TURKISH MACHINE GUNS AT GALLIPOLI

[stevenbecker]

Mate,

Of cause I am relating Turkish accounts at Anzac not Helles where there were MGS in the defences.

At Anzac many of these so called accounts of MGS can be placed after a certain time when the MG companies arrived to support there the 2Bn 27th Regt.

Automadic weapons were known to be with Turkish forces to the flanks at Gaba Tepe which fired into our troops, no confirmed MGs were brought in to confirm the capture during the morning even if our troop reported over running them.

Skipmans account by Captain CA Milnard, only stated, MGs could be heard, not that he saw them?

Sorry I missed Weatherill's account, but I also don't disregard his account, only there no confirmation of this gun, like others, he did capture this gun or saw this gun.

But again we go in circles.

Sorry but if you disregard Turkish accounts but regard Allied accounts, you do fail to address what was going on.

While I can't agree with all allied accounts at Anzac. there must be some reason behind them seeing all these weapons, which we are not seeing what it is?

Lets take a look at one account research by Jeff Pickard about the Nek;

Quote

"“THE AUGUST OFFENSIVE, AT ANZAC, 1915” by David W. Cameron, Australian Army Campaigns Series – 10, Army History Unit, Canberra, 2011, is the next publication in line to use a form of the quote, and this found at the second paragraph, page 69.
“At this point the telephone rang at the front line and all watched as an officer conducted a heated conversation before putting down the receiver. The officer looked down the line at his men and, breaking into a smile, shouted, ‘Stand down, men!”
Although in the above publication the incident is not attributed to Trooper Jack Cox by David Cameron, it clearly has its derivation from his 2009 book “Sorry, Lads, But The Order Is To Go”, UNSW Press, as noted in the reference section titled “Further Reading “, where at the section, 7th August, PART 3: chapter 13 – ‘Goodbye, I don’t think I’ll be coming back from this one’ (The charge at The Nek), page 195.
“Trooper Jack Cox was waiting in the fourth line convinced he was about to die. He recalled: ‘(I was) lost in my own thoughts, thinking about my wife with whom I had never really known the joys of married life...’ (Chapter 13 reference number 44). At this point the telephone rang and he watched as an officer had an intense conversation before putting down the receiver. The officer looked down the line at his men and breaking into a smile shouted: ‘Stand down, men!’ (Chapter 13 reference number 45).”
Here he has used the quote of this incident from Jonathan King, published in the 2006 book “Gallipoli Diaries, The Anzacs’ Own Story Day by Day”, Kangaroo Press, at pages 142/143. (Cameron’s chapter 13 reference numbers 44 & 45). “Thinking he was going to die, Trooper Jack Cox of the fourth wave said he had been ‘lost in my own thoughts, thinking about my wife with whom I had never really known the joys of married life and my time in similar battles in the Boer War. But Cox had seen the phone ring and saw the officer doing a lot of talking. He saw the officer replace the receiver, look down the line and break into a smile shouting ‘Stand down, men!” (Quote - J. King)"

Jeff explanes;

There is a very simple explanation as to why this incident is a myth; Trooper Jack Cox was not there!
The quoted Trooper Jack Cox was not ever a member of the 10th Light Horse Regiment, or any other unit of the 3rd Light Horse Brigade; he was in fact Pte Arthur John Cox No.85, “A” Sqdn, 4th Light Horse Regiment. He was neither in the fourth line of the charge at the Nek nor present in the trenches on Russell’s Top, 7th August; nor likely to have ever set foot upon that particular sector of Anzac prior to that date. In fact at that time he was a member of the 4th LH Regt reinforcement to the 11th Infantry Battalion at Ryrie’s Post, and from his service record it shows that he was wounded in the right shoulder by shrapnel on the 6th August during the Turkish attack on Leane’s trench, and evacuated from Anzac Cove onboard the Hospital Ship “Ascania”, 7th August, the morning of the said incident taking place. On another note, there were no phones in the firing line trenches on Russell’s Top, 7th August; the closest phone to the front line was the ‘AW’ phone at the 3rd Light Horse Brigade’s forward headquarters in the ‘White Street’ trench, about fifty meters behind the firing line, the same command dugout that housed the Brigade Major, Lt Col Jack Antill.

