TURKISH MACHINE GUNS AT GALLIPOLI

[green_acorn]

Gents,

Even though I may often be humour deficient, I hate seeing the forum descend into acrimonious debate and I apologise where I may have contributed to that.

Now putting aside that, I believe the steam pinnaces slipped the tows about 400 yards out. I would like to put the following hypothetical to the group: How long did it take for the four lifeboats approaching Fishermans Hut to cover the last two hundred metres to shore?

Assumption: An Ottoman MG firing at 500 rpm or Eighty soldiers firing at 5-600rpm, at four lifeboats from a range of 400metres decreasing (The Hut to shore and 200m out).

Assumption: As Australian rowers were killed or wounded there was loss of boat momentum and additional movement of wounded and bodies to allow the able bodied to take turn on the oars, indeed there may have been times when the boats floundered.

Does anyone know the approximate rate of movement a fully laden lifeboat would have been doing as it came to the beach? Could they give an idea how long it would take once the first soldier rowing was killed or wounded and the subsequent loss of momentum as more were killed or wounded?

I would have thought it would take about 3-4 minutes to travel 200 metres in ideal conditions, I just can't comprehend the horrendous carnage that would have gone on in those boats, whether from eighty rifleman or even one MG. But I can imagine it would have dramatically multplied the time to shore. Anywhere between 250-300 rds struck each boat in two to three minutes if they kept the pace, or if they slowed and foundered and received fire for up to say ten minutes of rapid fire 1250 - 1500 rounds per boat.

Cheers,

Hendo

[Auimfo]

Hendo,

No need for apologies. It's certainly not you who's keen to criticise those involved in the debate without adding anything of substance to it.

I'm certainly no expert in these matters and have been fascinated by the information produced in this thread and the knowledge of it's participants. It's just a shame that some feel the need to make unwarranted and rash criticisms based on strange correlations to bridges and lighthorsemen (where they fit into the debate, I am at a loss to explain).

It's best that constructive criticisms come from those with expertise in this particular topic who can substantiate it with fair arguments containing facts and evidence based on the actual discussion.

Cheers,

Tim L.

[grantmal]

I wrote this yesterday but before I could post it saw that Bill had expressed similar uneasiness about the acceptance of sources. Not wishing to inflame the ensuing debate (which seems to have some history of which I'm not aware) I decided not to post, a decision which, on reflection, seemed a cop-out. So here goes:

This is a very interesting and informative debate, but one that seems to have, unfortunately, become more partisan and less rigorous in its scrutiny of sources as it has progressed. Whatever the conclusions, the processes should be evenhanded, or those conclusions arrived at are open to ongoing scepticism and doubt. Can I just compare the scrutiny of a few different sources without casting aspersions on any posters or researchers? I made a point earlier that perhaps men actually saw what they thought was a machine gun firing, quoting Bean as a source. It was rightly pointed out that the original source Bean relied on for this information is, as yet, unknown. Doubt was cast on Bean's reliability, particularly in Vol.1, by pointing out some discrepancies between his and others' accounts. No problems there; Bean's account deserves fair scrutiny, but whether it can be said that Bean is unreliable generally because of some discrepancies is, to me, problematic. There may be aspects of this volume, particularly in the timings of movements of troops as outlined by Chris, where Bean can be faulted and questions asked as to his motivations, but what does he or the Anzacs gain from claiming machine guns fired on the Covering Force? Nowhere is he attempting to say the machine guns prevented troops from landing or scaling the heights or pushing inland; in fact the machine gun he mentions on page 257 stops firing and disappears before the first troops even get to the top of the first ridge. Didn't Bean and the Anzac commanders see the landing of the covering force as a complete success?

Regarding the machine gun near Fishermans Hut, Bean does say "there appeared to be", but, for the sake of accuracy, it should be noted he was not so equivocal on other occasions. Just one: on page 266 Bean describes the fire received by the Beagle: "The range was long, but one machine gun had it accurately. It's shots pattered on the high bows of the destroyer like hail on an iron roof...." Again, his source here is (at least to me) unknown, but Bean uses language that is unambiguous and authoritative. Much was made of the difficulty of identifying individual weapons firing during a fight, to question whether those claiming machine guns at the landing could have been mistaken. Fair enough too. It does seem, however, that other ways of experiencing machine gun fire have been ignored. Bean claims men saw the machine gun flashing -- as opposed to the flashes of the rifles -- and also describes the incoming fire (see the Beagle above). Bean's claim that men saw the machine gun flashing has so far provoked no comment, except to raise doubts about Bean's reliability.

Criticism of Haluk Oral's conclusions have been examined and dismissed rather perfunctorily. I have not read his book, so am basing my comments solely on the information Chris H posted in #327. Again, can I say that I am not casting aspersions on Prof Oral, his research or conclusions, or those who have read and agreed with his book, but am merely questioning whether the scrutiny of his sources is as rigorous and evenhanded as the scrutiny applied to those suggesting the presence of machine guns. I note that Prof Oral uses the less than authoritative "must have been" when concluding the number of Turkish troops facing the Anzacs at the Landing, and that the letter written by Ibradil Ibrahim was composed some 30 years after the events it describes. Ibrahim's reliability is not questioned, nor are the reasons or purposes for which he wrote his letter. If Bean can be questioned regarding his motivations, shouldn't we question an account that begins with, “.... the moment has arrived to remind everybody of what a handful of Turks can accomplish even in the face of crushing odds... they would willingly perform all over again those feats... to protect their motherland...”?

Did Ibrahim's "almost 90 soldiers" each fire up to 10 shots a minute that morning? Did they all fire on the same target? Did some of them retire before the others? Were some of them bad shots? Were some of them ordered to fire down the beach towards Ari Burnu, or to face the south, or the rear, were some of them detached and sent to other positions nearby to prevent the original position being outflanked and to keep open a line of retreat? These are just some of the questions that could be asked of proceedings at Fishermans Hut. [Prof Oral may have had access to Turkish documents that no Australian has seen, but, according to post #327, a 30 year old letter from Ibrahim and the widely available memoirs of Sefik Aker are used to refute the machine gun theory. Prof Oral may very well be able to account for all light and heavy machineguns in possession of the Turks for the morning of April 25th thanks to Turkish documents, but this is not evident in Chris H's post #327]

Until this thread started I believed that the Anzacs faced machine gun fire at the Landing, a belief based solely on the dozens of first-hand accounts from Anzacs that I have read, but now I have strong doubts. But whatever a modern reader's beliefs on the subject, a rigorous and evenhanded scrutiny of the sources can only benefit the debate and lend credibility to any conclusions. That said, thanks to all who are contributing their knowledge, expertise and questions to this thread.

