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Remembered Today:

TURKISH MACHINE GUNS AT GALLIPOLI


Chris Best

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Gilly,

Mate I am not disagreeing with you, there are a number of accounts that record the capture of MG's on Anzac, but at the end of the day the 11Bn makes no claim for any MG's captured that day?

Either does the the 3rd Bde.

So what happened to the Gun captured by Les Parson's?

Of cause do we know where he landed as the 11Bn landed split up with A&B Co's landing together and C and DCos along with Co's of the 12Bn.and spread out from Plugges to Walkers.

So was Les Parson's in A or B Co who climded Plaggees and was that MG Captured there?

Not a bad possie for a MG as it covered all the beaches?

But since the Turks never left a single MG without suport there must have been a second gun close by?

But being first a shore they should have posted the Gun after capture, but since there was a lot of confussion it was the last thing on their minds?

So did another unit claim this MG after the 11Bn left it?

Well no, the MG just disappeared?

So we are left with another disappearing MG captured during the landing.

Not the only MG to disapear that morning?

S.B

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Hi Steve

A and C were off the London and B and D off destroyers, just to start. I am just putting it out there and you can shoot it down all you like. I am good with that. Same for events at Helles. The amount of interest in this debate judging by the hits, remains strong, so the odd post from both sides harms no one. I would suggest if the new version of events was proven beyond all doubt this thread would have dried up.

Cheers

Ian

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Mate,

Yes its the fustration of this, like I said I can name you any number of accounts that claim there captured but they don't show up in the Offical records?

if the Turks claim there were no MG's from there 27th Regt at the beaches where did these guns come from,

Preposition guns of some type are the most likely but these are not in the records?

Accounts all mentioned hearing guns and over running some of these guns but again none show up in the offical records?

Its a mystery that will never be confirmed?

S.B

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Chris,

Yes the Axis site under the Ottoman part has these German officers during 1914/15 in Turkish;

Albert Heuck is shown as 13th Div Commander;