So can we always believe first hand accounts weather Allied or Turkish?

Now you seam to disregard Turkish accounts but believe almost impossible allied accounts?

And I believe Turkish accounts but don't believe most of these Allied accounts?

Can I say we are both wrong?

And the Truth may lie in between, some where?

S.B

[gilly100]

Hi Steve

I think you will find many Turk historians saying no mgs at Helles judging from what I have been reading of late. I thought Murray Ewen's article gave the best hope so far of where the mgs came from pre landings. Very few writers of recent books on the landings have gone into any real depth on what role the Ottoman Navy and Fortified Zone Command had by way of weapons and manpower contribution for 25 April, and yet the Ottoman 9th Div had been under the latters command for a period leading up to the landings, someone else may tell us the dates.

Discrepancies in Turk accounts need looking at. I think 27 Regt accounts are quite insular, relating mostly to their own doings. Aker talks of the Mantelli at Gaba Tepe expending an exact quantified amount of various types of shells and the excellent effect they had on those coming ashore, yet Mesut Uyar's book talks of these weapons as antiquated and not much good, having been cobbled together from Fortified Command and placed at perceived landing zones. Spare parts apparently little or none, yet our blokes find spare mg parts on 400 plateau and Shepherds Hut. But then I have to remind myself that our blokes accounts are wrong and unreliable.

Mason of 11bn has his account almost totally discounted, yet his recollection of Turks retreating off Russels Top down Malones to Fishermans Hut marries up very nicely with Sefik Akers totally credible account.

I remain unconvinced on this now widely accepted version, both for Anzac and Helles. I would be interested if Erickson, who I think, did place mgs at Helles in earlier works, says otherwise now. I do not have his new work. So many books to look at present!

Cheers

Ian

[bacon]

Steve the issue here for me is the flimsy evidence ottoman sources offer either way. Ottoman sources require far more detail and exploration before they even come close to matching the detail of allied sources. There is as yet no comparison in their academic research reliability and detail.

Your single story about an account of an attack at the Nek has no relevance to the debate on hand. You cannot be seriously comparing the reliability of ONE diary account relating to the NEK attack with the myriad cross referenced accounts coming from several sources about MGs at the landing.

I do take serious consideration of any evidence available, but quite simply, I err on caution with everything until i see cross threads supporting statements. Thus far ottoman records offer such flimsy quality as to negate decisions that could possibly influence historical policy. Thus far they do not offer the detail to bring about any breach in issues of MGs at anzac.

I offer this:

You no doubt know of the story of Seyit Cabuk(single handedly carried 275kg shells and sank a battleship.

His story is manufactured by the Turkish state in the 1920's. The way his 'heroism' was constructed by the state and supported by the media in Turkey during the 1920's gives fair warning to any researcher basing their theories on any post war 'official' Turkish accounts. The guy never lifted any shells, when posed for photographs, he couldnt even lift the fake wooden ones the govt made for him, in the end they had to hollow out the wooden shells before he could pose. A little bit of sifting also shows that he never operated a gun that was in a position to fire on any of the ships claimed. But lets not let a good marketing story get in the way of an officially designed hero. His 'never happened' exploits are now mainstay history in Turkey, its accepted as a real story on Wikipedia and in several other documents. The fact that his unit was stationed in the wrong place at the wrong time to do the things it was said they did. The fact that, after the war, when he was asked to repeat a feat that never happened, he quite realistically couldnt do it...... All of this is irrelevant. Its now official policy. There are statues to him, official books written, and no doubt movies will be made.

For most professional historical researchers this type of development makes us wary of post war revision and documenting.

Now dont even get me started on the beautiful words of Atatturk etched on stone at Ari Burnu......

I can remember gallipoli before it became the almost circus site it is today. 30 years ago I did field research there for almost 2 years. It was a pristine site still, many old battlefield constructions still there (before the bulldozers came to 'clean' up the site for the 75th anniversary).

Im sure there are people who see the Turkish cemeteries believe they are real. So its strange for me to see all these newly constructed Turkish cemeteries with no one buried under the purely decorative headstones...........the names are of as much a fantasy as the cemeteries are themselves.

Seeing how all this has developed makes one tremble at the revisionism of it all.

