TURKISH MACHINE GUNS AT GALLIPOLI

[stevenbecker]

Gilly,

"some of the parts interchangeable with Brit Maxims and therefore stripped down and used and the remainder dumped"

Mate your right that may have happened but there is no record of that being done, does that disprove it wasn't done?

Well no, only there is no record.

Like wise this whole argument.

Accounts mention there being guns but no where are these guns shown captured, (but for the one or two guns mentioned captured bu aussie troops in the Ari Bunu area)?

Does that mean there was no guns?

Well no only none had been captured in the Fishermans Hut and Gaba Teppe areas.

You seam to be fixated on these possible Turkish naval MGs being in the area, but no where is there any proof these guns were in the Anzac Area?

I am also only condensing these 40 pages of coments by those interested in this subject, in all these pages we have still left with the original question but still no closer to an answer.

These Naval MGs are of cause interesting as its new information, but still not proof they are at Anzac, and your right we still need to dig deeper into what the Turks had but that detail is still not there and we still need to dig deeper untill a final answer.

But if there is no final answer and we see that there were no MGs at Anzac what would these accounts by aussie soldiers give us?

We already know the Turkish answer (there were no MGs) but your trying to justifiy aussie accounts without any evidence is just going round in circles.

Cheers

S.B

[michaeldr]

We already know the Turkish answer

SB,

Isn't the word 'partial' missing there

as in - We already know the partial Turkish answer

The full record from all the various Ottoman elements is not yet known

Even the infantry records which we do have are incomplete with regard to the placement of some of their other weapons

regards

Michael

[gilly100]

Hi Steve

Well we can agree to disagree. As we know, the new version relegates firsthand Allied naval and army accounts to the fabrication and mistaken identity dustbin. The full Turkish records remain incomplete in access, translation and availability and until such time as they are all out there I shall remain where I am. Murray has provided more historical record to the landing issue that raises pertinent questions. The door to the history of the landings is open, although some seem happy to have it closed. By the way, have you read the article yet?

Cheers

Ian

[michaeldr]

Commander Dix, in charge of the landing tows, specifically mentions an allied MG firing from the pinnace and a Turkish MG firing from land. Nobody has disproved his account. Suggesting he was 'too inexperienced' to tell the difference would be insulting.

Crossing 't's and dotting 'i's here Bryn, on behalf of those not familiar with the naval side of things

from The Naval Who's Who 1917

Dix C. C., Midshipman of 'Barfleur'; distinguished himself at the attack on the Taku Forts, June 1900, by rescuing a comrade and disposing of two Chinamen with his revolver; promoted to Lieutenant 15^th January 1903 for services in China. Lieutenant of 'Porpoise' during the operations in Somaliland. General East African Medal, Somaliland 1902-04 clasp; author of 'The World's Navies in the Boxer Rebellion'; qualified for Signal Duties 1910-11; Flag Lieutenant in First Battle Cruiser Squadron, February 1911, to February, 1913, in Third Battle Squadron, July, 1913 to June, 1914; and in First Battle Squadron , June, 1914; Commander, 31^st December, 1914; Commander of RN College Greenwich 1915; DSO 14^th March 1916

re the latter - “... was Assistant Beach Master, 'Z' Beach in the landing of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force on the Gallipoli Peninsula, 25^th - 26^th April 1915, and subsequently; commended for service in action (London Gazette, 16^th August 1915 and 14^th March 1916); the official report says:- 'Com. Dix was Assistant Beachmaster and later Beachmaster at Anzac and performed exceptionally good service under most trying conditions; was twice wounded.”

One of those wounds was referred to by Commodore Keyes in his letter of 30^th July 1915, addressed to his wife - “... and Dix, the NTO was wounded in the foot this afternoon – it is bad luck...!”