1. Mareşal Otto Liman von Sanders Alman Askeri Heyeti Başkanı 1. Ordu komutanı
2. Korgeneral Bronsart von Schellendorf Genelkurmay 1.Kurmay Başkanı Genelkurmay KurmayBaşkanı
3. General Posseldt Ağır Topçu Birlikleri Başmüfettişi Erzurum'da komutan
4. General Erich Weber İstihkam Birlikleri Başmüfettişi Çanakkale'de komutan
5. Albay Ulrich Back Askeri okullar Başmüfettişi Çanakkale'de komutan
6. Albay Trommer 10. Tümen komutanı 10. Tümen komutanı
7. Albay Weidtmann Halep Ordu depoları Kurmay subayı Yedeklik dairesi Başkanı
8. Albay Albert Heuck 13. Tümen komutanı 13. Tümen komutanı
9. Albay Eduard von Sodenstern Piyade atış okulu komutanı Çanakkale'de 5. Tümen komutanı
10.Albay August Nikolai 3. Tümen komutanı 2.Kolordu komutanı, 4.Ordu Müfettişi
11.Albay von Frankenberg und Proschlitz 1. Ordu Kurmay Başkanı 2. Ordu kurmay Başkanı
12.Albay Hans Kannengiesser Savaş bakanlığı Ordular ŞubesindeBölüm Başkanı
13.Albay Bischof Malzeme nakliye birlikleri Başmüfettişi Genelkurmay karargahı
14.Yarbay von Legat Askeri Akademiler Başkanı 5. Ordu Kurmay Başkanı
15.Yarbay Schlee Sahra Topçu Birlikleri Başmüfettişi
16.Yarbay Wehrle Ağır Topçu atış okulu Komutanı Çanakkale'de Topçu birlikleri komutanı
17.Yarbay Friedrich Kress von Kressenstein Savaş Bak.Ordular Dairesi Başkanı 2.8.1914-21.9.1914
Genelkurm.Harekat dairesi Başkanı
18.Yarbay Potschernik Ordular Ulaşım işleri Başmüfettişi
19.Yarbay Stange (1) İstanbul'da Piyade Alay komutanı İstanbul'da yedekbirliklerin Müfetttişi.
20.Yarbay von Hopffgarten Süvari birlikleri Başmüfettişi İstihbarat Subayı
21.Yarbay Perrinet von Thauvenay Genel Kurmay 2. Şube(İstihbarat) Başkanı 2. Kolordu Kurmay Başkanı
22.Yarbay Albrecht Halep'te 6. Kolordu Kurmay Başkanı Çanakkale'de komutan
23.Yarbay Otto von Feldmann Gen.Kur.Sınıraaskeri Yığınak Dairesi Baş. Gen.Kur.3. Şube(Harekat)Başkanı
24.Yarbay Felix Guse Sivas'ta 10. Kolordu Kurmay Başkanı Erzurum'da 3. Ordu Kurmay Başkanı
25.Yarbay Lauffer Suvari Subayları binicilik okulu Komutanı Filistin'de İstihbarat Subayı
26.Yarbay Kirsten Sivas'ta 1. Süvari Alayı Komutanı Bağımsız süvari tugayının Komutanı
27.Yarbay Böttrich Genel Kurmay 4. (Demiryolu)Şube Başkanı Gen.Kur.Sahra Demiryolu Dairesi Başkanı
28.Binbaşı von Frese Harp Akademilerinde Öğretmen 1. Ordu karargahında subay
29.Binbaşı Rabe Edirne'de 15. Piyade Alayı komutanı İstanbul'da Tümen komutanı
30.Binbaşı Binhold 3. Sahra topçu Alayı Komutanı Çanakkale'de komutan, Topçu okulu komutanı
31.Binbaşı Wilhelmi Ağır Topçu Tabur Komutanı Çanakkale'de(1.Ordu) ve Irak'ta ağır Top Tabur. Kom.
32.Binbaşı Stange (2) Edirne'de Topçu Subayı Lazistan Çete Birlikleri Komutanı
sonra Çanakkale'de General Weber Komutası altında, en son Topçu piyade atiş okulu komutanı
33.Binbaşı Vonberg Sivasta'da 30. Sahra Topçu Alayı Komutanı
34.Binbaşı Schierholz Kurmay Subay okulunda Öğretmen 9. Piyade Alayı Komutanı
35.Binbaşı Otto Welsch Süvari Subayı, Binicilik okulu Öğretmeni Filistin'de Süvari Tugayı Karargah Subayı
36.Binbaşı Franz Carl Endres Genelkurmay 1. Şube Başkanlığında
37.Binbaşı Hunger 20. Piyade Alayı Komutanı
38.Binbaşı Eggert Harp Akademilerinde Öğretmen 1. Kolordu Kurmay Başkanı
39.Binbaşı Alexander Effnert İstihkam Taburları Komutanı Çanakkale ve Filistin'de İstihkam birli. Kom.
40.Binbaşı Karl von Staszewski Edirne'de Mühendis Subay General Weber'in komutasında görevli
Erzurum'da İstihkam Birlikleri Komutanı
41.Binbaşı Schröder 1. Malzeme Nakliyat Taburları Komutanı Halep ve Mersin'de Cephe gerisi Kom.
42.Binbaşı Erich Prigge Süvari Subay okulunda Komutan Askeri Heyet Başkanının emir subayı
43.Binbaşı Lange Askeri Akademi'de Öğretmen Sivas'ta 10. Kolordu Kurmay Başkanı
44.Binbaşı von König Askeri Heyet Kurmay başkanlığında 1. Ordu Komutanının emir Subayı
45.Binbaşı Carl Mühlmann Askeri Heyet Başkanının emir subayı tarihçi
