TURKISH MACHINE GUNS AT GALLIPOLI

[bob lembke]

Bob - have you actually read any of the British accounts? ...and if

you have do you believe that are they all mistaken?

We could start with Fyfe's account. He was a specialist machine

gunner in the RNAS with a grandstand view at the bow of the SS River

Clyde, on a stable platform behind armoured plating. Could he not

know what a machine gun looked like or sounded like? Which parts of

his account are mistaken? Just curious to know.

I think I have only read about 20 Allied accounts, in English and

French. Aussie, Brit, and a book written by a Swiss who signed up

with the French Foreign Legion and wrote about his experiences in

French. I also think I read the Aussie official history. (Most of

this was about 10 years ago.

So I don't know a great deal about the Allied side. I do know a

great deal about the Turkish/German/Austro-Hungarian side, and I

do know that the Turks had very few MGs, about six per division,

many less than they had field guns, the reverse of the situation

in almost any other army. And I do know that, being a scarce

resource, some were held back and not initially committed in the

front line, or on the potential landing beaches. So, since the

Turks were deployed to defend something like 60-100 miles of

potential landing beach coastline, and they might have had 30-40

MGs in the entire Fifth Army in Europe and Asia, and only some

were deployed in forward areas, it is obvious that there only was

one MG deployed, on average, for several miles of coastline.

Exactly where were these MGs? Generally I have no idea. It doesn't

seem like anyone else does, generally. But I do know that there

were very few. I am reacting to, mostly, what seems to be a school

of Aussie thought that has specifically described the beaches as

being seemingly lined with vast numbers of MGs, originally described

as being manned by "German Marines", while my years of reading almost

everything available (except in Modern or Ottoman Turkish) has never

mentioned a single German Marine in the entire Turkish theatre in 1915.

To mention this "German Marine" business seems to flow from an effort

to read German by individuals that do not know German, and do not know

much about the organization of the German Navy, or what a "German

Marine" was. The German Navy dropped the use of shipboard Marines in

about 1875, and never revived it, till the present. I have to say that

I have never heard a member of the "Aussie school of many MGs" express

anything that indicates that they research in anything but English,

while in 16 years of work on the Turkish/German/A-H side of things have

I ever seen anything in English that really was of much use in the area.

As I may have mentioned, one of the High Priests of the "Aussie School

of Many MGs" accidentally sent me an (extremely vulgar) e-mail that he

thought he was sending to a mate, shedding light on his motivations,

and I have to say that based on this e-mail the motivation seems to be

nationalistic, not one of historical inquiry. Over the years I have always

been impressed by the fair-mindedness of Aussie students of WW I, and

a very constructive attitude towards and opinion of the Turks that they

unfortunately faced at Gallipoli. There seems to be this small sub-splinter

faction. I had better not speculate on what drives this school of thought.

To briefly answer your second question, I also believe that I read of

one or more Turkish MGs at the point where the River Clyde landed.

It clearly was a vital point for both offense and defense, a natural place

for the Turks to place one or several of their very scarce MGs.

A final point. Modern forensic science has found that eyewitness

testimony, held in both criminal and historical studies to be of almost

sacred status, is actually one of the worst and most unreliable forms

of evidence.

[Guest]

I think I have only read about 20 Allied accounts, in English and

French. Aussie, Brit, and a book written by a Swiss who signed up

with the French Foreign Legion and wrote about his experiences in

French. I also think I read the Aussie official history. (Most of

this was about 10 years ago.

So I don't know a great deal about the Allied side. I do know a

great deal about the Turkish/German/Austro-Hungarian side, and I

do know that the Turks had very few MGs, about six per division,

many less than they had field guns, the reverse of the situation

in almost any other army. And I do know that, being a scarce

resource, some were held back and not initially committed in the

front line, or on the potential landing beaches. So, since the

Turks were deployed to defend something like 60-100 miles of

potential landing beach coastline, and they might have had 30-40

MGs in the entire Fifth Army in Europe and Asia, and only some

were deployed in forward areas, it is obvious that there only was

one MG deployed, on average, for several miles of coastline.

Exactly where were these MGs? Generally I have no idea. It doesn't

seem like anyone else does, generally. But I do know that there

were very few. I am reacting to, mostly, what seems to be a school

of Aussie thought that has specifically described the beaches as

being seemingly lined with vast numbers of MGs, originally described

as being manned by "German Marines", while my years of reading almost

everything available (except in Modern or Ottoman Turkish) has never

mentioned a single German Marine in the entire Turkish theatre in 1915.