Charles C. Dix (1881-1951) later served on the Admiralty War Staff 1916-17; naval attaché Denmark 1917-1919; retired list 1919; entered colonial service 1926 serving in Barbados, Jamaica and the Straits Settlements, finally retiring in 1941.

regards

Michael

[stevenbecker]

Michael,

I am not saying any of these accounts are wrong, Byrn and Gilly and even me, if your read the first coments to this, all show aussie soldiers and some others reporting MGs firing at them and seeing flashes.

As stated the only MGs found or captured by aussie soldiers (these disappeared soon after capture) were in the Ari Bunu area?

Your right as are Gilly and Byrn "full record from all the various Ottoman elements is not yet known"

But we do know what is written by some of these Turkish officers there at that time and all say there were no MGs.

Can these unknown Turkish sourses show there were, I hope so, but as yet no luck.

The Naval MG coments are interesting but not proof there were there.

Will other Turkish sourse show there were, possibly or not?

So we are still left with unconfirmed reports and as stated by Gilly "relegates firsthand Allied naval and army accounts to the fabrication and mistaken identity dustbin"

I am not sure we can do that yet and look forward to what else can be found, but untill that date we are left with what Gilly gave us "relegates firsthand Allied naval and army accounts to the fabrication and mistaken identity dustbin"

Gilly,

Sorry no I have not seen this, and since you and others have failed to show what is written, even some of that evidence, then only if this does shows MGs on the beaches at Anzac, I am unsure how this suports your case?

Unless there is some copyright restrictions then why not quote some of this artical showing what he stated, thats Naval Mgs were placed on the Anzac beaches?

Cheers

S.B

[Bryn]

And again, it's not MY case - I am just not convinced that all those allied accounts, by all those reliable witnesses, could all be wrong on the exact same point. It's THEIR case. It's up to those disputing it to make the 'no MGs' case.

And Steve - we have not 'failed to show what is written.' It's up to everyone to stay informed; it's not up to me, or anyone else, to do others' research for them.

[gilly100]

Gilly,

Mate while we can agrree with most of this I am still not sure you can draw a line from coments like this "especially as a Turk POW stated that 9 Div got MG'S from Barbaros".

While yes addition MG Companies were attach to the 9th Div (or in fact the 5th Army) that should never be said that they went to Anzac or else where because as also stated Von Sanders didn't release these MG companies till after the landings.

I can agree with you that some of these MGs may have been given to the coastal defences including the Helles defences (in the 9th Div's AO) I can't see there showing up at Anzac, at lest as this was not seen as a possible landing area.

As we know Pom poms were at Gaba Tepe so could one ot two of these unknown Naval MGs have been sent to that area, then I am ready to concide that point even if they are not mentioned any where (in turkish sourses while aussie reports give MG fire from that direction) ,

but to say these missing MGS were all over the landing area (fishermans Hut to Gaba Tepe) reported by aussie Bns, in numbers of 4 or more MGS is not reasonible to say untill better evidence shows up.

Cheers

S.B

Hi Steve

This below from the Mitchell Report held in AWM. The report indicates the Turks certainly considered the Gaba Tepe area a place for enemy landings. Seems naval reconnaissance pre landing saw to that.

'Effects of Reconnaissance by Ships on Turks'

"The reconnaissances made by ships at this period were to some extent useful to the Turks in indicating the places where landings were most likely. Information had been received prior to the 25th April that an attack by land would take place, though the date was not known, and that 50, 000 Aust and NZers and 30, 000 French were concentrating at Mudros under Gen Hamilton. The officer in command of the Turkish troops on the peninsula and also a reliable Turkish staff officer both stated that the effect of our ships continually off the coast and coming so close in was to increase the certainty that landings would be made on the peninsula. Gaba Tepe was thought to be a certain landing place."

Just depends where one digs I guess, but all adds to the debate and to me assists the argument that available MGs from Navy were sent out along the coast to possible and or certain landing sites. Not saying it is proof, but certainly food for thought.