46.Yüzbaşı Fischer Genelkurmay kurmay başkanı emir subayı
47.Yüzbaşı von der Hagen Ask. Beden eğitimi okulu Komutanı İstihbarat Subayı, Suveyş harekatında
48.Yüzbaşı von Wrochem Albay Kannengieser'in komutası altında Kurmay okulu öğretmeni
2. Ordu cephe gerisi Müfettiş yardımcısı
49.Yüzbaşı Leo Pohl İstihkam Birlikleri başmüfettişinin emir subayı Genel Kurmay Emir subayı
50.Yüzbaşı Gerlach 1. İstihkam Taburu Komutanı 3.Kolordu istihbarat subayı, 307. İstihk. Tab. Kom.
51.Yüzbaşı Heibey Ağır topçu taburu komutanı 4. Kolordu İstihbarat subayı, Filistin'de Topçu Tüm. Kom.
52.Yarbay Prof. Dr.Otto Mayer Savaş Bak. Sağlık dairesi 2. Başkanı 5.Ordu Tuğgeneral Sağlık Müf. Yard.
53.Yüzbaşı Thieme Savaş Bak. Veteriner dairesinde görevli 1.Ordu ve Yıldırım Ordu. Veteriner Subay
54.Yarbay Burchardi Savaş Bak. Levazım dairesinde görevli 1. Ordu Levazım işlerinde
55.Binbaşı Dr. Huttner Eczacılık Dairesinde Müfettiş 1. ve 5.Ordu'da Eczacı Subay
56.Binbaşı Schuch Savaş bakanlığında Yedeklik dairesinde görevli
57.Yüzbaşı Sterke Levazım dairesinde görevli Filistin'de Levazım subayı
58.Teğmen Meinke Mühendis, Edirne'de Tahkimat subayı General Weber'in komutasında
59.Teğmen Weis Mühendis, Edirne'de Tahkimat subayı General Weber'in komutasında
60.Teğmen Jaenicke Edirne'de Ateşçi Subayı General Weber'in komutasında
61.Astsubay Meier Edirne'de Ateşçi Subayı General Weber'in komutasında
62.Astsubay Brimberg Levazım İşleri Muhasebeci 1. ve 5. Ordu'da
63.Astsubay Paul Wagner (sonra Üsteğmen) Genel Kurmay 1. Daire Sekreteri Genelkurmay Sekreteri
64.Astsubay Hardt Askeri Heyet Sekreteri 1. Ordu Sekreteri
65.Astsubay Westermeier Savaş Bak. Sağlık Daire Sekreteri 1. Ordu Sağlık dairesi
66. Astsubay Heiden Sahra topçu birliklerinde Acemi öğretmeni
67.Astsubay Thiel Ağır topçu birliklerinde acemi öğretmeni
68.Astsubay Egid Mühlbauer Piyade alaylarında acemi öğretmeni
69.Astsubay Mowitz Piyade alaylarında acemi öğretmeni
70.Astsubay Kutter Binicilik okulunda ahırların sorumlusu Yarbay Lauffer'in komutasında
71.Astsubay Ludwig Bader Gülhane Harp okulu ilaç fabrikasında Binbaşı. Dr.Huttner'in yanında
Ayrıca Yarbay Walter von Strempel önce İstanbul'da Alman konsolosluğunda Askeri Ataşe olarak çalışır. Daha sonra 1913-1914 yıllarında Alman Askeri Heyeti Kurmay Başkanı olur. Savaş sırasında Almanya'da askeri okullarda eğitim gören Osmanlı sarayının Prensleriyle özel olarak ilgilenme görevini üstlenir.
Yasal düzenleme olarak Osmanlı ordusu içinde Ayrı bir birim olarak çalışan Alman Askeri Heyetine sonra Daha bir çok Alman subayı katılacaktır. Örneğin: General von Wülfingen, ....
Birinci dünya savaşına katılma kararı alındıktan sonra bu sayı hızla artacak ve Osmanlı ordusunda görev alan ve ordulara birliklere komuta eden Alman subayların sayısı yüzlerle ifade edilecektir. Savaşa girildikten sonra Almanya'dan büyük miktarda para, kredi ve savaş malzemesi gelir. Almanlar askeri eğitimi tamamen değiştirirler. Prusya okulu tamamen ordu içine yerleşir. Artık verilen bütün emirler yazılı olmak zorundadır. ( Bu ilke, NATO'ya girildikten sonra değiştirilir ve sözlü emirler de geçerli olur.) İkmal, İstihkam,, demiryolu, tıp, eczacılık gibi geri hizmetlerinde de büyük değişimler yaparlar.. Yapılan anlaşmaya göre Alman subaylar, Osmanlı ülkesinde Almanya'da aldıkları rütbelerin bir üstü ile çalışırlar. Generaller Paşa adıyla anılıyor. Yanlız şu nokta unutulmamalıdır. Almanya'dan gelen ve gelecek bu subayların yetiştirilmeleri gereği düşünce yapılarında diğer Avrupalılardan hiç bir fark yoktur. Yüksek rütbeli subayların çok büyük bir bölümü pancermenist, sosyal darvinist ve yahudi düşmanıdır. Türkiye'yi kendilerinin gelecekteki koloni bölgesi olarak görmektedirler.
BİRİNCİ DÜNYA HARBİNE GİRİŞİMİZ
Şimdi tekrar başa dönelim. 28.7.1914'ta Avusturya-Macaristan imparatorluğu, Sırbistan'a savaş açmış. 4 gün sonra Almanya, Avusturya-Macari

