TURKISH MACHINE GUNS AT GALLIPOLI

[gilly100]

Hi Steve

I knew this series was coming out while in Perth recently and I saw the colour patches in the shorts. A few friends have emailed about it already. Wonder who was providing the historical consults. Don't have it here in Bali so will have to wait.

Of course, the presence or not of mgs on the beach may well be irrelevant if they can't get the colour patches correct in context of landing times. Then again, if they were Naval mgs on tripod mounts I might smile! Might be pushing you know what uphill for that though. Only one person in 100 years has worked that one out, for Anzac at least. As Harvey said, history is fluid.

Ian

[Jeff Pickerd]

Steve & Gilly,

Watched the first episode also and it was far better than I expected, although very graphic and quite gruesome in its depiction of the hand to hand bayonet fighting. Seems that the writers have done their research well, getting most details to the Australian landing correct, my first impression to that aspect was to notice the majority of men landing with the general service cap rather than slouch hats.

As to the colour patch worn by the battalion, I thought it to be the 10th Battalion (dark blue over pale blue), but it could have been also the 9th or 11th Battalions. The 3rd Brigade's pale blue colour most definitely shown as the bottom colour.

I would have to agree with you Steve about the depiction of the landing, to my mind the most accurate and authentic portrayal of that I have yet seen filmed, few casualties and no Turkish machine gun fire upon the beaches. Accords with some landing accounts, but naturally not all.

Jeff

[gilly100]

Hi Jeff

Well am glad the colour patches got sorted. Saxe blue was the true blue colour you mention. As to the landing accounts, as you now know the vast majority were liars and or were completely mistaken and too inexperienced to know anything. So glad it was the small handful of accounts that only mentioned rifle fire that they used for this show. With our limited weapons and our faith and all that blah blah. Never let a machine gun get in the way of a good story.

Enjoy it while it lasts, hopefully not too long.

Ian

[moggs]

I was wondering when someone was going to mention the new show. And interestingly, I thought of this thread when I saw the opening scenes without the mgs and agree about the use of the service cap.

Yes, there were some, perhaps, overdone gory effects but I liked the impact they created.

I read on one of the online preview blogs (I was searching for comments from viewers) that the creators of the show knew they were tampering with fact when dealing with the who and the where in terms of battalion reality. What they are after, I suppose, is creating the impact of the whole affair through the eyes of a few rather than the many who truly were there.

Speaking of the few, I was surprised at the few numbers of men seemingly present on the beaches. Those scenes were not chaotic enough in my view.

Other issues I have include the ordinary CGI backgrounds (they don't fit together at all) and the overly theatrical acting/direction with the officers in particular. For a show that espouses high production values some aspects looked very cheap.

Sorry for hijacking the OP, I was just responding to recent posts.

Jonathan

[stevenbecker]

Mates,

Yes I thought at first viewing, that the unit and men looked like we are following the 12th Bn AIF.

Since most of the fighting takes place around the areas it fought up on Baby 700.

Capt Taylor I thought maybe the real Capt Lalor (although I saw no sword)?

The colour patch by my TV looked like Green and White?

But I'll go with your ideas as the show looks like a unit of the 3rd Bde (landed in dark) rather then 2Bde around 0600 and 1st Bde later that morning around midday.

Cheers

S.B

[gilly100]

As evidenced by Cpl Weatherill DCM 10Bn scouts 25 April 1915. See attachment.

How does one explain this one away? Not another liar surely?

From amongst Beans wonderful diaries and notebooks as mentioned earlier.

Ian

[bacon]

The landing experience was certainly different depending on which area your boat actually grounded. The men whose boats grounded in the far north had a very different experience to those who grounded at anzac cove or hells spit. I guess it depends which unit they chose to follow for that documentary?

With all the Allied naval and air activity going on in the months before the landings, and the massive movement of troops, its inconceivable that the Germans and Ottomans did not know what was coming. Of course they did!!!!! They were not idiots!

The western coast would have absorbed all sorts of last minute defenses in expectation of the very well understood and expected.... great raid.

[Steven Broomfield]

How does one explain this one away? Not another liar surely?