Cheers

Ian

[stevenbecker]

Mates,

No worries,

Keep the faith

S.B

[gilly100]

Michael,

Don't confuse transfer of command with ownership, manning, and mobility. If the Area of Responsibility had been allocated from the Fortress Command to an in situ Infantry Division it is highly logical to transfer those Fortress assets to "Under Command" of the Infantry Division. This is entirely logical at this point of the campaign when it is realised that the peace time forts organisation and responsibilities needs bolstering with infantry with defined Areas of Responsibility.

Assets transferred would be transferred complete, including the manpower and supplies. Remember the vast majority of the Ottoman Army soldiers were barely literate, if literate at all. More technical equipment and weaponry requires some literacy and much training to recall and understand the basic theory of small arms fire and ballistics, use range finders, remember and instantly recall Stoppage Drills and Immediate Action drills and so forth, skills and knowledge not necessarily held by the majority of infantry Nefer and Onbasi.

Similarly transferring physical assets without manpower creates huge problems, disrupting unit and sub-unit organisations, adding logistic problems, creating a significant training impost at a time when rehearsals and enhancing defensive field works are very important. Furthermore what happens to the personnel whom you have taken the weapons and equipment from? Sit around and play Canasta perhaps?

Ian,

"Could have" is not "Did" without reasonable evidence and at the moment I would grade it as F6 leaning to E5 on the Admiralty Grading system. Rather than just throwing random ideas out there could you develop the hypothesis. As for this hypothetical it is all well and good, but what about the anti-aircraft defence of those ships if they sortied out against the Allies, were they to leave themselves defenceless to the roving aircraft of the RNAS spotting indirect Royal Navy fire? I would very seriously question the Admiral approving the stripping of his 9ships AA defences and his suitability to retain command! The ships are very costly and important assets, militarily and politically, compared to the more esoteric defence of the coast line in places not yet known to be the intended landing sites of the enemy.

Cheers,

Hendo

Hendo

A google on Torgut Reis and Barbaros Hayreddin via Wikapedia gives up some interesting info with all the references footnoted. Seems some of the guns were indeed stripped, the reference saying 1914/1915, these no doubt bolstering fortress positions. I think it was directly after the attempt on the narrows on 18 March, which failed, that the guns were stripped. These two ships were little more than floating batteries and supply vessels. As for the ships armories, we already have Liman von Sanders and a Turkish Colonel confirming the use on land of their machine guns numbering two detachments of some 24 weapons, which tallies the MGs of these two ships. Could is fine by me and I will pass on the canasta.

Cheers

Ian

[green_acorn]

In reference to post 973

This from the book 'Central Powers Small Arms of World War' One by John Walter

"Second Rank Patterns"

"The older MG01 Maxims were restricted to training and fortification use after the MG08 became available in quantity, though survivors remained in service when WW1 began. Some of the original Kaiserliche Marine guns were still in service in 1914, shipboard guns having been issued with tripods instead of army style sleds. Photographs taken of the Emden machine gun crews defending Direction Island in November 1914 clearly show Deutsch Waffen und Munitionsfabriken made examples of the MG07 (the commercial designation for an improved form of the MG01) on tripod mounts."

I am not too fussed if the numbering is correct or not, merely satisfied that evidence exists that 'naval machine guns' were sent from Turkish Navy to the army for use at the landings. I note this book is referenced elsewhere on this forum.

Cheers

Ian

I don't know how you are using the Imperial German Navy's transfer of guns to the fortress role, and the actions of the Imperial German Navy Cruiser SMS Emden, as factual evidence of the Ottoman Navy actions on the Gallipoli Peninsula. It does seem a very long bow to me.

I think you will also find the Imperial German Navy controlled their own coastal defence forces, so the transfer doesn't seem odd. If it was in Germany.

Cheers,

Hendo

[gilly100]

Oh dear, and I thought Barbaros Hayreddin and Torgut Reis were Ottoman ships as of 1910, hence their names. I think Goeben and Breslau were also renamed. The former two were pretty much basket cases in terms of operational ability, hence the terms floating batteries and supply ships. Barbaros got to its fifteenth round (in a mid ship turret)on 25 April when the round blew up in the barrel. Torgut Reis did some shelling then went back to Istanbul, no doubt to pick up ammo for the 5th Army, something both ships had been doing for awhile.