This is why trusting the seriously limited & flimsy accounts you put so much blind trust in....well its not smart. Some seriously detailed and cross referenced first hand accounts need to come on hand before you can seriously challenge the allied first hand accounts.

My friendship with Adil sahin in the 80's is also enlightening. We often talked about the landing as he remembered it. Although we never talked specifically about machine guns, as it was rather an irrelevant thing at that time, he did make many references to being supported by guns. What that meant im not sure but I will have to talk about that in another reply.....running out of time here.

Best wishes to all

[stevenbecker]

Bacon,

Mate I agree, we should take all first hand accounts, both Turkish and Allied sources with care.

But I think for Turkish writers not to mention MGs during the morning is far from concusive there were MGs there?

As stated by Crunchy, and Any look at Turkish sources confirms, that MGs were an important sub unit in a formation, the same could be said for our own forces.

These were important weapons that were accounted for in detail because there were not a lot of them in the forces at that time.

They were mentioned in most works because of that importance.

So for a Turkish writer not to mention them on the field during the morning, yes from the limited sources we have.

There must be some reason?

I can think of no reason why the Turkish writers would not mention the support of MGs, if they were there, since the 2Bn 27th Regt was chased up the steep Hills of Anzac?

But how do we account for all the mentions by aussie wrtiers of seeing and over running these guns?

I don't know?

S.B

[bacon]

I believe that the limited Ottoman sources presently available DO NOT discount the application and use of machine guns in at least 3 areas. To leap to the conclusion that they do, in the face of so much overwhelming evidence from allied accounts would be just silly.

But you are right to say that there is something not quite right going on here. Something was happening that we cannot yet see on that 'other side of the fence', and as Gilly points out, until such records come on hand that show us more detail on the other side of that fence, we need to stay fixed on the strongest evidence we have available.

I believe that the Ottoman records are neither detailed enough or prolific enough to show us the answers as yet. That there were machine guns there is irrefutable with the present evidence on hand. But what we should be doing is trying to delve into why we cant yet see what was going on in the German/ Ottoman camp. There were mgs allocated from somewhere, under some ones responsibility, but the sparse and limited evidence presently offered is not clarifying where, who and why.

I read Murray Ewen's article on Gallipoli maxims, and I believe its the most accurate analysis i have yet read of the machine gun issue at Gallipoli.

[stevenbecker]

Mate,

I also agree, we have only two officers who left records and as far as I know 1 soldier from the 2Bn 27th Regt who left accounts.

That is two officers from about 18 there who there that morning, from those who survived to record there expirences, and around 400 Turkish soldiers who could not read or write, we are lucky to find only one soldier who recorded his expirences later in life.

Take that from aussie sources that had around 4000 officers & men that landed that morning and who could read and write left us more then the Turks.

So we are left with few Turkish accounts to draw from.

But they say the same thing, as does there commander 27th Regt who supports there view?

Allied or aussie accounts differ with what was going on, because they were split up a fighting all over, some record MGs while others don't?

But your right there are enough accounts to question the use of MGs that morning.

Cheers

S.B

[gilly100]

And another that recorded mg fire. The list goes on.

711 Pte Walter Reeves was recorded as KIA 25 April 1915.

Ian

[gilly100]

This below some of what was recorded and printed in The Daily Telegraph in 1934 regarding the landing experience of 1109 Pte James Dundee Bostock 9Bn AIF.

"I remember the whole affair as if it happened yesterday. Lt Chapman was in the bow of the boat and I was crouched alongside him, my position at that time being signaller attached to No3 platoon commander......

...... It was whilst taking off my sodden pack on the beach that the first shot was fired. It was there that I saw the first man killed, young Courtney, who received a charge of machine gun bullets across the forehead....

The only Courtney recorded as died in 9Bn is 307 Pte Thomas Joseph Courtney who is interestingly recorded in all official records as killed in action on 2 May 1915. Within his 43 page service file are numerous references to that date, although on one page there is recorded above this date in brackets (KIA 25/4/1915 revised list OC Bn). Also in his records is a letter from one of his parents to Base Records, Victoria Barracks Melbourne dated July 1916, asking for confirmation of Courtneys date of death as the family had received private correspondence that he had been killed on 25 April.