Cheers

S.B

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Hi Steve

Parsons' letter states he was B Coy, at least in August. He arrived in Malta in mid July so all that tallies to his service record, also of which states he embarked with his Bn in Alexandria on 2nd March. Just another 1st reo absorbed onto strength of the 11th Battalion.

Only speculation on captured mg, but perhaps same one that Darnell mentions and the 9th Bn, that stated it was smashed. Who knows? They were certainly not all fabricators that is for sure.

This below from 618/2nd Lt George Holt Henderson-Smith via AWM. He was in 11Bn MGS under Dixon Hearder, who also mentions MGs, although I think Peter Hart's book on Gallipoli refrained from quoting that part.

..... When near the shore the enemy opened a heavy fire of shrapnel, also a heavy rifle and machine gun fire. Lots of men were hit whilst in the boats....

.... The Gun Section landed without any casualties and after recovering its wind on the beach, pushed on to the firing line. By this time it was daylight...... It was up hill and down dale, slipping down the steep slopes on the seat of ones trousers and toilingup steeper slopes. I was the first of the Section to reach the firing line and I was just about done up with the stiff climbing...

We got the guns going as soon as possible...

H Smith was soon after commissioned in the field and fell on 25th May.

The argument of being unable to quickly withdraw a MG appears less than strong when our blokes, who did not know the terrain, managed to get theirs up pretty well. We already know the Turk guns were not sled mount.

Surely MG personnel knew the difference of pinnace mg fire and enemy fire.

Cheers

Ian

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Capt ET Brennan was the RMO of 11th Bn AIF. In the the first wave of the Landing, he was MID and awarded the MC for his work at the Landing and the raid at Gaba Tepe on 4 May. In a letter to a friend in Fremantle, where Brennan had a practice as a GP, and which was published by The West Australian newspaper on 13 July 1915, he retold in great detail his involvement. This letter was quite long and I have put in about half of the letter for perusal. It was written whilst he was at Anzac.

"..... Our tow was on the extreme left..... Just as the picket boat cast off and we were lowering the oars to pull the last 40 or 50 yards a single rifle shot rang out in the stillness and everyone jumped about a foot in his seat. But we soon got over the jumping husiness, as within about 5 seconds the fire opened from the whole hill in front of us, and then a machine gun opened fire. I was in the second boat of the tow and being a fairly light boat we ran well into the beach. The first boat of the tow was a big pinnace, and having 50 men on board she grounded a fair distance out, and when the troops got out they were up to their shoulders in water; we were only up to our waists. There were only a few casualties in our boats-the machine gun didnt get into it,

but there were more in the others.....

Suddenly the shrapnel started. They were firing from a battery on the Gabe Tepe.....

I was busy dressing all kinds of bullet wounds. An engineer was shot through the chest just beside me, and died in a few minutes. Suddenly there was a cheer from the top of the hill; our boys had captured the machine gun and driven the Turks out of their trenches...

...... The different sound of bullets, shells etc, we are now experts in. There is the sharp crack of the bullet overhead, with a ping when it hits anything. There is the nasty, unfriendly swish of one that passes close to your ear. Then there is the crackle of a machine gun, changing to a mournful disappointed whisk whisp when the bullet gets closer....."

Brennan talks about trying to treat a few wounded Turks by giving oral morphine, only to have them spit it out. I wasn't sure how this was administered. A fascinating account of his landing and can be viewed on Trove.

Ian

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  • 2 months later...

And this from AWM38 3DRL 606-7-1

"Dr Brennan of 11th tells me that on Ap 25 Turks opened fire on his boat (the first) opposite Maxim Knoll......

....... They waited a little under knoll until a few more boats came ashore and then fixed bayonets and up over hill like smoke. When they reached MG knoll doctor was called on to dress two wounded."

An interesting reference to Ari Burnu knoll.

Got my Gallipolian journal today. Was pleased to see the article The Gallipoli Maxims published within. Interesting to note where the Maxims and pom poms came from with regard to Anzac and Helles.