Good on you,

Grant

[grantmal]

Hendo,

According to the 7th Battalion war diary it seems as though the boats were rowed the whole way rather than being towed part way by a steam pinnace: "At 5 a.m. about 120 men of B company 7th Battalion which was already drawn up on the TS Galeka were embarked in four of the ships boats and proceeded to row ashore."

Grant

[Bryn]

Since Bean's actual words seem to be such a bone of contention, let's examine what he said in a little more detail.

"There appeared to be two machine guns and many rifles at work."

Is anyone disputing that there were many rifles at work? Not that I've seen. And yet, Bean states there appeared to be be many rifles. According to the logic being employed here, this should mean there may have been no rifles. Bean is very exact in his language. He states here that there appeared to be both machine guns and rifles. Why, then, does it seem to be taken that his evidence is completely reliable in that there were rifles, while some claim this indicates there were probably no machine guns?

Bean does not say, "there appeared to be ten machine guns", or "there appeared to be be no machine guns." Not knowing the exact number does not automatically mean that there were none.

In the years since Bean's Volume 1 was published, not a single article by anyone who was there has ever appeared questioning the presence of a machine gun or guns on the northern flank. It's arrogance to assume that 'they' were all fools, or all engaged in some massive cover-up, while 'we' alone know better. Half the sources mentioned in this thread alone have not been sought out and examined. As an example, what does Bean's diary say about the MG that opposed the 7th Battalion; presumably the same one that Colonel Clarke, CO of the 12th Battalion, sent an experienced officer and his men to silence, that two 11th Battalion officers and their men attempted to locate, and that was reported by the 3rd Field Ambulance as well as by the others just mentioned? Next time I have access, I'll check. In the meantime, that and many other sources have not even been looked at. Though unseen, they're written-off as irrelevant because they're not likely to fit the 'new' theory.

Despite efforts to disparage the reliability of everybody who reported the presence of machine guns during the Landings, including Bean, I believe that, if Bean had believed there was no good case for the presence of machine guns, he would not have mentioned them. He does not even mention this instance in Gallipoli Mission, in which he tried to clear up some of the 'mysteries' of Anzac. It was clearly not regarded as a mystery. There were many years and thousands of accounts between Gallipoli and the publication of Volume 1, in which some hint that this gun may not in fact have existed could have reached Bean.

I reiterate that Bean is far from the only writer to claim the presence of a machine gun or guns on the northern Anzac flank, so to single his account out and imply that it 'does not count' because he did not know the exact number of machine guns is a smokescreen. Does this automatically mean that any account that states unequivocally that there was a machine gun must be correct?

"I was lying behind a bush when a machine gun spoke and was cutting the twigs of the bush over my head and next I got a graize through the right arm." (Diary of J. H. Turnbull, 8th Battalion, entry for 25th April). Proof positive. No 'appeared' or 'seemed' here. Driver Turnbull states there was a machine gun. Since the only criterion under which Bean's account is being trivialised is the inexact reference to the number of machine guns, then this account must be accurate, but leaves us with another problem.

And I have to agree with Bill and Grant. When I see as thorough a checking of others' sources and motivations as the allied ones have undergone, including the writer of the original report, and the questioning of abilities and experience to make simple judgements as to (for example) what weapons are firing, I'll believe this is an actual search for the truth, rather than what it has been - the attempted discrediting of all evidence that does not fit the Turkish view.

[green_acorn]

Hendo,

According to the 7th Battalion war diary it seems as though the boats were rowed the whole way rather than being towed part way by a steam pinnace: "At 5 a.m. about 120 men of B company 7th Battalion which was already drawn up on the TS Galeka were embarked in four of the ships boats and proceeded to row ashore."

Grant

Grant,

TS Galeka anchored 600 yards of Ari Burna (Anzacs, Peter Pedersen) and "With the shrapnel making it impossible to to lay in so close for long, the captain ordered a landing from the ship's boats". Comment: That would have been hard work, both getting down into the boats and rowing one of those lifeboats 600 yards to shore with a 90lb load on their backs and under shrapnel, then to have that devastating, machine gun/small arms/combined machine gun and small arms fire in the last 200 yards would have been horrendous. End Comment. Peter Pedersen also descibes a machine-gun at Fisherman's Hut, both in terms of the fire on 7th Battalion boats and in relation to the eariler landing by 11th Battalion, for example "the 11th was tormented by a machine-gun near Fisherman's Hut further north".

Logic still leads me towards there being no MG at Fisherman's Hut, but I will have to find and present the evidence and logic.

cheers,

Hendo

[Auimfo]

Bryn,

Bean's comment "There appeared to be two machine guns and many rifles at work." indicates an uncertainty. It can also be read in two parts, the first being "There appeared to be two machine guns" and the second part, "and many rifles at work"

Depending on where you place the emphasis decides on what the word 'appeared' relates to.

Using your interpretation, I don't believe the word 'appeared' is in reference to the weapons themselves but rather the uncertainty of numbers i.e. 'two' and 'many'.

Cheers,

Tim L.

[Crunchy]

Grant.

What an excellent post (# 353). I heartily agree with the thrust of your points.

One of the problems with posts on a forum such as this is that they address a specific issue often without background context. It is the nature of the thing. Thus a point a person makes can be taken out of the context of their broader opinion of the issue or can be misconstrued.

Just to clarify my view on Bean. While I have challenged his reliability, I also believe we owe him a great debt on his contribution to the historiography of Australia's participation the Great War. Bean is a wonderful source and he presents a detailed picture of events. I did not mean to infer he was generally unreliable, nothing could be further from the truth, and I ought to have made this clear in my post, as I have done elsewhere. The point I was seeking to make was that we have to be careful in quoting him to prove a point being made, as there are mistakes in his writing. This is not to criticize him, it simply happens in any account. On occasion, when one reads the primary source it does not always accord with Bean’s account referring to the same issue and that is quite understandable. I have a high regard for Bean and his work, it is a seminal source but that doesn’t mean he should be regarded as infallible in all that he writes. His quotes alone cannot be taken a the basis for proving a particular point and they ought to be balanced against other information that is available.

May I comment on Bean’s use of unambiguous and authoritative language? Such language does not necessarily make those passages any more accurate. He is unambiguous and authoritative when he writes of the men scrambling from the boats as they grounded in the Cove and says “Others, barely noticed in the rush, slipped into water too deep for them. The heavy kit which a man carried would sink him like a stone”. Yet in this thread

from post #39 on, it has been shown that the seafloor shelves gradually and at least 40 meters out one can still stand up mid chest deep in the water. Additionally, Loutit was quite surprised when his boat overturned and found that the air trapped in the their packs acted like life preservers and kept them afloat until they got back into the boat. So much so he told the same story on three separate occasions. With regard to the bullets hitting the destroyer’s bows, Bean is unambiguous and authoritative, however, he was not on a destroyer but on the transport that carried HQ 1st Division. We must assume, therefore, that he didn’t actually see this occurring as the destroyers, in the context quoted, were towing the 3rd Brigade’s second wave ashore during the initial landing. Nonetheless, I accept that bullets did hit the destroyers and other ships. There is clear evidence that men were wounded while standing on the decks. Whether they were actually machine gun bullets is an assumption and some sources indicate that in their particular instance it was from rifle fire, again an assumption. A good many reports from the receiving end of bullets on their origin are assumption unless the weapon itself was actually seen.