There are many men whose date of death was recorded as 2 May, but in a good few cases it was likely the day of the Landing or soonafter.

Bostock's recollection appears to confirm this one. It also reminds us that some recorded dates in service records are incorrect. The reason for posting this here is of course obvious.

Ian

[Jeff Pickerd]

Ian,

Private Bostock's account of the landing would appear to be in conformity to those others of A and B Coys, 9th Battalion. Sgt. Fred Coe and Pte Alex Wilson who landed from the same boat as Lt Duncan Chapman, and Bostock, confirm that the first Turkish shot rang out as they were taking off their packs, that would put the time at around 4.30 a.m.

It is from here that Bostock's account seems to differ from that of Coe and Wilson, and it should be stressed, of other accounts of the landing. After the first Turkish rifle shot rang out there was a slight pause then followed by several more reports in the darkness of the early morning. From then the rifle fire increased in volume and intensity.

It is from here that I have trouble with just what Bostock is relating to the death of Pte Courtney. Where did the 'charge of machine gun bullets across the forehead' come from? Is he relating the death to just on 4.30 a.m., or sometime later that morning?

All Turkish accounts put Deputy Officer Muharrem Efendi, with his sixty odd men of the 2nd Platoon, 8th Coy, 2nd Infantry Battalion, 27th Turkish Infantry Regiment facing the men of the 9th Battalion from his trenches up on Plugge's Plateau, with no machine gun/s.

Jeff

[gilly100]

Hi Jeff

Merely recording what this man who was there that day recorded. He recorded it again in an oral history in the fifties I believe. As you are wedded to the more limited Ottoman evidence as opposed to the myriad Allied army and naval accounts it is pointless saying too much, but If one believes there were mgs present, then this is just another to add to the long list of accounts.

I shall pop another one up soon and you can shoot him down too. But these guys were there and we were not. Just trying to put some credence back in these mens accounts because as sure as sh.t they were not all mistaken or lying. I am actually quite stunned at how many have been won over.

On a lighter note, enjoy your trip over there shortly. Hope it goes well. A terrific moment in time for you to be at the Nek.

Cheers

Ian

[gilly100]

752 L/Cpl Beresford Bardwell 13 platoon, D Coy 11Bn

Diary account dated 25 April 1915

"We landed immediately after in lifeboats amid a perfect hail of lead, a great many of our men being hit in boats and onshore....

Several boats landed further around to left upon which machine guns played cutting up the men dreadfully.....

Bardwell was a Geraldton boy, originally from Victoria. His diary covers ftom mid April to mid September 1915. He mentions 818 Pte Charles Puckle going in with first wave as he was a scout, but a D Coy man.

Bardwell's account marries up quite nicely with his platoon officer Charles Gostelow who also recorded machine guns.

Promoted corporal in early May and commissioned in early August. Wounded once at Gallipoli and once in France serving with the 51st Bn.

Finished the war a captain. A most interesting diary for those interested in 11Bn in particular.

More in due course

Ian

[stevenbecker]

Ian ,

To play devils advocate here, they only mention MG fire, why is that?

Did they see the bullet splashs and hear the MG noise in the early morning darkness?

Bullets splashes could be from rifle fire and MG noise could be from any type of MG firing that morning, like the British naval MGs which the sound would have travelled around the beaches?

This is not a direct sighting of any MGs but a guess that the fire they were getting was from a MG?

I could go on but you know the drill.

No not proof but what I would expect from young soldiers in there first action under fire for the first time.

S.B

[gilly100]

Lyon Johnston, Drake Brockman, Leane, Everett, Darnell, Hearder, Tulloch, Brennan, Fahey, Gostelow, Louch, Blay, Eastcott, Siefken, Pittersen, Howe, Mason, Sharp, Richards, Parsons, Henderson Smith, Anderson, Mitchell, Weatherill, Lorenzo, Weir, Leane, Butler, Harrison, Thomas, Rafferty, Clarke, Hilmer Smith, Margetts, Vaughan, McWhae, Adams, Penhaligon, Buchanan, Kirkby, Davidson, Layh, Heighway, Jones, Hooper, Derham.

Just the ones I can come up with off the top of my head. First half are 11Bn alone. Naturally there are many more including Royal Navy. I imagine Helles will be the same.

