TURKISH MACHINE GUNS AT GALLIPOLI

[Guest]

Bryn,

I think your statement of Aker is far from correct?

While yes he was not on the battlefield till later in the morning he did command the Regt that fought there.

He had looked over the battlefield before it was, and drawn his own concussions.

He was in a good position to know what forces he had to defend that area and has named the units he had under his command.

So why didn't he name these missing MG units we all talk about?

Were they not under his command?

Strange that the area commander would not name all the units under his command, and more so these missing MG companies, as he does his own Regt MG company in his book?

We can all agree there is a lot missing here but not from Aker's records?

Disregarding his account is a mistake, and your analogy is also incorrect, because he had prior knownage of the forces used on that front and although not on the battlefield till early morning he was there and had full control of his forces that day.

He was also in a good position to get second hand accounts of what his sub units did and saw that morning, in the few hours he was not there.

S.B

[Bryn]

The FACT is Steve - he was not a witness. Bean was there on the first day too. He's not considered a witness to the landing. The account by Aker is not a diary.

My analogy is perfectly sound as, unless it's with reference to Bean, which I've already mentioned, my analogy had nothing to do with Aker.

[michaeldr]

Martin,

This is the sketch to which you have referred in your previous post No. 1150

[it appeared previously in my post No. 74 of 20 Jun 2008 – see page 3 of this thread]

and these are extracts of entries from the log of HMS Albion, seen here http://oldweather.s3...33216-014_1.jpg

Sunday the 25^th day of April 1915, at Dardanelles

6.53 Men landed on V beach. Met by heavy rifle & maxim fire

7.30 Boat came alongside with wounded – others came throughout the day. Troops & boats still under heavy rifle & maxim fire ashore

9.10 Hoisted out launch & S(team) pinnace filled with [word unclear] to float them

9.50 Launch & pinnace reached shore to act as bridge to troops landing

All forenoon firing as req. over Seddul Bahr & trenches

1.30 … … Picked up several empty drifting boats in damaged condition. Fired 12” at Seddul Bahr. Fired at intervals at places where maxims firing on our men might be concealed

[my emphasis]

The latter may cover the incident referred to by Blumberg in his 'Britain's Sea Soldiers':

“In the evening (25th April 1915) the Albion closed in and destroyed a machine gun post on the left, and the following morning another one in the old Fort of Sedd-ul-Bahr which helped the troops to advance”

It may also cover the incident to which the SWB's history refers

best regards

Michael

[michaeldr]

Some other references as recorded by naval observers of the landings at Helles

From The Naval Review, Vol. IV, issue 1

A NARRATIVE OF H.M.S. AGAMEMNON IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.

See page 132

At 6 a.m. the troops commenced to land on W beach under a heavy fire of machine guns, shrapnel, and rifle fire from the trenches, some of the former being buried in the cliffs and practically invisible. The same occurred slightly later at V beach, the landing and the connecting up by lighters, etc., of the River Clyde to the shore being very heavily opposed by rifle and machine-gun fire from the castle and trenches, and by shrapnel and shell.

…..............................................................

From The Naval Review, Vol. IV, issue 2

DARDANELLES NOTES. H.M. S. PRINCE GEORGE

See page 222

The River Clyde beached about 6 a.m. rather to the east of the place intended and a little further out, as there was a little less water there. The result was that the lighters were not quite sufficient to span the interval. Immediately she beached the seamen commenced to get the lighters into position, and the troops swarmed out from her sides on to the lighters. At once hell seemed to be let loose. The terrific burst of rifle and machine-gun fire seemed to swamp all other noises. I think every man on the lighters must have been killed at once. At the same time the batteries we were an became very active, I was kept busy looking after them, and could give no attention to the splendid but terrible scenes that were being enacted before our eyes on Sed-ul-Bahr beach. … … … …

… … … ...