As for Haluk Oral’s book, I cannot make any comment. Other than the quote from Hendo, I have not read it. I was sent a scan of some pages but they are too faint to make out the words. It is a book that bears consideration and, as you rightly say, should not be dismissed perfunctorily.

There is a tendency by some to rely solely on documentary evidence and of these, some advocate that only primary sources are the true indicator of what occurred. Indeed, documentary evidence, and especially primary source material, are the main sources available to us and must be given first consideration. But are they completely accurate? I would argue they are not. Some documents such as manuals, instructions and orders written before an action can be regarded as true indicators of what was intended, but they don’t necessarily represent actual practice or include all of the discussion and considerations. At the other end of the scale are first hand accounts. Many of these have inaccuracies. One only has to read the contradictory first hand accounts in Red Cross casualty reports on how the same person was killed and where, to be wary of believing them out of hand. Nonetheless, most of them are written honestly and reflect what the author recalls of an action or believes what he saw of an incident but even they can include mistaken identification or misunderstanding. The odd first hand account has proven to be utterly false, for example Facey’s vivid account of he and his mates landing under heavy machine gun fire has been quoted in at least one history. Facey’s service record shows he arrived on the peninsula in May. As you rightly point out, all sources should be scrutinized and evaluated and that is a legitimate part of this discussion. They ought not to be misrepresented as seeking to discredit sources nor should they be quoted out of context.

Furthermore, are documentary evidence the only items to be considered or means of assessing what may have occurred? No they aren’t. There are other things: for example archeological evidence, as was done on the Little Bighorn battlefield, knowledge of military organization, capabilities and doctrine and the balance of probabilities. Indeed anything that may have a bearing on the issue. Thus in considering an issue I think it is important to look broader than just the documentary statements.

Your comment “But whatever a modern reader's beliefs on the subject, a rigorous and evenhanded scrutiny of the sources can only benefit the debate and lend credibility to any conclusions.” is undisputed. In response to it I will attempt to outline the considerations I am taking into account in a later post.

Thanks again for an excellent post that reminds all of not to be so brief when making a reply and explain the full context of what we stating.

Cheers

Chris

[Crunchy]

Logic still leads me towards there being no MG at Fisherman's Hut, but I will have to find and present the evidence and logic.

Hendo,

Not only is Peter Pedersen a highly respected military historian among his peers, he was also a professional soldier who commanded an infantry battalion. He has followed this thread closely over the past six months as a guest. This morning he asked me to make the following points on his behalf in relation to your quote from his book concerning the Fisherman's Hut. At the time he wrote The Anzacs the evidence he had then, nearly four years ago, were Australian, British and New Zealand accounts, including Jackson's report in the 7th Battalion diary. These pointed to machine guns being at the Fisherman's Hut. He had an open mind on the subject and while he was certain there were no machine guns at the Cove itself, there was nothing to indicate there were no guns at the Fisherman's Hut and the location was a sensible site for machine guns to be placed. Hence he wrote what he believed was the case based on the evidence available to him at that time. As a result of both the Turkish accounts now becoming available and the logic of some of the arguments presented in this thread he is now convinced there were no machine guns at the Fisherman's Hut. It takes a big man to ask for that to be made public.

Cheers

Chris

[Crunchy]

Until this thread started I believed that the Anzacs faced machine gun fire at the Landing, a belief based solely on the dozens of first-hand accounts from Anzacs that I have read, but now I have strong doubts. But whatever a modern reader's beliefs on the subject, a rigorous and evenhanded scrutiny of the sources can only benefit the debate and lend credibility to any conclusions. That said, thanks to all who are contributing their knowledge, expertise and questions to this thread.

Grant,

Having seen your comments I thought they deserved an explanation of my reasoning on this subject. It is not entirely based on documentary evidence but, as you will see, other considerations as well. A few points of clarification beforehand - I am referring to Maxim heavy machine guns, not nordenfelts, and only whether they were covering the landing beaches at Anzac; the Turks themselves say they deployed machine guns on Third Ridge around 8:30am, so that is not in contention – both sides agree they were there during the inland fighting later in the day. Nor do these considerations relate to the Helles landing. Furthermore, they are only an outline of the key considerations – space does not permit a fuller expansion of each point. My consideration has been along the following lines.

The case for Turkish machine guns being at Anzac Cove and the Fisherman’s Hut is based on the accounts of Australians who came ashore early that morning and like most others this was the basis of my accepting machine guns being there. There are enough of these accounts to suggest this was correct and I accepted them as an accurate reflection of what occurred. After visiting Anzac I had doubts about those said to have been on Plugge’s Plateau for reasons I gave in post #133 page 6. Nonetheless, the Fisherman’s Hut and Kaba Tepe were sensible locations to place maxim guns and I accepted the reports of them in those locations were correct.

Then we were presented with the Turkish view that there were no machine guns covering the beaches and it is supported by evidence that cannot be easily dismissed.

It got me wondering. On the one hand we have Australian accounts and the OH claiming machine guns opposed them on the beach, and Turkish views that there were none deployed to cover the initial landing beach. So what other evidence is there for us to unravel this conundrum?

Personal experience in action has demonstrated to me that while one side has a very good knowledge of their own situation on a battlefield, first hand accounts often have only a rudimentary knowledge of the enemy’s and can be far wide of the mark. Bill Woerlee has also demonstrated this regarding experienced light horsemen and machine guns at Magdhabe. (post #95, page 4) and there is the well known German misunderstanding of British firepower at Mons in 1914. I came to the conclusion many years ago the enemy have an infinitely greater knowledge of their own situation and numbers in a particular action than we do and vice versa and it is folly to argue a case simply on the basis of accounts from one side of the action. (Edit: Salesie has given a perfect analogy of this last point in another thread - arguing a case from one side only is akin to trying to explain the sinking of the Titanic without considering or mentioning the iceberg)

The first question was how many machine guns were there at Anzac? Reading Bean, there are two at the Fisherman’s Hut, either two or three at Anzac Cove, others at Gaba Tepe and one at the foot of Walker’s Ridge. That is between six and eight guns covering the Anzac sector. How does this stack up against the Turkish sources? The Turks say they had four machine guns per regiment held centrally in a machine gun company under the control of the regimental commander. Following the Balkan Wars, the Germans had reorganized and trained the Turkish Army and the Germans organized their regimental machine guns into machine gun companies under the same principles of regimental control, although they had six guns in their company. According to the Turkish OH only two of the 9th Division’s three regiments had their machine gun company, one of which was the 27th Regiment. Another source, Edward J Erickson, a respected American author, in Ordered to Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War, based on Ottoman sources, also says each Turkish regiment was authorized four machine guns and that at battalion and company level there were none. He also says there was a great shortage of machine guns and that some regiments were short of them. (post #75 page 3). Thus it becomes clear that each regiment had four machine guns controlled at regimental level, there was a shortage of machine guns in the Turkish Army, but the 27th Regiment had its full complement of four machine guns available on the 25th April. Bean recounts between six and eight being in the area. So there is a discrepancy in the numbers, but not of the fact that the 27th Regiment had machine guns.