To mention this "German Marine" business seems to flow from an effort

to read German by individuals that do not know German, and do not know

much about the organization of the German Navy, or what a "German

Marine" was. The German Navy dropped the use of shipboard Marines in

about 1875, and never revived it, till the present. I have to say that

I have never heard a member of the "Aussie school of many MGs" express

anything that indicates that they research in anything but English,

while in 16 years of work on the Turkish/German/A-H side of things have

I ever seen anything in English that really was of much use in the area.

As I may have mentioned, one of the High Priests of the "Aussie School

of Many MGs" accidentally sent me an (extremely vulgar) e-mail that he

thought he was sending to a mate, shedding light on his motivations,

and I have to say that based on this e-mail the motivation seems to be

nationalistic, not one of historical inquiry. Over the years I have always

been impressed by the fair-mindedness of Aussie students of WW I, and

a very constructive attitude towards and opinion of the Turks that they

unfortunately faced at Gallipoli. There seems to be this small sub-splinter

faction. I had better not speculate on what drives this school of thought.

To briefly answer your second question, I also believe that I read of

one or more Turkish MGs at the point where the River Clyde landed.

It clearly was a vital point for both offense and defense, a natural place

for the Turks to place one or several of their very scarce MGs.

A final point. Modern forensic science has found that eyewitness

testimony, held in both criminal and historical studies to be of almost

sacred status, is actually one of the worst and most unreliable forms

of evidence.

All very interesting Bob, but you have not addressed the specific question: What do you make of Fyfe's account?

I cant see how anyone can come to a balanced and reasoned conclusion without reading his version of events. He was a trained machine-gunner with a grandstand view who wrote probably the most detailed British account and mentions Turkish MGs on a number of occasions as he was duelling with them. One was located in an aperture in the Fort. Fyfe was manning the MGs on the bows of the SS River Clyde, so about as good a location as anyone could have and very close to the fort. The aperture in the fort would be a difficult location to cram a platoon of soldiers into in order to replicate the rate of gunfire from an MG. There would be insufficient space to fire enough rifles through the opening. Fyfe's account is a very precise. If you have not read this account, you might want to consider looking it up before coming to any conclusions. It seems pretty compelling evidence. To me at least.

When you say "Exactly where were these MGs? Generally I have no idea. It doesn't seem like anyone else does, generally." You might consider that a number of the British accounts are very specific about the location of the MGs that they saw.

I trust we are not sliding into discarding all eyewitness accounts. While single eyewitness testimony needs to be treated with great caution the dynamics change considerably when we have dozens of eyewitness accounts. There are at least 30 British accounts that recorded very similar versions of events - two of the factors that are critical when weighing eyewitness testimony - quantity and consistency. MG

[michaeldr]

Bob,

Ask your good lady, the librarian, to get hold of the book by Stephen Chambers (aka Krithia hereabout) and Richard van Emden, called 'Gallipoli – the Dardanelles disaster in soldiers' words and photographs' published by Bloomsbury, 2015; it has been reviewed here on the GWF

see

It has the account described by Martin, a part of which I attach below

together with a crop of one of the book's photographs showing (left to right) Sub-Lt A Coke and PO David Fyffe

The question of the machine gun placed by the Turks in the fort tower 'window' has be mentioned before, and I refer you to my post No.1125, amongst others by Martin and myself

regards

Michael

[bob lembke]

All very interesting Bob, but you have not addressed the specific

question: What do you make of Fyfe's account?

I cant see how anyone can come to a balanced and reasoned conclusion

without reading his version of events. He was a trained machine-gunner

with a grandstand view who wrote probably the most detailed British

account and mentions Turkish MGs on a number of occasions as he was

duelling with them. One was located in an aperture in the Fort.

Fyfe was manning the MGs on the bows of the SS River Clyde, so about

as good a location as anyone could have and very close to the fort.

The aperture in the fort would be a difficult location to cram a

platoon of soldiers into in order to replicate the rate of gunfire

from an MG. There would be insufficient space to fire enough rifles

through the opening. Fyfe's account is a very precise. If you have

not read this account, you might want to consider looking it up

before coming to any conclusions. It seems pretty compelling

evidence. To me at least.

When you say "

Exactly where were these MGs? Generally I have no

idea. It doesn't

seem like anyone

else does, generally." [

color=#282828]

You might consider that a number of the British

accounts are very specific about the location of

the MGs that they saw. [/color]

Martin;

If you go down to my sixth paragraph I specifically

pointed out that, although I have not read about the

landing of the River Clyde recently, my recollection

is that the landing British soldiers were in fact

landing in the face of Turkish MG fire. The site of

the grounding seems to have been been a critical spot

and a likely spot for a landing, and I would think that

the defenders would have sited at least one or two of

their scarce MGs there. And the intensity of the fire

and the staggering British losses, and the descriptions

of withering small arms fire all point to the employ-

ment of MGs at that point.