About 8 a.m. I was able to have a look at what was going on on the beach. We could occasionally distinguish in the lulls of the heavy gun firing, the almost continuous rattle of the rifle and machine-guns round Sed-ul-Bahr, and no progress appeared to have been made in getting ashore there.

…..............................................................

From The Naval Review, Vol. IV, issue 2

THE DARDANELLES OPERATIONS. NOTES FROM H.M.S. LORD NELSON.

See page 296

25th. - Expeditionary Force landed on the Gallipoli Peninsula. We were in our position (off Morto Bay) at 4.30 a.m. and commenced half an hour's methodical bombardment of an allotted area. At 5 a.m. ceased fire, the River Clyde and six steamboats, each of the latter towing four boatloads of troops emerged from the smoke making for Seddul Bahr. They were greeted with a terrible fire from pompoms, maxims and rifles, which had been hidden and protected with the greatest skill by the Turks, or more probably their German officers. Men fell in hundreds, but still a handful managed to get in under cover ashore. We could do nothing but watch, as the combatants were at too close grips to admit of our guns firing. Some companies landed near us at Eski Hissalik and eventually seized the position there as a flank guard.

[Guest]

Thanks Michael. The following Naval eyewitnesses recorded enemy machine-guns in their personal accounts

Leading Seaman James Parkinson, Anson Bn RND - quoted in VCs of the First World War: Gallipoli

Able Seaman Richard Rickus HMS Cornwallis - manuscript letter IWM collection

Midshipman Maurice Lloyd HMS Cornwallis quoted in the Immortal Gamble.

Edit. If these are added to Lt Congdon's account and the four ships logs that recorded machine-guns, plus the 29 in my earlier post (I added some more), that makes 37 British accounts written by people who were there that day who all recorded enemy machine-guns.

The following on the SS River Clyde left accounts that I have not seen in full;

Commander Unwin RN
Wedgwood RNVR

Some key players of course never lived to tell the tale.The Commanding Officers of the Royal Dublin Fus, KOSB and Hampshire Regt were all killed, plus the Brigade Major 86th Inf Bde, Brigade Maj RA 29th Div, Col Doughtie-Wylie and 38 other British Officers serving in line infantry Regiments on 25th/26th.

MG

Edited

[gilly100]

On the V Beach topic, this from the recently translated TGS OH

"On the morning of 25 April the story of the condition of the 37mm light maxim battery assigned to command of the battalion was the saddest of all. As the bombardments began they were only able to spend four ribbons of bullets on the light vessels at close distance, when the feeders of both guns had got stuck. As they were labouring over these the two other guns were damaged on taking a hit from a heavy 305mm shell. The battery was then evacuated..."

And from another page we have only two 37mm guns

"The 37mm light section battery assigned to the command of the battalion had taken a hit with the first bombardment and had lost its two cannons..."

It mentions these weapons coming from DFC. If we recall back to Murray Ewens article and the Turk officer Col Rascheid Bey " All available machine guns of the fortifications of the Dardanelles and of the fleet were disposed of". Murray alluded to the 37mm Krupps maxims coming off the Barbaros Hayreddin and Torgut Reis, two from each ship.

Another quote from the Turk OH claims the following, which one can decide for themselves on its accuracy.

"It was known that the weapons in the 3/26 Bn formation only consisted of infantry rifles. Yet within each of the British infantry battalions there was one heavy mg company, their numbers in the companys varying between eight and twelve. This meant that on top of naval artillery, there would be an additional mass of heavy mgs in excess of hundred confronting the 3rd Bn..."

And another page says

"Likewise another subject worth thinking about is the combat involving close in fire (as a fire mass inducing fatalities) of the 40mgs of the British brigade allocated for the Ertugral Bay action aimed from the transportation vessels towards the land..."

And finally, for my part, if the four 37mm flak guns came off these two warships to bolster coastal defence at Helles, why indeed would they not take maxim mgs when avaialable, given the 25 Regts mg coy took theirs with them on the changeover on 22 April, and which is admitted as a mistake in the Turk OH?