Then we have the 27th Regiment’s commander, Sefik Aker’s, account of the action, the 27th being the regiment which first confronted the Anzac landing. He says he kept his machine gun company in reserve and didn’t deploy it until after the landing had commenced. He places them coming into action near Scrubby Knoll on Third Ridge at around 8 -8:30 am. As a professional soldier, when I read his account and considered the way in which he responded to the landing, it was evident to me that he knew his business well and I cannot fault his actions. Given the shortages of machine guns in the Turkish Army, maxim guns were not so lavish at that stage of the war to allow for extra guns to be placed all over the peninsula. Thus if he didn’t deploy his regimental machine guns until the morning of the 25th and there were maxim guns deployed on the beach, where did they come from? No-one has provided an answer to this question. Can we simply dismiss Aker’s account as wrong? I don’t think so.

I then considered the concept of the Turkish defence. The Turks employed what Bean calls a 'trip wire" defence or an early warning defensive posture. It is based on the knowledge that one cannot defend everywhere and to try and do so is to defend nothing. In employing a "trip wire" defence, the bulk of the defending force is not deployed forward on the coast with the aim of stopping the enemy from gaining a foothold - a "destroy them on the beaches" approach. It involves establishing a screen of defended localities on the coast and holding strong reserves inland at locations from which they can respond to the actual landing sites once they are detected. The defended localities vary in strength depending on the assessed likelihood of where the landings will take place. They provide the screen or “trip wire” to provide early warning of the actual landing sites and their role is to delay and disrupt the enemy if they can. They are not intended to stop the enemy on the beaches. This is the job of the reserves, which deploy forward to the threatened points once they have been detected as quickly as possible and counter attack to try and contain the enemy lodgment. This allows the rest of the Army to be redeployed against the enemy lodgment to stop any further advance and then, if possible, go onto the counter offensive to eject them. Thus a trip wire defence accepts that the enemy will make a lodgment and it accepts that the defended localities will be over run or forced to withdraw. It comprises light forces forward supported by strong centrally located reserves with the aim of first identifying where the incursion is and then deploying the strong reserves to contain that lodgment, somewhere inland from the beaches until the main force (in this case the rest of 5th Turkish Army) can be re-deployed against the incursion.

There is a consideration of where the Turks believed the landings would occur as this would provide the priority for the deployment of troops. Von Saunders believed the landings would be made against Bulair at the neck of the peninsula or against the Adriatic shore. Secondary sites were firstly Helles and then the Kapa Tepe sector and the deployment of his forces reflect these priorities. The Turks themselves admit they didn’t expect a landing to be made at Anzac Cove and it came as a surprise to them.

Against this concept and deployment is a consideration of why Aker didn’t deploy his machine guns forward. Given the maxim machine gun was a heavy and cumbersome weapon that could not easily be manhandled in a withdrawal and given they were a very valuable resource and in short numbers, it makes sense to me for Aker not to put them in positions where the enemy might not land or in positions where they could be easily lost if the enemy did land there. It makes more sense in a “trip wire” defence to keep them in the reserve so that they could be quickly deployed against the main incursion. To place heavy maxim guns forward in lightly held platoon localities that are not considered the most likely landing site is not a sensible thing to do.

Then looking at the maps. What is evident in comparing the maps marked up by the British as a result of their aerial reconnaissance and the Turkish OH maps and Aker's maps is the remarkable similarity and agreement on the positions of the Turkish defensive deployments. Furthermore, the numbers the Turks say were there is borne out by Bean’s account of the landing. So there is a high degree of agreement from both sides as to the locations and numbers of the Turkish forces at the time of the landing. This applies to the Plugges and Fisherman’s Hut locations as well.

I had originally thought a platoon size force in each of these locations was relatively small. But then we have Lt Ibrahim’s account that he had 90 soldiers with him. I must admit I initially thought this number was too large for a platoon, (post 166, page 7) therefore he must have been reinforced or he was wrong in his numbers. Hendo quotes the British Army handbook of the day, which indicates there were 83 men in a Turkish platoon. This pretty much supports Ibrahim’s claim. Thus his memory after 30 years is not too bad and it seems in the order of 80 - 90 Turks were at the Fisherman’s Hut. He does not mention any machine guns in his force, but is this, of itself, evidence that none were there? No it is not and I cannot accept his account alone as proof that there were no machine guns there. If there was one there, it would have had to come from either the machine company of the 27th regiment or another source. CO 27th Regiment says he kept his machine guns in reserve and we have no idea what the other source was, if there was one.

If there were 80 -90 riflemen at the Fisherman’s Hut, that is a substantial force but it doesn’t explain why the 7th Battalion suffered so heavily before diverting to Anzac Cove – or did they? I was surprised when I found out that only four boats of the 7th Battalion landed at the Fisherman’s Hut – I had thought there were considerably more. This was my first intimation that perhaps there may not have been a machine gun there. That is when I did the computation of the relative effects of machine gun and rifle fire based on three scenarios (post #274 page 11). These were very conservative figures – 70 riflemen only firing and only 10% of the bullets striking home. Even with these low figures the results of high casualties surprised me. The effect of machine gun fire on fully packed boats over 200 yards would have been devastating and machine gun fire has a higher strike rate on such a target than the 10% I used, which was based on a strike rate for rifle fire. I was also surprised that Jackson reported that 1/3 of his men got ashore unscathed. Having seen the effect of machine gun fire on a confined space personally, I became skeptical that 1/3 of the 120 men in those four boats would have survived unscathed. In fact it would have been a massacre had one or two machine guns been firing on them. 1/3 of the group getting ashore unscathed is more indicative of the effects of heavy rifle fire, not concentrated machine gun fire.

Yet Jackson himself said they came under machine gun fire. So were the Australian accounts falsified? No, I don’t believe they were. I believe the Australians who wrote they heard machine gun fire or saw flashes in the dark actually believed it or in some cases recorded what others had mentioned at the time and believed it. So why is the evidence contradictory?