So we are not in disagreement about this point. The

events at the Clyde, however dramatic and tragic, do

not address my principal interests in the Gallipoli

events, which not surprisingly center on the ANZAC

beachhead, where my father served, and other aspects

of Turkish/German cooperation.

I hesitated to state some of my last post, and again

I have generally been struck by the generosity of

spirit of the Australian students of Gallipoli, but

I have recently been also struck by this streak of

statements about the supposed Turkish/German assets

and deployments that don't seem to be related to

any revealed research or sources. Repeated references

to "German Marines" posted on obsolete Turkish

battleships, while no German Marines had been posted

on Imperial German Navy battleships (or ironclads)

for 40 years, statements that these Turkish battleships

had their MGs stripped off by the Turkish Fifth Army,

for use in land fighting, but when I repeatedly asked

for a source for this unusual event none is provided.

Again, sounding a bit pompous, my research on the

Turkish/German/A-H effort has had to have been

conducted entirely in languages other than English

(a three day effort to translate three pages of Modern

Turkish was only slightly useful and extremely painful),

and I can't recall using a source that seemed useful

on the Turkish/German effort that was in English. (I

chose to read Liman von Sanders' work in German.) But

none of the proponents of this school of "many MGs" give

any evidence of working in any language other than

English. Perhaps this school of "German Marines, many

MGs" were just mislead be seeing reference it "Marine"

in German texts without knowing that it meant either

the German Navy, or sailors.

[gilly100]

Hi Bob

Firstly, if it is that I fall into a high priest of many mgs category, I guess it's better than keyboard warrior, idiot and moron. Merely a poke in an already thickened hide I guess.

I am glad you concur on the Turks having mgs in action at V Beach as the British landed on 25 April. That's one out of the way. Although the TGSA Official History appears to be mostly mute or vague on that subject. Plenty of references to their rifles and their faith, as well as either two or four 37mm weapons that their OH says, only got off limited rounds before being destroyed by naval fire, or jamming and being withdrawn, depending on which conflicting paragraphs you read. Now it has been put by one high priest in his article, that it may have been these Krupp made 37mm anti aircraft weapons that were present on Barbaros Hayrettin and Torgut Reis, as evidenced in Dolf Goldsmiths book The Devils Paintbrush. 'In 1903 the German Navy adopted the pom pom as the Maxim FLAK M1903 (Navy).' Merely a theory, but one that deserves consideration given the inaccuracy of the Turk OH.

I think you are also correct that Marine is an incorrect term and that some German sailors were trained as infantry and assigned to Landungs Abteilung or naval landing detachments as evidenced by the well accepted view of their involvement at Helles in early May, although again, you might not find much reference to that in the Turk OH. I only found one reference to 5 German mgs at Helles, which I think was in June and later in August where 12 German naval mgs are referenced.

As for Anzac, after reading every page of Beans notebooks, diaries and folders, Gallipoli Mission, as well as dozens of Royal Navy and Australian landing accounts, I personally find it hard to believe the Turks had no mgs present for the in the dark landing at Anzac on 25 April. Sure there are exaggerated accounts, but many are just too strong to so quickly dismiss. Fishermans Hut area, Ari Burnu/MacLagans Ridge and 400 plateau accounts are numerous and triangulating in many cases. Spare parts for mgs sighted, mg taken and dismantled on MacLagans, mg and SAA loaded on shot down mules on 400 plateau add to doubts on the no mg argument.

I did suggest that you read, time permitting, the entire mg thread and see just how much info the odd high priest and others have put up to challenge the no mg argument.

I think it is entirely plausible, based on what Murray Ewen has uncovered, that German/Ottoman naval mgs were indeed utilised on 25 April. Manned by whom I remain unsure, but Dardanelles Fortified Command is an area that also requires greater scrutiny for one.

At times I have slipped and got a bit cranky on this eternal thread, but some considerable information has also been put to challenge the no mg argument. And all in good faith to our thoughts on getting to the bottom of it all. As an aside, there is some interesting evidence that the Turks may well have had a few Hotchkiss mountain guns placed on Pine Ridge as well for 25 April, and we continue to pursue that line of enquiry. To suggest that all Allied accounts are mistaken, is, I think, unreasonable.

