived on 7 May), while Swain was on a transport, and didn't get ashore until the heights were taken.

Cheers

Chris

[stevenbecker]

Chris,

Yes mate, I believe they may have come from Div's on the Thrace border, these being the closest formations (other then those at Constaople) .

But with the mistaken belief that the Russian may suport the British landings or that the Greeks may have a go, those units (Div's) were not comitted to Gallipoli for some time.

Its possibly some of these MG companies joined the formations near the fake landing. Then later rejoined there units or followed then to Gallipoli after being released?

Maps for the period don't always include MG Companies so where they went of where they came form will remain a mystery.

I refer to Div's like the 1st Div (which had three MG companies) and 2nd Div's (had only one MG Co) and the 6th Div (had three MG Cos).

Cheers

S.B

[Crunchy]

Thank you Steve. That makes sense.

Cheers

Chris