On closer examination, all of the Australian accounts speak of indications of machine gun fire - noise, flashes in the dark and the pattering hail effect on a ship’s bows. None of them actually mention seeing a gun itself or capturing one. Thus could the Australians have mistaken what they heard, that is mistook heavy rifle fire for machine guns? Again, I went back to my own experience in action, which I explained at post#94 Page 4, and concluded that it was possible. Bill Woerlee also gave the account of the situation at Magdhabe, which supports that conclusion. Thus there was no doubt in my mind that the Australians believed they faced machine gun fire, but there is the possibility they mistook the noise.

There is growing agreement among some historians that there were no machine guns at Anzac Cove itself. Why is this? Firstly, as I explained at post #133 page 6, placing a machine gun on Plugge’s Plateau is not a sensible location for such a weapon. Anyone with an understanding of machine gun fire and its employment would not do it – and IMO Aker knew his business well.

The war diaries of the 9th, 10th and 11th Battalions mention “heavy” fire. Both the 10th and 11th war diaries, written and signed off by the their respective CO’s, mention heavy rifle and machine gun fire. The 9th mentions heavy rifle fire. There is no mention in any account of a machine gun itself actually being seen. They all record the the impressions of machine guns being fired. Nor is there any mention of a machine gun being captured in that area. Is this important? Given the prize captures they were at time and that even in 1918 captures of machine guns were recorded, why is there no record of one being captured at Anzac Cove? There are two possibilities, either the Turks got the gun or guns away or there weren’t any there. Let’s look at getting the gun away. Ari Burnu itself is a far better location for a machine gun than Plugge’s Plateau. Having carried a heavy machine gun and all of its accessories and having walked up Ari Burnu to Plugge's Plateau and across to Second Ridge, I believe it would have been nigh on impossible for the Turks to get one away from Ari Burnu before the Australians had reached the top, given the steepness of the hill, particularly as it nears the top of Plugge’s. It would have been very difficult to get one away from Plugge’s because of the steep terrain on the inland side and the very, very narrow neck joining it to Russell’ Top. They cannot be got away that quickly, especially in that type of terrain; they are cumbersome heavy weapons with a heavy tripod and cooling water can plus the boxed ammunition required for them. Nor is it sensible to place a maxim machine gun on Plugge’s Plateau simply to fire a few bursts and then withdraw. A competent commander, as Aker appears to be, simply wouldn’t do such a silly thing, especially if there was a chance they could be captured.

I am left with the conclusion that the Turks didn’t have a gun at the Cove. Thus it seems that Weir and Johnstone were mistaken in what they thought they heard. So if they were mistaken so close to the area where machine guns are said to have been located, it is entirely possible others were as well.

This not any attempt to discredit the Anzac accounts or Bean, it is simply trying to analyse the conundrum of two quite opposing accounts and see if there is a clue that might explain it. I think that is the clue.

That’s as far as I have got to date. In my mind there is no conclusive evidence either way about the machine guns at the Fisherman’s Hut. However, on the considerations above, I have changed my original opinion and I now doubt the Turks had them deployed at the Fisherman's Hut. For me this is not a matter of not accepting sources or being biased one way or the other - it is an issue of looking at both sides of the story together with other considerations and coming up with a considered view. I hope this post reflects that.

Please don't think this is an attempt to convince people that my conclusions are the correct ones. The members of the forum are quite capable of drawing their own conclusions on the subject. The only certainty is that there will be a great many differing views.

Well, I’m off to the UK for a couple of months so that is my contribution for a while.

Cheers

Chris

[Ozzie]

And what a contribution!

This will take some time to digest.

Congratulations on a thorough investigation of the sources and explanation of your workings.

Regards

Kim

[Auimfo]

Chris,

Excellent assessment that takes into consideration each side of the debate. It is certainly a very compelling evaluation that you have submitted.

Cheers,

Tim L.

[green_acorn]

Chris, a very well reasoned and detailed explanation. Thank you.

I quoted Dr Pedersen's book The ANZACS: Gallipoli to the Western Front partly to ensure I wasn't being discriminatory in my use of references. As I had mentioned in that post I will have to at some point in the future take the time to review the primary evidence of the day.

I was looking at the map on page 48 of his book and realised why I haven't been able to reconcile what I had until recently accepted as fact, the presence of machine guns opposing the initial landing, versus what logic had lead me to, that there were probably no machine guns. I unfortunately cut my post short given the tone of the thread and the trouble I was having at that late hour, in conveying my thoughts on why I interpret that it was unlikely that machine guns, Maxim, Nordenfeldt or otherwise, were at Fisherman's Hut or the Anzac Cove sector in general during the first few hours of the initial landings.

As I have mentioned in past posts, the first reason why I thought machine guns were probably not present related to the theory of machine gun fire, the desire for grazing enfilade fire, with beaten zones which are long, striking multiple targets with each bullet. The second was the number and value of the machine guns and the organisation of the machine gun company; it was structured to operate either as a company, or two sections of two machine guns each with importantly a Range Finder Corporal per section. For those that have Dr Pedersen’s book may I draw your attention to the picture on page 297 from the Second Battle of Gaza on 19 April 1917. This shows an Ottoman machine gun company in action with the Maxim machine guns deployed behind an embankment; gun, range finder and section commander, gun, company commander, gun, ranger finder and section commander and out of picture in the foreground probably the fourth gun.

Then there was the evidence presented to me by others and Australian sources (though I don't have the unit histories I'd love to get them!) But without looking at the Turkish sources regarding the battle it would be incomplete, as Crunchy has said, only the adversary knows what they actually did and no matter how good the intelligence may be, it isn’t infallible, nor is reporting of the participants at the time, so I presented information from two Turkish books. The evidence from the Turkish maps of the deployments by Sefik Aker’ and the 57th Regiment were compelling as it was the first time they had marked where their machine guns deployed.

By way of further explanation of my logic, the map on page 48 of Dr Pedersen’s book vividly highlights for me the military aspects of the terrain, in particular the nature of the spur lines which lead to the Key Terrain/Vital Ground (KT and VG)of Chunuk Bair, Hill Q and Hill 971. If we accept Von Saunders explanation of where he expected the landings and going against his subordinate Ottoman officers initial desire to defend their homeland on the beaches by concentrating his force and deploying outposts/trip wire in the likely areas, it is also likely that Von Saunders would want to protect the best approaches to the Vital Ground to give himself time to respond and deploy. Similarly it is unlikely Von Saunders would allow the dispersal of a key weapon system in limited supply, such as the Maxims, across all of the Outposts/Defended Localities as it would cut across his military pragmatism for their best use; concentration of assets and machine gun fire.