Ian

[Jeff Pickerd]

Faik, Gelibolulu Suleyman, Lapsekili Muharrem, Ahmet, Gelibolulu Cemal, Bigali Idris, Muharrem, Ibadali Ibrahim Heyreddin, Huseyin Sabri, Mustafa Hilmi, Asim, Ismail Hakki, Kor Halis, Malatyali Ibrahim, Refic, Mehmed Ismet, Adil Sahin.

Just some of the 2nd Battalion, 27th Turkish Infantry Battalion that faced the Anzac landing 4.30 a.m. To 8.00 a.m., 25th April 1915, with no machine guns.

Jeff

Ian, thanks for your good wishes with my soon to be pilgrimage to Gallipoli, I shall be giving remembrance to the men of the 10th Light Horse Regiment who fell on that fateful morning of the 7th August on your behalf, would have been great to have you there with us.

[bacon]

Faik, Gelibolulu Suleyman, Lapsekili Muharrem, Ahmet, Gelibolulu Cemal, Bigali Idris, Muharrem, Ibadali Ibrahim Heyreddin, Huseyin Sabri, Mustafa Hilmi, Asim, Ismail Hakki, Kor Halis, Malatyali Ibrahim, Refic, Mehmed Ismet, Adil Sahin.

Just some of the 2nd Battalion, 27th Turkish Infantry Battalion that faced the Anzac landing 4.30 a.m. To 8.00 a.m., 25th April 1915, with no machine guns.

Jeff

Ian, thanks for your good wishes with my soon to be pilgrimage to Gallipoli, I shall be giving remembrance to the men of the 10th Light Horse Regiment who fell on that fateful morning of the 7th August on your behalf, would have been great to have you there with us.

I'm not sure what this list represents jeff? Are these names of men who you know and interviewed?

Are they men who expressed a 'no machine gun' perspective? I am not aware if they did express this in any recollection or writing.

I spent quite alot of time with Adil Sahin in the 1980's. He never spoke to me about machine guns, they werent the issue back then. Had I known that hundreds of allied first hand accounts were going to be dismissed out of hand a couple of decades later i certainly would have focused my conversations with him on such memories. But alas, the tidal wave of allied accounts were yet to be crucified on the absolutely meagre Axis accounts available. Adil was a tiny, gentle, beautiful, wise old man who had some incredible first hand views of the battlefield. His only reference to me that borders on this debate was that there was 'a gun' on his left.

Jeff, simply rattling off the names of some old veterans who were NEVER interviewed about this issue does NOT make them eye witnesses that there were 'no guns'. They are merely a list of Ottoman veterans, not an argument for 'no machine guns'. Survivors, not mentioning machine guns, is NOT an argument that there were none. Please tell me this is not what you are attempting to argue here.

Gillys list, I believe, is based on those who actually RECORDED the existence of machine guns. They are two utterly different lists we are dealing with here.

[gilly100]

Hi Jeff

Re your post 1139 above, the only one I can comment on is Ibradili Ibrahim from FH area. I did bring up before and so too did Bryn I think, that Ibrahim does mention 2 guns over to his left, which we said might mean mgs. Certainly it could not have been the 4 Krupps aimed towards the south west, or the 3 Hotchkiss guns that don't even rate a mention in Turk history.

I understand gun might mean a number of things.

How many of your listed men distinctly say 'no mgs with them or manned by anyone else' is my only question.

And back on the lighter side. Thanks, please do that for me on the 10th LH lads that I feel I started to get to know as we wrote about them. Bloody pea green with envy I am. Safe trip. And if you bump into any Turk tour guides going on about no mgs, tell 'em Gilly says your wrong.

Cheers

Ian

[bacon]

Yeah have a great trip jeff, we are always jealous of anyone tramping the ground!

[gilly100]

This from 53 Sapper Thomas Edward Drane 1st Field Company Engineers AIF on his 25 April landing experience. It appears he was in No12 Tow under Commander Dix. The pattern of seeing the bright light, followed by one shot, then more and then you know what, those mgs.