Food for thought. There has been considerable scrutiny put on Brit and Aust OH's,, war diaries and witness accounts. Now the same scrutiny must apply to this Turk OH. Problematic prior to translation of course. Read it and make of it what you will.

Ian

[michaeldr]

The following on the SS River Clyde left accounts that I have not seen in full;

Commander Unwin RN

Wedgwood RNVR

Some key players of course never lived to tell the tale.The Commanding Officers of the Royal Dublin Fus, KOSB and Hampshire Regt were all killed, plus the Brigade Major 86th Inf Bde, Brigade Maj RA 29th Div, Col Doughtie-Wylie and 38 other British Officers serving in line infantry Regiments on 25th/26th.

To refresh my memory, this morning I have had another look at Wedgwood's writings on the landing.

He wrote to his friend Churchill, a long letter composed over three days 24-27^th April1915. The latter part of it written while ducking shells, such interruptions he marked with an 'X'. The letter is useful because of its immediacy and for the little details which he gives regarding various participants, however from our point of view in this thread, he adds nothing with respect to the enemy's machine guns. ['Winston S Churchill' by Martin Gilbert, Vol. III, Companion Part I, Documents July 1914 – April 1915]

Likewise his booklet 'With Machine-Guns in Gallipoli'* which was written and published later in 1915, after he had been wounded and hospitalised in the UK: alas he gives there no additional details regarding the positioning of the enemy's guns.

Amongst the personal stories which Wedgwood mentions:

- Carrington Smith (CO Hampshires) was shot in the head while on the bridge of the River Clyde

- Napier and Costeker - “A dash about nine o'clock was led by General Napier and his Brigade-Major. Would they ever get to the end of the lighter and jump into the sheltering water? No; side by side they sat down on the engine coaming. For one moment one thought they might be taking cover; then their legs slid out and they rolled over.”

- Doughty-Wylie - “Then yesterday the Munsters, without officers, could not face the last bit of the charge on the Old Castle hill. They were dead tired, not afraid. Col. Wylie, intelligence officer being on board the 'Clyde' ran ashore & without a cap or rifle dashed up to them & led them on & fell at the crest with a bullet thro' his head.”

* this was originally published in the Westminster Gazette and later in 1915 it was reprinted by Darling and Son Limited

regards

Michael

[michaeldr]

On the V Beach topic, this from the recently translated TGS OH

"On the morning of 25 April the story of the condition of the 37mm light maxim battery assigned to command of the battalion was the saddest of all. As the bombardments began they were only able to spend four ribbons of bullets on the light vessels at close distance, when the feeders of both guns had got stuck. As they were labouring over these the two other guns were damaged on taking a hit from a heavy 305mm shell. The battery was then evacuated..."

And from another page we have only two 37mm guns

"The 37mm light section battery assigned to the command of the battalion had taken a hit with the first bombardment and had lost its two cannons..."

Ian,

the 37mm guns are those referred to by the British as 'Pom-poms'

They are mentioned by the writer of 'A NARRATIVE OF H.M.S. AGAMEMNON IN THE MEDITERRANEAN'

“Two pom-poms serviceable and two damaged were captured.”

(page 136, the Naval Review, Vol. IV, issue 1)

…......................................................................

The publication of the Naval Review was seriously disrupted by the war and although the above edition is officially for the year 1916, it was in fact published only in 1919. This delay may have allowed the writers access to captured Turkish documents and the author of the Agamemnon piece makes use of these. One in particular may possibly be useful here.

See page 127 – quoting a Turkish Divisional Order

“April 17th.-The units sent forward for observation and protection near the coast will be supplied with hand bombs from the units in reserve.”

One should no doubt be very cautious in extrapolating too much from this order regarding 'hand bombs', however it reminded me of my own experience when rotating and taking over a fixed defensive position; items such as light mortars and heavy machine guns and their ammunition were left in situ by the out-going unit, and signed for by the OC of the new, incoming, unit.