Grab the book 'The Ottoman Steam Navy 1828-1923' by Langenspien and Guleryuz.

If you choose to ignore Liman von Sanders and the Turk Colonel previously mentioned in the thread, so be it.

Ian

[stevenbecker]

Gilly,

You mention " we already have Liman von Sanders and a Turkish Colonel confirming the use on land of their machine guns numbering two detachments of some 24 weapons"

And "If you choose to ignore Liman von Sanders and the Turk Colonel previously mentioned in the thread, so be it"

Sanders only confirms the addition of some MG Companies to the 5th Army, these have never been confirmed who they are, Crunchy and my self believed they may have been Army Companies attached to the units up here Sanos Bay, but its possible they were else where, but what ever Sanders mentions they were not deployed but in reserve?

Like wise the 24 Naval MGs from these ships seam a lot of MGs, and there placement to the defences is not stated other then suporting the Narrows or coastal forts, no where does he confirm there deployment of these Naval Mgs to the 9th Div other then the coatal defence forts in the 9th Div Area (Helles).

None are so far confirmed in the Anzac Area, so these reports (Sanders and Turkish Colonel) are not the smokinh gun your after.

Cheers

S.B

[gilly100]

Steve

And clearly you have not read the article yet. Smoking gun or not, the new evidence has not been seen previously or considered if seen, and clearly you choose to write off all Allied accounts, as well as von Sanders and this colonel. Perhaps go back over the last dozen posts or so and you will see what von Sanders said as well as the Turk colonel. Both indicate MGs coming from fortifications and fleet. Not from army. This is clear.

Gilly

[Bryn]

And there, Ian, is what I see as the weakest part of the 'no MG' argument, but also it's most commonly-used tactic: the immediate and automatic rejection of every single Allied account, whether those accounts are examined or not.

The automatic dismissal of everything that undermines the 'no MGs' position is really the only reply I see used in tying to discredit the many eye-witness accounts.

Nobody knows those witnesses could not recognise the sound of an MG because nobody knows what they did and saw every day of their lives. To pretend otherwise is, to put it politely, not a convincing argument.

As an example, and to name a very small number of the witnesses, nobody knows what Colonel Clarke, Commander Dix, Major Brereton, or Lieutenants Rafferty, Gostelow, or Scanlan did or saw or heard every day of their lives, or what they knew.

So how can anyone make a blanket statement like, "they couldn't recognise the sound of a machine gun"? If statements like that can't be proved then they should be seen for what they are; personal opinion backed by absolutely no evidence whatsoever.

I'll continue to post accounts here for the benefit of those with an open mind. However I have no illusions that some contributors see eye-witness accounts, and evidence such as Murray Ewen has uncovered, as inconvenient annoyances that just have to be written-off. That's not research..

[michaeldr]

Quote from Bryn:

So how can anyone make a blanket statement like, "they couldn't recognise the sound of a machine gun"? If statements like that can't be proved then they should be see for what they are; personal opinion backed by absolutely no evidence whatsoever.

May I follow-up on this one technical point – It's not really clear to me either, how the confusion of the weapons' sounds works in the Ottoman v Allied context.

I'm not a WF fronter, but as I understand it, the Germans did at times mistake British rifle fire for MGs. This seems to refer to the British professional army which went over to F & F very early in the war. These British professional soldiers benefited from the training at Hythe instigated by Hamilton when, to quote his biographer, “A British soldier fired seven times more ammunition on the ranges at Hythe than any conscript in any other European army.”

If the Turkish army of 1915 had reached the same height of proficiency as the British professional army of late 1914, then their infantryman would be able to fire 15 aimed rounds per minute.