Ian

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Got my Gallipolian journal today. Was pleased to see the article The Gallipoli Maxims published within. Interesting to note where the Maxims and pom poms came from with regard to Anzac and Helles.

Ian

Thanks for the advanced warning, Ian

My copy arrived this morning and Murray Ewen's article is certainly a very good contribution to the debate.

all the best

Michael

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Yes Michael

The Turk sources add to the debate as well as the POW intel. I know Murray very well and one look in his study gives an indication as to how hard he digs for his projects.I look forward to more info coming out that proves the prescence of early morning MG's. Perhaps Turkish naval archives might yield something. Interesting in that during our May visit to Gallipoli, one Turkish boat tour was waxing lyrical on the non prescence of MG's. Did not take long to take hold this new version of events.

I thought the article was well written and researched and provides a credible rebuttal to the other side of the debate. The reference to field guns was the only minor blue that should have said mountain guns, but did not detract from the MG argument. Well done Murray on a ballsy effort.

Ian

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Perhaps Turkish naval archives might yield something.

This is certainly an area which needs examining in more detail, as do the records of the Çanakkale Fortified Area Command.

It is to be hoped that in the future we will be able to ascertain exactly to where they distributed their minor assets; eg - 37mm Pom-poms, 25mm Nordenfelts and the old ex-naval machine-guns.

Some we already know about, but the record in English is currently incomplete

regards

Michael

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Hi Michael

Well certainly the last two paragraphs of the article allude to where the 37mm pom poms came from and which have come into the debate before with regard to Helles. The number of available MG'S off the two Turk battleships certainly allows for a good spreading out of the weapons over the peninsula, with the option to bring a few more into action when deemed appropriate, and where.

The third last paragraph of Murray's article is also of great interest in that it alludes to what effect these weapons could have had later in the morning, when said weapons would have been already withdrawn back to the heights, especially at Anzac. Certainly there are Allied accounts that indicate such.

I am just pleased some information is now out there that no one else seems to have found, or at the least, bothered to countenance.

And finally my apologies to Murray with regard to his reference to field guns. It is clearly explained in brackets the real Krupps 75mm mountain guns. All in all a well developed, researched and presented piece. Well done The Gallipolian for publishing it. Take note AWM.

Ian

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Ian,

Another important point made by Murray, was with regard to the machine-gun's muzzle flash or flame.

quote: “The prolonged muzzle flash/flame of a Maxim firing short or sustained bursts in the half-light of dawn would have been unmistakable.”

(Put 'flash' into the search engine here and in the 961 posts so far, it has only been mentioned in five!)

As Murray points out, while credence may be given to the idea that someone might confuse the sound of the rapid fire of several rifles with the sound made by a machine-gun, there can however be no doubt as to difference made by the flash of the two weapons; one very short indeed and the other appearing to be much longer.

Given the early hour of the landings and the consequent prevailing light conditions, surely it would be very difficult (if not impossible) to confuse the flash of a rifle with that of a machine-gun

regards

Michael

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Ian,

Another important point made by Murray, was with regard to the machine-gun's muzzle flash or flame.

quote: “The prolonged muzzle flash/flame of a Maxim firing short or sustained bursts in the half-light of dawn would have been unmistakable.”

(Put 'flash' into the search engine here and in the 961 posts so far, it has only been mentioned in five!)

As Murray points out, while credence may be given to the idea that someone might confuse the sound of the rapid fire of several rifles with the sound made by a machine-gun, there can however be no doubt as to difference made by the flash of the two weapons; one very short indeed and the other appearing to be much longer.

Given the early hour of the landings and the consequent prevailing light conditions, surely it would be very difficult (if not impossible) to confuse the flash of a rifle with that of a machine-gun

regards

Michael

To beginning with, should state I don't have a dog in this fight, nor am I an expert on early machine guns or Ottoman small arms.

But, would have presumed the muzzle flash from a rifle or Maxim gun would have been very, very similiar. Same ammunition coming out of a similiar length barrel...

Are you referring to a muzzle booster, Michael?

Thought, at least from the Commonwealth perspective, that while Vickers guns had muzzle boosters, Maxims didn't. As regards to whether my comments are relevant to whatever the Turks were using (/or not) on April the 25th, I have no idea.

regards,

Antony

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But, would have presumed the muzzle flash from a rifle or Maxim gun would have been very, very similiar. Same ammunition coming out of a similiar length barrel...