And this prompts a question or two;

were the Turks also used to passing along weapons in a similar fashion?

And does this explain why not all units are recorded as having machine-guns?

Regards

Michael

[gilly100]

Hi Michael

I have no doubt there were rifle calibre maxims at V Beach. My question is, who manned the pom poms and the mgs? The Turk OH makes a big point of counting what they faced, perhaps to the point of gross exaggeration regarding mgs, and minimising any sort of quick firing weapons from their side. Ironically, if indeed they had these weapons, it takes nothing away from a steadfast defence and ultimate victory in late 1915 early 1916. As I am far from expert on Helles, perhaps the writers on the no mg side for Helles can explain. Happy to be educated further.

Happy to be corrected on gross exaggeration of numbers of mgs per British infantry battalion at Gallipoli in April 1915. Just looking for the truth. One shouldn't take their bat and ball and go home until its over might be pertinent now that it seems, at least to me, the Turk OH is not strictly accurate. Bash Bean and his work while on site, and bash Oglander as well, but be prepared to bash equally the other OH written by the victors with equal enthusiasm. Theirs was written for home consumption as well, and they won.

Cheers

Ian

[Bryn]

ANOTHER officer, this one of the 9th Battalion AIF, who seemed to have no difficulty distinguishing between rifle and machine-gun fire during the landing at Anzac:

'I was in the first tow, there being 12 all told. There wasn’t a murmur from anyone; as a matter of fact I had a sleep going over. There were 63 in my boat, as it took somewhere about two hours to reach land. When about 50 to 100 yards from the beach, a shot was fired, and whistled past our heads, then another and another ; then the enemy’s machine guns started, and the air was getting rather musical. When within 20 to 30 yards from land, we had to row, as the pinnaces left us. The men got to work like anything, and pulled for the shore. My boat was rather unfortunate, as we hit one in front and stopped, so out I jumped, being the first in the bow and I landed in the water up to my neck. I had, in the meantime, removed my pack which was very heavy, and held it above my head to keep it dry. Anyway my men followed me, and we reached terra firma after a bit of trouble.'

Lieutenant Robert William Laws Chambers, draftsman, studying architecture with his father (architect), of Brisbane.

2nd Lieutenant in A Coy, 9th Battalion at embarkation: previously served 3 years, Brisbane Grammar School Cadets, 3.5 years 7th Infantry - Lieutenant (Moreton Regiment). Wounded on the far right of the Anzac line, near Bolton’s Hill, on 25th April 1915. Killed in action as Captain commanding C Coy., 9th Battalion, Mouquet Farm, 21 Aug 1916).

I await the usual; either completely ignoring his account, or hearing all the excuses as to why he could not possibly have known what he was talking about.

[gilly100]

And back at Anzac.

A cursory glance over the 30 officers of 11th Battalion AIF that landed on 25 April shows us this. Three were killed that day and another two days later, so unable to record their landing. Of the others, ten recorded coming under rifle and mg fire, while several others just mentioned heavy fire. Others may have recorded their experience, but as yet unfound. Only Selby says he didn't think there was an mg at Ari Burnu.

Then of course are the numerous accounts by the other ranks. Bring in all the others from the 3rd Brigade and it will be a seriously long list. And thats just on the beach.

Ian

[alantwo]

I've just come across a couple of entries in the 29th Division CRA War Diary

April 25th

4.30am

....and landing began at 6am on 5 beaches simultaneously against strong opposition and under heavy rifle fire and machine gun fire. The landing was covered by gun fire well directed from the ships....

Lieutenant A.R. McLeod RHA was killed at W Beach and 2nd Lieutenant A.A. Middleton was wounded at V Beach where the greatest opposition was encountered. At this latter beach 3 well concealed pom poms commanded the beach at a range of 300x and inflicted heavy casualties.