"The squad I was in under Sgt Maj Pantlin were attached to the 11th Battalion......... No sooner were the words out of his mouth, then a bright light shone out from the shore, and one shot rang out over the hills. We knew then that we were seen by the Turks and were told to pull for our lives for the shore. By the time we had dipped the oars into the water the bullets were hitting the boats and the water wholesale, then we were told to get out and get ashore the best way we could every man for himself. I can tell you it was cruel to see our lads dropping into the boats, for they had machine guns trained onto us as well as rifle fire...."

Drane's diary gives some other interesting detail into life in the engineers, although it seems he went off with the infantry the first few days, before getting back to his squad.

Ian

[gilly100]

For those interested in seeing and hearing a maxim firing, check this out.

Hi All

Google maxim mg08

Then click on spandau maxim machine gun mg08

It's a youtube clip of 2.25 minutes

Sorry dunno how to show the link.

That rythmic sound at a certain rate and listen to the out of sight weapons firing single shots and some other mg firing at a much higher cyclical rate.

Worth a look if nothing else and wherever one stands on the debate.

Ian

[Guest]

Mate,

I heard the sound of these types when we were involved in the filming of the Anzac's Series in the 80's with 1AR who were used as extras in the show. (see the part where the 1918 attack is stopped in the woods) I think I am still seen in the German line when we got shot up and shelled.

Although we used blank ammo the 08 maxim had a nice sound to it and differed then our (Lewis and Vickers) types.

S.B

[Guest]

The MEF GHQ dairies have rather a lot of material on the landings as one might expect. A certain Captain Aspinall* wrote a summary report of the day's events from signals messages and verbal reports sent to him on the HMS Queen Elizabeth where he was a Staff Officer with GHQ. The report runs for many pages and is handwritten, suggesting (to me at least) it was written within days of the events, if not the day after. Furthermore there is a typed report (no author given) but definitely a Staff Officer (possibly Aspinall) in GHQ providing a lengthy report which runs for more than a dozen pages.

* later, author of the OH Gallipoli Vols I and II.

While the authors might not have seen the events themselves, they were undoubtedly reporting what they had been told either verbally or via messages or signals.. The most interesting report I thought was at 08:20;

"QE sent picket (sic) boat and 2 cutters wh[ich] were fired on by machine guns from village. 3 wounded and 20 wounded picked up and taken to B1, Officer on picket boat on return reported principal fire on V Beach came from round tower on Old SEDD EL BAHR Fort wh[ich] was full of machine guns..."

Presumably the RN Officer in charge of the picket boat got fairly close given he was picking up wounded. It is also interesting that this was reported at 08:20 and I doubt very much he had time to discuss with others the source and nature of the fire.

Furthermore there is a handwritten report from Hunter Weston's HQ on the landings. I doubt he wrote the report himself, but the Staff Officer who did mentions machine-guns on at V Beach on a number of occasions and the capture of the Pom Poms.

Machine guns on the landing beaches get mentioned 16 times in the various reports as well as the GHQ diary. one might argue that the GHQ diary simply repeats what the 29th Div (and other units) told them. Either way it is an historical fact that at every level in the British records the diarists believed there were machine-guns covering the beaches. The one that surprised me the most was the one allegedly firing on the SWB in Morto Bay. Possibly worth pursuing.

Edit. There are three further reports of the landings in the HQ 29th Div Diaries. One is by an anonymous Staff Officer (typed), one by Major O Striedinger a Staff Captain and one is Capt & Adjt H S Wilson's (1st Bn RMF) which is annotated as having been personally handed to Aspinall (incidentally also RMF but as we know working as a Staff Officer at GHQ). This part is interesting as they would have been acquainted (both Captains in the RMF) and clearly had an opportunity to discuss the situation. Wilson's handwritten report (and others) would have formed the basis of Aspinall's report. We know from his OH work that he was meticulous and as a psc would have been well versed in the intricacies of establishing accurate reports. An example of this is the fact that parts of the report are annotated as being found later to be incorrect. The presence (or otherwise) of machine-guns seems important enough for at least twenty Officers to mention them in their reports.