I've been vaguely following this thread and I have to say using the word "liar" is a little perjorative. I think the worst allegation is that inexperienced troops might have been mistaken; I'm not sure anyone's accusing anyone of lying about what they might or might not have faced.

Mind you, I used to enjoy browsing the ALH Forum. Such fun.

[gilly100]

Interesting, if one claims to have taken apart an enemy tripod mounted mg on first ridge and thrown the weapon down a cliff, but indeed the Turks had no mgs at the early landings according to this new version and we are to believe that, then surely that is a little more than mistaken. Let's call a spade a spade, not a shovel.

Of course, for my part, Weatherill was telling exactly what happened. His scout officer Talbot-Smith who was with him knew what a tripod mounted mg was. He operated one later that day before falling mortally wounded.

Agreed Bacon, the Turks got well prepared in terrain they knew very well. More to this story.

Ian

[gilly100]

And that 4 gun battery on 400 plateau was recorded as 7 gun battery on this pre landing intel map. Must be those pesky 10pdr Hotchkiss mtn guns we mentioned awhile back that don't appear in any Turk records, just ours.

Apologies to Bill, I pinched the image off his Bean Landing myth thread, recently revived.

Ian

[gilly100]

This from Hooper of 5Bn regarding trying to get the enemy Hotchkiss gun into action, the well covered emplacements they held until around 11.30 that night of the first day. Hooper later was killed at Lone Pine in August.

This was on Pine Ridge as evidenced by Derham, another 5Bn officer. Are these guys wrong, mistaken, telling porkies, what then?

See attachment

Ian

[bacon]

Awesome work Ian, you're a hard man to keep down.

Normally you would think that the men on the ground deserve some kind of respect for their observations, especially when coming from more than one source.

I would say that their reports are highly reliable......

Edited 29 March , 2015 by bacon

[gilly100]

Bacon

With all the current interest with the upcoming centenary of the Landing, numerous new accounts have been surfacing, especially 11Bn from WA. They all say the same thing, especially the lads off the destroyers. Rifle and mg fire. Pretty much lost count now. One also has to hand it to Bean, he knew how to dig and make note.

As a by the by, I note the Sefik Aker account talks of some of one platoon up on second ridge, fearing getting cut off, made their way down to Fisherman's Hut to join up with the platoon there. This is what George Mason 11bn said. In all the new books out of late that run the no mg argument, do any of them mention this important point? The fighting that took place down that way later in the day does not have much coverage from either side, although Broadbent relates elements of the 57th got decimated fighting down there. Its a part of the first day that needs greater inspection.

Ian

[bacon]

You are right about the lack of information about this area of the fighting in the first days. I also believe that the fighting there was more severe and involved than the limited accounts give it credit for.

[gilly100]

Mistaken again or perhaps not?

Probably 400 plateau/pine ridge area

Ian

[bacon]

This topic is a little weird.

Normally you have the 'official' papers adjusted by the observations of the men on the ground. The visual, on the ground feedback is paramount. Here, we have a uniformly unreliable single Ottoman account trumping the several dozen observations of officers and men on the ground. One distant and unreliable report trumps multiple observations from dozens of reliable visuals on the deck. Go figure that for weird. It sounds to me like the armchair donkeys analyse us away from expert witnesses yet again.

[gilly100]

As we, apparently, cannot rely on ANY Aussie and Royal Navy mens accounts, we therefore must accept the Ottoman records uncovered THUS far. I look forward to further rigorous research taking place so that this new yarn can finally be recanted. Seems it applies to Helles as well. Oh dear.

We can of course believe our mens accounts sometime after 8am that day on second ridge. Then they knew an enemy mg, apparently.

Ian

[Guest]

You can download this interesting letter, (a first-hand account of the Gallipoli landings from Captain CA Milnard) free from the National Archives Click

Mike

[stevenbecker]

Bacon and others,

"we have a uniformly unreliable single Ottoman account trumping the several dozen observations of officers and men on the ground"

Sorry but your question is also unreliable.

First we have a number, yes small number of Turkish first hand accounts, which all agree, even if writen at differents times, that there were no MGs during the landing that morning.

Also the Offical Turkish records also say this?