In addition to the logic I applied, I also thought of my practical, though limited infantry training and experience and subsequent training and experience in staff support to commanders and my only visit to the Peninsula in 2005. During my training and service, the strong tendency was for Standing Patrols(Outposts) to be placed on the most likely routes to the KT with the mission of defending that approach as ordered, whilst at the same time providing good surveillance coverage of an area. In seven years as an infantryman I cannot recall going on, or commanding a Standing Patrol which wasn’t on the approach to the KT. In practical terms those Standing Patrols tended to be on the end of spur lines, as those spurs provided the best (easiest) means of getting to the KT, whilst also providing the Standing Patrol with a withdrawal route that is hard to outflank quickly. An Ottoman platoon being on Plugge’s Plateau accords with that logic as it leads to Baby 700 then onto Chunuk Bair, whilst providing a position which, theoretically, could be defended for quite a while and with excellent observation of the coastline north towards Suvla Bay. Another Ottoman platoon being at Fishermans Hut also accords with that logic given the small spur that runs southeast to Baby 700 and the more important spur which runs east to Table Top and Chunuk Bair. The numerically weaker of the two platoons being on Plugge’s also makes sense to me in terms of the terrains defensive advantage, just as the need for a strong platoon on the tactically more tenuous and distant northern flank at Fisherman's Hut does. I would also say that the actions of those two platoons on the morning accords with what I would expect of Standing Patrols/Outposts.

Then there is the redeployment and resupply issue, Crunchy has described the problems for redeployment with a gun as heavy as a Maxim. I am reasonably reliably told that the standard rate of fire for a Maxim was 250+ rounds per minute (one box) sustained fire, emergency rate of fire was up to the cyclic rate of fire (2 boxes per minute), that is a lot of ammunition. The crew could not carry more than enough for a few minutes without the ammunition column constantly moving down to them along an insecure route from a distant encampment. Yes each of the 80 odd rifleman at Fisherman's Hut may have carried a box down with them, to give about another 40 minutes of ammunition, but that would be a lot of evidence that would have been found by our troops in 1915, or by later historians and archeologists.

Finally I always go through at least a mental process of source and information grading, the Admiralty System looking both at the source reliability and information validity. As I have said or implied a number of times, this is only my opinion, indeed at this remove and with all of the participants gone, we may never know the whole story; I am therefore wavering at a B2/C3 for no guns, it will never be A1.

cheers,

Hendo

PS: Chris have an enjoyable trip to the UK.

[Bryn]

I'll also take time to read the detailed posts by Crunchy and green acorn. One thing I will say, however, based on a quick skim through, is that there are plenty of documented accounts of machine guns being got away quickly. However if there was a machine gun in the vicinity of Fisherman's Hut this is not even an issue, as the Turks opposing the landing in that sector were never reached by the Australians, and there is no chance in that case that it would have been captured. Anyone familiar with that sector of Anzac will know there are numerous hills rising all the way back to Battleship Hill.

Anyone familiar with Fisherman's Hut knoll itself would probably appreciate the unlikelihood of there being able to fit 80 or 90 men into the trench there, and in fact I have already mentioned an account by a 7th Battalion soldier claiming only eight or nine men were manning this trench. The trench itself ran along the top of the knoll, and the knoll ran east-west, making it perpendicular to the shore for most of its length. Other defenders seem to have been on No. 1 Outpost, and it's highly likely others were further north than Fisherman's Hut and would have had to move south in order to join the battle.

The whole issue of machine gun positions not being identified by aerial observation is irrelevant. Nothing smaller than artillery pieces was identified; partly because of their size, but also because semi-permanent emplacements had to be dug for them. Machine guns were easily and often skilfully concealed, and there is no shortage of reports of machine guns firing that could not be located even by troops on the ground.

[green_acorn]

Anyone familiar with Fisherman's Hut knoll itself would probably appreciate the unlikelihood of there being able to fit 80 or 90 men into the trench there, and in fact I have already mentioned an account by a 7th Battalion soldier claiming only eight or nine men were manning this trench. The trench itself ran along the top of the knoll, and the knoll ran east-west, making it perpendicular to the shore for most of its length. Other defenders seem to have been on No. 1 Outpost, and it's highly likely others were further north than Fisherman's Hut and would have had to move south in order to join the battle.

Bryn,

Turkish books, such as Gallipoli 1915 describe the 1st Platoon "positioned in trenches near the Fisherman's Hut area, with its two lookout squads positioned to its north and south." The 7th Bn man possibly only saw the southern lookout squad. As Crunchy has written the positions should be more correctly called "Defended Localities" rather than my use of the term Standing Patrols, though the intent is the same.

The map below from page 46 of that book shows the 4th Coy, 2nd Bn, 27th Regt dispositions at the morning of the landing (and the northern platoon of 1st Coy), the Australian movement and Ottoman reaction (red arrows), the dashed line at Brighton Beach is the boundary with the 1st Coy. Interestingly the arrows show, what I interpret, as the 3rd Platoon's position vicinity Courtney's Post, then its move forward onto Maclagan Ridge and then its withdrawal to the westsouthwest. More interestingly it shows the 1st Platoon advancing or attacking twice from its position at Fisherman's Hut apparently in reaction to the Australian advance to the north and to the 7th Aust Inf Bn landing.

Map source Kadri Perk, Cannakale Savaslan Tarihi (Historical Section of the Askeri Mecmua, 1940, no:116) I would suggest the map is part of a series produced for the Turkish Offical History given the time sequence with my previous map post and the very similar folds topographical representation and paper ageing.

The map shows the mountain guns, other artillery and infantry entrenchments at Gaba Tepe smaller than platoon and one small squad post (observation post) a third of the way north towards Anzac Cove, but unfortunately no machine guns (I have had to snip the image to keep clarity and below the 100Kb and can post a lower res image if necessary.) Given the level of detail in sub unit marking it still seems to me quite illogical not to have marked any machine guns that may have been present.

And no, just because it may have been from the Turkish Official History does not make it from a Completely Reliable Source (A) and Confirmed by Other Reporting (1) = A1. But it is highly plausible and probably true (B2ish), noting of course those who may have known far more died during that war and the national, political, social, security, personal biases and other needs that all histories and in particular official and unit histories are written under.

cheers,

Hendo

[Crunchy]

Anyone familiar with Fisherman's Hut knoll itself would probably appreciate the unlikelihood of there being able to fit 80 or 90 men into the trench there, and in fact I have already mentioned an account by a 7th Battalion soldier claiming only eight or nine men were manning this trench.

Ah yes, the 7th Battalion man, presumably laying out on the beach under heavy fire. He obviously did see only eight or nine Turks and recorded this faithfully. Is this, however, a suggestion that only eight or nine Turks, or perhaps a couple more, were actually at the Fisherman's Hut? If so, are we saying the numbers of Turks opposing Jackson's boats can be arrived at from the account of one Australian under fire, and that Ibrahim's statement of the size of the force he commanded can be dismissed as incorrect and hugely over-inflated? Not to mention the British handbook of the day stated a Turkish platoon was 83 men. Anyone with even a modicum of commonsense would have difficulty accepting that logic. If not, then why bring it up?