I respect your efforts and argument, but I do suggest you read much more widely the evidence that suggests there were mgs present at both Helles and Anzac that early morning 25 April 1915. Evidence, not only from British and Australian witnesses, but the odd Turk and German as well. This is what Murray Ewen did in his 2014 article.

It's probably incorrect to label me a high priest. I am much too coarse and infinitely too unheavenly to be so named. Ian or Gilly will do.

Cheers

Ian (far from perfect and sometimes vulgar Australian, but only amongst mates)

[gilly100]

This from an interview by CEW Bean with Lt AP Derham OC 10 Platoon, C Coy, 5th Bn AIF regarding his fighting around 400 plateau and Pine Ridge on 25 April. A two page document, some of which is reproduced here with reference to the gun pits and Turk mg found there.

Derham had already been shot in the thigh by this time and gets hit again, described within. Awarded an MC for his efforts that day.

"There was mg fire on the right- heavily. Probably got onto Weir Ridge. Levy (5Bn officer) realised what a mistake it had been and that it would be best to go back. They decided that they would get cut up either way and that it was better to go forward. They went on in one rush. There were wounded lying everywhere - mgs had them absolutely ranged- 3 bullets hit Derham while talking to Levy, one in revolver under stomach, one through shoulder strap and one through left shoulder flash..... They could see their own men moving down the bare forward face of a hill about 200 yards away. They could see it was some sort of position. Made there in a rush. They were under sniping fire but well dug in in some gun pits..... There was a Turkish mg there outside the gun pits and two guns (at least one). The men were all 5th and 6th Bn. Derham was in command of a small squad between Hooper (5thBn) and Levy (5thBn)..... There was a Turkish mg with ammunition but no one could work it. It was just what was wanted but none of them understood it...

Just then some reinforcements came down from the top of the hill, 10 or 20 under a Sgt Major. Sgt Major got the guns going ready to fire near right hand gun pit......

Orders came from rear to retire on a formed line in rear. There were just as many wounded as unwounded, a few wounded were able to hobble along. Every unwounded man carried a wounded man. They took all the wounded. No one over. Derham and another carried the mg. They came on a man who had a broken leg -carried him in and left the mg in a bush....

How does one refute this Turk machine gun? More reading related to this fighting at Pine Ridge, Hotchkiss mountain guns there etc can be viewed back in this thread between page 42 and 44, along with some other interesting evidence put up on wounded on the landing beach, MacLagans Ridge mg encounter and so on. Nothing to do with being nationalistic. Merely just don't buy the no Turk mg theory, other than the four sited on Third Ridge hours after the Australians were ashore. These weapons were sighted and handled.

Ian

[bob lembke]

Hi, Ian;

I'll address a few points.

I never said "no MGs", nor has anyone, I think. As I said a few

posts back, the Fifth Army, in Europe and Asia, might have had

30 or 40 MGs or less and were defending 60 or 100 miles of coast,

and certainly had some, perhaps half of their MGs in reserve, so

there had to have been about (on average), one forward deployed

MG per about four miles of defended coast. Which must have meant

that long stretches of coast had no MGs deployed, and where they

were, where it was felt that there was a high probability of a

landing, there were only one or two. One reward for my effort has

been, seemingly, the disappearance of the utterly fantastic stories,

such as the "woman with the MG", or "the painted women snipers tied

in trees".

Of course, at points, one or two effectively deployed or manned MGs

could have been spotted, cursed at, and later described by 50 of the

advancing troops in different letters, journals, etc. This may explain

the large number of reports.

There were some 25 mm Nordenfelds and 37 mm Maxim-Nordenfelds; these

were not MGs, nor would they have sounded or visually appeared to

have been MGs. The "rifle caliber Nordenfelds" would have sounded

much like a MG, but I have never seen mention of the Turks having

had any of these weapons. Also mentioned are several types of mountain

or AA guns, again infantry would not have described these as "MGs".

Also, isn't the Dardanelles Fortified Command the command structure

that existed inside the Narrows, stretching on either side of the

Narrows for about 20 miles? The Allied infantry never got within

miles of this area, except at the very southern-most tip of these

defenses. I am sure that there were some MGs there, you described

one or more, but again this had no connection to the land fighting,

which is what (I think) we are talking about. This was not under

the command of Liman von Sanders and his Fifth Army.

Let me state something briefly. Generally, with few or really only

one exception, German troops did not engage in ground fighting. They

were distributed at various HQs, many or most regiments and divisions

had either a German commander of a German adviser posted to the side

of the Turkish commander, and there were Germans in various other

staff functions, but I am almost absolutely certain that the only

German formation that engaged in ground combat were the two MG landing

detachments, German sailors from the Goeben and Breslau (especially)

led by German naval officers and occasionally petty officers. And

a few posts back I posted exactly when they were first available for

combat, I think the morning of May 4th, having only arrived 11 PM May

3rd.