Anthony,

The flash from a rifle and from a machine-gun when BOTH weapons are firing SINGLE rounds, would indeed be similar

[As an aside, many years ago I trained under NCOs who would have loved us to fire single rounds from their machine-guns, and they attempted to train us to do just that]

However the point which Murray is making, and with which I tend to agree, is surely this:

battlefield conditions preclude the possibility of a machine gunner firing his weapon in single shots.

He undoubtedly fired it in bursts.

Thus the flash/flashes/flare/flame from his weapon would look quite distinct from that of his companion firing a single round from a rifle.

No matter how efficient that rifleman was in his rapid fire, the flash or series of flashes from his gun would appear quite different from that of the machine-gun which was firing a burst.

Regards

Michael

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Mates,

I am disapointed that well known authors and reseachers like you both can still make coments that a muzzle flash difference between a Rifle and a MG (maxim).

Vetern soldiers over two years later were still making the same mistake so why not inexpirenced soldiers in their first fight in half light under fire and climbing those highs?

You both have the advantage of this sourse but our poors selfs don't so what you are comenting on escapes me.

Unless the Gallipolian journal can place MGs or some other type of gun on the beaches at Anzac, we are still left with the same stories told by veterns on what they saw that day, but without any confirmarion that these MGS showed up later to be confirmed in any offical sourse.

Of couse that dosn't disprove the guns were there, but spreads a twist to the many stories that mention MGs all over the beach where a number of writers claim to have captured these guns, that don't show up in any offical records?

I surpose I am asking to read this articale myself to see what you blokes are talking about.

'Cheers

S.B.

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Hi Steve

If one is a member of the Gallipoli Association the journal arrives by post. Back issues are put up online in PDF format for download and are available to buy as a disc going back from beginning to recent editions, but not the last few as of yet. I presume available if one is a member. Perhaps Steve Chambers or Keith Edmonds can further enlighten availability to non members or get on the website and take a look.

The article in question takes up about 11 pages of the 65 total, so I will not be typing all that up here. Am sure you will find a way to get your eyes on it. It is well worthy of perusal whichever way one stands.

I bought the disc a year or so ago as it contains so much quality information, gleaned primarily from the membership.

A good article that offers balanced rebuttal of the current view, which I feel has been largely accepted by the majority without sufficient questioning. Only my opinion here but stated nonetheless.

Ian

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Imagine if you can the following scenario.....

Bimbashi Mehmet retired from the army after Turkey's War of Independence and then published his diaries.

On 9th March 1915, he records being with his unit at Sedd ul Bahr when they came under enemy Howitzer fire.

When copies of the diary reached London & Canberra, the Bimbashi's story was ridiculed;

how could he have come under allied Howitzer fire at Sedd ul Bahr on 9th March 1915?

Of course, the officer was mistaken; he was no doubt quite inexperienced. Even if he had come under Howitzer fire, then perhaps it was an 'over' from the Turkish batteries on the Asiatic coast.

But the Bimbashi was not mistaken and he was not inexperienced; earlier he had served in the Balkan wars and he knew very well when he was under the plunging fire of a Howitzer, compared to being on the receiving end of a field gun or naval gun. His colleagues serving on the Asiatic shore confirmed that they had not been firing in his direction on 9th March 1915.

No matter. In Canberra and London they rolled out their Official Histories which proved beyond a shadow of a doubt that no Howitzer battery of theirs was within range of Sedd ul Bahr on 9th March 1915. If this was not enough, then there were the Brigade War Diaries; etc etc etc.

The foolish and inexperienced Bimbashi must have imagined being under Howitzer fire on 9th March 1915.

However, if, instead of London and Canberra, someone had checked with Portsmouth, then the Bimbashi's diary would have been seen as true and correct.

On 9th March 1915 a 6-inch Howitzer mounted on HMS Prince George was firing at Sedd ul Bahr.

See

"We fired, the howitzers into Sed-ul-Bahr, more as an experiment
than for any other reason, and to give the R.G.A. sergeant-major an
innings as he has not had much to do so far. As a matter of fact
they gave much better results than anyone expected, and their rounds
went quite near where they were meant to go.”