The Turkish infantryman carried 120 rounds which were held in the two pouches on his belt:

1 pouch on each side – each pouch has three pockets – each pocket holds four clips of five rounds so that each pouch has 60 rounds and the soldier has 120 rounds on his belt.

A further 30 rounds were carried under the flap of his knapsack

Total 150 rounds per rifleman.

If the Turkish/German Maxim fired 300 rounds per minute, then 20 riflemen firing together at 15 rounds per minute could emulate its rate of fire for 8 minutes. There would then be a brief hiatus while they scrabbled in their knapsack flap for the extra 30 rounds, which would then give them a further 2 minutes fire.

After these frantic 10 minutes, what happened next?

Colonel Williams states that he saw a machine-gun firing through a hole in the wall of Sedd ul Bahr fort at 0635.

If he was mistaken, and 20 Turkish infantrymen were in fact crammed into this particular hole, then, what happened after 06.45?

Michael

[Bryn]

Thanks for the information you provided on Commander Dix, Michael. Very interesting that he'd fought at Taku.

Maybe it'd be best to consider Occam's Razor when faced with two or more explanations for a single event, in that it's most likely to be the simpler explanation that is in fact true. In this case, is it more likely to have been a machine gun, as described by a witness, poking out of a hole in the wall, or twenty rifle muzzles?

Same on No. 2 Outpost. A gun, as described by witnesses, or a platoon of riflemen all dropping their cartridge cases in the same pile?

And playing devil's advocate for a minute, if it IS considered legitimate to question every allied witness's ability to tell rifle fire from machine gun fire, I could, surely, just as legitimately question every Ottoman soldier's ability to keep up the rate of fire necessary to be mistaken for a machine gun. Can't see the difference really - I have no idea what each and every individual rifleman could do, but if I'm allowed the same leeway that others have assumed in dismissing allied accounts, that shouldn't stop me rubbishing the idea anyway.

[gilly100]

Hi Bryn and Michael

Murray addressed this in his article. From 'The Book of the Machine Gun' by Longstaff and Atteridge

"In 1904 Captain Vuilleumier of the Staff of the Swiss Army, published a very interesting study of the action of machine gun against infantry. When it is a case of keeping up prolonged and rapid fire the MG at once asserts its superiority over the man who becomes tired, nervous or excited when he has to keep up a rapid fire for any length of time...

And

"A body of infantry soldiers firing the same number of bullets will include a wide diversity of temperaments. As each man reloads and brings his rifle to the shoulder he will have to take a new aim; and experience shows that there are few men who, in the excitement of battle, fire with anything approaching the steadiness of a fairly good shot on the rifle range."

Cheers

Ian

[Guest]

Some of these veterans were convinced they were being fired on by machine-guns (doesn't mean they were, or weren't?) Well worth a watch though.

Click

Mike

[stevenbecker]

Gilly,

As stated by you;

"Liman von Sanders, according to his own idea had ordered barbed wire to be drawn below the water along the shore. In this his assailants got entangled and suddenly the machine guns of the death defying Turkish garrison which one had believed smashed, held a rich harvest in the confusion. All available machine guns of the fortifications of the Dardanelles and of the fleet were disposed of."

From Murrays article and referring to a lecture given by a former Turkish officer in 1932 on the anniversary of von Sanders' death. Colonel Harun-el-Raschid Bey.

This clearly indicates fortress command around Cannakale that Michael was onto years ago, as well as MG's coming from the navy. Does a Turkish source carry more weight than a Brit one"?

Mate no way does either of these statements show MGs at Anzac.

As I have said befrore these show there may have been guns sent to suport the Coastal defences in the forts along the narrows including Helles, but so far none are mentioned as being sent to Anzac

So your idea that its hepls (Sanders and the Turkish Colonel) that MGS could have been at Anzac is false.

UNtill more evidence shows up I can't see it helps the case for MGS at Anzac.

S.B

[gilly100]

And once again (boring now), read the article Steve. In its entirety.