As for the size of the location, Jackson's report in the 7th Battalion Diary says he occupied the Turkish trenches on the Fisherman's Hut knoll with his 4O survivors. Bean's maps indicate the Fisherman's Hut and No 1 Outpost were defended localities of about equal size. So were they posts of about ten men each or posts of roughly 35 to 40 men each? Were there other trenches in the immediate area?

It seems that in the case of any contradictory information, we are being asked to believe the Turkish sources are wrong. How convenient and comforting for us. Do we really believe the Turks have falsified all of those issues that don't match our accounts and faithfully recorded all those that do? Are we saying the Turkish accounts and records are quite incorrect on the matters where they disagree with Australian accounts, and the Australian accounts are absolutely correct in every respect and, therefore, are the true indicators of the Turkish strength and weapons? That is what is being inferred. One would have to be entirely biased towards the Australian accounts to believe that - and probably accept that pigs can fly. Such an attitude shows absolutely no respect for the Turks.

I would have thought there are inaccuracies on both sides, however well intentioned each side was in reporting what they believed to be the truth. I am sure most of us are seeking to see where those inaccuracies might be and come to a considered opinion.

Cheers

Chris

[Bryn]

Crunchy,

The supposition that 80 or 90 Turks would not fit comfortably into a trench on Fisherman's Hut knoll is based on my personal experience of being there. Numerous times. You introduce your own personal experiences and ask us to consider them as evidence against the allied accounts of the identification of machine guns. I'm just doing the same. However I concede that people's personal experiences are what would be called, in a real critical analysis, 'anecdotal evidence'. Because it happened to one person, does not mean it must necessarily have happened to another.

If there were Turks on No. 1 Outpost, they can not all have been on Fisherman's Hut knoll. Since No. 1 Outpost is much bigger in area and higher than Fisherman's Hut, it does not seem too much of a stretch to assume that maybe there were more on that location. The same soldier also noted the presence of a machine gun. Odd that Bean seems fine as a source when he apparently backs the Turkish view, but is a lot more unreliable when he doesn't. Although of course even 35 - 45 soldiers on Fisherman's Hut does not back the Turkish account.

I include statements such as these to show that, even if they are inaccurate (and that has not been proved by anyone), they contradict the Turkish sources, which seem to just being accepted by a lot of contributors as gospel, rather than being subject to any form of examination. I'll post a couple of examples later to question this assumption of infallibility. The Turkish accounts have undergone NO critical analysis.

This whole thread is based on the premise that the Turkish sources must be right, so it's just a question of explaining away all evidence to the contrary.

[Crunchy]

This whole thread is based on the premise that the Turkish sources must be right, so it's just a question of explaining away all evidence to the contrary.

Bryn,

I'm afraid that is a misconception on your part. If you read the posts carefully you see that we have not said the Turkish sources must be right. My last post actually concluded with "I would have thought there are inaccuracies on both sides, however well intentioned each side was in reporting what they believed to be the truth. I am sure most of us are seeking to see where those inaccuracies might be and come to a considered opinion." As a fifth generation Australian with a relation who actually landed on the morning of the 25th, I don't question the Australian accounts lightly. In fact I would much prefer to believe them.

Even you have agreed in this thread some of the Australian accounts are myth:

The myth of landing under heavy fire in Anzac Cove itself I'd go along with, as it was largely a complete surprise, and at least until the crests of the first ridges were reached and the rising sun was directly behind the defenders, resistance was minimal. But on the northern flank resistance was a lot stiffer.

If the accounts of landing under heavy fire at Anzac Cove, which all three war diaries (9th, 10th &11th Bns) and other first hand accounts describe it as such, is myth, then why cannot other accounts be mistaken?

We have tried to evaluate the Turkish accounts against other types of sources that either refute or corroborate them. The whole issue of this thread is about evaluating all of the evidence, both Australian and Turkish, which I have attempted to do in my post #360 if you care to read it carefully. As I have said previously, I have no doubt the Australian accounts reflect what they believed they heard and Bean writes what was told to him.

Furthermore, I haven't refuted your assessment of the size of the Fisherman's Hut knoll. I believe you. Nor have we said all of the Turks were on the Fisherman's Hut knoll. I fully accept your view that all of them could not have been there. That is not in dispute. What I don't accept, however, is the suggestion that only eight or nine Turks were at the Fisherman's Hut simply based on the reports of one Australian, when Jackson says the position was large enough to hold his 40 survivors. One account is based on what a man saw when under fire and he may not have seen everything, the other account speaks of actually occupying the knoll with a known number of people. You seem to be arguing there were considerably less than a platoon of Turks (roughly 80 men) opposing Jackson's landing and using the 7th Battalion's man account to sustain the argument.

We have been talking about the area Ibrahim's platoon occupied (the Fisherman's Hut/No 1 Outpost area), which for brevity's sake we have called the Fisherman's Hut. If that has confused you I am sorry. That more Turks were at No 1 Outpost than at the Fisherman's Hut is probably right, but both locations could fire on Jackson's boats so we are splitting hairs in arguing what was where. I also accept that not all of the Turks could have fired on the boats as they came ashore and have reflected that in my computation. Some were firing on Srickland's and Rafferty's party and others may not had a clear field of fire. If we are going to discuss the matter seriously we ought not to simply regurgitate what participants wrote as the only basis for discussion but evaluate their claims against other information available to us.

May I ask you seven questions?

1.Do you believe Aker's account that he kept his machine guns in reserve is wrong?

2. If so why?

3. If you accept Aker's account is correct, who provided the machine guns in the area of the Fisherman's Hut/ No 1 Outpost?

4. What other evidence do you have, other than what people say they heard, that provides conclusive evidence that machine guns were there? If you have conclusive evidence I would be delighted to see it as, like you, I believed machine guns were there because the Australian accounts said they were there.

5. It would appear from the Turkish accounts that a platoon of roughly 80 men were located in a defended locality in the area of the Fisherman's Hut/No 1 Outpost. Do you believe this is wrong?

6. If the Turkish accounts of their strength are wrong? How many Turks do you believe were at the Fisherman's Hut/ No 1 Outpost area and on what basis do you make your calculations?

7. If the accounts of landing under heavy fire at Anzac Cove, which you have previously agreed, is myth, is it possible that other accounts could be mistaken?

It would be useful, for me at least, if you could clarify your views on these issues.

I depart for O/S tomorrow morning so I will may not be able to reply for some time.

Cheers

Chris

[Bryn]

Chris,

If you read the posts carefully you'll notice that on 24th June - more than two months ago - I asked you what I would think is a fairly simple question:

"can I ask what your definition of someone experienced enough to tell the sound of a machine gun is?"

When you reply to that one I'll look at answering your seven.