The moral of the story -

It's just a matter of someone looking in the right place,

and the right place may not be the usual place, either.

…...........................................................................................

For more information on The Gallipoli Association see http://www.gallipoli-association.org/membership

best regards

Michael

:thumbsup:

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Well said Michael

There still seems to be significant interest in this topic, even if only a few chime in at this time. Hope it's all sorted before April next year!

Ian

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Gilly,

Very interesting hypothesis about the MG's from the Ottoman battleship. I would like to posit a few questions that you may be able to provide from the Gallipolian article:

  • What type of Maxim MG's did the Ottoman Navy have?
  • When were the Navy's MG's landed and deployed on the Peninsula?
  • How many MG's were landed for this purpose?
  • Who operated these MG's once they were landed? Ottoman Navy sailors or the Army?
  • Where were they deployed and located?
  • Why aren't they mentioned in the Turkish official account? I would have thought this would be a significant event for the TGS to highlight.

Cheers,

Hendo

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Mates,

Untill reading what this said I am still not sure the use of any Naval MGs were any where near the Anzac shores that morning.

Sure if correct these guns may have been sent to suport the ground troops around the forts along the shore line because British marines had landed during the naval battle in March but to move them into the 9th Div area of operations (other then the forts down at Helles) seams a bridge to far?

As stated if these MGs were there why didn't Turkish writers with the 27th Regt report these weapons systems to suport them?

They do mention other types like Pom pom and such, so why not Naval MGs (possibly with crews) that suported them?

Sorry I don't think this is a second gunman on the grassy knoll here, but I am open to conjecture here.

S.B

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Hi Hendo

Briefly, Murray's article indicates an earlier naval model maxim that likely were DWM MG07 models, being the commercial variant for the improved naval model MG01. He goes into calibres and what the rounds were made up of etc, something you will understand better than myself given your knowledge and experience etc.

The number of available MG'S is quoted as is a date just prior to the landings and not to be confused with the Goeben and Breslau MG deployment in May. Intelligence reports back this up and one mentions 9 Div getting guns from Barbarossa (report spelling) a POW intel report.

Your other questions are not answered, although there are plenty of Allied accts that indicate where the guns were, all of which have been previously explained away by Chris and Peter in their books. There are a few Turk and German accounts that back Murray's view, and which I feel are strong enough to warrant a published counter argument. It is after all everyone's right to have their view, and for The Gallipoli Assn to publish it speaks volumes about the content and where the current new version of the landings sits amongst those with keen interest. In other words not proven beyond all doubt.

I dont think Murray set out to provide every answer, but he certainly found enough to warrant the effort, and which I might say, appears to have not been found and or used by others. You will be best served by joining an excellent association and not only getting this article, but all the previous and future ones. The article needed to be fully put by way of word length, to which the powers that be at the GA clearly agreed. Something other publishers for want of a better word denied.

How the Turks wrote/recorded and stored their history remains their domain, one of which only a rare few people have had access to. We are all well aware of Harvey Broadbent and his current work and where it stands with regard to this argument. What has been viewed, translated and so on and how much of all the records have been accessed, viewed and translated I and others do not know. Maybe this article might push the study in another direction.

As I said to Steve, am sure you will end up with a copy to read and then you can decide and ask further. Some will no doubt shoot it down, but it is well put together, researched and presented. Where this all goes from here who knows, but from my personal standpoint it is greatly welcomed. Not interested in nastiness, invective and all that has passed previously on this terrific thread.

Cheers

Ian

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Giily,

These guns may have something to do with an earlier coment found in Erickson and others mentioned by me and Chris about these MG companies sent before the landings?

"In the old edition (1975, 2000) it is 25-27 March. it was the pre-Sanders defence period. So no great wonder to see the machine gun company at the coastline. But you know von Sanders enforced his concept at the end of March and machine gun formations were reassigned as part of strong reserves away from coastline. It is not an exact translation I should say some sort of a summary. The translator add some information not provided (like unit numbers) and neglected others (like the company at Kabatepe).

Now untill some evidence shows up its hard to say where either these guns or thoses from the Ships were sent?

But Turkish sourses make it clear they were not sent to the beaches of Anzac, but possibly to the forts or defences along the Coast or to suport the possibly landing a else where?

The Turks would not have deployed single guns but in sections of two or more guns (four guns being a MG Company), but that appears not to have happened on Anzac or at lest not so far a can be found?