Ian

[Bryn]

Ian - it's apparent that no amount of evidence has, or will, change some of the minds on this forum. Lots of evidence exists to support the presence of MGs at the landing. Murray's research opens new possibilities to discover where they came from.

Regarding not being able to access Murray's article - if I went onto the 'Western Front' threads and expected to be taken seriously, especially in controversial matters, I'd at least be a member of the Western Front Association and receive their journal, and be able to read and respond to articles written in it. If somebody is not a member of the Gallipoli Association, and so does not receive 'The Gallipolian,' that of course is a disadvantage to them, but that's not someone else's fault - I think that, if you're really serious about the study of Gallipoli, join up!

[gilly100]

I agree Bryn, but Murray has already explained where these guns came from by quoting von Sanders himself and backed up by the Turkish colonel. Then there is the POW intel that further assists the argument. This is the trigger to delve further into the hard to access Turk records. I note another thread mentions only three Westerners having been given access to the Turk records. Anyone can dive into ours merely by logging onto the net and downloading for free. What isnt digitised is still available for viewing, as it should be. The tax payers of Australia pay for it one way or another. The Brit records are excellent and available also.

Ian

[gilly100]

This from AWM38 Bean diaries, notebooks and folders regarding evidence from Captain Tulloch of B Coy, 11Bn AIF

"Landed at A. Fire was coming from a sheer position high up on the left where the Turks had a circular trench apparently round the edge of the end of the knuckle. This was apparently the same MG fire which knocked out the boats on the left. They got into single file up what Maj Tulloch takes to have been Walkers Ridge.....

..... Tulloch pushed on over the Nek. Turks were sniping from the east side of the head of the left fork of Monash Gully so a few men worked round over the Nek and dislodged them from their flanks-probably shot them. This left the coast clear - the firing had been nasty from these men. Tullochs party of about 60 pushed over the Nek - in groups and on the other side extended facing towards their objective (about NNE). There were about 7 to 10 paces between the men. They worked over rolling scrubby country and on the second crest from there (probably the first hill which had two crests) they had a stiff firefight with Turk rifles and one MG......

Another credible and often quoted witness and participant, who related to Bean MG fire. He goes on to mention later fighting and subsequent MG fire, although this would have been later in the morning when Turk reos had arrived.

Ian

[stevenbecker]

Gilly,

you keep repeating this false statement;

"but Murray has already explained where these guns came from by quoting von Sanders himself and backed up by the Turkish colonel"

Wrong Sanders didn't say where these guns came from (or who they were) and no the Turkish Colonel didn't give where these guns went other then coastal defences?

That doesn't mean Anzac Cove or any where near it?

S.B

[gilly100]

This regarding machine guns on 400 plateau, from correspondence to Bean by Lt Thomas of 9Bn AIF

'After going forward about 100 yards, we came upon one Krupp gun and a quantity of ammunition, and saw one Turk make a quick exit down the gully. I left Cpl Bell in charge of this gun with a few men, and made towards the earthworks. On reaching same, Harrison and his section came forward. I found in this locality another gun and much ammunition, and laying about were several dead Turks, including one Turkish officer who died just as I reached him, having been shot by by Harrison through the head. Also lying about 50 yards in front of the gun were two dead mules and a dead Turk with the reins still clasped in his hands. Both mules carried packs, and in one of these was a quantity of SAA and on the other, a machine gun.'

This marries up with the account from the book on 9th Battalion called 'From Anzac to the Hindenburg Line.' The account in the book mentions the men from one party coming under mg fire on approach and in a small roofed shelter subsequently finding within, books, papers and spare parts for machine guns.

In David Cameron's 2007 book on the Landing he names the Turk officer killed by Harrison of 9Bn.

I hope he does not recant all this in his latest book.

Steve, let's continue to agree to disagree in this rather robust debate. I wish someone could effectively explain away all these accounts. Surely a Krupp mountain gun looks like anything but a tripod mounted mg with SAA in boxes nearby.

Will see if I can dig up some more gems to add to this.

Gilly