I have not read all of the Allied memoires, but I may have read 20,

and there were a number of cases of dead officers being described as

"Germans", having fallen at the level of platoon or company fighting.

These descriptions are erroneous; perhaps based on a finer cut of

uniform from a military tailor, and perhaps a lighter skin tone.

The "volunteer Pioneer company" that my father fought in at ANZAC

(some of it was deployed at Helles) did not engage in land fighting

per se at Gallipoli, possibly the closest was the incident I described

where three German Pioniere and ten Turkish engineers were in a dugout

(armed with three rifles, evidence that they were not planning on

actually fighting), when a British breakthrough almost reached their

dugout, being saved by throwing hand grenades, and by arriving Turkish

infantry. I think that their casualties totaled 200-300 from various

illnesses and poisonings, and about one dead and three wounded from

rifle or artillery fire, over about six months. They mostly helped

direct the Turkish tunneling against the Allies, and tedchnical help

with things like explosives; which the Turks were very poor at. (My

father was already a trained explosives expert, his father was an

"explosives worker" and then an "Explosives Officer" in the Prussian

Heavy Artillery for about 35 years.)

The only other non-Turkish units in the zones of land fighting were

two Austro-Hungarian artillery units, arriving in November, I think

(along with supplied of German artillery ammunition that actually

exploded); a battery of two 24.5 cm (9.8") Motor=Moerser posted to

ANZAC (where my father saw them firing, and told me they were very

effective); and a battery of A-H 15 cm (5.9") howitzers sent to the

Helles front.

There are multiple primary source descriptions of the German naval

MG involvement in the Gallipoli fighting (e.g., Lt. Boltz, the first

CO of a naval MG detachment, and Lt. zur See Doenitz, officer on the

Breslau, where most of the sailors came from.) No mention of German

Navy MGs being sent ahead, without Germans, as also suggested, this

would have been a very odd act indeed.

Murray Ewan sent me a link to his Gallipolian article, I read it, but

unfortunately I lost track of it. I am happy to look at it again. I

would like to see the sources for some of the assertions, about

German deployments, especially pre-April 25th. I don't remember any.

[gilly100]

182 L/Cpl WA Connell 12Bn AIF. DCM for 25 April 1915. DOW a Captain on 28 Dec 1917.

His recommendation reads

"Attempted to capture a machine gun and rushed enemy's trenches on right flank on 25th April."

Reading Beans OH Vol1 on the 400 Plateau fighting we have this from p375. Importantly, the timeline appears to be well before Aker sent forward one or two mgs from Third Ridge late in the arvo of 25 April. I say one or two as Turk sources seem to vary on the number.

"Connell took this for a command to advance against Third Ridge. As he led his party across, Turks jumped up from the scrub ahead of them and bolted. They had probably been lying there all the morning, and a few seem to have lain there still, occasionally sniping when a good target offered. Connell led his party half southwards into Owen's Gully, but other sections of Australians could be seen who continued to advance eastwards on the summit of Johnston's Jolly. Ahead of these, where the shoulder of the Jolly sloped into Owen's Gully, Connell noticed a short trench containing a party of Turks and a machine gun. The enemy were intent upon the Australians on the Jolly, who had seen them and were making towards them. Connell's party at once turned up the slope and raced for the gun. As they neared it the Turks caught sight of them, fired a few hurried shots, shouldered the gun and disappeared into the scrub."

Other men recalled mg fire coming UP Owen's Gully as well. Was this an mg that got away from the guns around the Cup or elsewhere?

As an aside, Bean's Diaries, notebooks and folders amount to some 303 PDF files that I counted, all available online to download. An amazing resource that covers the whole war and the resource for his 6 volumes of the OH series. Some hidden gems within.

Ian

[bob lembke]

My father told me that when the two Austro-Hungarian 24.5 cm

"Moto-Moerser" (literal translation: "motorized heavy

mortar/howitzer"; the word Moerser cannot be simply translated,

it means either mortars or howitzers, but only of certain calibers,

generally 21 cm and up.) they must have been effective, as every

morning revealed more ANZAC graves climbing up a certain hillside,

indicating more deaths over the last 24 hours. Any comment or

corroboration, or refutation? I do hope to write this up.

I have 40 pages of my father's oral history, and over the 16 years

since I put it down it has proved remarkably accurate, at least the

parts that can be compared to documents, letters, other memoires, etc.