Cheers

S.B

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Hi Hendo

Briefly, Murray's article indicates an earlier naval model maxim that likely were DWM MG07 models, being the commercial variant for the improved naval model MG01. He goes into calibres and what the rounds were made up of etc, something you will understand better than myself given your knowledge and experience etc.

..............

Cheers

Ian

Ian,

The first problem is that, as far as I am aware, the German factory DWM never produced a "MG07". The Austrians did produced a M.07/12 by Schwarzlosse in 8mm, as the Austrian rifle fired 8mm rounds and they did make 6.5mm versions for Greece, Sweden and Holland. They didn't make any 7.65mm versions for the Ottomans. http://guidearms.blogspot.com.au/2011/07/machine-guns-of-world-war-i.html

If the Ottoman Navy had 7.92mm MG01's (A distinct possibility, an even more cumbersome combination than the MG08, it would have created very real logistics and supply problems for the Army using 7.65mm ammunition, as the German Navy guns would have when deployed. In that case the obvious solution is to keep them tightly grouped to one area, as the German guns were when deployed. We should also remember that all these MG's were inherently unreliable, often having stoppages. The critical parts like barrels and "locks" (bolts) were not interchangeable and were not made with modern hardened steels. Key internal of the Vickers were for example brass. That is why doctrine of the time specified MMG's must be deployed at a minimum by company, where the spare company gun could be used to replace the damaged gun. Even when the war degenerated into trench warfare, MMG were still tightly grouped to cover each other, whilst an out of action gun was repaired or replaced.

I would also have expected the Royal Navy to be aware of the type of MG available to the Ottoman Navy, as they provided the naval advisors and staff trainers pre-war. Noting of course Michael's howitzer case, I must assume that Admiralty Intelligence made this information available to the Army, either to the DMI at the WO or to the MEF via the Mediterranean Fleet Comd at Malta, or even the on scene Admiral's staff prior to the landing. Yet this is not recorded in Army documents or the EEF Intelligence Branch (Cairo) Ottoman Army handbook. If anyone has access to the Admiralty Intelligence Branch Ottoman study, I would love to get a copy!

Even allowing for the use of modern flashless powder in this video, with the M07/12's huge flash spreader, I can't imagine a huge flame of a single MG, nor the flash being fleetingly identifiable, amongst all the haze that much to someone trying not to be shot, amongst the scrub and rosemary during the 25th of April on Gallipoli.

I am still happy to hear of any reasonable hypothesis, backed by evidence.

Cheers,

Hendo

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Hi Steve

If one is a member of the Gallipoli Association the journal arrives by post. Back issues are put up online in PDF format for download and are available to buy as a disc going back from beginning to recent editions, but not the last few as of yet. I presume available if one is a member. Perhaps Steve Chambers or Keith Edmonds can further enlighten availability to non members or get on the website and take a look.

The article in question takes up about 11 pages of the 65 total, so I will not be typing all that up here. Am sure you will find a way to get your eyes on it. It is well worthy of perusal whichever way one stands.

I bought the disc a year or so ago as it contains so much quality information, gleaned primarily from the membership.

A good article that offers balanced rebuttal of the current view, which I feel has been largely accepted by the majority without sufficient questioning. Only my opinion here but stated nonetheless.

Ian

The first edition of The Gallipolian was published at Christmas 1969 and was available to non-members for the sum of 2/6 (two shillings and sixpence) - 12.5p in todays money. Annual membership of the Association at that time (available to veterans only) was 5 shillings (25p).

The Gallipolian is now only available to Association members and is issued three times per annum. Typically 60+ pages per issue. For details of membership please see the Gallipoli Association's web site, or email membershipsecretary@gallipoli-association.org.

Anyone joining will be sent a copy of the issue with Murray Ewen's article in as part of their membership (subject to availability). 30+ available as of today. Behind the member's area of our web site are copies of Gallipolians 1 - 120, an excellent resource and worth the membership fee alone. Other editions are being added as time for indexing etc allows.

Some libraries in Australia are corporate members and will have a copy for public, on-site access.

Hope this helps.

Keith

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Hendo

I would again suggest you either join the Gallipoli Assn or wangle a copy of the article from a mate who is a member. Then you can read in full. Glad you are still happy.

Ian

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