The interesting aspect is that they all concur on the specific locations. When other details of these accounts are compared they stand up to scrutiny. That so many eyewitness accounts agree in such fine details is quite important. Twenty-six separate accounts from the British make specific mention of Turkish machine-guns at the landings:

1. 1st Bn Lancashire Fusiliers War Diary of 25th April 1915, ref WO 95/4310 Vol III page 109

2. 86th Inf Bde War Diary of 25th Apr 1915 ref WO 95/4310 Vol III page 17

3. Capt Wilson, Adj of the 1st Bn RMF in an account of the landings where he mentions [Turkish] machine guns on five occasions in his account ref WO 95/4310 Vol III page 11

4. 2 Lt H A Brown 1st Bn RMF in a report to OC W Coy written on 26th April 1915 ref WO 95/4310 Vol III page 16

5. Capt H R Clayton (W Beach) quoted on page 135 of "Men of Gallipoli" by Peter Liddle.

6. Midshipman H Wilson commanding No.6 Picket Boat from HMS Euryalus mentions machine guns and Pom-Poms and rifles. Quoted on page 133 of "Men of Gallipoli" by Peter Liddle.

7. Lt H D O'Hara 1st Bn Royal Dublin Fusiliers. Mentions 'they let drive at them with rifles, machine guns and pom-poms....". Source: letter quoted on page 32 of Neill's Blue Caps.

8. Lt C W Maffett 1st Bn Royal Dublin Fusiliers. "they opened a terrible fire on us with machine guns, and pom-poms..."Source: 'account of his experiences' quoted on page 30 of Neill's Blue Caps.

9. Lt C McCann 1st Bn Royal Dublin Fusiliers (at the time a Sgt in W Coy commanding No.1 Platoon there being no Officer). "As we filed out of the holes cut in the side of the old Clyde and down the gangway machine guns opened fire...after about ten minutes we moved on but had only reached the two barges...when we came under heavy rifle and machine-gun fire again.... we moved off the barges....over the small rowing boat, scrambled ashore. ...All this time we were under a very heavy rifle fire and machine-gun fire..." Note he mentions this three times. Source: quoted on page 33 in Neill's Blue Caps.

10. Col O C Wolley-Dod DSO GSO1 29th Div "A terrific fire of pom-poms machine guns and rifles.." quoted in The story of the 29th Div by Capt Stair Gillon.

11. Gen Hare - report on landings to GHQ (appendices)

12. Lt Col Tizard CO 1st Bn RMF - report on landings

13. Capt Geddes 1st Bn RMF- report on landings

14. RN Officer on picquet boat form HMS Queen Elizabeth picking up wounded - report on landings

15. Report by SWB on Morto Bay landings

16. Maj O Striedinger Staff Officer 29th Div - report on landings in 29th Div Diaries (appendices)

17. Capt Aspinall Staff Officer GHQ- report on landings in 29th Div Diaries (appendices)

18. Anonymous Staff Officer 29th Div - - report on landings in 29th Div Diaries (appendices)

19. Petty Officer David Fyfe No. 3 Armoured Car Sqn RNAS (SS River Clyde) - personal diary

20. L/Cpl George Smith 1/1st West Riding Fd Coy RE - personal diary

21. Capt H Farmar Lancashire Fusiliers (Staff Captain (later Brigade Major) 86th Inf Bde, 29th Div) - letter quoted in 'With the 29th Div at Gallipoli' by O Creighton

22. Col W de L Williams (Staff Officer on SS River Clyde) - account quoted in OH

23. Capt Richard Willis quoted in Gallipoli Gazette page 72

24. Lt Douglas Talbot Lancashire Fusiliers quoted in a letter dated 2nd May 1915.

25. Pte W Flyn RMF

26. 2 Lt R B Gillett Hampshire Regt

27. Capt Harold Clayton 1st Bn Lancashire Fusiliers - personal account

28. Capt Guy Nightingale 1st Bn RMF

29. Cpl William Cosgrove 1st Bn RMF -quoted in VCs of the First World War: Gallipoli.

Anyway, for those still interested in this episode here is what two diarists mentioned at the start who were there that day wrote;

[gilly100]

Martin

You might find it worthwhile reading the english language version of the TGSA OH regarding Helles by way of comparison. At V Beach they mention two 37mm maxims being destroyed during the initial naval barrage and the other two only getting off four clips before failing and being withdrawn, upon which it fell to only their rifles and their faith, while facing some 40mgs amongst the Brit landing pinnaces, River Clyde and other ships guns of all manner of calibre. That part i have not checked, but seems rather a lot. It is mentioned that on 26 Regt taking over from 25 Regt on 22 April or thereabouts, it was a mistake that 25 Regts 4 maxims went with them.