To my surprise. Unfortunately very little about Gallipoli, although

he told me details about both getting there and the trip back.

[gilly100]

Getting back on topic, we have this from Captain RW Everett 2IC A Coy 11 Battalion on his landing and arrival up on Russell's Top, then called Walker's Top. From Bean's notebooks, specifically officer interviews.

....." The boat was hit in several places with bullets and the water was rising in it. She eventually grounded about 20 yards from the shore in a sinking condition. Everett gave the order every man ashore. As they got there Everett told the men to get down as MGs were enfilading from Fisheman's Hut, striking sparks from the stones... .....Some of these men were hit as they landed on the beach by these MGs...."

Everett's tow landed between the point of Ari Burnu and the Sphinx, but closer to the Sphinx. His senior, Major Drake Brockman landed very close to Ari Burnu itself.

"While on Walker's Top Everett saw Captain Lalor (12Bn) moving forward on his left (this while waiting on Walker's). Lalor was moving forward with about half a company in the direction of what was Quinn's Post. Lalor had a sword and waved it at him. Everett warned him about a MG which was firing on his left from the high ground on the left of the Nek."

Ian

[gilly100]

This from Bean's Gallipoli Mission page 118 as he set out to solve some of the riddles of the Landing. This part regarding Noel Loutit of 10Bn and his subsequent return towards 400 Plateau and Wire Gully after getting forward towards Third Ridge. Bearing in mind we are told that 27 Regt's four machine guns set up on Hill 165, where they remained for most of the daylight hours.

".... He (Ryder of 9Bn) sent a message to Loutit and then fell back with his men to his former position on the 400 Plateau. Loutit had 'dashed hard work' to prevent his men from taking the same direction, but managed to withdraw them, by alternate sections each covering the other, from spur to spur until they reached a small mound just on the Turkish side of the creek. The Turks quickly followed them to the ridge that Loutit had just left, and as the enemy carried with them a machine gun the fire was very hot..."

Perhaps the same mg that others record firing up Owen's Gully and the one Connell of 12Bn later attempted to capture near Johnston's Jolly.

Ian

[RodB]

I've just read Peter Hart's book on Gallipoli, and he is quite vociferous in his assertion that there weren't any machine guns at Helles without giving evidence for his opinion. I find this difficult to reconcile with descriptions of men being mowed down trying to come ashore from the River Clyde : how could such a small number of Turks have achieved this with rifle fire only ? They weren't British regulars with Lee Enfields.

[gilly100]

Rod

Read the recently translated Turk Official History, especially with regard to V Beach. It tells you there. 'With their rifles and their faith.'

I found a number of issues with this history. I would be interested to know what others think of it. Has anyone reviewed it?

At Anzac, all our blokes, ALL of them were too inexperienced to define rifle fire from mg fire as they came into shore. Interestingly, Sefik Aker, who was miles away in an olive grove near Maidos, managed to differentiate massed infantry fire from machine gun fire as he waited for orders to move, which he claims he got around 5.45am. So there you go. If indeed there were no Turk mgs in place to contest the landing, the ONLY mg fire Aker could have heard, albeit extremely briefly, were two or three pinnace mgs that fired briefly as they pulled away from shore. It's highly unlikely any Aussie mg teams got into action prior to 6am i would have thought.

Never mind, I'll keep putting stuff up until the worm turns.

Ian

[Guest]

For what it's worth the diary entry of Sgt Joseph Cecil Thompson, stretcher-bearer 9th Battalion   for Tuesday the 27th of April 1915 says " New Zels? captured 9 machine guns yesterday. " (26.4.1915) Click

Mike

[gilly100]

Thanks Mike

Have seen this one before. Nice that he names and gives reg numbers for all the stretcher bearers. The nine captured mgs appears a big stretch.

Cheers

Ian

[gilly100]

Sefik Aker had this to say way back near Maidos after hearing of a landing at Ari Burnu.

"Meanwhile as there was no movement order I gave the order 'let the men drink their soup quickly on the spot'. This was done and still there were no orders. The sound of gunfire continued at infrequent intervals. But between those sounds there was a buzzing noise which came out of the darkness from afar off and the melancholy and mysterious noise had a profound effect on me. This buzzing was the echo of the explosion of masses of infantry rifles and machine guns and it gave the impression that our regimental comrades far from help and consisting of a mere handful of men at Ari Burnu........ Finally at 0545 hours I received the movement order."

 

It's a shame the Australian witness recollections of opposing rifle and mg fire are not accorded greater credence. In all the accounts I have come across and amongst all of Bean's diary and notebook scribbles, which formed the backbone of his OH Vol 1 regarding the Landing, I only found one reference to some men of 9Bn men in a tow mistaking pinnace fire via RN for enemy mg fire. Hardly convincing.