Meanwhile, this is a view of Fisherman's Hut knoll from No. 1 Outpost. People with good eyes will just make out the hut itself.

[Crunchy]

Bryn,

I thought I had answered your question already, although not as a definition - because there is no definition. Nonetheless, I will answer it again. Any person who has heard a machine gun firing on its own or amongst rifle fire up to a certain volume is experienced enough to tell the difference of machine gun fire. I have already said, twice, LTCOL Clarke would have known the difference in certain situations - as you well know. But that is not point made - hearing them in a battle situation is not a matter of experience, it depends on the number of weapons and amount of fire being generated at the time - or it certainly was for me. It didn't become easier each successive time we were on the two way range. However, you have never accepted that and that's fine. If you believe one can tell the difference in any situation, that's fine.

If you don't want to answer the seven questions, that's fine too.

Thank you for your photo of the knoll - much appreciated. It is small and I agree only a small portion of Ibrahim's platoon would have been on the actual knoll. The photo certainly shows the dominating position of the No 1 Out Post feature. Nonetheless, if we are going to argue every inch of ground it is pretty futile because none of us know exactly where Ibrahim placed all of his troops within the general area of the Fisherman's Hut/ No 1 Out Post. Edit: I would suspect it would include not only the Fisherman's Hut knoll, but the ridge running behind it and No 1 Outpost and perhaps ground around it. Having seen the ground yourself how many troops could occupy the general defensible area?

Cheers

Chris

[Ozzie]

On reading every post thoroughly, and weighing up the individual posts, one comes to a conclusion.

We have had the privilege of having those who have been in the firing line, give their accounts. We have had the privilege of some who have studied the history for many years. Also we have had the privilege of the introduction of documents and accounts of both sides of the line. It has been a fascinating thread, one which furthers discovery of truth.

And then there are some who are good at spouting that others should not believe the myths and stories, but should study ALL the available evidence, and draw intelligent conclusions from ALL the evidence. Shame that they don't heed their own words.

Congrats to all who have moved this wonderful thread foreward.

Best Regards

Kim AKA Pollyanna.

[grantmal]

Chris,

Thanks very much for your detailed replies. I appreciate the knowledge of infantry tactics and the personal experience you bring to a discussion such as this -- experience and knowledge of which I'm completely lacking. My thoughts on this subject are based solely on documentary evidence, as you are no doubt aware, and are only vaguely informed by any higher tactical or operational considerations. Again, I was not denying the power and validity of the argument against machine guns being present, but merely pointing out that the scrutiny of the various documentary sources was, to me, becoming unbalanced. Thanks for the time you put into answering my specific concerns.

I can't argue against your analysis of the tactical situation, and of the likely, logical steps that a commander in Sefik Aker's position would have followed. Hendo's clear and reasonable analysis, again informed by his knowledge and experience, helps refine the argument further. Thanks to you both.

I've got more to say in response but as it is taking so long to get my thoughts together I thought I'd post this in the meantime. Thanks again,

Grant

[Crunchy]

I would like to clarify my last post to Bryn. As Kim so delicately reminded me. I have not expressed my point as cleary as I should have. I apologise for that.

I do NOT mean to infer Bryn's photo of the Fisherman's Hut is not valid evidence. Quite the contrary, it is very sound evidence that a platoon of 80 -90 men could not fit on the knoll itself and I accept without any qualification, and did so prior to the photo being presented and thought I had made that clear in the post above. I agreed only a small portion of his force could have been on the knoll itself. Looking at the photo I would think it would be roughly 10 -15 men, possibly a few more noting that in those days they were not as dispersed when occupying trenches as we do these days. For the sake of argument lets say there were 10 on the knoll. My point is that we ought not to consider that only the knoll itself was the defensive position occupied by Ibrahim's platoon, we should consider the whole of the Fisherman's Hut/No 1 Outpost area as the the position he occupied - to try to argue where each of his sections may have been is futile as we don't know the layout of his defended locaility. What we should be looking at isthe overall area and what size force that could hold with men manning trenches, and we know some of them were on No 1 Outpost..

What impressed with the photo is the dominent position No 1 Outpost has over the beach and surrounding area. It is much higher than I thought it was and I thank Bryn for sharing it with us. Bryn, if you have any more photos of that area it would be good to see them and try and guage the extent of the high ground and its surrounding. I would also be interested in finding out the area No 1 Outpost occuppies and the what the ground like behind the knoll at the Fisherman's Hut. If the whole area could not hold 80 - 90 men in trenches covering not only the area to the sea but also to the flanks then I would agree that Ibrahim's platoon was understrength.

Again, I am NOT dismissing Bryn's photo, it is a valuable piece of evidence

Regards

Chris

[Crunchy]

I was ... merely pointing out that the scrutiny of the various documentary sources was, to me, becoming unbalanced.

Grant,

And rightly so.

I am sorry my post to you came across as such. A topic like this requires a considerable post to cover all aspects that ought to be considered and a post doing so would be just too long. Better to discuss it face to face. Sometimes, one's experience gets one into trouble as you forget people may not grasp the point you are making, although it seems obvious to you.

Regards

Chris

[green_acorn]

Bryn,

Turkish books, such as Gallipoli 1915 describe the 1st Platoon "positioned in trenches near the Fisherman's Hut area, with its two lookout squads positioned to its north and south." The 7th Bn man possibly only saw the southern lookout squad. As Crunchy has written the positions should be more correctly called "Defended Localities" rather than my use of the term Standing Patrols, though the intent is the same.

......................................

cheers,

Hendo

Bryn,

Thank you for posting that picture of Fisherman's Hut, I understand your point better now.

Gents,

Can I draw you to my recent post saying that the 1st Platoon occupied positions near the hut with lookout squads to the north and south. Can I suggest that the squad nearest Fisherman's Hut was the northern lookout squad, with the majority on No1 Outpost and another squad to the south.

To give everyone an idea of the issues relating to the Maxim MG '08, the complete gun on its "sled" (schlitten '08) weighed 139lbs, a little over 63Kgs, without ammunition, the MG '01 had a heavier sled (schlitten '01). After every 1,000 rounds the gunner had to stop firing so the gun could be topped up with another pint or more of fresh water. The Maxim MG '08 weighed 64lbs (29Kgs) with its water jacket filled and the sled (schlitten '08) another 75lbs (34Kgs). Not having played with one, I don't know how long or complicated it is to get the gun of the sled, but looking at photographs from later in the war the Germans didn't break it down but wore slings and carried the gun like a stretcher, not something I think you can run or fire and move uphill on the heavily broken ground of Gallipoli during a withdrawal.

By comparison with more recent machine guns some may know, the M60 weighed: 10.5 kg (23.1 lb) , the MAG58/L7: 11.79 kg (25.99 lb) and the Minimi 6.85 kg (15.1 lb).

Cheers,

Chris