Little or no mention of DFC . Certainly they were convinced of landings to take place at V and W beaches, hence a greater concentration of troops and weapons. The style of writing in the Turk OH, as I have mentioned before, seems over the top and I feel its more about what is not mentioned than what is. Of course, only my thoughts which remain unchanged when taking into account Murray Ewen's article and research.

Ian

[Bryn]

Excellent post, Martin. Ian, I'd call the style of writing 'overly heroic,' which some have suggested, when applied to allied accounts (letters home for example), is enough to dismiss them.

One thing I'd like to comment on which has been stated in a couple of places, is the reference to accounts from people who were not witnesses. If someone is not a witness, that is where it ends. You can not then state that, because Private 'X' was not present (but wrote as if he were), that we should therefore disregard the accounts by people who were witnesses.

If we applied that 'logic' to criminal investigations we'd have the detective giving up on witness accounts as soon as he received one from somebody misrepresenting themselves as one, on the grounds that, "Well, Mr X was not in fact a witness, although he claimed to be, so I don't believe - and will completely ignore - anyone who was actually there." Preposterous.

On the Ottoman side, Sefik Aker, on whose work a lot of this conjecture has been based, was NOT an eye-witness. Like Bean, he collected accounts by people who were, or probably were. His 'Ariburnu savaslari ve 27 alay,' published in 1935, is not a diary, as it has sometimes been referred to.

He does, however, stress that Ari Burnu area - which he describes as 'embracing the foothills of the Kocacimen Mountain comprising these and these and other small headlands and whose reidges or ramifications run parallel to the coast as far as Kabatepe,' was of great tactical importance. He continues 'Thus Ariburnu is considered a more important part than the Kabatepe landing area.' So the Ari Burnu area, including everything from Hill 971 to Kaba Tepe, plus all the ridges running parallel to it and from it towards the sea, he writes, (if it were not captured by the enemy), would be 'so dangerous as to be almost impossible for the landing force to drive inland from the Kabatepe beaches and advance toward their target.' So much for it being of secondary importance and not considered a likely landing area.

[michaeldr]

Martin,

what a most useful post! Thank you.

best regards

Michael

[Guest]

Michael I am sure you will be able to trace as many RN, RVR and RMLI accounts. The panorama sketch by Lt C H Congdon* RMLI of V Beach and the alleged dispositions of the MGs should be added to the list of course. It is similar in many ways to Geddes' panorama sketch but differes in detail which suggest to me there was no collusion between the two. As you doubtless know they both show the alleged positions of the Maxims.

If accounts in published histories are included the number of accounts would increase significantly. I have deliberately excluded these. Although most authors had access to personal diaries and could probably discuss details with surviving members of the regiments. Few authors managed to ascribed the detail to any individual (RDF is an exception) so we can not be 100% certain who the author was quoting. One example: from the History of the South Wales Borderers; At the landing in Morto Bay, their published history records;

"Indeed machine-guns from Sedd ul Bahr-Cape Helles area kept opening fire on B and C [Companies] from the rear, though they made poor shooting they were a nuisance rather than a danger".

This is very specific and it is interesting as De Tott's Battery was 2,000 yards from Sedd el Bahr. The fall of shot from bursts from machine-guns at that range would have very distinctive tell-tale signatures of the cyclic rate of a Maxim raking across a battlefield, something that I would argue is difficult to replicate by riflemen at that range. Also the chances of this being confused with British Maxims is of course significantly lower. To be clear this is my speculation. While it is not a first hand account that can be ascribed to any individual, it does suggest someone in the SWB thought they were being fired on by machine-guns from Sedd el Bahr that morning. Incidentally the SWB was one of the first units to land. MG

*Page 36 Britain's Sea Soldiers 1914-1919. Interestingly this account claims HMS Albion came in to specifically shell an MG position. The HMS Albion records might be worth exploring. I think Lt C H Congdon RMLI was on HMS Albion or had some connection with the ship.