Ian

 

 

[gilly100]

Major EA Drake Brockman commanding A Coy of 11th Bn AIF, in the first wave to shore at Anzac on 25 April, had this to say to Bean, subsequently written into his copius notebooks and diaries.

"The first thing Drake Brockman saw was a flare which went up on the beach. It was like a tow flare or a bunch of cordite. Drake Brockman had looked at his watch on the way in. It was 3.45am. The time when they landed was about 4.20am he thinks. The boats were 700 to 800 yards out when the flare went up. Almost immediately machine gun fire opened. Something went into the water before they landed - possibly Hotchkiss shells, and threw up a spray - a number of these were falling about.

They got rifle and mg fire also while in the boats. A Hotchkiss gun was trained (a word correction above this might be captured or taken, hard to read, my words here in brackets) by 10th Bn, Drake Brockman thinks, on MacLagan's Hill. This probably did the shooting. They could not see the flashes or where the shooting was coming from. Did not notice it anyway...."

 

Interesting on several fronts in that he stated he got shelled on the way in, mentioning Hotchkiss type shells. He also appears to have heard that 10Bn were involved in taking a gun on MacLagans on first ridge, which ties with Weatherill and Talbot Smith of 10Bn. He certainly considered himself under three types of fire, and the mention of Hotchkiss shells raises questions about the presence of Hotchkiss guns on Pine Ridge, on seeing the flare, getting into action. Given the Krupps mtn guns failed to get into action, with its officer Sadik subsequently losing his position because of this failure, it raises questions in a number of areas and certainly gives some validation to what some of us have long been pointing out. Drake Brockman landed right on the point of Ari Burnu, and after a brief pause and reorganization on Plugges, was instrumental in getting men forward to second ridge and beyond that morning. Worthy of posting and consideration.

Ian

[Bryn]

Commander C. C. Dix commanded the tows which landed the covering force at Anzac. He was in steamboat No. 12, on the extreme left (north), towing the 11th Battalion AIF, which landed on and north of Ari Burnu - that is, not in Anzac Cove itself.

He stated, "One of the picket boats fired a belt or so at the crest of the hill, and the flickering flame of a hostile maxim was seen coming from a little look-out station half-way up the ridge at Ari Burnu." (Dix, Charles Cabry (Captain) CMG, DSO. "Effcient Navy: How Troops Were Landed." Reveille: RSS&AILA, Sydney, 31 Mar 1932 p20, 63, 64).

 

From MichaelDR:

Dix C. C., Midshipman of 'Barfleur'; distinguished himself at the attack on the Taku Forts, June 1900, by rescuing a comrade and disposing of two Chinamen with his revolver; promoted to Lieutenant 15th January 1903 for services in China. Lieutenant of 'Porpoise' during the operations in Somaliland. General East African Medal, Somaliland 1902-04 clasp; author of 'The World's Navies in the Boxer Rebellion'; qualified for Signal Duties 1910-11; Flag Lieutenant in First Battle Cruiser Squadron, February 1911, to February, 1913, in Third Battle Squadron, July, 1913 to June, 1914; and in First Battle Squadron , June, 1914; Commander, 31st December, 1914; Commander of RN College Greenwich 1915; DSO 14th March 1916

 

re the latter - “... was Assistant Beach Master, 'Z' Beach in the landing of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force on the Gallipoli Peninsula, 25th - 26th April 1915, and subsequently; commended for service in action (London Gazette, 16th August 1915 and 14th March 1916); the official report says:- 'Com. Dix was Assistant Beachmaster and later Beachmaster at Anzac and performed exceptionally good service under most trying conditions; was twice wounded.”

 

I've posted this again, slightly modified, as a reminder that it was not only 'inexperienced' soldiers who reported MGs at the landing at Anzac. Commander Dix clearly reports two maxims firing - one from a landing craft, and the other from a Turkish post - itself later identified in photos - on the knoll just above Ari Burnu itself. 

[gilly100]

Yes Bryn. Dix certainly ticks boxes for previous service and was definitive in his explanation of his landing experience. I just found Drake Brockman, who had a distinguished military career in WW1, interesting in his yarn, clearly describing something other than rifle or mg fire, or small calibre bullets in comparison to being shelled. Coupled with his hint at Hotchkiss shells, and knowing the Gaba Tepe guns are largely accepted as coming into action later than this time, as well as the Weatherill and Talbot Smith evidence of dismantling an mg on MacLagan's, it gives some credence to both mg fire, captured weapon and Hotchkiss guns firing at the Anzac Landing. Of course he could not see where the Hotchkiss shells were being  fired from as they were well back, but well in range, at Pine Ridge. Why does no one bother to scrutinise this part of the Landing more? Just because the Turkish records don't mention it? Not good enough for me. An untold story that will be told one day.