April 26th

Landing at V Beach held up by pom pom fire and heavy rifle fire from old fort SE pt 138. 460 How Batty and 26th FA Batty ordered to shell this point. Did so and enabled infantry to capture position about 11am.

Regards

Alan

[gilly100]

Interesting Alan

There is a good sketch of V Beach I have been sent recently that clearly shows 3 pom poms and 2 maxims nearby. If I could reduce it properly I would post it, but just can't get it done. Interesting the Turk OH saying only 4 clips got off before jamming and the two others getting destroyed pre landing.

The sketch shows lines of fire, guns locations, wire, landing boats etc and was drawn I think in 1918 as annotated in a corner. Am sure someone has it amongst the forum with greater image reduction skills than I.

Ian

[alantwo]

Ian

If it helps pm a copy of the drawing to me and I'll see if I can do anything via photoshop, unless someone posts in the meantime.

Regards

Alan

[Bryn]

I think this is the one Ian's talking about:

[Bryn]

The annotation in the corner of the diagram that Ian mentioned appears below. It appears to me to read, 'copied from [for?]...' and a word or words I can't make out, but that appears to be 'shot OR' as well as a date (9/9/18) and what appear to be initials, either of a person or unit. It appears to have nothing to do with the creation date of the diagram, but is indicating only that it was copied from somewhere else [or for someone?] in 1918.

[gilly100]

Thanks Bryn for posting. It certainly marries up with some of the eye witness accounts.

Cheers

Ian

[Cpl Coleman]

Found this photo in the US Library of Congress Digital Collections ... Maxims?

• Title: Turkish soldiers under German command near the Dardanelles
  
• Date Created/Published: [1915?], c1915 Jul. 29.
  
• Medium: 1 photographic print ; 12.1 x 16.6 cm, on mount 35.7 x 28 cm.
  
• Summary: Photograph shows Turkish soldiers with machine guns perched atop earthen bunkers.
  
• Reproduction Number: LC-USZ62-36552 (b&w film copy neg.)
  
• Rights Advisory: No known restrictions on publication.
  
• Call Number: LOT 8880 [item] [P&P]
  
• Repository: Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division Washington, D.C. 20540 USA
  

[Guest]

Mate,

This is the normal way the Turkish Army deployed its MG's, that is by sections of Two guns.

The only time this was not used is when some MG's sections had one gun.

This happened in early 1915 because the lack of MG's in their companies, like some companies had three not the normal four guns.

If you follow the above MG's were always reported by Australian and British accounts as single guns, rearly two or more, that's what makes these accounts hard to understand given the normal way the Turkish Infantry used their most important weapon, but as stated there are always exceptions to the rule, but so many?

Cheers

S.B

[Bryn]

2nd Lieutenant Alexander Elder FORSYTHE, Canterbury Battalion, NZEF, wrote:

'The Turks then attacked in earnest, and two machine guns opened fire on the Punjabis immediately on our left. My men were very cool, and waited patiently. By this time there was terrible noise with the enemy's machine guns and rifle fire, also the Punjabis' fire.'

(This refers to the encounter with the Turks on the Suez Canal at about 3am on the morning of 2 February 1915. Lieutenant Forsythe was one of three New Zealand officers present with two platoons of the Canterbury Battalion; one of the others being Major Brereton).

My observations are:

1) Lieutenant Forsythe identifies two machine guns on a 'densely dark' night. He obviously can not see them. Same as at Gallipoli, not just during the landing, but reported often - mgs were usually, even in daylight, well-concealed. There are numerous reports of officers being killed in the first few days and in August while trying to locate enemy machine guns which they knew to be firing, but which they could not see.

2) Lieutenant Forsythe was not so 'inexperienced' that he did not know what he was hearing. And yet this is almost three months before the landing at Gallipoli.

It's about time to lay to rest the ridiculous assertion that these men did not know what they were hearing. There is no way to prove that anyway; it's nothing but conjecture, speculation, opinion.