We are stuck with these sourses because unlike our own forces, most turks there could not read or write, other then the officers, and most of these were killed or wounded that morning.

The only Turkish soldier accounts come years later and were written by someone else for them.

I am sorry but when you say "uniformly unreliable single Ottoman account" you leave your self open to the same questions

"uniformly unreliable Allied accounts"

When a Aussie soldiers mentions "destroying four MGS", you have to ask your self did he?

But Just as you find Turkish accounts unreliable, I find many aussie accounts unreliable.

That's is not to say that what the aussie writers are say in incorrect, only what that are seeing maynot be what was on the ground or what they are hearing was Turkish.

Since both sides used maxims I find that sounds can play tricks with the mind?

But your right that' doesn't account for all these MGs that show up in the records, which if correct how number over 10 or more?

Its amazing that such numbers were not mentioned by Turkish writers when there support would have or should have tipped the scales that morning?

We may never know the true story, even if Turkish records give an answer, will we believe it?

Since you still fail to address Turkish accounts and only believe our own accounts?

Just to add

2nd Battalion: commander (?) (Maj Ismet & Capt Mustafa Efendi KIA 25-4-15 to Capt Faik Efendi (some accounts place Capt. Halis (Ataksor) Efendi as commander 2Bn at Anzac?)

• - Lt. Mahmut Efendi (5Co) (KIA 25-4-15), Capt. Refik Efendi (possibly 6Co?), Capt. Asım Efendi (possibly 7Co?), Capt. Faik Efendi (8Co?) (wrote an account) (8Co had only 3 of 89 men survived) (Capt Rıza Efendi 5Co KIA 26-4-15)

- - - team commanders: Under Lt. Mustafa, Officer cadet Mthat, Under Lt. İsmail Hakkı, Under Lt. İbrahim Hayrettin (2 platoon 8Co wrote account of that first day), Under Lt. Muharrem, NCO Master Sargeant Süleyman

Of all these offiers that morning two made accounts that survive concidering the number of losses they suffered that day.

Cheers

S.B

[gilly100]

Weatherill's account can hardly be taken as 'mistaken'. Nor can many others. Call it for what it is or don't call it at all.

Ian

[Rockturner]

Stand your ground boys, for sooner or later the day will come when one side or the other will have to admit they got it wrong.

Let's just make sure we try and get it right in the end for the sake of all those who were there and now lay under a head stone, or rate a panel at Lone Pine Memorial.

It's business as usual today but in a week's time the only sounds will be Turkish tourist coaches running up and down the coast, the gentle lap of the water on the stoney beach at

Ari Burnu and the chirps of the local bird population.

Lest we Forget

LonerangerVC

[bacon]

First we have a number, yes small number of Turkish first hand accounts, which all agree, even if writen at differents times, that there were no MGs during the landing that morning.

Also the Offical Turkish records also say this?

We are stuck with these sourses because unlike our own forces, most turks there could not read or write, other then the officers, and most of these were killed or wounded that morning.

The only Turkish soldier accounts come years later and were written by someone else for them.

So i guess you are saying that your Ottoman records are singularly flawed.......well yes..... i can see thats exactly what you are saying without admitting it. So lets finally admit that these sources are singularly unreliable...isnt that just what i said in my post?

I dont have any such excuses or flaws in my evidence. Evidence for machine guns is multiple, detailed, sourced from several directions and highly cognizant with the experience of the men and the evidence on the ground. Steve this is still a one way contest and not yet a debate people should be writing books about.

The presence of machine guns wins hands down and we should be directing our energy into trying to understand why the flimsy, limited and disjointed 2nd hand accounts from turkish records even get a look in.....

[Guest]

For anyone interested in this debate, the recently published book by Richard van Emden and Stephen Chambers "Gallipoli: The Dardanelles Disaster in Soldiers' Words and Photographs" is an interesting read. The book understandably leans very heavily on first-hand accounts by eyewitnesses. The Author(s) state that the participants were mistaken and the there were no MGs at the landings. This is an interesting conclusion given the accounts they have chosen to include mention MGs at the landings. The implication is that these accounts are reliable except when describing Turkish MGs.