Ian

[Guest]

Mate,

 

Even expirenced officers and men make mistakes, are you saying because he said Hotchkiss fire that there must be a Hotchkiss gun firing at them?

"A Hotchkiss gun was trained (a word correction above this might be captured or taken, hard to read, my words here in brackets)"

 

Can I say that even the best soldiers can not always be sure what weapons are firing at them, they may sound like them or the effects may seam the same, but are not always correct.

 

I don't have to tell you this, but you and others keep falling into this trap?

 

I am no dought he believed he was under this type of fire, that is why he wrote it, but that doesn't mean it was a Hotchkiss?

 

What is more telling are these words;

 

"Almost immediately machine gun fire opened. Something went into the water before they landed - possibly Hotchkiss shells, and threw up a spray - a number of these were falling about"

 

So was it a MG and or a Hotchkiss?

 

Could it be a Pom pom from Geba Tepe?

 

I don't know for sure, but I would say either did Brockmann, all he saw and heard was firing of some sort, and he put two and two together to get four, or was it five?

 

Cheers

S.B

 

 

[Bryn]

It's not a 'trap'; it's what experienced soldiers and sailors reported. Your OPINION is that they didn't know what it was that they were seeing and/or hearing. 

[Steven Broomfield]

And, to be fair, Bryn, your opinion is that they did know. Steve's alternative suggestion seems a reasonable hypothesis to me.

[gilly100]

Hi Steve

I guess after reading the Turk OH, now in English (note the Krupps mtn howitzer thread), its notes saying the Lone Pine Krupps battery did fire on our troops, but recent 'no mg' books saying they did not, I was looking for who might have been firing small artillery shells at 4.30am. As we are being told the Gaba Tepe guns did not come into action until 4.50am, then what shelling was Drake Brockman referring to? Given my stance on the landing at Anzac, I am merely raising a possibility. Coupled with Drake Brockman mentioning 10Bn being involved in a weapon capture on MacLagan's, which fits my earlier posts on Weatherill and Talbot Smith of 10Bn dismantling a tripod mounted mg on MacLagans, I thought this a worthy post. I am way past dying in a ditch over it, just putting another witness account out there, previously not mentioned and seeing any response.

I hope to be over there next May and want to range the distance between the Cup and northern Pine Ridge to gain more knowledge. I am still struggling to find the Turk OH a compelling narrative in some cases. Bean, for all his faults, appears  more accurate and his depth in seeking out first hand accounts far outstrips anything from the other side of  second ridge!

Cheers

Ian

[Guest]

Mate,

 

I am not saying its not, sure he heard and saw something that looked like a Hotchkiss, but as no such guns are known to be on the Turkish ORbat, then was it something else?

 

Mate as soldiers we are use to certain weapons systems firing, we see and use these weapons to train with. SO when in action unless we have seen and heard the enemies weapons then we equate theirs to ours.

 

From my expirence a Russian heavy MG sounds and fires much like a .50 cal Heavy MG (US made) when your under its fire, does that mean the enemy had 50 cal MGs, possibly, but more likely it was a Russian Heavy MG (the name escapes me after all these years) but you get the idea.

 

So he heard a Hotchkiss because that's what he knew, and possibly didn't know the sound of some other weapon, much like a Hotchkiss, like a pom pom, then he belived Hotchkiss not Pom pom?

 

But Bryn is right its my OPINION much like its Brockmann OPINION that what he's hearing is Hotchkiss not some other weapon system.

 

So Brockman is stating OPINION not fact.

 

Cheers

S.B

[gilly100]

Steve

Certainly we are all entitled to put our opinions forward, just like Weatherill of 10Bn did to Bean in October 1915 when relating how he and Talbot Smith dismantled an enemy tripod mounted mg on MacLagan's Ridge staight after coming ashore on 25 April. And Derham of 5Bn relating his opinion of enemy guns on Pine Ridge and carrying back a Turk mg from there on 25 April. Those are particular opinions I find very hard to dispute as facts, not just opinions.

I would be interested in your opinion on the quality of the Turk OH now that it has been translated. There have been numerous comments on the quality of Bean and Aspinall Oglanders historical works, yet no one appears interested in doing the same on the Turk OH for Gallipoli. Why?

Cheers

Ian