Major Brereton, who was present, and who inspected the Turkish positions on the far bank of the Canal after the fight, is the same officer who later reported the 'piles' of cartridge cases on No. 2 Outpost, near Fisherman's Hut, after the landing.

[gilly100]

Major JF McCall of 1st FCE wrote to Dennis McDonald regarding the death of his brother Cpl AJ McDonald 1st FCE....

He was on the TB destroyer and was in the act of stepping off her deck on to the ladder leading to the store boat when he was hit...

The enemy was pouring in a heavy shrapnel and machine gun fire....

Infantry officers and other ranks, Engineer officers and other ranks, Field Ambulance officers and other ranks, Royal Navy officers and ratings, the list is quite complete regarding their experiences that early morning.

Ian

[Guest]

Somewhere in the depths of this long running debate was a discussion on the weight and challenges of portability of Turkish machine guns. A snippet from the history of the KOSB in the Great War (page 137) describing an encounter of one 1st Bn KOSB Officer with Turkish machine guns on the day of the landing. It sheds some light on how Turkish MGs were moved around the battlefield.

"In places the line was pierced and Turks fired into the reserve of our men at the head of the nullah. Stirling Cookson was detailed to clear the bluff of these unwanted guests. Whether it was then or not, he certainly had a bullet through his glengarry and another which grazed his puttee. Almost unbelievable is the encounter of Lieut Miller with a party with a M.G. on a pack pony. They had turned the position of the L of the KOSB and were coming calmly along behind our position. He dealt with them with his revolver - each Officer had twenty-four rounds"

Click page 137 proper, page 167 of the digital copy.

The KOSB landed on Y Beach on the day of the Landings. The battalion war diary also mentions the enemy bringing up a MG on a pony which was put out of action. See here. Click page 36. I suspect it is the same event. MG

[gilly100]

Interesting Martin, nice find.

Sounds awfully similar to the Turks clearing out of 400 Plateau upon which Lone Pine sat that early 25 April morning. Mule shot containing mg and SAA. Spare parts for mgs found in tent nearby. This all posted some time ago but of course, just completely ignored or treated with disdain as not reliable. I suppose we could argue over ponies versus mules instead? The portability question should never have made it to the table in the first place.

Ian

[Rockturner]

Nice work Martin,

I have always believed that pack animals be they donkeys, mules, ponies or horses had to have been used to transport the non-existent machine guns, ammunition and spares.

And as Ian mentions, a mule or in fact, two mules were noted on 400 Plateau, one loaded with ammunition and another with a machine gun strapped to kits back.

Given the hilly terrain on the peninsula, particularly to the north of Gaba Tepe, pack animals had to be the obvious choice for the local Ottoman defender.

It is also interesting that on p.36 of the KOSB War Diary there is mention of a German officer, which by all accounts were not there apparently.

How dare you try and kill two birds with one stone.

Loneranger VC

[michaeldr]

It is also interesting that on p.36 of the KOSB War Diary there is mention of a German officer, which by all accounts were not there apparently.

LR, Ian & Martin,

Private John Vickers, of No.1 Company, Plymouth Btn, RMLI, also mentions officers believed to be German “shouting to us in good English to retire.”

see 'From Trench & Turret, RM letters & diaries 1914-1918' by S. M. Holloway, published by Constable in 2006, ISBN 13: 978 1 84529 321 5

From the same book – Sgt William Meatyard MM, HQ Company, Plymouth Btn, RMLI.

The battalion's Signal Sergeant, Meatyard wrote

“Throughout all my experience I have not heard a greater volume of rifle and machine gun fire, considering the hours that it lasted. It never ceased during the night.”

He is referring here to the night of 25/26^th April 1915 at Y Beach

Also quoted in the above book are extracts from an article which appeared in the Globe & Laurel in April 1919, written by Lt. Charles Conybeare of No.3 Company, Plymouth Btn., RMLI, where he mentions fire from a Nordenfeldt here.

regards

Michael