A number of the long passages that are quoted do mention Turkish MGs very early on. Some of the quotes are familiar and have appeared on this thread some time ago, but some are new; The most notable ones coming from the RNAS Armoured Car team (3rd RNAS Armoured Car Sqn) situated at the very front of the SS River Clyde. There is one very graphic account by an RNAS Petty Officer (Fyffe) describing the exact location of a Turkish MG in Sedd-el Bahr fort and how they tried unsuccessfully to knock it out with their own MGs. It was eventually obliterated by RN shellfire,which the RNAS man describes in fine detail. Personally I find this particular account of the MG duel the most compelling anecdotal evidence. The idea that this team could not recognise an MG or MG fire observed with field glasses from a very short distance really does stretch one's imagination. That he chose to single out this episode and describe it in fine detail is particularly interesting. The MGs are not mentioned in passing, they are deliberate focus point of his narrative.

What also struck me was the level of detail in Petty Officer Fyffe's account when describing other events happening on the beach and in the immediate vicinity. It was consistent in every detail with other accounts. He was described by colleagues as being very calm throughout. He and his RNAS colleagues probably had the best view of the landings being high up, as close as one could be to the action, protected behind sand-bags and armoured plating, had field glasses, wide arcs of unobstructed observation and were static - factors, when combined, that were fairly unique to this team. Two of them left accounts.

It is well worth a read. I would be interested to hear if anyone else reading Fyffe's account thinks he was mistaken. MG

[gilly100]

Thanks for the update Martin.

I do not have this book, but is on my wish list. To be honest, the whole area of Cannakale or Dardanelles Fortified Command Zone has been largely overlooked. Several interested parties have hinted at this and what we know thus far screams they sourced 37mm pom poms AND mgs from Ottoman Navy prior to the landings. Plenty of weapons were made available for the worst kept secret of an amphibious landing. I think thats where this naval mg came from. The level of quality accounts from the Allied side far outstrips Ottoman records, both at Helles and Anzac. Patience is a virtue I am told. Far from decided this issue. I look forward to those that have recanted their previous works, recanting once more, and that historical accuracy prevails.

Ian

[michaeldr]

quote from Martin: I would be interested to hear if anyone else reading Fyffe's account thinks he was mistaken. MG

I for one don't think that he was mistaken and his account's placing of this machine-gun coincides exactly with that mentioned by Lt-Col W. de L. Williams at 06.35 hrs (ie 7 minutes after the River Clyde ran ashore) see the British OH Vol.I, p.232

The old post below will remind us exactly how close these two men were to where they saw that machine-gun

In the above sketch by Congdon, the machine gun on the right flank is noted as having been taken out only on the 26^th by the Albion (as also noted in the Naval OH).
Perhaps the clearest reference to this gun came from Lt-Col W. de L. Williams who also mentions the exact time when he first saw it.
Williams was part of the General Staff, GHQ, and he was on the bridge of the River Clyde.
Quote from the British OH:
6.35 A.M. - Connection with shore very bad. Only single file possible and not one man in ten gets across. Lighters blocked with dead and wounded. Very little fire on this ship. Wedgwood's maxims in bows firing full blast, but nothing has been seen excepting a maxim firing through a hole in the fort and a pom-pom near the sky-line on our left front.” (my emphasis)

As you will see from the photograph below, Williams obviously had a good view from the bridge of the River Clyde, which he notes was not attracting much fire at that time. His position up on the ship's bridge must have put him level with the machine gun's position in the fort, giving him a clear line of sight.



The aerial shot below was taken in January 1916 and I use it here only to indicate the position of the River Clyde relative to the fort.



We are talking here about a very few hundreds of yards between the ship and the fort. Certainly less than 600 which is the distance represented by the side of the red squares on the map below.



I suggest that an experienced staff officer like Williams is unlikely to have made a mistake in identifying this gun seen at such a close range. He was right about the pom-pom, which was eventually captured, and I think that he was also right in this case too.

My copy of the Chambers/van Emden book has just arrived and I am going through it now - it's fantastic! with lots of photographs which have never been published before and the many, many, excellent quotes from private diaries and letters.

regards

Michael